ML20151Y835
| ML20151Y835 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1986 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1486, NUDOCS 8602130179 | |
| Download: ML20151Y835 (316) | |
Text
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'{ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
i IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 (RESTART)
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LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D. C. . PAGES: 1- 169 DATE: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1986 ,, h, T n3m itjc!gjpik p y y jdge wuen h o 3010t 30m0Ve from ACRS Office ACE-FtDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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4 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS t
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR STATION 5
UNIT 1 (RESTART) 6 l
7; Nuclear Regulatory Commission !
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Room 1167 -
1717 H Street, N.W. !
80 1 Washington, D. C. l Thursday, February 6, 1986 10 -
ijl The neeting of the subcommittee convened at 8:30 a.m.,
! Dr. Forrest J. Remick presiding.
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1 13 h ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT: g
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DR. FORREST J. REMICK !
15 DR. CHESTER P. SIESS 0
MR. JESSE C. EBERSOLE ,
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() PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONERS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACT'OR SAFEGUARDS THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1986 The contents of this stenographic transcript of the 4
proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions recorded at the meeting held on the above date' .
4 No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at O this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this transcript.
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7250 01 01 2 jDAVbur 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 DR. REMICK: (presiding) The meeting will now 3 come to order.
4 This is a meeting of the ACRS Davis-Besse 5 Subcommittee.
6 I am Forrest Remick, subcommittee Chairman.
7 The other ACRS members in attendance this morning 8' are Jesse Ebersole and Chet Siess.
9 The purpose of this meeting is to review the 10 restart activities for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 11 that have taken place since the June 9th, 1985 loss of p, 12 feedwater event.
13 , Portions of this meeting will be closed to 14 discuss material related to plant safeguards and security.
15 l H. Alderman, on my right, is the ACRS staff i
16 member for this meeting.
17 The rules for participation in today's meeting 18 i have been announced as part of the notice of this meeting 19 1 that was published in the Federal Register on January 21st, 20 1985.
21 It is requested that each speaker first identify 22 himself or herself and speak with sufficient clarity and 23 volume so that he or she can be heard readily.
- 24 We have received no requests for time to make 25 oral statements from members of the public.
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7250 01 02 3 m 'DAVbur 1 Do any members of the subcommittee have any 2 comments at this time?
3 (No response.)
4 DR. REMICK: If not, we will now proceed with the 5 meeting in accordance with the schedule.
6 I call upon Mr. John Stolz of the NRC staff to 7 give us an overview.
8 <
MR. STOLZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is 9 John Stolz.
10 With me today is Conrad McCracken on my far right 11 and Al De Agazio on my right. Al is the project manager for 12 I the Davis-Besse plant review.
13 We have members of the staff present who will be 14 able to assist us in answering any questions that the 15 I committee may have.
16 Later on, following the licensee's presentation, 17 Mr. De Agazio will brief the subcommittee on the staff's 18 l draft SER.
I 19 There are a number of open review issues that 20 need to be resolved prior to restart. As you recall, that 21 j is summarized in Section 1 of the SER draft. These open 22 issues are essentially unchanged from those that were 23 described at'the last briefing in January.
( ') 24 The principal open issues are the maintenance 25 programs and the systems review and test programs. There ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 01 03 4 lDAVbur 1 are a total of about eight that either we found problems 2 with or for which the licensee has committed to do something 3 prior to restart.
4 In addition, there were about six items that were 5 derived from ACRS comments at the January meeting. I 6 understand that Toledo Edison-will address these items in 7 their presentation.
8 Let me talk about the remaining milestones and 9 schedules to complete staff's evaluation and issue the final 10 SER.
11 First, regarding the maintenance issues that are 12 still left open, the maintenance team did plan to visit the 13 site in mid-February. We are going to delay that visit in 14 order to accommodate the plant readiness. They are not 15 l quite ready for that team yet, and we are going to 16 reschedule that visit in mid-March. The final SER would 17 i then be issued in mid-April.
I 18 l Following the final SER, we would still need to 19 have a subsequent Commission meeting.. So I would say late 20 April would be the time when we would get approval for plant 21 restart in the event that everything goes well. So this is 22 about a one-month delay from what we had previously 23 estimated.
() 24 The other item I would like to get some advice 25 from the subcommittee on following this meeting is what ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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k /DAVbur 1 future ACRS meetings would be recommended.
2 We appreciate the fact that the subcommittee and 3 the full committee has given us comments and suggestions, 4 which we feel certain have contributed a lot to the review.
5 Whether or not you feel that further review by either the 6 subcommittee or the full committee is needed, we would like 7 to get your recommendations on that.
8 DR. REMICK: Let me just address that.
9 As you recall, the staff asked the ACRS to review 10 the restart plan for Davis-Besse, so we don't have a l'
11 mandatory ACRS letter. But in discussions with the full
<~ 12 committee, I believe last month, there was a fairly clear a
13 indicatio,n, I would say, from a number of the members that 14 they would wish to write a letter to the Commission on the 15 l restart plan.
l 16 So I would think that since the SER is not 17 i complete and the staff's evaluation of the restart is not l
18 l complete, it seems to me that we would probably need another 19 l subcommittee meeting when the staff has basically completed 20 their review and would need then to take that matter to the 21 full committee in order that they could write a letter.
22 From what you said, it is not clear to me, 23 although it seems likely possible, that perhaps the March
( ]; 24 meeting would be the meeting that we would take it to the 25 full committee, with the idea of getting out a letter then ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 01 05 6 1 DAVbur 1 to the Commission.
2 I am not sure if you are going to have your staff 3 review completed at that time.
4 MR. STOLZ: We would not expect to have the 5 safety evaluation report issued by that time.
6 DR. REMICK: Excuse me. You said your trip was 7 going to be mid-April. I am sorry.
8 MR. STOLZ: Mid-March, and it will take a month 9 to prepare a final SER. I think the maintenance situation 10 will probably be the pacing item.
11 DR. REMICK: Excuse me. I said March, full
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- 12 cemmittee meeting. I really should have said April.
13 Do you think that the staff will be ready to 14 basically have their final positions by the April full l
15 i committee meeting?
16 MR. STOLZ: It is possible we would have our l
17 l final positions ready by the April meeting. We would not 18 have formally issued the final SER.
19 As you may know, we have issued the safety 20 evaluation report as a draft, and we do not plan to issue 21 any supplements. We plan to issue a final safety evaluation 22 report that would stand on its own, and we will do that when 23 everything is closed out.
4 24 DR. REMICK: Let me correct myself then. I do 25 not see a full ACRS committee meeting until April, and we ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
7250 01 06 7 DAVbur 1 would need a preceding subcommittee meeting prior to that.
2 Do other members of the subcommittee have any 3 comments on that?
4 MR. EBERSOLE: It sounds fine to me.
5 DR. REMICK: Mr. Williams?
6 MR. WILLIAMS: I am Joe Williams, Senior Vice 7 President of Toledo Edison. ,
i 8 For that subcommittee meeting will you need 9 i something from the staff, a supplement which addresses the 10 ,
maintenance issues in the 32 systems?
?
11 Most of them are closed out now because, John, gq 12 you said you were not going to issue a supplement, and I 13 ! don't know what they will-be working from o'ther than what 14 they have now.
l 15 '
So how do we do that?
16 MR. STOLZ: If we were to discuss the matter 17 i before the subcommittee, we would essentially be briefing i
i 18 !
them based on our updated findings but not have a piece of 19 ! paper formally issued in the way of a report.
I 20 DR. REMICK: Wouldn't you be updating the draft 21 i from time to time?
22 There are sections that are still missing. I 23 assume that those will be coming somewhere along the line in 24 draft form.
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25 MR. STOLZ: Well, we hadn' t planned on formally ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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lDAVbur 1 issuing. We would be updating the draft. What you would be 2 getting is a status report. It would still be a draft, but 3 we would not be issuing the final report until everything is 4 closed out.
5 MR. WILLIAMS: No, John, What you confused me 6 with is that there would be no supplements issued, and I 7 would view those things that you are talking about now as 8 really supplements to the draft, informative data on those 9 items.
10 MR. STOLZ: We hadn't really clearly thought 11 about interim reports, frankly, Mr.~ Chairman. We could r^g 12 think about that if we had to make a report prior to issuing
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13 the final report. I am sure we could come up with an 14 updated draft to issue as.an interim report.
15 DR. REMICK: I notice we were handed out this 16 morning -- oh, I am sorry, it is something different. So 17 the version that we received in the mail is the most recent 18 version of the draft or the only version of the draft?
19 , MR. STOLZ: That is right.
I 20 I had nothing else to say unless there are any 21 questions.
22 ~(No response.)
23 DR. REMICK: Hearing none, I suggest then that we
() 24 proceed with the agenda. Next is a presentation from the 25 licensee, Toledo Edison.
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7250 01 08 9 u DAVbur 1 Mr. Williams, do you want to lead that?
2 MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, sir. Ag a in , I am Joe 3 Williams, Senior Vice President - Nuclear for Toledo 4 Edison.
5 (Slide.)
6 It is a pleasure to be with you once again, t
7 gentlemen, for the regular update as to where we are.
8 Of course, we talked to you sometime -- time gets 9 on. I guess it was some months ago -- about what we 10 intended to do, and if you remember when we assessed the i
11 situation, not only were we concerned with the specific l
rm 12 I occurrences of June 9th and the actions that we had to take
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I 13 there, but we also determined that there were a great many 14 ! programmatic actions that needed to be retaken to ensure l
15 that Davis-Besse would operate at a level of excellence at 16 : which it ought to operate.
17 l So I am going to address the programmatic issues i
18 '
first. I will run through them rather rapidly. I will l
19 l address the programmatic actions that we briefly described i
20 '
to you at our last meeting.
21 These are the gentlemen that are with me today 22 i presenting:
23 Steve Smith, the Assistant Plant Manager for
() 24 Maintenance, is the first one on the right.
25 The next one in Bill O'Connor, Assistant Plant ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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L /DAVbur 1 Manager for Operation. ,
2 Mr. John Wood, the head of our new Nuclear Plant 3 -Systems Group.
4 Mr. Phil Hildebrandt, who is the Chairman of the 5 IPRC, the Independent Review Group, set up to review the 6 work of the engineers that are reviewing the operability of 7 the 34 systems that we are reviewing -- and also today will 8 be discussing the test programs in the absence of 9 Mr. Jacques Lingenfelter, who is ill today.
10 And Mr. Sushil Jain, head of the Nuclear Safety 11 Group and has headed up the task force that has looked into 12 decay heat removal, all aspects of it of course.
OL .
13 (Slide.) ,
14 The new mission organization now looks like l
15 this. I have the directors reporting to me. The Nuclear 16 Engineering Group Director in the green hatches was a new 17 position we formed.
18 This is what you saw the last time, with the 19 . exception of the red one, the dashed red position, i
20 Information Management Director. That represents the effort 21 that we have accomplished to bring records. management, 22 document control, correspondence control, and the computer 23 or the process and support for the configuration management 24 into the nuclear mission. It had before this time been
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25 scattered throughout corporate. So we just brought it all ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 01 10 11 DAVbur 1 in and enlarged it somewhat.
2 (Slide.)
3 The engineering organization. If you recall, the 4 Nuclear Engineering Group director was moved in from plant 5 manager. We have a nuclear engineering general manager who 6 was secunded in from Stone & Webster, Mr. O. J.'Mavereaux, 7 l and the nuclear plant systems director, Mr. John Wood. That 8 was a new part of the engineering organization in our 9 expanded organization.
10 We moved the yellow hatches up, the operations l
11 l engineering manager into engineering services manager.
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Operation engineering came out of the plant, leaving the u- ,
13 i plant with a small cadre of engineers reporting to the plant I
14 manager. ,
15 l I want to mention a change on this that has just 16 l come about. The B&W Owners Group has embarked on an
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17 ambitious program to clean our own house and to make sure we 18 end up with the safest, most reliable plants, giving us the 19 ! best availability possible.
20 There are a lot of activities going in under that 21 group, about 15 subcommittees there doing work. But we are 22 going to concentrate on one program immediately, and that is 23 the determination of the reasons for the trips and the 24 transients.
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25 What can we do to reduce the numbers of trips and ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1"'DAVbur 1 better control these transients?
2 Everybody is going to have to contribute.
3 Mr. Coelho, now the Nuclear Engineering Group director, is 4 going to move over and get that started for the D&W Owners 5 Group.
6 (Slide.)
7 l Plant manager. The differences there. The l
8 f assistant plant manager, the office of assistant plant A
9 manager - maintenance are elevated to those line positions 10 and filled by the planning superintendent. That 11 1 organization, planning and scheduling, was formed, reporting i
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12 l to the plant manager.
13 The technical support manager has about 12 1
14 l engineers in it.
15 l (Slide.)
16 The nuclear projects director remains the samo.
17 ; He is the one who controls the construction trades and the i
18 { projects, accomplishes the projects that maintenance does 19 not do, and we have moved the materiel manager -- or 20 established one because we had nobody who was responsible 21 for materiel in the nuclear mission. That has been a very 22 , productive move.
I 23 (Slide.)
( }) 24 Quality assurance. Since we last talked to you, 25 we did a study of the Quality Assurance Group. Wo enlarged ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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! 7250 01 12 13 DAVbur 1 it somewhat. We have brought in a new' quality assurance l 2 director, and the one that was there is now the operations i
I 3 quality assurance manager, and this is the way the l
4 organization looks. .
5 (Slide.)
l 6 Assistant Vice President - Nuclear, I will 7 describe him when he is there. But the information 8 management director has now been established under him, with 9 computer systems, records, and documentation as I mentioned 10 before.
11 (Slide.)
12 These are the major changes.
13 New Centralized Planning Department established.
14 The previous plant manager is the head of the 15 expanded Engineering Division, and we are just changing it a 16 little as I described.
17 The Nuclear Engineering Division has been 18 substantially enlarged and is being staf fed. We are moving 19 toward an in-house engineering siipport, with a minimum 20 reliance on consultants. That will come about probably in 21 the 1987 time frame.
22 The Nuclear Engineering Division has been 23 enlarged. The position of the nuclear plant systems
() 24 director has been filled by the manager of mechanical and 25 structural engineering, Mr. John Wood.
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l' DAVbur 1 (Slide.)
i 2 The new plant manager is in place. That is 3 Mr. Lou Storrs. That is the second chair on the right, 4 right here. He was formerly the assistant plant manager for 5 Waterford.
6 The assistant plant manager for operations has 7 been established and filled. That is Mr. Bil) O'Connor.
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8 The assistant plant manager - maintenance, ;
9 Mr. Smith, is in place. l I -
10 The Maintenance Department has been reorganized, 11 enlarged, and experienced personnel have been hired for all positions, and Mr. Smith will describe that to you.
{} 12 13 -And a materials manager has been established.
14 (Slide.)
15 Position descriptions for all management l
16 positions in the nuclear mission were completed on October 17 the 15th, 1985. They are being fine-tuned, and the 18 positions are being filled, but the organization -- and so I '
19 told you before, they need to be told what it is they are 20 supposed to do, and now they know what they are nupposed to 21 do, and all of that is in place.
22 All nuclear mission personnel except the Nuclear 23 Fuel Department -- that in two poople who are downtown in
() 24 Toledo -- have been moved out to the alte. A new OA 25 director who was a vice president of quality assurance at l
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7250 01 14 15 DAVbur 1 Marble Hill before it closed and has since been a 21 ,
consultant.
3 The previous quality assurance director has 4 assumed the position of manager of the quality assurance 5 organization, and a new Information Management Division has f i
6 been established. ;
7 (Slide.)
8 Our new organization structure was approved. The ;
i 9 staffing increases from 690 to 930, and it will grow on up 10 to 990 because we are moving people in from corporate. .
11 We are expanding the OA Division by about five 12 people in chemistry and health physics. It will be expanded 13 by about 20 in the information systems.
14 So we will end up when we get everybody in house ,
I 15 that is working for the nuclear mission with about a 16 thousand people.
17 Salary increases were approved, and we raised the 18 salaries. We gave them 60 percent of the increase on 19 January the lat, and if they perform as they should then 20 they will get the other 40 percent on 1 January 1987. That f 21 is in addition to their regular merit raises.
22 ,
The on-shift SRO 11conne bonus was incroaned from 23 550 to 800, the on-shift RO licanso bonus from 485 to 550, j
() 24 so that we could be competitivo.
25 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 'DAVbw 1 The manning status as of July 1st was 644, as you '
2 see here.
3 (Slide.) >
4 221 vacancies. We have 103 contractors seconded 5 into 103 of those chairs. 68 of those are engineers. The 6 remainder of the work is being done for each chair, whatever 7I the responsibilities are, by more than one guy, but we've i 8 not seconded any one person in. That's also a source of the 9 ones -- after we look at them, it's a source of some of the 10 acceptances that we've had, that we've boon able to hire as 11 permanent employees. January acceptancos. Thoso savon 12 management or nonmanagement. In February, we have, I think,
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13 about 20 offers out. ,
14 Recruiting is going well, and here's the way ;
I 15 we're doing it. We run a security background check on [
t 16 them. We get their drug screening psychological testing and 17 evaluation, their education check, assessment and career 18 development testing and personal interviews. We' re going ,
i 19 after quality. We want to make suro have it. j i
20 (Slide.) ,
21 The security background check, of course, as you 22 know, covers the previous five-year period with the critoria 23 thoro, the drug acrooning. We scroon them all at the timo
() 24 of employment, and as of the middle of thin month, probably 25 around the 17th, we'll go to random drug sampling at the
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1%-DAVbw I site. Psychological testing and evaluation is the NNMPO.
2 It's given to everybody. There's an interview with a 3 psychologist and the candidate has to receive a possible 4 recommendation for employment.
5 (Slide.)
6 Further than that, we give them their education 7 check. Wo verify higher education, regardless of graduation 8 date. High school graduation is verified, if it's during 9 the past five year. Falsification is grounds for 10 disqualification at any later date. We give them the 11 assessment and career development test. They're timed and 12 untimed tests. It evaluates both their capability and 13 suitability for specific positions. The tests are scored 14 and evaluated by industrial psychologists, and each person 15 gets an interview about his performance on that test.
16 There are six levels of competonce. We uso that 17 test to determine whether we really want to hire the
, 18 i person. We also use it to determine whether we really want 19 to promoto them. It has now boon given to, I'd say, 99 20 percent of the people on the sito, the management people.
21 DR. REMICK: Mr. Williams, if I can intorrupt you 22 thero. One of our colleaguos who's not here today, 23 Mr. Reed, would want us to ask if you conduct any mechanical 24 aptitudo testing in the scrooning process.
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25 MR. WILLIAMS: Not an such. Stovo, what about ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.
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'7250 02 03 18 DAVbw 1 the maintenance people?
2 MR. SMITH: Are we talking about the maintenance 3 folks?
4 MR. WILLIAMS: Management people, Forrest?
5 DR. REMICK: I'm thinking more of the 6 maintenance, the operations type people.
7 MR. S!!ITH: We have not as yet started that typo 8l of applicant testing.
9 MR. WILLIAMS: Lot the plant manager speak.
10 Mr. Lou Storrs, the plant manager.
11 1 Mr. STORRS: My namo is Lou Storrs. We're
)
12 investigating with personnel right now to begin implomonting 13 the Edison Electric Institute test program that's boon 14 approved for utilities. We're beginning negotiations with 15 our labor relationa organization and have plans for putting 16 that in placo.
17 , DR. REMICK: Is this the PAS tost?
18 l Mr. STORRS: Yes.
19 DR. REMICK: One other quantion. Based on your 20 experience, do you have any fooling for the percontage of 21 peoplo scrooned out duo to drug testing or do to the 22 psychological testing?
l 23 MR. WILLIAMS: About overy caroor day that we've n
() 24 had -- on a caroor day, wo invito peoplo in after they've 25 boon scrooned by a tolophono intorview, and we've looked at ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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l_ DAVbw 1 their resumes. We invite them and their wives in to Toledo, 2 and we spend two days. The two days are given over to the 3 physical exams and the tests and a tour of the plant and 4 interviews. Each one of those, we've had one to three 5 people that declined to participate further in that. They 6 withdrew. But we've had no one that was rejected that we 7 tested, but we've had people that declined to participate.
8 DR. REMICK: For both drug and psychological 9 testing?
10 MR. WILLIAMS: I couldn't tell. Some of them on 11 that psychological test on the assessment and career
- 12 development test just got up and walked out. That's a tough 13 exam. They just got up and walked out.
14 DR. REMICK: Okay. Please.
15 (Slide.)
16 MR. WILLIAMS: If you recall, we had a 17 performance enhancoment program, and we had our replies or 18 responses to the SALP report, outlined a lot of things that 19 we had to do. I think there were 146 or so when I got 20 there. We just concentrated on the high priority ones, and 21 we put a lot of them back over into the business as usual 22 column. These are the high priority ones. position 23 descriptions have boon completed. The merit review and 24 salary administration program is completed. The
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25 configuration management is in process. Managomont
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k -DAVbw 1 training is in process.
2 Management by objectives. I'll resume that after 3 restart. Fire protection, the pursuit of Appendix R 4 compliance is in process. The Nuclear Commission procedures i 5 are in process. The OA awareness program is in process.
6 The nonoutage work prioritization will be resumed after 7 restart and the STA trained on EDO duties is compleged.
8 'I'll discuss some of these in just a little bit i
i 9- more detail.
1 10 DR. REMICK: Will you be discussing the STA, EDO 11 duties?
12 MR. WILLIAMS: That will be discussed by 4
13 Mr. O'Connor.
- 4
- 14 (Slide.)
15 The big swing in the future and the very costly
- 16 program that we've embarked upon to make sure that we have
- 17 good control of this plant on a design basis is 18 l configuration management. When I was before you last, I ,
! 1 19 think I indicated I would probably go to a prime contractor 20 and a subcontractor. It didn't take long to conclude that i 21 I'd probably be had if I did that, so we established an f 22 in-house program manager. I went to MPR. I got a very i
23 talented gentleman by the name of John Dyer to come in and 24 back up the program manager. We said we'll start on four
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! 25 prototype systems, and we'll do those four prototype !
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7250 02 06 21 1 AVbw 1 systems to make sure where we're going, with one system 2 description being written by B&W, that kind of thing.
3 But also we recognized that once we close the 4 door on containment, we want to keep it closed. So we went 5 ahead with an effort, at the same time, to gather all the 6 data on all the systems in containment, and all of that is 7 going. We figure that we'll put about 120 man-years of work 8 into this. When we get through, we'll know what it is that 9 we have in the plant. We will have system descriptions that 10 give out operators the design basis for the operation of the 11 system, consideration of the actions that they take, what it 12 really means in that' respect. We'll have the vendor manuals
. 13 updated. We'11 have a basis for determining a good 14 inventory of spare parts, drawing controls, the whole thing, 15 and it will be a living program.
16 Today we're working 12 teams of 25 people in 17 containment, walking down gathering data. We've had our 18 fits and starts and we've had to back up and start again a 19 couple places, but the program is ironed out and going well, 20 and the monios are in the '86 budget and will be in th'o '87 21 budget. It will end up being about a $17 million effort.
22 MR. EBERSOLE: Mr. Williams, can I ask you a 23 question? I see those swarms of people that you'ro getting, 24 lots more, and so forth, out of. Inevitably, it will come 25 around to the point of asking what percent of those really ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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l 1 -DAVbw 1 understand the plant on a integral basis.
l 2 That is, is there a group that you assign for 3 system integration studies that comprehensively understand 4 the plant rather than having it all compartmentalized in 5 little groups and sections, and so forth, with few people 1
6 really knowing how the plants performs as an entity, 7 particularly because it's a B&W plant, and you and Rancho 8 Seco and lots of others, I think, well know that you've got 9 ,
a lot of things to do to stabilize-these B&W plants.
10 They're norvous.
11 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes., They are very nervous.
12 Well, in the operations area, the understanding l s 13 of the plants and the systems and the operation of them is 14 done through our regular training program, but I did mention 15 that we didn' t have the system descriptions and do not have 16 them, that give the design basis to operators. That's part 17 of the configuration manual program. That will provide 18 that.
19 i In the engineering what wo look for in the future l
20 and the reason wo established it is the system engineering 21 group being the cognizant engineers responsible from cradle 22 to grave for all these systems under John Wood, with a very 23 thorough understanding of it, I think will contributo a lot
() 24 to that, because heretofore, all we've had is a donign 25 group, the f acilities engincoring out thero. They didn't ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
FMEm__ NEkmwM9vgrear El%e
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)DAVbw 1 really know how the systems operated.
2 MR. EBERSOLE: How about intersystem 3 relationships?
4 MR. WOOD: I was also assigned Louie Simon who is 5 a former operations supervisor.
6 MR. WILLIAMS: John, would you like to speak-7 to what you intend your group to do?
8 MR. WOOD: My name is John Wood, Nuclear Plant 9 Systems.
10 In the Systems Group, we will have divided the 11 plant up into six major areas of responsibility. We will 12 I have a Reactor Plant Systems Group, who will have a cadre of
(
13 up to 10 engineers, who will be devoted almost as a team and 14 also individually to their particular systems, to looking 15 after the reactor plant. We also plan on using quite 16 extensively some other help that we'll have in the 17 organization. One of those will be Susshil Jain's group, 18 who is activly involved in the PRA type work, such that they 19 will be able to help us understand what our shortcomings are 20 in the systems integration area, and where we have to 21 address perhaps modification to take care of shortcomings 22 and also to evaluate transients that may have occurred as to 23 how that should be viewed in light of systems interaction.
{} 24 MR. WILLIAMS: Mr. Sushil Jain is moving over.
25 Once he gets through with the work connected with the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
[ 2023M.M00 NaioneWe CoC m)W
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7250 02 09 24 bAVbw 1 outage and the determination of what we need to do to 2 improve the reliability of our AFW system and decay heat 3 removal capability, he was movd over Jus head. We're going 4 to call it the nuclear safety group -- is that what it's 5 going to be, Sushil -- which will interact in the capacity 6 that John just described.
7 But then we have a program also of training 8 people throughout to understand the system. For the first 9 time,~were putting foremen, for example through systems 10 description training. They have not had this. It's all 11 embryonic. You just don' t turn a switch and all this 12 happ' ens, but it's moving .in that direction.
13 I also look to a good pay-of f f rom the B&W owners 14 Group effort. That second program we're going to take on in 15 there is called " availability," which to me translates 16 " maintenance," okay? But right now, there's a forced 17 transfusion into this group, because they're looking into 18 those 34 systems. That has been the damndest transfusion of 19 professional knowledge about the interaction of those 20 systems that I've ever seen, because these individual groups 21 that will be described later, are going through and 22 analyzing. For the first time, young engineers, backed up 23 by experienced professionals from industry are going through
[} 24 these systems surfacing up through the IPRC committee, where l 25 they say, no, that's not enough background, becauso you 1
i ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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k 7250 02 10 25 dhDAVbw 1 didn' t understand this interdependence on the other system.
2 I'm going to have a cadre of people on how 3 systems interact. It will be no mystery to them, when we 4 get the plant started up again.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: You know, the secondary systems 6 were long neglected, 7 MR. WILLIAMS: They' re not going to be here, 8 Boss.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: And for of all of them, the 10 secondary system is the driver.
11 MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. Where were we?
12 (Slide.)
O 13 Intermim fire protection. That Appendix R is a 14 bear, particularly one for us. We have our program ,,
15 developed, action plans were draf ted in November of '85. We 16 have 30 technical and programmatic issues related to fire 17 protection, plants assigned and prioritized. We have 18 detailed action plans under way. A program manager for 19 this. Final Appendix R Assessment is due to the NRC on 20 March 6th. We've updated the fire hazards analysis report l 21 to them on March 6th. We revised our technical specs in i
- 22 June and design and modifications will be completed by the l 23 sixth refueling outage.
l l 24 (Slide.)
25 Procedures. A big effort before restart and also l
- ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
I 202 347 3700 Nationwide Om a 400 336 4646
7250 02 11 26 L DAVbw 1 after restart, to get this organization to operate in 2 accordance with procedures.
3 I need 272 administrative. 17 nuclear mission 4 procedures for restart. I've got three approved. Tne rest 5 of them are in the approval cycle and there are another 59 6 that we'll produce after restart.
(
7 As you go on down through there, you'll find at j
8 the bottom I need 497 for restart. 132 are approved. All 9 the rest of them are somewhere in the approval cycle. And 10 this is a reall big ef fort, because you've got to make sure 11 that these procedures do not conflict with others. It takes
,- 12 a lot of management time.
13 That's one of the reasons that with all of this 14 on our plate that we're sliding this effort on back into 15 l March and April.
16 (Slide.)
17 l Training. We're really pleased with the way the i
18 l training department has progressed. We have all the 19 positions filled either with contractors or our own people, i
20 l We have 10 contract instructors ont of our allowed 54 and 21 will hire the other ones when we can find them.
22 Our accreditation program is on track.
23 (Slide.)
(~'l 24 Our facilities are completed for the mechanical l
25 maintenance lab. It is in use. Everything is in use, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 341-370r) Narionwide coverage 800 316-6646
7250 02 12 27 1 DAVbw 1 including the chemistry and health physics lab, but we do 2 not quite have the equipment yet in the chemical and health 3 physics laboratory. But our facilities are as good as I've 4 seen anyplace, and I'm really pleased with the way they're 5 moving toward accreditation. We're late, but we'll get 6 there. And it will be a quality job, when we do.
7 Is that all for me? That's all I have on the 8 programmatic issues, gentlemen.
9 The next presenter will be Mr. Smi,th, who is the 10 Assistant Plant Manageer for Maintenance.
11 DR. REMICK: Where does your Training Department I
,i 12 ! report on your organization?
i !
j 13 ' MR. WILLIAMS: To me. Hes a director.
14 j MR. SMITH: Thank you. My name is Steve Smith.
15 I'm the Assistant Plant Manager for Maintenance at the 16 Davis-Besse Station.
17 j (Slide.)
l 18 l Since we last met, we have proceeded with the i
19 maintenance improvement program. We have implemented 20 l changes in the following broad areas in the organization and 21 staffing, training, our maintenance activities, spare parts 22 and materials control, our engineering interface and support 23 and, of course, our maintenance facilities.
[ 24 (Slide.)
v 25 Since we last met, we've added some new ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
E-}47-3700 Nationwide coveraae 800-3364M6
7250 02 13 28 DAVbw 1 positions'to the organization. The positions outlined in 2 red, with the red-dotted lines, are now newly added 3 permanent positions. We have previously had training 4 foremen, which was a collateral duty of a foreman in each 5 group, and it didn' t take us long to realize that that guy 6 had a permanent full-time job as a training foreman, so we 7 made that a permanent position and staf fed it.
8 i In addition, with our plant clean-up effort, we 1
9 realized it would take a full-time, senior supervisory 10 l person to assure that we ketp the plant and well-maintained ,
11 once we got it there.
12 So we added a startion services general foreman, v
13 and he heads up the group of individuals that are in charge 14 of the plant cleanliness and the material readiness effort.
15 1 DR. REMICK: Question on your training foreman 16 there in maintenance. What relationship will he have to 17 your training programs? Would this pern be responsible for 18 I the on-the-job training, or how will he be integrated with 19 ! your overall training organization?
l 20 MR. SMITH: He's integrated at several levels, 21 sir. He has direct responsibility within the maintenance 22 discipline to assure that the craft personnel in that 23 discipline are maintaining the correct pace and keeping up
(^)
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24 to speed on the qualification program. He sees to it that 25 they're in classes and don't miss the classes. He's ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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I DAVb'w 1 responsible for assuring that they achieve any remediation 2 should they fail a course.
3 He works directly with the discipline training 4 manager in setting up training schedules and rescheduling 5 personnel who are out for various reasons, sick or 6 whatever.
7 He controls the training shift, and he reports 8 directly to the general foreman and essentially to the
^
9 superintendent and myelf in all matters that pertain to 10 training within a group.
11 Along with that, he chairs what we have 12 established as training councils in each group.
> O
.G 13 l Why don't you flip to tha next slide there?
14 15 16 17
'18 19 20 21 22 23 O 24 V
25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Covec 80433H646
7250 03 01 30 13 ksDAVbur 1 (Slide.)
2 One of the problems we were faced with at the 3 onset was that the craft personnel didn' t feel they had 4 enough direct input into our maintenance training programs.
5 We weren' t learning from their experience, and we weren' t 6 listening well enough to what their needs actually were.
7 So we established training councils within each 8 discipline. The training council consists of the 9 maintenance training person, the discipline trainer, the 10 training foreman, who is the chairperson of the training 11 council, and craft are on that council in a ratio of one for 7, 12 every 10 craft-person in the discipline.
13 Those people act to advise both myself and the 14 maintenance training manager, of course, as they feel they 15 should get. They provide direct input on the quality of our 16 courses that we do have and direct input on our 17 qualification program.
18 We have formed the disciplines into shifts.
19 There is a training shif t for each discipline. They have a 20 chunk of training that lasts about eight weeks out of every 21 year as part of their full-time training program.
