IR 05000333/1988027

Insp Rept 50-333/88-27 on 881031-1104.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Exam of IGSCC Conducted During 1988 Outage & Repair of in-vessel Core Spray Pipe Crack

ML20196E729
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	12/01/1988
From:	Mcbrearty R, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196E716	List: IR 05000333/1988027 ML20196E710
References
50-333-88-27, NUDOCS 8812120069
Download: ML20196E729 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /88-27 Docket N License N DPR-59 Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York James A. Fit: Patrick Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 1 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear power Plant Inspection At: Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted: October 31. 1989 to November 4, 1988 Inspectors: /6' h W h h.E./,/9M" W. A. McB eart , Reactor E(pfineer date Approved by: g htkw k' .

e /j MN

. R. Strosnider, Chief, Materials & Process date Section. EB, DRS Inspection Summary: In Report No. 50-333/88-27.spection

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on October 31 to November 4. 198L _(Insnection Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced inspection was conducted of the licensee's activities regarding the results nf IGSCC examinations conducted during the 1988 outage and the repair of the in vessel core spray pipe crack. Particular eTphasis was placed on the comparison of UT examination results with results of previous exa91 nations and the licensee's decisions regarding surface preparation and ultrasonic examination of weld overlays which were applied in 1937 and 1983 to repair cracked weld Results: The inspector concluded, based on areas inspected, that the IGSCC examinations were performed in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements. The examination records are complete and permit evaluation and t*ending of results from one examination to the nex The licensee has obtained relief from the NRC from inspecting three overlay repairs v,hich were applied in 1987, and, at the insistence of the NRC, plans to perform surfa:e preparation and ultrasonic examination of three cverlay M pairs which v.ere applied during the 1988 refueling outag PDR ADOCK C'5000333 O FDC

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Details Persons Contacted New York Power Authoritt

• R. Converse, Resident Manager

• W. Fern:ndy, Superintendent of Power

• R. Patch, Quality Assurance Superintendent

• R. Penny, Senior OPM Engineer

• G. Sechler, Quality Control - NDE Level III U.S. Nuclear Regulatery Commission

• Schmidt, Senior Resident inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit meetin . Scope of Inspection

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NURFG-0313 was revised in 1980 to provide guidance and recomr.c detions regarding naterials and processes that could be used to minimize intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) and to provice recommendations about augmentation of tne axtent and frequency of ISI on welds considered to be susceptible to IG3CC. The present (second)

revision updates these recommendations and adds several subject The approach *) sed in previous editions of NUREG-0313 to identiiy welds i that require augmented inspection is simplified, but is expanded to  !

include consideration of reinspections of welds found to be cracked, witt l or without repair or mitigation action The current approach is based on  !

the following:  ;

(1) All stainless steel welds in high-temperature EWR systems ars considered to be subject to IGSCC unless measures have been taken to make them resistan (2) The frequency and sample size L. sed to inspect all safety relat,ed

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piping welds in EWR plants will depend on the material and processing used. Sample bases are provided for such classificatio ,

(3) S w utilities may choose not to replace, or to operate for some interim period of time before making njor modifications or replacing piping. This would mean that operation with cracked or repaired welds may be planned. Guidance is provided to cover these situations.

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During the current refueling outage the licensee has performed examinations in response to Generic Letter 88-01 and NUREG-0313, Revision 2. The licensee additionally repaired an in-vessel core spray system pipe crack using a welded sleeve over the cracked pip The following areas were selected for inspection:

NDE data related to IGSCC examinations (73755)

• Welds scheduled for repair by weld overlay (73755)

• Three core spray system welds wnich were repaired in 1987 with w.ld overlay (73755)

• In-vessel enre spray pipe crack repair (92703)

Findings INSPECTION OF ISI ACTIVITIES The inspector's review of ultrasonic examination data confirmed that the examinations were performed using comparable procedures and techniques since 1984. The examinations were performed by EPRI trained and qualified examiners. The personnel training and qualification complied with applicable regulatory requirements in effect when the examinations

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were oerforme During the 1943 refueling outage the licensee performed ultrasonic examination of all 28" diameter recirculation system welds, all 22" diameter recirculation system welds and all 12" diameter recirculati n system riser to sweepolet weld Eight susceptible 12" diameter welos were not examined during the 1988 outage. The licansee offared the following as juttification for not perforning ultrasonic examination of the eight welds:

• A total of twanty-seven 12" diamater welds were examined during the outage, and one riser to sweepolet weld was found defectiv l

• All remaining riser to sweepolet 12" diameter welds were examined -

none were found to display indications of IGSC * Five of the eight welds were examined using an automated e> amination syste* (P-s:cn) ir 19?t. 1925 and 202 F4ve others were examired cace in 1984 using the P-scan system.

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• The use of Hydrogen Water Chemistry will be initiated upon returning to power after the 1933 refueling outage.

