05000245/LER-1982-012, Forwards LER 82-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards LER 82-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20058D454
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/16/1982
From: Mroczka E
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20058D461 List:
References
MP-1-2119, NUDOCS 8207270142
Download: ML20058D454 (2)


LER-1982-012, Forwards LER 82-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2451982012R00 - NRC Website

text

.

NORTHI!AST trrII.frII!S

]

I. CNN.YI AR FORD, CONNECTICUT 06101 r

  • ll :.,:: : ::ll."' """

(20:n msu L

L 7'" '.".

July 16, 1982 MP-1-2119 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes Regional Administrator, Region 1 Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference:

Provisional License DPR-21 Docket No. 50-245 Reportable Occurrence R0-82-12/lT

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence R0-82-12/1T required to be submitted within 14 days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.8.i.

An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY A w/

E. J. Mroczka Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station l

EJM/MJB:mo

Attachment:

LER R0-82-12/IT l

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C. (30) cc:

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control, Washington, D. C. (3) l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch, i

Washington, D. C. 20555 l

l ff207270142 820716 DRADOCKOS000g

O ATTACHMENT TO LER 82-12/lT NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21 DOCKET fa.lMBER 50-245 Identification of Occurrence Performance of systems was discovered that required corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analyses and the Safety Analysis Report.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence Prior to the occurrence, the unit was operating at a steady state power level of 100 percent.

Description of Occurrence On July 2, 1982, while updating and reviewing training system description and drawings on the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System, a discrepancy was identified. A LPCI timer that inhibits throttling of the LPCI injection valves during the first five minutes of LPCI injection appeared to be in-correctly wired, permitting the operator to close the valve during this period.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence Incorrect wiring of the LPCI timer is attributable to a discrepancy between the system specification and the wiring diagram. Although the system spec-ification accurately described system operation, the wiring diagram did not correspond to the logic.

The timer was installed in accordance with the wiring diagram.

Analysis of Occurrence The LPCI timer in question prevents the operator from throttling the LPCI injection valve during the first five minutes following system initiation.

Failure of the timer to perform as intended does not degrade the LPCI system from functioning as required in the event of any previously analyzed accidents.

If the LPCI system had initiated, incorrect installation of the timer would have permitted throttling of the injection valve prior to the five minute time limit, however, this operator action would not have occurred until core reflood had been achieved, as per direction of emergency procedures.

Corrective Action

Upon discovery of the occurrence, operations personnel were given guidance to preclude operator action during the initial five minutes following LPCI initiation. Plant personnel worked with the General Electric Company to verify and resolve this condition.

The LPCI timer has been rewired, retested and functions as intended.