IR 05000302/2004013

Insp Rept 50-309/85-06 on 850302-0413.No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room,Accessible Parts of Plant Structures,Plant Operations,Radiation Protection,Physical Security & Fire Protection

ML20128A078
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River, Maine Yankee
Issue date:	05/03/1985
From:	Elsasser T, Holden C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128A059	List: IR 05000302/2004013 ML20128A055
References
50-309-85-06, 50-309-85-6, NUDOCS 8505240117
Download: ML20128A078 (12)

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A I-U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Docket / Report: 50-309/85-06 License: DPR-36 Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic' Power Inspection At: Wiscasset,~ Maine Dates: Marc A il 13, 1985 Inspector: ./ '/ f C(Ho}d'~Sen r Resident Inspector /date

.LApproved: 0 ', 6/J/85 T. C. Els@ fer, Chief, Reactor date Projects Section,3C Summary: Inspection Report 50-309/85-0 ' Areas' Inspected: Routine resident inspection (137 hours0.00159 days <br />0.0381 hours <br />2.265212e-4 weeks <br />5.21285e-5 months <br />) of the control room, ac-cessible parts of plant structures, plant operations, radiation protection, physi-cal security, fire protection, plant operating records, maintenance, surveillance, radioactive effluent sampling program and open item Results: No violations were identified. Significant issues-discussed include the plant computer power supply (section 4.k), contamination of the instrument air system (section 4.n), and spent fuel storage rack spacing (section 9). The licensee is taking aggressive action to resolve each of these issue hbho9 PDR

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DETAILS

1; Persons Contacte '

.Within'this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with

.various licensee. personnel, including reactor operators, maintenance and-

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-surveillance technicians and the licensee's management' staf . Summary of. Facility-Activities

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,. Details of the following are included in.the body of the report

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-On March.7, 1985, Control Element AssemblyAt the beginning CEA) 64 dropped of the report p for no apparen '

reason. Subsequent investigation revealed a loose wire in.the timer modul (.The. plant reduced power and retrieved the'CEA in accordance with. plant pro-cedures. This same CEA~was dropped once more while troubleshooting the problem and.again.when the timer module was replaced...The plant returned to 100 per-

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Tcent power on March 8,1985. Plant power was reduced later that same day to

. -investigate chloride leaks from the main condense '

On March'10,- 1985 while placing waterbox 'B' of the main condenser back in

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. . service,. vacuum was lost in the main condenser. In accordance with plant pro-

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c'edures the operators manually tripped the plant. The plant computer was lost:

' coincident with the plant trip. The loss of the computer was attributed to the. shifting from onsite to offsite power. Later that day in response to a

'panalarm, a grounded wire in the Reactor Protective cabinet was identified as the cause of loss of automatic control of the Power Operated Relief Valves

'(PORV) which was-discovered after the-reactor. start up.'

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The plant returned to power on late on. March'10; however, chloride-levels in-creased sharply'because of. chemical hideout return. The highest chloride levels reached were 19 ppm in the steam generator ~

Steam generator chloride levels began to drift upward between March 13 and s March 20. The chloride levels eventually reached .08 ppe in the steam gener-

,, zators. The. plant reduced power on March 20 to search for the source of the

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chlorides. The plant returned to 100 percent power on March 2 The plant reduced power on March 22 in order to repair the heater drain tank

, level control valve, HD-A-180.~The plant returned to 100 percent on March 23, 1985.

