05000336/LER-1982-052, Forwards LER 82-052/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-052/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20083N983
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 01/28/1983
From: Mroczka E
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20083N984 List:
References
MP-4629, NUDOCS 8302030308
Download: ML20083N983 (2)


LER-2082-052, Forwards LER 82-052/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3362082052R00 - NRC Website

text

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l l NORTHEAST trrII.rFIES 14 amewet t wt u.o mu n cow"**' P.O. BOX 270 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06101 l Os i$$s5Yr sY 5mw i nrw.iv.m w wecmew (203) 666-6911 L L A C:23': L"":l January 28, 1983 MP-4629 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes Regional Administrator, Region I Office of Inspection and Enforcerrent U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Catmission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference:

Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 Docket No. 50-336 Reportable Occurrence RO 50-336/82-52/3L-0

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report 82-52/3L-0 required to be sutmitted within thirty days pursuant to Millstone Unit 2 Appendix A Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, conditions leading to operation in a degraded node permitted by a limiting condition. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly, NORIHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CmPANY

/ t w E. . Mroczka Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station EJM/TF:no

Attachment:

LER RO 50-336/82-52/3L-0 cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C. (30)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control, Washington, D. C. (3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Carmission, c/o Document Managanent Branch, Washington, D. C. 20555 8302030308 830128 PDR ADOCK 05000336 S PDR -ff.W

. /'

ATTACHMENT 'IO LER 82-52/3L-0 NORIHEAST NUCLEAR ENEIGY CWPANY MTTTRITE NUCLEAR POWER STATICN - UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NUMBER DPR-65 DOCKLT NUMBER 50-336 IDENTIFICATICN OF OOCURRDCE

'Iko separate and independent HPSI punps were not operable as required by the Technical Specifications 3.5.2.a.

CCNDITIONS PRIOR 'ID OOCURRENCE The unit was in a routine startup mode prior to the event occurrence.

DESCRIPTIm QF OOCURRENCE On Deceber 31, 1982 at 0940 hours0.0109 days <br />0.261 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.5767e-4 months <br />, a leak was discovered on the discharge of the C Service Water punp. 'Ihe C Service Water punp was tagged out of opera-tion. To maintain two operable service water punps on separate emergency facilities, the swing bus powering the B Service Water and HPSI punps was lined up to the Facility II emergency bus. This electrical line up caused the only two operable HPSI punps (B & C) to be powered frun the same emergency facility (Facility II) . Therefore the A HPSI punp was aligned to the Facility I bus and the B HPSI punp breaker was racked-out.

APPARENT CAUSE OF CNw Subsequent to the overhaul of the A HPSI pump, a flow test to prove operabil-ity was required. 'Ihis test nust be done during a refueling outage. h re-fore the swing facility HPSI punp was aligned to Facility I. Due to the leak on the C Service Water punp, the swing facility Service Water punp was required for operation. Rather than maintain both operable Service Water pumps powered frun the same facility, the swing bus was aligned to Facility II. 'Ihe A HPSI pump was aligned to Facility I so that two HPSI pumps would be available, though only one had satisfied all of its Tech. Spec. surveillances.

TSAS 3.5.2.a was entered during the Service Water repair.

ANALYSIS OF OOCURRDEE It was deemed more conservative to pcwer the operable Service Water punps frm separate facilities. There exists a high degree of confidence that the available HPSI would satisfy all emergency requirments, therefore no adverse effects would result frm this operating condition.

CORHrLnVE ACTICN The C Service Water pump was repaired and returned to service. The swing bus was returned to being fed frm the Facility I emergency bus. This allowed the plant to return to two separate and independent HPSI and Service Water pumps.

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