IR 05000263/2007005
| ML080230057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/2008 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2 |
| To: | O'Connor T Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2010-0209 IR-07-005 | |
| Download: ML080230057 (44) | |
Text
ary 18, 2008
SUBJECT:
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2007005
Dear Mr. OConnor:
On December 31, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on January 3, 2008, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based upon the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000263/2007005 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: See next page
Letter to
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000263/2007005; 10/01/2007 - 12/31/2007; Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Routine
Integrated Report.
This report covered a three-month period of baseline resident inspection and announced baseline inspections of radiation protection, licensed operator requalification training, emergency preparedness, and heat sink performance. The inspections were conducted by Region III inspectors and the resident inspectors. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,
Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations of significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Monticello operated at full power for the majority of this assessment period except for brief down-power maneuvers to accomplish rod pattern adjustments and to conduct planned surveillance testing activities with the following exceptions:
- Power reduction on November 9th to approximately 70 percent power to perform control rod suppression testing. Power ascension to full power operation was completed on November 15th.
- Power reduction on December 14th to approximately 65 percent power to perform control rod scram testing and execute a control rod sequence exchange. Power ascension to full power operation was completed on December 16th.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Winter Seasonal Readiness Preparations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees winter checklist procedure and performed a plant walkdown, specifically focusing on safety significant equipment that had the potential to be negatively impacted by extreme cold weather and the licensees efforts to protect that equipment. The inspectors reviewed plant specific design features for the systems and implementation of the procedures for responding to or mitigating the effects of cold weather.
The inspectors evaluated readiness of seasonal susceptibilities for a total of one sample:
- site cold weather preparations This inspection constitutes one seasonal adverse weather sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems:
- Division I control room ventilation system with 14 emergency service water pump out-of-service for maintenance;
- 14 residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) system with 12 RHRSW out-of-service for breaker maintenance; and
- reactor core isolation cooling system with high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)out-of-service for planned maintenance.
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specification (TS) requirements, Administrative TS, outstanding work orders (WOs),condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP) with the appropriate significance characterization.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
These activities constituted three partial system walkdown samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas:
- Fire Zone 32-B, emergency filtration train (EFT) building second floor (Division II);
- Fire Zone 1-E, HPCI room - reactor building 896;
- Fire Zone 33, EFT building third floor (Division II);
- Fire Zone 7-A, 125V Division I battery room;
- Fire Zone 12-B, hydrogen seal area;
- Fire Zone 31B, EFT building first floor (Division II); and
- Fire Zone 9, control room.
The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition, and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events, with additional considerations given to fire areas which had the potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a plant transient or impact the plants ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the Attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees CAP.
These activities constituted seven quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05AQ-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Fire Protection Drill Observations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed both announced and unannounced fire brigade activations for the conduct of fire brigade drills. The observations were used to determine the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The inspectors verified that the licensee staff identified deficiencies; openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and took appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated were:
- (1) proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus;
- (2) proper use and layout of fire hoses;
- (3) employment of appropriate fire fighting techniques;
- (4) sufficient firefighting equipment brought to the scene;
- (5) effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control;
- (6) search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas;
- (7) smoke removal operations;
- (8) utilization of pre-planned strategies;
- (9) adherence to the pre -planned drill scenario; and
- (10) drill objectives.
- fire brigade response to an unannounced fire drill in the vicinity of the 1AR transformer; and
- fire brigade response to an announced fire drill in the vicinity of the 11 emergency diesel generator (EDG) room.
These activities constituted two annual fire protection inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
.1 Biennial Review of Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed documents associated with maintenance, performance tests, and inspection of the 13 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Motor Cooler and the 14 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Pump Motor Cooler. These coolers were chosen based on their risk significance in the licensees probabilistic safety analysis, their important safety-related mitigating system support functions and their relatively low margin. The inspectors reviewed operability determinations, completed surveillances, vendor manual information, associated calculations, performance test results and cooler inspection results. The inspectors also reviewed documentation to confirm that methods used to maintain and monitor the operational effectiveness of the heat exchangers were consistent with expected degradation and that the established acceptance criteria were consistent with design accident requirements and accepted industry standards. The inspectors walked down both the motor coolers and associated piping to ensure proper installation and configuration.