22- There's other additional training plus the OGT 23 program within the plant itself.
[} 24 DR. REMICK: Do your training foremen have the 25 qualifications to sign the qual cards themselves, or does ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
SRPJ/-dei) NcicIwide cirwn 8%M"cm
7250 03 02 31 DAVbur 1 somebody else do that?
2 MR. SMITH: Right now we are in the process of 3 doing a detailed training records review in order to qualify 4 the qualifiers if you will.
5 Any program that you implement -- that is one of 6 OGT and qualification -- requires that somebody be there 7 first.
8 In the past Davis-Besse has had a fair training 9 program, and a lot of training has been done. So we are 10 researching to see who has had what training. Then we are
~
11 taking that back to the plant and reviewing the maintenance 12 work history to see underneath that training for specific 13 areas -- let's say the reactor protection system, for which 14 individuals have implemented the procedures and done the 15 maintenance work and the surveillance testing work in that 16 area.
17 We are only looking at the journeymen at what we 18 call the group leader level, the senior maintenance craft 19 types, and the foremen. Those individuals, once we have 20 established that they have had the training and have 21 actually correctly conducted the activity in the plant, will 22 be the qualifiers for the qualification program. That is 23 'the activity that is ongoing right now.
(} 24 MR. WILLIAMS: If I may. But in the future, is 25 the training foreman going to be the sole one that signs off ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coveg a 800 336 4646
7250 03 03 32 g)DAVbur L/ 1 on qualification?
2 MR. SMITH: He will be the one that conducts the 3 block interviews. The way the qualification card is set up 4 is that there are several activities that group together in 5 a block. That block will be the certification of the 6 individual to perform that activity.
7 The training foreman will conduct the interview 8 and sign off, certifying that the man is qualified to A
9 perform that block.
10 .The maintenance superintendent signs the bottom 11 line on the qualification card that says the man is fully f, 12 .
qualified in that area.
(_) I 13 i DR. REMICK: But the person who observes the 14 performance of the task and says he has done it correctly 15 might not be the training foreman, but it would be 16 somebody --
17 MR. SMITH: Who is qualified, who has been 18 certified as qualified in that area. It will either be a 19 senior craft person or it will be a foreman, yes.
20 Now, the foremen are attending the technical 21 training with the craft, also. In addition, those 22 journeymen and group leaders that have had the training in 23 the past have already agreed to attend the training as a 24 refresher. So we are not having any problems in that area.
(~JT-25 Let's go on.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 03 04 33 DAVbur 1 (S1ide.)
2 This is just an update of our organization, the 3 positions that we have added from outside and of course the 4 newly aligned positions within a group.
5 The superintendent slot, the general foreman, and 6 the lead engineer are new slots within a group, plus the 7 reduced ratios of foremen to craft.
i 8 We have maintained a 1 to 10 ratio of supervision 9 to craftsmen in the mechanical area, a 1 to 6 ratio in the 10 i electrical area, and a 1 to 7 ratio in the I&C area. These I
11 l ratios do not include the training foreman. The training 12 ! foreman position is over and above the direct craft 13 supervisory ratio.
14 , Currently, we have 464 individuals that report in 15 ;
maintenance. 175 are Toledo Edison employees, and 289 are 16 l contractors. They are directly involved with maintenance 17 l activities at the plant right now.
I 18 i This does not include our facilities modification I
19 l group, which has the prime responsibility for major 1
20 modifications in the plant. This is repair work and 21 preventive maintenance.
22 (Slide.)
23 To address some of the corrective maintenance and t '? 24 modifications in the plant the date of the June 9th event, w/
25 we had 1,339 open work orders. As you can see, we have ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3Wil ref7Tffhfoverage CTibe
1 7250 03 05 34
$ bAVbur 1 reduced that number appreciably. Currently, we have some 2 4,600. We have generated some 4,625, of which we have 3 identified 3,150 are needed for restart, and we have 4 accomplished quite a few of those.
5 But of course the workload keeps building up in 6 front of us. Right now we anticipated that we will probably 7 generste and complete some 5000 work orders prior to 8 restart.
9 .(Slide.)
10 In the area of preventive maintenance, of those 11 that were backlogged on June 9th, there currently remain 12 some 20. Those are mostly impeded by' plant mode for their 13 performance.
14 In addition, we have created another 1,245 and 15_ completed 912. The others are currently scheduled for 16 completion prior to restart.
17 We have revised the administrative controls for i
18 the preventive maintenance program. The most significant 19 aspect of that is that for any preventive maintenance 20 activity for which there'is a'need to defer or delete that 21 activity, it requires the joint approval of the assistant 22 plant manager - operations and myself before that can 23 happen.
(} 24 We have very strong and dedicated attention to 25 the preventive maintenance program.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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, i l' #DAVbur 1 DR. SIESS: I see a lot of figures on work 2 orders.
3 Could you give me some idea of what a work order 4 involves in terms of man-hours?
5 MR. SMITH: We use the work order to document 6l every piece of maintenance activity in the plant. A work 7 order could document the replacement of a light bulb or the 8 replacement of a reactor coolant pump seal .
9 In calculating the man-hour expenditures for 10 budget, I believe the average corrective maintenance work 11 - order requires some 35 man-hours for completion. That was I
(') 12 direct craft man-hours.
\ ,
)
13 DR. SIESS: So if I look,at your numbers and see 14 i so many open or so many accomplished, can I translate that 15 to man-hours by multiplying by-35?
16 MR. SMITH: For corrective maintenance work 17 orders, that is a good average. For modification work 18 orders, field change request work orders, those hours come 19 out to be somewhere around 130. So each one that would be 20 i associated with a modification is a higher number of 1
21 man-hour requirements.
Also, what you don' t see here is the some 70-man 22 l 23 crew that is dedicated to plant cleanup and the amount of I) v 24 man-hours that they are putting in in the plant to bring the 25 l plant back to a cleanliness and material readiness condition ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 03 07 36
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2"#DAVbur 1 that we can accept.
2 DR. SIESS: Do9s the 35 man-hour average include 3 the OC/0A?
4 MR. SMITH: No, sir, those are just craft 5 man-hours. That is just what I use for craft. You also 6 have to consider the planning man-hours, the quality control 7 man-hours, plus. administrative control man-hours, the 8 document control group that assembles the work package.
9 DR. SIESS: What would that run?
10 MR. SMITH: All told, at least 50 man-hours per 11 work order.
{} 12 DR. SIESS: More than the actual craft time?
13j MR. SMITH: Yes.
14 MR. WILLIAMS:~ Let's put.that other slide back 15 on.
i 16 i This is preventive maintenance, and this takes 17 less man-hours.
18 (Slide.)
i 19 ! When you get into corrective and modification l
20 work orders, the corrective work order, as he said, might 21 take 35 trade man-hours but the modification work orders --
22 let's just talk about those associated with the rework of 23 the motor-operated valves.
() 24 I think we are up around 16,000 man-hours, two or
- 25. three -- I don' t know how many ' work orders.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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.u[")DAVbur 1 MR. SMITH: About 600 work orders.
2 MR. WILLIAMS: So it just varies all over the 3 place.
4 DR. SIESS: Not just QA and a light bulb 5 replacement?
6 MR. WILLIAMS: No, sir. That is almost skilled I
7 trade.
8 DR. SIESS: A bulb in an enunciator panel, do you 9 have to tell them not to drop it? If it goes out, they have 10 to replace it. Is that a safety-related item? Would that 11 be QA and OC?
12 MR. SMITH: The light bulb itself may have been 13 bought under the quality control program just as our fuses 14 and other small electrical components are bought. That 15 would not normally receive direct OC inspection.
16 DR. SIESS: I was trying to get a feel for it.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: When you get back online, you will 18 l have lots of work to be done.
19 l What explicit instructions and protective actions
/ l 20 would you require to be taken to prevent creating a 21 transient because that seems to be the dominant source of 22 transients, fixing things? Do you have some explicit red 23 line instructions that say watch it, you may trip the plant?
24 MR. O'CONNOR: I would like to respond to that.
(]}
25 My name is Bill O'Connor, the Assistant Plant Manager for ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
E }47-37QQ Nationwide Coverage 800-33Ms646
j .
7250 03 09 38 i
l'" DAVbur 1 Operations.
2 We have a very detailed requirement when the 3 instrument and control mechanics are doing our monthly 4 surveillance tests on all the reactor protection system S channels and the anticipatory reactor trip system, and so 6 on.
7 We plan that work out through the week, such that 8 I only allow them in one channel of anything at a time. In 9 other words, both the steam feed rupture control system and 10 the safety feature actuation system can close the main steam l
11 ! isolation valve, such that if you were in one channel of one
(~', 12 thing and one channel of another it could close the MSIVs LJ
> 13 and obviously turn the plant off.
14 So between the shift supervisor and my operations 15 l coordinator, in planning and scheduling the SRO, we assure 16 that that work does not occur simultaneously. We won't 17 allow them into two different channels of something at the 18 l same time.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: Irrespective of the crafts 20 involved, a fellow working on a bearing versus one on a 21 relay? You prevent that, too?
22 MR. O'CONNOR: All the work comes through the 23 ' shift supervisor and through my operations coordinator.
() -
24 They will now allow them into two trains of a safety system 25 at the same time, and they know all the work that is in ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 03 10 39
[s v DAVbur 1 progress.
2 MR. EBERSOLE: What about one train of a safety 3 system where some other man is going to do some work on the 4 mechanical aspects of a valve not related to the 5 instrumentation?
6 MR. O'CONNOR: There could be work going on 7 similar to that. It is' up to us to ensure that we don' t 8 operationally allow it into a system that could cause a
'9 transient.
10 MR. WILLIAMS: They are all cleared through the 11 shift supervisor. That is where that control ought to be.
12 But one of the things that you are going to see i
13 i here after-restart is that people are doing things by 14 procedures. .That is the reason there are some 1500 15 maintenance procedures yet to be written, and instead of 16 going by skill or trade that --
17 i MR. EBERSOLE: You will have a matrix?
, l 18 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.
19 , MR. SMITH: I think it is also significant to 20 repeat that there is a senior reactor operator in the 21 Planning and Scheduling Department that reviews that first.
22 It doesn' t even get to the field until he has had a cut at 23 it.
24 Let's go on.
25 (Slide.)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide CSCC~) 800 33Ms646
7250 03 11 40
/
1"'DAVbur 1 In the area of spare parts and material control, 2 our newly hired materials manager has assumed responsibi'lity 3 for coordination of that effort. He is onsite, has control 4 of the warehouse and of the materials procurement 5 personnel.
6 The program for spare parts identification has 7 been developed and implemented. The personnel who are i
8 j actually doing the parts identification work very closely 9 with the system engineers that report to John Wood.
10 We are currently doing spare parts identification 11 l and procurement for the 34 systems that were under review as i
g 3 12 ! being important to the safe operation of the plant.
V , ,
13 j one of the better fallouts of the review that has l
14 l been done plus the plant cleanup effort, we have extracted a 15 l considerable amount of surplus material from the plant. In l
16 j the warehouse that is being identified and inventoried, and 17 ! the material that no longer has any use to the plant will be i
18 dispositioned outside the plant so it doesn' t clutter up the 19 i!
area, occupy space and funds that we don't need to waste.
20 l (Slide.)
I 21 In the area of engineering interface and support, 22 we have implemented a number of programs that are working to i
23 l ,
support Os. Engineering attends our daily plan of the day l
(/)
m 24 meeting, where we discuss technical problems and assign I
25 responsibilities for resolution.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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.I 7250 03 12 41 i hDAVbur 1 We have established the duty manager roster, for 2 which there is a duty engineering manager who is on call to 3 respond to problems in the plant 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, seven days 4 I a week.
l 5' ,
We have implemented a program for requesting engineering assistance, a document program. That is 6l 7 currently under a station administrative procedure in the ;
j 8 process of being refined. We are going to make- that a i 9 nuclear mission procedure to make sure.that it covers every 10 corner of the nuclear organization.
l 11 In addition, the outstanding requests for 12 engineering assistance have been prioritized for those that
(:) . 13 l 'have to be done before restart and those that can wait.
14 The major problems are again discussed at the 15 daily plan of the day meeting.
! 16 Also, the procedures which govern preventive ,
j 17 maintenance and post-maintenance testing have considerable i
18 requirements for engineering interface and input to those f
( 19 l programs.
20 (Slide.)
21 Last, our new maintenance facilities are j
22 currently on schedule, for completion in November. All the 23 basic erection steel is in place.
f l
/} 24 In addition, we have acquired some very We have also built and 25 sophisticated test equipment.
1 1
1 i
! ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
fBE3i?-DED - 9ttisD@nIO ______________mww6 __ _ _.
l 7250 03 13 42 DAVbur 1 implemented a new metrology lab. We have acquired the 2 MOVATS unit for testing of our Limitorque actuator. The new 3 metrology lab will assure that we keep most of our equipment 4 onsite and not be dependent on suppliers and outside 5 contractors.
6 That concludes my presentation.
7 Questions?
8 (No response.)
9 MR. SMITH: Thank you.
10 DR. REMICK: Thank you.
11 MR. WILLIAMS: The next presenter is the 12 Assistant' Manager for Plant Operations, Mr. Bill O'Connor.
l 13 MR. O'CONNOR: As Steve said, my name is Bill .
14 O'Connor, the Assistant Plant Manager for Operations. I 15 ;
will be discussing the operational and procedural changes i
16 that we have implemented or in the process of changing prior 17 . to restart.
I 18 l (Slide.) .
19 I have begun formalized training for all my shif t 20 operators, emphasizing the need for very strict adherence to 21 procedure setpoints, even when drastic actions are required, 22 such as when you get to 600 degrees and the new emergency 23 procedure for feed and bleed initiation. There is no time 24 to be thinking, well, gee, I know the analysis is it takes
}
25 l me 10 minutes to recognize this and so many minutes to take ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 4 47 3700 Nationwide Coverage 2 334 6646 ,
7250 03 14 43 DAVbur 1 action. At those trigger points, your actions are to be 2 taken, no questions asked.
3 Not that this is a change in philosophy, but the 4 operators did understand much of our analysis, and they knew 5 there were some built-in time frames. So we don' t want them 6 to assume any of this. When the engineers sit down and do 7 the analysis, they take all that conservatism out, such that 8 i when we get to these trigger points it is imperative that f
9 the operators take their actions immediately at that point.
10 We have pre-startup training for high priority, l
11 l infrequent operator actions, such as the aux feed pump trip gm, 12 l-throttle valve. That training will commence now. iowever,
</ \
13 ; ,
the actual hands-on portion of that we are reserving until l
14 we get to full steam pressure, so that the operators can all 15 i feel that valve when it has really got a 900-pound I
16 differential across it.
17 j Some other examples of this are resetting the 18 diesel generator overspeed trip, transferring the essential l
i 19 l motor control center for the new motor driven feed pump f rom its normal to its alternate source, which the operators may 20 l 21 have to do should we assume a loss of one of our central 22 l 4160 buses that supplies the oil system.
23 Manual versus automatic safety system actuation:
24 the operating philosophy now requires that the reactor
('}
25 operator inform the SRO of his intent to manually actuate ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage FX) 33MM6
7250 03 15 44 DAVbur 1 any safety system.
2 In other words, our procedures, some of them, 3 require the operators to manually actuate safety systems, 4 such as on a loss of station and instrument air. You have 5 to get off of your secondary side systems and onto your 6 safety systems, whic'h requires the operator to trip the 7 reactor and trip the steam feed rupture control system.
8 He must state this to the SRO in the control room 9 prior to doing these actions or any time that h'e is going to 10 manually actuate. This gives the SRO an opportunity to say, 11 no, you don't need to do that right now, and stop the 12 reactor operator.
O 13 ! But we don' t want to impede that reactor operator 14 from doing his job.
i 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1
23
{) 24 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
fir 347 3700 Nationwide Cm A00136 6646
7250 04 01 45 g,
w DAV/bc 1 We have pre-startup training for all licensed 2 operators on the events listed on the bottom, the top one 3 being the loss of feedwater events. This is all the 4 analysis that's been performed since June 9th.
5 But we' re going to go through with the operators 6 and explain to them how we came up with this magic number of 7 600 degrees on our hot leg temperature indicator to trigger 8 them into the lack of heat transfer section of the emergency 9 procedure, why 600 degrees is so important; back out the 10 calculations so the operators understand this, 11 ; What happened on June 9 th, where they were at i
w 12 l-that point? How much time did they really have? What core
)
a 13 levels are. All the detailed feedwater analysis, loss of 14 ICS power at Rancho Seco.
15 ,
We're preparing a lesson plan. This training 16 will begin on February 24th for all the operators, when we 17 go into detail as to exactly what happened to the Rancho i
18 l Seco operators, how their integrated control system is the l
19 l same and different from our system.
I 20 ' What our system would do in the same particular 21 scenario, how our procedures protect us against problems 22 l with the loss of ICS and NNI power.
I 23 The next two kind of go together, the control
('] 24 logic and the operation for aux feed 599 and 608. There 25 were some problems of that on the night of June 9th, where ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Nationwide Coverage WB_._33E%86
i 7250 04 02 46
-DAV/bc 1 the operators were trying to open them from the control room 2 with every means possible. It turns out the valves were 3 torqued out, they wouldn't have gotten them anyhow. But 4 there was some misunderstanding as to their exact logic.
5 We have incorporated this into our SSRC as 6 changes in actuation training, which began on November the 7 20th. This is a very detailed training lesson which goes l
8 into all the logic that currently is in the steam feed 9 rupture control system, or will be in the system when we 10 start up -- not only how the system works, but what happens 11 if you do the wrong thing.
12 In other words, if you depress the wrong
( ]3 N- ,
13 j pushbuttons, or you actuate it on an actuation level that is 14 ; not expected, what would happen to the system and why did it 15 happen? So they have a very good appreciation for this.
I 16 l We've completed the steam header pressure control 17 training for events af ter reactor trip where the operators I
18 l had gotten kind of into the habit of manually controlling 19 steam header pressure right after reactor trip due to the 20 problems we had had with our main steam safety valves and 21 their excessive blowdown.
22 i We have done a lot of work on the main steam 23 safety valves, sent them all back for rebuild. So we wanted f) 24 to get it into the operators that we have valves up there t/
25 that are all rebuilt and corrected. We went through ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 147 3700 Nanon*ide Coveraze 800-N%86 . . _ _
7250 04 03 47 1 DAV/bc 1 calculations with them to show how they can get in trouble 2 in a short period of time if you blow down too far and empty 3 the pressurizer.
4 Simulator training was completed, which included 5 mockups of the SPRCS manual actuation pushbuttons and manual 6 PT plotting or pressure temperature plotting, which assumes l
7 that the safety parameter display system was inoperative.
8 One day of our training at the simulator this 9 year, we didn' t allow the operators to use the safety 10 parameter display system; they had to manually perform those 11 actions and classify the events based on their manual cs 12 plotting.
-) .
. 13 I Of course, all the other new FCR modifications 14 training must occur. In other words, we've done a lot of 15 ,
changes to the plant in addition to just these big ticket i
16 l items, and the operators have to be changed on the other 17 FCR's.
18 (Slide.)
i i
19 i Under the area of NRC notification, we have 20 provided a very detailed checklist to the control room 21 operators, it's also in the shift supervisor's area, that 22 has the operators will out this checklist before making 23 their red phonecall or emergency notification system phone
(^') 24 call.
v 25 It is the same checklist that the NRC duty ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
7.0ll 14717(X) Nationwide Coverase WM)6-6646
7250 04 04 48 1 bAV/bc 1 officer has at the other end of the phone. So that we know 2 the questions that are going to be asked, we have all the 3 blocks filled in and we ensure that the level of severity of 4 the incident is very clearly given to .the NRC duty of ficer 5 and exactly what's happening to the plant.
6 We have a detailed training lesson plan for all 7 of the licensed operators and shift technical advisers, 8 which are the people who would be making these phone calls 9 when they are required. S we are beefing up this lesson and 10 actually making them go-through these practice sessions.
11 You know, what would you say when you pick up the red phone 12 and go through this checklist?
13 DR. KEMICK: Let me ask a question.
14 You have indicated that you are stressing the 15 importance of operators to take action when you have loss of 16 heat removal capability at the 600 degree temperature.
17 other procedures, you allow operators to anticipate the 18 automatic' actuation, like the SFRCS. You argue that tha t's 19 permissible to anticipate that, to do it manually.
20 Would it be permissible to manually initiate 21 whatever you call that system, the feed and bleed, I guess, 22 initiation when you've lost heat removal capability.
23 Where do you draw the line when you do it exactly 24 according to procedure and when you're permitted to
(])
25 anticipate?
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coveraar 800 33H646
7250 04 05 49 d DAV/bc 1 MR. O'CONNOR: When you say " anticipate", maybe I 2 didn' t get the point across, but he's not allowed to just 3 say, well, gee, I think we ought to trip the SFRCS right 4 now.
5 Our procedures, like the loss of ICS and NNI 6 procedure, the loss of instrument air procedure, the loss of 7 turbine building cooling water, where you have to *:ip the 8l SFRCS since you're going to lose vacuum within a few l
9 seconds, all of those procedures have very specific steps 10 that say:
11 When you get to five feet in the high level 7- 12 cooling water tank, you will trip the reactor and trip the
</ +
13 l steam feed rupture control system.
14 So when I say the operators are going to take 15 those actions to manually actuate it, that's not really in 16 I anticipation.
17 DR. REMICK: I realize in that case but how about 18 ! the one where the operators are criticized for not having 19 ! initiated whatever the system was when you reach the 20 temperature of 600 degrees? -
21 MR. WILLIAMS: Those, that must be done 22 manually. That's the one they allow no latitude on. Those 23 automatic initiations that he can foresee are going to
( ';
~
24 '
happen, he has permission to go do it manually in advance
(/ _
25 provided he tells the SRO's what he's going to do. He ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Cm 80tk336-664
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7250 04 06 50 lDAV/bc 1 doesn' t have to get permission, he has to tell the SRO's.
2 So the one is a group that must be done no matter what you 3 think; the other is a group that is going to have them 4 automatically and you've got permission to lead the problem 5 because it just saves time.
6 MR. O'CONNOR: Also, the operator has to be able 7 to think based on the ccnditions that are going on. If he 8 gets an actuation of some safety system and it isn't exactly I
9l i correct, it's his job to actuate that system and try and get 10 it in its correct mode.
11 In other words, if he sees just the MSIV's closed
/3 12 and he knows he has a full SFRCS actuation, the system i_/
13 didn' t work. So he should manually actuate the system. So 14 l if that's anticipation, yes, he should do that.
I 15 : MR. WILLIAMS: That's not anticipation, that's an 16 l after the fact thing. And you're trying to play catchup 17 l ball.
l 18 ! DR. REMICK: Kind of confirmation.
19 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
20 DR. REMICK: I assume your operators understand 21 when they can and cannot.
22 MR. O'CONNOR: Yes, sir.
23 MR. EBERSOLE: Do the operators fully understand (j 24 that if they start down some tracks, they can' t back out?
25 MR. O'CONNOR: Yes, sir. If they get into that ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
7250 04 07 51 I)DAV/bc 1 section of emergency procedure, they must proceed through 2 that. Now, there are breakout steps, obviously. If you're 3 in HPI cooling and you get feedwater back, there's parallel 4 paths that you can back out of those sections of the 5 procedure. But it is defined within the procedure.
6 Once they're embarking on a course within that 7 emergency procedure, they're to stay on that course until 8 the trigger point pushes them out of that section of the 9 procedure.
10 (Slide.)
11 The next slide is changes to our symptom-based 12 emergency procedure, 12-02-01. It has been modified, 13 obviously, to provide ~very definitive criteria for our 14 makeup IIPI cooling. We have corrected the table in the 15 SFRCS response verification. There were a few minor errors 16 in that table on June 9th, on the night of June 9th. This 17 table obviously had to be modified based on a renew SFRCS 18 actuation.
19 In other words, the components do not actuate 20 exactly the same as they did on that night, which we 21 discussed later on in the presentation.
22 We also put these response verifications in a 23 much more human factor format for the operator in the 24 control, not only for the SFRCS but the safety features 25 actuation system. So when he goes back to the panel, it's ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33H646 j
7250 04 08 52 DAV/bc 1 in the order that he's going to see all the lights and 2 buttons and he can verify it very easily.
3 MR. EBERSOLE : Could you comment on the makeup of 4 the HPI valve which permits outflow from the pressurizer?
5 What's been done to that to eliminst 3 its susceptibility to 6 environmental problems?
7 MR. O'CONNOR: This will be discussed in detail 8 by the engineering group later on in the presentation.
A 9 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.
10 MR. O'CONNOR: The realignment of the auxilliary 11 ; feedwater mini-recire flow path on night of June 9th. The r 12 minimum recirc fer these pumps initially is lined up so that
> 1 13 I it always has a flow path down to a floor drain for the i
14 small, mini-recirc line.
15 We did pump a lot of water needlessly down the 16 i floor drain, and now it is in our procedure that after so 1
i 17 : many minutes, the operators may realign this back to the 18 l condensate storage tank.
I 19 I The MSIV status verification has been added to I.
'20' the first part of the supplementary actions of the emergency 21 procedure to ensure that the operators do verify the MSIV l 22 l status early on in the event, so that they can see if they 23 have lost their steam dumping capabilities to the condenser 1
fx_/')
24 and their source of steam for the main feed pumps.
25 We have added some very specific criteria when i l
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-1700 Nationwide Coveraae 800-31MM4
7250 04 09 53
,m L_)DAV/bc 1 it's appropriate to transfer the auxilliary.feedwater 2 suction source from service water back to the condensate 3 storage tank. In other words, our service water is a safety '
4 grade supply.
5 If a transfer occurs over to the service water
/
6 system, then the operators need some specific criteria of 7 when it's appropriate to transfer it back. We think we 8 have taken care of the problem of spurious transfers, which 9 will be discussed later on, but should it happen, the 10 operators did not have a very clear-cut criteria of .when it I
11 was allowed to go back to the nonsafety grade source.
12 I '.kipped on on the new motor-driven feed pump l'3 operation. That obviously had t,o be added to the procedures 14 since that's the now system, and it is in Section 6 of the 15 Lack of Heat Tranfor section. It gives very detailed 16 instructions as to how that pump will be operated during 17 , this particular phase if we get in the overheating section l
18 of the procedure.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: Are these transfers of pump 20 suction done by a pair of valves or by a splitting valve?
21 Or what*t 22 MR. O'CONNOR: The suction transfer occurs by the 23 service water valve going open and the suction from the
{} 24 condensate storage tank now will be depowered open. All we 25 have to do is just reclose the service water valve.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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l l
l l
7250 04 10 54 i
/~'i L sDAV/bc 1 MR. SHSHIL: Is that in your presentation also?
2 MR. JAIN: I'll describe that in detail.
3 (Slide.)
4 MR. O'CONNOR: The next slide is under the 5 Emergency and Abnormal Procedures. Also the SRO is required 6 to remain in the control room once we enter into 7 EP-12-02-01. On the night of June 9th, for several minutes 8 there, there was a transition between the shift supervisor 9 and assistant shift supervisor when the assistant left to go 10 get the startup feedpump running and there wasn' t a very 11 clear transfer of authority in the control room.
-s 12 We practiced this on many occasions at our 13 simulator training this fall at Lynchburg, requiring this 14 turnover to occur between the two SRO's. So we were sure 15 that, once we get in that EP, that there is always somebody 16 that is in direct charge of directing the actions of the 17 reactor operators.
18 We've completed our review of all our emergency 19 , and abnormal procedures to assure that the instructions are I
20 clear to the operator, especially where any unusual or 21 drastic actions are required. The major one that fell out 22 of this was, of course in the lack of heat transfer section 23 of when it was time to go to feed and bleed cooling.
/~T 24 Some other examples of this. We found that, in G'.
25 our section for loading the diesel generator, we are ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 f97 ThAT) Pd'fmrf0 Coverage 3 800 336 6646
7250 04 11 55 7N L,,DAV/bc 1 starting it in the piggyback operation. The cooling water 2 line up for the diesel was not very clear. We had to 3 realign that to get our component cooling water lined up in 4 a more human factor for the operator in the control room.
_ '5 Some other examples, I mentioned earlier, were 6 putting the SFAS and SFRCS response checks or verification 7 checks in a human factor walkdown order for the operators so 8 he can look right at his checklist and the valves are in the
^
9 same order. He's going to see them on the panel so he 10 doesn' t have to look over here and then look back, and so 11 on.
12 We had it by actuation level before and not by
^
13 how he would actually walk around the. control room in the 14 most expeditious manner.
15 We reviewed all of our emergency and abnormal 16 procedures to assure that the control room instrumentation 17 was also adequate to support these decision statements.
18 It's not fair to tell a guy to do something at X-degrees 19 Fahrenheit, or X-pounds pressure if he couldn't read it to 20 that accuracy.
21 We human-factored some of these items also.
22 We're going to mark, like the steam generator startup level 23 indicators, the aux feedwater has a band that it controls 24 based on the type of trip -- whether we have lost reactor
}
25 coolant pumps, whether we have an SFAS trip. All these ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
7250 04 12 56 bAV/bc 1 numbers, the operators had to remember. So we've put little
~
2 bands on the meters now. He knows that if he's in the one 3 band, he should be 128-130 inches or so and he can look-4 right over at his needle and it's in that band. So-he 5i doesn' t have to think of those numbers and verify that he's 6 there.
7I The narrow range hot leg temperature indicators 8 that he uses for his decision step on makeup HPI cooling, 9 there's a line right across the meter at 600 degrees, so he _
10 doesn't have to stand right there'and watch that meter. He 11 can tell, watching it, if it goes above the red line, you' re 12 there. You' re in Section 6 of the procedure, and go to it.
13 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask a question?
14 There's a curious thing about the new motor-15 driven feedpumps. It's capable of being started from the 16 control' room.
17- MR. O'CONNOR: Yes, sir, it's all lined up.
18 MR. EBERSOLE: However, there is a little thing 19 hanging below it which was suspicious. It says here you've 20 got to go outside to crank up a vital oil pump.
21 MR. O'CONNOR: No, sir. When you turn on the 22 switch in the control room, it automatically starts the oil 23 pumps. The oil pumps, as soon as it develops 20 pounds 24 discharge pressure, the motor-driven feedpump starts, which
{~}
25 is just a second or so.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide CoGe~J 800-33MM6
7250 04 13 57
.~-DAV/bc 1 MR. EBERSOLE: What does this mean/
2 "However, if diesel generator no. 2 is 3 unavailable, transferring to the other requires operator s
4 action from outside of the control room to transfer a vital 5 loop oil pump to generator no. 1."
6 MR. O'CONNOR: Yes, sir. The oil pump is powered 7 out of one of our essential motor control centers that can 8 be powered either from the essential bus one or essential 9 bus two. It is lined up normally to the same , essential bus 10 as would be the motor-driven feedpump running off the 11 diesel.
,, 12 Should we lose that bus -- in other word's, a i
~
13 failure occurs on that side -- we would have to power up the 14 motor-driven feedpump from the opposite side diesel i
15 generator. You can do that from the control room with the 16 breaker alignment, but the oil pump transfer would have to 17 be done at the motor control center.
18 That was one of the other infrequent, high 19 priority action training items that we had for our 20 auxilliary operators.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: So what do you do if you transfer 22 ,
the oil pump?
l 23 MR. O'CONNOR: Will not start, you have to have 24 oil pressure to start it.
/~)
25 MR. EBERSOLE: So he still has to go outside?
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 NatioTw'WCTm?a ge f7M3MM6
7250 04 14 58
/~T L_sDAV/bc l' MR. O'CONNOR: If he's in that failure mode,
~
2 where he lost one side ~of his p1 ant electrical system, then 3 you have to, yes, sir, manually realign that to the opposite 4 side.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: Wasn't that the most likely 6 failure mode?
7 MR. O'CONNOR: You have to lose your offsite
- 8. power and your diesel generator.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: I understand. What'if you got the 10 feedpump fixed but this little accessory to it, you haven't, 11 which is the oil pump, because it's part of a transfer gS 12 system, auxilliary transfer switch? It's the load circuit U
-13 off of a transfer switch. .
14 VOICE: How far does the operator have to travel 15 to make that electrical transfer?
16 MR. O'CONNOR: The motor-control center is one 17 level below the control room and, you know, it's within 100 18 feet of the control room.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: It was not considered worthwhile 20 to make that transfer switch remote manual from the control 21 room?
22 MR. JAIN: In the longer term, after restart from 23 the present outage, we're looking at making it such that it
{} 24 can be powered from the control room.
25 MR. O'CONNOR: Our phase two plans put that into ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
F%PS-3700 Nationwide Caa~3 800 336 6646
7250 04 15 59 DAV/bc 1 an auto transfer. Now you must manually transfer that oil 2 pump.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: At least it won' t ruin the pump.
4 MR. O'CONNOR: No, sir.
5 MR. DEAGAZIO: I believe that's a commitment to 6 accomplish that before the next restart from the fueling 7 outage.
8 (Slide.)
