IR 05000263/2017001
Download: ML17109A082
Text
April 19, 2017
Mr. Peter Site Vice President Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company, Minnesota 2807 West County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362-9637
SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT-NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2017001
Dear Mr. Gardner:
On March 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. On April 4, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The enclosed report represents the results of this inspection. No NRC-identified or self-revealed findings were identified during this inspection. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
Sincerely,/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000263/2017001 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV Letter to Peter Gardner from Kenneth Riemer dated April 19, 2017
SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT-NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2017001 DISTRIBUTION: Jeremy Bowen RidsNrrDorlLpl3 RidsNrrPMMonticello RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource Cynthia Pederson Darrell Roberts Richard Skokowski Allan Barker Carole Ariano Linda Linn DRPIII DRSIII ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov
ADAMS Accession Number: ML17109A082 OFFICE RIII RIII NAME KRiemer for NShah:bw KRiemer DATE 04/19/2017 04/19/2017 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Docket No: 50-263 License No: DPR-22 Report No: 05000263/2017001 Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Location: Monticello, MN Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2017 Inspectors: P. Zurawski, Senior Resident Inspector D. Krause, Resident Inspector I. Hafeez, Reactor Inspector
Approved by: K. Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects REPORT DETAILS ....................................................................................................................... 3 Summary of Plant Status ........................................................................................................... 3 1. REACTOR SAFETY ............................................................................................ 3 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) .............................................................. 3 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04) ........................................................................ 4 1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05) ................................................................................... 5 1R06 Flooding (71111.06) ............................................................................................. 7 1R07 Annual Heat Sink Performance (71111.07) ......................................................... 7 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11) ...................................... 8 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) ................................................................ 9 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) ........ 10 1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15) ............... 10 1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18) .......................................................................... 11 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19) ............................................................... 12 1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) ........................................................................ 13 1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06) ................................................................................ 14 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES .......................................................................................... 15 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151) ....................................................... 15 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) ............................................ 16 4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) ............... 18 4OA5 Other Activities ................................................................................................... 19 4OA6 Management Meetings ...................................................................................... 20 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................... 2 Key Points of Contact ................................................................................................................ 2 List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed ........................................................................... 2 List of Documents Reviewed ..................................................................................................... 3 List of Acronyms Used ............................................................................................................ 12 2
SUMMARY
Inspection Report 05000263/2017001; January 1, 2017, through March 31, 2017; Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced baseline inspections by regional inspectors. No findings were identified by the inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings None
Licensee-Identified None 3
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status Monticello operated at, or near, 100 percent power for the inspection period with the following exceptions:
- Several rod pattern adjustments were conducted during the inspection period due to the core nearing end of life.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Condition-Extreme Cold Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
Since extreme cold conditions were forecast in the vicinity of the facility for the week of February 6, 2017, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's overall preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. During the week of February 6, 2017, the inspectors walked down the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), EDG-Emergency Service Water (ESW), and EDG Fuel Oil systems, along with the Reactor, Turbine, and Intake Buildings, including the heating boiler system to ensure equipment was sufficiently warm to operate, because their safety-related functions could be affected or required as a result of the extreme cold conditions forecast for the facility. The inspectors observed insulation, heat trace circuits, space heater operation, and weatherized enclosures to ensure operability of affected systems. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and discussed potential compensatory measures with control room personnel. The inspectors focused on plant management's actions for implementing the station's procedures for ensuring adequate personnel for safe plant operation and emergency response would be available. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This activity constituted one readiness for seasonal extreme weather condition sample as defined in IP 71111.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Condition-Severe Weather Conditions:
a. Inspection Scope
Severe storms and high winds were forecast in the vicinity of the facility for the week of March 5, 2017, and the inspectors reviewed the licensee's overall preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. During this week, the inspectors walked down the General Protected Area external areas and Switch Yard, 4 because of the potential impact of flying debris and wind driven missile hazards on safety-related equipment and functions by loose objects as a result of the high wind conditions forecast for the facility. The inspectors observed material tie-down conditions, crane and equipment preparations, general site cleanliness, high wind preparations, and weatherized enclosures to ensure continued operability of any affected systems. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and discussed potential compensatory measures with control room personnel. The inspectors focused on plant actions for implementing the station's procedures for ensuring adequate personnel for safe plant operation and emergency response would be available. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This activity constituted one readiness for impending adverse weather condition sample as defined in IP 71111.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems:
- Upper 4 Kilovolt (kV) Switchgear-Protected;
- 11 EDG-ESW Pump During 12 EDG Maintenance. The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Technical Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work orders (WOs), condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions.
The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies.
The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. These activities constituted three partial system walkdown samples as defined in IP 71111.04-05.
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b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Semi-Annual Complete System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
On March 8, 2017, the inspectors performed a complete system alignment inspection of the "A" and "B" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) systems to verify the functional capability of the system. This system was selected because it was considered both safety significant and risk significant in the licensee's probabilistic risk assessment. The inspectors walked down the system to review mechanical and electrical equipment lineups; electrical power availability; system pressure and temperature indications, as appropriate; component labeling; component lubrication; component and equipment cooling; hangers and supports; operability of support systems; and to ensure that ancillary equipment or debris did not interfere with equipment operation. A review of a sample of past and outstanding WOs was performed to determine whether any deficiencies significantly affected the system function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the CAP database to ensure that system equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This activity constituted one complete system walkdown sample as defined in IP 71111.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas:
- Fire Zone 6; Refuel Floor-Welding/Hotwork HPV West End;
- Fire Zone 4-A; Reactor Building 985' South;
- Fire Zone 8; Cable Spreading Room;
- Fire Zone 13-C; Turbine Building 911' MCC;
- Fire Zone 4-D; SBGTS;
- Fire Zone 15-A; 12 Diesel Generator (DG); and
- Fire Zone 14-A; Upper 4kV. The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition, and implemented adequate 6 compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensee's fire plan.
