ML20198F608

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Refers to Predecisional Enforcement Conference on 970729 Re Technical Aspects,Safety Significance & Regulatory Significance for RM Containment Isolation Valves in CS & Ccws.List of Attendees & Presentation Slides Encl
ML20198F608
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/06/1997
From: Gwynn T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Dugger C
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
References
EA-97-278, NUDOCS 9708130091
Download: ML20198F608 (59)


Text

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AHLINGToN TE X A5 MD1100ti4 L AUG- 6 1997 EA 97 278.

' Charles'M. Dugger, Vice President Operations - Waterford 3 Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066

SUBJECT:

PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES This refers to the Predecisional Enforcement Conference conducted in the Region IV office on July 29,1997. This meeting related to the technical aspects, safety significance, and regulatory significance for remote manual containment isolation valves in the containment spray and component cooling water systems, in accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules cf Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely, ,

\i \k n ;\ % $

Thomas P. Gwynn, Director Division of Reactor Projects Attachments:

-1. Attendance List

2. Licenseo Presentation ec:

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O.' Box 31995 k\

Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 ~

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9708130091 970906 F PDR ADOCK 05000382 G PDR .

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l Entergy Operations, Inc. 2-Vice President, Operations Support Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway P.O. Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 General Manager, Plant Operations Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 Manager Licensing Manager Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 Chairman Louisiana Public Service Commission One American Place, Suite 1630 Baton Rouge, Louisiono 70825 1697 Director, Nuclear Safety &

Regulatory Affairs Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70006 Willinm H. Spell, Administrator Louisiana Radiation Protection Division P.O. Box B2135 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884 2135 Parish President Gt. Charles Parish P.O. Box 302 Hahnville. Louisiana 70057 l

._- 9

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! Enter 0y Operations, Inc. 3-Mr. William A. Cross Bethesda Licensing Office 3 Metro Center Suite 610 Bethesda, Maryland- 20814 Winston & Strawn

- 1400 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005 3502

. AUG 6 1997 Entergy Operations, Inc. 4-bec to DCD (IE45) bec distrib. by RIV:

Regioral Administrator Resident inspector

- DRP Director DRS PSB

- Branch Chief (DRP/D) MIS System Project Engineer (DRP/D) RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

Director, WCFO '

PAO SLO DOCUMENT NAME: R:\_WAT7-29 )R To receive copy of document, IndicateA box- j opy withoutj enci ures "E" = Copy with encloswes "N" = No copy PE:DRP/D,, 4 C:DRQD )fy 'D:DRP R GAPick;cW PHHgsfry f TPGvyynn Q 08/h /97 08/ VQ3 08/ /p/97 N f DFFIClAL RECORD COPY-

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i 3 AUG 6 1997 Entergy Operations, Inc. bec to DCD (IE45)

- bec distrib. by RIV: ,

Regional Administrator Resident inspector /

DRP Director DRS PSB Branch Chief (DRP/D) MIS System Project Engineer (DRP/D) RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) '

Director, WCFO PAO SLO 3

DOCUMENT NAME: R:\_WAT7 29 >R To receive copy of document, IndicateA box- j opy wthoutjen ures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy PE:DRP/D, g C:DR$D Bly 'D:DRP R GAPick;cW <

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Attachment 1

. PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ATTENDANCE

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LICENSEE / FACILITY Entergy Operations. Inc.

Waterford-3 DATE/ TIME July 29. 1997, 1 p.m.

CONFERENCE LOCATION Region IV. Training Conference Room Arlington. TX '

EA NUMBER EA 97-278 NRC REPRESENTATIVES NAME (PLEASE PRINT) ORGANIZATION TITLE diaj DW(DL 0126 MIM hm4 Al Mk kewhededs 10RC 2tV WCFob NaRRELv kat R6 @M GteF N Lson s; s cw s t,oc, d\RK ,

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. PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ATTENDANCE LICENSEE / FACILITY. Entergy Operations. Inc Waterford-3 f DATE/ TIME July 29. 1997. 1 p.m.