9 MR. O'CONNOR: Some other instrumentation 10 requirements. We went to the control and drive cabinets.
11 If they hav~e inadvertent control _ rod motion, we have to s 12 remove. The program refuses to stop the control rods from gd 13 moving the way they' re not supposed to. We mark all theso 14 control room program fuses with clear labels so the 15 operators know when'they get down there exactly what fuses, 16 just as some examples of this instrumentation and 17 indications that he needs in his emergency procedures.
18 We've provided manual pressure temperature 19 plotting capability on the operator console, as I say. We 20 practiced this at the simulator. We have a plastic-colored 21 graph exactly like the SPDS display that he does his 22 plotting on, should the SPDS be not functioning.
23
(} 24 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nauonwide Coverase 800 336-6646 _ _ _ . . . _ _ _
'n _0 05 01 60 1 DAVbur 1 MR. EBERSOLE: What is the nature of the control 2 that predicts startup of the motor driven feed pump if it 3 doesn' t have pressure?
4 MR. O'CONNOR: The oil pump is a gear driven pump 5 that supplies oil to the bearings of the pump. We have to 6 ensure that there is oil at those bearings before the motor 7 starts.
8 MR. EBERSOLE: How do you determine that there is 9 oil at those bearings?
10 MR. O'CONNOR: The oil pump has a pressure switch
(", 11 on the bearing header, that it has to get to 20 pounds and i
12 it to sensed right on the bearing header so we ensure that 13 j there is flow.
14 MR. EBERSOLE : Without that the pump won' t start?
l 15 l MR. O'CONNOR: That is correct.
16 l MR. EBERSOLO: Thank you.
I 17 l DR. REMICK: I would just like to make a comment l
18 on your first bullet up there.
19 I am pleased that the staff did not make a big 20 issue of the fact that I think there was a short period of 21 time that there was not an SRO in the control room, even 1
22 i though the regulations, with the Commission's wisdom, said I
(' 23 that an SRO must always be there.
24 This committee felt that there were extenuating 25 circumstances. I was pleased to see that the staff seemed ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
W. t.t?.1Tno Nat tnnm L!r (*nter2sr Ron lin.MJn
7250 05 02 61 lDAVbur 1 to have an understanding of that situation.
2 MR. O'CONNOR: The operators realized the 3 severity of the incident, and they fully were aware that, 4 hey, for these few minutes here one of them had to go 5 nextdoor and one of them had to get going down to that 6 startup pump. So they were well aware of the severity of 7 it, and they took that action appropriately.
8 (Slide.)
9 The next slide is in our shift technical adviser 10 changes. We have the shift technical advisers now working 11 i in their shift rotation. They are on a continuous duty day 12 where they work 12-hour shifts. It is a four-day on, 13 three-day off type arrangement, where they are always within 14 the protected area. Their office is within just a few l
15 minutes of the control room. However, most of their time is 16 spent over in the shift supervisor's office, especially now 17 ; that they are doing a lot of the coordination of the testing 18 ! activities and, during the restart phase here, the testing 19 phase.
20 We have completed the training of the STAS as 21 interim emergency duty officers. Our procedure does not 22 have the shift technical adviser assume that duty as the 23 i first person. The shift supervisor maintains the overall
() 24 responsibility as interim emergency duty officer.
25 The STA is fully qualified. He has had the same ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 147-1700 Nationwide Coserage M336-664
7250'05 03 62 i ,
l' 'DAVbur 1 training as the emergency duty officers and shif t 2 supervisors, but his prime role is to allow the shift 3 supervisor to still take care of his plant.
4 The STA will get into the emergency action levels 5 and get into the protective action guidelines and advise the 6l shift supervisor and take some of that administrative burden 7 off of the shift supe and say, hey, shift supe, we are here, 8i we should be in an unusual event right now.
9 The shift supe will say, yep, you are right, we 10 will declare an unusual event.
11 ! So the actual authority and designation of who i
<~s 12 l; declares the unusual event, ,the alert to site area and the 13 generals, remains with the shift supervisor or the assistant 14 shift supervisor.
15 l If for some reason neither of those people were 16 present, then the STA is the third person to fully assume 17 l the duties as interim emergency duty of ficer until the EDO 18 arrives onsite.
I 19 l DR. REMICK: So it is not a requirement that the 1
20 emergency duty officer be SRO licensed?
21 MR. O'CONNOR: No, sir.
22 MR. WILLIAMS: But it wcn't be about two years 23 until he will be because the STAS are going to be SRO
) 24 1 licensed.
25 MR. O'CONNOR: All of the STAS will have our SRO ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l - w.tr.1 m Nuinn o u, courm son nA.ua
7250 05 04 63 e-DAVbur 1 license.
2 In our next bullet, the new class of STAS, of 3 which I have seven of them in training, will complete their 4 training in the first part of 1987, and they will all be SRO 5 licensed individuals on shift with the shifts.
6 DR. REMICK: I compliment you on that change. I 7 personally think that is a good philosophy to have the STAS 6l licensed.
9 (Slide.)
10 MR. O'CONNOR: The next graph was one of the 11 questions that the ACRS wanted to know, what was our past I
c1 12 I license examination summary?
) .
13 ! If you look at the graph, from 1977, with our 14 ! initial code license group, the lefthand bar is the initial 15 license exam; in other words, taking your NRC exam. The 16 f righthand line is requalification exams from 1977 through i
17 l our most recent exam, which was in December 1985.
I 18 l For our initial exams we had a pass rate of about 19 86.1 percent. Overall, it is much higher except for a 1
20 couple of dips. This first dip was when the 70/80 criteria 21 came into effect after the TMI situation.
22 We regrouped, changed our training program, 23 beefed it up again, and we received 100 percent the f1 24 following year, 91.7, 88.8.
25 Now, we had an exam, if you notice here, 66.7 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
707.1.17.17m Natinnmuir rnveraar R00 1 % f616 . . .
7250 05 05 64
' O am/DAVbur 1 percent for 1985. We just had a recent exam in December,
. 2' where we only received four out of ~eight oper.ators, which 3 .was very disturbing to us because we take pride in not 4 ' sending operators up there. We don't really think they are 5 going to pass.
1 j 6 In other words, I don' t send 10 operators up in i
7 hopes to get five. I send up 10 in hopes to get 10, and I 8 do the weeding out at the station.
9 One of the problems we had on this exam was the 10 operators with one of the examiners were not allowed to use 11 procedures. In other words, they were requested to do 1
1 12 everything from memory, things like prestart checklists on
(:) 13 reactor coolant pumps and main feedwater pumps.
a 14 We have asked for a review by Region 3 of this 15 particular exam and how it was administered because we are 16 very clear with our operators. They are not allowed to do 17 things from memory. We have procedures. The NRC wants us +
18 l to use procedures. We don't want to operate the plant 19 without using procedures.
4
{ 20 So it shouldn' t be f air to examine under that l
l 21 criterion.
j 22 MR. WILLIAMS: That is under discussion.
i 23 MR. O'CONNOR: We have that under discussion with 1
{} 24 25 the NRC.
DR. REMICK: Are there any steps in your 1
i 4
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L. . _ _ _ _ _
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l 7250 05 06 65 l 0s_j DAVbur 1 emergency procedures that operators must do from memory?
2 MR. O'CONNOR:- The immediate actions of all 3 emergency procedures have to be memorized. So that is a 4 very fair question. ;
5 DR. .REMICK: So it is beyond that; it was not 6 using procedures beyond that point?
7 MR. O'CONNOR: We have a very admirable success 8 rate, as far as I am concerned, with our licensing, and our ..
^
9 operators, if you look through our past SALP reports, have '
10 even been broken out separately, saying that they are well 11 qualified.
12 MR. EBERSOLE: What is the criterion for O 13 immediacy because I want to know where do you demand that 14 they use checklists and where do you demand that they use 15 memory?
16 MR. O'CONNOR: The only place they are allowed to 17 use memory is immediate actions of emergency procedures and 18 routine repetitive operations like adding water to the 19 makeup tank.
20 MR. EBERSOLE: In general, the plant ought to 21 survive quite a long interval of time without anybody -- his 22 hands could be locked to the table and might better be, in 23 fact.
24 So what do you call immediate?
25 MR. WILLIAMS: Give an example of immediate ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coversee 233MM6
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L_fDAVbur 1 action level.
2 MR. O'CONNOR: Out of a procedure. When the 3 reactor shuts down, he has several immediate actions he must 4 take. He must verify that the rods went to the bottom; if 5 not, manually trip the reactor; if that doesn't work, 6 manually trip the buses that supply the control rod drive.
7 MR. EBERSOLE: These are confirmatory?
8 MR. O' CONNOR: As an immediate action for the
. 9 reactor trip, also, he verifies that the turbine stop valves .
10 have gone closed; if not, manually trip the turbine.
1 11 ! Those type actions.
12 But as you said, as f ar as doing things on a 13 reactor trip, he does not have to do anything. He can stand 14 ,right there and verify that the rods went to the bottom, 15 verify that the turbine tripped, and so on.
16 We do start a second makeup pump as a i
17 precautionary measure in case we get a little excess 18 blowdown, so that we can keep up with the pressurizer 19 shrink.
20 So there are some actions that the operators take 21 on a reactor shutdown that they would not have to take 22 should everything work as it is supposed to. But you want 23 to be one step ahead of the plant.
24 MR. WILLIAMS: Is that from memory, Bill?
)
j 25 MR. O' CONNOR: Yes, those are from memory.
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1 DR. REMICK: I am curious, in your emergency 2 procedures where you do have emergency actions, is it 3 clearly identified in those procedures what is?
4 I have seen plants where the administrative 5 procedures say that the operators -- or the first three 6 steps, let's say, of actions. You go and you find then that l
7 there is action 1-A, B, C, then actions 2 and 3, no lines to 8 designate. So operators quite of ten don' t know is it 1-A, 9 l-B, or 1-C, or is it 1, 2, and 3.
10 MR. O'CONNOR: Our administrative procedure says 11 thou shalt know the immediate actions of the emergency 12 procedure. That is a clear section of the procedures. It O 13 says Section 1, immediate operator actions. All right? He 14 must know that.
15 In addition to that, the specific rules for 16 throttling, blocking, and stopping HPI pumps must be 17 memorized. The specific rules for steam generator level 18 control on aux feedwater must be memorized because the 19 procedures say control steam generator -- per specific Rule 1
20 1 -- the operator must know that band of steam generator 21 level that he must control. He must know when it is 22 appropriate to throttle HPI.
23 DR. REMICK: So if I was an examiner, I would let 24 that procedure be very clear to me what that operator has to 25 have memorized and what not?
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 8(n33MM6
7250 05 09 68 1 /DAVbur 1 MR. O'CONNOR: Yes, sir.
2 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask you about the 3 procedures in the context of how far do they go if you have 4 a transient of some sort and you either have automatic or 5 manual executed recovery functions but the system doesn't 6 answer.
7 Let's say I will pick a comment, water flow 8 pressure, when it momentarily fails and the auxiliary system 9 picks up. Suppose it doesn' t pick up.
I 10 For instance, I was asking an airline stewardess l
11 not long ago what do I do if my oxygen bottle doesn' t fall k
] 12 I out. Her answer was it will always do so, sir.
~: l 13 ' (Laughter.)
14 ; MR. EBERSOLE: I am asking you the counterpart 15 ; question:
I*
16 How far do your procedures go in the event an 17 l unexpected secondary failure occurs?
18 j . MR. O'CONNOR: As you know, we redid all of our l
19 l procedures to be symptom oriented rather than event 20 oriented. As part of that process, you have to think what 21 if; what if this doesn't work?
22 l So the procedure flow charts, which we also have l
23 l now in our emergency procedure, in addition to the verbiage,
() 24 have all the little blocks in that say, did this so and so, 25 yes, and if they are all yes's, you keep moving down the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
SfD.t.17.1?nn P.aium a Lir Or. raar %n 116 MJ6
7250 05 10 69 L-- iDAVbur 1 page. If you get a "no" answer, it bounces you out to the 2 right and says, no, E-1 bus is not energized. Then it says 3 go to Step 6.3, and it tells you how to get it back.
4 MR. EBERSOLE: It used to be, you know, you had 5 the right to expect Channel D to start.
6 MR. O'CONNOR: The flow charts are very clear.
7 "Yes," this comes straight down. "No" bounces you out to 8 the right and gives you the actions you must take should a 9 "no" occur.
10 MR. WILLIAMS: The reaction should have been 11 l grab your seat, matos.
es 12 (Laughter.)
l 13 ' MR. O'CONNOR: If there's no other questions for 14 l me, that concludes my part of the presentation.
15 ) I will turn it over to Mr. John Wood, our 16 Director of Nuclear Systems.
17 DR. REMICK: You have not had an NRC-administered 18 ' roqualification exam, is that correct? Those are all your 19 own?
20 MR. O'CONNOR: Yes, sir.
21 MR. WOOD: Thank you, Bill.
22 My name is John Wood. I am the Nuclear Plant 23 Systems Director.
() 24 I think you will recall that during the June 9th 25 ovent at Davis-Bosso there wore a number of equipment ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
W. L17.1*(1) N2r Lan n uir (hernas Wn 11A/44
7250 05 11 70 AVbur 1 malfunctions.
2 As a result of the large number of malfunctions 3 and the significance of the malfunctions, Toledo Edison 4 undertook a very detailed equipment investigation program.
5 This included interaction with the NRC fact-finding team.
6 The prime purpose of this investigation of course 7 was to determine what the root cause of the problems were, 8 so that we could get on and define what corrective actions 9 would be needed to appropriately take care of the 10 situation.
11 In summary, the scope of the investigation 12 covered some 13 areas of speci51c equipment concern, and 13- seven systems were impacted as a result of those 13 areas.
14 We have them listed here.
15 They included, of course, the auxiliary feedwater 16 system, which was the one that was of most concern; the main 17 feedwater; our steam feedwater rupture control system; main 18 steams the pilot-operated relief valve of the reactor 19 coolant system; our nuclear source range instrumentation; 20 ' and our SpDS, or safety parameter display system.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: Are you going to discuss in 22 greater detail the steam tube rupture control system?
23 MR. WOOD: Sushil will be talking about that at 24 greater length, and also phil Hildebrandt.
25 (Slide.)
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
302 147 1700 NniorrfhCover n M3M
I 7250 05 12 71 hAVbur 1 This chart merely represents the process that was 2 undertaken for the, equipment investigation. Prior to 3 putting our hands onto the equipment and perhaps destroying 4 evidence that was there to lead us to the root cause, we sat 5 down and went through a very thorough evaluation of what 6 happened on June 9th.
7 We also looked at the prior history of the 8 equipment. We developed hypotheses as to what went on, what 9 were the primary hypotheses, the most likely thing that 10 happened, and also what were some of the more unlikely 11 things that would have happened.
12 We then laid those evaluations out into what we O 13 call action plans. Those ac, tion plans gave us a selected 14 , trouble-shooting methodology to go af ter the root cause of l
15 the anomalies.
16 I then subjected that trouble-shooting effort in 17 the field to a OA program and then carefully documented each 18 step along the way so that we could retrace our steps at any 19 point along the path.
20 Of course, the trouble-shooting effort led then 21 to our findings in generic implications. Those were 22 recorded in the course of action document.
23 They of course led to what were then defined as 24 the root cause corrective actions. This was our primary
)
25 goal in the equipment investigation, was to correct the
! ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
L 202 347 3700 Nation *We Coversee al0 3)HM6
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! 7250 05 13 72 l
n N DAVbur 1 defects that were found.
2 However, there was another important ingredient 3 here, in that as we investigated the equipment we of course j 4 found additional things that were of concern to us, even i
- 5 though they were not things that contributed to the j 6 malfunction of June 9, and we rolled this information into J
)
7 our system review effort. l
} 8 As I u ntioned, there were some seven systems 9 impacted with the equipment investigation, and the system
} 10 review effort of course took into account 34 systems.
! 11 Therefore, we have lessons to be learned out of i
12 this investigation process rolled into our system review l 13 effort into a much larger picture.
- 14 (Slide.)
i l 15 Just to perhaps recap or summarize the findings,
- 16 the findings which are detailed in the 13 reports l 17 essentially cover all bases of the effort here. We found !
I 18 root cause problems in design, in maintenance, testing, in i
f 19 the procedures, and in training. ;
20 Of course, correct..'ve actions then were needed in 21 each one of those areas to bring the equipment or the 22 problem into a state of resolution that we could then j 23 continue on with restart of the plant.
24 Now, I will go over --
l 25 MR. EBERSOLE: Before you go any further, I 1
1 l 1
i
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7 50 05 14 73 1 DAVbur 1 noticed you started putting equipment investigation. I 2 Where do I see the counterpart to system 3 investigation?
4 MR. WOOD: The system investigation is what Phil 5 Hildebrandt is going to go through.
6 MR. EBERSOLE: Oh, that will be later, okay.
7 MR. WOOD: The equipment investigation was a very 8 narrow review of just what the anomalies were during the 9 event to get to the bottom of what the problem was, get it 1
10 fixed, f actor the lessons to be learned from those anomalies 11 into a larger picture so that we could account for the
{} 12 overall readiness of the plant to restart.
! 13 (Slide.)
1 14 Just as a highlight -- I won' t go through all 13 15 of the areas of concern, but I will hit the major issues.
l l 16 The first major issue is the auxiliary feed pump !
17 turbines. of course, they tripped on overspeed shortly into 18 the event, and as we talked with you earlier, our root cause 19 finding here was that we had long cold inlet lines that 20 accumulated condensation as you started the turbines up. ;
21 That condensation then disrupts the auxiliary feed pump 22 turbine control valve, the capability to limit the speed on 23 the aux feed pump turbine, and then led to the overspeed.
() 24 As a result of the findings, we went and 25 installed new steam admission valves much cloner to the i
I AK:E. FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.
7250 05 15 74 1 bAvbur 1 turbines in the turbine rooms themselves. Thoreby, we will 2 have this long stretch of cold piping which was formerly --
3 it could have been anywhere up to 600 foot -- that will bo 4 hot pressurized and therefore will not contributo any longer 5 to causing accumulation of moisture to como into the turbino 6 during the fast start, which is required of those aux food 7 pump turbinos.
8! Installing those now steam admission valves, of 9 course, and bringing them out toward the turbinos, we have 10 had to then extend the high energy lino concerns for tho 11 jl fact that we have now this high pressurized line running cs, 12 l through much more of the plant than was in existence prior d 13l to June 9th.
14 Sushil will be talking more about the auxiliary 15 feed pumps and some of the changes there.
16 i We are also installing a now governor on aux food i
17 i pump, Turbino No. 1, and the No. 2 turbino had a now 18 improved governor on it. Wo have not put it on No. 1 until 19 we have some more assuranco that it would perform in an 20 '
acceptable mannor. We are now comfortablo with the way that 21 governor performs, and wo will be replacing the No. 1 22 j governor with the same one that wo havo on No. 2.
23 l ,
Wo are also improving the trip throttle valvo l
T')
v 24 renot capability. You will recall that those operators had 25 to run down into the pump rooms and roset the trip throttle i
l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 05 16 75 1 DAVbur 1 valves after the head overset.
2 They had some difficulty in doing that, and what 3 we found was that the oporators had not had enough hands-on 4 training under live steam load conditions in order to do 5 this properly, and what we are doing now is running those 6 operators through that training and also providing some 7 local placards and some local indicators for the complicated 8l linkage that exists there so they can tell more readily i
9 right at the spot that they have the thing linked up 10 properly and that they are ready to go then with the firing 11 l up of the aux feed pump turbines.
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1 /DAV/bc 1 MR. EBERSOLE: Is it necessary that the pumps 2 have a full throttle start and so challenge the overspeed
[
3 trip? Or can they be started at speed?
4 MR. WOOD: They are wrapped into speed. I 5 believe there's about a 1,500 rpm plateau. They are ramped 6 up. There is a 40-second time requirement per our technical 7 specifications to bring the aux feedpump system into 8 operation.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: They can try to avoid challenging l 10 the overspeed trip. -
11 MR. HILDEBRANDT John, if I may, Phil 12 Hildebrandt, the throttle valve itself is fully opened f O 13 because until I have the turbine spinning, I have no control 14 on it. However, there's a stream of that in addition to the 15 valve which John has described, which is opening by release 16 of air and to admit the steam in a controlled manner to 17 avoid the overspeed condition until the throttle valve can 18 take control.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: So it's in the barrel forward of L 20 the control valve?
21 MA. HILDEBRANDT: Yes.
22 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.
23 MR. WOOD: Okay. The next issue that I'll 24 address is the pilot-operated relief valve. You'll recall
(]) l 25 again during the June 9 event that the pilot-operated relief ,
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC,
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i 7250 06 02 77 h DAV/bc L 1 valve opened twice and reseated and opened the third time 2 and did not receive properly.
3 Now, the operator, while he was not perhaps aware 4 directly that the PORV was not reseated, had his plant !
5 indications that the pressure was decreasing and took the ,
l i 6 right action and closed the block valve. That, of course, l
7 stopped any flow from the port discharge pathway.
8 Later on, after his condition restored, he opened 4
l 9 the block valve and the PORV was reseated and remained .
10 reseated through the cert of the transient. We, therefore, 11 had a concern about how the PORV was operating during the '
12 event.
[}
13 In this particular case, after doing some very 14 detailed trouble-shooting, we found no specific root cause 15 identified; that is, we found no broken parts. We found no 16 improper circuitry. However, it is suspected perhaps that 17 foreign material momentarily got lodged in the pilot area, '
18 which is very sensitive to foreign material; if it sticks in 19 that area, it can hold the main disk open.
20 We suspect that foreign material did contributo 21 then to the way that we stalled the PORV operate during June '
22 9th.
23 We did subject also a pilot-operated relief valve -
() 24 of very similar design to additional testing at the Marshall 25 facility under this bullot here, and confirmed the overall 1 :
i ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
7250 06 03 78 1 DAV/bc 1 reliability of the design.
2 We cycled it approximately 100 timos open and 3 closed, opening it for five seconds, closing it for 30, and 4 it demonstrated its performanco very well.
5 Through all this, we learned that although the 6 PORV is highly reliable, you still must be able to design 7 your plant in the case that it does not closo and, of 8 course, the block valvo is the device used to isolato the 9j PORV if there is difficulty with it.
i 10 tiow we had a post-accident monitoring panol of f 11 to the left of the oporator, but it was not in his line of i
sight of his station to deal with. And so wo mado somo
(~)
y/
12 l 13 control panol changes to bring some of that indication moro 1
14 i in line with what he nooded to worry about during such a 15 transient.
16 Thoroforo, he now has botter information provided l
I 17 to him so he can take the proper action should the PORV not I
18 seat proporly in a transient.
19 l MR. EDERSOLE: Could you montion the circuit 20 indopondonce that operatos the block valvon versus the PORV?
21 MR. WOOD: The circuits are indopondont. And the 22 block valvo is a safety-grado valvo with safety-grado power 23 supply, wholly indopondent of tho PORV.
(]') 24 MR. EDERSOLE: What is it? A DC solonoid?
25 It's a motor-oporated valvo?
1 ace. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
c~uva n -- -
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P DAV/bc 1 MR. WOOD: It's a motor-operated valve.
2 MR. EBERSOLE: It gets its power from where?
3 MR. O'CONNOR: B-16, which is an essential 4 motor-control drive. It's directly powered from the
! 5 diesel. It's only powered from one normally.
6 MR. EBERSOLE: One diesel. And the PORV is what?
7 A DC air-driven?
8 MR. O'CONNOR: It's pilot-operated.
l 4 9 MR. EEERSOLE: Thank you.
10 DR. REMICK: If I recall, I think you indicated 11 earlier -- not today, but at one of our previous meetings --
12 that you were considering the possibility of additional
) ,
! 13 .' ORV's for feed and bleed capability. Is that still under 14 consideration in the long-term?
15 MR. WOOD: Yes, it is under consideration for a 16 long-term item. Sushil will be talking more about the PORV 17 as it relates to feed and bleed. What I have here is PORV 18 as it relates to failing open. And we'll talk about the
! 19 desire to keep it open under feed and bloed a little bit 20 later.
21 One of the most significant items that we found ,
22 during our review of the 6/9 event was motor-operated l 23 valves. You'll recall that we had two valves on the
() 24 discharge of the aux feedwater system that did not come 25 open after the operator had inadvertently closed them by i
(
- ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
7250 06 05 80 1 DAV/bc 1 pushing the wrong buttons. Th'o operator later recovered 2 from his mistake, reset the logic ~and the valvos should have 3 como open. These are AF-599 and 608. But they torqued out, 4 as it was found later.
5 The operators ran down there. They were able to 6 hammer-blow the handwheels and then the motor operators took 7 them, after they were off their seat.
l What we found here was that we had limit switches 8l 9 which woro placing the torque switches into the circuit much 10 i too early. For a wedge- type motor-operated valvo, thoro's a 11 high torque requirement when the valvo initially opens in
{')
- 12 l i
order to overcomo the seat friction, and also the dolta p 13 4 that may be in existence that may bo in existenco due to l
14 ! system conditions.
i 15 ! These limit switches were adjusted such that the 16l torque switch was being put in early, before they woro 17 l overcoming this high torque requiremont. And the torque I
18 { switches then would open and provent the valves from 19 traveling.
l 20 i flow, wo have then, through using MOVATS tost 21 equipment, which I think the ACRS is familiar with, wo've 22 l boon able to go through our entico motor-operated valvo I
23 l inventory, which is 167 safoty-rolated valvos, go through n I (m
i 24 i and verify that we havo propor limit switch torque switch 25 adjustments and also thoro was a concern about testing ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
'~
1 7250 06 06 81 1 DAV/bc 1 them with differential pressure that, once you have them set 2 up, how do you know that they will function.
3 We're doing several valves using differential 4 pressure af ter they' re being set up with MOVATS to 5 demonstrate that, yes, indeed, we can demonstrate that the 6 valve will function as it's designed.
7 Now, that was somewhat simplified. But as we got 8, more into the motor-operated valve problem, we found a j
9 number of other problems that we have to address, and it 10 became a very complicated program that we had undertaken and 1
11 ! they're still in the process of correcting several other 1
w 12 l features -- include doing of course a pro and a post-local v
13 leak rate test. If you have a containment isolation valvo, 14 you must confirm that you have proper leak integrity for 15 your containment, so you have to do a pre and a post test.
i 16 There's T-drains in the housings which serve to 17 < drain off condensato. We found in some cases that T-drains 18 weren' t installed or these environmontally qualified i
19 l operators. We had to remove space heaters. We had to do i
20 wiring checks. We found wiring problems electrically.
21 The valves would operate that they may not be 22 wired in accordance with the drawings. We found that we had 23 i some wiring that could not be EO qualified. We had to make
^
I 24 some changes there. We had to do stem checks. We found a
25 that that information that we had didn't always agree with ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC,
'X 147 1?00 Wianoide Cour. tac 900116 6M6
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7250 06 07 82 Ib lDAV/bc 1 the design document and that we had to .go out and physically 2 measure what the stem diameters were, what the pitch were 3 for the valves.
4 We had to do lubrication checks and we found in 5 some cases we had to do some relubing in order to bring them 6 into necessary_ working order. Of course, from the MOVATS 7 equipment, we could do current signatures and get a 8 dianostic now~of where our motor is, if it's demanding A
9 excess current or if it's following along . the lines that you 10 would normally expect.
11 We had some parts problems and we also are
(} 12 confirming the valve and the operator design data, so we can 13 now bring this altogether and assur6 ourselves that we know 14 what the thrust requirements are, where the weak links are.
15 We have all that put together in a fashion that if we have a 16 torque switch in, that torque switch isn't going to be the 17 weak link during a safety-demand on the system, but that the 18 torque switch really does serve a purpose of protecting the 19 valve if that's desired, and not having the valve destroy 20 itself.
21 (Slide.)
22 The equipment investigation, of course, is l
23 described in the staff's SER. There are a couple of other
() 24 issues that are not in the SER but I think are good to talk 25 about just to give a perspective of some of the other l Au:E. FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.
I
7250 06 08 83 l' 'DAV/bc 1 efforts that are going on in support of the restart of 2 Davis-Besse. One of those efforts is the piping support 3 walkdown program. About three months prior to the June 9 4 event, we had a concern at Davis-Besse relative to aux 5 feedpump turbine steam supply lines, and we had supports 6 that had been found damaged. We again had this situation of 7 having water intrainment in the line or condensation forming 8 water slugging.
9 That was viewed as being a contributor to the 10 condition of those supports. As a result of working with 11 Region III, we embarked upon a piping inspection program.
w 1 12 And, in support of restart, we inspected some 945 supports 13 in seven selected systems.
14 These seven selected systems or portions of 15 l systems were chosen because they were in normally a standby
[
16 mode as the aux feedwater system is normally in standby.
17 And the question was whether these systems that are suddenly 18 called upon to actuate, whether we had enough confidence 19 that the hangers there were in good working conditions.
20 And, as a result, we sent out, I believe it was, 16 21 inspection teams with very strict information not to leave 22 anything off of their inspection of these supports, and to 23 look at them in very excrucisting detail and to report all
',_/.
24 anomalies.
25 And the results of that inspection were that ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 06 09 84 O
1--DAV/bc 1 there were some 875 nonconformances generated. These 2 nonconformances were of such a nature that perhaps the weld 3 was viewed as undersized. There was a loose bolt and the 4 angularity was slightly off.
5 And the sum total here is that approximately 80 6 percent of the anomalies were acceptable as found through 7 evaluation by engineers, and some 20 percent required some 8 minor rework.
9 They, however, did not contribute to any system's 10 being declared inoperable as a result of the findings.
11 Then, we also inspected some 1,475 additional r~- 12 supports; that was the balance of the in containm'ent piping
(_) j _
13 i supports because we knew we weren' t going to get in 14 containment for, hopefully, a long while af ter startup. And 15 we wanted to assure ourselves that we had the necessary data 16 so that we could bring this whole effort to conclusion by 17 the end of the next refueling outage.
18 l And we have preliminarily evaluated those 1,475.
19 And also have concluded that there were no major problems in 20 those supports.
21 Now, after restart, in fact, we've already begun 22 this effort. We're going to be looking at another 2,500 and 23 some supports, going through the entire sequence of
() 24 gathering the information in the field, giving it to the 25 engineers to evaluate and then making any corrections or i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
7f1L147.1700 Nmannunde (*nvernme Ron.11A.Jinda
7250 06 10 85 1 bAV/bc 1 adjustments that are needed.
2 MR. WILLIAMS: John, you're going to have to 3 speed yours up a little bit here because we' re falling 4 behind.
5 But this environmental qualification is very 6 important and I want him to address this because this has 7 crawled out of the woodwork along with the high energy line 8 b eak.
9 MR. WOOD: This is the last slide that I have.
10 The environmental qualification effort, we were not very 11 concerned with this initially and we started to get into 12 environmental qualification when we moved the steam w/
13 admission lines. And we had to look at more areas of the 14 plant for environmental qualification.
15 ! As.we started-pulling that string, we got i
16 involved into the rest of the EQ program and needed to bring 17 that up to a proper level of qualificatica.
18 Here, in our activities, we had to review and 19' upgrade the qualification files, make them auditable. We i
20 I had to review and reissue the EQ equipment master list. I 21 think we started in the~ area of about 600 items on this 22 master list and we're up over 800, I believe, now.
23 We are preparing programmatic and implementing
() 24 procedures so that, once we have identified this EQ 25 equipment, that we can keep it on track, keep it controlled.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nauanwide Coverase 800-336-6646
7250 06 11 86 1 )
l'#DAV/bc 1 We did a walkdown, a baseline survey of the as 2 installed plant EQ equipment, the equipment that's on that 3 master list, gathering the information so that it could be 4 fed into this configuration management item that we talked 5 earlier on.
6 We reviewed the documentation of the to date 7 maintenance and surveillance of the EQ equipment, so that if 8 we have EQ equipment out there, have we properly maintained 9 it and done the proper surveillance on the equipment?
10 And we have found problems in these areas, had to 11 go back and correct some conditions.
f ')j 12 Sushil will talk about the aux feedwater system 13 and motor-driven feed pump. We have done EQ checks of those 14 and have other nonqualified EQ equipment that we will be 15 upg rading .
16 17 18 !
19 !
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25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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}gpAV/bc 1 MR. EBERSOLE: May I just ask a couple of 2 questions about the EQ problem?
3 One is, some of the EQ information is based on 4 the assumption that if you have a steam or water leak of 5 some kind, you do in fact get valve closure after some 6 specified time interval. And, thus, there's a limited 7 amount of steam or water released to the environment.
I 8l You may in fact of course not get valve cl.osure l
9 ; and have to face the consequences of continued release.
I i
10 l Do you follow me?
I 11 l MR. WOOD: That's correct.
I 1,2 MR. EBERSOLE: That's a conmon mode failure.