The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plant's Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) with later additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the Attachment to this report, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. These activities constituted seven quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in IP 71111.05-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Fire Protection Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
On February 3, 2017, the inspectors observed a fire brigade activation for a fire drill on the 985' elevation of the Reactor Building. Based on this observation, the inspectors evaluated the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The inspectors verified that the licensee staff identified deficiencies openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and took appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated were:
- proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus;
- proper use and layout of fire hoses;
- employment of appropriate firefighting techniques;
- sufficient firefighting equipment brought to the scene;
- effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control;
- search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas;
- smoke removal operations;
- utilization of pre-planned strategies;
- adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario; and
- drill objectives. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. These activities constituted one annual fire protection inspection sample as defined in IP 71111.05-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
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1R06 Flooding
.1 Internal Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected risk important plant design features and licensee procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analyses and design documents, including the USAR, engineering calculations, and abnormal operating procedures to identify licensee commitments. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the to this report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee drawings to identify areas and equipment that may be affected by internal flooding caused by the failure or misalignment of nearby sources of water, such as the fire suppression or the circulating water systems. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's corrective action documents with respect to past flood-related items identified in the corrective action program to verify the adequacy of the corrective actions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following plant area(s) to assess the adequacy of watertight doors and verify drains and sumps were clear of debris and were operable, and that the licensee complied with its commitments:
- Reactor Building 896' and 935' Elevations;
- Intake Structure; and
- EDG Fuel Oil Pump House. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This activity constituted one internal flooding sample as defined in IP 71111.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Annual Heat Sink Performance
.1 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 1136-01; RHR Heat Exchanger Efficiency Test, to verify that potential deficiencies did not mask the licensee's ability to detect degraded performance, to identify any common cause issues that had the potential to increase risk, and to ensure that the licensee was adequately addressing problems that could result in initiating events that would cause an increase in risk. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's observations as compared against acceptance criteria, the correlation of scheduled testing and the frequency of testing, and the impact of instrument inaccuracies on test results. Inspectors also verified that test acceptance criteria considered differences between test conditions, design conditions, and testing conditions. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this document.
8 This activity constituted one heat sink performance inspection as defined in IP 71111.07-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On January 23, 2017, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plant's simulator during licensed operator requalification training. The inspectors verified that operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems, and that training was being conducted in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
- licensed operator performance;
- crew's clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
- correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan actions and notifications. This performance was compared to pre-established operator action expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This activity constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program simulator sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Observation During Periods of Heightened Activity or Risk
a. Inspection Scope
On January 7, 2017, the inspectors observed a Control Room Reactivity Manipulation - down power to 75 percent. This activity required heightened awareness and was related to increased risk. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
- licensed operator performance;
- crew's clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction; 9
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
- correct use and implementation of procedures;
- control board manipulations; and
- oversight and direction from supervisors; The performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action expectations, procedural compliance and task completion requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This activity constituted one quarterly licensed operator heightened activity/risk sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
.1 Routine Quarterly Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk-significant systems:
- MO-1749, CS Test Return to Torus, Test Failure; and
- C-87-A SBGT Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Contactor Replacement. The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:
- implementing appropriate work practices;
- identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- scoping of systems in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of the Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
- characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
- charging unavailability for performance;
- trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
- ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
- verifying appropriate performance criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2), or appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1). The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. These activities constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined in IP 71111.12-05.
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b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
.1 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:
- Troubleshooting Rod 14-27-Failure to Move;
- 12 EDG Maintenance Window;
- Refueling Bridge Load Cell Calibration;
- New Fuel Assembly; Fuel Channel and Control Blade Receipt, Inspection, and Handling; and
- Open Phase Condition Interim Compensatory Measures. These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted five samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments
.1 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
- Partial Loss of Process Computer, 1 percent Rx down-power;
- 11 CRD pump (P-201A) re-install w/defective pump casing; and 11
- CAP 1553131 and 1553137-ESW Pipe Pitting. The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and Update Safety Analysis Report to the licensee's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This operability inspection constituted four samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
.1 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following modification(s):
- Install Tee into 2" Vent Piping (11 EDG Day Tank);
- EC 27227-HCVS Vent Pipe;
- SBGT B Loop Flow Controller Replacement; and
- RX BLDG 962' MG Set Room Airlock North Door Replacement. The inspectors reviewed the configuration changes and associated 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation screening against the design basis, the USAR, and the TS, as applicable, to verify that the modification did not affect the operability or availability of the affected system(s). The inspectors, as applicable, observed ongoing and completed work activities to ensure that the modifications were installed as directed and consistent with the design control documents; the modifications operated as expected; post-modification testing adequately demonstrated continued system operability, availability, and reliability; and that operation of the modifications did not impact the operability of any interfacing systems. As applicable, the inspectors verified that relevant procedure, design, and licensing documents were properly updated. Lastly, the inspectors discussed the plant modification with operations, engineering, and training personnel to ensure that the individuals were aware of how the operation with the plant modification in place could impact overall plant performance. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. These activities constituted four modification samples as defined in IP 71111.18-05.
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b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
.1 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance (PM) activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:
- OPS-MO-2106 PMT/RTS, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Pump Otbd Discharge Valve;
- ELEC-102-6X-PMT, 1AR to Bus 16 XFR Time Delay Relay;
- 11 Control Rod Drive (CRD) Pump Re-Install w/Defective Pump Casing;
- HPCI Maintenance Window-HO7 Turbine Stop Valve; and
- SBGT B Loop Flow Control, PMT-FIC-2942. These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance were properly removed after test completion); and test documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against TSs, the USAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. These activities constituted seven post-maintenance testing samples as defined in IP 71111.19-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
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1R22 Surveillance Testing
.1 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural and TS requirements:
- 0081 Control Rod Drive Scram Insertion Time Test [ROUTINE]; 11 Standby Liquid Control (SBLC), OPS-Standby Liquid Control (SLC) 0255-02-III [IST];
- High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Steam Line High Area Temperature Test (0058) [ROUTINE]; and
- EFT Charcoal Filter Laboratory Test 0468-01A [ROUTINE]. The inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated records to determine the following:
- did preconditioning occur;
- the effects of the testing were adequately addressed by control room personnel or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
- acceptance criteria were clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and were consistent with the system design basis;
- plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
- as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was in accordance with TSs, the USAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
- measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
- test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
- test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability; tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used;
- test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
- test equipment was removed after testing;
- where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of Mechanical Engineers code, and reference values were consistent with the system design basis;
- where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was declared inoperable;
- where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests, reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
- where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished; 14
- prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
- equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the performance of its safety functions; and
- all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and dispositioned in the CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. These activities constituted four routine surveillance testing sample(s) and one in-service test sample(s), as defined in IP 71111.22, Sections-02 and-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
.1 Training Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector observed simulator training evolutions for licensed operators on February 27, 2017 and March 6, 2017, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors' activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crew's performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and other documents listed in the Attachment to this report. This activity constituted one of the licensee's training evolution with emergency preparedness drill aspect sample as defined in IP 71114.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Performance Indicator (PI) for the period from the first quarter 2016 through fourth quarter 2016. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of January 2016 through December 2016 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This activity constituted one unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours sample as defined in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Unplanned Scrams with Complications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams with Complications performance indicator for the period from the first quarter 2016 through fourth quarter 2016. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of January 2016 through December 2016, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This activity constituted one unplanned scrams with complications sample as defined in IP 71151-05.