Two attributes of the ultimate heat sink were verified during the inspection. The inspectors verified that the functionality during adverse weather condition (e.g., icing and freezing temperatures). Additionally, the inspectors verified the adequate controls were in place for biotic fouling. The inspectors also performed walkdowns of accessible portions of the ultimate heat sink supply and return piping to look for possible settlement or movement and piping conditions that would indicate loss of structural integrity.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed condition reports concerning cooler or heat sink performance issues to verify that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective actions to the identified issues. The documents that were reviewed are included at the end of the report.
These inspection activities constituted two samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review
a. Inspection Scope
On November 6, 2007, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plants simulator during the conduct of a site emergency plan drill to verify that operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems, and training was being conducted in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
- licensed operator performance;
- crews clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
- correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan actions and notifications.
The crews performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action expectations and successful critical task completion requirements.
This inspection constitutes one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Facility Operating History
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the plants operating history from September 2005 through September 2007 to identify operating experience that was expected to be addressed by the Licensed Operator Requalification Training (LORT) program. The inspectors assessed whether the identified operating experience had been addressed by the facility licensee in accordance with the stations approved Systems Approach to Training (SAT)program to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59(c), Requalification Program Requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Licensee Requalification Examinations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a biennial inspection of the licensees LORT test/examination program for compliance with the stations SAT program, which would satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59(c)(4), Evaluation. The reviewed operating examination material consisted of six operating tests, each containing two dynamic simulator scenarios and five to ten job performance measures. The six written examinations reviewed each contained approximately 30 questions. The inspectors reviewed the annual requalification operating test and biennial written examination material to evaluate general quality, construction, and difficulty level. The inspectors assessed the level of examination material duplication from week-to-week during the current year operating test. The examiners assessed the amount of written examination material duplication from week-to-week for the written examination administered in 2005. The inspectors reviewed the methodology for developing the examinations, including the LORT program 2-year sample plan, probabilistic risk assessment insights, previously identified operator performance deficiencies, and plant modifications.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Licensee Administration of Requalification Examinations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the administration of a requalification operating test to assess the licensees effectiveness in conducting the test to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 55.59(c)(4), Evaluation. The inspectors evaluated the performance of one crew in parallel with the facility evaluators during two dynamic simulator scenarios. The inspectors also evaluated various licensed crew members concurrently with facility evaluators during the administration of several job performance measures. The inspectors assessed the facility evaluators ability to determine adequate crew and individual performance using objective, measurable standards. The inspectors observed the training staff personnel administer the operating test, including conducting pre-examination briefings, evaluations of operator performance, and individual and crew evaluations upon completion of the operating test. The inspectors evaluated the ability of the simulator to support the examinations. A specific evaluation of simulator performance was conducted and documented under Section 1R11.8, Conformance with Simulator Requirements Specified in 10 CFR 55.46, of this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Examination Security
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and reviewed the licensees overall licensed operator requalification examination security program related to examination physical security (e.g., access restrictions and simulator considerations) and integrity (e.g., predictability and bias) to verify compliance with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests.
The inspectors also reviewed the facility licensees examination security procedure, any corrective actions related to past or present examination security problems at the facility, and the implementation of security and integrity measures (e.g., security agreements, sampling criteria, bank use, and test item repetition) throughout the examination process.
b. Findings
The facility identified that an instructor was signed on to the 2007 Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR) Annual Operating Test/Biennial Written Examination Master Security Agreement provided instruction to an Initial License Training class that an individual was attending for the purpose of performing a management observation.
The individual was scheduled to take the LOR Annual Operating Test/Biennial Written Examination. The facilitys Fleet Procedure, NRC Exam Security Requirements, FP T SAT-71, Revision 1, Section 5.2.10.1, lists activities that are not allowed for individuals who have signed the applicable Master Security Agreement for an exam.
One of the activities is providing instruction where examinees are in attendance. The facility performed interviews and identified that there was no interaction between the instructor and observer during the class. No information was presented while the management observer was present that was outside of the prepared lesson plan. The lesson plan was readily available to all site personnel. The information presented was not part of the LOR operating test or written examination. The training department documented this lapse of examination security in Document CAP 01114446.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees investigation and assessed the overall incident for possible violation of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests. The inspectors determined that no actual examination compromise had occurred. These issues were considered minor in nature and were not subject to enforcement action in accordance with NRC enforcement policy.
