IR 05000263/2023003

Integrated Inspection Report 05000263/2023003 and 07200058/2023001

ML23313A208
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	11/13/2023
From:	Hironori Peterson NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB3
To:	Hafen S Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
References
IR 2023001
Download: ML23313A208 (1)

Text

November 13, 2023

SUBJECT:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2023003 AND 07200058/2023001

Dear Shawn Hafen:

On September 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. On October 25, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Signed by Peterson, Hironori on 11/13/23 Hironori Peterson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000263 and 07200058 License No. DPR-22

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000263 and 07200058 License Number: DPR-22 Report Numbers: 05000263/2023003, 07200058/2023001 Enterprise Identifier: I2023003-0054, I2023001-0111 Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Location: Monticello, MN Inspection Dates: July 01, 2023 to September 30, 2023 Inspectors: N. Bolling, Project Engineer T. McGowan, Resident Inspector C. Norton, Senior Resident Inspector K. Pusateri, Resident Inspector D. Sargis, Health Physicist D. Tesar, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By: Hironori Peterson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Meet Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.1.3, Condition E, for Individual Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green [H.14] - 71111.15 NCV 05000263/202300301 Conservative Open/Closed Bias A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (TS)

(LCO) 3.6.1.3, Condition E, individual leakage of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) during power operations, was identified when the licensee failed to enter the TS LCO required action statement for leakage exceeding acceptance criteria.

Inadequate Procedures Resulting in Loss of Safety Function and Loss of Control Room Habitability Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green None (NPP) 71152A NCV 05000263/202300302 Open/Closed A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions,

Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to implement proper procedures to control steam leaks, resulting in a loss of safety function and Control Room Habitability.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000263/2023001-00 LER 2023001-00 for 71153 Closed Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Exceeds Technical Specification Requirements Due to Stem Scoring

PLANT STATUS

Monticello began the inspection at rated thermal power. At 10:00 p.m., on July 27, 2023, the licensee lowered reactor power to 90 percent to provide discharge canal temperature margin, and returned reactor power to 100 percent on July 28 at 2:00 a.m. On September 26, 2023, the licensee lowered reactor power to 75 percent for control rod pattern adjustment and turbine testing. On September 27, 2023, at 10:41 a.m., the unit experienced an unplanned scram and entered Mode 3. The unit entered Mode 4 on September 30 at 2:45 p.m. The unit remained in Mode 4 for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Division 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) starting air subsystem, while the division 2 EDG was inoperable for surveillance testing on July 24, 2023

(2) B reactor pressure system (RPS) prior to swapping A RPS from alternate to normal power supply on August 10, 2023

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Recirculation pump motor-generator set room on July 17, 2023

(2) Emergency filtration building 1st floor, division 1 on July 27, 2023

(3) Turbine building 911" elevation east motor control center (MCC) area on August 1, 2023

(4) Reactor feed pump and lube oil reservoir room on August 1, 2023

(5) Fuel pool skimmer tank room on August 2, 2023

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated external flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) Cable vaults NMH 310 and 2MH03

71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) Division 2 EDG heat exchanger

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(2 Samples)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during normal operations, discussed EOP entry for main steam line high radiation alarm on September 13, 2023.

(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during down-power and control rod friction testing on September 26, 2023.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification exam scenarios in the simulator on August 15, 2023.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Risk associated with emergent reactor water cleanup system outage to repair regenerative heat exchanger leak on August 5, 2023

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) 501000075457, general design criteria critical characteristics for commercial grade dedication of banana jacks

(2) 501000071120, AO286C packing material ejected

(3) 501000076948, Y81 momentary transfer to alternate power supply

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)

(1) (Partial)

The inspectors evaluated a forced outage starting September 27, 2023, following a reactor scram occurring during turbine control valve testing.