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b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Transients per 7000 Critical Hours performance indicator for the period from the first quarter 2016 through fourth quarter 2016. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of January 2016 through December 2016 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This activity constituted one unplanned transients per 7000 critical hours sample as defined in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
a. Inspection Scope
As discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and adverse trends were identified and addressed. Some minor issues were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as a result of the inspectors' observations; however, they are not discussed in this report. These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
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.2 Semiannual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's corrective action program and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors' review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector corrective action program item screening discussed in Section 4OA2.1 above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors' review nominally considered the 6-month period of July 2016 through December 2016, although some examples expanded beyond those dates where the scope of the trend warranted. The review also included issues documented outside the corrective action program in major equipment problem lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists, departmental problem/challenges lists, system health reports, quality assurance audit/surveillance reports, self-assessment reports, and Maintenance Rule assessments. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensee's corrective action program trending reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensee's trending reports were reviewed for adequacy. This activity constituted one semiannual trend review inspection sample as defined in IP 71152.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues:
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions related to the establishment of the XCEL Nuclear Fleet Adverse Condition Monitoring Program (ACMP). The inspectors selected this issue for an in-depth review because the licensee instituted this program at Monticello in May 2016, to preempt issues similar to the HPCI oil leak from March 2016 that led to a White Finding. This inspection focused on a review of CAP issues identified since May 1, 2016, utilizing the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71152, Section 03.06 and Table 1. The inspectors verified the following attributes during their review of the licensee's corrective actions for the above condition reports and other related condition reports:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance and ease of discovery;
- consideration of the extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;
- evaluation and disposition of operability/functionality/reportability issues;
- classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with safety significance;
- identification of the root and contributing causes of the problem; 18
- identification of corrective actions, which were appropriately focused to correct the problem;
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue;
- effectiveness of corrective actions taken to preclude repetition; and
- evaluate applicability for operating experience and communicate applicable lessons learned to appropriate organizations. This activity constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution inspection sample as defined in IP 71152.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reports 05000263/2014-002-01:
Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker did not Indicate Closed During Testing and Licensee Event Report 05000263/2014-003-01: Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Dual Indication During Testing These events, which occurred on February 7, 2014, and again on February 11, 2014, involved the failure of a drywell to torus vacuum breaker to indicate full closed during testing activities. Specifically, on two separate occasions, during surveillance test cycling of vacuum breaker AO-2382A, the vacuum breaker showed dual indication when full closed indication was expected. In both instances, the vacuum breaker was declared inoperable. In response to the unexpected indication, operators used an alarm response procedure to cycle the valve until it indicated full closed. Both events were reported under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 for discovery of events or conditions that could have prevented systems from performing their safety function and as an unanalyzed condition. The original licensee event report (LER) was previously evaluated by inspectors as part of Monticello Integrated inspection report (IR) 05000263/2014003. Additionally, related to these events, inspectors documented three NCVs regarding preconditioning, the discovery of inadequate refueling outage post-maintenance tests (PMTs) of all eight vacuum breakers, and an inadequate operability recommendation in Monticello Integrated IR 05000263/2014002 relating to these events. On July 13, 2016, the licensee submitted Supplement 1 to each of the LERs providing updated causal evaluation conclusions based on as-found testing during the 2015 refueling outage, revised corrective actions, and conclusions regarding the impact of as-found test results on whether the vacuum breakers met the most limiting design requirements and maintained an ability to perform their intended safety function. As documented in these original LERs, the most probable cause was inconsistent operation of the valve limit switches in which the closed limit switches did not consistently indicate closed when the valve was, in fact, closed. As an additional input to the original causal analysis, the licensee created an action to inspect vacuum breaker AO-2382A, its limit switches, and