05000245/LER-1982-014, Forwards LER 82-014/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-014/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20058D843
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/14/1982
From: Mroczka E
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20058D847 List:
References
MP-1-2116, NUDOCS 8207270411
Download: ML20058D843 (2)


LER-1982-014, Forwards LER 82-014/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2451982014R00 - NRC Website

text

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July 14,1982 MP-1-2116 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes Regional Administrator, Region 1 Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference:

Provisional License DPR-21 Docket No. 50-245 Reportable Occurrence R0-82-14/3L

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter for.tards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence R0-82-14/3L required to be submitted within 30 days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b.

An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

/ $ff]A E. J. Mroczka Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station EJM/TST:mo

Attachment:

LER R0-82-14/3L cc: Director, Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C. (30)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control, Washington, D. C. (3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch, Washington, D. C. 20555 8207270411 820714 I(,9 PDR ADOCK 05000245 S

PDR

LER 82-14/3L NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21 D0CKET NUMBER 245 Identification of Occurrence Operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition of operation occurred when one Emergency Service Water Pump was declared inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence Prior to occurrence the unit was operating at a steady state power level of 100 percent.

Description of Occurrence On June 14, 1982, at 1450 hours0.0168 days <br />0.403 hours <br />0.0024 weeks <br />5.51725e-4 months <br /> while performing Emergency Service Water (ESW)

Pump Operational Readiness Test, "D" ESW pump failed to meet the minimum pump discharge pressure.

Technical Specification 3.5.B.1 requires both containment cooling subsystems to be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence Pump inspection revealed a large buildup of marine growth and mussels on the pump suction volute. Additionally a large clam was found in the first stage suction eye.

Analysis of Occurrence The ESW system consists of four pumps, grouped into two sets of two pumps resulting in two completely segregated emergency service water systems. One set supplies 5000 gpm of seawater to one LPCI heat exchanger providing 100 percent capacity.

Should one set of pumps fail the other set is placed in operation.

The system is designed to operate with a positive differential pressure between the ESW system and the Low Pressure Coolant Injection System at the heat exchanger to insure that there is no leakage of LPCI water into the service water in the unlikely event of heat exchanger tube leakage: i.e., no radioactive material will be released to the environment by way of the ESW system. Therefore, a minimum discharge pressure was conservatively assigned to the ESW system and made subject of periodic verification.

Failure of the pump in question did not impair the system's ability to perform its intended fuction.

The redundant loop was available and would have provided the required cooling to the LPCI heat exchanger.

Corrective Action

The pump was dismantled and cleaned.

Similar occurrences were R0-82-2/3L.