ML20246B389

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Withdraws Proposed Civil Penalty in Amount of $50,000, Based on Consideration of Util Past Performance & Duration Adjustment Factors.Violation Covered Failure to Install Vortex Suppressors in Containment Emergency Sumps
ML20246B389
Person / Time
Site: South Texas STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 06/30/1989
From: Lieberman J
NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
To: Goldberg J
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
References
EA-89-001, EA-89-1, NUDOCS 8907070317
Download: ML20246B389 (4)


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C UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 r

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s Docket No. 50-498 License No. NPF-76 I EA-89-01 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: J. H. Goldber9, Group Vice President, Nuclear j Post Office Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 1

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL 0F PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY This refers to your letter dated April 12, 1989 in response to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty sent to you by our letter dateo March 17, 1989. Our letter ano Notice discussed HL&P's failure to install. vortex suppressors in the South Texas Project Unit 1 containment

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emergency sumps. To emphasize the importence of verifying that equipment relied upon in the design of the plant is in fact installed and available, a .

civil penalty of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) was proposed. "

In response, HL&P admitted that a violation of NRC requirements occurred but stated that the violaticn was improperly classified at Severity Level III.

  • HL&P also scught mitigation of the proposed penalty on grounds that the NRC failed to give adequate consideration to HL&P's good performance in the functional area of quality assurance and that the NRC gave undue consideration to the duraticn of the violation.

Af ter considering your response we have concluded that a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III did occur and that it was properly categorized at Severity Level III. While the NRC agrees that other criteria of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, such as Criterion VI may also have been violated, it stands by the determination that Criterion III was violated. In particular, the architect engineer's failure to distribute the drawings to the implementing organization is seen as the final step of the design ccntrol process, whicn is covered by Criterion III. If the orawing had been provided to the imple-menting organization, then the failure to ensure the draw 1ngs "are distributed to and used at the location where the prescribed activity is performed" would be a violation of Criterion VI.

With regard to the severity level of the violation, the NRC did not base it primarily on the at.tual sdfety signific6nce as determined by an after-the-fact analysis but on the regulatory significance of failing to install devices, which were relied upon in the design of the plant, without prior assurance that their absence would not adversely impact safe operations. The NRC considers HL&P's failure in this case to be significant in that HL&P in designing the plant, relied upon the vortex suppressors to assure the operation of important safety systems under specific emergency conditions.

Moreover, HL&P took creoit for the vortex suppressors during the licensing process.

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e Houston Lighting & Power Company' Even if the NRC accepts HL&P's position today that the suppressors were not necessary and that no safety systems would have teen adversely affected by their absence, the NRC cannot ignore the irrportance of f ailing to install them in the first place. The NRC considers this violation "cause for significant concern" in accord with the general description of Severity Level 111 violations in the Enforcement Policy and finds its significance is on a par with other examples of Severity Level III violations in the supplucents to the Policy.

Further, had HL&P not been ab'le to demonstrate the low actual safety significance of the failure to Install the vortex suppressors, the NRC would have considered a Severity Level II violation for a system designed to mitigste serious safety events being unable to perform its intended function. Thus, the NRC acheres to its original position that the violation is of significant concern and properly categorized at Severity Level III.

After considering HL&P arguments for mitigation of the civil penalty the NRC finds they have merit. With regard to past performance the NRC agrees that too little consideration was given to HL&P's performance in construction and quality assurance activities. With regard to the application of the duration factor, the NRC-acknowledges that, based on the information provided after the problem was discovered, the failure to install the vortex suppressors did not result in a condition of high actual safety significance, with respect, to the operability of plant equipment. Therefore, notwithstanding the signi-ficance of the initial failure the NRC ogrees that esculation of the civil penalty because of duration is not warranted. Based on the above considerations, the NRC concludes that full mitigation of the civil penalty is appropriate.

In suuriary, the NRC concludes that a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR =

Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III occurred but that the proposed civil penalty should be withdrawn after reconsidering the post performance and duration adjustment factors. Your corrective actions will be examined during future inspections.

In bccordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Coae of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosures I will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Sincerely, i

l James Lieberman, Director j Office of Enforcement j cc: See Service List

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Texas. Radiation Control Program Director City Public Service Board NRC Public. Document. Room ATTN: k. J. Costello/M. T. Hardt NRC Local Public Document Room P.O. Box 1771 San Antonio, Texas 78296 Houston Lighting & Power. Company ATTN: M. A. McBurnett, Manager Houston Lighting & Power Company Operations Support Licensing ATTN: Licensing Representative P.O. Box 289 Suite 610 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Three Metro Center Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: Gerald E. Vaughn, Vice President Nuclear Operations P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Houston Lighting & Power Company

' ATTN: 'J. T. Westermeier, General Manager South Texas Project P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483' Central Power & Light Company ATTN: R. L. Range /R. P. Verret  :

P.O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 -

City of Austin Electric Utility ATTN: -R. J. Miner, Chief Operating Officer 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, Texas 78704 Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.

ATTN: J. R. Newman, Esquire 1615 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATIN: S. L. Rosen P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Houston Lighting & Power Company i

ATTN: R. W. Chewning, Chairman Nuclear Safety Review Board P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth,-Texas 77483

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