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-On March 4, 1985, rod #42 dropped for.no apparent reason. The rod was imme-

diately recovered. The temperature variation that was caused by the dropped-

rod resulted in steam generator level variation and the detection of a problem

'with. dirty air filters for the feed regulating valve +

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.Waterbox A' exhibited problems with' the ambertap ball collecting system and

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power was reduced on April 4, 1985, to examine the ambertap ball collecting

screen.inLthe discharge plenum for 'A' water box. The collecting' screen was overloaded.with . debris from the circulating water system. Power was returned to 100 percent ~on April 9,showever, power was.again reduced the same day to

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repair'HO-A-180. Power:was returned to 100' percent on April-10 and remained

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there.for-the remainder of this reporting perio ' = Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

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(Closed) Followup Item (309/80-CI-17) Fuel pin. damage due to water jet in- 4 7pingement from baffle. plate corner. The licensee reviewed the water jet im-

.pingement problem and' determined'that the Maine Yankee design is not suscept-7 - 'iblelto'-the proble .(Closed) Followup Item (309/81-CI-04) Role of the shift ~ technical advisors

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and the importance of reporting operational events. The licensee utilize .

Nuclear Safety Engineers (NSE) as the shift technical advisors. The duties ,

m and responsibilities of the NSE's are described in Procedure 20-1-1. The in-

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tv , , spector reviewed this procedure (Revision 2. dated February 16,1984) to verify

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-that the NSE's are involved-in normal and off normal events and that the duties of the NSE's are well defined. Additionally, the inspector routinely observes-the NSE's-performing their daily routine and their. involvement in the classi -

fication and reporting of events. Operational Event Reporting procedure;1-

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-26-1,-- revision 3 dated January-1, 1984 was also reviewed'to ensure event re--  :

L 1 porting was consistent with the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50.7 (Closed) Unresolved Item (309/82-04-06) Qualification of high range detectors not supported bytonsite data. This item was the subject.of a violation in In-

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spection Report 84-17. Follow up-will be documented under Violation 309/84-17-0 (Closed) V'iolation (309/82-05-04) The licensee modified' plant systems without

'an approved plant alteration. The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures

? 0-07-3, Deficiency Reporting and procedure 0-07-4, Repair Orders. These two

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procedures' control the documentation of a deficiency from initial-identifica-

, tion until final disposition.-These procedures provide for adequate review-E~~

of a deficiency'to. determine if a alteration to a plant system is involved

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in the repair of an ite (Closed) Violation (309/82-16-02) Failure to review 23 class A procedures

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s Lwithin the required 2 year. interval. The licensee has instituted a program of' notifying the applicable ~ department in advance of the required review date

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of a' procedure to ensure all reviews are performed as required. The inspector '

= reviewed a sample of Class A procedures and determined that all were reviewed

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[ ' ' j . Review of Plant Operations

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-The inspector reviewed plant operation through direct observation throughout-

.the reporting period. Conditions were found to be in compliance with the fol-lowing licensee documents:

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' Maine YankeelTechnical Specifications

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--4 Maine Yankee Technical Data Book

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^ Maine' Yankee Fire Protection Program

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Maine Yankee Radiation Protection Program

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Maine-Yankee Tagging Rules

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-- : Administrative and Operating Procedures

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> a; Instrumentation

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Control room process instruments were observe'd for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification-requirement , No unacceptable conditions in process instrumentation were identifie ' ' '

. Annunciator' Alarms

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The inspecto'r observed various alarm conditions which had been. received !

.and acknowledged. These conditions were discussed with shift personnel who were knowledgeable of the. alarms and actions required. Operator re-

-sponse was: verified to be in accordance with procedure 2-100-1, Response

'to Panalarms, Revision During plant inspections,- the inspector. observed.the condition of equip-

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ment ~ associated with various alarms. -No unacceptable conditions were identifie ' Shift Manning The operating shifts were observed to be staffed t'o meet the operating requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5,- for both the number

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'and type of licenses. Control room and_ shift manning were observed to 3 -be.in conformance with 10 CFR 50.5 l Radiation Protection Controis-

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-Radiation Protection control areas'were~ inspected. -Radiation Work Per-

~m its in use were reviewed; and compliance with those documents, as to sprotective-clothing and required monitoring instruments,-was inspecte rProper posting'and control of radiation and high radiation areas was reviewed in addition to verifying requirements for wearing of appropriate personnel monitoring devices. There were no. unacceptable conditions identifie _ ,

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l e.- . Plant Housekeeping Controls-