.6 Licensee Training Feedback System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the methods and effectiveness of the licensees processes for revising and maintaining its LORT Program up-to-date, including the use of feedback from plant events and industry experience information. The inspectors reviewed the licensees quality assurance oversight activities, including licensee training department self-assessment reports. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to assess the effectiveness of its LORT program and their ability to implement appropriate corrective actions. This evaluation was performed to verify compliance with 10 CFR 55.59(c),
Requalification Program Requirements, and the licensees SAT program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.7 Licensee Remedial Training Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the adequacy and effectiveness of the remedial training conducted since the previous biennial requalification examinations and the training from the current examination cycle to ensure that they addressed weaknesses in licensed operator or crew performance identified during training and plant operations. The inspectors reviewed remedial training procedures and individual remedial training plans.
This evaluation was performed in accordance with 10 CFR 55.59(c), Requalification Program Requirements, and with respect to the licensees SAT program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Conformance With Operator License Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the facility and individual operator licensees' conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55. The inspectors reviewed the facility licensee's program for maintaining active operator licenses and assessment of compliance with 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f). The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedural guidance and process for tracking on-shift hours for licensed operators, and which control room positions were granted watch-standing credit for maintaining active operator licenses.
The inspectors reviewed the facility licensee's LORT program to assess compliance with the requalification program requirements as described by 10 CFR 55.59(c). In addition, medical records for six licensed operators were reviewed for compliance with 10 CFR 55.53(i).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.9 Conformance with Simulator Requirements Specified in 10 CFR 55.46
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees simulation facility (simulator) for use in operator licensing examinations and for satisfying experience requirements as prescribed in 10 CFR 55.46, Simulation Facilities. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of simulator performance test records (i.e., transient tests, malfunction tests, steady state tests, and core performance tests), simulator discrepancies, and the process for ensuring continued assurance of simulator fidelity in accordance with 10 CFR 55.46. The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the discrepancy process to ensure that simulator fidelity was maintained. Open simulator discrepancies were reviewed for importance relative to the impact on 10 CFR 55.45 and 55.59 operator actions as well as on nuclear and thermal hydraulic operating characteristics. The inspectors conducted interviews with members of the licensees simulator staff about the configuration control process and completed the Inspection Procedure 71111.11, Appendix C, checklist to evaluate whether or not the licensees plant-referenced simulator was operating adequately as required by 10 CFR 55.46(c) and (d).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.10 Annual Operating Test Results and Biennial Written Examination Results
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the pass/fail results of the 2007 individual biennial written examinations, and the annual operating tests (required to be given annually per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee during calendar year 2007. The overall written examination and operating test results were compared with the significance determination process in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix I, Operator Re-Qualification Human Performance Significance Determination Process.
This review represented one biennial licensed operator requalification inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
.1 Routine Quarterly Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk significant systems:
- feedwater heating and steam extraction system components.
The inspectors reviewed events where ineffective equipment maintenance resulted in control system malfunctions and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance issues in terms of the following:
- implementing appropriate work practices;
- identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
- characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
- charging unavailability for performance;
- trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
- ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
- verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components/functions classified as (a)(2) or appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).
The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
This inspection constitutes one quarterly maintenance effectiveness sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:
- emergent issue evaluation during fuel pool work preparation activities;
- troubleshooting of B feedwater regulator valve signal noise and M/A controller;
- failure of A residual heat removal (RHR) room cooler to start when operated from the control room; and
- control of high energy line break (HELB) boundaries during emergent heating coil replacement in the ventilation system that services safety-related 4 kV switchgear rooms.
These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
These activities constituted four samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following issue:
The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to the licensees evaluations, to determine whether the components or systems were operable.
Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following post maintenance activities for review to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:
- 11 emergency service water pump pre-service pump test following pump replacement;
- replacement of the B feedwater regulating valve manual/auto controller;
- 12 core spray system testing following maintenance and modification of test return line motor operated valve;
- replacement of B feedwater regulator valve controller; and
These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance were properly removed after test completion); and test documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against TS, the UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with post maintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
This inspection constitutes five samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural and TS requirements:
- reactor building to torus vacuum breaker operability check (routine);
- containment sump flow measurement instrumentation (reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage);
- 13 emergency service water comprehensive pump and valve test (inservice testing (IST)); and
- primary containment isolation valve exercise (routine).
