ML20236R684

Forwards Preliminary Addendum Summarizing 19 Deficiencies Observed at 871014 Joint Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans Involving State of Wa & Cowlitz County & State of or & Columbia County

ML20236R684
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	11/16/1987
From:	Krimm R Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Congel F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8711230424
Download: ML20236R684 (5)

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/kk Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 e [>[ NOV l 61987 MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank J. Congel hb Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor' Regulation U. S Nuclear Regulatory Commission FROM: c r1 S Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT:

Preliminary Report of the October 14, 1987, Exercise of the Oregon and Washington Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant.

Attached is an Addendum summarizing nineteen Deficiencies observed at the October 14, 1987, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency pre-paredness plans for the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant. This was a joint full participation exercise for the State of Washington and Cowlitz County, and the State of Oregon and Columbia County. The attached Addendum is based on preliminary findings and an exercise summary prepared by the Federal Emer-gency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X on October 27,198'/.

The Region X preliminary findings and exercise' summary are now being reviewed and evaluated by the States and localities that participated in the October 14, 1987, exercise. These findings ' include not only' Deficiencies but also Areas

' Requiring Corrective Action. Complete responses to the FEMA findings from the States are expected by January 18, 1988, and will contain a proposed schedule of corrective actions. This preliminary report by FEMA is being transmitted to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at this time because of the exter.t of the Deficiencies observed by Federal evaluators at-this offsite exercise. As soon as the responses by the States of Washington ,

and Oregon are received and analyzed, we will send you a copy.

While there were impediments to protecting the public identified in the exer-  !

cist, the approval of offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans under  !

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 will remain in effect since offsite authorities are participating in the consultation process with FEMA to set dates for remedial 4 exercises and other corrective actions.

If you have any questions, please contact me at 646-2871.

Attachment .

y B711230424 871116 PDR ADOCK 05000344 F PDR J E d5 'll

l I

l PRELIMINARY 11/09/87 l Addendum on Deficiencies Observed by Federal Emrgency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X at the i October 14, 1987 Trojan Exercise  !

Washington State

1. Deficiency: The State did not demonstrate ability to nobilize staff ,

and activate facilities promptly, an issue still outstanding from the Trojan 1985 exercise. There are 5 centers and 72 radiological nonitors i needed to serve a working day population of 80,000 persons in the event of )

a radiological accident at the plant. These centers and staff need to be activated and maintained for the first 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of an accident, to provide protective services before the arrival of Federal assistance.

l Cowlitz County, Washington

2. Deficiency: Incomplete prescripted EBS messages and vague instructions '

to special populations.

3. Deficiency: Access Control Points not established at access points to I the Columbia River or at proper locations to implement recommendations for protective actions regardirg shelter. Also adequate resources and personnel were not identified to address the evacuees from the Columbia River, or identified via rumor control operation and evacuation verification patrols.

l 4. Deficiency: Inadequate control and nonitorirg of dose commitment for I

emergency workers (EW). County EOC staff did not plot plume locations or advise operations of desired routes for EWs to travel. No observable attempt to track, manage or advise on dose commitment, dose exposure and control for EWs and special populations.

l Oregon State IOC.

l 5 Deficiency: State failed to demonstrate capabilities to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock (staff changes).

6. Deficiency: State EBS messages were inconsistent with those of Columbia and Cowlitz Counties which would have been broadcast back to back by the EBS Station. The State failed to nonitor the EBS broadcasts or request copies of same to assure consistency and to avoid misinforming and confusirg the public. The Goverfor did not follow the plan and delegated the broad-castirg of the second and third State EBS messages to a staff member.

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-2 Oregon State EOC (Continued)

7. Deficiency: Durirg this exert , not one item was prepared and channeled to the electronic media disseminovion team or the public concern team that a major release of hazardous radiation was occurrirg at Trojan. Telephane teams did not have current, timely or accurate information on the radiological emergency or status of response actions and protective actions. The media production team inaccurately classified the event as a General Emergency and it was only an action by Washirgton State that this error by Portland General Electric and Oregon State was detected.