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' Storage of material and components was observsd with respect-to preven-

tion of-fire and safety hazards. Plant housekeeping was evaluated with

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respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne' contaminatio There were'no' unacceptable conditions identifie ?. f Fire Protection / Preventio ~

The inspector examined ti)e condition of selected pieces'of fire fighting equipmen Combustible-materials were b~eing controlled and were not found near' vital areas.. Selected cable penetrations were examined and

+' fire barriers were found~ intact. Cable trays were clear of debris. No

abnormal conditions were identifie Control of Equipment 1+ ~ ~

D'uring plan _t inspections, selected equipment under safety tag control was examined. Equipment conditions were consistent with information in y / ~ ^'

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plant control log h.- : Plant Operations-Red ew Committee (PORC)

The in'spector attended the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)

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meeting on April 11, 1985. Technical specification 5.5 requirements for required member, attendance were verified. The inspector had no furthe comment . Dropped Control Element Assembly x On March 7, 1985, Control Element Assembly (CEA) 64 dropped for no ap-

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parent reason. Plant power was reduced in accordance with plant proce-

.dures and the:CEA was recovered. I&C personnel investigated the problem and ' identified a loose wire in the timer module that was intermittentl grounding causing the CEA'to drop. During this troubleshooting the CEA

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f dropped for a second time. After the CEA was recovered the upper gripper

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. was,jumpered to hold the CEA withdrawn while the timer module was re-placed. -Once repairs were complete the jumper for the upper gripper was

_ removed and-the CEA dropped for the third time. The CEA was recovered

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-and:the plant returned.to.100 percent powe On April 4,1985 CEA 42 dropped during weekly control rod exercises, procedure 3.1.8. The CEA was immediately recovered. I&C personnel in-

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vestigated the rod drive circuitry for rod 42 but could not determine the cause of the dropped CE The licensee plans to replace the power supplies for the control rod drive circuitry in.the upcoming August outag The inspector had no further question ,

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4 q ,,, of Vacuum Trip

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, -While' returning waterbox 'B' of the main condenser to service following chloridelleak investigation on March 10, 1985,. main condenser vacuum was lost. This loss of condenser vacuum'was attributed to_ overloading the

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?: vacuum priming' system for the' circulating water system when the' discharge

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valveifot'B'.waterbox was cracked open. LWithout sufficient-vacuum-

~; priming and:with 'B'Materbox .still out of service, the vacuum in ' A

waterbox of the'sain condenser began.to fall. Plant operators manuall tripped.the plant when main condenser differential pressure reached the

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administrative limit of 2.5 lbs. The plant computer was lost coincident-with the trip. This topic is covered separately belo '

k Th[ inspector.hadnofurtherquestion .

l Plant Computer Power Supply

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, On-March 10, coincident with the p1' ant trip, the plant computer was los 'The inspector reviewed the power supply arrangement for the plant compu-

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.ter and held discussions with plant personne [ The plant computer normally receives its power from battery bus 5, a

non-nuclear safety (NNS) 0.C. bus. The D.C. power is converted to 120 volt A.C.'1through an. inverter. The plant experienced problems keeping

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, battery bus 5 fully charged after the computer.was placed in service following the last outage. An. investigation into the problem revealed

, ' that-the battery _ charger did not have sufficient capacity to handle the

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normal-battery loads and the plant computer. In' order .to upgrade the

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charger to increasewits capacity, the charger must be removed from ser-

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vice. There are no' disconnect switches from the battery bus to the char-4ger-so'the. battery bus must be_deenergized (i.e'., charger deenergized)

or the work performed while-the. bus is energized. A manufacturers repre -

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sentative:was contacted and the decision was made to wait until the bat-tery bus could be deenergized for personnel safety reasons. Additionally,

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the battery bus supplies relay power for the-345 kilovolt yard which contributed to the decision to postpone any changes until a shutdow ~