The inspectors observed in plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated records to determine whether: preconditioning occurred; effects of the testing were adequately addressed by control room personnel or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing; acceptance criteria were clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and were consistent with the system design basis; plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented; as left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency were in accordance with the TS, the USAR, procedures, and applicable commitments; measuring and test equipment calibration was current; test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied; test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability; tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used; test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid; test equipment was removed after testing; where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were adequately assessed for operability or the system or component was declared inoperable; equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the performance of its safety functions; and all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and dispositioned in the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
This inspection constitutes four surveillance testing samples: two routine, one IST and one RCS leakage sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modification:
- Engineering Change (EC) 11472; Install Temporary Heating Boiler.
The inspectors compared the temporary configuration changes and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening and evaluation information against the design basis, the UFSAR, and the TS, as applicable, to verify that the modification did not affect the operability or availability of the affected system(s). The inspectors, as applicable, performed field verifications to ensure that the modifications were installed as directed; the modifications operated as expected; modification testing adequately demonstrated continued system operability, availability, and reliability; and that operation of the modifications did not impact the operability of any interfacing systems. Lastly, the inspectors discussed the temporary modification with operations and engineering personnel to ensure that the individuals were aware of how extended operation with the temporary modification in place could impact overall plant performance.
This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.23-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a screening review of Revisions 29 and 30 of the Monticello Plant Emergency Plan to determine whether changes identified in Revisions 29 and 30 decreased the effectiveness of the licensees emergency planning for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. This review did not constitute an approval of the changes, and as such, the changes are subject to future NRC inspection to ensure that the Emergency Plan continues to meet NRC regulations.
This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
.1 Training Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected licensed operator re-qualification simulator exercises that the licensee had scheduled as providing input to the Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator (PI). The inspection reviewed classification of events by the shift manager, simulated notifications to off-site agencies, and post-exercise critiques. Observations were compared with the licensees observations and CAP entries. The inspectors verified that there were no discrepancies between observed performance and PI reported statistics.
- simulator exercise with four drill/exercise performance opportunities (11/26/07);and
- simulator exercise with two drill/exercise performance opportunities (12/12/07).
This inspection constitutes two samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)
.1 Plant Walkdowns and Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Reviews
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors identified three radiologically significant work activities within radiation areas, high radiation areas (HRAs), and airborne areas in the containment and auxiliary buildings. Selected as-low-as-is-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) WOs and RWPs were reviewed to determine if radiological controls including surveys, postings, air sampling data, and barricades were acceptable. RWPs and ALARA work packages reviewed included but were not limited to the following:
- WOs 134819, 139885, and 291040; torus project with the associated RWP Nos. 273, 300, 674, 675, 691, and 694;
- WO 140418; recirc pump/motor activities with the associated RWP Nos. 652, 354, 682, 678, and 675; and
The inspectors reviewed selected WOs, RWPs, and associated radiological controls used to access these and other radiologically significant areas. Work control instructions and specified control barriers were evaluated in order to determine if the controls provided adequate worker protection. Site TS requirements for HRAs and locked HRAs were used as standards for the necessary barriers. Electronic dosimeter alarm set points for both integrated dose and dose rate were evaluated for conformity with survey indications and plant policy. The inspectors reviewed the pre-job briefing records to determine if instructions to workers emphasized the actions required when their electronic dosimeters noticeably malfunctioned or alarmed.
The inspectors reviewed job planning records and interviewed licensee representatives to determine if there were airborne radioactivity areas in the plant with a potential for individual worker internal exposures to exceed 50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent. Barrier integrity and engineering controls performance, such as high efficiency particulate filtration ventilation system operation, and the use of respiratory protection, was evaluated for worker protection. Work areas having a history of, or the potential for, airborne transuranic isotopes were reviewed to determine if the licensee had considered the potential for transuranic isotopes, and provided appropriate worker protection.
The adequacy of the licensees internal dose assessment process for analyzing internal exposures that exceed 50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent was assessed to determine if affected personnel would be properly monitored utilizing calibrated equipment, that the data would be analyzed, and internal exposures would be properly assessed in accordance with licensee procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees physical and programmatic controls for highly activated and/or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within the spent fuel pool.