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system

operability and/or functionality: Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) 025502-III, standby liquid quarterly pump and valve test after division 1 standby liquid pump discharge relief valve replacement, on August 9, 2023

(2) MO2100, reactor core isolation cooling torus suction inboard valve testing after electrical and mechanical preventative maintenance on, August 16, 2023

(3) CV 1729, division 2 residual heat removal service water heat exchanger outlet valve after disc pack replacement, work order 7001061930050

(4) D 90, 120 volts direct current swing charger following routine preventive maintenance, work order 7001079650020

(5) 79TD/C24B, B standby gas treatment system time delay relay replacement, work order 70008658820

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) EDG 11 monthly surveillance test on August 08, 2023

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) Dual site demonstration drill (Monticello Nuclear Generating Station / Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station)-common emergency operations facility (EOF)capabilities demonstration drill conducted on August 21, 2023:

• Emergency preparedness drill demonstrated the response capability of the common EOF to a multi-site event. The drill included participation by offsite response organizations and was observed by inspection staff from NRC Region 3 and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region

OTHER ACTIVITIES-BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) ===

(1) July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) The inspectors evaluated effectiveness of corrective actions to address water found in cable vault 2MH03 during the August 23, 2022, cable vault inspection.

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)

(1) Corrective actions associated with corrective action program (CAP) 501000056684, EQ program health is unacceptable

71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 2023001-00, Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Exceeds Technical Specification Requirements Due to Stem Scoring (ADAMS Accession No. ML23137A275). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71111.15. This LER is

===Closed.

Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)===

(1) The inspectors evaluated unplanned reactor scram and licensees performance on September 27,

OTHER ACTIVITIES

-TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

60855 - Operation of an ISFSI Operation Of an ISFSI

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees activities related to long-term operation and monitoring of their independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). The inspectors were onsite on August 2 and August 3, 2023. During the onsite walkdown, the inspector toured the ISFSI and evaluated the material and radiological conditions of the ISFSI pad and storage system. The inspectors verified that radiological conditions on the ISFSI pad were as expected during the walkdown.

Since the last inspection, the inspectors evaluated corrective action documents and changes performed in accordance with 10 CFR 72.48, Changes, Tests, and Experiments. The inspectors also reviewed procedures and interviewed operations staff regarding daily checks on the loaded Horizontal Storage Modules.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Meet Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.1.3, Condition E, for Individual Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green [H.14] - 71111.15 NCV 05000263/202300301 Conservative Open/Closed Bias A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (TS) (LCO) 3.6.1.3, Condition E, individual leakage of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) during power operations, was identified when the licensee failed to enter the TS LCO required action statement for leakage exceeding acceptance criteria.

Description:

In June 2021, a minor packing leak on the C outboard MSIV was identified by the licensee.

C MSIV was determined to be operable, and an adverse condition monitoring plan was established by the licensee to monitor the leak. On March 4, 2023, packing material was observed on camera being ejected from the packing gland of the valve. The licensee justified continued usage of the C main steam line based on their experience with previous leakage from MSIVs. On March 21, 2023, the C outboard MSIV was declared inoperable in accordance with TS LCO 3.6.1.3, Condition E, due to indications of excessive leakage and the loss of the presumption of operability. It was concluded that March 4, 2023, was the date at which the TS limit for the individual MSIV leakage limit was exceeded.

Corrective Actions: On March 21, 2023, the licensee declared the C outboard MSIV inoperable in accordance with TS LCO 3.6.1.3, Condition E, and isolated the C main steam line. During the planned maintenance outage, the MSIV was repaired to compliance with TS LCO 3.6.1.3, Condition E, by repacking and leak testing. Additionally, during the April 2023, refuel outage, the licensee performed a full rebuild of the C outboard MSIV.

Corrective Action References: 501000071244, 501000071429, 501000071284, 501000071512, 501000071555, 501000071120, 501000073551

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees inadequate assessment of the operability of the C outboard MSIV and failure to enter the TS LCO required action statement was reasonably within their ability to foresee and correct, should have been prevented, and was therefore determined to be a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the inspectors determined if no additional actions were taken to fix the C outboard MSIV leakage, then the containment isolation system could have failed in an event.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix A, exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, to determine this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the reactor containment barrier and did not involve a failure of the containment isolation system, containment pressure control equipment, containment heat removal components, or severe accident mitigation features.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, the inspectors determined that the licensee non-conservatively continued to declare the C outboard MSIV operable despite indications that the leakage rate had exceeded the TS SR 3.6.1.3.12 maximum allowed leakage of 100 standard cubic feet per hour. The licensee justified the C outboard MSIV to be operable based on previous experiences with MSIV leakage, despite additional indications which had not previously been observed associated with MSIV leakage.