< s
_' 13 ; The second is that we found out that lots of the 14 EQ equipment in the field, upon finding that they couldn' t 15 l do anything else, has been put in in ventilated designs, the I
16 i problem of the transient condition of this equipment being i
17 I somewhat colder than the steam that's admitted to the area, 18 that you have a surface condensation problem on contact in I
19 open equipment, which leads to potential shortcircuiting.
20 l There's two aspects of this E0 system. Those are 1
21 I the two that I think are the most critical currently under 22 investigation.
~
23 The continued release of steam and then equipment 24 which is, in fact, exposed to surface condensation in the
(_'8
~
25 initial stages of the transient.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347&iT NWwide @verage CTibD3M686
7250 07 02 88 T~'DAV/bc 1 MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, John.
~s 2 Sushil, we took some of your time.
3 DR. REMICK: I'd like to make a slight change in 4 schedule. I'm told that there is a room upstairs with air 5 conditioning that is available and is now set up for us. It 6 might be a little tight but I think will accommodate 7 essentially everybody.
I 8! I would suggest, however, that we undertake the 9 security presentation perhaps now. Take a break and, as 10 part of the break, move upstairs to 1167.
11 l So, at this time, we'll need to ask the public to 12 ! leave. Members, if you would identify your people, k ,! 13 ; Mr. Williams, the NRC staff, but we'll ask the public.to i
- 14 leave us for about 15 minutes and we will be moving upstairs 15 into 1167 after a break.
16 i (Whereupon, the meeting recessed, to go into 17 ! executive session.)
l 18 I DR. REMICK: Please proceed.
19 (Slide.)
20 DR. REMICK: Reconvene, please. Excuse me.
l 21 (Laughter.)
22 i MR. JAIN: My name is Sushil Jain I'll be 23 talking about the heat reliability improvement program that 24 Toledo-Edison has undertaken to improve the decay heat i _D 25 removal systems.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nation _ wide _ Coverage _ M 46 800-336-_
7250 07 03 89
}ggpAV/bc 1 Following the June 9th event, the system targeted 2 all systems used for removal of the decay heat, namely, the 3 main feed and steam system, the auxilliary feedwater system, 4 the startup feed pump system that existed at the time, the 5 steam and feed rupture control system that is used to 6 initiate the aux feedwater system and the primary side feed 7 and bleed mechanisms.
8 The task force identified changes to improve the 9 operational reliability of these systems and to reduce the 10 complexity of the steam and feed rupture control system.
11 The membership of the task force was both from 12 i within Toledo Edison as well as high level people from l
/ , <
() 13 i outside, experienced in engineering design and operations, l
14 li including people from NPRBW and Slgma Corporation.
15 (Slide.)
16 The objective of the task force was to reduce the 17 frequency of demand for emergency means of decay heat 18 removal. Also to reduce the number of automatic system f
19 responses required to initiate auxilliary feedwater and 20 ; reduce potential for common mode failure within the 21 auxilliary feedwater system. And, finally, to evaluate what 22 other things could be installed which are diverse or 23 j redundant to remove decay heat from the reactor core.
24 The overall goal for the task force was to come
(' ")'
25 up with equipment modifications that would bring about the i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTEF.S. INC.
M-)47 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
7250 07 03 90 T DAV/bc 1 reliability improvement, commensurate with the standard 2 review plan elaborated criteria for the auxilliary feedwater 3 system.
4 (Slide.)
5 The methodology used by the task force was using 6 deterministic techniques, scoping analyses or a possible 7 using of engineering judgment and using PRA'models; 8 probabilistic risk assessment models, wherever they were 9 available.
10 The task force reviewed documentation that was 11 available, past operating experience, interviewed Toledo -
12 Edison personnel, and also reviewed the original design
,m
(_) 13 requirements for the systems.
14 (Slide.)
15 After all of this effort, there were several 16 modifications identified. The very first thing was to 17 reduce the spurious initiators for the'auxilliary feedwater 18 system. During the June 9 event, the sudden closure of the 19 j turbine stopped valves caused a pressure pulse in the steam 20 lines, which caused the steam generator level signals to, in 21 a sense, an oscillating behavior which then fed into the 22 SFRCS and caused a partial activation of the SFRCS, which 23 i resulted in the closure of the MSIV's.
24 The modification here is to filter the steam 25 generator level signals so that the spurious oscillations ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347--3700 Nationwide Coverage 80433M686
7250 07 05 91 gDAV/bc 1 are not detected or are damped out on the system by 2 providing this filter.
3 This filter is being used by using a filter in 4 the transmitter aplifier board. Basically, it's being made 5 functional so the spurious signals are filtered out.
6 One oth'er problem with the SFRCS in the past was 7 the spurious trips occurring because of high temperature 8 within the SFRCS cabinets.
9 We are taking steps to provide improved cooling 10 for the power supplies within the cabinet. Perhaps one of 11 the major changes on the SFRCS itself is the revision of the 12 logic such as in low level conditions, main steam and main O)
(, 13 feedwater is not isolated.
14 In the previous configuration, under a low level 15 ' condition, essentially, we isolated all main feed from both 16 steam generators so initiation of SFRCS low level 17 i essentially resulted in a loss of main feedwater.
I 18 l This particular change preserves the availability i
19 of main feedwater for steam generators, thereby preserving 20 the primary means of decay heat removal from the steam 21 generator.
22 Another potential spurious means of actuation of 23 SFRCS during low power operation and reactor power runbacks 24 at Davis-Besse was the close proximity of the SFRCS low 25 level trip setpoint, with the ICS low level limit during ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationct09 CovGIn DNEX"C3
7250 07 06 42 JggDAV/bc 1 low power operation or during power runbacks.
2 The level in the steam generator is controlled at 3 the ICS lower level limit and they are very close. The 4 limit is very . lose to the SFRCS low level trip setpoint.
5 To minimize such spurious challenges to the auxilliary 6 feedwater system, the ICS low level is being raised.
7 -
(Slide.)
8 As John Wood mentioned earlier, one of the causes 9 of the overspeed trips of the June 9th event of the 10 auxilliary feedpump turbines was the condensation in the I
11 long cold steam lines. What we are doing here is providing l
12 hot steam lines to the auxilliary feedpump turbines.
'us 13 This is done by providing air-operated steam 14 admission valves in close proximity to the aux feedpump n
15 l turbines, which have high energy line break implications and l
16 nonmetal qualification implications which are being 17 corrected in parallel.
l I
18 i The auxilliary feedwater system has several 19 MOV's motor-operated valves. And, as John Wood also 20 mentioned e'arlier, the MOVATS testing and several upgrades 21 to the MOV's themselves will further improve the reliability 22 of the auxilliary feedwater system.
23 In the same light, the valves from the condensate
-s 24 storage tank to the auxilliary feedpumps, these are also
( )
25 motor-operated valves and these are the valves that used to ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
W. ti' .1*m N2rinnaide Intern er R0fL11AJ/d6
7250 07 07 93 1 go closed on low pressure on the suction. And also, in low jggDAV/bc 2 pressure on the suction, the service water valves used to 3 come open. If the valves are powered, a spurious signal 4 could cause these valves to go closed. A spurious low 5 pressure signal.
6 The intent here is to depower these valves so 7 that this particular failure mechanism of losing suction 8 , from the nominal source, which is the condensate storage 9 tank, is thereby eliminated.
10 one of the common mode failures for the 11 l aurilliary feedwater system that was identified earlier was i
12 l the common paths from the deaerator, which is the nearest k_J 13 storage tank to the hot water, a common path -- one single 14 path for both auxilliary feedpumps.
15 ! It could disable both pumps because of very hot 16 water which could not be tolerated. We have taken steps to 17 eliminate that suction path, thereby eliminating a potential 18 l common mode failure for both aux feedpumps, l
19 ! The SFRCS change is the next one. Essentially, 20 it's a logic change to the low pressure logic. Low steam i
21 generator pressure logic which disables the isolation of 22 auxilliary feedwater.
23 l For the generator that senses a low pressure
_ 24 l condition, the last. What that means is, for example, if
'~' 25 you were to have a low pressure condition -- for example, a ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 R"ation%Dverage Cihm
7250 07 08 94
[ ~ ]DAV/bc 1 steam line break or whatever -- in one generator, both aux v
2 feedpumps are aligned to the good generator, the second 3 generator.
4 And if the second generator were to sense a low 5 pressure condition, whether spurious or whatever, the 6 auxilliary feedwater will not be isolated from that 7 generator.
I 8 ! So at least you have one steam unit available to I
9 you getting auxilliary feedwater.
10 Finally, on the menu on the initiation of SFRCS--
11 DR. REMICK: Before you leave that, what was the 12 purpose of the suction to the deaerator tank if the pumps
) 13 were not able to handle that water temperature?
14 MR. JAIN: We were originally planning to use the 15 auxilliary feedwater as a startup feedwater pump.
16 Therefore, we were planning to use the deaerator water.
17 iR . REMICK: Thank you.
I 18 i rL: JAIN: These manual initiations which -- this 19 is the new setup. The old setup that existed on June 9th 20 contributed to the complexity of the transient and isolation 21 of auxilliary feedwater from both generators.
22 We had told you earlier the corrective actions we 23 were taking about rearranging and providing protective 24 features to mitigate or reduce the possibilities of f )
25 misactuations of these buttons. This ic the revised ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
N171.17 lim Narinnwide Coveranc R00-116-6M6
7250 07 09- 95 1 mechanism we have since come up with. It essentially qggDAV/bc 2 provides a more positive restraint to misactuation of SFRCS 3 on low pressure.
4 On low pressure SFRCS, it is the only mode of 5 SFRCS which isolates auxilliary feedwater. By providing 6 this kind of mechanism, he has a lesser probability of 7 depressing the wtong two buttons and thereby causing 8 isolation of auxilliary feedwater from both generators.
9 DR. SIESS: Excuse me. What is that? A physical 10 piece of plexiglass? An overlay? What is that?
11 MR. JAIN: This is one piece of plexiglass here.
12 This is another piece of plexiglass. And this is not a O
\_/ 13 magnetic lock. This is a regular lock now. This is a small 14 disk-like arrangement with a little knob here, so he would 15 have to rotate it this way to open that one. He would have 16 to rotate it this way to open that one.
17 , You can only potentially open one at a time.
18 MR. WILLIAMS: You had the logic changed so that I
19 if you' re dealing with high level, it's the top. Low level 20 is at the bottom.
21- (Slide.)
22 MR. JAIN: To further improve the reliability of 23 the auxilliary feedwater system, as John Wood mentioned 24 earlier, we are replacing the governor on the number one D
b 25 turbine. This PGPL governor we're replacing with a PGG ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 N=riaawideCM346646_ - -
7250 07 10 96 qggDAV/bc 1 governor, which has been shown to be more reliable during 2 testing.
3 The number two turbine also has the PGG governor, 4 which has already been installed during the last refueling 5 outage.
6 The next one shown is an educated manual reset 7 for the SFRCS full trip alarm, for the operator to be better 8 aware of a transient or a partial or a momentary SFRCS 9 actuation which may otherwise have been lost in the number 10 3 of enunciators that may have come up during a trancient like I
11 l the June 9th transient and gone away.
12 I By his depressing the common reset acknowledgment
~
13 button on the main panel, this gives him better information 14 that the SFRCS trip has gone away, and so he can verify his I
15 response within the control room.
16 On the suction strainers, there used to be two 17 strainers, one on each suction line of the auxilliary 18 feedpump. The baskets are being removed from those I
i 19 l strainers to minimize the potential pressure that would i
20 I occur in that line. The common strainer from the condensate i
21 storage tank, which supplies both suction lines to both aux 22 feedwater pumps, we' re making this strainer that will 23 minimize pressure.
,, 24 , There is some disagreement with the staff as to
/ ,
l 25 whether the strainer should be in place. We believe that, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
?n7.1.17.1700 Narinnsule rmermar MMM %(M _
7250 07 11 97 1 in our prudent judgment, that the strainer basket does jggDAV/bc 2 belong there. The suction transfer scheme, which, again, 3 challenges the valves to be repositioned, the challenges to 4 those valves should be minimized. Therefore, we are 5 revising the suction transfer scheme by changing the 6 setpoint at which the transfer occurs, and also providing a 7 time delay so that the transient or spurious signals are 8! filtered out.
I 9l As John Wood mentioned again, as part of the l'
10 collective action programs, we are providing a local trip 11 throttle valve for the au:cilliary feedpump turbine.
12 DR. REMICK: Has experience demonstrated that the l
(_' 13 strainers actually do capture something?
14 MR. JAIN: The few times we opened them up, they 15 were very clean.
I 16 DR. REMICK: But you feel they should remain?
17 MR. JAIN: The one that's coming from the bottom 18 I strainer on the condensate storage tank, we believe should 19 remain in place. That's because of the debris that could 20 I occur here during a seismic event or whatever would be 21 I captured by this and would still keep these pumps running.
22 Even if the strainer were to plug, there are pressures right 23 I here which enable the transfer of suction from the 24 condensate storage tank to the seismic safety grade service
- 8 25 water system.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
, M 3471700 Naeionwide roverage Roo.1%/M4
7250 07 12 98 gAV/bc 1 (S1ide.)
2 One of the major changes that we have 3 accomplished is the installation of the motor-driven 4 feedwater pump, which provides more than 100 percent I
5! capacity auxilliary feedwater flow. And during normal, full 6 power operation, the discharge of the pump will be aligned 7 to the auxilliary feedwater headers. The suction will be 1
8 from the condensation storage tank.
9 The pump has the capability of being started from 10 the control room and the motor can be supplied from either 11 diesel generator from the control room, as we discussed 12 earlier.
s .) 13 : The new lube oil pump is supplied for no. 2 1
14 !
diesel. In the case of no'. 2 diesel loss, the manual action l
15 ! would be required outside the control room to start up that l
16 j pump.
i 17 l DR. SIESS: What kind of an action is that? Do 18 l you just throw a switch, or do you have to bolt in a bus i
19 ! bar?
i I
20 l MR. JAIN: It's a cut-key interlock. He has to 21 open the key and move it the other way.
22 During low power operation, the pump will be 23 aligned to supply the main feedwater header to f acilitate
, 24 { feedwater cleanup. In this mode, the suction will be from
- \ \
25 ! the deaerator storage tank.
I ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
?M tt?1'm Nar in n m uir (~ns ermar $100-1% 66.16
7250 07 13 99 qggpAV/bc 1 Installation of these pumps gives us some more 2 advantages. It eliminates the high energy line break 3 concerns that marred the existing startup ferdwater pump and 4 required some local manual operator action to put in the 5 startup feedpump in operation.
6 It also results in some Appendix R concerns.
I 7l MR. EBERSOLE: Does this new pump have controls 8 both in the control room and at the auxilliary control l
9 conter for fire, for Appendix R?
10 MR. JAIN: There is no control of the pump at the 11 auxilliary shutdown panel.
12 l MR. O'CONNOR: But there is local control in the r I
(_) 13 , plant. .
I 14 l MR. JAIN: Which is outside the control room.
15 So, in case of control room evacuation, the pump could be I
16 started.
I 17 MR. EBERSOLE: I don' t like that term, 18 . " evacuation". Suppose there were a fire in the control l
19 j room, which may not require evacuation but does extensive l
20 i damage? Is this local control point affected by this 21 hypothetical fire?
22 MR. O'CONNOR: There's a disconnect switch to 23 isolate the control room circuitry from a motor-driven 24 feedpump circuitry, so it can be locally started.
25 MR. EBERSOLE: It's locally started from a point I
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-1700 Nationwide Netase m116-%:6
. ~ - -
7250 07 14 100 gAV/bc 1 distant from that fire zone?
2 MR. JAIN: If the fire isn' t in the control 3 room.
4 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay. So, in essence, it's a 5 unique point someplace independent of that control room.
6 Spreading room fire.
7 MR. O'CONNOR: Yes, sir.
8 MR. EDERSOLE: Thank you.
9 DR. REMICK: Is it my understanding, to start 10 that motor-driven pump, the only time you'd have to start it 11 from outside the control room would be if you lost offsite i
12 l power, and you lost the no. 2 diesel? Then you would have I
w) 13 to go to start the lube oil pump one. floor below. .
14 Otherwise, it would be controllable from the i
15 ! control room. Is that correct?
I 16 ! MR. JAIN: Yes.
i 17 I l
18 i l
19 20 i 21 22 23 ;
i 24
( l 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
ne.ue., m v2nnoma,cm ,,2., w .u m
7250 08 01 101 1 MR. EBERSOLE: This oil pump that you have to
}ggpAVbur 2 start, is this also in a fire zone that would enable you to 3 get oil pressure to a pump?
4 MR. O'CONNOR: It is on the skid of the pump.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.
6 (Slide.)
7 MR. JAIN: Since we last met, we have also 8 completed a reliability analysis of the auxiliary feedwater 9 system consistent with the data and methodology provided in 10 NUREG-611, essentially to demonstrate our compliance with 11 i the standards review plan criteria.
12 l The events that were looked at in the analysis
/ 13 were the loss of main feedwater event, loss of main feed 14 with loss of offsite power, and loss of main feed with loss i
15 i of all AC onsite as well as offsite AC power.
I 16 l Three configurations that were looked at were the I
17 ; June 9 th configuration, the auxiliary feedwater system 18 configuration, which is a two steam driven pump integration l
19 i which we envision to be at restart, and the two pump aux l
20 ! feedwater configuration. This is the motor driven feed pump l
21 I configuration.
22 These three configurations were analyzed, and the 23 l result of the analysis was that with the motor driven feed 1
24 pump the reliability of the system is within the SRP-10.49 l
( )
25 acceptance criterion. )
i 1
l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Ri3XS-MID PdWTfMh Cli>M
7250 08 02 102 1 There seems to be some disagreement between the gggpAVbur 2 staff and us. That could be in the methodology or the 3 approach that was utilized in the reliability analysis.
4 DR. SIESS: Excuse me. As I look at these two 5 configurations here, I counted up that you have got 11 more 6 valves on this one than you have got on that.one, and that 7 actually leads to more reliability?
8 MR. JAIN: We have got 11 more valves on this one 9 mainly because you have got the motor driven feed pump in ,
10 '
there.
11 j DR. SIESS: I don' t know, I didn't bother l
12 I counting. It just bothers me a little bit that we improve k
) 13 ! reliability by adding valves when they are the most 14 unreliable things.
15 MR. WILLIAMS: That is a whole new system that is 16 j going in. That has got to be valved off, you know. It just 17 wasn't there before.
18 DR. SIESS: That is all right. It was just a 19 philosophical type question. I am trying to correlate 20 l reliability with number of valves, and I think it is 21 inverse.
22 (Laughter.)
23 MR. JAIN: You also have to assess the 24 independence of this train with the other train and how it
(-
( /
's 25 adds up to the top.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
M.347 3700 Nationwide foverage 800 33MM4
7250 08 03 103 gAVbur 1 (Slide.)
2 The feed and bleed analysis that was done -- I 3 will give you details of the analysis.
4 The analysis was done by giving 102 percent full 5 power condition with all feedwater, main auxiliary startup, 6 motor driven, whatever feedwater, everything lost. The 7 reactor trip occurred at 15 seconds on high pressure.
I 8l The operator action, as Bill O'Connor earlier i
9 mentioned, was initiated at 600 degrees in the reactor 10 coolant system, and 10 minutes after that the operator was 11 assumed to start two makeup pumps and open the PORV.
12 The results of the analysis show that the mixture 13 level in the core is more than 15 feet, and the collapsed 14 height in the core is 11.9 feetslightlybekowthetopof 15 the core.
16 (Slide.)
17 We realize that the decay heat removal systems 18 are important with any PWR. We are doing as much as we 19 said, and we will be doing much more to improve the overall 20 reliability still further. The first one among that is the 21 installation of primary system blowdown valves.
22 The design for this is in the conceptual phase.
23 So I would not be able to give you much more detail, but we 24 will provide blowdown valves at the top of steam generators O 25 which will give you enough depressurization capability for ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
m nnn m.m.a e m- ann.tu.uu
7250 08 04 104 1 us to get down to the high pressure injection pump discharge ggpAVbur 2 pressure and thereby give us a safety grade single failure 3 proof feed and bleed capability.
4 The existing startup feedwater pump which was 5 disabled for us to utilize the electrical switchgear for the 6 motor driven feed pump, we will be resurrecting that pump by 7 providing additional switchgear and also providing control 8 room capability for the valves that were previously closed 9 for the high energy line break or moderate energy line break 10 l in service.
I 11 We also provide control room capability for the 12 motor driven feedwater pump discharge valves to the
() 13 auxiliary feedwater header in order to forther reduce the 14 reliance of the auxiliary feedwater system on MOVs and AC 15 power. It would be further reducing the number of valves 16 that have to open to initiate auxiliary feedwater with the 17 steam generators.
18 The level control for the auxiliary feedwater 19 system at Davis-Besse is the feeder control, which changes 20 af ter sensing different levels of changes-if turbine speed 21 l is erratic and can cause problems in performance of the 22 system.
23 We are looking at improving the performance of 24 the level control system in the longer run and also to 25 further improve the distance between the SFRCS low level ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
8 237-3700 Nationwideh L7AM
7250 08 05 105 gggDAVbur 1j trip setpoint and the ICS low level limit to give you more 2 margin, to prevent spurious acceleration and undesired 3 demands on the auxiliary feedwater system.
4 MR. EDERSOLE: Is it not true that you have 5 denied the SFRCS system the prerogative of turning off all 6 the feedwater? Is that correct?
7 MR. JAIN: You have designed?
8 MR. EBERSOLE: No, you have denied it.
9 . At one time I understood the SFRCS had the 10 ability to turn off all water and it did that.
11 Didn't I see earlier in the presentation here 12 I .that you had cut out -- that you will save the last steam l
\/ 13 l generator at least?
14 MR. JAIN: Yes.
15 l MR. EBERSOLE: So you have denied it its critical I
16 capability to cut off feedwater?
17 MR. JAIN: No.
18 l MR. EBERSOLE : I must have missed a point. It l
l 19 can in fact dry the steam gener'ators?
20 MR. JAIN: Yes.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: Dry up both of them?
22 MR. JAIN: One it can.
23 MR. EBERSOLE: One it can, but prior to this it
,_ 24 could have dried up both, or did?
~'
25 MR. JAIN: Yes.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l w u .Pm Nannnmids Fnsermar Ron.MU.m
7250 08 06 106 gAVbur 1 MR. EBERSOLE: That is all I wanted to hear, that 2 you had cut its neck off, its ability to turn off all 3 water. Had you not done that, I would argue it contributed 4 more of a hazard than it provided safety.
5 MR. JAIN: It is a different beast. In the 6 longer term we are totally revamping the logic of the SFRCS 7 to further minimize isolation of main steam and main feed.
8 In the previous configuration there used to be 9 too many isolations of, for example, the MSIVs or the main 10 feed valves, and we will be critically looking at all theso 11 aspects of the SFRCS.to further minimize these isolations.
12 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask you, what safety price G 13 did you pay, if any, when you terminated the ability of the 14 SFRCS to turn off all water?
15 j You had it turning off all water for a purpose.
16 What was it?
17 MR. JAIN: The purpose --
18 l MR. EBERSOLE: Was it to prevent containment 19 l overpressurization?
20 MR. JAIN: The obvious concern that you might 21 think would be first the containment overpressure.
22 MR. EBERSOLE: So how did you get rid of that 23 ,
argument that you don't need to turn it off?
l 24 MR. JAIN: We looked at the extant analysis for 25 which such isolations would be required, and given a single ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ,
?n7147-3700 Nationwide Coveraae fML13&6M6
7250 08 07 107 MlhDAVbur 1 failure, we have concluded that even with a single failure 2 this particular logic chain which continues to feed the 3 second generator would not cause a containment overpressure 4 or criticality concerns.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: So that was unnecessary in the 6 first place then?
7 MR. JAIN: If you were to critically look at it 8l that way, yes.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: All right.
10 { MR. JAIN: The final bullet here is the 11- l installation of a comprehensive control room panel for the f
, 12 l operator, where he has all the information readily available .
(#
'~
t 13 fI to put it into the auxiliary feedwater system as well as the 14 SFRCS.
15 That is the end of my presentation.
I 16 l DR. REMICK: Any questions?
17 (No response.)
18 MR. WILLIAMS: Mr. Hildebrandt will give the 34 19 , system review considerations, and he will also cover the i
20 ! tests.
~
21 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask in a generic 22 characteristic, is this SFRCS characteristic of all the B&W 23 plants?
,s, 24 MR. JAIN: We looked at the emergency feedwater
'~'
)
25 initiation and control system that B&W has for some other ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
. . . . . . , , . . , .. ,c ...m ,,,m.,
- . . mm, 7250 08 08 108 JggDAvbur 1 plants.
2 MR. EBERSOLE: Did they have the capacity to dry 3 up steam generators on the hypothetical gain that they get 4 from not pressurizing containment?
5 MR. JAIN: No, in general it does not. SFRCS is 6 and was significant.
7 l MR. EDERSOLE: Is there any one which still does l
8l have the capacity to dry up steam generators that you know 9 of?
10 MR. JAIN. In my review, I haven't found one.
11 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.
I 12 MR. HILDEBRANDT: I am Phil Hildebrandt.
- 13 ! I am going to discuss the system review and test l
14 program. I will discuss how the program itself works, the 15 Independent Process Review Committee that provides a review 16 of the work in this program, what has been found in this 17 program in terms of an overview for you, then the testing i
18 I work itself, which is just now being initiated.
19 i For systems important to safe plant operation, I I
20 I will talk more about that in a moment. The purpose and the 21 objective of this work is to identify those important 22 recurring design basis and operations problems, to determine 23 whether corrective actions are required prior to restart or 7_ 24 can be taken over the longer term, to evaluate the scope of c
25 existing surveillance or other forms of periodic testing, to ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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- ~ . - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ~ ...- ..... - . .
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7250 08 09 109 MlhDAVbur 1 identify whether any additional testing needs to be 2 performed to demonstrate functions or is the present body of 3 testing adequate, and then to conduct a test program to 4 demonstrate that these systems are functional and operable 5 using these test procedures.
6 This work will be completed prior to restart of 7 Davis-Besse.
8 (Slide.)
9 The review encompasses a total of 34 systems 10 judged important to the safe operation of Davis-Besse.
11 The attributes that have been considered in the 12 selection of the system is that the syst3m performs an
(. )
13 active safety function, the system malfunction can lead to 14 challenges to safety systems, that the malfunction could l
15 result in abnormal plant transients, that the system is 16 important to preventing, detecting, controlling, or 17 , mitigating pl ant transients, that the system itself has a 18 history of unreliable performance or the system was 19 associated with the June 9th event.
20 l 34 systems are listed on the next two pages of 21 your handout. I won' t go through each of those systems.
22 I will note that the NRC's SER lists 33 systems.
23 The 34th is what we call the miscellaneous containment s 24 isolation valves, which we have named as a system. That is
( )
25 the difference between the SER and the listing you have in ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
7250 08 10 110 gAVbur 1 your handout.
2 (Slide.)
3 Describing the approach taken, there is a team 4 assigned for each system. This team is headed by a Toledo 5 Edison engineer. That Toledo Edison engineer is supported 6 by highly qualified industry personnel, as many as he needs 7 to get the job done.
8 The most important part of the experience a 9 gathering or data gathering on the experience with the 10 systems in the plant has been the focused interviews of 11 operations, maintenance, and engineering personnel in the 12 plant or associated with the plant.
'J 13 This was done in a very organized, orderly 14 fashion: checklists,. the experienced industry personnel 15 sitting, the Toledo Edison engineer working with the person 16 being interviewed. That is either individual interviews or 17 group interviews, as may be appropriate. Also to complement 18 ,
this with a review of selected records for Davis-Besse 19 experiences, such as licensee event reports, NPRDS data, et 20 cetera.
21 Based on this experience gathering, there are 22 then corrective actions for problems that were identified or 23 characterized as prior to restart or that they could be over
-s 24 the longer term; that is, after the restart of the plant. i 25 There was a report put together then that ,
l l
l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
,m u, um m.a w.c_ . am m uu
7250 08 11 111
$lhDAVbur 1 describes the functions of the systems and the problems and 2 corrective actions for each of these systems.
3 I am going to go back and talk about what is in 4 that report again in just a moment.
5 (Slide.)
6 The test review portion of this is to review the 7 i surveillance testing as required from tech specs, review 8 other periodic test requirements for each system to ensure 9 that the required functions are adequately demonstrated and 10 confirmed by the body of testing required in the plant, to 11 prepare a report summarizing the results of this test review 12 and then identifying any test changes that are required, and i i
~'
13 then test outlines and procedures are prepared for any 14 post-modification testing for changes thac have been made 15 during this outage, any new periodic or surveillance testing 16 and a revised periodic or surveillance testing and then 17 one-time tests that may be required specifically for what we 18 are doing in the plant at this point.
19 Then the test program work is also then put in a 20 ;
summary.
21 (Slide.)
22 The review process -- and Admiral Williams has 23 named the Independent Process Review Committee. The purpose s 24 of that committee was to provide an overall review of the i
25 system review and test program to ensure that the system ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
7250 08 12 112 jl)DAVbur 1 review and the corrective action process in combination with 2 system and equipment testing adequately demonstrates the 3 operational readiness and functionality of the systems and 4 equipment important to safe operation of Davis-Besse.
5 Committee membership, which is on the next page 6 of your handout --
7 (Slide.)
8 -- combines a broad background of nuclear 9 industry experience with specific knowledge of Davis-Besse 10 plant design.
11 As you can see, representatives from B&W, 12 Bechtel, f rom Toledo Edison operations and, eng inaering ,
13 United Engineering Services Corporation, myself with MPR 14 Associates, and Bechtel, as I mentioned before.
15 We have a broad background of general industry l
16 l experience plus specific knowledge of Davis-Besse.
i 17 ; (Slide.)
18 l How did we do the work? How did we do our 19 business?
l 1
20 ! The function was to provide the current -- and I l
21 will walk through these.
22 First, the scope and depth of the review by the 23 teams. Did they look? Did they have the system defined to
,_ 24 the right extent? Did they have the interfaces defined with
( )
25 other systems? Did they have the interrelationships with ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 08 13 113 JggDAVbur 1 other systems properly defined?
2 The answer was usually "no." It took several 3 rounds to go through that, not completely in each case.
4 Had they identified the interfaces? Had they 5 identified interrelationships? Had they properly identified 6 the scope of the system? Problems in areas such as power 7 supplies, cooling water to support particular pumps, 8 ventilating air, interactions with the control systems?
9 The kind of things -- it was a growing process, 10 okay?
11 So, first, there is the scope and depth of the 12 review by the teams, a clear identification and statement of K' 13 the system functions that are important to the safe 14 operation of Davis-Besse.
i 15 l Those are not just the functions classically 16 delineated in the safety analysis report for the plant.
17 ! Those are those functions important to safe operations 18 l
- beyond the classical safety functions.
19 The corrective actions that are required prior to 20 restart and over the longer term were then defined. Then we 21 reviewed periodic testing. Surveillance and periodic 22 testing concurred with the specific testing requirements to 23 be performed prior to the restart of the unit to ensure the
,_ 24 functionality of the system and then concurred specifically i
25 with the results of that testing.
I i
1 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l muwm m, _ a, cm ,_ m num
7250 08 14 114 P~sDAvbur- 1- This is the purpose of the work being done by the V
2 Independent Process Review Committee to support a larger 3 ef fort by the systems review and test program by Toledo 4 Edison.
5 DR. SIESS: Could you go back a minute and 6 enlarge a little on your comment about system functions 7 essential to the safe operation that go beyond the FSAR?
8 MR. HILDEBRANDT: There is a classical list --
9 well, there is a listing.
10 DR. SIESS: Could you give me an example of 11 something that is classical and something that goes'beyond 12 it?
() 13 MR. HILDEBRANDT:- Let me take it by system and 14 function both.
15 The main feedwater system does not have specific 16 safety requirements, all right?
17 But there is a list of functions of the main 18 feedwater system that are very important to the continued 19 safe operation of Davis-Besse, all right?
I 20 If you go through, the main feedwater system is 21 not a safety system. However, the main feedwater system and 22 maintaining a high reliability of the main feedwater system, 23 its control systems, its drain systems, maintaining 24 feedwater to the steam generators is very-important to 25 ' continued heat removal from the reactor and should be your ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 08 15 115 gAVbur 1 primary focused intent.
2 So the point is there is not only a system, but 3 all functions associated with that system which are outside 4 a classical safety system.
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 7s
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i 14 15 16 17 18 I
i 19 i 20 21 22 23 1
24 25 1
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7250 09 01 116 qllpAV/bc 1 DR. SIESS: It sounds to me like you're making a 2 distinction between safety-related and importance to 3 safety.
4 MR. HILDEBRANDT: I didn' t want to get trapped on 5 those two words, no, sir, or I think we would not get out of 6 here.
7 (Laughter.)
8 DR. SIESS: I think you've given the best 9 definition of those two terms that I've seen in quite a 10 while now.
11 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Yes, sir, and I've avoided 12 using those terms because I don't know what they literally OkJ 13 mean. Yes, sir, I agree with that. That's why I defined e
14 them as I just described.