close indication circuit during the 2015 refueling outage to confirm the results of the failure mode and effects. During the 2015 refueling 19 outage, the inspectors observed as-found testing as additional validation of the licensee's conclusions. The as-found testing identified that vacuum breaker AO-2382A had higher than expected opening torque, and during subsequent investigation, failed to close. The licensee concluded the increased torque was from interference between the vacuum breaker test lever and the vacuum breaker test actuator stem. Subsequent licensee evaluation concluded the interference had been introduced during the 2013 refueling outage when the lever arm had been removed to replace the seals in the vacuum breakers resulting in intermittent interference and binding. Inadequate procedural guidance was the identified cause why critical clearances were not maintained during the removal and replacement of the torus to drywell vacuum breaker test lever. The licensee resolved the inadequate clearances during the 2015 refueling outage by establishing proper clearances between the test level and actuator stem on all vacuum breaker valves. In five of eight cases, a portion of the test actuator stem was removed eliminating the potential for interference. Based on as-found testing performed during the 2015 refueling outage, the licensee determined the torque required to overcome the binding between the vacuum breaker test level and actuator stem was very small. However, even with this additional friction, the licensee concluded the operational characteristics of the vacuum breaker would have met the most limiting design requirements for the ability to open and close as well as seating requirements. Overall the licensee concluded the condition would not have prevented torus to drywell vacuum breaker AO-2382A or any other torus to drywell vacuum breaker from performing its specified safety function to maintain reactor pressure boundary leakage requirements. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions associated with the two events including as-found testing during the 2015 refueling outage, resolution of test lever to stem clearance issues, and revised causal evaluation and safety function determinations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. These LERs are closed. These activities constituted two follow-up review samples as defined in IP 71153-05.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction TI 2515/192, "Inspection of the Licensee's Interim Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems"
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of this performance based temporary instruction (TI) is to verify implementation of interim compensatory measures associated with an Open Phase Condition (OPC) design vulnerability in electric power system for operating reactors. The inspectors conducted an inspection to determine if the licensee had implemented the following interim compensatory measures. These compensatory measures are to remain in place until permanent automatic detection and protection schemes are installed and declared operable for OPC design vulnerability. The inspectors verified the following:
20
- The licensee had identified and discussed with plant staff the lessons-learned from the OPC events at the US operating plants including the Byron station OPC event and its consequences. This includes conducting operator training for promptly diagnosing, recognizing consequences, and responding to an OPC event;
- The licensee had updated plant operating procedures to help operators promptly diagnose and respond to OPC events on off-site power sources credited for safe shutdown of the plant;
- The licensee had established and continue to implement periodic walkdown activities to inspect switchyard equipment such as insulators, disconnect switches, and transmission line and transformer connections associated with the offsite power circuits to detect a visible OPC; and
- The licensee had ensured that routine maintenance and testing activities on switchyard components have been implemented and maintained. As part of the maintenance and testing activities, the licensee assessed and managed plant risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a) (4) requirements.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary On April 4, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. P. Gardner, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
The licensee acknowledged the information presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
===.2 Interim Exit Meetings Interim exits were conducted for:
- The inspection results for TI2515/192, Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities, was conducted with Mr. M. Lingenfelter, Engineering Manager, on===
March 9, 2017. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary. Proprietary material received during the inspection was returned to the licensee. ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- P. Gardner, Site Vice President
- K. Scott, Site Operations Director
- H. Hanson, Jr., Plant Manager
- C. Dieckmann, Plant Manager
- M. Antony, Operations Manager
- M. Lingenfelter, Director of Engineering
- R. Olson, Maintenance Manager
- S. Quiggle, Chemistry Manager
- C. England, Radiation Protection Manager
- A. Ward, Regulatory Affairs Manager
- S. O'Connor, Regulatory Compliance Lead
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission K. Riemer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
- P. Zurawski, Senior Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None.
Closed
- 05000263/LER-2014-002-01 LER Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker did not Indicate Closed during Testing (Section 4OA3.1)
- 05000263/LER-2014-003-01 LER Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker did not Indicate Closed during Testing (Section 4OA3.1)
Discussed
None.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection.
- Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort.
- Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
- 1R01 Adverse Weather - 4