CONFERENCE LOCATION Region IV. Training Conference Room Arlington. TX EA NUMBER EA 97-278

( LICENSEEREPRESENTAk)VES -

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- Agenda gT* Introduction & Overview C. Dugger Statement of Apparent Violation D. Vinci System Overview D. Vinci Design / Licensing Basis D. Viener Sequence of Events T. Gaudet Safety Significance & Corrective Action A. Wrape Enforcement Perspective E. Ewing Conclusion C. Dugger Entergy 4

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The FSAR in Table 6.2-32, Table 6.2-43 and section 6.2.4.1.2 identifies that each penetration flow path consists of the following:

+ Check valve inside containment

+ Air operated valve outside containment

+ Water filled, closed system, outside containment This is a GDC 56 Penetration Entergy 10

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Containment Spray (CS) n ks&#

+ FSAR Table 6.2-32 describes the features associated with the containment spray penetrations Penetrations are essential CS-125A(B) valve actuation is pneumatic Loss of air OPENS CS-125A(B) valves Post accident position of the CIVs are OPEN

- Actuation signals open the CS-125A(B) valves

- Appendix J Type C testing on the penetrations is not required because the system is connected to a closed water filled system outside containment (FSAR Table 6.2-43 provides additional description)

OEntergy 11

j g Containment bpray(CS)

The FSAR 6.2.4.1.2(a) stated that " Valves isolating penetrating lines serving engineered safety feature systems are not closed automatically by the CIAS, but have the ability to be closed by remote manual operation from the main control room, thereby isolating any engineered safety feature system which malfunctions" W3 recognizes that this FSAR statement did not reflect the original design of the CS system Osracrgy 12

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+(. Containment Spray (CS) s;::;r warm Valves CS-125 AaB perform the following safety functions:

+ Open on a containment spray actuation signal to protect containment

+ Open on a loss of power to its safety position X Entergy

h containment spray (cs)

With the CS-125 A&B valves open, two containment barriers exist:

+ One containment isolation check valve in each line which is tested in accordance with the IST Plan

+ A closed water filled system outside containment With the CS-125 valves open the containment continues to be protected from a single active failure The CS-125 valves have no closed safety function in the IST Plan Entergy 14

CCW t@ the C6ntainment Fan

++ur Coolers (CFCs) in accordance with FSAR section 6.2.4.1.2 and Table 6.2-32, each penetration flow path consists of the following:

+ Air operated valve outside containment

. Closed system inside containment This is a GDC 57 penetration S Entergy 15

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CCW to the C6ntainment Fan rery; Coolers (CFCs)

+ FSAR Table 6.2-32 describes the features associated with the CCW penetrations Penetrations are essential CCW valve actuation is pneumatic Loss of air OPENS the CCW valves Post accident position of the CCW valves is OPEN

- Actuation signal opens the CCW valves

- Appendix J Type C testing on these penetrations is not required because the system is connected to closed seismic Category 1 system inside containment (FSAR Table 6.2-43 provides additional description)

Entergy 16 1

F CCW t@ the C6ntainm@nt Fan c.m a wh Coolers (CFCs)

The FSAR 6.2.4.1.2(a) stated that " Valves isolating penetrating lines serving engineered safety feature systems are not closed automatically by the CIAS, but have the ability to be closed by remote manual operation from the main control room, thereby isolating any engineered safety feature system which malfunctions" W3 recognizes that this FSAR statement did not reflect the original design of the CCW system Ehlergy 17

CCW to th@ Csntainment Fan 6;ng Coolers (CFCs)

Valves CC-807A(B), CC-808A(B), CC-822A(B) and CC-823A(B) perfoim the following safety functions:

+ Open on a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) to protect the containment

+ Open on loss of power to its safety position

+ With the CCW valves open, a closed seismic Category I system inside containment exists. A single active failure will not affect containment integrity The CCW valves have no closed safety function in the IST Plan Entergy 18

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%+, +( a Date KEY EVENTS Event Juiv.1981 The initial Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Waterford 3 was issued

- air-operated valves assume position of areater safety

- containment isolation system conforms to all staff oositions and industry codes and standards September 13.1982 The IST Plan is submitted to the NRC The IST plan has consistently identified the CS and CCWvalves as havino an open safety function only Sprina 1984 Numerous discussions and meetinos were held between LP&L and the Containment Systems Branch (CSB) durina development of the Containment isolation Valve Tech Spec. The NRC aareed that the valves in the Containment Spray and CCW to CFC penetrations were exempt from Appendix J. type C Leak testina.