T 15 MR. EBERSOLE: In looking at these systems, I 16 guess you look at failure modes and effects of each system 17 as it fails.
18 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Not on a point by point 19 rigorous but on a standing back and looking at.
20 MR. EBERSOLE: When you do this, do you look at 21 the failing of parameters such as air pressure, water 22 pressure or electrical voltage in a gradual oscillitory 23 context rather than a sudden chop?
24 MR. HILDEBRANDT: No, sir.
O- 25 MR. EBERSOLE: If you don't, then you're going to ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 09 02 117 qlgDAV/bc 1 get trapped. Numerous safety features have been found to 2 operate in an unexpected fashion on the onset of gradual 3 failure of the supply source.
4 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Only a limited aspect of that 5 has been looked at associated with the air system.
6 MR. EBERSOLE: You're familiar with the problem.
7 MR. HILDEBRANDT: I have some familiarity with 8 the problem.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: Air valves is the main one. They 10 get near the point when they don't operate any more and you 11 don' t know what they' re going to do. They'll open or shut, 12 or whatever. Notably, for instance, the reactor scram s 13 l valves on the boile'r, the air pressure gets to a certain 14 intermediate point very near where it refuses to operate at 15 all and then you can't tell what it's going to do. It can 16 l go either way.
I 17 l And I've heard of other air valves like that.
18 For that matter, that applies to voltage levels, too; as you 19 get near to the point of falability, you don't know what 20 it's going to do.,
21 So you must include in these studies some sort of 22 a range to see where if you get a low parameter level, you 23 ' must chop it.
_ 24 Do you follow me?
l 25 MR. HILDEBRANDT: I anderstand what you're 26 saying.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 09 03 118 hlgpAV/bc 1 What we have not done is included anything 2 rigorously in that area. Two areas, you're aware of, but 3 one we have looked at decreasing air pressure in very 4 specific instances and, two, looked at lower than nominal 5 voltages, for instances, simply with regard to the operation 6 of motor-operated valves. Okay.
7 Only in those areas, not in general and not 8 rigorously. That's a large of fert. I understand what 9 you're saying.
10 MR. O'CONNOR: If I could interject something.
11 In the instrument air area, we have a very definitive loss 12 of instrument air emergency procedure that has every single 13 air valve in the pignt -- what its fail position is, which 14 ones can be manually overridden and very specific guidelines 15 for the operators that at 75 pounds decreasing pressure, 16 which is above where any of them would lose it, their 17 actions are taken so that we don't get down to those 20-30 18 I pound ranges where the valves lock up and not move.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: That's what I'm talking about.
20 Once you get to a level where you chop it. I just had last 21 week a personal experience. A station service transformer 22 at Oak Ridge utopped down to 52 volts and stayed there for 23 about an hour and a half.
-s 24 l You can imagine the chaos in the refrigeration l )
25 industry. It didn' t cut.
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l 7250 09 04 119 gAV/bc 1 (Slide.)
2 MR. HILDEBRANDT: The next item is how do we {
3 determine what corrective actions are required prior to 4 restart. Again, these are the corrective actions necessary 5 to ensure the safe and reliable plant operation.
6 And this is based on the collective experience 7 and judgment of the independent process review committee, 8 considering the plant design basis described in the updated 9 safety analysis report; the technical specification 10 requirements, reliable plant operation, the protection of 11 I personnel systems and equipment and prudent engineering i
12 practice.
(.
J 13 I Again, relying on the collective experience and 14 judgment.
15 (Slide.)
16 The current status of this system review and test 17 program. The identification of system and equipment i
18 I problems requiring resolution is complete. The system I
19 review reports summarizing the system functions and 20 problems, the interfaces and required corrective actions are 21 also complete.
22 Those reports have been provided to Region III 23 for their review.
,_ 24 The review of the periodic tests on surveillance,
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25 testing for system functions and operability and ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 09 05 120 AV/bc 1 preparation of reports is about 75 percent complete.
2 (Slide.)
3 To give you an overview of the types of things 4 being defined, for the 34 systems, approximately 150 problem 5 areas requiring resol'ution prior to restart and, similarly, 6 about 200 require resolutions over the longer term.
7 This resolution ranges from engineering S evaluation for specific hardware changes or testing of the 9 plant. And the necessary paperwork, facility change 10 requests, maintenance work requesta, et cetera, have been 11 initiated or are being completed to address all of the 12 problem areas requiring resolution prior to restart.
O 13 - (slide >
14 To give you an example, here are some examples of 15 , problem areas that have been found in the sys' cam review or 16 efforts associated with the system review.
17 one, the power operated relief valve not being 18 operationally qualified for the environment that's expected 19 during feed and bleed. I'll come back and talk about that 2,0 one again in just a moment.
21 We found that the control room emergency 22 ventilation system for practical purposes is inoperable over 23 a range of climatic conditions and'its capacity was 24 inadequate.
25 We found that the auxill'iary feedwater discharge ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, l 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-MW6 )
l 7250 09 06 121 dlhDAV/bc 1 piping had been overpressured during the June 9 th event when 2 the auxilliary feedwater pump turbine .had oversped.
3 We found that there is a potential for undetected 4 flooding of the pit containing decay heat removal valves.
5 Corrective action has been taken to address detection of 6 that possible flooding.
7 We found that there was inadequate ventilation in 8 ; the service water pumprooms. We found there was inadequate l
9 configuration control and the depth necessary to support 10 . modifications in the safety features actuation system.
11 l There was impropdr terminal wire wrap technique 12 ; in the steam feedwater rapture control system requiring
( ) !
13 "
rewiring of several thousand terminations in the steam and 14 feedwater rupture control cabinet.
i 15 ,
We found that the installation of dampers located 16 i in through wall ducts was improper to Appendix R 17 l requirements and, finally, there was widespread station and i
18 i instrument air system leaks. There were 600 approximately 1
19 leaks in the system and heavy dependence on temporary diesel 20 '
air compressors.
21 The station air compressors were often off line 22 and capacity was limited because of the large number of 23 leaks in the system.
24 MR. EBERSOLE: What about the reliability of the 25 fire dampers even if they're...are they not in fact rather ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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e 7250-09 07 122 AV/bc 1 unreliable?
2 MR. STORRS: I think that the test program since 3 the Brown's Ferry fire has started to improve the 4 demonstration reliability. In fact, that program has been 5 ongoing at plants and has built up test data to show that 6 they are fairly reliable. ,
7 MR. EBERSOLE: I'm thinking about that feature of 8 the Salem incident called the marginal force. I never 9 thought that marginal force with dampers was very much 10 unless you trip a weight or something.
11 MR. STORRS: As a result of failures, a 12 modification has been made to the tripping mechanism. So I
() 13 think that the data that's going on is making it more 14 reliable.
15 MR. SMITH: Also, our own experience with them 16 has led us to increase the frequency of inspection and 17 cleaning of the actuating mechanism.
18 MR. EBERSOLE: It all comes down to the critical 19 margin of force, you know, to override static friction and 20 dirty conditions.
21 I think that's an invaluable experience that we 22 had at Salem in the broader context.
23 MR. WILLIAMS: We have a problem that's come out 24 of our fire protection investigation Appendix R review.
O- 25 That is that the clearance between the dampers and the ducts ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
RiR237-DE0 Narionwide Com 800-33H646 ;
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7250 09 08 123 qllDAV/bc 1 was reduced inadvisedly by the installer.
2 So what we'll end up with when we go into startup 3 is we'll have everything covered with fire watches unless we 4 get this thing fixed.
5 MR. STORRS: One of the areas we're testing to 6 l improve is the efficient differential flow testing of the 7 damper. It tests real well when you're in a static flow 8 i condition and I believe the NRC and the industry has moved 9 be do some of the testing, at least in the early stages, 10 l during startup design.
11 A functional test with the flow across the valve.
12 l DR. SIESS: How many fire dampers do you have on r^s I k./ 13 I that?
?
14 l MR. WILLIAMS: How many, Steve?
15 l MR. QUINO: About 180.
I 16 l DR. REMICK: I remind people to identify i
17 j themselves for the completeness of the record, i
18 l MR. HILDEBRANDT: For each of these areas we are 19 ; describing, corrective actions have been identified for the i
20 i short te rm and , in some cases, over the longer term. Now, 21 the recurring problem areas that kept cropping up as we go 22 through the system reviews are basic inattention to heating, 23 ventilation and air conditioning requirements, inoperable
_ 24 nitrogen regulators, inadequate maintenance for hydromotor-25 actuators, tracking and replacement of limited life 1
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. .
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7250 09 09 124 qggpAV/bc 1 components is not a way of life, not well-established; an 2 extensive valve-packing leakage steam trap maintenance and 3 INC preventive maintenance and calibration was of ten non-4 existent.
5 , So each of these areas, particularly in tho 34 6 systems have been specifically addressed and are being 7 corrected.
8 (Slide.)
9 I talked about the system review effort and 10 things associated with the system review effort and what was l
11 found. The other side of the coin is the test review.
12 We're finding in the process of the test review es l
[ 13 that there is inadequate performance testing requirements 14 for safety-related heat exchangers, the lack of a 15 performance basis for the acceptance criteria for 16 ! safety-related pump testing.
17 There are inadequate leak check requirements on i
18 i some of the check and isolation valves, both in terms of the I
19 l testing method and the acceptance criteria.
20 l There's incomplete acceptance testing for the I
21 RCS hot leg level instrumentation. That was installed in 22 1984 and there are incomplete operability checks of some of 23 the standby flow paths, such as between the decay heat 24 removal pumps and the high pressure injection pumps and the 25 so-called piggyback mode.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-334 6686
7250 09 10 125 qggDAV/bc 1 Each one of these items is being corrected and 2 will be corrected before restart in the various forms of 3 testing.
4 (Slide.)
5 I'll give you a brief look at the results of 6 initial system testing. We've gone the full route. We've 7 found the problems, identified the corrective actions. The 1
8l corrective action has been taken. The testing is being l
9 reviewed on these systems. The tests have been changed as 10 necessary to provide an adequate look at functions.
11 Now we're beginning to do the testing and the 12 testing has found some problems. When we found improporly t_/ 13 wired containment air cooler fan that was wired backwards, 14 basically, and turned in the wrong direction, we also found 15 l that the air cooler containment had inadequate flow l
16 capacity.
17 Secondly, we found inadequate flow and 18 l distribution of ventilation for the service water pumps, 15 which was a carryon from the original problem I discussed 20 earlier.
21 We also found there was improper low air pressure 22 limits on the bottles to support multiple air starts of the 23 emergency diesel generator.
24 DR. SIESS: Excuse me. On the previous slide,
)
25 you list some examples of the areas found in the testing ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
?n?.1J7.1?an Nannnside Cm eraar 800 1 E 6646
7250 09 11 126 qggpAV/bc 1 review. What's your opinion as to the root cause for those 2 particular deficiencies?
3 MR. HILDEBRANDT: I think it's basically 4 engineering experience of sitting, very carefully sitting 5 down and saying what's the function? Trying to show how do 6 I test to show that function? When I get a result, how do I 7 .
evaluate it?
8 I would put it in the context of engineering 1
9 experience.
10 MR. HILLIAMS: Accepting the AE's word as gospel 11 and not having an inhouse capability to check it out.
12 , DR. SIESS: How widespread was this? These are i_-.
13 examples, there are five items. I'm sure there must be 14 hundreds of test procedures.
15 MR. WILLIAMS: He's going to discuss those but 16 they're also in -- rou' re not going to cover all of them?
l 17 MR. HILCtBRANDT: I'm not going through all of 18 those.
DR. S1ESS: As you looked at test procedures-19 l 20 l what percentage did you find inadequate?
21 MR. HILDEBRANDT This is a guess only. Let me 22 just put it in that context. It's a guess. Less than a 23 third were inadequate.
p 24 Now, in your package, you have for each of the 33
( l 25 systems for which there are corrective actions identified a ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 09 12 127 1 page by page summary of the problems that we have found the gggpAV/bc 2 corrective actions to be taken. I do not plan to go through 3 those at this point.
4 I'll be glad to discuss ar.y questions if you 5 should have any, but I don't plan to go through this item by 6 item here. I just wanted to point out one item to you if I 7 <
could.
8 i The second page after the separation page, which 9 shows the system review and test program, similar corrective 10 actions, if you go back in two pages -- if you go back in 11 two pages, there's a summary of the qualifications of the 12 solenoids at the PORV's.
,a C) 13 (Slide.)
14 We have successfully completed operability 15 , qualifications for the PORV solenoid for conditions expected 16 i during extended feed and blood operations. Those test 17 conditions are listed there. A testing environment of 220 18 l degrees and 15 pounds gauger initial 20 minutes of.on/off cyclic operation; five hours of being continuously energized 19 l I
20 ! and holding the valve open.
1 21 f The solenoid itself was mounted on a bracket like 22 the geometry in the plant connected to a thermal source set 23 at 650 to represent the steam flow through the valve and its 24 l effect on the solenoid.
,m h
'/ 25 And the solenoid plunger was loaded to represent ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
,, 202 347 3700 Nation 1de Coverage FTbO3MM6
7250 09 13 128 gggpAV/bc 1 valve operation. That testing has been just recently 2 completed.
1 -
DR. SIESS: Now, this suggests that the solenoids 4 have been the principal reasons those valves have 5 malfunctioned?
6 j MR. HILDEBRANDT: No, sir. The purpose here is 7 the environmental qualification of the solenoid and to make 8 sure that it would continue to operate as you wish it to 9 operate. That is, hold the valve open for feed and bleed I
specifically during the extended period of time when the 10 l 11 containment begins to get hot at a higher pressure during 12 . feed and bleed operation.
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- 13 That was the specific purpose environmental 14 l qual.ification.
i 15 MR. EBERSOLE: What voltage are those?
16 i MR. IIILDEBRANDT : 125 volt DC.
l 17 i Now let me jump through to further back in your 18 package and describe the testing program itself. It should 19 ! be right after the last of the system discussions.
1 20 ! (Slide.)
21 About an eighth of an inch from the back of your I
22 pack, we measure in inches...
23 MR. EBERSOLE : When you tested that valve, did
_ 24 you put a mega on it to see what happened to the impedence 25 to ground?
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 09 14 129 LllpAV/bc 1 MR. HILDEBRANDT: I don't know the results. Do 2 you know the answer?
3 MR. QUINO: We did mega that valve after the 4 test, and it mega-ed satisfactorily.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: It gets an inductive kick when you 6 turn it off. Did you get operations excessively on that 7l kick? You know, when you turn it off, it kicks.
8 MR. QUINO: I can't answer that, sir.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: It has very high voltage on the DC 10 solenoid trip.
11 MR. QUINO: We did test it five times in i
succession successfully after the test.
,, 12 l 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Af ter the test but not during the 14 l test?
15 i MR. QUINO: Yes, during the test.
16 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.
17 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Both.
18 (Slide.)
i 19 l Now, again, j ust recapping, this is the test
\
20 program test review and then the testing work itself to be 21 done. We're looking at periodic and surveillance tests to 22 ensure that we have testing in place and define the 23 procedures or write new procedures if that's required. And
,s 24 then perform a demonstration of each of the functions for I !
25 the 34 systems that we were discussing earlier.
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 09 15 130 1 The results of the review of this testing again gggpAV/bc 2 are given by an independent process review committee, and 3 the independent process review committee confers with the 4 scope of the testing to be performed.
5 (Slide.)
6 Based on this approach, we have identified a 7I total of about 253 tests that will be performed prior to 8 restart; 154 of these are existing periodic tests; 92 are 9 modified or new surveillance or other types of periodic 10 testing or one-time test limits needed to demonstrate 11 specific functions as a result of modifications.
12 ! We have seven integrated tests where we' re using, r~ \
J 13 l for instance, the steam and feadwater rupture control system 14 to take all of its actions at once and start the auxilliary l
15 feedwater system, et cetera.
l 16 (Slide.)
17 l We' re using the existing station administrative 18 , procedures to implement and control the restart test 19 program. That's augmented by a set of new procedures which, 20 i due to the unusual testing environment we're in, an i
21 organizational structure has been put together and 22 l responsibility groups defined, et cetera.
l 23 l tiow , development of test procedures for new or i
-, 24 l modified tests goes through the following paths 25 One, the independent process review committee ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC 70214 WOO Nationwid;r overage H F il W 46
7250 09 16 131 gAV/bc 1 confers with the scope. There's a group then called the 2 joint test group which approves the test procedures.
3 Station review board and plant manager approve the test as 4 usual; that's a normal function.
5 The tests are then conducted by a combination of 6 the special test organization and the plant operations. The 7 results of all testing conducted to demonstrate functions 8 are.then reviewed by the joint test group and finally by the 9 independent process review committee.
10 :
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25 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 10 01 132 T DAVbw 1 (Slide.)
2 The next two slides just provide you with an 3 outline of these organizations. I don't think it's 4 important to go through these here. They provide you with 5 an outline of the interrelationships of these organizations 6 for the test program at Davis-Besse.
7 DR. REMICK: Out of this, you will have developed 8 l some engineers, Toledo Edison engincors, who are extremely 9 knowledgeable, I assume, in various systems. Are your plans 10 to have them adopt those systems long term like the Japanese 11 ,
systems that they adopt and follow, and that's their baby?
t 12 MR. WILLIAMS: That's correct.
/~'s !
( / 13 DR. REMICK: Do you plan to do that?
14 l MR. WILLIAMS: That's a very rapid learning i
15 l ground for Mr. John Wood's systems engineers. We didn't 16 l have that when we started. Now we can smell it.
i 17 l Now that's the end of our presentation, 1
18 i Mr. Remick. We will be glad to answer any questions.
l 19 l DR. REMICK: Chet? Jesse?
20 l MR. EBERSOLE: I'm saturated.
21 (Laughter.)
22 MR. WILLIAMS: And I'm cold.
23 (Laughter.)
, 24 l DR. REMICK: We road in the newspaper recently,
( ) !
25 in fact, in Central Pennsylvania, we felt an earthquake in ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 10 02 133 1 Ohio. I assumo you felt that in Toledo.
ggDAVbw 2 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, wo did.
3 I'd like for Mr. Storrs and Mr. Quino to give 4 you, if you would like, a brief rundown on our view of that 5 earthquake. I wasn't there. I got a call on the highway 6 between Columbus and Cleveland. Stopped at a way station 7 l and called him, and he said, wo just had a shake.
l 8 i Lou, why don't you tell about our experience.
9 Mr. Lou Storrs, Plant Manager.
10 ; MR. STORRS: Thoro's quito a bit of activity that I
11 l day, since we had throo nuclear stations located right thoro I
12 ; on Lake Erie. I was at the plant. There woro ruports of
_' 13 l people feeling some motion at the facility; however, our 14 alarm, our procedure, when it was announced through the 15 media that thoro had boon an earthquake, we went to our procedure and followed our procedure, which, for us to 16 l 17 ! declare an unusual event would require a confirmatory alarm 18 from our site equipment. We did not receive that alarm in 19 j the control room.
l 20 ' DR. SIESS: What's it set at?
21 '
VOICES: .01.
22 MR. STORRS: As a precautionary measure, we 23 walked through the proceduro, including the walk downs of 24 the systems in the plant, as spelled out in the proceduro,
(~)
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I 25 interviewing people that were in the plant and their ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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2 event took place. We made a courtesy notification to the 3 NRC, the site resident and also to the region. Following 4 those activities and notifying our management team and the 5 press, we made a press release indicating that we had not 6 had a problem at the Davis-Besse plant.
7 Following that, we validated that the system was 8 functional. We ran a functional test on it and verified it 9 was operational.
10 John Wood and a team of engineers came out and 11 were in the process of removing the passive indication 12 equipment to verify that, in fact, the electronics was
() 13 working properly.
I don't know if we got the results back 14 on that.
15 MR. Wood: I have not heard we have the results 16 back yet.
17 DR. SIESS: Does the recording equipment turn on 18 only when it is tripped?
19 MR. STORRS: Yes, sir. We demonstrated that to 20 our satisfaction, in about an hour and a half after the 21 event. The way that works is, you actually depress a coil,
' 22 and it moves past the trigger. So it's actuating equipment 23 all the way from the detector through the recording system.
24 DR. SIESS: I thought you'd just go over and kick 25 it!
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 10 04 135 DAvbw 1 ( Laug hter. )
2 MR. WILLIAMS: We're going to modify that ST.
3 ( Laug hte r . )
4 MR. STORRS: John might amplify why we think that 5 our sito may not have shook as hard as some of the other 6 areas.
7 DR. SIESS: Ilow far away from the epiconter?
8 MR. WILLIAMS: You know, we're west of Cleveland, 9l about 60, 70, 90 miles, and the period is up to 20 miles.
I 10 1 There's a lino betwoon them and Formi that crosses out on 11 the Lake from us. I. don't know how far we are from that 12 lino. Formi, I think --
- J 13 DR. SIESS
- You woro about 120 miles from what I call the epiconter, perry would be about 30 or 40 miles.
14 l 15 MR. WILLIAMS: About 20 miles.
16 MR. EDERSOLE: May I ask one little question?
17 I The reintograted control system -- we' re going to l
18 be looking at another plant, as you know, shortly, where all 19 l sorts of things broko loose when the power supply to it l
20 l failed and chaos resulted all over the place. It suggested 21 that wo should settle down to certain -- well, not optimized 22 performance lotter, but it should be getting water at somo reduced rate, and it could, in short, lock into a safe and 23 l 24 stable modo, intending fixing the system.
()
\/ 25 Aro you all looking at the ICS in depth like ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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2 MR. WILLIAMS: Let Mr. Hillebrand discuss that, 3 because that's one of the nystems where we did take that l
4 into consideration. As a matter of fact, well, he'll get 5 into that. There's an interesting little sideline to this.
6 MR. EBERSOLE: That seems to be a key system for l
l 7 this particular station to do something.
l 8 MR. WILLIAMS: We have a slide on that, Judy.
l 9 You're putting your stuf f away too soon.
10 MR. EBERSOLE: By the way, is that a so-called 11 fail-free power?
12 MR. O'CONNOR: It's off with an uninterruptible l () 13 power supply.
14 MR. EBERSOLE: Does it, in fact, have to be? Is
! 15 its transient performance on loss of power supply incapable 16 right up there of switching the transient? You follow me?
17 We have found many pieces of apparatus tied to a " fail-free" 18 power supply. You find upon examining it, that they don't 19 need that kind of power supply, which is intrinsically 20 unreliable anyway. A f ail-f ree power supply really doesn' t l
21 mean fail-free. It means free of a 60 cycle wave 22 interference. That doesn' t mean f ail-free, that means 23 transient free, and it more of ten than not could be better 24 supplied with a system that an adequate transition 25 switching. You know what I mean, interruption transient.
l t
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r-7250 10 06 137 DAvbw 1 Certainly, that's one of the things you should 2 look at. Do you really need it hoped to an inverter.
3 MR. O'CONNOR: I can't answer that.
4 MR. EBERSOLE: We found out long ago that early 5 on in the systems you needed hooks that were computers and 6 clocks, if you had a stable system.
7' Go ahead.
8 (Slide.)
9 MR. HILDEBRANDT The integrated control system 10 for selected portions of the nonnuclear instrumentation, one 11 of the systems or combinations of systems in the review 12 process. We did identify a number of items -- let me just
()
13 take the first one out for a second -- a number of items 14 that require attention prior to restart and modification of 15 the plant. Such things as wire wrap termination, we 16 probably mentioned earlier. We have improvements being made 17 in the main feedwater pump run back, when we have a trip of 1
18 a feedwater pump. We're calibrating and tuning the system 19 as a whole.
20 But now this work was coming about as a result of l
l 21 our review efforts. When the Rancho seco event occurred, we 22 recognized we ought to take a look a little bit harder in 23 that specific area, and the items associated with the Ranco 24 Seco event.
( 25 (Slide.)
, ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 10 07 138 3'wDAVbw 1 This additional review work is currently ongoing V
2 right now, and this is to very carefully review the system 3 design and plant response on loss of power to the ICS and 4 NNI, focusing on minimizing plant transients. This is go in 5l and take a hard look right now before restart and make sure
, 6, we understand all the work that's been done over the last 7 several years, because much has been done in this area on 8 these plants.
l I
9 Make sure we understand that, review the control 10 ' room indications available to the operator on loss of power, 11 procedures for operator action and what the consequence of 12 the plant response would be, when the operator takes those
( ); 13 l actions, review the procedures for restoration of the power 14 to the ICS and what happens when I restore it.
15 l Do I have to take any actions before I. restore 16 that power? Based on the above-review, to identify changes 17 that may be warranted prior to start-up.
18 There's one area right now that we've identified 19 that would be most likely -- and I say most likely. I 20 expect the decision to be made in the next couple days --
21 that we will go in to change the runback behavior on the 22 main feedwater pump.
23 Right now, on loss of power to the ICS, for 24 instance, the main feedwater flow path isolates from the
( 25 block valve flows, but there's a bypass path, which is to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Covec 800 336 6646 !
7250 10 08 139 7DAVbw 1 the startup valve. The main feedwater pump failure V
2 condition is such that it would continue to feed water 3 through and into the steam generators to the startup path.
4 We don't want to close that path off. That's why we worked 5 so hard on the steam and feedwater rupture control system to 6 avoid that kind of thing.
7~ On the other hand, we don't want to overcool. At 8 the same time, in the loss of power to the ICS, we're going 9 to run the feed pump back to a lower speed, still running, 10 but it's a speed tha't it won't feed the steam generators 11 right there, if we should lose power to the ICS until the 12 operators regain control.
/"'T
(_) 13 M 3. EBERSOLE: How about commenting on the 14 reliability of power to the ICS. Can it, in fact, stand 15 switching transients? If not, why not?
16 MR. HILDEBRANDT: I can't comment at this point.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: If the answer were yes, you could 18 say, gee, I could jack up the reliability by auxiliary 19 transfers. I suspect that's the case.
20 MR. HILDEBRANDT: At this point, what we're not 21 doing is looking for -- attempting to identify in the short 22 term design changes to the basic power supply lineup. That I
23 is a little bit larger chunk than we can grab right now, but 24 longer term, we'll be looking at improved reliability, but 25 right now, given the system we've got, if we lose power, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 10 09 140 f1DAVbw 1 what happens to the plant?
G 2 What would be the minimizing effect?
3 MR. EBERSOLE: I guess I'd like to have you 4 identify. What is loss of power? Suppose I say it's 5 one-t ath of a second, and I get it back? What's happening?
6 I'll pick another number, if you want.
7 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Yes. I understand. In a tenth 8 ; of a second I don't know if I lose that system. I don't 9 think I could lose it. ?
10 MR. EBERSOLE: You know, solid state equipment 11 has some nasty response times.
12 MR. HILDEBRANDT: I dons't know the answer. Do
() .
13 you know the answer to that? -
14 MR. QUINO: Steve Quino, Toledo Edison.
15 We made modifications at Crystal River to improve 16 the reliability of power to both the NNI and the ICS. One
/
17 of the areas that we addressed was 118 volt power at AC 18 power, and we put it in in all three cabinets, NIX, NIY and 19 ICS, and our automatic bus transfer would improve the 20 reliability of AC.
21 Now the DC side is auctioneered power supplies, 22 which helps to provide a source of power to the cabinet 23 itself to improve reliability there.
24 One of the things that was added as a result of 25 Crystal River was the capability of power monitors. There's ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nanonwule Coverase 8(&33Ml646 . . _ _
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7250 10 10 141 jggDAVbw 1 a monitor on the DC side which will sense problems with 2 your plus 24, minus 24 ground, not only to alarm, but to 3 secure power to the cabinet and prevent you from having 4 indeterminate transient effects on the system itself.
5 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Have these beeb discussed with 6 you before? We're presuming this is a starting point in 7 this conversation. This work has gone on over the last 8 several years.
9 MR. WILLIAMS: That's not happened at all B&W 10 plants, though; right?
11 MR. HILDEBRANDT: That's correct. Each of the 12 plants have adjusted in some way, some to a lesser extent.
f3
(_/ 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, you' re still studying this.
14 Okay.
15 DR. REMICK: Any other questions?
16 Does Staff have any questions?
17 (No response.)
18 I suggest we proceed then with a Staff 19 presentation.
20 , We thank you very much for a very thorough and 21 complete presentation, Mr. Williams.
22 MR. DE AGAZIO: I'm Al De Agazio of the Staff.
23 For about the last three hours, we've been 24 referring to Toledo Edison providing a lot of. details about (O) 25 what they've done to improve their organization, strengthen ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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DAVbw 1 their organization to correct some of the weaknesses that 2 might have contributed to follow-up on the event and provide 3 corrective action, modifications to the system and finally, 4 the review of other systems that weren't involved, perhaps, 5l in the event, but which will provide a good basis for 6 confidence that the plant can operate safely.
7 I don' t think it's necessary for me to go into I
8 l detail of what we evaluated. We evaluated much of the 9 information that the NRC provided. So what I'll do is, I'll 10 try to be brief and try to prevent repetition, and we' ll 11 just touch upon some of the highlights.
12 First of all, as you know, the safety evaluation
) 13 ;
l report is just a draft at this point. It's been provided to 14 l the members of the Committee. It's been provided to Toledo l
15 Edison, and it has been placed into the Public Document i
16 l Room. So it is available to the public also.
17 That draf t safety evaluation report is not 18 l complete, as you know. The Staff evaluation of some of the l
19 li items is still under way. Specifically, there's a portion i
20 of an evaluation of the motor operated valve corrective 21 program which still has to be added to the report. The 22 safety features actuation system policy on modifications, 23 the evaluation has yet to be completed. There's a section 24 on main steamhead pressure control, which needs to be added, q\d 25 a discussion of the systems review and test program.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1DAVbw 1 Finally, there was an evaluation, a single 2 failure evaluation of the reactor protection system that 3 Toledo Edison submitted that is under evaluation now also.
4 These will be added into the final report, when 5 it is issued.
6 So the schedule that John Storrs provided this 7 morning that by about the middle of April these items should
- 8. be provided. The draft safety evaluadtion report identifies i
9 a number of unresolved issues. These are flagged in the 10 ! introduction to the safety evaluation report. There may be 11 more that get added to that, and I've identified 12 specifically with respect to motor-operated valve programs.,
(.
_) that.there will be some unresolved items that will need to 13 l 14 l be addressed before we start.
l 15 i There are some of the items that will also be 16 ~ acceptable to resolve following restart. The safety l
17 ! evaluation report also contains some Staff recommendations.
18 They're not requirements; however, we w'll attempt to close 1
19 out those recommendations in the final report. We've asked 20 Toledo E,dison to look at those recommendations to provide us 21 their evaluation of the comments regarding those 22 recommendations, and to the extent that it will be possible, 23 , we will include a closeout of those items in the final 24 evaluation report.
t !
25 MR. EBERSOLE: Al, on the question of the l l
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 10 13 144 7 3DAVbw 1 unresolved issues, the second item that was listed in the U
2 drart SER was steam binding of the motor-driven feed pump, 3 and you gave a section reference. I -didn' t find it in that 4 section. That's a very long section, yet I do think I 5 remember reading something about steam binding.
6 MR. DE AGAZIO: There is steam binding. We may 7 have a problem with some typographi;al corrections that 8 need to be made. We did do some rearranging of sections at 9 the last minute.
10 DR. REMIdK: When I first read it, I thought I 11 remembered some steam binding. When I went back and looked 12 at this, I was looking up some items, and I couldn't find
() 13 it, using this as a reference.
14 MR. DE AGAZIO: The concern there is'that Toledo 15 Edison did not specifically address both 8501 in their 16 course of action report, with respect to the motor-driven 17 feed pump. Their response to the bulletin for the auxiliary 18 feedwater pump will be handled in the normal procedure for 19 responding to a bullet; however, what we' re looking for 20 ! there is for an indication that for the motor-driven feed i
f 21 pump, they've taken proper attention to the bulletin and l
l 22 ' will address that.
23 24 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 11 01 145 gggDAV/bc 1 - MR. O'CONNOR: If I can respond to that for a 2 second, we've made the same modifications to our procedures 3 and our operator log sheets that we did for the auxilliary 4 feedwater pumps to the new motor-driven feedpump, where the 5 operators are taking temperatures of the auxilliary feed 6 li'nes and the motor-driven feedpwmp casing temperatures on 7 their rounds.
8 And there is a new section of the procedures 9 should that temperature get up to where it would be steam, 10 how to refill the pump and revent the system to get rid of 11 the steam. So we have placed that in our procedures.
12 ! MR. WILLIAMS: That's in the mill to the NRC.
() 13 MR. HERNON: Ron Hernon with the Staff. I'd like 14 to help you a bit. The reference in that section 3321 is on 15 page 3-66.
16 l MR. DE AGAZIO: Ron, is that the correction l
17 section reference?
18 MR. HERNON: Yes, it is the correct section.
19 'It's a long section.