- AWI-04.02.01; Housekeeping; Revision 28 - A.6; Acts of Nature; Revision 55 - 1444; Pre and Post Severe Weather Inspection Checklist; Revision 13 -
- CAP 1552419; Safety - Potential Capacity Issue with Tornado Assembly Point
-
- CAP 1552448; Insulation Blown from Roof due to High Winds
-
- CAP 1552468; RC Boundary Altered by High Winds
-
- CAP 1552473; Security Training Facility (trailer) Siding Separating
-
- CAP 1552521; Damage to Personal Vehicle from High Winds -
- CAP 1552526; Cooling Tower Panel Loose - #12 Tower (West Side) -
- CAP 1552565; Aggregate Response to Wind Conditions Inadequate 1R04 Equipment Alignment - 2124; Plant Prestart Checklist Diesel Generators and Fuel Oil System; Revision 10 - 2200; Plant Prestart Checklist Emergency Service Water System; Revision 2
-
- NF-36175; Single Line Diagram Station Connections; Revision 85
- 5962; Radiation Protection Survey/dose Map, RHR "A" Room - Lower Level, Reactor Bldg - Elev 896'; Revision 4 - 5963; Radiation Protection Survey/dose Map, RHR "B" Room - Lower Level, Reactor Bldg - Elev 896'; Revision 4 -
- NH-36246; P&ID Residual Heat Removal System ("B" Train); Revision 85
-
- NH-36247; P&ID Residual Heat Removal System ("A" Train); Revision 87 -
- NX-7905-46-12; Residual Heat Removal System; Revision 76 1R05 Fire Protection - USAR Appendix J.04; Fire Protection Program; Revision 34 - USAR Appendix J.05; Fire Hazards Analysis; Revision 34
- USAR Appendix J; Fire Protection Program; Revision 22
-
- WO 537891; Fire Detection Instrument Detection Functional Test; August 19, 2016 -
- OSP-FIR-0256; Fire Detection Instrumentation Test; Revision 6 - 2176; Fire Drill Procedure; Revision 32
-
- WO 544159; 1148-01 Fire Detection Battery Load/Charge Test; January 5, 2017
-
- WO 528640; Halon System Functional Test; February 1, 2017
- A.3-4-A; Fire Strategy for Fire Zone 4-A; Revision 8 - A.3-08; Fire Strategy for Fire Zone 8; Cable Spreading Room; Revision 14 - A.3-13-C; Fire Strategy for Fire Zone 13-C; Turbine Building 911' Elevation East MCC Area; Revision 10 - A.3-14-A; Fire Strategy for Fire Zone 14-A, Upper 4KV Bus Area (14 & 16); Revision 16
- A.3-15-A; Fire Strategy for Fire Zone 15-A, No 12 Diesel Generator Room; Revision 11
- A.3-04-D; Fire Strategy for Fire Zone 4-D, SBGTS Area; Revision 7
- A.3-06; Fire Strategy for Fire Zone 6, Refueling Floor Area; Revision 10 -
- EC 26081 - HPV, Fabricate and Install Tornado Missile Barrier;
- December 28, 2016 - Combustible Source Use permit # 3067; Revision 17; -
- WO 540338-09; EC27227 - Install Rx Bldg Reinforcement Steel; December 09, 2016
- 9210; Master RPV Disassembly Procedure; Revision 20 -
- FP-MA-FME-01; Foreign Material Exclusion and Control; Revision 12 1R06 Flood Protection (Internal) - C.4; Abnormal Procedures; Revision 15 - Calculation 07-035; Internal Flooding Analysis; Revision 0
- DBD T.08; Design Basis Document for internal; Flooding; Revision 3
-
- DBD-S.1; Reactor Building; Revision 4 -
- DBD-S.6; Turbine Building; Revision 5 -
- DBD-T.6; High Energy Line Break; Revision 6
- USAR 01.03; Section 1, Introduction and Summary; Revision 32
- 1R07 Annual Heat Sink Performance -
- WO 540671; 1136-01 RHR Heat Exchanger Efficiency Test; February 15, 2017 - 1136; RHR Heat Exchanger Efficiency Test; Revision 36 -
- NX-7905-62; Residual Heat Removal - Sys 10; Revision 10 - B.03.04-05; Operations Manual, Residual Heat Removal System; Revision 82
- USAR, Appendix F, Section 2.4.1; Revision 18
- 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program -
- RQ-SS-137; Simulator Exercise Guide; Revision 0 - 2300; Reactivity Adjustment; Revision 18; January 7, 2017
- B.02.03-05-E.2; "B" Ops Manual Section E.2, Reactor Vessel Pressure Control; Revision 33
- B.01.04-05.E.1; "B" Ops Manual Section E.1, Changing Recirculation Flow; Revision 49 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness - 0141; Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Operability Check; Revision 37 Amendment 146 -
- CAP 1517914; Localized Hot Spot Impact on Ambient Temperature -
- CAP 1544705;
- MO-1749 11 CS Test Return to Torus Trip Upon Closure Attempt - ILSCO Information Sheet; Tightening Torque Values; Revised September 21, 2015
-
- NX-9288-7-1; Electrical Schematic, Standby Gas Treatment system
- C-24A & C-87A; Revision 79 -
- POD 01517914; SBGT C-87A & C-87B Cabinet Temperature Concerns POD; Revision 0 - Technical Specification 3.3.3.1; Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation;
- Technical Specification 3.6.1.1; Primary Containment; Amendment 146 -
- WO 00545364; C-87A, Replace Select EQ Components; February 06, 2017 -
- MO-749, 11 CS Test Return to Torus; January 6, 2017 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control - 0081; Control Rod Drive SCRAM Insertion Time Test; Revision 70 - 9012; Fuel, Control Blade and Fuel Channel Receiving Procedure; Revision 26
- 9015; Procedure for Inspection of New Fuel; Revision 42 - 9023; Refueling Bridge Load Cell Calibration; Revision 15
-
- CAP 1546846; Control Rod 14-27 Failed to Insert during 2300 -
- CAP 1548357; G-3B (12EDG) Engine Block to Foundation Bolt Found Loose -
- CAP 1548358; 1/2" x 3/4" Tee has Degraded Threads
- Condition Evaluation
- 01546846-04; 3A-KB Failure; January 30, 2017
-
- FS1-27594; Unloading, Handling, and Storage of Fuel Channels; Revision 1.0
-
- NX-7866-74-11; Elementary Diagram Reactor Manual Control System; Revision 76
-
- SOP-40723; Bundle & Cage Inspection; Version 4.3 - Technical Specification 3.1.3; Control Rod Operability; Amendment 146 -
- WO 508357; High Risk Plan-Inspect and Place New Fuel Assemblies and Channels; February 27, 2017 -
- WO 518721-07; Perform Refueling Bridge Load Cell Calibration; February 7, 2017
-
- MECH-FS-3237 Install Tee into 2" EDG Oil Vent Pipe; January 23, 2017 -
- WO 557188; Control Rod 14-27 Failed to Insert During 2300; January 07, 2017 1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments - B.01.04-05.E.1; "B" Ops Manual Section E.1, Changing Recirculation Flow; Revision 49 - B.02.03-05-E.2; "B" Ops Manual Section E.2, Reactor Vessel Pressure Control; Revision 33 - C.2-05.C.2; "C" Ops Manual Section C.2, Monitoring Core Thermal Power during a Process Computer Outage; Revision 68 -