This inspection constitutes two samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71121.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)
.1 Radiological Work Planning
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees list of work activities, ranked by estimated exposure that were in progress and selected the four work activities of highest exposure potential.
The inspectors reviewed the ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and integration of ALARA requirements into work procedure and RWP documents, in order to determine if the licensee had established procedures, along with engineering and work controls that were based on sound radiation protection principles in order to achieve occupational exposures that were ALARA. This also involved determining if the licensee had reasonably grouped the radiological work into work activities, based on historical precedence, industry norms, or special circumstances.
The inspectors compared the results achieved including dose rate reductions and person-rem used with the intended dose established in the licensees ALARA planning for WO 314220 that contained 16 work task activities. These tasks included:
- (2) installation of EC 9174 accelerometers in the drywell;
- (3) removal and installation of insulation in the drywell;
- (4) installation of strain gauge and accelerometer scaffolds in the drywell; and
- (5) installation of scaffold in the steam chase during RFO 23. In addition, inspectors reviewed reasons for inconsistencies between intended and actual work activity doses on these WOs and the associated tasks.
This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71121.02-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The licensees process for adjusting exposure estimates or re-planning work, when unexpected changes in scope, emergent work, or higher than anticipated radiation levels were encountered, was evaluated. This included determining that adjustments to estimated exposure (intended dose) were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles and not adjusted to account for failures to control the work. The frequency of these adjustments was reviewed to evaluate the adequacy of the original ALARA planning process. As an example, during the steam dryer acoustic modification for an extended power up-rate on the last RFO, during the work in progress review, the radiation protections (RP) ALARA coordinator identified that workers were getting dose at a rate greater than expected based on the approved ALARA goal by the Site ALARA Committee (SAC). During the investigation, RP identified that workers were performing work in an area of drywell that was not provided to the RP ALARA coordinator for dose estimation purposes. Work was being performed on the 951 elevation of the drywell and dose rates in the area were higher than the work areas provided to RP for planning purposes. After working with the project group, the RP revised the dose estimate that was approved by SAC.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees exposure tracking system in order to determine whether the level of exposure tracking detail, exposure report timeliness, and exposure report distribution was sufficient to support control of collective exposures. In addition, the inspectors reviewed whether RWPs contained too many work activities that may cause a dose control problem. During the conduct of exposure significant maintenance work, the inspectors assessed whether licensee management was aware of the exposure status of the work and would intervene if exposure trends increased beyond exposure estimates.
This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71121.02-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Declared Pregnant Workers
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed dose records of declared pregnant workers for the current assessment period to verify that the exposure results and monitoring controls employed by the licensee complied with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20.
These activities were a partial review and did not represent an inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Problem Identification and Resolutions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees self-assessments, audits, and special reports related to the ALARA program since the last inspection to determine if the licensees overall audit programs scope and frequency for all applicable areas under the Occupational Cornerstone met the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1101(c).
These activities were a partial review and did not represent an inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems (71122.01)
.1 Onsite Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the records of abnormal releases or releases made with inoperable effluent radiation monitors and reviewed the licensees actions for these releases to ensure an adequate defense-in-depth was maintained against an unmonitored, unanticipated release of radioactive material to the environment.
The inspectors observed that the licensee did not make any abnormal releases during the inspection period.
The inspectors assessed the licensees understanding of the location and construction of underground pipes and tanks, and spent fuel pool that contain radioactive contaminated liquids. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify unmonitored leakage of contaminated fluids to the groundwater as a result of degrading material conditions or aging of facilities. The licensees capabilities such as monitoring wells of detecting spills or leaks and of identifying groundwater radiological contamination both on site and beyond the owner controlled area was reviewed along with the licensees technical bases for its onsite groundwater monitoring program. The inspectors discussed with the licensee its understanding of groundwater flow patterns for the site and, in the event of a spill or leak of radioactive material, whether the licensees staff had the capabilities necessary to estimate the pathway of a plume of contaminated fluid, both onsite and beyond the owner controlled area.
This inspection constitutes two samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71122.01-05.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 PI Verification
.1 Data Submission Issue
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the data submitted by the licensee for the 3rd Quarter 2007 Performance Indicators (PIs) for any obvious inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with IMC 0608, Performance Indicator Program.
