ML20129B066

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Transcript of 850614 Interview of R Walleman in Oak Harbor,Oh Re 850609 Event.Pp 1-114
ML20129B066
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 06/14/1985
From: Walleman R
TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8507290060
Download: ML20129B066 (120)


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{{#Wiki_filter:. - -. . . - - . . . . . . . - . 1 (g. 1 BEFORE THE FACT FINDING TASK FORCE

; \/

2 OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

3 - - - - -

l [ 4 5 ,Re:  : 6 Davis-Besse crent  : i

               -7                       of June          9, 1985                       :

1 s .- - - - - J 4 9 INTERVIEW OF RICHARD WALLEMAN 4 10 .. . - - - 11 Interview of Richard Walleman by the 12 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Fact Finding Task- , O 13 Force, taken before me, . .< i m E. Snyder, a Registered j 14 Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for 15 the State of Ohio, at the Site Emergency-Operations , 16 center, Davis-Besse.Nuclaar-Plant,-Oak Harbor, Ohio, 1 17 on Friday, June 14, 1985, a t 9 :12 o' clock a.m. 18 - - - -- -- I 19 20 4 J 4 21-22 i j 23 8507290060 850614 PDR ADOCK 05000346'- - _O j V 24 T PDR I RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 + COMPUTERIZED. TRANSCRIPTION

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4 2 fy 1 APPEARANCES:

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4' '3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4 Office of the Executive Legal Director 5' lia s hi n g to n , D. C. 20555  ! i 6 By Mr. Stephen Burns, 7' 8 On behalf of the Commission. t 9 10' 11 MEMBERS OF~THE TEAM: 12 Wayne Lanning 13 Larry Bell

14 J. T. Beard 15 Ernie Rossi

, ~16 , 17 18 ALSO PRESENT:

                 -19                  Louis Simon 20

, 12 1 - -- - - - 22 f 23

6 ,

O 24 RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477

                                         ' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i

4 3 (~S 1 Friday Morning Session V 2 June 14, 1985 3 9:12 o' clock a.m. 4 - - - - - 5 MR. BEARD: Okay. This is a meeting of 6 the NRC Fact Finding Team. My name is J. T. Beard. 7 Dr. Rossi is not with us at the moment, but we 8 expect that he may be able to join us in a few 9 minutes. 10 The other people in the room are Larry 11 Bell of the Fact Finding Team, Wayne Lanning on the 12 Fact Finding Team, and Steve Burns, who is y 13 supporting the Team. 14 We have with us also in the room Rick 15 Walleman, Richard Walleman, and he has asked to have 16 present Mr. Louis Simon. And here we are. 17 The purpose of this meeting is to talk to 18 Rick and have him~ explain from his perspective as a 19 reactor operator who was in the control room on the 20 night of the event here at Davis-Besse on June 9 21 what he saw, what he did and things of that nature. 22 This is a fact finding trip. We are not 23 focusing on any compliance-type matters. We are im () 24 just looking for facts so we can understand what RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

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u_ , 4 i L 4-l l' h'a p pe n e d , and, secondly, and la ter we are looking to [ 2 ' why' things happenad. 3 I guess I.should mention that-with regard a

4 -to the transcript and your presence, our. plans and 5 intent. a t the moment.are that'sometime later when r -
                      .6       they are available, you will be allowed to review 7       the transcript to idenitify: thingsiwhere maybe.the I'                     ~8    . transcript is inaccurate'from what you said in an-

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9 addendum fashion.

j 10 ,Then there will be a revised document.

                    'll     >available, and we intend at this time to make that i                                                                                                               z j                     12'       document available to you for a period of days if.

l' ()-

                    -13        you should'want to' refer. back tofit for some' reason.

14: You could: come, contact the Team, let us { , 15 know .you;would like to see,something'for~whatever ( 16 reason, . de will make it availableEto you. 1 17 We intend to - re t,a in a ll ' the copies of all

18 the transcripts until such. time as we have completed i

i: ,19 all of our interviews ~with the operating staff'as a j.

:20 package'and gone through'this process of~~ review and
                    '21
                              ' corrections, and'then we would' intend when-they are 22         there to release those-transcripts so-that for your                            ,

} 23 . interview you.would get aEcopy.directly forsyour use. , m

     ,( )            24'                         And they will-be available to the Toledo' RUNFOLA & ASSOCI TES (614)445-8477 l            ,                                      COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 4

i 1 5 3 1 Edison Company and the-general public at that time (~J s_ 2 as a package, okay. Do you un'erstand d that? 3 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes. 4 MR. BEARD: Do-you have any questions? 5 MR. WALLEMAN: No. A little nervous but 6 no. i 7 MR. BEARD: Tha t's perfectly normal. I 8 .think, for the record, we should say-that Rick'is 9 here without notes, diagrams, et cetera, so he will 10 be speaking from mamory. Okay. 11 Maybe we should start, Rick, as we have 12 with the other folks, with you. introducing yourself,

     ) 13   tell us what your present function is, things like 14   how long you have been with the company and a minute 15   or two about background.

) 16 MR. WALLEMAN: Okay. My name is~ Richard 17 Walleman. I have been with Toledo-Edison for 18 approxima tely Live years. I have been licensed 19 since January. 20 MR. BEARD: January of this year? 21 MR. WALLEMAN: Of this year. This was my. 22 first trip and unfortunately it_was rather difficult, 23 but I work in a control room with Brian Young, and () 24 we worked together'since I have'been qualified. RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION d

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6 1 I was in the Navy eight years before I 2 came here at nuclear power. 3 MR. BELL: Rick, did you come up through 4 the operator ranks? Were you an equipment operator? 5 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 6 MR. BELL: And you worked in both the 7 turbine building and the auxiliary building so you 8 were very familiar with the units before you 9 qualified as a reactor operator in January? 10 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 11 MR. BURNS: Can we go off the record. , 12 (Discussion held off tne record.)

  ,]'

13 MR. BURNS: Back on the record. 14 MR. BEARD: We apologize for the 15 interruption. oG o ahead with what you were saying. 16 Did you have any more to add? 17 MR. WALLEMAN: No. 18 MR. BEARD: Okay. The way we'have done it 19 with the other folks that we have interviewed.is 20 sort.of say you came on shift at a certain time and 21 when you arrived there were certain plant conditions 22 and'if you could elaborate on those and then I guess 23 if nothing~ unusual happened then we-can jump in time f) v 24 to about the time the transient started and pick up RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION I I

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         .1 with the first things you became aware of sometning 2 . unusual was beginning to nappen and just sort of go 3 through it.      Is that okay?

4 MR. WALLEMAN: Okay. The when I came in 5 we were working midnights. This was our second 6 midnight. 7 When I came in on midnight, part of our j 8 procedure is to walkt around the panels'and look at 9 the alarms that we have in and review the logs and 10 then get a turnover from the reactor operator that 11 was on shift at the time. 12 And when we came in, the plant was at 90 . 13 percent power, which is mode one, and the -- we had 14 a restriction in power to 90 percent so we wouldn't 15 be changing power that night. 16 And no other important things stick out in 17 my mind at the moment. I 18 MR. BEARD: Did you have any, I don't want i 19 to say abnormal, but special conditions rela ted to 20 the control of the main' feed pumps? 21 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, we had two main feed-22 pumps and one of,them was in automatic moda, number 23 two, or number one was in automatic mode and number (( ) 24 two was in manual mode. And we had special RUNFOLA &-ASSOCIATES (614)445-3477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

i l 8 r 1 instructions regarding if we had a trip what we were ($) 2 supposed to do with the one that was in the manual 3 mode. 4 MR. BEARD: Could you describe generally I 5 what those instruction were or the essence of them?- 6 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, what it was was they 7 were supposed to perform the same functions as the

   '8   rapid f eedwater auxiliary does and that is to 9   increase the main speed of the feed pump turbine 10   trip.

11 MR. BEARD: So when you came in, you 12 really didn't have that many unusual conditions, 13 things were running pretty straight :and normal. 14 I guass there is one item might be worth 15 ' documenting, do you. remember what the reason for-the 16 restriction of 90 percent related to? 17 MR. WALLEMAN: That the restrictions for 18 90 percent was due to we had had -- earlier we had 19 had some problems with our flow transmitters for our 20 reactor coolant system flow, and they.had determined 21 that it was a problem with the transmitter itself. 22 And they had gone through and put some 23 filters'on'the power supply the transmitters but () 24 until they had done that with the other power RUNFOLA '&-ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED ~ TRANSCRIPTION

9 1 supplies, we were not going to go above 90 percent (]

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2 power, which is where they figured tnat was the 3 problem area could lie. 4 MR. BEARD: Was the problem of a noisy 5 channel, was that the general nature? 6 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, fluctuation in the 7 signal transmitter from the flow detector. 8 MR. BEARD: Would it be a problem 9 statement to say you were just operating a little 10 lower than a hundred percant power in order that 11 that noise wouldn't cause an inadvertent plant trip? 12 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes. I 13 MR. LANNING: Were you assigned specific 14 responsibilities for this shift? 15 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. Having worked 16 with Brian Young before, we have a -- kind of split 17 the control room into certain areas. 18 And ha normally monitors feedwater flow 19 and that particular side of plant where I monitor 20 the primary system or the perimeters involved with 21 the reactor coolant systems such as pressure and 22 maxeup flow. 23 MR. LANNING: Who decides who monitors [} u_./ 24 which panels? RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

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3-10 1 MR..WALLEMAN: Well, that was something _.2 that was just decided between the two of us. 3 M3. BEARD: Is it a general approach that 4 the two. licensed reactor operators would -- one or 5 the other would be each at those duty stations and

       '6     . shift ~ supervisor didn't specifically designata which-7s    .one. They just left it up to you             --

8 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, that was -- 9 MR. BEARD: -- as long.as the two 10 stations were covered? 11 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, we are essentially 112 responsible for the whole control room, but in a O 13 transient type of situation normally he would go to 14 that area and I would'go to the ~other area. 15 MR. BELL: Was,there any equipment that 16 was out of service in your araa of rosponsibility

17 when-you came on shift, any of your normal equipment 18 that was removed from service?

