ML21013A422

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Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000263/2020010
ML21013A422
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/13/2021
From: Hironori Peterson
Region 3 Branch 3
To: Conboy T
Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
References
IR 2020010
Download: ML21013A422 (16)


See also: IR 05000263/2020010

Text

January 13, 2021

Mr. Thomas Conboy

Site Vice President

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

Northern States Power Company, Minnesota

2807 West County Road 75

Monticello, MN 55362-9637

SUBJECT:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - BIENNIAL PROBLEM

IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT

05000263/2020010

Dear Mr. Conboy:

On December 4, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem

identification and resolution inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant and

discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. D. Barker, Plant Manager, and other members

of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations

implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating,

and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations

and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the

team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported

nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating

experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of

these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious

work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these

programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found

no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your

employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several

means available.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

T. Conboy

2

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection

and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document

Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public

Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Hironori Peterson, Chief

Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000263

License No. DPR-22

Enclosure:

As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

ML21013A422

SUNSI Review

Non-Sensitive

Sensitive

Publicly Available

Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE RIII

RIII

NAME

NShah:wc via email

HPeterson via email

DATE

1/12/2021

1/13/2021

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000263

License Number:

DPR-22

Report Number:

05000263/2020010

Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-010-0032

Licensee:

Northern States Power Company, Minnesota

Facility:

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

Location:

Monticello, MN

Inspection Dates:

November 16, 2020 to December 04, 2020

Inspectors:

J. Draper, Health Physicist

J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector

N. Shah, Project Engineer

J. Weigandt, Reactor Engineer

Approved By:

Hironori Peterson, Chief

Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

2

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees

performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The

Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of

commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer

https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

3

PLANT STATUS

Monticello operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with

their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met

consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection

Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,

observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance

with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President

of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), regional

inspectors were directed to begin telework. During this time regional baseline inspections were

evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could

be performed remotely. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site.

The inspection documented below was determined that the objectives and requirements stated

in the IP could be completed remotely.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution

Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensees corrective action

program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety

conscious work environment.

Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the

corrective action programs effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating,

and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of

the Part 21 process.

Operating Experience, Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors

assessed the effectiveness of the stations processes for use of operating

experience, audits and self-assessments.

Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the

effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-

conscious work environment.

4

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment

71152B

Assessment of the Corrective Action Program

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each

of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Generally, issues were screened and evaluated consistent with the guidance in licensee

procedure FP-PA-ARP-01, CAP Process, revision 58. However, the team did identify some

examples where issues were either improperly handled or weaknesses in the CAP process;

these are discussed in the appropriate subsection below.

Effectiveness of Problem Identification

Overall, the station was effective at identifying issues at a low threshold and was properly

entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) as required by station procedures.

During interviews, workers were familiar with how to enter issues into the CAP and stated that

they were encouraged to use it to document issues. The team determined that the station

was generally effective at identifying negative trends that could potentially impact nuclear

safety. For the areas reviewed, the team did not identify any issues in the area of problem

identification.

The team identified a missed opportunity to identify a potential generic station issue with

configuration/status control during the performance and subsequent screening of apparent

cause evaluation for CAP 501000045769, CV-1502 Demand Signal Went to 100%. This

evaluation discussed a prior event documented in the Root Cause for

CAP 5010000028365, AS-78, AS-79 Found Open. In both events, the cause was

inappropriate configuration/status controls used during work activities by workers in

maintenance (instrumentation and controls) and operations, respectively. The apparent

cause did not address whether the occurrence of similar issues for similar causes potentially

indicated a generic issue with configuration/status controls. In fact, the apparent cause

simply documented the prior event with no evaluation of its applicability or influence. Since

the corrective actions were limited to the specific work groups, based on its recurrence, there

is a potential that more generic actions are needed. The licensee documented this issue as

CAP item 501000046645.

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

In-depth reviews of a risk-informed sampling of condition reports (CRs), work orders (WOs),

and root and apparent cause and condition evaluations were completed. The team

determined that the licensee had established a low threshold for entering deficiencies into the

CAP, that the issues were generally being appropriately prioritized and evaluated for

resolution, and that corrective actions (CAs) were implemented to mitigate the future risk of

issues occurring that could affect overall system operability and/or reliability.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in developing CAs that were

appropriately focused to correct the identified problem and to address the root and

contributing causes for significant conditions adverse to quality to preclude repetition. The

5

licensee generally completed CAs in a timely manner and in accordance with procedural

requirements commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. For NRC-identified

issues, the team determined that the licensee generally assigned CAs that were effective and

timely.