Enforcement:

Violation: SR 3.6.1.3.12 requires that the individual leakage from an individual MSIV not exceed 100 scfh. Contrary to this requirement, on March 4, 2023, the licensee continued to declare the C outboard MSIV operable despite indications that the leakage was in excess of the SR 3.6.1.3.12 acceptance criteria. This was confirmed on March 21, 2023, when the licensees as-found leakage of the C outboard MSIV was determined to be 987.1 scfh.

Documentation of this violation closes LER 2023001-00.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Inadequate Procedures Resulting in Loss of Safety Function and Loss of Control Room Habitability Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green None (NPP) 71152A NCV 05000263/202300302 Open/Closed A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to implement proper procedures to control steam leaks resulting in a loss of safety function and control room habitability.

Description:

In May 2022, an engineering evaluation (EE) was conducted by the licensee to identify current margin to the alternate source term allowed dose for the exclusion area boundary, low population zone, control room, and technical support center. Significant changes were made from previous inputs for the control room dose calculation. In addition, recommendations were made to repair hot side leaks to gain operational margin. The margin calculated during the May 5, 2022, EE, was bounded by a steam leak on MS232 being less than 2 feet in length. During a subsequent licensee inspection of the steam jet air ejector room on May 13, 2022, it was observed that additional leakage from MS242 and MS232 exceeded the bounding leak rate calculated in the EE. This was discovered after more leakage was found under the insulation, and valve packing was found to be ejected from the valve. Due to the additional steam leaks observed, the licensee declared the control room habitability inoperable per TS 3.7.4, Condition B.2, and an 8-hour non-emergency notification for being in an unanalyzed condition and loss of a safety function was made to the NRC.

Corrective Actions: Leaks were corrected and mitigated, allowing the licensee to declare the control room operable on May 20, 2022. Changes were then made to FPPE-FAC01 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) to include inspections of components within or adjacent to piping replacements for FAC and FPMA-VPI01 valve packing installation and adjustment to verify packing is properly installed before bringing the valve into service.

Corrective Action References: 501000063092, Steam Leaks Meet High Post-LOCA Dose, 501000078235, Third Quarter 2023 Exit Violation

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensees failure to provide procedures with specific instructions for the valve packing installation and adjustment program (FPMA-VPI01) and specific instructions for the flow accelerated corrosion program (FP-PE-FAC01) was a performance deficiency, and a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings. This was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and therefore was determined to be a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Based upon Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, questions number 2 to determine this finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of a single train TS system for greater than its TS-allowed outage time.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. The licensee established FP-MA-VPI01 Valve Packing and Adjustment and FP-PE-FAC01 as the implementing procedure for leakage mitigation, an activity affecting quality.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to provide adequate procedures to mitigate leakage contributing to the alternate source term. Specifically, the valve packing and adjustment procedure failed to include steps to verify proper packing was installed from the factory before placing valves in service, and the FAC procedure failed to include steps to include inspections of surrounding components during replacement of pipes subject to the flow accelerated corrosion program.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Corrective Actions for Corrective Action Program 501000065846, 71152A Water Found in Cable Vault 2MH03 The inspectors performed a detailed review of corrective action program (CAP)50100075639, Water in Vault Key 41 Door Broke. On August 1, 2023, the inspectors observed the performance of the annual cable condition monitoring program of cable vaults to inspect for water intrusion. Cable vault 2MH03 was found to have water intrusion covering the lower cable trays located within the vault. It was also noted that the vault door hinges had rotted away due to rust. FP-PE-CBL01, Rev. 5, commits to the inspection requirements of NUREG-1801, Generic Lessons Learned Report, XI.E3, which included the following aspects.

• Cables are NOT wetted or submerged.

• Cable splices and support structures are intact.

• Dewatering and/or drainage systems are functional, and operation is validated.