20 DR. REMICK: Thank you very much.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: Question. Prior to this event, 22 the defense for continuing operation of these things was a 23 mixture of deterministic and PRA type studies of the 24 system. What's been learned in the context of the O'd 25 deficiencies in the PRA approach to this, that we have to ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 11 02 146 f'SDAV/bc 1 look at again?
G 2 MR. DE AGAZIO: I can' t answer that question 3 specifically, but perhaps Owen Fife fom the staff can.
4 MR. EBERSOLE : Is that going to be a separate 5 topic?
-6 MR. DE AGAZIO: Could you repeat your question?
7 MR. EBERSOLE: What have we learned in the PRA 8 context about the Davis-Besse event? PRA reliability. Do 9 we need to taka a look at PRA in a new light as a result of 10 Davis-Besse', as well as these other incidents that have 11 happened?
12 MR. FIFE: I'm not sure what you mean, Jessic.
() 13 MR. EBERSOLE: There was a structure of arguments 14' that Davis-Besse was all right based on deterministic 15 conclusions and then, certainly, some small statistical 16 studies on reliability of the systems.
17 What have we gotten out of that?
18 MR. FIFE: What we have concluded as far as this 19 SER is concerned is that they have " improved their system by 20 l a f actor of 5.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: I understand that. Where were we 22 to begin with? They've improved it by a factor of 5, you
'23 say.
24 MR. FIFE: Yes. They're still not in the 10 to I '
O- 25 l the minus 4, 10 to the minus 5 as far as the staff ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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I 7250 11 03 147 InDAV/bc 1 concludes now.
U 2 MR. EBERSOLE: And they were not, therefore, 3 earlier on up to 10 to the minus 3.
4 MR. FIFE: That's true.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: But it stood in that mode for a 6 long time. Was that justifiable?
7 MR. FIFE: I'd have to speak for myself, Jessie.
8 I've been pushing for certain plants to add more pumps for 9 some time. And all the staff is not in total agreement.
10 MR. HERNON: May I respond to that? Are you 11 overlooking the fact that at the time of the event, there 12 had been imposed a license condition?
(~%
(_) 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Right. But it was dragging on and
'14 on.
15 ' MR. HERNON: No, it was committed and it was 16 scheduled for the refueling outage, what was to start after 17 the event. So there was a commitment in place as a result 18 of the staff's evaluation.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: How long had that been in place?
20 MR. DE AGAZIO: It had been in place since 21 January of '85.
22 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.
23 DR. SIESS: As I recall, the EDO wrote to NRR 24 asking for sort of a review of this whole process. Has im 25 there been a response to that?. You know, why this dragged ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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l 7250 11 04 148 l 1 on so long and why things didn' t get done? Am I right about 1-)DAV/bc 2 the letter? Wasn't there a letter from the EDO to NRR?
3 MR. STOLZ: Yes. There was a retrospective 4 request to have us examine essentially what we did in the 5 past, among other things, why we took so long to arrive at 6 these conclusions. And it's a tortured-answer but you're 7 talking about backfit procedures, and you're talking about 8 j udgments regarding the cost benefits involved. And it just 9 went back and forth. The staff's efforts in arriving at an 10 appropriate basis for a backfit just never came off.
11 ,
As a matter of fact, we're still there.
12 DR. SIESS: Is there going to be a formal
- ( ') 13 response to the ED0's letter?
14 MR. STOLZ: Yes, there is.
15 DR. SIESS: What you're saying is a lot of us 16 feel that judgment might be a better basis for doing things 17 that PRA. And what you're saying is that judgment sometimes 18 becomes difficult because there are different judgments, and 19 the process of resolving them is either impossible or long 20 and drawn out.
21 Maybe we should just do PRA's which everybody can 22 agree on.
23 (Laughter.)
24 DR. SIESS: There's always a tendency to replace 25 j udgment with something quantitative. I'm not sure it's ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide CovGip 800 336-6646
7250 11 05 149 DAV/bc 1 ever any better -- but it's faster.
2 MR. STOLZ: I think, deservingly, the process of 3 arriving at a deterministic basis of what appears to be a 4 satisfactory system, there's where a lot of judgment comes 5 in.
6 Then we play the numbers game and the numbers 7 don't always arrive at a sharp cutoff point. But I think 8 we're arriving at the answer for the plant startup, that the 9 numbers that we are arriving at, whether it's the licensee's 10l or the staff's, they're good enough.
11 DR. SIESS: Effectively, you're saying that the 12 process just never got to a point where s mebody could make
(_) 13 ! a decision. It just got... kind of developed more and more I -
14 information for somebody to make a decision, but it never got up to the AD or whoever?
15 l 16 i MR. STOLZ: That's right.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: John, really, what I was getting 18 around to is we have enough of these events, John -- the 19 Brown's Ferry fire, say, the Davis-Besse, and lots of other I
20 ' things now that maybe we could compile sort of an 31 experience-based set of statistics and make a judgment on 22 what it's really cost in dollars and cents not to have made 23 , these judqmental decisions early on.
l 24 I'm not so sure but what we've lost a lot of 1/ 25 money in this business because of the inability to make a ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Covmq7 800 336-6646
7250 11 06 150 7 sDAV/bc 1 judgmental decision early on. You know, we drag it out.
O 2 I don't know what this cost to Davis-Besse, but 3 it's a lot of dough.
4 MR. WILLIAMS: I'll tell you after we get out of 5 this meeting. Okay?
6 (Laughter.)
7 MR. WILLIAMS: But not in an open forum.
8 MR. EBERSOLE: I'll bet it's a lot more than one 9 pwsp.
10 MR. WILLIAMS: It beats the hell out of that one 11 pump. What it comes down to is, at some point in time when 12 you've got this thing, somebody has got to be in charge and
() 13 ,
l have the balls to say go do it.
14 I MR. EBERSOLE: There's got to be a hammer in all 15 this place.
16 DR. REMICK: Let's proceed.
17 (Slide.)
18 MR. DE AGAZIO: There are some major items that ,
19 need to be completed before restart. These are not 20 l necessarily items on which resolution is required, but 21 there's an open issue on. These are just a checklist of 22 some of the issues that we see need to be taken care of 23 before restart.
24 The first is the resolution of the event specific G
k/ 25 problems. Toledo-Edison submitted their analysis of the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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t 7250 11 07 151 73DAV/bc 1 causes of equipment failures during the event. These are U 2 usually items that were placed on the so-called freeze list 3 by the investigating team that went out there.
4 There were either 12 or 13 items. I guess, 5 depending on how you count them. We have completed the 6 evaluation on all of them but the motor-operated valve 7 problem and the header stream, the steam header control 8 problem.
9 There doesn't appear to be any particular problem 10 with respect to the evaluation on the header control. The 11 steam header pressure control problem. And I don't think 12 that there will be any open issues on that.
() 13 l
We would expect that the corrective actions that 14 l have been identified as a result of these reviews by Toledo 15 Edison will be completed before restart.
. 16 The systems review and test program, obviously, 17 that cannot all be completed before restart. Some of it has 18 to extend into the restart phase. Some of this testing will 19 extend all the way to 100 percent power or whatever, but a 20 substantial portion of the system, of the review and test 21 program, is to be completed before restart.
22 The installation of the motor-driven feedpump is l l 23 a requirement. It is to be operational before restart. And l 24 I believe that is either completed or essentially complete.
) 25 MR. O'CONNOR: We've operated it in all modes ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
7250 11 08 152 DAV/bc 1 except full pressure.
2 MR. DE AGAZIO: Similar comments can be made for 3 the SFRCS modifications, the short-term modifications that 4 Toledo Edison identified to correct the problems with the 5 various trips and the ability to isolate both steam 6 generators.
7 There are some longer-term modifications that 8 Toledo Edison is investigating. Those are not involved 9 here. Management restructuring is substantially complete.
10 There may be some additional changes that Toledo Edison will 11 be making, but, again, most of those items will be complete 12 I before restart.
() 13 The implementation of new maintenance 14 organizatibn, that is an open item right now. A team had
.15 gone out to Toledo Edison in, I believe it was 16 mid-September, to assess the effectiveness of the 17 maintenance organization. They were unable to make a 18 conclusion at that time on its effectiveness.
I 19 We are currently scheduling a team to go out to 20 I the site in mid-March to provide an additional 21 reassessment. They have a benchmark they can compare 22 against to determine how much progress actually has been 23 made.
24 This is one of the basic items for the n
(_) 25 preparation of one of the safety evaluation reports.
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7250 11 09 153 DAV/bc 1 On this next item, completion of the analysis to 2 support installation of enhanced depressurization 3 capability, there's a little bit of confusion on that.
4 We' re involved in a move just recently and some of the 5 documentation couldn't be found.
6 Some of us recalled there was a commitment to 7 complete that before restart. Others could not recollect I
8 that commitment.
9 Toledo Edison informs me that that was not --
10 MR. WILLIAMS: No, the commitment is to get it in 11 there at the next outage, but the analysis will not be I
12 completed. The commitment is that we will have an enhanced
( ~,
) 13 depressurization capability put in that plant at the next l
14 l outage. But the analyis, you know, the next refueling i
15 i outage...thank you.
I 16 (Laughter.)
17 l MR. WILLIAMS: There's not going to be another i
18 l outage. .
19 MR. EBERSOLE: Will that necessarily be on the 20 l pressurizer tank, or might we consider - ,
21 MR. WILLIAMS: We think it may be on the high 22 points and loops. We don't know. That's part of the 23 analysis, you know.
24 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.
5 25 MR. DE AGAZIO: Finally, a side item. It's not ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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{SDAV/bc 1 really associated with the event, but there was a cost
\_)
2 supply modification which Toledo Edison has proposed. This 3 'was to resolve an issue that had been going on for some time 4 regarding the full performance of the redundant channels,.
5 safety features actuation system.
6 In the process of doing that modification, Toledo 7 Edison identified a number of wiring anomalies. We call 8 them errors, but, wiring anomalies which may or may not 9 functionally be correct. However, that has to be resolved.
10 If they are true errors, they need to be corrected be' fore i
11 startup. If they are anomalies, but electrically it's 12 acceptable, then justification needs to be provided.
() 13 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask you a question?
14 In your knowledge, do we have any plants out 15 there which, in their zeal to protect containment, have gone 16 to such methods as isolating all steam generators, whether 17 two or three, or whatever, on a PWR?
18 Do you follow me?
19 MR. DE AGAZIO: I'm not aware of any.
20 MR. EBERSOLE: I'm not either. I hope there 21 aren't many. . But we found this one.
22 MR. DE AGAZIO: Yes. The capability, it was not 23 designed to intentionally --
24 MR. EBERSOLE: It makes me suspect maybe there's 25 some more. . Cut the water off, you know, and protect the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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~gDAV/bc 1 containment at a deadly price.
{U 2 DR. REMICK: Has the staff pretty well agreed 3 with the licensee on root causes of the various specific 4 events? The failures and so forth?
5 MR. DE AGAZIO: There's been no disagreement with 6 the identification of root causes. 'The open issue is on the 7 motor-operated valves. It really is not with respect to a 8 root cause but to the extent of the program to correct it.
9 MR. JONES: Bob Jones, NRC.
10 In response to your question, Jessie, I'm not 11 aware of any that are out there. We did, however...my 12 recollection is, in talking to you gentlemen here, we did
() 13 identify systems functionally similar to the steam tube 14 rupture control system at Davis-Besse to be looked at as a 15 potential generic issue in the prioritization effort.
16 I would expect out of that review, it will be 17 assigned a priority and we'll look at it as an issue of 18 perceived importance.
l 19 j MR. EBERSOLE : It's been flagged anyway, Jones.
I 20 It has been flagged.
21 DR. REMICK: Before seeing your next slide, I 22 hear some stomachs rumbling, and so forth. Maybe we should 23 discuss our agenda.
24 How long does the staff need for their
(
x 25 presentation? Should we go through and wait until lunch is ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 11 12 156 gDAV/bc 1 finished, or should we break at some point?
2 MR. DE AGAZIO: Without questions, I could 3 probably go through it in 10 minutes.
4 DR. REMICK: And that's the staff presentation 5 then? I see. Well, if that's the case, let's proceed.
6 (Slide.) -
7 MR. DE AGAZIO: Just going through the safety 8 evaluation report itself, the management and programmatic 9 aspects, Toledo Edison has restructured their mgnagement.
10 The senior vice president reports, or had been reporting, to 11 the chairman of the board. He now, as a result of a change 12 made at the beginning of this year, reports again to the
(,.) '
13 ; president of the corporation.
14 I The management structure was evaluated against l
15 l the standard review plan, Section 1301, and acceptance 16 criteria, and was found to be acceptable.
17 The proposed merger may change some of the 18 organizational aspects, but at the moment, none have been l
19 I identified that are unacceptable.
i 20 When some of those details are available 21 specifically, the formation of the service company and any 22 other reporting changes that may take place, it may be 23 subject to further review.
24 But, at the moment, the details that we know of
(^'T k/ 25 regarding the merger...well, they'll be two wholly-owned ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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{ DAV/bc 1 subsidiaries of a holding company. They are acceptable at 2 this time.
3 With regard to maintenance, as I said before, the 4 team came back without the ability to make a conclusion 5 regarding the effectiveness of the program. They did identify weaknesses in nine areas.
6l 7 When they go back to the site in March to 8 , reassess the program, they will take another look at those 9 areas where they have identified weaknesses and provide an 10 assessment of the progress that has been made since their 11 last visit. .
I won' t say anything about procedures, the STA 12 f!
',l ,
13 j and security.- Bill O'Connor has gone through that in 14 detail. The staff has reviewed the procedural changes that 15 Toledo Edison has made and has not found any disagreement 16 l with those procedures. The procedural changes are 17 acceptable.
18 With regard to the plant review, the motor-19 operated valve corrective program is the one area where 20 ! there may be some open issues. The open issues may require, 21 depending upon the information that Toledo Edison is able to 22 provide, some additional MOVATS testing.
23 i There are six issues that the staff has 24 identified. This is not in the safety evaluation report, by 7
J 25 the way. Several of these may require additional motor-ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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2 Based on the information that Toledo Edison has, 3 they've done a tremendous amount of work on that program and 4 it may just be all that information that will resolve those 5 questions just hasn' t been provided to us.
~
6 7
8 9
10 11 ,
12
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l 7250 12 01 159 DAV/bc 1 DR. REMICK: Those are questions on the motor-2 operated feedwater pumps?
3' MR. DE AGAZIO: The 167 safety-related motor-4 operated valves. There are only two valves that are 5 involved here. However, to examine --
6 DR..REMICK: Yes, but your questions --
7 MR. DE AGAZIO: It's generic.
8 MR. SMITH: Excuse me. Steve Smith, Toledo
,9 Edison.
10 MR. WILLIAMS: Hold it. No questions.
11 MR. DE AGAZIO: I'm going to skip some of these.
12 The thermal transient ef fects on the steam generator and the
() 13 reactor vessel have been looked at. The transient was a 14 relatively mild transient. There as no impairment to the 15 components of the steam generator, nor to the pressure 16 vessel.
17 .There was no concern regarding pressurized 18 thermal shock or other possibility of damage to the vessel.
19 (Slide.)
20 In the interest of time, staf f has reviewed the 21 short-term modifications that Toledo Edison has proposed to 22 make. Their concluson was that with those short-term 23 modifications made, and with the re-analysis of the main 24 steamline break, which demonstrated that if you depend upon 25 the turbine stopvalves to close, that there is no single ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
, , _ _ _ . _ . 202-347-3700.. _ . Nationwide % __. , 800-336 4646
7250 12 02 160
- ~'DAV/bc 1 failure that could interrupt feedwater to at least one a
2 steam generator, to both generators. The steps that 3 Toledo Edison has taken are acceptable. That resolves the 4 staff's concern regarding the possibiligy$65@ isolation of 5 both steam generators.
6 The motor-driven feed pump has been reviewed. It 7 meets the staff's requirements. It's been found.
8 acceptable. They did, however, make a recommendation for 9 automatic start of the motor-driven feedpump. That's one of 10 the areas that we'll be looking to Toledo Edison to have 11 their views regarding improving that feature in the plant.
12 MR. EBERSOLE: Wha t's going to be the status of i 13 the old startup pump?
14 MR. DE AGAZIO: The status of the old startup 15 pump and restart is that they're going to be inoperable.
16 It's not even in the system at this point.
17 Toledo Edison has committed to some time in the l
18 l future put that pump back into service.
19 ,
DR. REMICK: When we toured the plant, there was I
20 !i a question about the new motor-operated pump, its location 21 from a security standpoint, not in a vital area.
22 Has that been resolved? I thought there was a 23 comment that it was not -- in a secure area, not in a 24 cubicle and so forth. And there were some security 7m 25 l questions. That's not an issue, I take it.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 12 03 161 IjDAV/bc 1 MR. DE AGAZIO: The staff has not brought up 2 security of that pump.
3 DR. REMICK: There's not a fence around it or 4 anything? I'm not suggesting there should be. But, I 5 remember somebody mentioned that.
6 MR. WILLIAMS: The valves are locked.
7 MR. O'CONNOR: We lock all the valves that affect 8 its operation and position so that the pump itself, although 9 it's not in a vital area, all the valves are protected.
10 MR. WILLIAMS: We did a study of the building 11 collapsing on it, missile hazards, and that kind of thing.
l 12l MR. EBERSOLE: In the event, through some i
A
)
13 unfortunate combination of circumstances, the motor-driven t
14 I pump, of which you have only one, doesn't answer the alarm,
~l 15 ! so to speak, can you depressurize the secondary end, I 16 guess, the water end, with otner sources of pressure, much 1
17 l lower pressure?
i 18 l You know, I'm talking about opening.
19 ! MR. DE AGAZIO: The only other lower source of 20 , water to the steam generator at that point would be by the l
21 service water system.
22 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay. So you open atmospheric 23 dump valves and go for that. Can you do that?
73 24 MR. O'CONNOR: I can answer that question. The
( )
a 25 steam generators would be depressurized at that point by ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
7250 12 04 162
?
DAV/bc 1 lining up the auxilliary feedwater system through the open 2 valves, either the service water system or the fire 3 protection system can go right through.
4 MR. EBERSOLE: You don' t think at about 200-300 5 pounds?
6 MR. O'CONNOR: As soon as you get it in there, 7 that water turns to steam, which provides the force for the 8 auxilliary feedpump.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: Sure. Okay.
10 MR. DE AGAZIO: I'm just going to skip in the 11 interest of time over some of these i tems .
12 DR. REMICK: You don't have to go too fast, Al.
()s 13 We're certainly in good shape.
14 MR. DE AGAZIO: One item on that ' slide was the 15 systems review and test program. Again, it doesn't yet 16 appear in the draft you have. Staf f has reviewed the first 17 ,
portion of that program and found acceptable the scope of i
18 i the program, the identification of the system and the 19 functions that we tested.
20 I The final report will reflect that. There may be 21 some additional comments regarding that program but, 22 generally, that portion of the program is acceptable.
23 With regard to the test procedures and the 24 results of the test program, that will be a separate report g/
k- 25 by Region III.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 12 05 163
'DAV/bc j 1 (Slide.)
2 The last slide that I had talked about the 3 feedwater and the auxilliary feedwater for liability and 4 capability to react to decay heat removal. Main feedwater 5 would really be picked up under the system of test program, 6 so I have no comments regarding that.
7 i The auxilliary feedwater system reliability was l
8 ! looked at both by Toledo Edison and by the staff. The staff 9 reviewed Toledo Edison's reliability study and provided some 10 of their own calculations and concluded that the reliability 11 of the auxilliary feedwater system has been improved to an 12 extent that restart can go forward with respect to the 13 l auxilliary feedwater system.
14 However, Toledo Edison has committed to providing 15 more detail of the reliability study. That will be 16 l submitted sometime after restart and depending on what that 17 ; study shows, there may or may not be some additional i
18 i recommendations on that.
19 l With respect to the power-operated relief valve
- 20) and the high pressure injection makeup system to provide l
21 l feed and bleed cooling, staff confirmed Toledo Edison's 22 conclusions that with makeup feed and bleed cooling is 23 instituted within about 20 minutes.
,, 24 (Slide.)
{ \
25 The final slide I have is some of the unresolved I
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 12 06 164 "N 1 items. One is the justification for not correcting some of
[GDAV/bc 2 the significant safety-related HED's. There are 29 HED's 3 that were identified. Twelve, according to Toledo Edison, 4 are to be corrected before restart.
5 There is some confusion regarding exactly which 6 12 they are. So staff would want identification of which 7 had been completed and the justification for those that will 8 not be completed at the time of restart, as to why, that's 9 acceptable.
10 Verification of compliance with Bulletin 8501, 11 which Mr. O'Connor talked about earlier, the assessment and
. 12 similarly for the assessment to improve maintenance. The
() 13 only one on this. . . I don' t think I have any additional 14 comments.
15 MR. WILLIAMS: Are those all for restart, Al?
16 i MR. STOLZ: No, they're not all for restart.
17 DR. SIESS: I thought there was an area of 18 disagreement between the staff and the licensee about 19 removing strainers.
20 ' MR. DE AGAZIO: That was one of the 21 recommendations that the staff had identified. Again, we 22 will be attempting to close that issue out with Toledo 23 Edison's response to that recommendation.
24 DR. SIESS: By recommendation, you're making a 10 V 25 distinction between a recommendation and a requirement?
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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7250 12 07 165
{ jDAV/bc 1 MR. DE AGAZIO: We look at that as being 2 potentially a backfit item.
3 MR. WILLIAMS: It's getting down like that 4 feedpump. One of these days, he's going to pick up his two 5 balls and say, Joe, go do it. Maybe he agrees with us, I 6 don' t know.
7 MR. DE AGAZIO: I think we want to hear from 8 Toledo Edison the reasons for not wanting to do it, 9 however.
10 DR. SIESS: It's not black or white.
11 DR. REMICK: There was another item in the draf t 12 SER. It says: The staff recommends that Toledo Edison
' ~ '
l 8 LJ 13 l: Company consider the establishment of an independent safety I
14 engineering group.
15 Has there been any resolution of that?
l 16 ! MR. WILLIAMS: Can I speak to that, Al? I got 17 that question. Sushil Jain is considering doing that in 18 ,
that nuclear safety group that he is heading up, as soon as 19 l he gets back to Toledo and goes back to work. And that's 20 i where it will be located. And I think he'll probably do 21 that.
22 I Are you ready to say you'll do it?
23 MR. JAIN: Yes.
p._
24 MR. WILLIAMS: He'll do it.
( l 25 (Laughter.)
l ,
l 1
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. '
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7250 12 08 166
- DAV/bc 1 DR. REMICK
- So recorded.
2 Are there other staff comments? Yes?
3 MR. STOLZ: Mr. Chairman, I think, just to 4 clarify, there were a number of areas in the report where 5 the staff made recommendations. We have requested the 6 licensee to respond to these either up or down. Either say '
7 he agrees with it or give us his reasons for not complying 8 with it. But it's not strictly a requirement. It's not a 9 position.
10 DR. REMICK: Any other questions for my 11 colleagues here?
l 12 MR. MCCRACKEN: Jessie, Conrad McCracken, Staff.
1' 13 I think one ' thing I would like to discuss a 14 little bit is the next presentation we have before the 15 subcommittee. I really don't think we want to try to bring 16 back of the licensee's people. Maybe we should just focus 17 . on the items we listed as open in the SER this trip, or 18 something like that. To not bring these people back here 19 but let them do their jobs.
l 20 DR. REMICK: Yes. ' In f act, you bring up a point 21 I wanted to mention before next week's full committee 22 meeting. I think we're scheduled...what? We have a 23 half-hour? I would see that purely as an informational
,s 24 subcommittee report to the full committee.
( )
25 I would see no need for the staff or the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
, _ , . , , , _ , , . ,c _ ,,,,,.,
7250 12 09 167 fSDAV/bc 1 licensee to be there. You're welcome to be there if you k/
2 wish. I see. That would only be informational subcommittee 3 to the full committee. And then with the prospect of the 4 full committee consideration of restart in April, I would 5 foresee a subcommittee meeting sometime before that, 6 preceding that.
7 I would_think that when we do go to the full 8, committee, I would think the licensee would want to have 9 some people there just in case to answer questions that may 10 come up from the full committee.'
11 MR. WILLIAMS: At the subcommittee meeting,.
12 Forest, would you foresee that we would come to address only
() 13 i these open items?
.14 DR. REMICK: I would certainly find that '
15 acceptable. Do other members of the subcommittee agree with 16 that?
17 " DR. SIESS: Sure. For the full committee 18 meeting, Forest, it seems that the staff is almost treating 19 this like a license application, with a full-fledged SER.
20 Usually, for that, we have had some presentation by the 21 licensee, so that should be 4 presentation of the licensee 22 and the staff.
23 DR. REMICK: I agree.
24 MR. WILLIAMS: That could be a short one, I would 25 think.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverp3 800 336 6646 __
7250 12 10 16e DAV/bc 1 DR. REMICK: It would have to be. I think we 2 would probably have only two hours, I would imagine.
3 DR. SIESS: Get up and confess your sins and show 4 your penitence.
5 MR. WILLIAMS: Wear my sackcloth and ashes?
6 DR. 'REMICK: The best estimate we have is that is 7 Thursday afternoon. Afternoon or early evening. Six 8 o' clock.
9 MR. HERNON: Forest, I had one more comment I 10 wanted to make. I don't know if there's confusion between 11 what we' re calling a draf t SER. I think there's tw) routes 12 we could have gone -- issued an SER and then a formal t'8 L .), 13 supplement.
14 In this case, I think, for efficiency reasons, 15 we're calling it a draft. But it's really comparable within 16 the scope to an NTOL. I hope there's not a reluctance on 17 the part of the subcommittee to wait until the final SER 18 comes out.
19 l DR. SIESS: When will that be, Ron?
20 MR. HERNON: It sounds like about mid-April, 21 DR. REMICK: .But I would say that whenever we 22 schedule that next subcommittee meeting, if you have 23 supplements, if there are points that aren' t even addressed 24 in here, if you have drafts of those, that you provide them 25 to us so we have an opportunity to read them.
l l
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
?R2 M71700 Narinnwide Coverane 804 33 6 6646 !
. . _ _ . - _ ~ . . . - . . ~ _ . . . . _ . _ _ . - . . .. ..
j 7250 12 11 169 f~';DAV/bc 1 DR. SIESS: The difference, Ron, is that in an v
2 SER with supplements, you would have at least stated what 3 the issues were. Here, it says to be supplied later.
4 That's the only thing I think that hangs people up, because 5 they don't even know what the issue is.
MR. HERNON:
6 I would presume we would have those 7 , portions available before the next subcommittee meeting.
8 DR. SIESS: I think the full committee would want 9 to know what the issues were and be willing to accept 10 supplement. It seems to me that once you've got that third 11 l pump in, you've covered 90 percent of somebody's concerns j
12 about restart.
,a kl DR. REMICK: That plus your feed and bleed 13 l 14 future. I know that is of concern to some people on all B&W 15 plants.
16 Any other comments by the staff or the licensee?
17 (No response.)
18 . DR. REMICK: Other members of the subcommittee?
19 (No response.)
20 DR. REMICK: Okay. Thank you very much.
21 (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the meeting was 22 concluded.)
23
,- 24 f :
25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:
NAME OF PROCEEDING: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 RESTART DOCKET NO.:
PLACE: WASHINGTON, D. C.
'f")'
DATE: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1986 were held as herein appet s, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
.J (sigt) artf6 -
(TYPED)
DAVID L. HOFFMAN Official Reporter ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Reporter's Affiliation O
o O ACRS BR EENG DAVIS-BISSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION RESTART FROM JUNE 9,1985 EVEN" l -
O l
f A. DE AGAZIO X28115 ME1 O
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O MAJOR ACTBNS TO BE COMPLETED PMOR TO RESTART 0 RESOLUTION OF EVENT SPECIFIC PROBLEMS 0 SYSTEMS REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM 0 StSTAll.ATION.0F MOTOR DRIVEN FEED PUMP 0 SFRCS MODIFICATIONS 0 MANAGEMENT llESTRUCTUltlNG WITH FOCUS ON NUCLEAlt MISSION 0 EdPLEMENTATION OF NEW MAINTDUNCE ORGANIZATION O 0 COMPLETE ANALYS!S TO SUPPORT 9tSTALLATl0N 0F ENHANCED DEPRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY 0 C0RRECTION 0F SFAS WIREING ERRORS CONTACT A. DE AGAZIO X28115 SLDE 2 O
O .
SAFEW EVALUATION STATUS SELECTED TOLED0 EDIS0N ACTIONS o MANT, GEE NT AND PROGRATATIC ASPECTS MANArRENT RESTRUCTURING MAINTENANCE PR CEDU'RES (STA; SECUP,IU )
O
~
o PLANT REVIEW EVENT SPECIFIC INVESTIGATIONS (ROOT CAUSE PIPORTS)
PEVIEWS OF OTHER SYSTEPS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY (PART OF SYSTEMS REVIEW AfD TEST PROGRAM)
THERMAL TRANSIE?ff EFFECTS (STEAM GENERATOR; PEACTOR VESSEL)
CONTACT:
C. McCRACVD' X28595 SLIDE 3 O
l
_ _ _ , . . .- . . . . . . J
SAFETY EVALUATION STATUS.
O SELECTED TOLED0 EDISON ACTIONS (CONT'D) o PLANT MDDIFICATIONS SFRCS AFWS SUFP - PDTOR DP.IE FEED Ptw O
o SYSTEMS REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM (SRTP)
CONTACT:
C. McCRACKEN X28595 SLI E 4 O
l l
SAFETY EVAlllATION STATils .
i-v O :
i o DECAY EAT REMOVAL RELIABILITY AND CAPABILITY l
1- _ ppw i
AFWS l .
i PORV/HPI/ MAKEUP SYSTEM.FOR BLnal AND FEED a
4 O
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1 l
l CONTACT:
C. McCRACKEN X28595 SLIDE 5
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SUWWARY OF UNRESOLVED ITEMS 0 JUSTlFICATION FOR NOT CORRECTING SIGNIFICANT HED:
0 VERIFY COMPUANCE M BULL 85-01 WITH RESPECT TO WOTOR DRIVEN FEED PUWP 0 ASSESSWENT OF PROGRESS MADE TO RPROVE MAINTENANCE O DEMONSTRATION OF FUNCTIONAUTY OF SYSTEMS IMPORTANT
!! TO SAFETY T) ROUGH SYSTEMS REVEN/Itsi PROGRAW
!! >0 WOTOR OPERATED VALVE CORRECTIVE PROGRAW ..
O O COMPLET)0N OF C0WPREHENSIVE AFW SYSTEM RELIABILITY 4 STUDY 2 0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TO REQUIRE OPERABLE WDFP h 0 RESPONSE TO STAFF REC 0WWENDATIONS l
_. CONTACT A DE AGAZIO X28115 l SLIDE 6 O
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ACRS/ Toledo Edison Meeting Agenda !
. February 6,1986 Joe Williams, Jr. Sum try of Mission Senior Vice Anssdent, Manet Ament Changes Nuclear Steve Smith Summary of Maintenance AssistantPlantManagec Organization Activities Maintenance Bill O'Connor Summary of Operational Activities AssistantPlantManagec Operations O John wood NuclearPlant Summary of event invest!9ation (Equipment Investigation)
Systems Director SushilJain Auxiliary Feedwater System NuclearSafetyManager Modifications and Decay Heat Removal PhilHildebrandt Independent Process Review IPRCChauman Committee Jacque Lingenfelter System Review and Test Program Operations Engineering Manager Joe Williams, Jr. Closing Remarks O
- - - - - - , , . , . . , _ . - _ _ . _ ~ _ _ , _ - _ . - . . _ . _ _ , . . , . - _ , - - , - _ , _ _ . _ _ _ . _ , , , _ . _
I
! O O O
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1 i
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Nuclear Mission Organization Seeler l Vice Prealdoet l eleases i
f Assistaat Vice President 1
Chielel80eNFeeslige j
i l -
u siew r ,,,,,, 7 f poseen cuency l~ incenessee '
Proloste i Engineering i Traiolog manie w sesser and Licesslag Assurance m nessear Services l Management i Ditoster Gro Director Ilhoster Director g, Strester L .up Director.-J L . Director.J
j O O O
! I ~ "Nuclear"~7 l'
l Engineering I Gr L _oup Director __J Nuclear l Engineering I
, Gen i
L _eral Manager __J I
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Nuclear Facility Nuclear Plant g Systems Director g- En insering j recter j
{___j i
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Operattens Nuclear Mechanicall Elect.lControls E Structural Egn. Ser ngineerint.-
- m-a Eng.leeerial- Engineering a.-
E neerlet r
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i
o O O Plant Manager I I Assistant Assistant Plant Manager Maintenance l Plant Manager Operations i I Chemistry and r-- ,
Planning Health Physics I Superintendent l Superintendent j
1 I Plant 7 Technical Support Services Manager Manager
i O O O '
I I
Nuclear Projects Director l
i l
J i
rl-, Facility I I Cost &
I Lead Proj9 cts Materials Modification Administration l Man ger l Manages i Manager Manager L _ _ . _ _1 _
I i
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- Assistant Vice President, Nuclear l
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l Personnel Administrator i
i l
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1 p-__q Intermation Nuclear Services
, Disector l Management l Director L___J i
j '
I I I I Environmental & r---i r---ir-- ,r---i Nuclear Feet Emergency g Special Programs g Computer b Manager P ness Manager g Systems Manager l l Records Manager l l Systems Manager l L___J L___JL___JL___J i
l
O l l Summary of Major Changes Within The Nuclear Mission l'
= A new centrahed Planning Cpiii at, reporting to the Plant Meri.i,c, has teen established and an experienced manager has been hired as 9;re i'r.de-n.