For issues identified as Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ), station procedure

FP-PA-ARP-01, required that they be documented in the CAP and screened as either level

"A, B or C" commensurate with the risk and level of evaluation needed to assess the issue.

Those classified as level "C" were typically well understood and of low risk, and therefore

required only a condition evaluation instead of a root or apparent cause evaluation.

Regardless of the classification, each CAQ was required to have an associated corrective

action assigned.

NRC regulation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, states that measures shall be

established to ensure that Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ), such as failures,

malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-

conformances are promptly identified and corrected. Attachment 8 to FP-PA-ARP-01,

further clarified that corrective actions associated with CAQs, should be completed as soon

as possible, not to exceed the next refueling outage. However, this requirement was only

applied to "A" and "B" level CAPs; For CAQs associated with "C" level CAPs, the Attachment

has no backstop for completing corrective actions, and they can be postponed indefinitely.

Some examples identified by the inspectors included CAP items 501000015382, Internal

Flooding Concerns, and 501000035317, Essential Service Water Division II Insulated, not

Per Calculation. Both of these CAPs documented issues with design documents for safety-

related components. These issues were correctly classified as CAQs and screened as level

"C" CAPs, as the issues were well understood and determined not to affect operability.

However, the team identified that the associated corrective actions had been extended

several times due primarily to resource availability and remained open. For example,

CAP 5010000015382, which was identified on 8/8/2018, had a current due date of 12/9/2020;

and CAP 501000035317 which was identified on 12/4/2019, had a current due date of

12/9/2020. During this review, the inspectors concluded that both issues were likely to be

extended again, leaving the CAQs uncorrected. The team questioned whether the verbiage

in FP-PA-ARP-01 resulted in inappropriate, disparate treatment for CAQs based on the CAP

screening, which, in this case, resulted in the above two CAQs, remaining uncorrected,

contrary to Criterion XVI of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The licensee documented this issue

as CAP item 501000046796. Because there were no open operability or safety concerns, the

inspectors concluded that the failure to timely correct the CAQs was minor in nature.

Assessment

71152B

Assessment of Operating Experience and Self-Assessment and Audits

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance in the use of

Operating Experience (OE) and Self-Assessments and Audits adequately supported nuclear

safety.

Use of Operating Experience

The licensee routinely screened industry and NRC OE information for station applicability.

Based on these initial screenings, the licensee-initiated actions in the CAP to fully evaluate

the impact, if any, to the station. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented

in a timely manner to prevent similar issues from occurring. Operating Experience lessons-

6

learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations.

During the 5-year review of the Part 21 process, the team identified one example of a

Part 21 report applicable to the station that was improperly reviewed. Specifically,

CAP 501000031467, documented a Part 21 associated with Westinghouse Nuclear Safety

Advisory Letter (NSAL) 19-2, issued in September 2019. This NSAL, documented an issue

with Size 1 Freedom Series contactors failing to release/open when de-energized under

certain conditions. Westinghouse had determined that Monticello had these contactors and

recommended that an evaluation be performed to determine the site impact. During CAP

screening, this issue was classified as a non-CAP item, meaning that it was not considered

a CAQ. As a consequence, it was considered of low priority and assigned a due date of

December 2020 to complete the evaluation. In the interim, no action was taken to determine

if the contactors were used at Monticello, specifically in any safety-related application.

Subsequently, after prompting by the NRC, the licensee determined that the contactors were

installed in safety-related equipment, but that the specific conditions described in the NSAL

for inoperability, were not present; therefore, the contactors (and by extension, the affected

equipment) were operable. Although the inspectors had no issues with the operability

assessment, given that the NSAL potentially affected safety-related components at

Monticello, it should have been classified as a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ), consistent

with Attachment 5 to FP-PA-ARP-01, instead of a non-CAP item. The licensee documented

the failure to properly screen and correct this issue as CAP item 5010000046791. Because

there were no safety or operability concerns, the inspectors concluded that the failure to

properly characterize and evaluate this issue was minor in nature.

Self-Assessments and Audits

The inspectors reviewed several audits and self-assessments and deemed those sampled as

thorough and intrusive with regards to following up with the issues that were identified

through previous NRC inspections and in the self-assessments and fleet oversight audits.

Reviewed corrective actions for the identified issues were deemed reasonable and completed

commensurate with their safety significance. The inspectors regarded licensee performance

as adequately self-critical of their own performance and that performance-related issues were

being identified through their self-assessment process.