This review was performed as part of the inspectors normal plant status activities and, as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) - RHR System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the MSPI - RHR system PI for the period from the 3rd Quarter 2006 through the 2nd Quarter 2007. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in Revision 5 of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, and MSPI derivation reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection and, if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective action database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constitutes one MSPI RHR system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 MSPI - Cooling Water Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the MSPI - Cooling Water Systems PI for the period from the 3rd Quarter 2006 through the 2nd Quarter 2007. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in Revision 5 of the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, and MSPI derivation reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection and, if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective action database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constitutes one MSPI cooling water system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
.4 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees determination of the PI for the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone to verify that the licensee accurately determined this PI and had identified all occurrences required by the indicator. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensees CAP records for 2007 Occupational Exposure PI data to ensure that there were no PI occurrences that were not identified by the licensee. Additionally, as part of plant walkdowns, the inspectors selectively examined the adequacy of posting and controls for locked HRAs, to determine if barriers and postings met TS requirements. The inspectors interviewed members of the licensees staff who were responsible for PI data acquisition, verification and reporting, to determine whether their review and assessment of the data was adequate.
This inspection constitutes one occupational exposure control effectiveness sample as defined by Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness
.1 Routine Review of Items Entered Into the CAP
a. Scope
As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees CAP at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Attributes reviewed included: the complete and accurate identification of the problem; that timeliness was commensurate with the safety significance; that evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews were proper and adequate; and that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue.
Minor issues entered into the licensees CAP as a result of the inspectors observations are included in the attached list of documents reviewed.
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.
.2 Daily CAP Reviews
a. Scope
In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished through inspection of the stations daily condition report packages.
These daily reviews were performed by procedure as part of the inspectors daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screening discussed in Section 4OA2.2 above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors review nominally considered the six month period of June 2007 through November 2007, although some examples expanded beyond those dates where the scope of the trend warranted.
The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP in major equipment problem lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists, departmental problem/challenges lists, system health reports, quality assurance audit/surveillance reports, self assessment reports, and Maintenance Rule assessments. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees CAP trending reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trending reports were reviewed for adequacy.
This inspection constitutes one semi-annual trend sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.
b. Assessment and Observations The inspectors evaluated the licensee trending methodology and observed that the licensee had performed a detailed review. The licensee routinely reviewed cause codes, involved organizations, key words, and system links to identify potential trends in their CAP data. The inspectors compared the licensee process results with the results of the inspectors daily screening and did not identify any discrepancies.
The licensees CAP identified a potential adverse trend related to untimely revisions of test procedures and work plans. In one instance, a reactor building-to-torus vacuum breaker (valve) was tested with incorrect acceptance criteria due to an extension of a procedure change request (PCR). The licensee determined that, due to inadequate attention to detail, the wrong priority was assigned to the particular PCR after a change was requested during RFO 23. Although the incorrect acceptance criteria was used to test the valve, there was no impact on the valves ability to perform its safety function.
The change was due, in part, to a separate issue involving the pneumatic source used to test the valve. The inspectors questioned whether an extent-of-condition review was performed to ensure that similar conditions did not exist with other procedures and/or valves tested during RFO 23. The licensee promptly evaluated all IST-related procedures and valves tested during the timeframe in question to ensure that the correct priorities were in place and that procedures were quarantined as necessary.
.4 Selected Issue Follow-up Inspection: Troubleshooting of Feedwater Regulating Valve
Signal Noise
a. Scope
On October 3, 3007, the licensee observed the B feedwater regulating valve (FRV)demand signal fluctuating via plant process computer indication. Because no actual valve movement was observed, the licensee attributed the fluctuating signal to noise in the control system. The licensee established a troubleshooting plan to systematically identify and repair any faulty components. The licensee first determined that the electric-to-pneumatic transducer located near the valve was the likely cause of the noise due to past internal operating experience. After locking the FRV and replacing the transducer, the noise was still apparent. Next, the licensee replaced the auto/manual control station unit in the control room and again, the noise was not reduced. During these replacement activities, various signals within the control system were monitored to assist in identifying any extraneous noisy signals. Finally, on October 13, analog module (AM) 35, associated with computer point CFW 207, among others, was replaced after it was identified as contributing signal noise while the point was bypassed in the control system. Thermal power was reduced to 1773.5 megawatts (MW) thermal per procedural requirements and the computer points associated with feedwater flow were zapped, or locked. Replacement of AM 35 resolved the noise; however, after unlocking the computer points, core thermal power indicated 1777 MW thermal (2 MW above the licensed thermal power limit of 1775 MW thermal). Operators immediately reduced power to below required limits and a CAP document was initiated to determine whether the licensed thermal power level was violated.