-
- CAP 1550440; Prompt Operability Determination -
- RV-2097 Partially Lifted During Surveillance -
-
- CAP 1551643;
- Partial Computer Loss Experienced on Process Computer
-
-
- CAP 1551749; Upper/lower Casing Degradation on P-201A -
- CAP 1553131;
- SW-MIC Pitting Detected in Line
- ESW1-HBD-EFT Building
-
- CAP 1553137;
- SW-MIC Pitting Detected in Line
- ESW1-HBD-Intake Tunnel
-
- DBD-B.02.03; Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System; Revision 78
-
- FP-PE-SW-01; SW/MIC Program; Revision 12
- Gardel (mtpc11) LPRM Signals; LPRM Signals, Detector 20-29-3 (Detector No. 43, String
- No. 11) printout; February 27, 2017 -
- MT-MIC-076;
- MIC-1R28-024 UT Examination Report - 916' Intake Tunnel
- EFT-ESW A; March 15, 2017 -
- NF-93490-C; ESW "A" Loop; Revision 01
-
- NH-36244; Control Rod Hydraulic System P&ID; Revision 84 -
- Technical Specification 3.2.1; Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR); Amendment 146 - Technical Specification 3.2.2; Minimum Critical Power Ration (MCPR); Amendment 146 - Technical Specification 3.2.3; Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR); Amendment 146 -
- PM 4850-506 (152-506) P-201A (11 CRD Pump); February 28, 2017 -
-
-
- RV-2097, RCIC Run with Instrumentation; February 21, 2017
-
- WO 560227; MX15 Failing and Requires Repair or Replace; February 28, 2017 -
- WO 560617; Replace Section of
- ESW1-3-HBD; March 10, 2017 -
- WR 131642; Replace Section of
- ESW1-3-HBD; March 8, 2017 1R18 Plant Modifications- 16-084; Design of Hard Pipe Vent Supports HPVH 5-7, HPVH 8 & 9 Associated Structural Steel Evaluations, and
- HPVH-14; Revision 0 - 16-085; Evaluation of RB Steel Superstructure for Loads from New HPV Supports; Revision 0 - 50.59 Screening 16-0157; Hardened Containment Venting System NRC Order
- EA-13-109 Phase; Revision 3 -
- CAP 1553192; Load Drop Protection Partially Over Duct Bank
-
- CAP 1553192; Load Protection Partially Over Duct Bank
-
- EC-26083; Hardened Containment Venting System NRC Order
- EA-13-109 Phase 1 Design Description; Revision 0 -
- EC-27227; Hardened Pipe Vent; Revision 0
-
- EC-28338; Heavy Load Drop Evaluation of Pipe Assemblies for Hardened Pipe Vent Project;
- March 29, 2017 -
- NF-119034-3; # 11 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System; Revision 76
-
- NH-36051; P&ID Diesel Oil System; Revision 85 -
- NX-9288-7-2; Electrical Schematic Standby Gas Treatment System C-24B & C-87B; Revision 79 -
- NX-9288-8-1; Electrical Ass'y Remote Console Gas Treatment Units (PNL C-24A & C-24B); Revision 77 -
- SK-EC-27227-NF-118086; Hard Pipe Vent Stack Piping Isometrics; Revision 0 -
- SK-EC-27227-NF-118086-1; Hard Pipe Vent Stack Piping Isometrics; Revision 0 -
- WCR 545768-01-01;
- FS-3236 Vent Line; October 13, 2016
-
-
- WO 540338; Modify Vent Pipe and Install HPV Check Valve; March 13, 2017
-
- WO 540338; Rigging Evaluation; March 16, 2017 -
- FS-3236 Install Tee in to 2" Vent Piping; January 9, 2017 -
- FIC-2942; Revision 10 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing - 0255-06-IA-1; HPCI Quarterly Pump and Valve Tests; Revision 99 - 41111-PM; HPCI Coupling and alignment Checks HPCI Turbine Oil Filter Changeout; Revision 24 -
- CAP 1554210;
- NX-9288-8-1 Does Not Match Plant February 8, 2017 -
- NE-36858-5; #1AR Reserve Transformer Secondary
- ACB 152-610 Control; Revision 77 -
- NH-36881; Standby Gas Treatment Flow Diagram; Revision 79 -
- NX-8875-9-20; Power & Control Circuits, Unit 201; Revision 78 -
- PMT-C-87A, N3348 Contactor,
- CB-1 Breaker and Raychem Splices, "A" Standby Gas Treatment Panel; February 08, 2017 -
- PMT-FIC-2942 & Partial Turnover; March 30, 2017 -
- PT-1130 Instrument Isolation Valve Leaks Internally,
- PT-1130 PMT, -
- PM-4850-506 (152-506) P-201A (11 CRD Pump) PMT; March 10, 2017 -
-
- MO-2106 Packing Leak PMT; February 14, 2017
-
- MO-2106 PMT; February 13, 2017
-
- PMT-FIC-2941; March 30, 2017 -
- WO 549466-01; 0255-06-IA; HPCI Valve OP Test Rated Pressure; March 23, 2017
-
- WO 549466-01; Troubleshooting Plan; December 20, 2016 -
- WO 561121-01; Failure to Open
- HO-7 Turbine Stop Valve During PMT; March 22, 2017 1R22 Surveillance Testing - 0081; Control Rod Drive Scram Insertion Time Test; Revision 70 - 0081; Control Rod Drive SCRAM Insertion Time Test; Revision 70 - 0081; Control Rod Drive SCRAM Insertion Time Test; Revision 70
- 0468-01A; EFT Charcoal Filter Laboratory Test; Revision 12
- 2300 Attachment; Reactivity Maneuvering Steps; Revision 0 Amendment 175 - B.01.03.05; HCU Restoration; Revision 47 - B.05.05.05; Control Rod Movement; Revision 21 -
- CAP 1546846; Control Rod 14-27 Failed to Insert during 2300
-
- CAP 1550101; 12 SBLC Pump Discharge Pressure Change During 0255-02-III
-
-
- FG-EP-WI-18; Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicator Guidance; Revision 1 -
- NH-170037; Main Control Room CRV/EFT System; Revision 81 -
- NX-8292-12-1; HPCI System Shutdown; Revision 78
-
- NX-8292-12-2; HPCI System Shutdown; Revision 78
- Technical Specification 3.7.4; Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System;
- Technical Specification 3.7.5; Control Room Ventilation System; Amendment 154
- Technical Specification 5.5.6; Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP); Amendment 181 -
- WO 518806-04; 0081 Control Rod Drive Scram Insertion Time Test; January 27, 2017 -
- WO 518806-04; High Risk Plan; January 27, 2017
-
- WO 547349; 0255-02-III, SBLC
- Pump Inservice Test; February 9, 2017
-
- 1EP6 Drill Evaluation -
- RQ-SS-143; Simulator Exercise Guide - Group 1 Isolation with LONOP Requiring Manual Initiation of HPCI to Recover Reactor Level; Revision 0
- 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification -
- FP-PA-PI-01; Performance Indicator Control; Revision 11 -
- FP-PA-PI-02; NRC/INPO/WANO Performance Indicator Reporting; Revision 11
-
- FP-R-PI-01; Preparation of NRC Performance Indicators; Revision 5
- Monticello Station Log Entries; January 2016 through December 2016 -