19 MR. BEARD: Either control systemstor

20. safety related systems?.

21 MR. WALLEMAN:- 'I don't. remember'anything

  • 22 as having been out of service that would-effect,my 23 function'of working in that' area.

( )' 24 MR. BEARD: ~Were you in,any-type of action RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 ' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION'

s 11 rm 1 s ta teme n t with regard to the plant's tech

  'L) 2     specifications?

3 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, we were in several 4 action statements. One concerning fire barriers, 5 ene concerning seismic instruments. We were in an 6 action statement concorning one of our nucl'ar e 7 instruments. And in order to remember the rest, I 8 would-have to look at the turnover. 9 MR. BEARD: Would you consider that the 10 number of action s ta teme n ts that you were in for the 11 ' pla n t' s conditions was a typical number or more than 12 - usual or less than usual? 13 MR. WALLEMAN: I would say it was probably 14 a typical number. 15 MR. BEARD: Could you describe the action 16 statement related to the nuclear instruments that i 17- you referred to? 18 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, one of our source i 19 range instruments was not working properly in the 20 fact _that it wasEgiving a level of source range 2 21 counts were up with-the power, and it should not be 22 doing that becausa the high voltages cutoff the 23 detector. [) m 24~ MR. BEARD: Are you aware of'when the RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES'(614)445-8477 [ COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i

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12

 ,g      1    situation developed on that instrument?

V 2 MR. WALLEMAN: The situation seemed to 3 develop about . approx ima tely the day after power 4 operation. It kind of just seemed the type to 5 appear. 6 MR. BEARD: So the instrument was operable 7 for the start-up and getting the power, and roughly 8 a day later it started misbehaving? 9 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, as I remember it. 10 MR. BEARD: . Elow long had you -- I am i 11 trying to get a feel for the time frame because I 12 don' t remember off the top of my nead exactly when

   ']   13    you rostar ted, but how many days had it been since
14. the plant had done its last restart roughly? Two 15 days, a week, a_ month?

16 MR. WALLEMAN: Well, we had tripped about I 17 a week before that, and than we' had been down for a 18 couple of days. If I could ask. 19 MR. BEARD:. Sure. 20 MR. SIMON: I think it was somewhere 21 around June 2 'tha t we had tripped, and I don't 22 remember the exact time. I got it in my notes, but 23 we w e r e n ', t down_very.long.. () 24 MR.' BEARD: -I am really trying to focus on

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RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TR4NSCRIPTION-I e

13 I how long the nuclear. instrument that we are talking 2' about was in tnis inoperable-state,-one day, one 3 week? 4 MR. SIMON: Nearly a week. It had been 5 ' declarad inoperable shortlyLafter start-up. 1 6 MR. WALLEMAN: As a ma tter of fact, I was 7 the one_to notice during my reading that the counts 8 were up_on it and had informed the shift supervisor. 4 9 MR. BEARD: Was this an unusual failure or, i 3 10 is this'what one might call a repeat occurrence on

11. tnis your start-up or. source range channel nuclear 3

12 instrumentation? 13 MR. WALLEMAN:- This has happened before on. 14 that particular enannel. When it had been shutdown J 15 to where they could test it with the voltage on the 16 - detector, _cney could ' find no anomalies with it. 17 From what I understand all the troubleshooting they 18 haven't been able to find a problem. 19 MR. BEARD: Is it a situation tha t ' has i 20 happened some number or times in the past and

                                   ~ 21    troubleshooting efforts but really haven' t been.able                                                                                 .

22 .to nail down the cause of the misbehavior? i 23 MR. WALLEMAN: ~ Yes, as far as I can tell, 1 () '24 they haven't been able to determine what it is. RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 > COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION ____m-_________._.___.__m_m_, ______mm._.-_____.__________..__-.___.____ms-_.___.._-.______.____.___._______._______m.___

A 14

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1 - Although when we.were' shutdown, it doesn' t seem to 2 appear on the shutdown. , 3 MR. BEARD: Does that cover pretty-much 4 -the initial conditions when you came on snitt? Did 5 1anything unusual happen between those initial 6 conditions.and the onset of the transient that are 2 7 worth mantioning?

!               .8             MR. WALLEMAN:.      No, we had done our normal 9 -surveillance testing doing the ST's that you have to j               10   do on midnights, and everything was pretty much 4

11 s ta te in the plant.

12 At.the time that the event happened, I was 13 sitting in the control room at the' control room desk, 14 and I was reviewing one of the procedures we are 4

15 currently studying for our requal exam. 16 And I was sitting there' reviewing the I 17 procedure, .and Brian. Young had exited to the Kitchen, 18 which.is-just behind the control room, and was , 19 fixing something to ea t. I 3 l 20 And the SRO was in the control room, and i 21 ne was walking around the panels looking at some o f. 22 indications. 23 MR. BEARD: Who was the SRO you are ( ), 24 referring to?

RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
                                   ' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

1-v' 15

       .feg              1                                                           MR. WALLEMAN:                                        Steve Faasel.

V

                        -2                                                           MR.      BdARD:              And he was serving the role of 3  what in your organization structure, what title 4- would he have besides senior reactor operator?
                                                                                                                                                       ~
                       ~5                                                            MR. WALLEMAN:                                        He was assistant shift 6  supervisor.                                                    And essentially ~nothing was out of the 7  ordinary.

8 MR. BEARD: ~ Things pretty quiet then?. 9 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, it was"relatively 10 quiet. 11 M R . _ B E A R D :~) Wha t was the, _as you remember 12 it, the first thing that called your attention to 13 something going ~ astray or unusual.or -- 14 MR. WALLEMAN: The .. firs t thing that called - 15 my attention to the fact that something was out of 16 the ordinary was' Steve Peasel saying, and I am not 17 sure if this is his exact words, but:that the feed 18 pump had tripped or it was malfunctioning. I am not 19 sure how he -- 20 MR. BEARD: This is one of the two turbine 21 driven main feed pumps? 22 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes. And right after he

             ,         23   said t h a t ',                                            I. looked up and saw he was looking over
     -( )              24   at.that.                                                 Right at.that time'after,about within two RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED. TRANSCRIPTION-

L h i  : 16 , 2

1 seconds of him saying that, I started, hearing the C 2 plant flow noises changing out in the plant.

3- MR. BEARD: Had the reactor trippad at

                                   '4      this .. tim e ?                                                                                            ,

5 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir.

6 MR. BEARD
How would you-describe the
7 behavior or the mode of control or wha t - wa s going on

[ '8 in the primary system that you were trying to keep 9 an eye on?  ; 10 MR. WALLEMAN: Well, .after I heard this'  ; i 11' noise I immediately exited the chair, and as I i 12 headed towards the panel, I called towards the O 13 kitchen for Brian Young to come out because you can 14 hear from the kitchen from the control room, but , j 15' just as I called he cameEin. l 16 He had heard the flow noises also and 17 Steve was at the -- Steve Fessel, the assistant

18 shift supervisor, was at the main feed. pump. turbine
                                ' 19       controls.                                   ,
                                 -20                             And I went over to the primary system to 21      monitor what.was going on there, and within a couple 22      of seconds Brian Young was over at the main feed i                                   23      pump turbine controls, and Steve kind of just backed
   -()                             24      away and started looking around the whole plant.
                     .                                        RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 I

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17 ,- 1 As Bri'an s ta rted to try to increase the L)g 2 speed of the number two main feed -- I don't know 3 how far I should go on. 4 MR. BEARD: Go ahead. We would like to 5 hear your understanding of what ha ppe n ed . Tha t's 6 what we are here for. 7 MR. WALLEMAN: As Brian started increasing 8 the speed of number two main feed pump, I was 9 watching the pressure in the primary system and 10 noticed that there was a slight mismatch with the 11 feed pump having cut -- with the one feed pump 12 having tripped and the other one not supplying tha

 ~s 13 amount of feedwater required for the conditions in 14 the primary system.

15 Pressure was going up there. Thero 16 in-surging the pressure, pressurzied level was going 17 on and primary system was going up. 18 I did notice that the plant was running 19 back, and that the control rods were driving it. 20 MR. BEARD: That's a normal expected 21 function for this kind of situation through the 22 in teg ra ted control system? 23 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, the in teg ra te d control rx (~.s ) 24 system tries to drivo the whole plant back at the RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

t l 18 1 same time. It would try to drive the plant back to

    . r]-

2- 55 percent power, which is the one main teod pump. 3 It would be able to control the amount of flow l 4 required for.tha primary system. 4 5 MR. BEARD: Did that run back sort of kind 6 of seem.to.be going fairly smoothly, not only was it 7 trying to do it, it seemed to be doing it okay or 8 was it-having problems?