The plant has made. arrangements _to install a disconnect switch between-the: battery bus and the battery charger 1during the next shutdown. This will allow troubleshooting of battery charger while the plant is at power The switch is in place and ready for hook up as.soon as the plant is off y 4 . the line,

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,The alternate power for-the computer comes from 'a 480 volt A.C. supply e '

- through the inverter which produces 120 volt A.C. An automatic switch-E -over from the normal battery supply to the alternate 480 volt supply,is "

provided in the inverter. Since the battery charger could not handle the battery loads and the plant computer, the switch was placed to the.al-

. ternate 480 volt supply. With the~ alternate power supply selected on the inverter, the plant computer is subject to oscillations of the 480

volt supply. During a plant trip the normal plant power switches from the main generator to offsite power. This is a break-before-make

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switchover. The plant computer automatically trips when it detects low /

high line frequency and/or voltage. This feature caused the loss of the plant computer on March 1 ~

The inspector discussed the affects of the loss'of the computer on the post trip review conducted after every unscheduled trip. The plant com-puter is used to generate two event records that are used to determine the cause of the trip and the corrective action necessary for plant

, startup. Since the plant computer will probably be loct at the moment the plant trips, the post mortum log and the sequence of events log from the computer will not be available for post trip revie .

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The licensee stated that prior to the trip on March 10 it was not recog-nized that the plant computer would be lost during a plant trip. Since

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the plant was on line following this trip when all the ramifications of

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a plant trip were understood, the installation of the isolation switch

/ was changed from an outage item to a hot shutdown item. Since all major parameters are recorded on strip charts, the licensee feels that the necesary information will be available for review following a trip. The

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information that will not be available is the time for the reactor trip breakers to open. The program for trip breaker refurbishment is nearly completed with eight refurbished breakers presently installed. Testing of the reactor trip breakers has shown that all breakers are reliably tripping within the required 100 msec. Based on these considerations the licensee has decided to wait until the next shutdown to install the bat-tery charger isolation switch.

l The inspector had no further question ' Power Operated Relief Valves Following the manual trip and subsequent plant startup on March 10, 1905, '

the plant received a loss of power to the Power Operated Relief Valves

, (PORV). The initial alarm was received at 5:30 p.m. Instrument and Con-l9

, trols (I&C) technicians were called to investigate the problem. At 7:00

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p.m., I&C determined that the problem was a loose wire in the control cabinet grounded to the chassis. The bare wire was repaired and the l/ PORV's were returned to service at 7:40 p.m. The control cabinet had been open and shut on numerous occasions that day for troubleshooting other indication .

j The only function lost while the bare wire was grounding in the cabinet l was the automatic opening of the PORV's at the high pressure trip set-point. Manual control of the PORV's was still available, and Technical

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Specification requirements were me '

There were no violation 't

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); m.' . Main Feed Regulating Valves

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10n April 4, 1985, rod #42 dropped as reported above. As a result of th close; proximity of. rod #42 to loc t2-hot leg, a reduction.in the hot leg

' temperature :for loop 2 was- generated. This caused the level in #2 steam -

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generator;to decrease.' Feed regulating valve (FRV) #2 was' slow to respon ;#2 steam generator levelLincreased to: 80 percent when the reactor. opera-

, -tor took~ manual control.from the main control boar . ,

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.  ; Subsequent investigation reveale':that d the filter for the control air JS7 -

- #- cto the #2 FRV was clogged with black: dirt.1The' problem of dirt in~the-control air system is discussed below.

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'The licensee developed a plan, based on the results of,the FRV perfor-

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.mance,-to take local manual control of the FRV and maintain. steam gener-P .ator level using the FRV bypass valve in order to remove the air filter p , from service'and replace the filter. Each of the three FRV's was to be~

Edone,' one at a tim ~

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, _ During the. initial effort'to take manual. bypass control of #2'FRV, the '

' handwheel broke -free when turned to the open position and spun freel 'Naintenance removed the manual operator and discovered the locking key

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was broken and the drive gear was cracked'for the manual operator.:Since ithe ' manual- operator'isinot associated with the air actuated section~ of the-valve,1this problem was considered a separate proble ~

cFurther investigation into .the handwheel operation of-the valve deter-

'? -mined-that the drive gear andHk'yway e were probably broken _during the.in-

-p . 'itial attempt to turn the; handwheel. The worm gear that drives the shaft

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Land drive gear were discovered installed backwards. When the handwheel

• iwas-turned to the open' position, the operator was actually forcing the.