Assessment

71152B

Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

The team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work

environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these

programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, workers at

the station expressed freedom to raise and enter safety concerns through any one of the

various avenues available to them, and the team encountered no indications of chilling or

retaliation. Finally, all plant personnel interviewed were aware of the Employee Concerns

Program and expressed a willingness to use it as an avenue to raise concerns, if desired.

In addition, the team included questions on the topic of the ongoing extended COVID

pandemic and the associated changes to plant staffing, including extended use of telework, to

assess for any negative impacts on safety performance or overall safety culture both for the

individuals and the organization. Employees consistently communicated the belief that

sufficient competency, engagement, resources, and commitment exist at the station to

maintain high performance standards at the site.

7

In July 2020, the licensee completed a safety culture assessment of the site. Overall, the

licensee concluded that an appropriate environment existed for the raising and addressing of

concerns and that workers felt comfortable using the various processes available. However,

an issue was identified in the Program Engineering group, specifically that engineering

management was ineffectively prioritizing work and that insufficient resources existed to

handle the workload. As a result, there was a potential for certain activities, that may affect

conditions adverse to quality, not being completed. The licensee had captured this issue in

the CAP and developed an action plan to address it. Although it was too early to assess its

effectiveness, the inspectors concluded that this plan appeared reasonable to address the

concern.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On December 4, 2020, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and

resolution inspection results to Mr. D. Barker, Plant Manager, and other members of the

licensee staff.

8

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71152B

Corrective Action

Documents

500001552560

Service Water Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC)

Pitting Detected in Line ESW1-3-H

03/08/2017

500001552684

Service Water-Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC)

Pitting Detected in Line ESW1-3-H

03/09/2017

501000000027

Elevation of High-Pressure Coolant Injection Trend

06/26/2017

501000006644

Target Sets Inspec URI Operator Action

12/21/2017

501000009060

Inadequate Security Search (NRC ID)

03/01/2018

501000010484

Steam Chase CAM Met ACMI Action Level

04/06/2018

501000012880

Steam Leak from Vlv Packing on AO-2-86C (ACE)

06/05/2018

501000014866

Security Manual AVBS Out of Alignment

07/26/2018

501000015382

Internal Flooding Calculation Details

08/08/2018

501000015405

DSC SVP Exam Additional Documents

08/14/2018

501000015691

Exam Control Adverse Trend (ACE)

08/15/2018

501000015701

U/I Watch Performed Under Exam Security

08/16/2018

501000015782

Environmental Qualification Cable Submergence

Documentation Issue

08/17/2018

501000016026

Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve Calculation Not Updated

for Extended Power Uprate

08/23/2018

501000016054

Incorrect Assumption in Operating Experience Evaluation

08/23/2018

501000016705

CST-103-1 / 104-1 Failed to Seat (ECE)

09/10/2018

501000018035

2018 PI&R--CE Did Not Document Extent of Condition

10/30/2018

501000018660

11 EDG Failed to Load (ECE)

10/15/2018

501000020085

Equipment Cause Evaluation: "C" Outboard Main Steam

Isolation Valve Failed to Stroke

11/16/2018

501000020222

Apparent Cause Evaluation: As Found Hydrogen Cooler

Gasket Condition

11/20/2018

501000020960

CE for the UPS-PAL-1 and 2 Recent Failures

12/11/2018

501000021275

Potential Part 21--OTBD MSIV

12/20/2018

501000022240

Equipment Cause Evaluation: P-25A Will Not Establish Flow

01/22/2019

501000022876 11-297 Incorrect Stroke Time Criteria

02/07/2019

501000022942

11 EDG Vent-Cocks Leaking

02/10/2019

9

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

501000023118

13 DG/52-710 Locked Out

02/13/2019

501000023534

V-EAC-14B Compressor Tripped During Swap

10/01/2019

501000023854

SW-21-1 & SW-22-1 Failed In-Service Test Testing

03/05/2019

501000024419

MR A(1) Determination Needed for Deferral

03/19/2019

501000025469

Drywell Dose Rates Significantly Higher

04/13/2019

501000025624

RHR DHR Hardening Issue Identified (ACE)

04/16/2019

501000026282

Past Operability Review: HPCI-14 Failed In-Service Test

04/24/2019

501000026577

Past Operability Review: Check Valve BF-14 Failed Testing

04/30/2019

501000026645

NOS: PT Indication on SR-27-2 Poppet

05/01/2019

501000026727

C.4-I (Plant Flooding) Entry (ACE)