          ~9               MR. WALLEMAN:     .Yes, as a matter.of fact,
10. it seemed to os going fairly well' with the exception 11 of RCS pressure started to increase. I kind of f

12 expected that because it is just pretty hard for a i I) 13 plant to reduce in power the amount of flow that it 14 dropped oft. I 15 So as I saw pressure start to increase, I-16 took manual. control of pressurizer spray snd opened 17 the valve all the way. 18 MR. BELL: What made you do that? Is that 19 an action that is recommanded in some amargency or 20 off normal operating procedure? 21 MR. dALLEMAN: No, the reason I did that, i 22 it has an automatic function to open with a 23 transient, but I had expected this transient to go 1 () 24 beyond the normal design capability of the normal. 1 RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 ! COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION ' l l l

19 1 pressurizar control system just knowing that the 2 feed pump had tripped. 3- So when the spray cycles, it cycles at a 4 lower value than what you can by taking manual 5 control induced in the pressurizer.

      -6                MR. BELL:        Have you had this transient 4

7 occur before while you were the reactor up there? 8 MR. WALLEMAN: .No, sir. 9 MR. BELL: 'Have you seen this transient at 3 10 .the simulator or baan involved with this transiant 11 during your training? r 12 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir, I had seen 13 transient of this sort several times. 14 MR. BEARD: So would it be a fair 15 s ta temen t to say that you took manual control in i 16 order to sort of get 3 jump on the spray sys tem in i a 17 order to get the pressure back to where you would I 18 like to see i t? I 19 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir, I was.trying to i 20 reduce or Keep the pressure below the high pressure i 21 trip set point. 22 MR. BEARD: Why don't you just continus l 23 than. You got the spray turned on. l () 24 M R'. 'W A L L E M A N : Yes, sir. It appeared that l RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-6477 i COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

I' l 20 1- it'might be with the spray on all the way, and Brian ' O' . 2 Young trying to control the main toad pump turbino 3 speed. I 4 It appeared that we might be able to make

        -5       the run back without,experioncing a trip, but the
               ~

6 pressure creeped-up a little boyond what I had 7 wanted it to and ended up by causing a high pressure 8 trip. 9 MR. BELL: But you had done all you could 10 to prevent that occurrence? 11 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 12 MR. BEARD: ' So at tne point the reactor O 13- tripped, the only action that you had taken besidas 14 monitoring the primary to mako sure there were no 15 additional actions were the more or less 16 an ticipa tory move of helping get the pressure down a 17 little bit? 18 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 19 MR. BELL: ,I'would like Rick to describe 20 the actions he would' perform should a reactor trip

      .21        occur now or I guess the actions he         did---

22 MR. BEARD: In a hypothetical situation? 23 MR. BELL No, sir, tne actions he did () 24 perform in a reactor trip. We have gotten to the RUNFOLA &. ASSOCIATES:(614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

k 21 i ) 1 reactor trip stage. We will go into the post trip 2 actions. 3 MR. WALLEMAN: 'Okay. The-post trip , 4 actions, I looked at the control' rods to maxe sure i1

5 -tnat they were on the bottom. And in order to do 6 that, you look over tha panel and there is on the
 ;                                                                        7  back panel where you have the indication for tne s

8 control rods there is absoluta: position indication l 9 'which gives good indication of where the rods l 10 actually wnero. And that indicated that all the N 11 rods were on.the bottom. I 12 I isola ted let down from the reactor

                              )                                          13  coolant system.           I started a second makeup pump.                         I     [

< 14 hit the reactor trip button, and I then a t that 6 t 15 point I witted and start watching where pressure was I 16 going. i 17 Brian'was on the main food pump turbine at 18 the time, and Steve Feasel had brought out the EP l 19 1202, which is our emergency procedure, and started

20 going through the actions for reactor trip.

1. }' 21 MR. BEARD: These actions in your 7 22 emergency procedure are both actions that an ! i 23 operator might take manually and verification or- + f ,( )' 24 confirmation of the-detions that should occur j RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 j COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 4

22 1 automatically? Is that a general -- 2 MR. WALLEMAN: Yas, sir. 3 MR. BEARD: So I guess having the 4 procedure out, you would go through and contirm the 5 automatic actions and then take those manual actions 6 that were prescribed? i 7 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 8 MR. BEARD: Pino. Go right ahead. 9 MR. BELL: Excuss me, Rick, why did you 10 start the second makeup pump? 11 MR. WALLEMAN: I started the second makeup 12 pump because on a reactor trip you tind that you and r b 13 up losing inventory in the pressurizer, and I wanted 14 the second manaup pump available and running to 15 increasa the amount of inventory supplied. And that 16 is also an action through EP 1202. 17 MR. BELL: Your pressurizer level at this 18 time was probably higher than normal pressurizer 1 19 level; was it not? , 20 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 21 MR. BELL: And-you felt you still naeded 22 this additions 1 manoup pump because tne pressurizer 23 level there it would require additional makeup? () 24 MR. WALLEMAN Yos, sir. RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZ8D TRANSCRIPTION

a 23 ,

1 MR. ' BELL: L My second question is when did
2 .you'close the spray valve?

. 3 MR. WALLEMAN: I will have to think about , 4 this f or a minuto. 5 MR. BEARD: Maybe it would help you to, in 6 tne thinking . process, to say did you'close it right 5 7 away, after a couple of minutes or a long time later? i 8 MR..WALLEMAN: I believe that I went.to i 9 automatic on it as soon as I saw the pressure start 10 to coma doun.in tne reactor coolant system.

11 MR. BEARD
What sort of pressure value i 12 are we talking about that it rose to,' do you -

13 remember a-value? i i 14 MR. WALLEMAN: Approximately'2300 pounds. i l 15 MR. BEARD: How does that correspond to { 16 the pressure you had*been at at 90 percent or the i , i 17 pressure tnat, say, your tirst system relief would 18 come in? l i' 19 MR. WALLEMAN The normal system pressure ]! i 20 is 2150 pounds and the relief set point for our  ; i  ! l- 21 first relief, which is the PORV, is at approximately I ' I believe it'is set at 24, 25. 22 2400 pounds. i 23 MR. B E r.R D : And the plant had gotten up.to i

I

() 24 23007 RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 I COMPUTERIZED' TRANSCRIPTION } l

                                                 ~. - .        . ~ .                                                        _

24 (mg ~1 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. , %J i 2 MR. BEARD: And then it turned around i J 3 somewhere in that ares?  ! 4 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir, it started coming

i 5 down.

6 MR. BEARD: On the isolation of the let t 7 down, was the reason for that similar to the reason i

!                              S   for starting the second makeup?

i 9 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir, that let down is i' 10 the makeup pump starting is part of a supplementary 11 action for a reactor trip. The isolating the let i ) 12 down is part for immediate action for reactor trip. ( 13 MR. BEARD: Why is ola te d let down? } 14 MR. WALLEMAN: Just to reduce tne amount P 15 of inventory on the reactor coolant system. 16 MR. BEARD: In tnat sense it is comparable j l'7 to cutting in tne second makeup? 18 MR. WALLEMAN Yes, sir. 19 MR. BEARDS, So I guass before we l i 20 interrupted you with those questions, you were at  : i 21 the point where the assistant super was opening up I. !- 22 the emergency procedures. L ( 23 MR. WALLZMANs Yes, sir. lie had gone i l () 24 through the immedia te actions to make sure that you RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 i COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION t _.._______________m______m - _ - .

                                                                   . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _  m_ _ _ . . . _ _ _  ___..m____m.__      . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . . _ . _ .               _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _    __   _ . _ . .

i. F i !- 25  ; I are supposed to reverify the immediate ~ actions as l 2 part of the trip, and then he went Anto the

        '3     supplementary actions.

4 And he was asking several questions j 5 .concerning enunciators and indications that we have , i- 6 as part of.the supplementary actions to maxe -- i 7 MR. BEARD: Are these question

1
8 confirmstory questions like --

9 -MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. ] 10 MR. BEARD: Did you receive that or did

11 that do that, those xinds of questions? ,

a t 12 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. -j 4, l'3 MR.-BEARD: Go ahead. 14 MR. WALLEMAN: The conditions in the RCS ' l 15 appeared to be approximately normal for post trip l 16 action. It seemed like everything was going pretty  ; a ,

17 well until it got to the point where Brian Young
                                                                                              ~

1

la said, I am losing control of the --

I 19 MR. BEARD: Let me interrupt you'a minute, ! 20 Rick. I don't like to interrupt you. I thinX we 21 should say for the record that Dr. Rossi has arrived I ! 22 now and turn the leadership of the meeting over to I

l 23 him. ,

I i I () 24 MR. ROSSI: I would like to go ott the F ! RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES-(614)445-8477 ! COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i i e