February 7.1989 The NRC issued an SER addressina its review of the IST Plan throuah Rev. 5. There were no exceptions identified for the CS & CCW valves A

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m _ , ~4 KEY EVENTS pggyps pate Eve _nt May 22,1990 IR 90-07 stated that inspectors performed an in-depth review of accessible portions of the containment isolation system:

reviewed Section 6.2.4 and Table 6.2-32 of FSAR reviewed TS table 3.6-2, Containm ent isolation Valves Verified all containment isolation valves IIsted in TS table were covered by a surveillance test procedure no violations or deviations were noted Septem ber 30,1993 W3 submits an emergency TS change to allow operation with CS-125 A(B) open:

clear discussion of the CS-125 valve's open safety function clear discussion of the valves remote manual function and logic ilmitations reilance on the inboard check valve, closed system outside containment and the water seal to provide an additional containment isolation barrier O

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KEY EVENTS

, e, .7 pma Date Event October 1.1993 An SER was issued for an emeroency TS chance (Amendment 861 that allowed continued operation with CS-125A(B) open:

The SER provided a clear discussion of the CS-125 valve's open safety function The SER also recoanized that the CS-125 valves could not be closed with CSAS sianal present The SER further stated that with the CS-125 valves open. should an event occur requirina containment isolation, but not reauirina containment spray, then inboard check valves CS-128 afb) would l orovide a containment isolation barrier and the CS system pipina l watar seal would provide a second barrier l

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W POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS INDUSTRY e There are other plants with " containment isolation valves" in equivalent systems that do not have a closed safety function specified in their IST plan e There are other plants that do not have the ability to override an ESFAS signal to similar valves l

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SUMMARY

e Prior to issuance of the TIA, Waterford 3 believes the requirements as previously prescribed, reviewed and enforced were met e Previous regulatory inspections, reviews and correspondence supports Waterford 3's position that the CS and CCW valves have no closed safety function l

e The regulatory position has evolved 1

e This issue may have potentialindustry implications from a design, safety function and ESFAS override perspective l

- - Errty 29

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CORRECTIVEACTIONS P'

e Once the issue was raised, Waterford 3 maintained a dialogue with the NRC to ensure a satisfactory resolution e Prior to receiving the current interpretation of the regulatory requirements as stated in the TIA, Waterford 3 took prompt and comprehensive actions, conservatively addressing the valve isolation concerns and increasing margin e Prior to completion of plant mods, a standing instruction was issued to enable overriding the ESFAS signal to allow valve closure

@entergy 31

r CORRECTIVEAbTIONS e DC 3523 - added an override function for the CS and CCW valves at auxiliary panels e DC 3429 -increased scope and added an essential air supply to the CS and CCW valves; mod scope increased in April in lieu of seeking relief for cycle 9 e Post modification iesting has been completed on both plant mods and the systems are operable e Training has been provided to Ops personnel e As a result of the plant mods, W3 currently operates in accordance with FSAR 6.2.1.4.2 for the valves in question

  • %crgy 32

SAFETYSIGNIFlbANCE 4

e There was no actual safety significance associated with the inability to close the CS and CCW valves with an ESFAS signal present e The CS and CCW system will meet single active failure criteria with the subject valves in the open position I Entergy 33

( e g,, SAFETYSIGNIFICANCE r ,

CONTAINMENT SPRAY o Have 30 day water seal that meets Appendix J requirements e Have loop seal while on RAS e CS-128, the inboard check valve is tested for closure in accordance with the IST plan e Containment Spray piping is ASME code class 2, seismic Category 1 e An inspection for boundary leakage from the Containment Spray piping outside containment is performed every outage in accordance with TS 6.3.4.a

,E ntergy 34

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- . si SAFETYSIGNIFICANCE CONTAINMENT SPRAY e Probability of LOCA and loss of Containment Spray water / loop seal is 3.4 x 10-8 e Dose consequences of water / loop seal failure are small and within allowable dose limits -

Osnwgy 35

s.