! = The previous Plant manager has assumed the duties
- as head of the expanding Engineering Division.
i a The Nucieer Engineering DMalon has been l substantially enlarged and is being staffed.
l 8 The position of Nuclear Plant Systems Director has O been Med by the fonner Manager of Mechanicay Structural Engineering.
I i
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l 1 O Summaryof MajorChanges Within The Nuclear Mission !
m A new Plant Manageris.in place.
a The position of Assistant Plant Manager, Operations has been established and fmed.
s The position of Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance has been established and an
+:-T: '; -c+d maintenance manager has been hired forthat position.
a The Maintenance Department has been reorganized, enlarged, and experienced personnel O have been hired forall positions, a The position of Materials Manager has been established. An exper'enced manager has been hired. Organization is functioning smoothly.
9 9
l l
l O l l
1 i , 1
O Summary of Major Changes l Within The Nuclear Mission a Position descriptions for all management positions in the Nuclear Mission were completed October 15,1985.
m All Nuclear Mission personnel, except the Nuclear Fuel Department, have been moved to the site.
a A new Quality Assurance Director has been hired.
m The previous Quality Assurance Director has
! assumed the position of Manager of the expanding Quality Engineering organization.
O a A new information Management Division has been formed to prwide better management of data processing, records, documents and conoscondence.
O
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O Summary of Major Changes Completed
= New organization structum approved. StafRng increases from 690 to 930 to mom than 990 with Records M&rs;:T.;TJDocument Control, i Procedures and reorganization of QA/QC, a Salary increases approved. 60% of increase on
! January 1,1986 arxl 40% on January 1,1987, 1
depending on perfonnance.
- On-shift SRO license bonus increased from $550 to
$800/ month; on-shift RO license bonus increased
- om s4asto sss0/ month.
O 4
l 1
O l
- , . , . - - - , . _ _ - - - - . . - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - - - - - - - - - _ - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----~ ~ ~ ~ ~'-~~~'~ - '~'
O Manning a Manning Status 644 July 1
~
739 January 30,1986 221 Vacancies 103 Contractorsseconded 68 Of those contractors seconded are engineers.
, a January Acceptances 7 Management 4 Non-management s Recruiting Assessment Process Security background check Drug screening Psychological testing and evaluation Education check l Assessment and careerdevelopment testing Personalinterviews O
9 .
i Recruiting Assessment Process a Security Background Check Previous 5-year period:
-Employment verification
-One personal reference
- Military service
- Police check u Drug Screening
^ ' ' '* * * '" * ' * * " d ' d *** * ' ' '
- P ' Y * * "' -
'O All transfers from non-nuclear to nuclear.
Positive test disqualifies candidates.
m Pyschological Testing and Evaluation MMPI administered to each candidate.
" Individual Evaluation'!--fill in the blanks.
One hour interview with psychologist.
I Candidate must receive positive recommendation for employment.
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o.
- Recruiting Assessment Process .
(Cont'd)
- a Education Check -
Higher education verified regardless of
. graduation date.
High school graduation verified if during past five years.
i Falsification grounds for disqualification of candidate or discharge of employee.
u Assessment and Career Development Testing
, O Timed and untimed tests to aii professionai candidates.
. Evaluates both capability and suitability for
- specific positions.
i Tests scored and evaluated by industrial psychologist.
6 levels of competency._
s PersonalInterviews j Technical interviews by nuclear hiring j supervisors.
Personalinterviews by Employment Department.
4 i O :
4
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Reassignment of PEP and SALP Improvement Program Activities High priority-will receive commensurate emphasis and resources:
a Prepare detailed position descriptions for new organization (completed) i a Merit Review and Salary Administration j Program (completed)
, a Configuration Management (in process)
O a Management Training (in process) e Management By Objectives (resume after restart) a Fire Protection (in process) s Nuclear Mission Procedures (in process) u QA Awareness Program (in process) a Non-outage Work Prioritization (resume after restart) e STA Trained on EDO Duties (completed)
O
0 .
1 i
Configuration Management ,
(in process) a Program Manager established - Toledo Edison /MPR.
- Program Basis:
Component / system data base.
System descriptions / design basis.
Wikfated vendor manuals.
Control of drawing and manuals.
Accurate spare parts allowance.
- O Schedule - completion by December,1987.
i 120 man-years of work.
e Prototype program -Four Systems High pressure injection.
4.16 KV electrical system.
. Instrument air.
! SFRCS.
a Containment equipment information walkdowns.
12 teams; 25 people.
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l Fire Protection Program Summary
- e interim Fire Protection Compliance Assurance i Manager assigned.
! e Program developed, action plans drafted i November,1985.
l = 30 technical and programmatic issues related to l Fire Protection compliance assigned and 1 prioritizeo. .
m Development of detailed action plans underway.
u Final Appendix R assessment (compliance i
O assessment report) with revised exemption requests to be submitted to NRC - March 6,1986.
! . m Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Report to be submitted March 6,1986. ;
s Revised Technical Specifications to be submitted 1 June 1,1986.
! = Design and modifications completed by sixth refueling outage.
- i iI O
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O -
Davis-Besse Procedures Effort Required - Approved Additional For Restart 1/27/86 in 1986 NuclearMission Procedures 17 3 59 Division Procedures Station Administrative 12 8 90 Maintenance 181 85 801 Operations 79 304 Chemistry / Health Physics 318 Sub-Total 272 93 1,513 Engineering O Environ = at=iouaiiricatioa-Test 3'
101 32 Administrative 4 4 63 Sub-Total 136 36 63 Quality Assurance 30 NuclearTraining 32 Nuclear Services 90 Nuclear Projects 20 Nuclear Safety & Licensing 15 Information Management 30 Industrial Security 5 Other FCR-Affected l Procedures 72 l
Total 497 132 1,857
! Complete 132 -
In Process 199 -
i *EQ Procedure and Schedule Requirements not yet finalized.
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Training Program Enhancements
= Staffing -
8/84 8/85 12/85 Approved Positions 24 41 54 i Toledo Edison Staff 7 35 44 l Contract Instructors 2 10 10 l 3 new employees will report by 2/86.
Additional staff is being added to support the simulator and expanded maintenance training.
O = Program improvements.
INPO Accreditation--All programs ready by 12/86.
Operator Programs-Self Evaluation Repoit.
were submitted to INPO at year end.
Remaining programs (Mechanical, Electrical, I&C, Chemistry, Health Physics, Shift Technical Advisor, Technical Staff and Managers) prior to 12/86.
Clarification of responsibilities for training functions using Nuclear Mission Procedure to be completed priorto restart.
Facilities Dedicated training labs.
New training offices and classrooms.
Plant specific simulator On site and operable by 12/88.
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! Laboratory Facilities Mechanical Maintenance Lab Area-1440 square feet Major equipment includes - fully equipped machine shop, air conditioning and ie's.eion equipment, vibration analysis equipment, valve test stand, wide variety or plant speeme itema.
Electrical Maintenance Lab Area-850 square feet Major equipment includes - motor control center, O numerous circuit breakers, soidering stations, motor generator trainer, electrical test equipment.
Instrumentand Control Lab Area-1300 square feet Major equipment i.ncludes - sophisticated LabVolt process control simulator, control rod drive part task trainer, functional Reactor Protection System channel, electronic test equipment.
Chemistryand Health Physics Labs Area-1120 square feettotal Ntajor equipment includes - speuhuphotometers, gas chromatograph, gamma ray sphiiuscopy systems, counting and survey equipment.
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Maintenance improvement Program Changes have been implemented in these broad areas:
m Organization and Staffing.
e Training.
= Maintenance Activities.
m Spare Parts and Material Control.
O = sngineering interrace and Support.
a Facilities.
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l Organization New Management Personnel -
m Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance a i & C Superintendent u Mechanical Maintenance General Foreman :
Increased supervisory personnel for each discipline:
a Superintendent a General Foreman a Lead Engineer O' = Foreman improved supervisor /craftwisan ratios:
a Mechanical,1/10 (was 1/23) m Electrical,1/6 (was 1/26) e i & C,1/7(was 1/19)
Total Maintenance Department manning: 464.
m Toledo Edison:.175 m Contractors: 289 l
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O O O Plant Maintenance Assistant Plant Manager Malalemanca I i r-- Malatenance
, r-- Maintenance
, r-- Maintenance l superinteadent l l Superintendent l l Seperintendent l l4C Mechanical Electrical L___J L___J L___J l i I I I I I I I I I Lead I & C yGeneral Foranas Lead MechankW ybord Fwoman r-- ,
Lead Electrical y General Foreman I & C F*** y General ForemanStation Services Engineer I&C Engineer Mechanical Engineer y Electrical L___J r-- 7 r-- 7 r-- 7 r-- 7
-l Traiolog Foreman l -l Training Foreman 1 -l Training Foremae ! -l Training Foremse l L___J L___J L___J L___J .
Engineer Foremse Engineer Foremen Foremen Engineer Foremen Maintenance C,g Maintenance
specialist specimet Crd Crd "s*pe'c'isn'et Crd
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Training a Each discipline has a designated Training Foreman.
m Training shift concept has been adopted.
e Training Councils formed in each discioline.
m Outside. organizations or facilities are utilized to provide training.
a Training Records Review.
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Corrective and Modification Work Orders Backlog: -
1339 Corrective work orders open on -
June 9,1985.
972 Of those closed as of January 29,1986.
111 Facility Change Requests open on June 9,1985. i 45 Of those closed as of January 29,1986.
Current:
O 4625 Corrective work orders issued since June 9,1985.
2772 Of those closed as of January 29,1986.
. 830 FCR's issued since June 9,1985.
405 Of those closed as of January 29,1986.
. 3150 Required for restart.
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O Preventive Maintenance Backlog: -
405 Work orders open on. June 9,1985.
385 Of those closed as of January 29,1986. l All will be closed priorto restart.
Current:
1245 Work orders opened since June 9,1985.
912 Of those closed as of January 29, 79'3.
At restart- no backlog PM work order s will b* "t***"d'"8-O 790 Required for restart.
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O Spare Parts and Materials Control a Responsibility transferred to Materials Manager.
New position in Nuclear Projects Division.
Onsite with Warehouse office.
m Program developed and implemented.
m Spare parts adequacy and inventory control implemented.
- Surplus identified and inventoried and being O evaluatedf rdiSPosition. ,
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O Engineering Interface and Support ,
a Engineering attendance at Plan of the Day meeting.
m Duty Manager Roster System.
- Station Technical Support Section.
m Request for Engineering Assistance Process.
Currently 75 outstanding.
Mission procedure being developed.
a Engineering support programmatically O required in preventive maintenance and post maintenance testing.
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O New Maintenance. Facilities Five-story structure being constructed.
a Adds 100,000 square feet of shop and office space.
s On schedule for occupancy-November,1986.
l Adding additional test and support equipment.
m MOVATS for testing of Limitorque Valve Actuators.
m Test system for Hydromotor Damper Actuators.
m New Metrology I =haratory with new reference O -
standards. '
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Operational and Procedural Changes Training / Administrative -
a Assistant Plant manager, Operations will train l shift operators, emphasizing the need for strict l adherence to procedure setpoints even when '
drastic actions are called for. (Began 1/30) a Pre-startup training of all operators on high priority-infrequentoperatoractions(e.g. AFPT-trip '
throttle valve). Began 12/16 except for AFPT l which will be done in Mode 3. l
! a Manual vs. automatic safety system actuation.
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= Operating philosophy requiring Reactor ;
Operator to inform Senior Reactor Operator of !
intent to manually actuate system. i AD 1839.00 modified.
m Pre-startup training for licensed operators. ,
. m Loss of feedwater events. (Began 12/16) ;
< a Loss ofICS event. (Begins 2/24) l l m Control logic and operation of AF 599/608.
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l (Began 1/20) a SFRCS changes and actuation. (Began 1/20) l 8 Control of steam header pressure following a reactortrip. (Complete) a Simulator training completed included SFRCS mock-up and manual P-T plotting (assumes inoperable SPDS).
m Other new FCR modifications. (Ongoing)
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O Operational and Procedural l Changes ,
NRC Notification -
a Checklist provided in the Control Room to ensure information provided to the NRC Duty Officer is timely and accurate.
AD.1839.00, Enclosure 6, provides checklist for Control Room operators. (Completed 11/23) e Additional training completed for personnel responsible for NRC emergency notifications.
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Operational and Procedural Changes .
Emergency and Abnormal Procedures a Symptom-based EP 1202.01 modified to:
a Provide definitive criteria for Makeup /HPl cooling.
- Correct SFRCS response verification.
m Realignment of Auxiliary Feedwater mini-recirculation flowpath.
uSiv status verification.
O m New motor driven feedwater pump operation. .
m Criteria for AFW suction transfer from service water to the CST. (SP.1106.06 AFP operating procedure modified.)
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Changes Emergencyand AbnormalProcedures i a SRO required to remain in the Control Room '
Panel area directing actions of the RO once EP 1202.01 is implernented. (AD.1839.00 modified) a Review all Emergency / Abnormal Procedures to assure clarity of instructions when unusual actions are required. (Completed 11/15) e Reveiw all Emergency / Abnormal Procedures to i
assure Control Room instrumentation is adequate '
to support the decision statsments requiring O operatoraction. (Compisted 11/15) -
a Provide manual pressure-temperature plotting capability on the operator console.
(Completed 10/30) ;
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O Operationaland Procedural Changes ShiftTechnical Advisor (STA) a Shift schedule changed from 24-hour duty day to rotating 12-hour shifts. (Completed 10/30) a STA spends entire shift within protected area.
(Completed 9/1) ;
a STA office located within 1-2 minutes of the Control Room. (Completed 9/1) i a Trained as Interim Emergency Duty Officer to ~
l advise the Shift Supervisor in event classification O and Protective Action Guidelines. .
(Completed 11/6) s New class of STA'S cusimiUy in training will be SRO licensed and part of normal shift complement.
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1 i License Exam.inat. ion l Summary '
} .
100 100 100 100 9
91 6 . h 92.0 90 0 .
91.7 91.7 89'6
- 90 - g 88 8 88.2
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- G 70 - 2 2
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- $ 30 - g -
l 20 - == m -
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0 22/24 7/7 18/18 4/4 23/25 9/10 21/22 11/15 18/23 5/5 31/33 11/12 22/24 8/9 26/29 10/15 30/34 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 4
Year initial Exams E Requalification Exams I TotalInitialExams 87/101 = 86.1%
g TotalRequalification Exams 189/208 = 90.9%
O EquipmentInvestigation i
Purpose:
Determine root cause of equipment i maNuncuons in order that appropriate and l' enscovoconecthe acuansare implemented.
Scope: TNrteen (13) areas of equipment concem l wereidenoned forinvestiganon.
i Seven @ systems wereimpacted:
- 1. AuxBary Feedwater
- 2. Main Feedwater O a Steam r.edwaterRupeurscontroi System
- 4. Main Steam iReactorCoolant System (pilotoperated reliervalve only) i Nucieer Souna Range instrumentation
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- - Equipment Investigation
! IWgthodology: ,, ,,,,, ,
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l 7 Adellesel Assess i
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Equipmentinvestigation MaiorIsmas:
A. AuxiliaryFeedpumpTurbines a installing new steam admission valves.
i e Designing for high energy line bnsaks.
einstalling new govemoron AFPT#1.
e improving trip / throttle valve reset capability.
B. Pilot Operated Relief Wlve(PORV) i
= No specmc root causeidentmed.
- Performing control panelchanges. ,
-Q s Rebuilding PORV with new parts.
- a Testing program performed / planned.
C. Motor-Operated Wives a Resetting limit switches / torque switches.
m Using MOVATS test equipment.
s Performing differential pressure tests.
a Correcting / Checking other features Pre-LLRT Stem checks Post-LLRT Lubrication checks T-Drains Current signatures l Space heaters Parts check Wiring checks Wlve design data EQ wire checks Operatordesign data O
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- EquipmentInvestigation Findinge
- DelaBed in reports generated for each of the 13 armes of concems.
Roct causes identified in the areas of:
Design unininnance Testing Pmcodures O
W Conecthe Root cause corrective actions to be done Actions: priorto restart include:
15 Design modificatione l
13 Maintenance / replacement actMties 5 Proceduraland/ortrainingissues O
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Piping Supports Walkdown Phase I-Priorto Restart -
A. Inspect and complete evaluation of 945 supports.
Three complete systems-Auxiliary Feedwater, High Pressure injection, Low Pressure injection.
Four systems, containment portion only-Core Flood, Containment Spray, Hydrogen Q Dilution, Pressurizer Relief.
Results: Inspection complete-875 NCRs.
~ 80% acceptable as-found
~ 20% minor rework B. Inspect and preliminarily evaluate ~1475 supports.
Addresses balance of in-containment piping supports. ;
Results: Inspection complete. ;
No major problems noted.
Phase Il-After Restart Complete inspection and evaluation of all safety-related piping supports prior to end of l next refueling outage. Adds 2500 supports.
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O EnvironmentalQualification Environmental Qualification (EQ) program assures that s i=/,-dst.d electrical equipment will perform their important functions under accident environmental conditions (e.g., temperature, Pressure, radiation).
EQ Program ActMtiesinclude:
a Review and upgrade of the Qualification Files.
m Review and reissue of the EQ Equipment Master List.
E Preparation of programmatic and implementing .
procedures.
O m Walkdown (baseline survey) of "as-installed" plant EQ equipment.
8 Review and documentation of to-date maintenance and surveillance of EQ equipment.
Outage Reisted EQ ActMties: 1 s Evaluation of the reconfigured auxiliary feedwater system and the newly installed motor driven feedwater pump for high energy line break and EQ ;
impacts.
8 IWodification or replacement of non-qualified EQ equipment.
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Deca HeatRemovalReliability improvement Program l
Task Force Effort a Chartered to review all systems used for decay heat removal.
Main Feed and Steam AFW SUFP SFRCS Feed and Bleed s identified changes to improve operational O
reiiabiirty and to redue. compiexity of SFRCS.
m Broad Membership u Experience in design, engineering,
, operations.
e included outside expertise:
l MPR Associates .
i Babcockand Wilcox l Cygna l
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a Reduce frequency of demand for emergency decay heat removal.
m Reduce number of automatic system responses required to initiate auxiliary
. feedwater.
- a Reduce potentialforcommon mode failure.
O e Evaluate diverse and redundant means of decay heat removal.
Goal:
m Provide equipment recommendation that would improve reliability of systems used fordecay heat removal. Specific improvements forthe AFWshould eventually achieve SRP reliability criteria.
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O Task Force Methodology a Multiple " techniques" used. -
Deterministic Preliminary Scoping Analysis Engineering Judgement Aaamment of existing PRA's a Reviewed documentation.
m Evaluated past operating experience.
4 m Interviewed Toledo Edison personnel.
O m Reviewed original design requirements.
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AFW/SFRCS Reliability Reduction of spurious initiators:
a Filter existing steam generator level signals.
mimprove SFRCS powersupply performance.
m Remove main steam and main feedwater isolation on SG low level.
m Raise ICS low levellimit.
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AFW/SFRCS Reliability -
AFW initiation to SG--improvements:
a Provide hot steam lines to AFW pumps.
m Valve motor operator improvements, a Depower CST to AFWPT suction valves.
- Eliminate deaerator suction paths.
- Disable feed isolation to last steam generator depressurized.
a SFRCS manual initiation improvements.
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O AFW/SFRCS Reliability l
AFW continuation imprec.T._.6 l ainstall PGG govemoron AFPT-1.
a Provide seal-in manual reset for SFRCS full trip l alarm. .
a Remove AFW pump suction strainers. l m Resize strainerform CST. '
s Revise AFP suction transfer scheme.
m install local AFPT trip throttle valve indication.
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l SFRCS O ManualInitiation Switches CHANNEL 1/3 CHANNEL 2/4 Tripped Tripped SG -1/ 2 SG -1/ 2 LEVEL HIGH. LEVEL HIGH o LEVEL o HIGH Trip F Trip F F F
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LOSS OF RCP'S O RCPM o LOSS OF RCP'S Trip F Trip F F F
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Installation of Motor Driven Feedwater Pump New pump design features:
u Provides > 100% capacity auxiliary feedwater flow.
m Pump discharge aligned to the auxiliary feedwater headers during normal full power operation.
m Pump suction normally from the Condensate Storage Tank.
- O = Pump manually started from the Control Room.
- Pump motor can be supplied from either emergency diesel generator following a loss of offsite power.
- a Can be manually realigned to feed the Main Feedwater System. This will be the normal alignment during low power operation. Pump i suction in this alignment will be from the Deaerator Storage Tank.
m Eliminates high energy line break concerns associated with existing start up feedpump.
m Resolves some fire protection compliance items.
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O Summary of AFWS Reliability Analysis Analysis conducted in accordance with the scope and methodology pnwided in NUREG0611.
a Events modelled Loss of main feedwater(LMFW)
LMFWwithloss of offsite power LMFWwithloss of onsite AC power aThree csd.gurations analyzed O
June 9,1985 AFWS(two pump)
AFWS at restart (two pump csir.guration)
AFWS at restart with motor driven feed pump (three pump csiTguration) m Results Unavailability of the Davis-Besse AFWS (at restart) with the motor driven feed pump is within the SRP
! 104.9 acccpiance criteria.
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Feed and Bleed Cooling Evaluation TOTAL LOSS OF FEEDWATER l FROM 100% POWER Assumptions: Power 1.02 x 2772 MWT Feedwater Main, Auxiliary, Motor driven and Startup Feed-Unavailable ReactorTrip 15 Seconds on high pressure O Operator Action RCS Hotleg initiator temperature at 6007 Makeup Flow 2 pumpsinitiated at operatoraction time PORV Blocked open at ',
- operator action time l l
Results: Core Mixture Level > 15 feet 1 (Collapsed level) 11.9 feet l l
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LongerTerm Decay Heat Removal Reliabilityimprovements :
a Provision of primary system blowdown valves for enhancement of feed and bleed capability.
- Restoration of existing startup feedwater pump and provison of Control Room capability for associated a Provision of Control Room capability for the motor driven feedwaterpump discharge valves to the AFW header.
m Further AFW valve flowpath reductions.
O- = improve AFWlevel control.
m improve margin between SFRCS and ICS low level setpoints.
a SFRCS logic revision to further minimize isolation.
m Control Room " mimic" panel for finalized AFW/SFRCS.
O N _ __ . _ .- . - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - . . - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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cavis sesse Auxiliary Feedwater System June 9,1985 8 -8 -
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DavisBesse Auxiliary and Motor Driven Feedwater Systems O start-up configuration 8 -B An ,- m%. -
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O System Review and Test Program Objectives For systems important to safe plant operation:
m identify important and recurring design, maintenance and operations problems and determine whether corrective actions are required prior to restart or can be taken over long term.
m Evaluate scope of existing periodic testing to identify any additional testing needed to ensure required functions will be performed.
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a Conduct test program to assure these systems are functional. Testing will also be performed to verify adequacy of system modifications completed during outage.
1 This program will be completed prior to restart of Davis-Besse.
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System Review and Test Program Scope Review encompasses 34 systems judged important to safe operation of Davis-Besse.
Attributes considered in system selection included:
a Performs an active safety function.
s Malfunction could lead to challenges to safety systems.
O e maifunction couid resuit in abnorm.ai piant transients.
e important to preventing, detecting, controlling or mitigating plant transients.
a History of unreliable performance.
m Associated with June 9,1985 event.
The 34 systems are listed on the following two pages.
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System Review and Test Program Systems Selected .
Reactor Coolant System High Pressure injection System Core Flooding System Decay Heat Removal and Low Pressure injection System Containment Spray Systeni
- Containment Emergency Ventilation System
~O Containment Air Cooling and Hydrogen Control System Makeup and Pu~rification System Electrical 125/250 VDC System (includes Battery Room H&V)
Electrical 4.16 KV System (13.8/4.16 KV transformers) !
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Electrical 480 V Distribution (includes inverters and required transformers)
Electrical 13.8 KV System (includes startup and auxiliary transformers)
Emergency Diesel Generators (includes "Q" fuel oil tanks and diesel room ventilation)
Instrument AC Power System (includes inverters and required transformers)
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l System Review and Test Program Systems Selected Anticipatory ReactorTrip System -
Control Rod Drive Control System incore Monitoring (includes core exit thermocouples)
Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System Safety Features Actuation System Integrated Control System /Non-Nuclear Instrumentation Security System O Control Room Normal and Emergency H&V Systems Station andinstrurnent Air Station Fire Protection Component Cooling Water System Service Water System Auxiliary FeedwaterSystem Main Steam System Steam GeneratorSystem Main Feedwater System
- Gaseous Radwaste System Post Accident Sampling System Miscellaneous Containment Isolation Valves O
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System Review and Test Program !
Appmach a" Teem"for each system.
Headed byToledo Edison engineer. !
Supported by highlyqualified industry personnel.
m Focused interviews of operations, maintenance and engineering personnel.
- Review of selected records for Davie Besse experience (E.G., Licensee Event Reports, NPRDS Data, Maintenance Work Orders, Transient O Assessment Program .Di., Deviation Reports).
s identify corrective actions for problems.
Priorto restart.
Long term.
- Prepare report including summary of system functions, problems and corrective actions.
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System Review and Test Program Test Review
- a Review periodic test requirements for each system l
i to ensure required functions are adequately demonstrated and confirmed.
m Prepare report summarizing results of test review and identifying test changes required.
m Prepare test outlines and procedures for:
l Post-modification testing.
O "** ' d'*****'"8' Revised periodic testing.
One-time tests supporting restart.
a Review results of test program and prepare test summary.
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independent Process Review Committee s Overall review of system review and test program.
m Ensure system review and corrective action process in combinaton with system and equipment testing will adequately demonstrate the operational readiness of the systems and equipment impod.iit to safe operation of Davis-Besse.
m Committee membership combines a broad background of nuclear industry experience with specific knowledge of the Davis Besse plant i
1 O d**isa-i a Concurrencewith:
! Scope and sym of review by " Teams".
System functions.
Corrective actions required prior to restart and overlong term.
! Periodictest review.
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- Test requirements to support restart.
I Test results.
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Independent Process Review Committee Membership RC. Hildebrandt -
Chairman (MPRAssociates)
R.S. Brodsky (BETA)
J.D. Carlton (B&W)
M. J. Derivan O (TED Operations)
E.C. Novak (TEDEngineering) -
J.R O'Hanlon (UESC)
L.R Simon (TED Operations) i J.G. Walker (Bechtel)
C.A. Hengge Secretary (TEDNuclearSafety)
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Determination of Corrective Actions Required Priorto Restart a Corrective actions necessary to ensure safe and reliable plant operation.
m Based on collective experience and judgment of Independent Process Review Committee considering '
s Plant design basis described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.
m Technical Specification requirements.
a Reliable plant operation. -
! O Protection of personnel, systems and equipment.
m Prudent engineering practice.
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Current Status of System Review and Test Program a identification of specific system and equipment problems requiring resolution prior to restart is complete, a System review reports summarizing system functions, problems, and required corrective actions complete.
a Review of periodic tests for system functions and operability and preparation of reports is about 75%
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~ = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --,.ca_._,, --,,-, . . .,n _ ~ ,_, g---
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4 Problem Areas identified During System Reviews u For the 34 systems -
Approximately 150 problem areas require resolution r,riorto restart.
Approxim'ately 200 problem areas require resolution overlong term.
m Resolution ranges from engineering evaluation to l hardware changes in plant.
m Facility Change Requests, Maintenance Work O "*9 " **** ' "*9 " **** ' ' '" 8 '" ** " " S ""* ' " *" "
, have been prepared to address all problems that must be resolved priorto restart.
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- Examples ofimportant
. Problem Areas Found in .
System Review a PORV not operationally qualified for environment during feed and bleed.
m Control Room Emergency Ventilation System.
i a Auxiliary feedwater discharge piping overpressurization.
i a Potential flooding of pit containing decay heat removal valves (DH-11 and 12 motor operated i O valves)-
j u inadequate ventilation in service water pump room.
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, a Lack of configuration control in Safety Features Actuation System.
! , a improper terminal wire wrap technique in Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System.
1 m improper installation for fire dampers located in ,
through wall ducts. ;
! u Widespread station and instrument air system leaks and dependence on temporary diesel air compressor.
-~w~we , w-ww v=w - rw _ywm_
O Recurring Problem Areas a inattention to heating / ventilation / air conditioning requirements.
sInoperable nitrogen regulators, e inadequate maihtenance for hydromotor actuators.
s Thacidng and replacement of limited life components (e.g., seala, elastomers, electrical i components).
'Wlve pacidng leakage.
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- Steam trap maintenance, j e I&C preventive maintenance / calibration.
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Examples of Problem Areas Found in Test Review ..
m inadequate performance testing requirements for safety related heat exchangers, a Lack of performance basis for acceptance criteria for safety related pump testing.
m inadequate leak check requirements on some check and isolation valves (both testing method and allowable leakage.)
O = Incomplete acceptance testing for RCS hot leg level instrumentation.
m incomplete operability checks of standby flowpaths (e.g., decay heat removal pump /high pressure injection pump " piggyback" alignment.)
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Examples of Problem Areas Found During Initial System Testing
- Improperty wired containment air cooler fan and
- less than designed flow capacity.
- Inadequate flow and distribution of ventilation for service water pumps.
m improper lower air pressure limit for multiple starts of emergency diesel generator.
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l System Review and Test Program Summary of Corrective Action items for Davis-Besse .
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i Reactor Coolant System PriorTo Restart -
I e Test operability of PORV actuations solenoid for extended feed and bleed environmental conditions, a Repair / replace and calibrate PORV discharge line temperature element.
- Install PORVloop seal drain line. .
)
e Modify PORV status indications.
m improve stroke time on containment isolation valve.
m Repair ieakage fr m R s to nitrogen system.
O j u Realign hot leg Rosemount RTDs to TSAT meter.
l Long Temi .
m Repair end plugs on out-of-service pressurizer heater elements.
e improve maintenance capability for RC drain tank. i l , a Repair / replace nitrogen regulator for RC drain -
l tank.
! a Repair / replace Tave digital readout.
! e Evaluate RC pump seal or motor parameters'to be
! used for securing pumps.
i a Calibrate RC pump vibration instrumentation.
e improve core exit temperature measurement capability.
m Modify pressurizer heat bank operation to handle larger heat losses.
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Qualification of PORV m Successful completion of operability qualification for PORV solenoid for conditions expected during extended feed and bleed operation.
m Test Conditions
- Testing environment at 220P and 15 psig.
. - Initial 20 minutes on/off cyclic operation.
- 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> continuously energized.
- Solenoid mounting bracket connected to O thennai source at s505.
- Solenoid plunger loaded to represent valve operation.
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Auxiliary Feedwater System
! PriorTo Restart -
s Evaluate applicable portions of November 21,1985 transient at San Onofre Unit 1 regarding check valve inoperability and water hammer.
m Install air operated steam admission valve near each auxiliary feedwater pump turbine (AFPT);
resolve associated high energy line break items.
j u Ensure operability of steam traps on AFFT steam Supply lines and periodically reconfirm operability.
!' O s Revise AFW pump automatic suction transfer i setpoints for switching from condensate storage tank to service water.
i s Resolve overpressurization problem for discharge
- piping from AFW pumps.
a install PGG governor on AFPT #1, as currently on AFFT #2; revise low speed stops to accommodate changes in govemor operation time.
i a Evaluate coincident AFW and MFP feed to steam
! generators.
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- Confirm AFW pump discharge valves will open for maximum credible differential pressure.
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Auxiliary FeedwaterSystem PriorTo Restart (Cont'd) e Remove individual suction strainers to AFW pumps
, and enlarge mesh on common strainer from condensate storage tank.
m Remove control power from suction valves FW786 and FW790 to preclude spurious closure.
m increase time delay on suction pressure switch actuation which isolates steam supply to AFPTs.
s implement improvements to AFPT overspeed trip l
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a Calibrate AFW pump flow instrumentation.
a implement controls to preclude steam binding of AFW pumps (NRCIE Bulletin 8501)
~ m Install pressure switches to detect main steam line
! breaks upstream of MS106, MS106A, MS107, MS107A.
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O Auxiliary FeedwaterSystem (Cont'd>
Longterm
{
m investigate means of monitoring for condensate in l AFPTsteam supplylines. l s Improve steam generator level control capability l when using AFW pumps.
a evaluate leaving AF3870 and AF3872 open during plant operation to further!mprove AFW System reliability.