                                                                                                                                    ~ _ _ -     - . - .      .-. .-

d 26 (~g 1- record. U 2 (Discussion hold off the record.) 3 MR. BEARD: Back on the record. - 4 MR. ROSSI: We are going to take ~ a recess 5 for 15 minutes. 6 (Thereupon, a recess was taxen.) 7 MR. BEARD: We would like now to resume 8 our~ interview with Mr. Walleman. For the record, it 9 should be s ta ted that Dr. Rossi is absent from this 10 session, and the other people attending the 11 interview are the same as previously were here 12 before we took a recess. O 13 Rick, maybe you csn sort of catch us up 14 where you think wo left off, and we can try to 15 resume a normal type interview without any more f 16 interruptions than we can. i 17 MR. BURNS: She can read it bacx. 18 (Record read as requested.) 19 MR. WALLEMAN As I said before, 20 everything seemed to be going pretty well post trip. 21 Then at that point Brian Young stated that he was 22 losing control of the main feed pump turbine. And 1 23 looked over at him. And he was still using the j ()' 24 controls. t RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477  ; COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION ( i

27 (S 1 And at that point I believe it was the V 2 snitt supervisor who had come in during this avant 3 looked up and said that the MSIV's ware closad. And 4 so then we all noticed that and then the -- I went S back to looking to see what was going to happen to 6 RCS pressure. 7 And at this point we still had level lett 8 in the steam generator. Okay. We loonad up for 9 signs of a safety steam feed rupture control system 10 actuation, and we didn't have the signs of a normal 11 steam feed rupture control system a c tu s tion. So we 12 didn't understand wny the MSIV's had gone closed. O 13 At that point we were losing level in the 14 steam generstors, and tne snitt supervisor decided 15 tnat we should probably trip the steam food rupture 16 control system on low level. 17 So no informed Brian Young to go over and 18 trip it before we got to the point where it would 19 trip automatically, which if you feel that a system 20 is going to trip automatically that is an action 2 21 tnst you are supposed to do. 22 MR. DEARD Could I explore that area with 23 you a minute, Rick. () 24 Every utility trains their operators in a RUNFOLA 6 ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION I

2d rx 1 way they think best, and sometimes the norms 1 thing U 2 is that there is a little varia tion here and there, 3 and every company ha s their own policy with regard 4 to safety snd plant operations and other matters. 5 I have hesid it mentioned several times 6 that it is a good idea to go ahead and trip it 7 manually 11 you know tha automstic is going to got 8 you. l 9 Could you tall ma a little bit about i 10 whether tnis comes out as a part of your training or 11 some policy or just general guidance or maybe comes i 12 bsca from your Navy days or where does this type 01 {- 13 tninking origina te in your view 7 14 MR. WALLBMAN: In my view, well, this is i 15 not from my Navy training. This is something that 16 has been brought out in training with us that you 17 should, if you are going to get the actuation, go la anosd and actuate it. 19 And I believe that tha t's just like a kind 20 of a preventative medicine. If you know you are 21 going to get the trip, why not trip it earlier so 22 you have the actions of the satety system betore it 23 is going to take place. () 24 MR. USARD Would there be sny advantage RUNFOtA & ASSOCIATBS (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

i 29 r 1 in terms of the way the reactor systems would 2 respond to do that or is it just almost like a 3 philosophical thing of go ahead and get a jump on it? 4 MR. WALLEMAN: Hell, it wouldn't be , 4 i 5 philosophical. It is go ahead and get a jump on it . l ) 6 Decause'once you have -- we had lost all feed pumps, 4 7 and we didn' t consider that we would be able to get 8 that bacx so you want to feed the generators. You

 ,              9     don't want the generators boiling dry.                                      And so that              [

l  ! l .10 is a next line of defense. l

 )                                                                                                                       ,F j             11                       MR. BEARD:               I guess the big thing I am                                [

I ' i 12 hearing you say is tne training you received trom j iO 13 tne company at Toledo Edison is that where you i 14 receive the advice that it it is inavitable it is i

 !             15     going to you ought to go ahead?

l l 16 MR. WALLEMAN Yes. s [

 }

j 17 HR. LANNING: Why would actuating the ' i l f 18 rupture control system prevent the steam generators i

 ;             19     from boiling dry?

I  ! l 20 MR. WALLEMAN: Well, an actuation would i i 21 automatically start the aux feed pumps and ta rgo t ' 22 them for a level in the steam generator. Since we 1  ! i 23 didn't have the normal f eed steam genera tor, this is f () 24 a desired situation. 1 RUNroLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-6477 Ii C O.M _ P_ U T E R I Z E D TRANSCHIFT10N l i i

30 r3 1 MR. BEARD: Do you think it would have V 2 preventad, the aux feed pumps coming on so fast, it 3 would have prevented a boil out or boil dry? 4 MR. WALLEMAN: Yas, sir. Not that I think 5 we boiled dry. 6 MR. BSARD: No, that's generally what you 7 are saying if you can gat tne aux tawd pumpa running, 8 tna desire would ba to avoid actually boiling it dry. 9 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 10 MR. LANNING: Did the generators boil dry?  ! l 11 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir, I don't believe 12 they did. Again, I was not on that sida of the () 13 plant. I cannot mako a judgmont. You would nave to 14 talk to Brian Young. 15 As I noted it from the indica tions wa nad, 16 it didn't indicste tnat it was boilad dry. t 17 MA. LANNING: This is based on lo convarastions with the other re a c to r o pe r a to r't 19 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 20 MR. DELL: Is it not a tact that this 21 actuating this steam and Leedwater rupture control 22 system manually would have maintained 2 higner level 23 in the steam generators becauso we were probably () 24 grester than its actu1 tion set point 11 it woro to RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATE 3 (614)445-6477 COMPUTERIZMD TRANSCRIPTION

31 1 be actuated manually, is that a correct assumption 2 on my part? 3 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir. I b011 eve it was 4 below the lesel of where it would hava gone for 5 actuation, but I am not sure. f 6 MR. BEARD: Should we continuo then. l 7 MR. WALLEMAN Yes, sir. At this point 8 Brian had gone around to the panel where you can l 9 actuate the SFRCS from the control room.

10 And'before he actuated, he looked up at 11 the shift supervisor and aside Do you want to 12 actuste than on low level, and as near as I can

() 13 remember tnia was nia words. i l 14 And tne snitt supervisor said yes, actuate l l 15 SPRCS on low level. And then ho actuated it. Ho l l 16 came oack around to tna tront of tna panel and i 17 atsetad looking at tho aux teed pump turbinea now l la snd enan. i 19 At that point ne said, I have lost control 20 or the aux tuod pumps. I looned up and saw tnat we l l 21 had the aux teod pump turbino over tripped -- 22 overspeed trip enuncia tor alarma. i i 23 This la one pump or both? ~ MH. 11 E A M D 24 MR. ed A L L C M Ati t both p u 'a p s . And than 1 l i RUNFOLA & A330CIATB3 (014)445=0477 l COMPUTERIZHD TRANucaIPTION t

32 i turned around, and ne was still watching his aux 2 feed pump turoino indications. And I turned around 3 and noticed that we had two equipment operators 4 standing in the control room watching the ovent. 5 So while he was still looxing at his 6 indications, I told them to expedits going to the 7 aux feed pump room. I am not sure if those were the a words, but I told tnem to hurry up ind go to the aux 9 food pump room and datormine what was wrong. And so 10 they immedia tely lett. 11 Then I turned back around and started 12 monitoring my indications again. At this timo, the 13 assistant and the shift supervisor wore both in the 14 control room along with neian Young ind myselt. 15 MR. DEARD What were the conditions on 16 the primsry side of the p14nt at the point in tne 17 scenario you are in, the point now where the pisnt 10 nas lost both aux toad pumps ind you have toturned 19 more caratul sttention Lu your duty stations r$ther 20 than the control room in general. 21 Can you give us a ieel tor whst were the 22 conditions thst you adw at that tima on the primary 23 side of tne system? () 24 MR. W A L L Bil A tl i Oxay. After the aux tend RUNFOLA de AS;10CIATMS (u14)445-0477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

33 1 pump turbines did not respond and I had sent the 2 paople down to the aux teed pump room, I started 3 watching pressure in the RCS and noticed that it was 4 starting to incressa. 5 MR. BEARD: Did you notice where it was at 6 that time besidas starting to increaso? 7 Ma. WALLEMAN: No, sir, I couldn't say 3 exactly. It was the RCS was heating up 2nd as 9 pressure s ta r ted incrassing, I went ansad and opened 10 the spray valve tuli, all the way again. . 11 MR. BEARD: This is the second actuation 12 of the spray valvo? - 13 MR. WALLEMAN Yes, sir. 14 AR. DELLS And it is in manual? 15 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 16 And spray valve was opened all the way. 17 Sometime during the event, I am not sure it it was 18 just -- I would have to roter to my -- I would havu 19 to refer to some graphs to be sure, but ! Know that 20 I had stopped and started the manoup pump. 21 I ar not sure it it was at this point or 22 not, but 1 -- it it wasn' t started, I indeed mado 2J sure that the second makeup -- Wait a minute. Let 24 me thinn. 14 U H FO L A 6 ASSOCIATE 3 (614)445-0477 COMPUTEHIZED TRANSCRIPTION __________2__-____-___-__________________.