SAFETYSIGNIFICANCE gin:

COMPONENT COOLING WATER e CCW piping to CFCs forms a closed system inside containment e Isolation valves are outside containment e Probability of LOCA and rupture of closed CCW piping to CFCs inside containment is 8 x 10-10 Entergy 36

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REGULATORYkERSPECTIVE g;g; ApparentViolation 1 e Design approach at initial licensing: reasonable interpretation at that time e Other plants took similar approach to interpreting requirements o Consistent in design and implementation of assigning only OPEN safety function to these valves; no safety analysis credit taken for CLOSED position Osniergy 39

1

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+'

REGULATORYP$RSPECTIVE yy ApparentViolation 1 re e W3 design essentially represents an exception to requirements for an effective remote manual capability

+ FSAR does not reflect this exception e Regulatory requirements subject to varied interpretation

+ Position of " greater safety"

+ Components and systems with dual functions

+ Use of term " containment isolation valve" and application in licensing documents l

39

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+ REGULATORYPERSPE um ApparentViolation 1 TIA e Does not consider other means of satisfying GDCs requirements per Reg Guides, ANSI, SRP e Suggests evolution to a new interpretation and/or intent of GDCs e in its narrow focus, TIA appears to be inconsistent with previous positions

+ SERs (Waterford 3)

+ Inspection activities (Waterford 3)

+ Other plant designs and technical specifications linflYgy

REGULATORYPERSPECTIVE

_ ApparentViolation 1

~.y IDENTIFICATION e W3 questioned then reaffirmed that CS and CCW valves had no closed safety function e issue evolved after 1996 NRC IST inspection:

+ reviewed valve position and safety function

+ concluded testing practice in accordance with

" designed licensing basis" e Resident inspector raised questions regarding CS penetration isolation after STA identified the issue on CR-96-1429 Entergy ,

41

REGULATORYP RSPECTIVE g4 ApparentViolation 1 Corrective Action e Prompt, comprehensive actions initiated prior to TIA e Plant mods installed an essential air supply and added an override function for CS and CCW valves e Training provided to Ops on mods e Approved a revision to the FSAR which accurately reflects CS and CCW valve capabilities e Other independent actions in progress:

+ FSAR fidelity program

+ Improved Tech Specs Entergy 42

.. ~

REGULATORYNERSPECTIVE j;;;;, Apparent Violation 1 Safety Significance e No Effect on Containment Integrity e MinimalImpact on Offsite Doses Entergy 43

REGULATORYNERSPECTIVE

s ApparentViolation 1 CS and CCW Valve Operability Per TS a component is operable when it is capable of performing its specified function e valves had no remote manual capability post accident but this not credited in safety analysis I

e valves safety function is to open on ESFAS e open function verified through our surveillance program e valve was capable of performing its safety function and was therefore operable NO VIOLATION OF TS Entergy 44

REGULATORYP$RSPECTIVE gg ApparentViolation 1 Conclusion if violation issued e old design issue e requirements:

.+ apparently have evolved

+ not clearly defined or uniformly enforced

,+ issue has potential industry implications e corrective actions

+ plant modifications complete

+ FSAR clarification in next update  !

e CS & CCW valves were nonconforming, but operable

@gfg 45 i

-- 2  %

C REGULATORYNERSPECTIVE gg

~

ApparentViolation 2 e NRC identified e notwillful e caused by not clearly delineating the functions of the CS and CCW valves in FSAR e corrective actions discussed in apparent violation 1 e no actual safety significance I

e o

ac REGULATORYPERSPECTIVE nm

SUMMARY

e both apparent violations relate to a single issue -

CS and CCW valves not having a closure capability with an ESFAS signal present e no actual safety significance e valves were nonconforming, but operable - no TS violation e interactions with NRC contributed to the understanding that W3 met all requirements

~

e TIA may not be consistent with other NRC documents and positions e issue may have industry implications and regulatory action against an individual plant may not be appropriate a Entergy 47

N, I!kf CONCLUDING REMARKS CHUCK DUGGER l

i Osniergy l 48 l  !