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4 g The NRC agreed that, based on the above, the licensee's justification for not examining the eight welds was acceptabl Three welds were scheduled for repair by the weld overlay method during the 1988 outage. The licensee wished to postpone the surface preparation and the ultrasonic examination of the overlays until a subsequent outage based on time constraints during the current outage. After discussions with the NRC in this regard the licensee was requested to perform the recessary surface preparation and ultrasonic examination prior to returning to power in 198 During the 1937 outage at Fit: Patrick the licensee repaired three Core Spray System B loop welds with weld overlays. The licensee requested and received NRC approval for not performing surface preparation and ultrasonic examination of the overlays based en plans to replace the piping during the 1988 refueling outage. The replacement was not performed in 1988 due to the unacceptability of replacement piping and the licensee's inability to obtain acceptable oipe in time for the 1988 outag The replacement is reschtduled for a September 1989 maintenance outage. The licensee again requested NRC approval for not performing the ultrasonic examination of the overlays, and approval was granted with a stipulation that if '.he piping is not replaced in September 1959 then the licensee must prepare the surface and perform the ultrasonic examination of the three weld overlay INSPECTICN OF IN-VESSEL CORE SPRAY PIPING REPAIRS The performance of underwater, remote visual examination of the Core Spray Spargers and associated piping in the RPV in accordance with IE Bulletin 80-13 identified two circumferential cracks in the heat affected zone on the lower side of the pipe to pipe weld located approximately 6 inches below the elbow te pipe weld on the 190' azimuth riser pip ,

On Tuesday, October 11, 1983, the licensee briefed the NRC staff in the cracks and the proposed repair. On October 13, 1988, during a telephone conversation, the licensee advised the NRC staff that the cracks were locate. in a pipe to pipe weld rather tNan elbow to pipe weld as initially stated in the October 11 meetin The completed repair consists of a welded "clamshell" arrangement composed of 6 inch schedule 80 pipe, 4 inches long made of ASTM A-312, Type 316L material. The clamshell was cut in two rpproximately 130*

halves, ar.d was petitioned on the existing 5 inch schedule 40 pipe s.ith the effected weld in the center cf the 4 inch long clamshell. Both cracks were ccmpletely covered by the clamshell. The inside diareter of the clamshell was approximately 0.2 inches larger than the outside diameter of the existtrg 5 inch schedule 40 pipe. At the location of the cracks, the core spray line has a clearance with the RPV wall of

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approximately 1.25 inch, providing limited access for welding. The welds consist of circumferential fillet welds tying into the existing 5 inch pipe at the upper and lower end of the clamshell, and two full penetration longitudinal groove welds along the side The copy of the licensee's Safety Evaluation (SE) provided to the inspector indicated that the "clamshell" was installed as originally planned before the correct crack location was identified. The upper end of the "clamshell" was welded to the existing pipe and not to the pipe / elbow weld af, originally planned. When the inspector brought this to the licensee's attention he was advised that the SE would be correcte He was further advised that the conclusions documented by the (E were based on the as-built configuratio Due to restricted accessibility, the circumferential welds do not extend the full circumference and are approximately 300 . Acceptability of welds less than 360' is addressed by the Safety Evaluation - JAF - SE - 88 -

190. The SE entitled "Repair of In-Vessel Core Spray Line using a Welded Clamshell Sleeve" concludes that the repair does not involve an unreviewed safety question, does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for Technical Specifications, does not increase the prob.bility of o:currence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, and does not create the possibility of ar accident or malfunction of a type other than any evaluated previously in the FSAR. The Safety Evaluation was approved by tne plant Onsite Review committee Meeting No.88-096 on 10/14/8 Conclusions Intergranular stress corrosion cracking examinations were conducteo by trained, qualified persennel and the results were properly documente The finai data were found to be complete and easily retrievabl Comoarir,on with results of previous examinations was made by the licensee to establish trcnds regarding the various weld The licensee has prepared a book on each weld which contains data from each examination of the wisld since 1984 The scope of the licensee's inspection had to be expanded to include baseline ultrasonic examinations of weld overlays applied during this outag Activities associe.ed with the in vessel core spray pipe crack repair were not thoroughly reviewed prior to licensee discussions with the NRC staff as evidenced by the discovery of an, until then, unidentified, short section of pipe in the affected line which changed the originally identified crack location and the final location of the repair sleev Further evidence of incenplete or ineffective review is evidenced by the inaccurate statement in the licensee's Cafety Evaluation regarding the location of the welded repair sleev This was corrected after the inspector brought it to the licensee's attention. The inspectors review identified no unacceptable conditions regarding the "clamshell" repair to the in-vessel core spray pipin __ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_ __ ___

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3. Exit Meeting '

l The inspector met with licensee r.?presentatives (denoted in paragraph 1) ;

at the conclusion of the inspection on November 4, 1988. The inspector i-summarized the scope and findings of the inspectio '

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, At no time during the inspection was written material provided by the i inspector to the license The licensee did r.ot indicate that I proprietary information was involved within the scope of this inspectio I L

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