05000336/LER-2001-001
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FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 05000336
I. Description of Event
On January 7, 2001 at 0300, the Millstone Unit No. 2 Shift Manager questioned the lack of compensatory measures in place for a 20 inch x 20 inch hole in the Auxiliary Building roof. No security guard or fire watch was posted at the hole. The Shift Manager contacted Protective Services at 0500 with what he felt was a potential fire issue. A Security Shift Supervisor was dispatched to the scene. The Security Shift Supervisor determined that a breach in a vital area boundary existed at 0514 due to the size of the hole, which could potentially have allowed undetected access into the area, and remained at the scene until another guard was formally posted. An immediate (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) notification was made on January 7, 2001, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1) and 10 CFR 73.71 Appendix G, "Reportable Safeguards Events." At the time of this event, the plant was in Mode 1 at one hundred (100) percent power.
On November 28, 2000, Design Change Request (DCR) M2-00023 was issued addressing Millstone Unit No. 1 Building 105 and common area heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) separation project. The DCR stated on page 26 that: "preparations in the MP2 Spent Fuel Building (Auxiliary Building) for the installation of the vertical legs to the Chemistry Lab duct run will be larger than 96 in' therefore, security requirements are to be established." It also stated on page 27 that: "Appropriate security measured shall be taken during implementation when the penetration is created for MP2 HVAC Equipment Room." AWOs were prepared by the planner in the time period from December, 9, 2000 to December 18, 2000. Although the DCR did state clearly the need for establishing security measures, the planner did not include the necessary structural barrier breach notification requirements or security guard requirements in the AWOs in accordance with the established procedures.
On January 6, 2001 Auxiliary Building roof cutting began with no compensatory security measures established.
On January 7, 2001 at 0300, the Millstone Unit No. 2 Shift Manager questioned the lack of compensatory measures in place for a 20 inch x 20 inch hole in the Auxiliary Building roof. No security guard or fire watch was posted at the hole. The Shift Manager contacted Protective Services at 0500 with what he felt was a potential fire issue. A Security Shift Supervisor was dispatched to the scene. The Security Shift Supervisor determined that a breach in a vital area boundary existed at 0514 due to the size of the hole, which could potentially have allowed undetected access into the area, and remained at the scene until another guard was formally posted.
This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(d), which refers to Appendix G, "Reportable Safeguards Events,"Section I.(c), which requires that, "Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a vital area for which compensatory measures have not been employed" be reported.
II. Cause of Event
The cause of the event was that the planner did not include the necessary structural barrier breach notification requirements or security guard requirements in the AWOs in accordance with the established procedures.
III. Analysis of Event
There were no safety consequences from this event in that unauthorized intrusion into the Auxiliary Building vital area did not occurred. During the period no evidence of contraband or sabotage was found within the Auxiliary Building.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) This event has low safety significance because there was no undetected access to the vital area nor was there any evidence of contraband or sabotage in the vital area. Among the major equipment within the Auxiliary Building is the Spent Fuel Pool [DA]. Undetected access could have allowed damage or sabotage of this or other vital plant equipment.
IV. Corrective Action As a result of this event training will be given to all planners and team leaders to re-enforce the requirement to use the Millstone work control procedures during the preparation and review of AWOs.
An interim compensatory action was implemented requiring AWOs that breach a system or boundary to receive a peer check by a qualified planner to ensure that all design functions are considered and proper implementation requirements are incorporated into the AWO. The interim compensatory action will be terminated upon completing the training of the planners and team leaders.
V. Additional Information
Additional information required for Security Events. (Item Number from Regulatory Guide 5.62, "Reporting of Safeguard Events, provided below.):
5. Type of Security Force Onsite: Contract 6. Number and Type of Personnel Involved: One Security Officer 7. Method of Discovery: Security Guard Observation 8. Procedural Errors Involved: Failure to follow Millstone Unit No. 2 work control procedures 11. Local, State, or Federal law enforcement agencies contacted: None 12. Description of media interest and press release: None Similar Events None Manufacturing Data None Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].