- PRA-CALC-05-003; MSPI Basis Document; Revision 6
-
- QF-0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal - 1st Quarter 2016; April 6, 2016 -
- QF-0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal - 2nd Quarter 2016; July 7, 2016 -
- QF-0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal - 2nd Quarter 2016; June 9, 2016 -
- QF-0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal - 2nd Quarter 2016; May 10, 2016
-
- QF-0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal - 3rd Quarter 2016; August 5, 2016 -
- QF-0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal - 3rd Quarter 2016; October 7, 2016 -
- QF-0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal - 3rd Quarter 2016; September 9, 2016 -
- QF-0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal - 4th Quarter 2016; December 6, 2016 -
- QF-0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal - 4th Quarter 2016; January 6, 2016 -
- QF-0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal - 4th Quarter 2016; November 2, 2016
- 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems - ACMP HPCI System Monitoring for Water Accumulation and Leakage; Revision 3 - ACMP Steam Leak at RO4001; Revision 1 -
- CAP 1521841; Ops Crew Briefings for
- FP-OP-ACM-01, Adverse Cond Monitoring -
-
- CAP 1527280; NOS ID:
- ACMP for
- RO-4001 Steam Leak Untimely
-
- CAP 1527308; Equipment Challenges Following Severe Weather
-
- CAP 1529200; DRUM Issue Identified Low Level Behavior Issues
-
- CAP 1529738; Site DRUM:
- Possible Trend in Unexpected Alarms -
- CAP 1529748; Site CRUM:
- Possible Adverse Trend in Loggable Events
-
- CAP 1529757;
- FI-4955 Flow Rate Below ACMP Trigger
-
-
- CAP 1530226; Oil Leak from
- MO-2007 Actuator -
- CAP 1530752; Potential Adverse Trend in Zone Alarms During July
-
- CAP 1532266; NOS ID:
-
-
- CAP 1532765; Potential Adverse Trend:
- Worker Practices
-
- CAP 1532845; Cognitive Trend in Contamination in Unposted Areas -
- CAP 1533395; #12 Recirculation Pump Upper Seal Pressures Increasing -
- CAP 1533869; Potential Trend Engineering Change Quality
-
- CAP 1533888; Security Self I'd Problem Resolution Rate KPI Turned Red
-
-
- CAP 1534754; Increasing Rate of Rise on the #12 Recirculation Pump Upper Pressure -
-
-
- CAP 1536340; Vibration Trend is Rising on P-2A
-
- CAP 1536340; Vibration Trend is Rising on P-2A
-
- CAP 1536560; P-2A, #11 Rx Feed Pump Vibes Exceeded 4.2 Mils -
- CAP 1536743; Increase in Bearing Cap Vibration on 11RFP -
- CAP 1537182; Negative Step Change in Vibrations on P-2A
-
-
-
- CAP 1537844; Potential Degraded Fan Belt Trend -
-
-
- CAP 1539357; Potential Trend in Maintenance Work in Electrical Panels
-
- CAP 1539719;
- CV-1003 Cycling Intermittently -
- CAP 1540239;
- RO-4001 Leaking From Furmanite Housing
-
- CAP 1543170;
- LS-23-98 May Not Be Functioning Properly -
-
- CAP 1544250;
- PI-4430A, V-EAC-14A Compressor Oil Press Ind, Oil Leak -
- CAP 1545998;
-
- CAP 1546068;
- MO-2036 (HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY) Leaking
-
- CAP 1553131;
- SW-MIC Pitting Detected In Line
- ESW1-3-HBD EFT Building
-
- EWI-11.01.13; System condition Monitoring Program; Revision 2 -
- FP-OP-ACM-01; Adverse Condition Monitoring Plan Process; Revision 1 4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion -
- CAP 1417977; Failure of Drywell to Torus Vacuum Breakers to Close -
- CAP 1418471;
- AO-2382A Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Closed Indication Anomaly -
- CAP 1478212; Interference Observed on
- AO-2382A Vacuum Breaker Actuator -
- CAP 1478212; Maintenance Rule Evaluation; May 8, 2015
-
- CE
- 1490632; Condition Evaluation Re-evaluating
- AO-2382A Dual Indication in Early 2014 and Interference Observed on
- AO-2382A during the 2015 RFO; April 5, 2016 4OA5 Other Activities -
- 1543881; Snapshot Assessment Report; December 19, 2016 - 2014-02; Turbine Building Outside; Revision 28
- 2014-02 Turbine Building Operational Log ( Nightshift); April 20, 2016 - 2014-02 Turbine Building Operational Log ( Nightshift); August 6, 2016 - 2014-02 Turbine Building Operational Log ( Nightshift); December 25, 2016
- 2014-02 Turbine Building Operational Log ( Nightshift); June 18, 2016
- 2014-02 Turbine Building Operational Log ( Nightshift); October 2, 2016
- 2014-02 Turbine Building Operational Log (Dayshift); January 1, 2017
- 2014-02 Turbine Building Operational Log (Dayshift); March 7, 2016 - 2014-02 Turbine Building Operational Log (Dayshift); May 26, 2016 - 2014-02 Turbine Building Operational Log (Dayshift); November 24, 2016
- 2014-02 Turbine Building Operational Log (Dayshift); September 5, 2016
- 2014-02; Temporary Change Request 025-C; (Turbine building Outside); December 16, 2014
- 2023; Reactor Building Operational Log (Dayshift); January 1, 2017 - 2023; Reactor Building Operational Log (Dayshift); July 24, 2016 - 2023; Reactor Building Operational Log (Dayshift); March 7, 2016
- 2023; Reactor Building Operational Log (Dayshift); May 26, 2016
- 2023; Reactor Building Operational Log (Dayshift); November 24, 2016
- 2023; Reactor Building Operational Log (Nightshift); April 20, 2016
- 2023; Reactor Building Operational Log (Nightshift); August 6, 2016 - 2023; Reactor Building Operational Log (Nightshift); December 25, 2016 - 2023; Reactor Building Operational Log (Nightshift); February 23, 2017
- 2023; Reactor Building Operational Log (Nightshift); June 18, 2016
- 2023; Reactor Building Operational Log (Nightshift); October 2, 2016
- 2023; Reactor Building Outside; Revision 50 - 2023; Temporary Change Request 048-A (Reactor Outside); December 16, 2014 - 2030; Control Room Log; Revision 94
- 2030; Control Room Operational Log (Dayshift); January 1, 2017
- 2030; Control Room Operational Log (Dayshift); July 24, 2016
- 2030; Control Room Operational Log (Dayshift); March 7, 2016 - 2030; Control Room Operational Log (Dayshift); May 26, 2016
- 2030; Control Room Operational Log (Dayshift); November 24, 2016 - 2030; Control Room Operational Log (Dayshift); September 5, 2016 - 2030; Control Room Operational Log (Nightshift); August 6, 2016