O = svaiuste potentini for contamination from service WaterSystem to AFW pump suction.
. m improve operability of manual mechanical overspeed trip on AFFTs.
- Improve access to AFW pump #1 room.
e inspect intemals of AFW pump and turbine during next refueling outage.
- Provide accurate means of monitoring AFW pump recirculation flow.
m Improve AFW pump rooms ventilation control.
e improve Control Room board control, indication andresetlayout.
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- Main FeedwaterSystem PriorTo Restart -
a Evaluate applicable portions of November 21,1985 transient at San Onofre Unit 1 regarding check valve inoperability and water hammer.
m investigate and correct cause of power supply failures for main feedwater pump turbine (MFPT) control system.
a lmprove reliability of MFPT low pressure drainage header pumps.
O m Evaluate via testing ability for automatic vs. manual control of main feedwater pumps between 15% and 45% plant power. .
s Minimize potential for overfeeding steam generators after reactor trip by modifying interlocks
, between startup valve and main feedwater block valve.
m improve reliability of MFPT hydraulic oil system.
- Resolve apparent vibration problem on MFPT 1-1 pump end bearing (instrument problem).
a lnvestigate high pressure differential on MFPT thrust bearing wear monitor.
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O Main Feedwater System (Cont'd'i Long Term !
e Perform overall reliability study of main feedwater system and associated support systems.
u Evaluate modifii,4 ions to high pressure drain system to minimize flashing and vibration.
m Repair or replace level indicating sight glasses on high pressure feedwater heaters.
m Correct variance among MFPT turbine speed indicators.
O = ImPfave reliability of MFPT tuming gear system.
e improve flow control during feedwater cleanup ope,4;cas performed prior to each reactor plant startup.
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l Integrated Control System Non-Nuclear Instrumentation PriorTo Restart a Perform additional review of ICS and Non-Nuclear Instrumentation to evaluate plant and operator response on loss of power supplies.
m Remove and replace improper wire wrap terminations.
m improve main feedwater pump runback control upon unit trip (rapid feedwater reduction circuitry).
- Replace inoperable fuse holders. ;
a Calibrate selected control modules.
- O u Perform action plan 16 requirements.
m Modify load balance control for turbine bypass valves. ,
a Upgrade selected control modules.
Long Term s Evaluate alternatives to rapid feedwater reduction control scheme.
e improve preventive maintenance system.
m improve proportional and integrating module reponse.
m Provide additional cooling for ICS cabinets.
m Provide monitoring capability for selected ICS -
i parameters (diagnostic).
m Replace power selector switches.
m im 3 rove transfer capability for pressure inputs to CS forturbine bypass valves.
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System /Non-Nuclear Instrumentation Based on Rancho Seco Transient
= Review system design and plarit response on loss of power to ICS and/or NNI: focus on minimizing plant tmnsients.
m Review Control Room indications available to .
operator on loss of power to ICS/NNI, procedures for operator action and consequent plant response.
a Review procedures for restoration of power to ICS and NNI.
- Based on above review, indify changes warranted priorto startup.
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Safety Features Actuation System i Prior To Restart l
= Modify SFAS to avoid ungrounded power supply !
common problems by installing separate sensor channel power supplies. Accomplish by completely rewiring power supply wiring to sensor logic.
m Confirm AC and DC contact current in SFAS output relays is within design capability.
s Repair / replace surveillance light cards with O d ""9'd
- P " * "t" ' "' " "' 'i " *-
a Perform complete logic, calibration and response time testing of SFAS channels.
Long Term s Evaluate altemate surveillance card design.
m Evaluate elimination of SFAS closure of main steam isolation valves. !
e investigate spurious SFAS incident level 1 trips due to spiking of radiation monitor strings.
m improve human engineering considerations i associated with relative location of SFAS manual trips and associated mset pushbuttons (2) location of reactor coolant pump seal injection and seal return valve control switches.
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Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS)
Prior To Restart -
a Provide filtering of steam generator level transmitter signal.
m Modify SFRCS to preclude isolation of main feedwater and main steam on low water level in steam generator.
= Modify SFRCS to isolate only first steam generator for which low pressure is detected.
O - a Modify SFRCS such that atmospheric vent valves are closed by a full SFRCS trip (actuation) rather than % trip.
m Modify SFRCS to provide open signals to MS106A and MS107A for all SFRCS actuation conditions.
m Rearrange manual SFRCS actuation switches and provide protection against inadvertent actuation.
m improve Control Room annunciator indication of which steam generator has been source of SFRCS actuation.
. m Remove and replace all wire wrap terminations on logic boards and card racks.
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O Steam and Feedwater Rupture ControlSystem (SFRCS)
PriorTo Restart (Cont'd) e Relocate reset buttons for startup feedwater valves to the control board.
e improve temperature control of SFRCS steam generator pressure switch sensing lines.
m Revise labels on manual resets for indicating lights associated with steam generator level Instrumentation.
m Provide separate manual reset for "SFRCS Full O .
Trip" alarm.
m improve SFRCS power supply operation.
Installforced cooling to cabinets.
- Measure power supply loading and estimate l useable service life, a Perform engineering evaluation of and measure response time for replacement amplifier / calibration boards for steam generator level transmitters.
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O Steam and Feedwater Rupture
. ControlSystem i:SFRCS)i: Cont'd)
Longterm a Remove automatic close signals to AF599 and AF608 and leave valves open to improve overall reliability of AFW System.
m Modify SFRCS fo preclude isolating both steam ,
generators if coincident low pressure signals are '
received forboth steam generators. l m Evaluate modifying control circuitry for main steam isolation valves to improve reliability.
O = Evaluate several additional changes to SFRCS to improve system reliability and improve decay heat removalcapability a Evaluate additional improvements of Control Room annunciator indication of SFRCS actuation.
m Evaluate removing SFRCS close signals to l atmospheric vent valves.
m Establish improved record keeping for SFRCS power supplies and trend to better determine expected service life.
l m Monitor, periodically, the 125 Volt DC bus to ensure noiseis at acceptablylowlevel. ;
a Modify steam generator level instrument monitors.
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O Control Room Normal and Emergency Ventilation Systems PriorTo Restart a Modify overall control scheme for water-cooled and air cooled condensing modes of Emergency entilation System (EVS).
m Manually adjust Service Water System cooling flow to water-cooled EVS condenser to accommodate seasonalchanges.
m Replace refrigerant solenoid control valves and O instaii additionai stop and check vaives to faciiitate :
refrigerant controlfor EVS.
ulncrease cooling capacity of EVS.
e improve air distribution across cooling coils.
m install / repair gaskets on Control Room door and security room door to limit air leakage.
s Calibrate control and indicating instrumentation.
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- Control Room Normal and Emergency Ventilation Systems !
Long Term a install flow modulating control valve in service l water cooling path for EVS. !
e Further increase cooling capacity of EVS.
m Limit use of manual switches on local control '
panels associated with EVS.
s Perform air flow balance of normal ventilation system.
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= Review overall adequacy of normal ventilation system.
m Develop improved preventive maintenance procedures for entire system including dampers and actuators.
a inspect and refurbish air handling duct work and associated insulation, filters and differential pressure units to improve cleanliness conditions in control room.
m improve operator indications and ~ control regarding normaland EVS operation.
- Clean and repair humidification system. Evaluate alternate designs.
m Evaluate causes of failures of chlorine detectors and station vent air particulate monitors.
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O Service Water System PriorTo Restart u Modify ventilation for sesvice water pump rooms.
- Perform ultrasonic test of selected portions of piping and fittings.
m Resolve service water flow through containment air coolets.
Long Term a Periodically ultrasonically test selected portions of service watersystem.
O a Review service water pump shaft performance post-modification.
m Evaluate apparent increased head and flow on service water pump 3-1.
m Evaluate tube corrosion / erosion performance in ECCS room coolers.
m Modify containment air cooler valves to improve stroke time.
m inspect tubes in component cooling water heat t
exchangers.
a lmprove temperature control for Component Cooling Water System. ,
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High Pressureinjection System l PrforTo Restart a Confirm HPI pump capability at high flow, low head l conditions. :
a Confirm HPI purnp capability at high suction temperature.
8 invaaHgada standing water from unidentified ;
sources in several areas (e.g., ECCS room #1; containmentvesselannulus floor).
- Remove startup strainers from HPl pump suctions.
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= Modify HPl pump suction check valves (HP10 and HP11) to facilitate proper disk seating. .
m Verify proper op..i;ca of several HPI pump 1 component cooling water stop check valves.
m Revise plant documentation to mflect higher design pressure capability of section of piping downstream of discharge check valve HP23. ,
i e investigate increasing trend in inboard bearing l vibration for HPI pump 1-1.
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Long Term a Evaluate need for design modification to HPl pump component cooling water stop check valves to preclude " sticking".
s Calibrate HPl pdmp motor temperatum instrumentation.
- Eliminate low flow nuisance alarm on HPI pumps.
m Replace improper flow measurement orifice in HPl l pump 1-1 minimum recirculation line. :
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= Relocate control cable for AC lube oil pump for HPI !
l pump 1-1 per Appendix R requirements. l e improve communications capability between ECCS !
rooms and Control Room.
m Resolve means of leak testing for back-tc>back j check valves in HPI discharge valves.
m Evaluate cyclic life of % inch elbowlets attached to HPI dischargeline.
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O Core Flood System PriorTo Restart a Con 5nn location of level taps on Core Flood tanics.
E inepect/mpair nitrogen regulator for Core Flood tanics. ,
Long Term a Prepare calibration procedure for Core Flood tank levelinstrumentation.
m Evaluats required purge time for sampling of Core
' Floed tanks.
O = Caiibrate sampiing purge fio meter.
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O Decay Heat RemovalSystem PdorTo Restart e Install level indicating canahility for DH11 & DH12 valve pit.
m Install modified pacidng in DH11 & DH12.
m Modify procedums to preclude overpressurization of decay heat pump suction, a improve cold weather operation of BWST -
levelinstruments.
a Reinstall mis-assembled studs on decay heat pump.
O = caiierate baron dirution fio transmitter instrument strings.
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O Decay Heat RemovalSystem (cont'd)
Long Term a Evaluate means of eliminating sealed pit design for valves DH11 & DH12.
- Evaluate possible system modifications to preclude decay heat pump suction overpressurization.
m Ensure spare parts availability for BWST recirculating pump and heater. -
a Add temperature alarm on BWST; evaluate improved temperature contml.
m Evaluate altemative means of precluding over-O ranging of low range decay heat ~p ump suction g.msure gauges.
m Evaluate more easily read oil level indicators for decay heat pumps. ,
- Evaluate means of reducing lealmge fmm cyclone separators on decay heat pumps.
e improve pas.;.iUve maintenance for pneumatic valves DH13A & B. ,
= investigate means of improving disk seating for check valves DH76 & DH77. '
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O l Containment Spray System ;
PriorTo Restart a Verify torque switch and torque switch bypass settings for two Containment Spray System valves (CS1530 and CS1531) e Detennine specific ope..^sr response required !
when containment emergency sump level indicator i lights are illuminated.
Long Term l e Evaluate adequacy of oil level sight glasses for O containment spray pumps. .
m Evaluate need for containment spray pump
- discharge pressure Indication in Control Room.
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Containment Emergency Ventilation System PriorTo Restart a Provide weather shield for EVS fan controller sensing line to ensuring operability.
- Replace seals on hydromotor actuator for i
ventilationdam er.
Long Term a Provide protection for instumentation controls forfans.
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Containment AirCooling System and Hydrogen ControlSystem PriorTo Restart a Repair bacicdraft dampers for Containment Air Cooling System fans, a ConBrm proper operation of fans when shifted from
- high to low anaad (overload indication is being received).
m Bench test hydrogen dilution system relief valve.
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= ConBrm Row balancing of Containment Air Cooling System.
m Replace failed retum bend on cooler C1-1.
- Evaluate installation of flow meter in purge test line to facilitate performing surveillance tests.
e install soft seat for valve CV210 (containment isolation checkvalve.
m Confirm hydrogen recombiner is compatible with Davis-Besse system and can be made operable within required time.
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.O Makeup and Purification System PriorTo Restart a Repair or replace failed containment isolation valve MU33.
m Remove any startup strainers in system.
s Confirm conectvalve trim in MU32.
m Repair or replace lealdng reactor coolant letdown pressure reducing valve (MU6) and controls.
- a Provide indicator of makeup flow for use during feed and bleed operations.
O " Remove inoperable and unused reactor coolant pump (RCP) sealleakageindication.
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O Makeup and Purification System (Cont'd) ,
Longterm a Repair / replace leaking reactor coolant batch makeup flow control valve, MU39 (currently isolated).
m Repair / replace batch controller.
m Repair minor oil leaks on makeup pumps. ;
- Evaluate and repair leaking valves MU19 (RCP seal injection valvs) and MU216 (RCP seal injection O """" *')-
a Evaluate and repair boronmeter.
m Perform review of problems with hydrogen system (for maintaining makeup tank overpressure).
m Repair MU1903 (Cation domineralizer inlet isolation valve).
m Repair / replace seal injection stop check valvest a Replace letdown block orifice.
s lmprove communications capability between makeup pump room and control room.
m Evaluate intended function of boron permissive light.
m Perform review of failure modes of makeup system equipment (e.g., power supplies) and ability of operators to recognize problem and take corrective action.
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O 250/125 Volt DCSystem !
PriorTo Restart aNone Longterm a lmprove temperature control in battery room.
e improve ground fault detection and location.
m Evaluate design change for low wiinge relays to reduce failures.
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i 4160 Volt AC System PriorTo Restart a Confirm operability of several breakers with original levering-in device.
m Replace CVE synchrocheck relay with different design. '
s Resolve tap setting for 4160/480 Volt transformers and reset alarm accordingly.
Long Term a Review consequence of paralleling bus tie O '
""*' '**'" ut- f-Phase.
s Visually inspect all 4160 Volt breakers in "Q" cubicles for"E'4fng damage.
m Control norWQ" 4160 Volt breakers to ensure they are not utilized in essential applications.
m Provide improved control of circuit breaker and relay setting records.
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O 480 Volt AC Distribution System PriorTo Restart l e Confirm operability of switchgear cabinet door and stab withdrawal interlocks to ensure 480 VAC '
breakeroperability. ,
- Long Term a Evaluate removal of stab withdrawal interlock i feature.
l 8 Evaluate attemative means of providing ground fault protection for 480 Volt AC motor control -
O - 'n**'5-e Establish program for tracking limited life components in motor control centers.
e improve preventive maintenance on switchgear cabinet door hardware and gasketing.
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0 13.8 KV System PriorTo Restart a investigate cause of fast transfer breaker failures and calibrate relaytiming.
Long Term i e improve method for racking in/out of 13.8 KV breakers.
m Repair small oil leak in Auxiliary Transformer.
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O 120 VoltInstrument AC Power PriorTo Restart -
a install larger power rating resistors in essential inverters YV1, YV2, YV3 and YV4.
Long Term ,
a Install ventilation fans for inverters.
- a Evaluate installation of static transfer switches and/or tank circuits to reduce potential for losing an inverter when a ground fault occurs.
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Emergency Diesel Generators PriorTo Restart a Eliminate electrical noise problems associated with diesel govemor to improve stability.
8 improve temperature control for diesel generator room by changss to control / alarm system and l
maintaining ventilation damper actuators.
m improve reliability of lubricating oil soak back Pumps.
Replace set.
l Check condition of filters and strainers, b u Tiest multiple air start capability of diesel generator.
m Calibrate low cooling water flow alarm switch.
m investigate cause of SCR diode failure nuisance alarm.
m Minimize ice buildup on diesel generator air intake.
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O Emergency Diesel Generators (Cont'd) .
Long Term a Evaluate impic.:.T. .e. to diesel generator air start system and improve reliability of air compressors.
m implement improvements for emergency diesel fuel oli system.
m Replace cooling waterflow gauge.
a Perform evaluation of overall improvements to diesel generator air intake configuration.
' O " 2* P' d'***' 8'"'*' 'P'*d "ad "'**'
frequency controlcapability.
m Correct erratic bearing temperature indications for dieselgenerators.
e improve Control Room / diesel generator room communications capability.
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O Anticipatory Reactor Trip System PriorTo Restart a Evaluate adequacy of no actuation of annunciator alarms when ARTS cabinet door is open.
, Long Term ,
a Modifylamp test circuit.
m Provide labeling to minimize problems in correlating channel and breaker designations.
m Evaluate separating ARTS channel signal inputs to computer to facilitate determining which parameter O '"'"*d "" A' " *'*
, a Review main turbine stop valve testing as potential
! source of spurious low pressure ARTS trips.
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O Control Rod Drive ControlSystem PriorTo Restart a Determine improved power supply fuse size and l
- design; pedviisi inrush cunent and current l waveform test.
a improve cleanliness of CRDCS cabinets to reduce l contactfouling problems.
m Ensure adequate forced air cooling of reactor service structure.
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O Anticipatory ReactorTrip System PriorTo Restart a Evaluate adequacy'of no actuation of annunciator alarms when ARTS cabinet door is open.
Long Term ,
a Modifylamp test circuit.
m Provide labeling to minimize problems in correlating channel and breaker designations. ;
e Evaluate separating ARTS channel signal inputs to i computer to facilitate determining which parameter O initiated an ARTS trip. !
a Review main turbine stop valve testing as potential l source of spurious low pressure ARTS trips.
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Control Rod Drive Control System (Cont'd)
Long Term I
e Evaluate attemate control rod direction error circuit design.
a Evaluate control rod motion momentary interrupt l circuit. '
s Review overall service structure cooling design.
e improve power cable mating and handling procedures.
( a Evaluate use of higher temperature silicon power l l
O cables. -
l m inspect all control rod leaf spring anti-rotation j devices at each refueling outage.
- m Evaluate improved control rod drop time test techniques.
e To preclude low vcitap problems, check voltage output of CRD transforme s frequently; clean and inspect Inductrol voltage iagulator and lubricate motor-generator set every refueling outage.
i a Determine long-term resolution of CRDM nozzle l flange leaks.
I a Evaluate means of minimizing occurrence of low insulation resistance in CRD stators.
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Incore Monitoring System PriorTo Restart a Detennine proper correction factors for neutron i
detectors
- Long Term ,
e improve reliability of incore neutron detectors for 15% to 30% reactor power.
m Evaluate need for two incore instrumentation multipoint recorders.
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i Reactor Protection System j PriorTo Restart l a Repair / replace defective components in NI Soume Range string contributing to erratic noise and less of signal problems.
a install eiectronic filters on reactor coolant flow transmitters to reduce flow turbulence noise.
Long Term a Evaluate Technical Specific.iion ctarge to permit placing a defective channel in manual bypass.
1 O = Evaluate providing more reiiabie power range signal to integrated Control System.
m Eliminate noise spikes in NI Source Range channels apparently due to door alarm switches on i
RPS cabinets.
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O Security System.
PriorTo Restart a Evaluate / modify security requirements to improve operatoraccess.
m Review electrical loads on uninterruptible powersupply.
m Revise procedures in evo*,t of loss of ventilation to Central Alarm Station.
Long Term a Perform evaluation of several operational / reliability O improvements forsecurity system.
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Station Air and instrument Air Systems PriorTo Restart I e isolate and repair leakage in Station Air and
'l Instrument Air sytuims to maximum practical extent. ,
s Perfonn required station air compressor preventive
. maintenance.
m Test se#nts of control valves used to maintain instrument air header pressure in the event of station air system failure.
O e Revise procedures and testing to identify the temporary diesel air compressor as the backup air
. supply.
m Provide improved reliability of diesel air compressor during inclement weather.
m Procedurally blow down drains from SA28 to remove accumulated moisture in station air system.
m Provide filtering of air supply through SA2010 to minimize debris accumulation.
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O Station Air and instrument Air Systems (Cont'd)
Long Tenn a Perform engineerlig study of Station Air and instrument Air systems to evaluate several areas for
- ' impnwing overall reliability e.g., required emergency air ciompressor (size; isolable vs. non-i isolable loads; need for 100/100 psig regulators; I leakisolation flexibility). i e install moistute trap on SA28 to improve draining.
m Segregate air intake and diesel exhaust for diesel ,
O . air compressor.
s Modify Station Air and instrument Air systems to '
prevent dumping system air to atmosphere when the dryers are bypassed. l m increase frequency of dewpoint check on ,
instrument air receiver to detect unacceptable moisture leakage from station air headers to instrument air headers; install permanent air dryer i around IA408.
- Evaluate providing capability to start station air compressor 1-2 from Control Room.
m Install flow meter to permit trending of air system
- degradation.
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Main Steam System PriorTo Restart a Refurtzish and check setpoints for all main ste am safetyvalves(MSSV's).
, a instail lift stop collars on "R" orifice MSSV's. l l s install lateral snubber on "A" main steam header. l 8 Recalibrate atmospheric vent valve controls.
m Administratively require plant shutdown if both 1050 psig setpoint MSSV's on a header are inoperah!a. l m Tee annaller inlet bore size for MSSV's. !
O = Establish leak rate for testing of main steam non-nytum valves.
. Long Term ainstall MSSV monitoring system.
m improve mechanical design of main steam isolation valve position switches, a investigate increased noise and general vibration with full arc admission to main turbine.
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O Component Cooling WaterSystem ;
i PriorTo Restart a Functionally test CCW pump room ventilation fans.
m Repair or replace nitrogen regulator for CCW surge tank. ,
Long Term u Acid CCW room ventilation fan periodic test.
a implement attemate pressure control for CCW j
- surge tank.
- a Rx smalloilleaks on CCWpumps.
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l Station Fire Protection '
PriorTo Restart -
a Provide audible fire alarm in Control Room.
- Provide fire watches for areas affected by improperly installed fire da.mpers.
Long Term a Maintain fire alarm location backup on security computers.
- Revise cimuitry for ionization smoke detectors to avoid spurious alarms.
O a Evaluate improving testing and maintenance accessibility of several smoke detectors and temperature switches.
l m Resolve operational problem with ionization smoke dciector installed above control rod drive breakers.
- Complete fire protection enhancement program on l
schedule consistent with Appendix R commitments.
l = Provide time delay for diesel fire pump start to minimize unnecessary starts while the electric fire pump brings up system pressure.
- Resolve power supply problems with Viking fire panels.
- Modify fire alarm display in Control Room so that
, both panel number and zone number are provided.
a Replace / modify improperty installed ventslation duct fire dampers.
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O Control Rod Drive Control System PriorTo Restart a Determine imptowed power supply fuse size and design; perform inrush cunent and current waveform test.
e improve cleanlihess of CRDCS cabinets to reduce contactfouling problems.
m Ensure adequate forced air cooling of reactor service structure.
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O i Steam GeneratorSystem PriorTo Restart a Provide engineering analysis regarding acceptability of having exceeded procedural pressura/ temperature limits during testing.
Long Term a lmprove inllability and accuracy of steam generator
- shell thermocouple temperature readings.
m Evaluate modifications to condenser steam jet air ejector radiation monitors.
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Gaseous Radwaste System l PriorTo Restart -
a Revise Station procedures to require periodic sampling of Clean Waste Receiver Tanks for oxygen and hydrogen upon failure of monitors. ,
Long Term a Eliminate air inleakage to Gaseous Radwaste System.
m Evaluate redundant oxygen and hydrogen monitors on Waste Gas Surge Tank and Clean Waste -
ReceiverTanks.
, a Evaluate relocation of oxygen / hydrogen monitors for the Clean Waste Receiver Tanks to minimize maintenance personnel radiation exposure.
, a lmprove ni^uugen overpressure control on waste t
gas tanks.
m Obtain reliable operation of degasifier.
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Post Accident Sampling System PriorTo Restart -
u Perfonn overall operability testing to confirm adequacy of several pnwious design changes.
i a Conact several component maintenance
! deficiencies (e.g., sample pump diaphragm l replacement; flowmeter replacement).
m Conduct additional training of Chemistry and I Health Physics personnel.
i O e Confirm time and motion study for taking samples WW addresses system design changes.
- Long Term s Evaluate attemate PASS isolation valve designs to ensure adequate isolation.
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l System Reviewand Test Program Objectives k systems important to safe plant operation:
l m identify important and recurring design, maintenance and operations problems and determine whether corrective actions are ^
required prior to restart or can be taken over long term.
m Evaluate scope of existing periodic testing to
, identify any additional testing needed to
! ensure required functions will be performed.
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s Conduct test program to assure these systems are functional. Testing will also be performed to verify adequacy of system modifications completed during outage.
This program will be completed prior to restart of Davis-Besse.
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- System Review and
- Test Program Test Review a Evasuste each system important to safe plant operation considering the effects of modifications made during the outage.
8 For each system function important to safe plant operation;
- 1. Identify existing periodic tests which adequately demonstrate the' function i
! or i
O 2. Prepara outlines for new or revised test which willWM demonstratethe function 1
or i
- 3. Provide Justification that the function cannot or should not be tested prior to restart. -
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- Document the results of this evaluation for review l by the independent Process Review Committee.
! e Independent Process Review Committee concurs i with scope of testing to be performed.
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Restart Tests To Be Conducted Preliminary results of the test review have identified:
154 Existing periodic tests to be
, performed priorto restart to demonstrate system functions.
92 New or modified periodic tests or
- one time tests necessary to i demonstrate functions including O tests required as a resuit of modifications.
7 Integrated tests to demonstrate
- system functions involving multiple .
, systems.
i 253 TotalTests 1
m Average test duration is approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> excluding test setup time.
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O Restart Test Program Approach a Use existing station administrative procedures to implement and control the restart test program to the extent possible.
m New procedures developed to control activities unique to the restart test program include:
! Organization structure, functions, and
.Wblities of the various groups and committees supporting the system review and test program.
O oeveiopment of test proceeu,es for new or i
modified tests:
! Independent Process Review Committee concurs with scope.
j Joint Test Group approves test procedures.
Station Review Board and Plant Manager approve test as usual.
Conduct of new or modified test by special test l organization.
Results of all test conducted to demonstrate :
functions important to safe plant operation to be reviewed by Joint Test Group and Independent Process Review Committee.
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! System Review and Test Program (SRTP)
- Organization l
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, Ceaummee Seulee8V Sseep !
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- Restart Test Organization i
l Joint Test Group Independent Process
! Review Committee
- Approve Te:;t Procedures j . Approve rest Outlines
- Approve Test Results
! . Approve Test Summary
- Maintain Test index Results
- Schedule (Input) l i
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i != . Prepare Test !
j Precedures
.Osalify Test Personnel .......................................!
einiplesnest Test i .Sununarize Test Results
. Schedule Tests l
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- Assistant Test Manager 4
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I Re:ults Review Planalag and M Test Precedure Writers Test Leaders 4 Coordinator Scheduling Ceardinator I
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13 Areas of Equipment Concem S
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1 O Main Feedpump Turbine (Mr re s)
Concem: Overspeed tripping of MFPT1-1 initiated a plant runback.
Findings: Failedcircuit board capacitorin GeneralEsctric controlsystem.
Corrective 1. Replace faulted board.
I Actions: 2. Check and test control circuits for i
both MFPT 1-1 & 1-2.
Generic None problemisspecific to MFPT O implications: controlcircuits.
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Steam Feedwater Rupture ControlSystem(SFRCS)
Concem: SpuriousSFRCS actuation closed both main steam isolation valves and Isolated steam to main feedpump turbines.
A Findings: Turbinetrip caused pressure
' oscillations which SFRCS detected as low steam generatorlevel. Level pressure tap was made moresensitive due to transmitterchangeouts.
O Corrective Add electronic Mering to signals.
Action:
- Generic increase in sensitivity / response can I implications
- result due to transmitter changeouts.
Installing filteringin Reactor Protection System flowtransmitter circuitry.
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Auxiliary Feedpump i Turbines I
Concem: Both auxiliar/feedpump turbines
- ' tripped on overspeed-this pnwented supply of waterto steam generators.
. Findings: Condensationinlong steam inlet lines disrupts proper turbine control.
Corrective 1. Keep lines hot with steam to Actions: greatly reduce waterformation.
- 2. Increase steam trap capability.
- 3. Improve govemor controls.
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- Generic None no otherquickstartsteam
! Implications: ddven turbines.
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Auxiliary Feedpump Turbine l Trip andThrottle Valves
! Concem: Operators experienced problems l 1 resetting the valves-delayed j initiation of auxiliaryfeedwaterto j steam generators.
!' Findings: Procedures and priortraining not sufficient.
Corrective 1. Provide improved hands on training.
Actions: 2. Provide placards and local indicators on T&TV to help' operators.
O s. enhance communication.b.tw.en pump roomsand from pump rooms to Control Room.
Generic Other crucial operator actions performed l Implications: locally. Covered i:y Operator Actions review.
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Auxiliary FeedwaterValves AF 599 and AF 608 Concem: Valvesfailed to open on demand afterclosing earlier-would have prevented auxiliary feedwater flow.
Findings: Motoroperators on valves were not propertyadjusted allowing valves to " torque out".
Corrective 1. Readjust AF 599 and AF 608.
Actions: 2. Evaluate and readjust other
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O 3. Test valve operations.
- 4. Provide new maintenande procedures.
Generic: Appiable to othermotoroperated implications: valves '
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Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV)
Concem: During transient PORYfailed to !
close property afterthird opening
-closure of the blockvalve isolated the PORV andit resented.
Findings: No physicalevidence found to explain improperclosure-foreign materialin pilotcannot be ruled out-performance O similartoindustry experience. -
Corrective 1. Testing of valve-old/new.
Actions: 2. Add acoustic monitorflow indicationlight on PORV control panel.
- 3. Change PORVannunciator light from white to red..
- 4. Improve panellabeling of solenoid open/close switch.
- 5. Provide for PORV exercising during shutdowns.
Generic None-no valves of similar '
implications: design.
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Main Steam Headem Concem: After closure of main steam isolation valves, pressure controlproblems were experiencedin the main steam headers.
Findings: Manuaiactuation of atmospheric vents valves (AW)causedlarge :
pressure dropin header #1 - AW contmlcircuitryon header #2is a
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lesserconcem. Switch contacts O * 'r ded n iCS moduie.
Conective 1. Fullcheckaxat and adjustment of Actions: MV controlcircuitry. '
- 2. Testing and mfurbishment of main steam safetyvalves.
- 3. Refurbishment ofICS modules for AW circuitry.
Generic Switch contacts being evaluated and implications: refurbished on otherICS modules.
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Main FeedwaterStartup Control Valve-Concem: Operators were uncertain of status of control valve SP-7A due to blown light bulb.
Findings: Valve operated properly - technician inserted incorrect voltage lamp during event.
Corrective Provide additionalinformation to Action: operators.
O Generic None-no significant findings.
Implications:
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-O Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
- 1 Suction Supply Concem: Pump suction transferred from -
normalto backup watersupply about l 20 minutes afterreactortrip. .
Findings: Noimpactto steam generator-transientlow suction pressure caused transfer.
Corrective 1. Revise strainerarrangement.
Actions: 2. Revise transfer switch setpoints.
- 3. Provide time delay.
O aeneri, ogne, pomp suction t,ansfer systems.
Implications:
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O Main Steam Valve MS-106 Concem: Wlve position indication recorded as closed to not closed to closed in about one-third the sq3eved time-this valveis used toadmitsteem from :
steam generator #1 to auxiliary feedpump turtaine #1.
Findings: Motor opes.ioron valve was not -
property adjusted.
corrective se.djust, inspect, and test voivo.
O Action: -
Generic Othermotor operated valves.
Implications:
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O NuclearInstrumentation Neutron Source
. Range Detectors Concem: Prior to event NI-1 was inoperable and NI-2 failed during transient - previous problems had been experienced.
Findings: NI-1-ir) adequate grounding of shield found at preamp due to paintandlack of starwashers.
NI-2-intermittent failure of containment penetration cable center i
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THax cable connectorsalso found degraded in each detectorstring.
Corrective 1. NI-1-proper ground established.
Action: 2. NI-2-teplacing penetration / module.
- 3. Replacing / refurbishing connectors as required.
Generic Preventative maintenance program implications: needed for source range, intermediate range, and power range connectors.
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. Turbine Bypass Valve Concem: Pneumatic actuator assembly cracked and failed during cooldown operations several hours following reactortrip.
Findings: Intemalvalve components became disengaged and caused hammerblow forces which damaged actuator.
Corrective 1. Repair damaged valve.
O Action: 2. Repair steam traps and drains. ,
- 3. Refurbish otherturbine bypass valves.
- 4. Revised operating procedure to assure properdrainage of headers.
Generic Appilos to both turbine bypass valve implications: headers.
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Safety Parameter Display .
System (SPDS)
Concem: Both SPDS Control Room display devices were inoperative during event -
theyareintended to be used by the operators during transients.
Findings: Bad fiberoptic cable and faulty terminations on data transmission.
cable.
Corrective 1. Use spare cable.
Q Action: 2. Correct terminations.
- 3. Replace obsolete terminal.
Generic None-no otherfiberoptic systems.
Implications:
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