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

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\ m July,1981 The initial Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Waterford 3 was issued

~~~~-~

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~ E~~ er 13 982

~i~~~~~f'~55 he1 I'~~-~~5Ii~

P an as su InIilfI~~iiey tted o t T e PC # with fo oniy~a~n~o~p~en ~

safety function listed for the CS and CCW valves.

~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~ ~~

~5pnYg75iBI'~~~~ "The lI56715teirdined the v5Ee~s~ii1 he 6ontaidmeit Spia'y~a~nTCC5~'

to CFC penetration were exempt from Appendix J, type C Leak testing.

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~

~fe~bMa~ry'7,1Y85~~~~ OR 'apprMe~s~15?i>Ia~n~w~ hic ~h lists oniy~a~n~o~pei1 afeiy~fuEclion fol~~'

the CS and CCW valves May 22,1990 IR 90-07 performed an in-depth review of accessible portions of the containment isolation system

~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~5eptir6Ee~r~137f9I3~ I~uas~de~tednin~e~d I by 55IhaI65~125 ~viasIn~o~piiabIe~a's~a~ result of pressure locking.

September 30,1993 W3 submits an emergency TS change to allow operation with CS-

.r 125A(B) open October 1,1993 NRC issued an SER that approved a temporary TS change to operate with the CS-125 valves open

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~ ~

~ EtoEe~r~15 I99Y~~~ Y[3 sI5tnItted L55~9iOdi~C0 oil the noperible 6F1Y5E~va ve.~~~~

~~ ~ ~~'

'6eie~m~beif,~1I95~~ f5Ilo v ng ah~Enio~rc~ern~e~nI6odfifence",~53 fe3E5fa vi3Ia5o~rian~d civil penalty for having an (noperable CS-125 valve.

~~~ ~ ~~~~ - ~~

~5I5Ich 33~1Y9T~~~ Edop~e~n~ item in ttie~l5T Designi!Iasisifocu~rne~n~tIdeI55Id vaIves~~~~

listed in the TRM Containment (solation valve table that had no closed safety function August 23,1996 A 50,59 screening was performed to eliminate accumulator testing for CS-125A(B) based on crediting CS-117A(B) to isolate a faulted train of containment spray,

~~ -

~IuIy~2il556 l

~~~~~~ ~iispoc5o~n~r~e~p5I5565~u~as issue ~d foIIo~vdn~g~a~n'e~de~n~siveI5I~~~~'

inspection which included a review of containment isolation valves

~ ~ ~

~5EptemEe~r 1Ei9Y6~~ ~foll5vIngIs~ sue of6R 9E1429 on 5~14 96~~ ~ 56~resIdeni nsp~e~ctor"~'

asks question about basis for isolating CS penetration w#

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS I

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October 29,1996 W3 issued a letter that discussed testing of the air accumulators on

. the CS and CCW valves November 13,1996 Following a containment isolation valve special inspection, Region IV issued a TIA to NRR with four questions regarding containment isolation valve requirements November 15,1996 W3 issued a letter to the NRC addressing the original design basis of specific containment penetrations Spring 1997 A standing order was issued to the control room with instructions for overriding the ESFAS signal to the CS & CCW valves March 1997 Design began on two plant modifications that would provide an override function for and a safety related compressed air supply to the CS and CCW valves.

March 21,1997 A meeting was held in Washington with NRR to discuss the containment isolation of essential systems

~

April 22,1997 NRR issued the TIA response to Region IV.

April 23,1997 A meeting was held on site with NRC to discuss the containment isolation issue May 6,1997 W3 issued a letter addressing actions to resolve issues conceming air operated containment isolation valves June 13,1997 The response to the November 13,1996 TIA was received with IR 97-13.

2

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