This inspection constitutes one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.
b. Assessment and Observations The inspectors reviewed documentation and interviewed licensee personnel to determine whether the event was properly evaluated and assigned corrective actions in accordance with plant procedures and regulatory requirements. The licensee performed a root cause evaluation and determined that the thermal power limit was not exceeded.
This conclusion was based on the determination that during the AM 35 card replacement, component signal tolerances and averaging inherent to the computer system components maintained thermal power below 1775 MW thermal. The decrease in power performed by the operators on October 13 was deemed conservative, and the root cause of the event was determined to be organizational insensitivity to work being performed on the process computer. Because the individuals involved in the computer module replacement were unaware of the effect on the thermal power calculation, compensatory measures were not addressed during the work planning and pre-job briefings performed prior to the work being conducted. Corrective actions included procedure updates for monitoring core thermal power during process computer work and more detailed instructions for zapping computer points during planned or corrective work activities.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees root cause evaluation conclusions and corrective actions. Overall the inspectors determined that the troubleshooting plan focused heavily on the causes of the noise, but did not adequately understand the impact the noise could have on the system (i.e., AM 35 effect on calculated thermal power). This observation was conveyed to the licensee and was captured in the final root cause report. The inspectors concluded that the licensees evaluation was reasonably detailed and contained corrective actions that were in place or planned, and were appropriate to preclude recurrence.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
.1 Non-Routine Isolation of A Offgas System Recombiner to Support Flow Indicator
Replacement On October 3, 2007, the licensee initiated a planned evolution to isolate the A offgas system recombiner in order to inspect, clean or replace, and test a degraded flow instrument that was not indicating expected flowrates. This work involved a reduction of hydrogen water chemistry injection rate and non-routine isolation of a normally-aligned system. The inspectors observed the licensees planning, isolating, and troubleshooting activities to ensure that the overall impact on the plant was minimized.
Although the flow instrument was replaced, post maintenance testing did not resolve the flow indication issue. The licensee restored system flow and resumed normal hydrogen injection rates. The licensee determined that additional troubleshooting was required and resolution would occur at a later date. The inspectors determined that the licensee followed approved and reviewed procedures during isolation activities, and demonstrated an overall conservative approach by restoring normal system alignment in order to evaluate the cause further. No findings of significance were identified.
This inspection constitutes one event follow-up sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153-05.
.2 Operator Response to Elevated Offgas Activity, Power Suppression Testing and
Reactivity Maneuvers, and Recovery from Potential Fuel Pin Leak On October 30, 2007, an offgas pre-treatment radiation monitor alarm was received.
The licensee determined that activity levels spiked to approximately five times normal levels and then quickly lowered to an elevated steady state value. Per procedure, the licensee initiated sampling of the offgas system and implemented 4 AWI-05.05.02; Fuel Integrity Monitoring and Failed Fuel Action Plan. Per this procedure, various subsequent actions were taken to troubleshoot and prepare for power suppression testing activities. During this process, the licensee monitored critical parameters including fuel operating limits, RCS and offgas chemistry, and other limits as designated in the action plan.
On November 8, 2007, the licensee reduced reactor power to perform power suppression testing in order to facilitate the identification of suspect leaking fuel bundles.
During the down power, issues were identified with the performance of a high pressure feedwater heater drain valve. The issue was resolved by making repairs and revising the reactivity management and power suppression test in order to perform testing within a wider power band. Testing was completed on November 11, 2007, and the suspect bundle containing the leaking fuel pin was suppressed by fully inserting one control rod.
The inspectors determined that the licensee demonstrated an overall conservative and cautious approach to monitoring critical parameters; performed the testing within a reasonable timeframe; and utilized appropriate procedures. Additionally, the appropriate attention was given by the licensee to simulator training and pre-job briefs to ensure that the testing could be conducted successfully. Several issues identified by the licensee were entered into the CAP for further evaluation and resolution. No findings of significance were identified.