Safety-related cables were found to be submerged and drainage systems were found to be inadequate to prevent water intrusion. The inspectors discussed these cables with the cable monitoring program owner and concluded there was very low risk to the safety-related cables, as they were rated for submergence in water as well as low voltage cables in accordance with the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. The inspectors reviewed CAP 5010000065846, Water in 2MH03, which was written in response to the 2022 annual manhole inspection results from PM 934409. That CAP identified the same conditions that were observed in the 2023 annual inspection. EWI08.19.01 drives the program owner to generate corrective actions commensurate to the risk significance of the cables in question.

The 2022 inspection drove the program owner to create recommendations that would be incorporated within work order (WO) 700111322. On August 1, 2023, the licensee identified, as documented in CAP 501000075687, that this work order was closed with no action and the recommendations were not implemented. This action was done without consulting with the cable program owner and fully understanding the significance of the work or recommendations.

The inspectors assessed that this programmatic weakness could lead to issues of safety significance if cables were not rated for wetted environments.

No findings or violations of NRC requirements were identified by the inspectors in the course of this review.

Observation: Corrective Actions for Environmental Qualification Program Not 71152S Updated On October 4, 2021, the licensee identified and documented in the station corrective action program (CAP) 501000056684 that the environmental qualification (EQ) had not been updated since the Monticello extended power uprate in 2013. The licensee determined that of the 85 EQ files, 88 percent needed technical updates that were not performed during the extended power uprate. Subsequently, the licensee ensured that all EQ program issues affecting installed plant equipment were entered into CAP. The licensee took measures, such as adjusting drywell cooling, to ensure that EQ components installed inside primary containment would not become potentially unqualified before the 2023 refuel outage. The licensee contracted an industry EQ subject matter expert to reconstitute the Monticello EQ program. The EQ program reconstitution was completed on June 8, 2023. The resident inspectors evaluated the licensee-identified condition and determined that not performing timely updates of the EQ files following the extended power uprate was violation of 10 CFR50.49 (d). However, the violation was determined to be minor because it was associated with program updates and no components had exceeded EQ requirements. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions were appropriate and included program changes to preclude repetition.

Observation: Reactor Scram from 75 Percent Reactor Power During Turbine 71153 Testing On September 27, 2023, at 10:41 a.m., the unit experienced an unplanned scram without complications, and entered Mode 3. The unit entered Mode 4 on September 30, at 2:45 p.m.

The unit remained in Mode 4 for the remainder of the inspection period. No operator performance issues identified.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On October 25, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to S. Hafen, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On August 2, 2023, the inspectors presented the ISFSI program review inspection results to S. Hafen, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

60855 Corrective Action 501000053477 ISFSI Roof Vent Crack 06/25/2021

Documents 501000066825 ISFSI 72.212A Distance Table Update 09/29/2022

501000066832 NOS: Cracks Found on HSM4B Roof Area 09/29/2022

Corrective Action 501000075711 ISFSI Inner Fence Animal Burrow 08/02/2023

Documents 501000075739 ISFSI Contact Readings 2021 to 2022 08/03/2023

Resulting from

Inspection

Miscellaneous 72.212 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ISFSI 10 CFR 72.212 11

Evaluation Report

B11E-6170500 Monticello HSM Visual Observations 10/17/2022

L-MT23019 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report 05/10/2023

SCR230064 Scaffolding 0

Procedures 0000A Operations Daily Log Mode 1 112

1444 Pre and Post Severe Weather Inspection Checklist 22

FP-E-SE03 10 CFR 50.59 and 72.48 Processes 18

FP-MA-FSC01 Scaffolding 0

Radiation Surveys MT VSDS- Semiannual ISFSI Pad Survey 06/03/2021

M202106045

MT VSDS- Semiannual ISFSI Pad Survey 07/08/2022

M202207087

MT VSDS- Semiannual ISFSI Pad Survey 05/23/2023

M202305232

Work Orders 7001048230010 INSP ISFSI Roof for Freeze/Thaw Damage 0

71111.04 Drawings NH36051 P&ID Diesel Oil System 87

Procedures B.09.1205 Reactor Protection Power Supplies 34

ESP- Division 1 RPS-Electrical Protection Assembly 3

RPP037901

71111.05 Procedures 1123 Portable Fire Extinguishers 67

OSP-FIR0256 Fire Detection Instrumentation Test 10

Strategy A.303-A Fire Zone 3A Recirc MG Set Room 9

Strategy A.305-C Fuel Pool Skimmer Tank Room 6

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Strategy A.313-B Reactor Feed Pump and Lube Oil Reservoir Room 14