05/22/2019

501000026921

Improperly Searched Employee Entered PA

05/06/2019

501000027212

Configuration Control Issues RFO29

05/10/2019

501000027329

Drywell Eq. Sump Alarms Coming In

05/13/2019

501000027374

1R29: 900# DW Inspection Results

05/13/2019

501000027548

Shutdown Safety Lessons Learned From ACE

05/17/2019

501000027548

Shutdown Safety (RCE)

0a

501000028099

50.59 Missed Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.46

Report

06/04/2019

501000028365

Drywell Isolation Downstream as 40

06/11/2019

501000028365

AS-78, AS-79 Found Open

06/11/2019

501000028661

  1. 11 Recirc Pump Seal Pressure Trend

06/18/2019

501000029829

Scram Discharge Volume High Level Scram Channel B2

07/21/2019

501000029837

V-EAC-14B Compressor Trip on Startup (ECE)

07/21/2019

501000030237

CRDs Refurbished Without ASME XI RR Plan

07/31/2019

501000031306

NRC P21 Fisher Butterfly Valve Taper Pins

09/10/2019

501000031370

Otbd MSIV Spec Conflicts

08/30/2019

501000031467

Westinghouse NSP-19-48/NSAL-19-2 Contact

09/04/2019

501000031593

MO-2034 Actuator Grease Discrepancy

09/09/2019

501000032300

2019 MT Outage Readiness FSA Not Perform

09/24/2019

501000034409

Bearing Defects Developing, 11 CRD Pump (CA)

11/07/2019

501000034573

Apparent Cause Evaluation: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

(RCIC) Isolation MO-2076 Times Out of Specification

11/12/2019

501000034676

Apparent Cause Evaluation: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

11/14/2019

10

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

(RCIC) Failed to Start During Component Testing

501000035317

Emergency Service Water Division II Insulated, Not Per

Calculation

02/04/2019

501000035427

NRC Part 21 with Monticello as Affected Plant

12/06/2019

501000037768

CR Received Unanticipated 13K028 Alarm

02/20/2020

501000040100

GEH SC 20-04 R0 Nameplate Discrepancy

06/25/2020

501000040114

Operating Permit Use Issue Identified (ACE)

04/29/2020

501000040138

Part 21 4KV-150/151-604-A Relay

05/04/2020

501000041066

Radioactive Shipment Not in Accordance with Manifest

05/27/2020

501000043571

Unexpected Response During ATWS Mod

08/06/2020

501000044981

Water Leak 962 RWPR RWCU Phase Sep Room

10/01/2020

501000045576

Downscale of NLO Must Perform Tasks

10/16/2020

501000045769

CV-1502 Demand Signal Went to 100 Percent

10/22/2020

501000046175

13 Batt. Pos. Post Bulging/Seal Leaks

11/05/2020

501000046204

LS-23-90/1 Leaking Steam

11/05/2020

501000046365

MO-3502 Diagnostic Test Follow-Up Items

11/13/2020

501000046402

Foreign Material Exclusion in 3 Cells of 13 Diesel Generator

Battery

11/13/2020

501000046495

Scope Addition to MT X-Ray Project

11/18/2020

501000046639

Part 21 SC 20-06 Rev 0 Issued

11/24/2020

601000000530

GE SIL No. 681

10/17/2018

601000000856

2020 NRC Part 21 Reports with Monticello Not Listed

02/05/2020

601000000911

GE SIL No. 684, Rev 0--Noble Chem TM Plating

04/14/2020

610000000546

Industry Operating Experience Evaluation: Flow Accelerated

Corrosion Leak on Reactor Water Clean Up Missed by

Ultrasonic Examination (UT) Technique

07/02/2019

610000000639

SIL 682 R0 Flow Induced Vibration Load

07/23/2019

610000000824

Limerick LER Multiple Trains of RHRSW Inoperable for

Greater than Time Allowed by Technical Specifications due

to Pipe Corrosion

12/06/2019

610000000851

GE SIL No. 683 Rev. 0 OP-Amp Board Polyur

12/20/2019

610000000868

Industry OE for Bolt Failure in ESW Pump

01/14/2020

610000000882

Industry Operating Experience Evaluation: Fermi Non-Cited

05/09/2020

11

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Violation 2020 Torus Coating Issues