This inspection constitutes one event follow-up sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153-05.
.3 (Closed) LERs 50-263/2007-002-00 and 50-263/2007-002-01: Unexpected
De-Energizing of Bus 16 during Refuel Outage 23 The initial evaluation of this event was performed by the inspectors and documented in Inspection Report 05000263/2007002. Inspection Report 05000263/2007003 opened the review of event, initially reported on May 15, 2007, as LER 50-263/2007-002-00.
This LER discussed the preliminary root cause of the event and planned and completed corrective actions. The LER also committed to issuance of a supplement following further investigation into causes of the event. The information contained in the LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no findings of significance were identified.
Supplement 1, reported on September 27, 2007, discussed in further detail an additional root cause of the event and additional corrective actions. The LER supplement was reviewed by the inspectors and no findings of significance were identified.
Documents reviewed as part of this inspection are listed in the Attachment. These LERs are closed.
This inspection constitutes one LER review sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153-05.
.4 (Closed) LER 50-263/2007-006: HELB Door Found in Closed Position Due to Fusible
Link Failure On July 26, 2007, at 0902, a plant operator discovered that a normally open fire door, located adjacent to the condenser room, had closed due to the failure of its fusible link.
In addition to being a fire door, this open door also serves a HELB mitigation function of providing a drain path from the turbine to the condenser room during certain HELB scenarios in the turbine building. With the door closed, the drain path was blocked and the licensee determined that the plant was in an unanalyzed condition in which, during certain HELB scenarios, both divisions of essential switchgear could become inoperable.
The licensee determined that the door had been closed a maximum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and, upon discovery of the failed fusible link, initiated prompt compensatory actions to mitigate the doors fire protection function and restore the doors HELB function.
By 1302 the same day, the licensee fully had restored the fire protection and HELB functions of the door by replacing the fusible link.
The inspectors observed the licensees initial response to the event and reviewed the corrective actions, applicable cause evaluation, and LER associated with this event, and identified no findings of significance.
Documents reviewed as part of this inspection are listed in the Attachment. This LER is closed.
This inspection constitutes one LER review sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153-05.
4OA6 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On January 3, 2008, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. OConnor and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
Interim exits were conducted for:
- Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas, ALARA Planning and Control under the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone, and Performance Indicator Verification of Occupational Control Effectiveness, with Mr. B. Sawatzke on October 5, 2007. On October 19, 2007, the inspectors conducted a re-exit to discuss a change in characterization of an issue;
- Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program Inspection results with Mr. B. Sawatzke, Plant Manager, on October 19, 2007;
- Licensed Operator Requalification Training Biennial Written Examination and Annual Operating Test results with Mr. P. Adams, Acting Training Manager, on November 1, 2007, via telephone;
- Emergency Preparedness Inspection with Mr. D. Pedersen on December 18, 2007; and
- The results of the heat sink biennial inspection were presented to Mr. John Grubb and other members of licensee management and staff at the conclusion of the inspection on December 14, 2007.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee:
- T. OConnor, Site Vice President
- B. Sawatzke, Plant Manager
- J. Grubb, Site Engineering Director
- W. Guldemond, Nuclear Safety Assurance Manager
- S. Sharp, Operations Manager
- S. Radebaugh, Maintenance Manager
- B. Cole, Radiation Protection/Chemistry Manager
- R. Baumer, Compliance Engineering Analyst
- J. Sabados, General Supervisor of Chemistry
- P. Vitalis, Radiation Protection, Health Physicist
- B. Weller, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- K. Pederson, Chemistry
- R. Nuelk, System Engineer Radiation/Process Monitors
- P. Saueressig, GL 89-13 Program Owner
- E. Fogarty, SW System Engineer
- R. Latsch, Chemistry
- S. Kibler, Engineering Programs Supervisor
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- K. Riemer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
50-263/2007-002-00 LER Unexpected De-Energizing of Bus 16 During Refuel Outage (Section 4OA3.3)
50-263/2007-002-01 LER Unexpected De-Energizing of Bus 16 During Refuel Outage (Section 4OA3.3)
50-263/2007-006 LER HELB Door Found in Closed Position Due to Fusible Link Failure (Section 4OA3.4)
Attachment