Strategy A.313-C Turbine Building 911' Elevation East MCC Area 12

71111.06 Procedures Strategy A.331-A EFT 1st Floor (Division 1) 12

Work Orders 70010730 Inspection of Manholes/Vaults for Water or Evidence of Water 0

71111.07A Engineering 608000000921 12 EDG Jacket Cooler Thermal Performance Test 140401 07/25/2022

Evaluations

Procedures 140401 EDG Emergency Service Water Heat Exchanger Performance 23

Test

71111.11Q Procedures 8397 Fuel Channel Distortion Monitoring 6

C.51300, Radioactivity Release Control 19

C.51400

Reactivity Sequence Exchange and 8397 CRD Testing 09/26/2023

Maneuvering

Steps

71111.13 Corrective Action 501000074568 Water Leakage Identified from the End Bell Area of the 06/01/2023

Documents RWCU Regenerative Heat Exchanger

71111.15 Corrective Action 501000071129 AO286C Packing Material Ejected 03/04/2023

Documents 501000076948 Y81 Trouble Alarm 09/21/2023

Corrective Action 501000075457 GDC Critical Characteristics-Banana Jacks 07/25/2023

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Engineering 608000000992 C Outboard MSIV Leakage Evaluation 03/21/2023

Evaluations

Procedures B.09.1301 Ops Man 6

B.09.1305 Ops Man 34

B.09.1306 Ops Man 7

FP-OP-OL01 Operability 22

71111.24 Procedures 018701B Emergency Diesel Generator 11/ESW 11 Monthly Pump and 47

Valve Tests

25502-III Standby Liquid Quarterly Pump and Valve Test 70

Work Orders 7000865880020 Replace 7TD/C24B 2

7000944370020 PMT/RTS Instructions RCIC Torus Suction Inboard 1

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

7001061930050 PMT/RTS Instructions 12 RHR HX RHRSW Outlet 5

7001079650020 PMT/RTS Instructions D90 Swing Charger 1

7001112530020 Standby Liquid Pump 11 Discharge Relief Valve Replace 0

71151 Miscellaneous QF0445 (FP-R- NRC and MOR Data Collection and Submittal Forms; 18

PI01) MSPI Emergency AC Power Systems; 3rd Quarter 2022

through 2nd Quarter 2023

QF0445 (FP-R- NRC and MOR Data Collection and Submittal Forms; 18

PI01) High Pressure Injection System; 3rd Quarter 2022 through

2nd Quarter 2023

QF0445 (FP-R- NRC and MOR Data Collection and Submittal Forms; 18

PI01) Heat Removal Systems; 3rd Quarter 2022 through

2nd Quarter 2023

Procedures FP-R-PI01 Preparation of NRC Performance Indicators 10

71152A Corrective Action 501000030239 Underground Vaults Found with Water 08/01/2019

Documents 501000043547 Water in Several Cable Vaults Onsite 08/26/2020

501000054508 Water Discovered in Underground Cable Vaults 07/28/2021

501000065846 Water in 2MH03 08/24/2022

501000075639 Water in Vault Key 41 Door Broke 08/01/2023

501000075687 Unresolved Cable Vault Water Issues 08/02/2023

71152S Corrective Action 501000056684 EQ Program Health Unacceptable 10/04/2021

Documents 501000058357 EQ Test Report Version Discrepancy 11/16/2021

Miscellaneous CD0336 Revised Document List 09/05/2023

Procedures EWI08.11.01 Equipment Qualification Users Manual 27

71153 Procedures C.4A Reactor Scram 50

C.51100 RPV Control (Mode 1, 2 ,3) 23

C.51200 Primary Containment Control (Mode 1, 2 ,3) 23

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