610000000897

Industry Operating Experience Evaluation: Dresden

Feedwater Nozzle

07/03/2020

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

501000046645

Missed Opportunity IN ACE Internal OE

11/23/2020

501000046784

PI&R Activity Closed Without Note

12/01/2020

501000046791

PI&R: GAP IN Severity & Timeliness: NSAL-19-2

11/30/2020

501000046796

Observations of Potential GAP in FP-PA-ARP-01

12/01/2020

501000046823

PI&R: CAP Not Submitted to SRO Screening

12/02/2020

501000046844

Opportunity in CAP Formatting

12/03/2020

501000046845

Missed Tracking Assignment for Corrective Action

12/03/2020

501000046850

PI&R: Inconsistent Use of CAP Fields

12/03/2020

Miscellaneous

Licensee Event

Report 05000-

263/2019-002-00

Tso Manual Primary Containment Isolation Valves Found

Open Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical

Specifications

06/11/2019

N/A

Corrective Action Program Pre-Screening Meeting

11/18/2020

N/A

Operating Experience Pre-Screening Meeting

11/18/2020

N/A

Corrective Action Program Screening Meeting

11/19/2020

N/A

Plant Heath Committee Meeting

11/20/2020

N/A

Performance Assessment Review Board (PARB) Meeting

11/24/2020

NA

Corrective Action Program Pre-Screening Meeting

11/30/2020

NA

Corrective Action Program Screening Meeting

11/30/2020

Procedures

4AWI-05.04.03

Valve Packing

4

9111-05

Decay Heat Removal Hardening

1

9111-05

Decay Heat Removal Hardening

5

FP-E-P21-01

10 CFR Part 21 Evaluations

6

FP-E-SE-03

10CFR50.59 and 72.48 Processes

13

FP-G-DOC-04

Procedure Processing

40

FP-OP-OL-01

Operability/Functionality Determination

21

FP-OP-OL-01

Operability

22

FP-PA-ARP-01

CAP Process

58

FP-PA-EVAL-01

Evaluation Methods

6

12

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

FP-PA-OL-01

Operability

22

FP-PA-PAR-01

Performance Assessment Review Board and Performance

Assessment Oversight

17

FP-PA-SA-03

Snapshot Evaluation

8

FP-STND-NSC-

01

Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Process

9

FP-T-SAT-71

NRC Exam Security Requirements

12

OWI-01.03

Operations Communications Standard

53

Self-Assessments

Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment June/July 2020

07/23/2020

600000542411

Integrated Performance Monitoring: Operations 1st and 2nd

Quarter 2019

1

600000613359

Operations Dept. Excellence Summary - Oct. 2019

10/30/2019

606000000691

Snapshot Self-Assessment: 50.59 71111/17T

11/14/2019

606000000694

Snapshot Self-Assessment: External Flooding FP-PE-IMEP-

01

11/14/2019

606000000704

FSA: Outage Readiness

11/14/2019

606000000705

FSA: Electrical Safety Governance

07/17/2020

606000000859

2019 Corrective Action Quality Closure Self-Assessment

02/21/2019

606000001073

FSA: Problem Identification and Resolution at MNGP

11/13/2020

606000001092

INPO Plant Evaluation of Watts Bar

12/19/2020

606000001103

Self-Assessment on CAQ Work Orders

11/07/2019

A-CAP-MNGP-

2018-1

MNGP NOS Corrective Action Program Audit 2018

03/07/2018

A-DES-MNGP-

2020-1

2020 Nuclear Oversight Audit of Monticello Nuclear

Generating Plant Design Control

07/16/2020

A-MAINT-MNGP-

2019-1

Maintenance (Nuclear Oversight Audit Report)

07/11/2019

A-PROG-MNGP-

2020-1

2020 Nuclear Oversight Audit of Monticello Nuclear

Generating Plant Programs (PROG)

03/27/2020

MO-20-08

Employee Concern Issue Plan

11/23/2020

N/A

Xcel Energy Survey: Safety Conscious Work Environment

07/23/2020

N/A

Integrated Performance Monitoring: Engineering

3rd Quarter

2018

13

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

N/A

Xcel Fleet: Engineering Department Excellence Summary

March 2019

N/A

Xcel Fleet: Engineering Department Excellence Summary

March 2020

N/A

Xcel Fleet: Engineering Department Excellence Summary

January

2020

N/A

Xcel Fleet: Engineering Department Excellence Summary

July 2020

N/A

Integrated Performance Monitoring: Engineering

2nd Quarter

2019

NA

Operations Dept. Excellence Summary - Aug 2020

08/04/2020

NA

Operations Dept. Excellence Summary - Jan 2020

01/23/2020

NA

Operations Dept. Excellence Summary - Apr 2020

04/27/2020

NA

Operations Dept. Excellence Summary - Oct 2020

10/07/2020