ML20207G608

Forwards Trojan Nuclear Power Plant,Ingestion Pathway Zone Exercise, of 860311-12 Exercise.Exercise Evaluated Protective Measures,Means & Capabilities of States of or & Wa.Four Deficiencies Observed

ML20207G608
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	07/14/1986
From:	Krimm R Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Jordan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML20207G611	List: ML20207G608
References
NUDOCS 8607230132
Download: ML20207G608 (2)

Text

-

M4 u 1 Federal Emergency Management Agency 1 s Washington, D.C. 20472 f

O O JL i 41986 MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. clear cry Conmission 4'

FROM:

Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Prograns

SUBJECT:

Exercise Report of the March 11-12, 1986, Exercise of the Ingestion Exposure Planning Zone for the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant.

Attached is a copy of the exercise report on the March 11-12, 1986, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness (REP) plans for the Ingestion Exposure Planning Zone (IPZ) of the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant. %is was an exercise to evaluate the protective measures, means and capabilities of the States of Oregon and Washington-to protect the public in the IPZ fran the consumption of contaminated food and water supplies. h e following jurisdictions participated in the exercise: the States of Oregon and Washington; and, Cowlitz and Lewis Counties in Washington.

he Portland General Electric Coupany also participated in the exercise.

All of the participants could be impacted by the 50-mile IPZ in the event of a radiological accident at the plant. he report, dated May 22, 1986, was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) RLgion X.

There were four deficiencies observed as a result of this exercise. he fif th deficiency in this report was due to the failure of offsite authorities to demonstrate all of the 35 exercise objectives within the six year exercise cycle. A sunmary of these deficiencies follows:

1. In tne State of Washington, the EDC did not demonstrate an ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. For exanple, it was not possible to discern at the EOC executive table who was in com-mand and decisions were arrived at by a loose concensus of the persons around the table. Also, decisions were made and disseminated to the public via the public information network without knowledge of the executive l group. For nore details see pp. 24-27 of the exercise report.

2. In the State of Oregon, the EOC did not demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. Technical assessment of available data was incorrect. Draf t procedures are inconsistent with

, Federal Guidance. Coordination did not occur between the appropriate f h \

8607230132 860714 PDR ADOCK 05000344 kp F PER /

! ]

1 decisionmaking authorities at the Omgon and Washington EOC's and the EDF regarding the Oregon decision to implement protective actions for a

50-mile 360* IPZ. For more details see pp. 67-70 of the exercise report.

! 3. 'Ihe State of Omgon EOC did not demonstrate an ability to inplement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards, in particu]ar in con-1 nection with the issuance of EBS messages. For more details see pp. 70-71 of the exercise report.

1 4. In the State of Washington, them were problems with the procedures '

j for drafting, coordinating, approving and distributing press releases.

{

In several cases, the misuse of " boiler plates" and/or inproper editions

of them, and/or failum to carefully read draf ts resulted in int'ormation

! reaching the public which would likely have caused confusion, concetm, and unnecessary, inappropriate, or harmful actions. For more details see pp 29-31 of the exercise report.

5. This exercise concluded the first 6-year exercise cycle for the Trojan site. Other than some remedial drills, no FEMA-evaluated exercise for 4 this site is currently scheduled until the Fall of 1987. However, as j indicated on page vi of this report, five exercise objectives have not i been demonstrated for a variety of State and local agencies. However, a since the Trojan exercise, the State of Oregon Radiation ConttV1 Section's l

Laboratory demonstrated one of these objectives by showing its ability to analyze various media sanples for deposition of iodines, cesium and other j nuclides. 'Ihis was accomplished in the Laboratory's adequate respponse

to the Chernobyl event as observed by FEMA Region X. 'Ihere will be

! trainirg in the interim and the remaining objectives will be denonstrated

at the next exercise scheduled for evaluation by FEMA.

i The mconmendations for corrective actions have been discussed with the i exercise participants. FEMA Region X will advise us of the schedule for i cormctive actions within 30 days of the date of this menorandum. We j will send you a copy of this schedule for corrective actions as soon as they have been evaluated.

1 If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.

Attachment As Stated i

n

.i 4

. l