F;'" . valve shut and subseq~uently broke the~ keylock~ pin ~and drive gear. Ade-quate, repairs;were.madelto correct the deficienc ,

n NoLviolations were identified.

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' Contamination of Air lines' '

'l Dirt in sthe air lines to the: heater drain tank level control valve (HD-

- A-180) was.found during the early part of the year. Since that time the licensee has .1)' attempted to identify the source of the dirt 2) identify x the extent ofLthe dirt contamination problem and 3) begun replacing the

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air filters. Recent problems with the.feedwater regulating valves have caused the licensee to develop'a plan to replace the air filters based

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-upon the function of the effected equipment and the accessibility of the

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. equipment.LTo-date approximately 30 filters have been replaced with ap-proximately.450 filters ' remaining.

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The' source'of the dirt was attributed to the breakdown / burning'of the )

2 desiccant used to. dry the compressed air as it exits the air compressor l The airLsystem has. an' electric' heater between the compressor after cooler h

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and the desiccant to' assist'in the removal of water. This heater:was'en-

• ergized whenever any of the compressors.were running. Normally one of t

s . ~t he.three compressors is in run.and one'.is in standby ready to. start on

. low header pressure. The licensee is modifying the system such that- the

' heater will be controlled by outlet temperature instead of compressor

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? statu The inspector will continue to follow the resolution ~ ofit'his problem (IFI-309/85-06-01).

5 .- : Review of Events-Requiring Notification to the NRC

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e iThe circumstances surrounding the-manual. plant trip due to condenser differ-

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cential pressure!were. reviewed with; respect to notification of the NRC. 'No 2 deficiencies were identifie '

' ' Observations of Physical Security

The' -Resident Inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, during regular- and off-shift hours,- that selected. aspects of the security plan were lin accordance withnthe regulatory requirements, physical security plan and-approved' procedures as noted below:

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- --- Maine Yankee Plan,. dated October 1979-

--- 115-1,-Security Procedures, Revisio ;-- ,. Emergency Contingency Procedures, Revision 0

-- " 115-15,. Protection of l Security ' Safeguards 1Information, Revision 1 j l Physical . Protection Security Organization

-- ' Observations and personnel. interviews indicated that'a full time member..of 'lthe security organizati_on~ with authority to direct .

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physical security actions,.was present-as; require *

---: Manning of all three shifts on various days'was observed to be as

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required; Physical Barriers X

N Selected barriers in'the protected area, access control-area, and the vital" area were' observed and random monitoring of the isolation zone was

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' performed.: Observations of car and truck' searches were mad ' . Access Control Observations of the following items were made:

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Identification, authorization and badging

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Escorting

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Communications-No violations were identifie ~

- Plant Maintenance

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The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation ac-tivities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and maintenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use,

- equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radiological con-trols for worker protection, fire protection, retest requirements, and re-portability per Technical Specifications. Modifications to the spare charging pump were reviewed. No violations were note . Surveillance Testing-The inspector observed parts of tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and LCO's, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution. Control element assembly (CEA) exercises were reviewed. No violations were note : Spent Fuel Storage Racks The licensee has been systematically. replacing the spent fuel racks with new racks. The new racks provide for closer storage of the spent fuel and there-

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fore increase the capacity of the spent fuel pool. During a recent review of