34 , 1 MR. USARD: Wo will go off the record for 2 a moment and let Mr. Wallemsn gatner nis thoughts 3 again. 4 (Off tne record.) 5 MR. WALLBMAN: No, I did not start the 6 maxeup pump a t this time. Pressure was going up, 7 and I was trying to minimize the pressure increase d by naving tne spray valve opened. RCS temperature 9 was going up. 10 Brian Young, the other reactor opera tor, 11 maid that ne noticed it was getting close to 590 12 degrees in the RCS. 13 Md. BELL Why is tnis temperature in the 14 resctor coolsnt system incrossed? 15 MR. WALLEMAN becauso whenever you 16 tripped the pisnt you have s -- trom decayed heat 17 it would tend to heat up the reactor coolant with no i la nest sanc. 19 MH. HEARD The normal hast sinc that you 20 don't have is wha t? 21 MM. WALLCMANs The steam generators. 22 MR. UMARD: Which are going low? 23 MR. WALLHMANs dnich are going low. () 24 MR. LANNING Now, in tne indicator tor RUNFOLA 6 ASSOCIATHS ( ts 14 ) 4 4 5 -0 4 7 7 COMPUTUR14MD TRAN3CRIPT10N

35 1 the primary system tempe ra ture on the panel that the 2 other coactor oporator is monitoring and it is not 3 on your panel? 4 MR. WALLEMAN I have indication ot 5 temperature or Th on tne psnel I was at, but I was 6 not -- I was more involved with watching what the 7 pressure exertion was coing than wha t RCS 8 temperature was at the time. 9 MR. BEARD: When you use the term "RCS 10 temperature," are you talking about T hots, T colds, 11 T aves or what are you generally referring to? 12 MR. WALLEMAN T ave. 13 MR. DEARD: And where la that .n e t e r 14 located? 15 MR. WALLEMAN We n,ive a mater on the bacx 16 panel. It is a large me ter with a T ave. 17 MR. uBARD: In the control room it I la remember rignt, it seems like your duty station in 19 where on the main control desk area? 20 MH. WALLEMANs On the left-hand sido. 21 MR. HEARD: And the T ave meter is 22 gener411y on the back ptnel where? 2J MR. WALLBMAN In the middle. () 24 MM. LANNING When you may the b1cx panel, auNroLA 4. Assoc 1ATEu (014)445-0477 COMPUf6HIEUD T4ANSCRIpTION 4

3G 1 you can view this panel from the control desk? 2 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. Not the wholo 3 panel. There are certain indications that are down 4 low that you can't sog. 5 MR. LANNING: You do not have to

    ,6 physically leave tne control panel to see the l

7 average temperature indicator? l l 8 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir. 9 MR. BEARD: So T avo was going up, and I 10 think you said somebody either you or someone else l l 11 noticed that you were approaching 5907 t l 12 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 13 MR. UBARD: Can you give ne some fool tor ' l ( 14 the significance of tnat in terms of what would, on 15 s normal trip situation, the temperature be and what l l 16 mort of a significance would you associate with l 17 being a t 5907 13 MR. WALLEMANs This type of incident when i 19 post trip -- your normal post trip tamparature' is 20 550 degrees. 21 MR. DEARD: So you are coming on 40 22 degrees higher thtn usual? JJ MH. WALLEMAN Yes, sir. () 24 MR. DEAHDI What sort of significance do HUNFOLA & AJSOCIAT83 (614)445-u477 C O M P U F C H 1 7,t? D THAt4 SCRIPT 10N

                                                             -        .       ._= _ -.

37 1 you attach to being 40 dagreas higher than usual, is 2 that a little bit, medium, a whole lot? 3 MR. WALLEMAN: That's a lot becausa for 4 every degroo of temperature change in the RCS, you 5 have approximately five inen change in the reactor 6 level. This type of occurence would cause a rapid l 7 pressure increase. 6 MR. BEARD: I think I would like to record I 9 to show that Dr. Rossi his jcined us again. 10 MR. ROSSI: Yes, I am here and hope to 11 taxe part in the romaining part of the interview. 12 Wny don' t you just continue wich what you 13 were doing. 1 14 MR. uBLL: Ricx, were you successful in 15 reducing reactor coolsnt sys tem pressure by taxing , 16 manual control of the spray valve? , 17 MR. WALLEMAN At this point, pressuro was is still going up, and I am not sure at which rate it i 19 was going up, but it was still increasing.  ; 20 MR. BELL: Did you look at the pressurizer 21 level indication it this time? 22 MR. WALLEMAN Yes, sir, it was high. It 23 was getting up towards 200 inches in the pressurizer. () 24 MR. UBLL: pressurizer was 200 inches. RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-3477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

38 r^s 1 What is normal? O 2 MR. WALLEMAN: 200 inches. 3 MR. BEARD: What would be -- I am trying 4 to understand the instrumentattor. and your 5 pressurizer design. W ha t would be the highest 6 reading you could read on your instrumsnts in the 7 control room for pressurizar lovel? 8 MR. WALLEMAN: About 320. 9 MR. BEARD: If it were to read 320, does 10 that mean the plant is solid or where does that -- 11 what does that correspond to? 12 MR. WALLEMAN: Tha t's where the instrumant G J 13 tap comes out at 320 to -- tor what the actual top 14 of the pressurizer is, I am not sure. I would ask 15 Louie. 16 MR. BEARD: This is a technical question. 17 I think it is tine that Louie can give us some la answer. 19 MR. SIMON: I don't know the exact value. 20 There is some steam space. I would guess at least a 21 couple fwat and maybe several feet. 22 MR. BELL The high lovel tap thun is 23 below the upper hemisphere of the head? () 24 MR. SIMON: Yes. RONPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

39 (m 1 MR. ROSSI: During the transient did the b 2 level ever reach -- do you remember what the highest 3 level was that you got to in the pressurizer? 4 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir, I think the 5 highest level I ever got to was 300. 6 MR. ROSSI: So you did not go up to the -- 7 MR. WALLEMAN: High level tack, no, sir. 8 MR. BELL: Spray valve is opening and it 9 is not-reducing pressure? 10 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir, pressuro was still 11 going up. 12 Ma. BELL: What happened next? (' 13 MR. WALLEMAN: At this point, and I am not 14 sure at what temperature it was, but Steve Feasel, 15 the assistant shitt supervisor, decided he was going 16 to leave the control room and go down and get the 17 start-up faad pump running. 18 MR. BELL: I was more interested in 19 resctor coolant system pressure. What happens next 20 if the spray valve is fully open and pressure is not 21 being reduced, what should happen next? 22 MR. WALLEMAN: Once it gets to the -- to 23 that approximately 2400 pounds, 24, 25, the PORY r~s 24 opens. y) RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION k

40 m 3 1 MR. BELL: Did tha PORV open? J 2 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir, it did. 3 MR. BELL: How did you know that the PORV 4 was opan? 5 MR. WALLEMAN: Okay, sir, about this time, 6 we were having trouble with the -- one of the SP7A 7 and 7B reset in the back so that Brian Young could 8 control them from the front. They see the start-up 9 feeds for the-steam generators. 10 They had to be reset, and we didn't have 11 anybody available so I -- he asked me to go reset 12 the s team valves. I reset those, came back into the i b 13 control room and started monitoring pressurizer 14 pressure again. 15 It looked like it had settled ott close to 16 2400 pounds. And I did not -- I had found out later 17 that the PORV had lifted twice, but I did not know 18 this fact at that time. 19 MR. BELL: All right. SP7A and 78 are the 1 20 supplies to the OTSG's from the normal f eedwa ter 21 system? 22 MR. WALLEMAN Yes, sir. 23 MR. BELL: And the resat for those are () 24 located on this bacx panel? RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

. 41 1 MR. WALLEMAN: No, they are located behind 2 the control. room where'the cabinets are.  ! i 3 MR. BELL: What cabinets, sir? 4 MR. WALLEMAN: I am sorry, we have power 5 supplies and cabinets that indicate the conditivns

               '6    'of reactor protection system, safety features 7      actuation system, SFRCS system action.

4 8 They are all in the back, and the resets 5 9 are on the back wall in the back which is out of the 10 control room proper. 11 -MR. BELL: I have not'been in your control 12 room-at this time so let me try to get'some () ! 13 understanding of location of controls. To override 14 this_SP7A and 7, you have to go back to the SFRCS 15 panel? 16 MR. WALLEMAN: .Y e s , sir. 17 MR. BELL: Also to.get feed in that steam 13 ' generator,with this s ta r t- u p feedwater. pump,,you are 19 going to have to open the~ main steam -- excuse me, i 20 main f e e'd isolation valves? 1 21 MR. WALLEMAN: N o , -.s i r , only s ta r t-u p p 22 . isolation. 23 MR. BELL: And the main fesd isolation {- i 24 ' valves'the-main valves'to the generators?

RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-847.7

! COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

                     ~

f 42  ! ' - 1 MR. WALLEMAN: I am not suro what he means 2 by that. 3 MR. SIMON: Main feedwater stop_ valves. 4 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir.

          'S                 MR. BELL:      Did you reset and open those 6    valves?