- 2030; Control Room Operational Log (Nightshift); December 25, 2016
- 2030; Control Room Operational Log (Nightshift); February 23, 2017
- 2030; Control Room Operational Log (Nightshift); June 18, 2016
- 2030; Temporary Change Request 092-B (Control Room Log); December 16, 2014 - 3271; Operations Memo 12-11, Potential Issue with Loss of a Single Phase of Power - Byron Station OE; February 16, 2012 - 3271; Operations Memo 12-19, Issuance of New AOP in Response to Byron OE;
- March 15, 2012 - ACMP
- 1518988; Adverse Condition Monitoring Plan for 2RS XFMR Secondary B Phase Bushing Temperature; Initiated April 20, 2016; Terminated October 7, 2016 - ACMP
- 1523745; Adverse Condition Monitoring Plan for X50/X70 CT Substation 13.8 KV Supply Fused Disconnect - C Phase; Initiated June 2, 2016; Terminated June 10, 2016 - ACMP
- 1526550;
- Adverse Condition Monitoring Plan for 8N4 Circuit Breaker Hotspot; Initiated October 27, 2016; Terminated February 16, 2017 - C.4-B.09.06.D; Non-Essential Bus Abnormal Phase Voltage; Revision 6 - C.4-B.09.06.D; Non-Essential Bus Abnormal Phase Voltage; Revision 0
- C.6-004-C-31; Annunciator Response Procedure - Recirculation Drive Motor A Trip; Revisions 3 & 4 - C.6-004-C-32; Annunciator Response Procedure - Recirculation Drive Motor B Trip; Revisions 3 & 4 - C.6-006-A-06; Annunciator Response Procedure - Reactor Feed Pump P-2A Trip; Revisions 3 & 9 - C.6-006-A-07; Annunciator Response Procedure - Reactor Feed Pump P-2B Trip; Revisions 4 & 10 - C.6-006-A-08; Annunciator Response Procedure - Condensate Pump P-1A Trip; Revisions 1 & 5 - C.6-006-A-09; Annunciator Response Procedure - Condensate Pump P-1B Trip;
- Revisions 2 & 6 - C.6-006-A-11; Annunciator Response Procedure - Reactor Feed Pump P-2A Overload; Revisions 1 & 2 - C.6-006-A-12; Annunciator Response Procedure - Reactor Feed Pump P-2B Overload; Revisions 1 & 2 - C.6-006-A-13; Annunciator Response Procedure - Condensate Pump P-1A Overload; Revisions 2 & 3 - C.6-006-A-14; Annunciator Response Procedure - Condensate Pump P-1B Overload; Revisions 2 & 3 - C.6-006-C-09; Annunciator Response Procedure - Circulating Water Pump P-100A Trip; Revisions 1 & 3 - C.6-006-C-10; Annunciator Response Procedure - Circulating Water Pump P-100B Trip; Revisions 1 & 3 -
- CAP 1325353;
- OE-IERL2-12-14 Scram Resulting from a Design Vulnerability
-
- CAP 1326520; C.6-102-A-01 -
- CAP 1431468; Thermal Anomaly Found on 8N4 Circuit Breaker -
- CAP 1459957; Control Room Indication for 1AR Voltage is High Out of Band
-
- CAP 1482541; 1AR Voltage on C-08 is High Out of Specification
-
- CAP 1483850; Isophase Bus Duct Temperature Higher Than Expected
-
- CAP 1497967; Control Room Voltage Indication for 1AR Transformer High -
-
- CAP 1518988; Type 2 Operational Decision Making Issue (ODMI) Evaluation - 2RS XFMR Secondary B Phase Bushing Return to Service Decision; June 13, 2016 -
- CAP 1518988; Type 2 Operational Decision Making Risk Matrix; June 10, 2016
-
- CAP 1523745; Hotspot at the C Phase Pivot Pin for X50/X70 Transformer
-
- CAP 1523969; Type 1 Operational Decision Making Issue (ODMI) Evaluation - 2RS XFMR Secondary B- Phase Bushing; June 3, 2016 -
- CAP 1526550; Step Change in Hotspot Temperature on 8N4
-
- CAP 1526554; Hotspot Identified on 8N9 Circuit Breaker
-
- CAP 1527136; Multiple Substation Hot Spots
-
- CAP 1530258; Hot Spot Detected on 1N7 The 13.8 KV B Disconnect C Phase -
- 01543881 -
- EWI-04.05.01; Thermography Program; Revision 13
-
- LPN-MT-ILT-AOP-030L; Licensed Operator Requalification Training Records - Abnormal Phase Voltage; August-October 2014 - Various Specific Operator Training Dates for Twelve
- SRO/RO's Sampled - M-8119S-140; Simulator Exercise Guide - Abnormal Phase Voltage; Revision 2 -
- MT-ILT-AOP-030L; Lesson Plan - Abnormal Phase Voltage; Revision 0 and Changes 1 & 2
-
- MT-LOR-12C-004S; Cycle 12C - C.4-B.09.06.D; Revision 0
-
- MT-LOR-16B-003S; Lesson Plan - Cycle 16B Integrated Scenarios; Revision 0 and Changes 1 & 2 -
- NF-36397; Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram 4160V System Buses 13, 14, 15, &16;
- Revision 79 -
- OWI-02.03; Operator Rounds; Revision 25
-
- SEG-LOR-12C-004S ; Licensed Operator Requalification Training Records - Cycle
- 12C - C.4.B.09.06.D; August-October 2014 - Various Specific Operator Training Dates for Twelve SRO/RO's Sampled -
- SEG-MT-LOR-16B-003S; Licensed Operator Requalification Training Records - Cycle 16B Integrated Scenarios; March/April 2016 - Various Specific Operator Training Dates for Twelve
- SRO/RO's Sampled -
- SEG-MT-M8119S-140; Licensed Operator Requalification Training Records - Abnormal Phase Voltage; October/November 2012 & October-November 2014 - Various Specific Operator Training Dates for Twelve SRO/RO's Sampled -
- TD-8N4 Inspect B Phase Bolted Connection on Circuit Breaker; March 1, 2017 -
- WO 530571; ELEC 3750-01 Thermography Substation and Transformers; May 2, 2016
-
- WO 531967; ELEC 3750-01 Thermography Substation and Transformers; June 1, 2016
-
- TD-X01/XFMR - Perform Elect PM (during
- RFO 28); March 2, 2017
-
- WO 534953; ELEC 3750-01 Thermography Substation and Transformers; June 29, 20016 -
- WO 536795; ELEC 3750-01 Thermography Substation and Transformers; August 2, 2016 -
- WO 538708; ELEC 3750-01 Thermography Substation and Transformers; August 30, 2016
-
- TD-2RS Repair Hot Spot on 2RS XFMR Secondary B-Phase; March 8, 2017
-
- WO 545680; ELEC 3750-01 Thermography Substation and Transformers; January 6, 2017
-
- WO 547910; Repair Bolted Connection on 8N9 Circuit Breaker; July 1, 2016 (OPEN NOT IN
- RFO 28 SCOPE) -
- WR 124994; Hotspot at C Phase Pivot Pin for X50/X70 Transformer; June 8, 2016 -
- WR 126364; Hot Spot Detected on 1N7 The 13.8 KV Circuit Breaker Disconnect;
- October 20, 2016
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- USED [[]]
CRD Control Rod Drive
- HP [[]]
- IPE [[]]
EE Individual Plant Examination of External Events
kV Kilovolt
NCV Non-Cited Violation NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PI Performance Indicator PM Planned or Preventative Maintenance
- RC [[]]
IC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
- SB [[]]