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the Safety _ Analysis Report (SAR) in March 1985, the licensee discovered a difference between the assumed versus the actual spacing between each of the spent fuel rack tube The spent fuel storage racks consist of a series of square-tubes. Each square tube holds one fuel assembly. The tube is constructed of boral sheets sand-wiched between a stainless steel outer sheet. The stainless steel is 32 mils thick. The square tubes are arranged in a matrix with other tubes. The size of the~ matrix depends on the location of the rack within the pool (typical racks are 7 X 12). The primary means of support for the racks is the upper and lower structures which hold all the tubes in plac In-order to conserve materials and reduce waste, the licensee embarked on a program to remove the old racks from the spent fuel pool, disassemble.them and remove the-boral sheets from each of the square tubes. The boral sheets

.were then decontaminated and shipped to the manufacturer of the new rack This boral was then used to manufacture the new storage racks.'The manufac-turing process of the new racks was conducted in two phases. The first phase required;the manufacturer to' supply the boral sheets for the racks. In the second phase the licensee supplied the boral sheets. All of the phase one racks have been installed in the spent fuel pool.

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, , :The'. Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for.the new fuel racks assumes a space of

.692 inches between eachisquare: tube. This space is essential ~since it pro . m

vides for a' flux trap between adjacent fuel assemblies. The use of this- flux 1 trapiassures that the Technical Specification (T.S.)-limit-for Keff (the ef -

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fective multiplication factor) will not exceed .95. Some of the assumptions

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cof this' analysis include the use of pure water vice the borated water used

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pin the' spent fuel pool and the uselof an infinite array of assemblies _(an 8

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yby.8 array!of. assemblies closely' resembles.an infinite array). The most ilimiting case'used'in the SAR'is 3.3 percent by weight fuel, unshimmed in an

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~ infinite; arra xThe' licensee discovered-that'not all of the new racks have the proper spacing-

<between each of the square. tubes. This was discovered during an inspection

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of'.the phase two racks. The boral sheets that were removed from the old racks-are' thicker than.the' boral supplied by the manufacturer. During the manufac-

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turing process the square tubes are pressurized with air prior to sealing the tubes.cSince..the stainless steal is thin it balloons during the leak check

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5 process and contributes to the reductionLin the width of the flux tra e^ "-

' :The licensee measured the accessible new fuel racks installed in;the pool.-

4 Sin'e.the c racks are. installed directly. adjacent to each other, only the outer

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' edges of.the' racks'can be measurtd. In all but three. cases a .625' inch di-s ameter dowel'was passed between cccessible tubes indicating with'some cer-xtainty that the racks' installed in the pool probably meet the assumed dimen-

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Lsions 'of the SAR. Computer calculations are currently being performed to ver--

71fy:that..the'as found dimensions of the spent fuel racks are consistent with

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the_ assumptions of.the SA iA. review of.the-spent and new fuel storage arrangement prior to-the'last re-fueling (the only. time that the-new racks'and new fuel were onsite). indicated that~new fuel'was stored in the new racks prior'to installing.it in the reac-tor. Two unshimmed assemblies were stored no closer.than 4 spaces away. Based

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>on the assumptions used in the SAR, it appears'thatino violations of the limit ofs.95 Keff occurred.~

.The licensee has taken measures to assure that no new fuel is stored in the

. spent fuel pool until this-issue is resolved (There is no new fuel onsite).

? Computer calculations are being performed to analyze the configuration of the

. . fuel pool last outage. Additionally,' calculations are being performed to de-

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-termine whether the phase two fuel racks can be used in the spent fuel. pool in.their.present configuration. Measurements of the new fuel racks not-in .

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stalled-in the fuel pool are being made. Daily samples of the spent fuel pool

_1, boron concentration are being take '

The inspector will continue to follow this item as an unresolved item (UNR '

3309/85-06-02).

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11 Meeting with' Local Officials iThe -inspector met with the Lincoln County Emergency Coordinator and exchanged

.information relative to the role each plays in the event of an accident at

. . Maine Yankee. The meeting.was a good forum to discuss.the details of Emergency

' Plannin . ' Exit Interview

Meetings were periodically held with seniorffacility management to discuss

=the inspection scope and finding ,

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