7 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir, I did not. They [ 8 don't nave the resets in the b'a c k lixo the SP7A and , 9 78 do. 10 MR. BELL: They.are at yet another i 11 location? 12 MR. WALLEMAN: Ycs, sir. 13 MR. BELL: Do you'Know if .those valves 14 were reset and opened? 15 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir. I had just done-16 - what the other reactor operator asked me to do. 17 MR. BEARD: ~ I would like to sort of review 1 i 18 - what'you.said before Larry' asked you a. couple'of 19 questions. 20 I believe what you said was they were 21 ' having trouble wi th-' these L two. . valves , and the other 22 operator apparently.was~ pretty busy, and there < 23 weren't other people.in the room.- So in effect he

       . 24    -asked you t o '. g o back and do the' reset _to-assit him7-RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION t

n k

                                                          ~ . . __.       . .. __
                                                                         '4 3 1                MR. WALLEMAN: '     Yes, sir.                           ,

2 MR. BEARD:- So you testified the main 3 control board, if I can' call it that, went outside 4 behind the, what I call, the back panel, the 5 vertical portion and really 'away.from the control 6 room area proper into the back area where-all these 7 racks are? 8 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 9 MR. BEARD: And did this function and then 10 wnen you returned I guass you were gone some period i 11 of time?. ' 12 MR. WALLEMAN: -About probably mayba about O 13 20. seconds, 30 seconds.  : 14 MR. BEARD: But when you returned -- 15 MR. WALLEMAN: I don't Know exactly how

      -16   _long it was.

17 MR. BEARD: When you returned to your, i 18 quoto, normal duty.'s ta tion on the rea c to r si te , the

                                                                                  'I 13    pressure seemed to have settled around 2400. pounds? .                 I l

l 20 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 21 MR. BEARD: i You were-not aware that the' ) 1 22 PORV had a ctua ted twice, and you learned about that 23 la te r?. () l 24 MR."WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. l I RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477  ! COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

4 44 f 1 MR. BEARD: That helps me summarize where Ls 2 we are and maybe we can continue trom there. 3 MR. BELL: dare thero any other valves 4 that didn't operate correctly that nad to be reset? 5 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. We had to reset 6 599 and 608 to open them up. That was tor aux toads. 7 MR. BEARD: Did you do tha t? 8 MR. WALLEMAN: It had been done already, 9 and I nad boon asked to go back and do that. That 10 is inside the control room proper. Tnat is on tne 11 back panel in tnosa safety features actuation area. 12 MR. BEARD: That's on the vertical panel 13 in the control room? 14 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 15 MR. ROSSI: Wnen you say in the control 16 room proper, the resetting of SP7A and SP78, is that 17 really outside tne control room or just outside of 18 tne control board area? 19 MR. WALLEMAN: .It'is outside of the 20 control board araa. The control room or actually 21 tne ones that is bounded by the doors in order to go 22 out of doors is the whole area, but wnst I call the 23 control room propar is where our main instruments 1 () (~ 24 are and where we normally stay. RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

45 j^) 1 MR. ROSSI: So you didn't have to go

 %J 2  outside the doors; you had to go out of the control 3  room proper?

4 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 5 MR. BEARD: Having soon the control room 6 here before, it is laid out similar to other plants 7 where there is not a wall to divide off the control 8 room from other equipment racxa. 9 If you just sort of walk around behind tne 10 vertical board, then you come into an area that is 11 not considered, I believe, the control room, but 12 there is -- it is still physically within the walls, C) 13 but there are a lot of equipment racxs and tnings or 14 this nature just as the integrated control system, 15 the racks are back there? 16 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, I can draw a picture 17 if you like. 18 MR. ROSSI: We intend to see it later. I 19 just wanted to get a picture of it. Thank you. 20 MR. BEARD: Again, bring us back to where 21 we were. You had returnad, sad tne pressure was 2 2. around 2400 pounds, and apparently I thinx you said 23 it was pretty steady. () 24 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, it seemed -- I knew ! RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (514)445-8477 COMPUTERIZBD TRANSCRIPTION l

46 r~ 1 it was around the PORV set point. So then I started N.T) 2 monitoring that and, indaad, the PORV did open. I 3 saw pressure start to come down and then the 4 indication in front of me indicated that the PORV 5 was closed. 6 MR. BEARD: I would like to asK you about 7 that. You said you saw the PORV open, and you saw 8 the pressure come down. 9 What indication did you use tnat would 10 tell you other thsn reactor coolant system pressure 11 that the PORV had opened? 12 MR. WALLEMAN: Well, the opening you have f3

 '-                                                                                  13    two indications on the front.         One just has control 14    available to the PORV solenoid and the other has             --

15 and the other indication is what the signal going to 16 tnose solenoids are. 17 And that is what I based -- we have other 18 indications for the PORV, but I did not even check 19 them at this time. 20 MR. BEARD: So that the indications on 21 your panel, if I remember right, you have got one, 22 like you said, says control power is available to 23 the control system which would operate the PORV? e l () 24 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes. l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 { COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

          .         __            _ . _ . . . . _ ._            . _ -_.                     _ _ . -           m._ _.    .   ._

E l 47 7- 'l MR. BEARD: Another that says the control , 2 system is telling the PORV to open? 3 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 4 MR. BEARD: That was.your indication that 5 PORV had-lifted? 6 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 7 MR. ROSSI: -And that it was closed also? 8 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, and pressure started i 9 to come down. 10 MR. BEARD: How long a time was it between 11 when you got the signal to open the PORY and 12 -subsequently you got the signal - to tell the PORY to O 13 close, is that one second? ^ 14 MR. WALLEMAN: About three seconds. l 15 MR. BEARD: I-just want to pursue this one 16 more thing, you got the indication in the PORV d 17 closed,.what does this tell you about the position l 18 of the PORV? i i 19 MR. WALLEMAN: It tells you what the t 20 control signal is going to the PORV. It tella you 21 that it should, in fact, be closed. 22 MR. BEARD: And you didn't use sny other

23 instrumentation at this time?

4 () 24 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir. RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 l- COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i i _..,.w, e--..-r- ,.,--...,---------,-,g,,,,,, - .-,,.g.-,

,                                                                                                                                                          48 1                   MR.         BEARD:                   What was your feeling as to 2   where the PORY was positioned?

3 MR. WALLEMAN: I had indeed thought it was 4 closed. l

 ,                     5                   MR. BEARD:                           Okay.

1 4 6 MR. ROSSI: Was this basically the third, , 7 now that you-know after the event, was this 8 basically the third time that it lifted?

9 MR. WALLEMAN
Yes, sir.

i 10 MR. ROSSI: So this was the last time it 11 lifted during the event. i 12 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 13 MR. ROSSI: Let the record show that I am 14 leaving for a minute. I 15 MR. LANNING: What was the reactor system 16 pressure doing a t ter you verified, I assuma, that i 17 the PORV was closed? ( , 18 MR. WALLEMAN: The reactor system was -- 19 tne pressure was coming down. 20 MR. LANNING: Why would it be coming down? 21 MR. WALLEMAN: Well, again, I didn't think r l 22 the PORV was open. I had seen a large increase in l  ; ! 23 pressurizer level and then that seemed to taper off  ; t () 24 to the point where it was relatively steady. ! RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477  ; - COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION t F 4

        --.-.7,. .- -          -             ,.  -r,---                     y_.,---.p-                     .y - , - - . , . - - . - , , , , .       .w,--+
                                                                       -,7              ,-,~,,-p.%.,,w--                                         c-           rw. .y--,

l 49

          'l                when you in-surge lixe that you end up
  .O 2    in-surging water that is a lot colder than the water 3    that is in the pressurizer.

4 I had the spray valve open all the time. 5 As pressure, it seemed to me that pressure had been 6 - steady around 2400, and when that opened and turned 7 it around, what I thought after the PORV closed and S with the amount of wate* I had in-surged into the 9 pressurizer from its normal operating level, I did ' l l 10 look at the pressurizer temperature and it.was well 11 below what the normal temperature would be in the 5 12 pressurizer. () 13 And the fact that I left the spray valve

14 wide open, I thought that I had turned pressure and I

15 that the spray valve was bringing pressure back down. j 16 MR. LANNING: What pressure are you

17 monitoring?

,! 18 MR. WALLEMAN: Wide range pressure. I

,        19    mean narrow range pressure.

1 20 .MR. LANNING: And this is -- where is

21 this instrumentation located?

i 22 MR. WALLEMAN: It is right to the right of 23 the controls for the PORV and the pressurizer. () 24 MR. LANNING: But where in the prime RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

50 rw 1 cooling system is this ins trumenta tion? 2 MR. WALLEMAN: I believe it is in the -- 3 the one I was watching was narrow ~ range for -- it 4 was I think it was the narrow range for the reactor 5 coolant loop. I_am not sure which loop it was. 6 MR. ROSSI: It comes off the loop in any 7 event, not off the pressurizer. 8 MR. WALL 8 MAN: Yes, sir. 9 MR. BEARD: Do you have other indicators 10 for -- the pressure is coming down. 11 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 12 M R .' BEARD: I think what you said in O 13 answer to Mr. Lanning's question was the reason the 14 pressurizer was coming down at least in your 15 understanding was because of the spray and the cold 16 water and temperature and you turned it around? 17 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 18 MR. BEARD: Did it seem to be coming down 19 in a way that you would expect for that situation or 20 was it a little slow or a little fast or how would 21 you characterize it? 22 MR. WALLEMAN: Well, it seemed to_be 23 coming down a little fast, but not-oxcessively so at () 24 1 erst for the conditions I was in. I kind of looked RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

51 1 at monitor prosaurized level. 2 We had Just -- avan though I did not l 3 think at all that the PORV was open, we had had 4 training in that at the simulator where when the l 5 PORY did stick open like that we had oscillation and l l 6 pressurizer level, and the level seemed relatively l 7 steady.