Oregon State in the Field

8. Deficiency: Staff assigned to be first responders for nonitorirg radia-tion levels in the field were not qualified or certified for respirator use. Such qualifications for first responders is an OSHA requirement.

Oregon State at the Emergency Worker Center (EWC)

9. Deficiency (p 8, EWC Item 1): There were inadequate procedures and denon-strations to indicate that emergency workers (EW) would have been decontami-nated to permissible levels in an actual accident. There was no questioning of EWs about whether they had been eatirg, drinkirg or snoking; no vehicle segregation; no step off procedures; no parkirg lot hot and cold zones; no  !

access control; no protocols existed for vehicle and equipment surveys or I decontamination methods; and no copies of EW dose forms retained so the EWC could not determine the number of EWs processed or the doses received by EWs by shift.

l Columbia County, Oregon

10. Deficiency: The County's EBS messages, witrout coordination with the State, gave instructions "to put animals on stored feed" without an irgestion 4 protective action from the State. RX felt that this lack of of coordination created conditions for misinformation, confusion and indecision on the part ,

of the public. In addition, the County used the instructions for the General Population over tone-alert radios as broadcast information for the Special Populations (schools and chemical plant located within the plume EPZ). This was inadequate since it created the potential situation for interpreting the General Population instructions as the instructions to the Special Population.

t Columbia County, Oregon (continued)

11. Deficiency: Inadequate control, nonitorirg and management of EW dose exposure includirg: EOC staff did not plot plume locations, advise Operations Group of desired travel routes for EWs, track and manage dose exposure and commitment, ensure the appropriate equippirg of field personne2, and administer KI.

12. Deficiency: Ranier School District did not have means to communicate  !

with District busses after they left scluols and transportation dispatch point. Also internal communication was minimal, if not impossible, between the Ranier Superintendent's office and the Bus supervisor.

13 Deficiency: Inadequate organizational ability and resources to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ. There were different I interpretations and confusion between the Ranier School Superintendent and ,

the bus supervisor on interpretations of the Alert, SAE or GE classifications  ;

recommended by Trojan. The County E00 instructions to special populations l contributed to the confusion (See Deficiency #9 for the Columbia County EOC). As indicated in Deficiency #11 Busses do not have the means to communicate by radio and the County has insufficient resources to provide escort by law enforcement vehicles. The County plans for evacuation of I the schools does not indicate dedicated resources, evacuation time estimates by facility, and desired evacuation routes. There are insufficient resources for the planned evacuation of all the children unless ad hoc arrangements are made at the time of the emergency.

Off Site Interfaces at the EOF re: PGE, Oregon and Washington i

14. Deficiency: The licensse and the States did not develop plots of the plume footprints but did develop plots of the plume location and provide these to offsite autlurities. The EOF, actirg for local authorities, was late (it took 25 minutes) in giving notice and PARS to the U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) thus precludirg that agency's rapid rrobilization. The initial faulty PAR was to evacuate the Columbia River to 10 miles and have 5 mile safety zone around the plant. This fault was corrected but in the interim it allowed public access to the 5-10 mile reaches of the River durirE the simulated radiological emergency. The licensee's interpretation of the PAR on Special Populations was not in agreement with either the on-site or the off-site plans. No irgestion PAR was produced by the EOF for the plume EPZ.

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Portland General Electric (PGE) at the Oregon State EOC.

15. Deficiency: This deficiency was assigned by RX to PGE and Oregon State is described in Deficiency #6 (Media) under the Oregon E00.

Joint Preparedness Issues.

16. Deficiency: There are inadequate capabilities to record Public Emergency Instructions from offsite agencies and rebroadcast them every 15 minutes.

17. Deficiency: Plans and resources are inadequate in both Counties to pro-vide the organizational ability and resources to have an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ.

18. Deficiency: Failure of EOF to promptly notify U. S. Coast Guard, faulty PARS, see Deficiency #13 under EOF.

19. Deficiency: The current public education brochure does not cover PARS and pas at the SAE Emergency Action Level (EAL). The demonstrated performance in this exercise called for shelterirg and evacuation of the general public and special populations at that EAL out to 10 miles, but the brochure dis-cusses these pas as only beirg applicable to the GE.

END

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