         '8            So that was one indication that I used 9 just to back up the fact that     I, indeed,,didn't have
        .10 the PORY open. I was also paying attention to the 11 fact that it looked like wo were getting this 12 feedwater back, and I am not sure at what point we O   13 got the f eedwa te r back, but I thought that might 14 have had a bearing also on the fact ot the pressure l

l 15 decreasing. ! 16 MR. BEARD: So you are saying if the l 17 taedwa te r returned, you would expect'that to be 18 return of the steas generators becomo a heat sinc i 19 and that would bring the pressure down? 20 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir, intense cooling 21 of the RCS. At this point with pressure coming down 22 and it did seam it might be a'little excessive, when 23 it got down to the point where the spray valve () 24 should be operating, first of all, since it was a RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES '(614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION e

52 em 1 little bit excessive or what I thought might ba h 2 possibly excessive although in thoso conditions I 3 was not sure, I want ahead and shut tha PORY block. 4 MR. BEARD: And this was at the point the 5 pressure had gotten, I think you said, the spray 6 would have normally come on. I don't understand. 7 MR. WALLEMAN: It was about the point 8 where the spray valve would normally close. It was 9 about 21 -- 10 MR. BEARD: Normally close? 11 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, about 2150. 1 i 12 , MR. LANNING: Had it closod? O 13 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir, I had the spray 14 valve completely open. After I closed the PORV shut, 15 the PORY block, as I shut the PORV block, I also 16 want to auto on the spray valvo. 17 MR. LANNING: Are you saying that the la reason that you chosa to close the PORV block valve 19 was oasad on the position of the spray valve? 20 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir, I just -- it was 21 lixo a back up just in case the PORV had stayed open, 22 which I did not think at all had happened, but it 23 was a back up because I just didn't lika how tast () 24 the pressure was going down. RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

m . _ . . _ . . . .- . . . _ . . _ . _, . _ . - . . . _ . _ _ . , . - _ . . _ . . _ l j

!                                                                                                                                                                                                           53 4

s 1 MR. LANNING: So it was based on the rate l 2 of. decrease of pressure? l 3 MR.'WALLEMAN: Yes, ' sir. f f 4 MR. BEARD: 'S o you took basically two 5 actions,.you closed the block valve on the PORV7 1 6 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. , 7 MR. BEARD: And you went to auto on tho . f 8 spray valve, but I think it is important to i > j 9 recognize, as Mr. Bell brought up yesterday or the l 6 r

j. 10 day before or sometime'in th'is business, in manual  :

j  ; j 11 you had the spray valve opan to a hundred percent I 12 open and when you went' to a u toma tic , the maximum

CJ 13 opening would be about 40 percent..

1 14 And as you indicated tha t. tor the pressure

!                                               15          you were at when you'put it in automatic this would l

i 16 be about tne pressure it would tend to close itsalf? i 1  ! 17 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. I i j 18 MR. BEARD: By going-to automatic had the 19 effect that you' realize of closing the spray valve

- 20 for you?

21 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. ! 22 MR. BEARD: Fine. i 23 MR. BELL: Do you have acoustical valve j l () 24 monitors installed at Davis-Besse? j RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION  ; i e

                         .m  __ ..._      .-. _. _ _ _ _ . . . _       ._ .. ._ . . _ . .

k 54 l

    ~

l MR. WALLEMAN: Yes. 2 MR.. BELL: Were those monitors used to 3 determine the status of the power operator ra11of 4 valve? 5 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir. 6 MR. BEARD: Where are thoso? i 7 MR. WALLEMAN: They are post accident j 8 monitoring panel, which is to tne left of the panel j ( 9 where I was at. I 10 MR. BEARD: liow far to the left? l 11 MR. WALLEMAN: About.seven-feet.  : 12 MR. BELL: Can you see-thoso panels + CE) 13 clearly from your wa tch s ta tion ? 14 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. Th2 controls on 15 them are the indication tor the type of flow is 16 relatively small. l 17 In fact, I had looked at the indications  ! i  ; 13 ' earlier in the event, but I didn't -- the main thing l ' { 19 that I was watching on the post accident' panel was 1 j 20 the subcooling margin. l 21 MR. BEARD: What type of subcooling.vslues I i i !. 22 were you reading at this time? L 23 , MR. WALLEMAN At this time, I.am not sure l f() 24 what they wero. I had monitored soveral times RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 l COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

55 (3 1 during ths transient that wo had, and every time 1 V 2 monitored it we nad adequate subcooling margin. In 3 fact, the whole <a v e n t , as I saw, it was 47 degreos. 4 MR. BEARD: What sort of rsnge does that 5 meter have on it in terms ot, I guass it is marked 6 in saturation degrees? 7 MR. WALLEMAN: Above saturation. 8 MR. BEIRD: What sort of scale is that? 9 MR. WALLEMAN: It is a digital read out. 10 MR. BEARD: So it can go as nigh or low as 11 you --

  . 12            MR. WALLEMAN:     Yes.

O 13 MR. ROSSI: That subcooling is located on 14 tne post accident panel? 15 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. There are two 16 indications. 17 MR. BEARD: If you were in this situation 18 tnat you described of having clossd the spray valve 19 by way of putting it in on the auto and having 20 closed the PORV -- 21 MR. WALLEMAN: Block. 22 MR. BEARD: Excuse me, PORY block, if you 23 had been -- if you had chosen to look over at tno () 24 acoustic monitors, what sort of reading would you RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

56 f'm 1 expect to find there? 2 MR. WALLEMAN: Well, it the PORV had stuck 3 opan, which is theorized or at least I nave tne 4 impres Jion that that is theorized might havo

  ,                                                                                                                                                                       5                                         happened, if tnat stuck open, there would have been 6                                          some flow on the acoustic monitoring system.

7 MR. BEARD: In other words, you are saying i a tnat it the PORV had, in fact, not closed, it at i

;                                                                                                                                                                        9                                          this time you looned at the acoustic monitor, you j

10 would expect to ase a flow type indication whicn i 11 tolls you the valve is open? 12 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. i 13 MR. BEARD: What sbout the effect of the i 14 blocx valve? 15 MR. WALLEMAN: If it was after I closed it,

16 then there would be no tiow.

17 MR. BEARD: That's the tima trame I was la talxing about. After you closed the spray valve and 19 the block valvo. 20 MR. WALT,EMAN: Yes, sir, there would have 21 been no indication of flow. 22 MR. BEARD: Would the acoustic monitor 23 give you -- wnst information would the acoustic () 24 monitor give you with regard to thu status of PORV RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)44S-6477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

l l 57  ; 1 itself? 2 MR. WALLEMAN: It would give you an 3 indication that it I hid, indaad, looked at it 4 during the tim 2 where the PORV was opon, it would 5 give indication of flow. 6 And even when the -- when I had the 7 indication on my panel that the control sat toe the 8 PORV to closo and if it was still open, you would 9 nave still read tiow there. 10 MR. BEARD: I am sorry, I got confused. I 11 don' t want to belabor this point, but I don't 12 understand your answer. Could you just ropsat it. O 13 MR. WALLdMAN: OKay. On the panel that I 14 was at, that I was monitoring, it showed that the 15 PORV control said for the PORV to be closed. With  ! 16 tnat control saying that should be closed it, indead, 17 it was opsn, you would still have flow on the post 18 accident panel. 19 MR. BEARD: This was before you closed the 20 block valve? 21 HR. WALLEMAN: Right. l 22 MR. DEARD: After you closed the block 23 valve? () 24 MR. WALLEMAN Yes, there would be no RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-3477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l l i

58 1 indication of flow. 2 MR. BEARD: I guess I understand you to be 3 saying that if the PORV were, in fact, still opened 4 at this point in timo, the acoustic monitor would 5 not be of great banctit in telling you tha t? 6 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir. 7 MR. ROSSI: In 2ny evant, you didn't use d tne acoustic monitor either before you closed the 9 block valve or after you closed the block valve, you

 ,            10 didn't note the position of the acoustic monitor?

11 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir, I didn't. I did 12 not think it nad opanad, and I was also worried

   \'         13 about foodwster even though urian Young was in that 14 area. I closed tnat puraly as a back up just in 15 caso it had opened.

16 MR. BELL: May I parsue this issue of the l 17 scoustical valve monitors one step turtner. 18 This indication that you mentioned to show 19 tiow, is it a digital indication or an analogue 20 mater? I 21 MR. WALLEMAN: Analogue meter. 22 MR. BELL: ilow big is this meter? I 23 MR. WALLEMAN: About two inches. () 24 MR. BELL: Two inches high and a half inch, l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

1 59

r. 1 quarter inch wide?

2 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir.

,          3             MR. BELL:   Can you asa that motor from 4 seven teet away, could you even saa the needia on 5 tnat meter from soven feet away?

6 MR. WALLEMAN No, sir, I would hav3 had 7 to go ovar thare. 8 JR. BELL: You would have to loave your i ( 9 normal control station and go to this post accident 10 monitoring package to see 11 the PORV had been 11 opanad? 2 12 MR. WALLEMAN: There is indication of the

      ) 13   PORY position on that tube that comes off that limit      - -

14 off the flow, am I correct, so that I could tall, 15 thero is a little indicator that tells whether tne 16 PORV is open or not. 17 MR. BEARD: Are you talking about like a 18 light such as a limit switch? 19 MR. WALLEMAH Yes, a small limit -- 20 MR. DEARD That would come Jn if it was 21 full closed or full open? 22 MR. WALLEMAN It comes off flow of the 23 acoustic monitor. 24 MR. DEARD: I am trying to understand it f() RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

a 1 i 60 i

1 the operation of this light is analogous to a motor

] 2 ope ra ted valve where it is really in effect telling i

                             '3          you that the valvo is in one of the two extremes, i                                                                                                                                                                        i l                                                                                                                                                                        ,

l 4 full open or full closed, by determining some j 1 j 5 measure of the flow? i ,

6 MR. WALLEMAN
Yes. It would go by the l o'

l ( 1 7 flow through the acoustic device, and once you got t i l 8 25 percent' flow, I believe on that gauge then that i i 9 light would indicato. I I 10 MR. BEARD: It would indicate the PORY is ( i i ! 11 open? 1 l l

12 MR. WALLEMAN
Yes, sir.

1 l () 13 MR. BEARD: Below that the indication of t ( ! i 14 flow is the light turned orf? ( t I f 15 MA. WALLEMAN Turning green. j f 16 MR. BEARD: Changes colors? 4 17 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes. i . i r ! 18 MR. BEARD: Can you see this light or, i j 19 from your own experience, can you distinguish the  ; 20 colors.from the seven feet distance? l 21 MR. WALLEMAN: Yas, sir. f ' j 22 MR. BEARD: So I guess, in summary, then i l 23 you are saying tnat you may not be able to read the i() f 24 exact position of this thing on the small needle RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 l COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

61 1 from seven feet but you probably could distinguish 2 tha open/closa sestus of it by virtue of the lights 3 from seven f ee t? 1 4 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 5 MR. ROSSI: But the valve could be, the j 6 PORY could be somawhat open like 20 percent or so i 7 and the light could show it as being closed? 8 MR. WALLEMAN: Yos, sir. , j 9 MR. BURNS: Green would indicato tha valve

10 is opan?

11 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes. No, green would i 12 indicate the valva was closed. Red is opan I , 13 believe. 14 MR. LANNING: After you close the block 15 valve, do you recall what the tuen of the pressure 16 was after that?  ! 17 MR. WALLEMAN After I closed tno block la valve ind at this time I had also gone to automatic

     '19 on the spray valve, the spray valvo closed and I saw 20 pressura seemed to stop decrassing.

r 4 21 MR. BELL: Rick, pardon ma, what 22 instrumentation is available on your wsten station 23 for tho quanch tank? () 24 MR. WALLEMAN: The quench tank is in the RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l

62 1 bacs panel and it -- to really determine wnst the 2 quench tank level and pressure was, you would havo 3 to waix around to the back and look at it. 4 MR. BELL: So from your watening s ta tion 5 you can't look ovar tha desk section of the panel 6 and quench tank instrumentation? 7 MR. WALLEMANI I could, but I would have i 8 to lean and kind of stand up to look down on it. t 9 MR. BEARD: I would like to understand i 10 also, snd we may be getting into the ares of 11 overlapping our traina of thought hera, but you 12 mentioned the spray valve was closed. 13 Wnst indication do you have that the spray 14 valvo nad, in fact -- why do you believe tnat the 15 spray valvo closed?

 ?

16 MR. WALLEMAN: For one thing you have 17 indicstion ot spray valvo position, and tnst is indicated that the spray valve was closed. 19 MR. DEARD: When you say position, ctn you i 20 elaborate on that? 21 MR. WALLEMAN That is, again, goes by 22 control power, I bellave, to the spray valvor am I J 23 right? t () 24 MR. SIMON: Position indication of the RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-u477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 4

63 1 limit switches.

 )

2 MR. BELL: Tho spray valve is a motor 3 operated valves is that correct? 4 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 5 MR. BELL: So you are talking about the 6 limit switches that are driven by the spray valvo 7 motor? d MR. SIMON: Yes. 9 MR. BEARD: Are thoro two acts of 10 indications of spray valve's position? 11 MR. WALLEMAN No, sir. 12 Ma. uCARD: Just one? 13 MR. WALLEMAN: Yoa, sir. 14 MR. DEARD: And I gusas with Lou's 15 assistance, you sto asying that ths t's the actual 16 position ot eno valve versus what a control system 17 may have requestad it or damanded it to go to? 18 MR. WALLEMAN: No, it is tne actus1 19 position of what tne motor asya the valve should bo 20 st. 21 MR. HEARD: Okay. But it is not a control 22 syatum output to toll it to go someplaco? 23 MR. WALLEMAN No, sir. () 24 MR. uBARD: It is where you thinn it want. RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

I l 64 1 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 2 MR. USARD: And this is ditterent from tho 3 indication you nad for the PORV valve? I

  ,      4                     MR. WALLEMAN:                                    You, sir.                                           The PORV valvo 5 is just solonoid indications.

6 MR. BEARD: The control demands nor the 7 actual -- 8 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 9 MR. BEARD: I don't want to put words in 10 your mouth, it is just my style to say things and i j 11 hope you will agroo with it and seu if I am 12 understanding you properly. 13 So at this time, the spray valve's closad; 14 ene blocx valve is closed, and wha t's going on with

)

15 tha pressure? c 15 MR. WALLUMAN: It seems the pressure had i 17 Kind of lavolod ott. The spray valve I think cycled ld in automatic again during this time.and then at tnis i 19 point I openad the PORV block. 20 MR. UEARD: Why did you choose to do that? 1 21 MR. WALLEMAN: I did not think that the 22 PORY had lifted, and I wanted the availability to i 23 have the PORY in automatic. I watchad -- () 24 MR. BEARD: Did you consult with anyone i RUNFOLA & A330CIATUS (bl4)445-d477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION I

65 1 else before doing tha t? 2 MR. WALLEMAN: No, I kapt the snitt 3 supervisor informed when I isola ted it and when I l 4 opened it. 5 MR. BELL: Pressure was returning to above 6 its normal value? 7 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. I believe that I 8 the -- that it was at its normal value and that the i 9 3 pray vslvo cycled onco during this event. 10 MR. ROSSI: Now, let me just clarify ona 11 tning. I gather that the bottom line on wnst you 12 could determino when you closed tna blocx valve was 13 tnat at the time you closed the PORV block valve, 14 the spray at the same time was effectively turned 15 off at about the same time? 16 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 17 MR. ROSSI: So you couldn't really 18 distinguish the effect of which of tnoae may have j 19 had an affect on the pressure? i 20 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir. As a matter ot 21 fact, I was, at this point, I was relatively 22 convinced enst I nad -- that it was the spray and 23 the effect of the water and the RCS tnat caused tna

() 24 tesnaient, and that is why I openad the block RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION
                      -         - - - -       . _ - ~.    -     - . . -

66 1 because if I had had any indication that it had been 2 the PORV, I would not have opened the block valve. 3 MR. BELL: You mentioned earlier tnat you 4 saw the pressurizer temperature was oclow a value 5 tnat you would expect. The normal pressurizer 6 temperature is somewhere around 648 degress. 7 MR. WALLEMAN: Yeah. 855. 8 MR. BELL: What value was tha tempe ra tu re 9 when you looked and made this determination? 10 MR. dALLEMAN: It was around 630. 11 MR. BELL: So it was 20 dagrees boiow 12 normal? O 13 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 14 MR. SELL: That is pressurizer water space 15 temperature: is tha t correct? 16 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 17 MR. BEARD: Is that a significant value, , la 20 dagrees below? 19 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. At approximately - - 20 well, trom a range of like at 600 degreas, you would 21 have around 1600 pounds and than at 650 or so ~ you 22 would have 2150. 23 So it led me to believe that it should be l () 24 below normal and I would also -- when this had RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 DOMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

67 rs 1 happened and that took place, I nad let them know i )

%)

2 tnat I did not taink that the PORV was stuck. 3 I intormed them that I just closed it just 4 to be safe, and then when I opanad it oack up, I was 5 watching pressure closely, and it did not go down so 6 then -- 7 MR. BEARD: The pressure did not decressa? 3 MR. WALLSMAN: No, sir. 9 ha. BEARD: So that would indicate what 10 about the status of the PORV? 11 MR. WALLEMAN: Than I assumed that it was 12 just -- yean, it was just sometning tnat I did that (~s, 13 was just being extra safe. 14 MR. BEARD: Because you beliaved that 15 since tne pressure didn' t decrease when you opened 16 the block that the PORV was closad and holding the 17 pressure? 18 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 19 MR. BEARD: Let me shift your focus a 20 little bit. 21 MR. LANNING: Before we leave the block -- 22 MR. BEARD: I am going to pursue that very

       .23 lino, but I think that what you are telling us tha es

() 24 general thing, ev3n though we naven't said it, is RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

     ~
           ~,   . ~ . .- .       . . . . . . -  .          .-        .     .  ~ . _ .                 .--        . - -                . . . - . . - .

i s 68 1 ba sica lly.- wha t you did, what you saw, that you 2 thought and the' reason behind'it as you were going 3 through it. [ 4 4 I would like to shift your train of 5 thought in a sense and say a tew days nave gone by I- 6 since tha event. As you indica ted and brought up . l 7 there is some speculation as to whether PORY did or { 1 8 did not operate properly. 1 9 MR. 4ALLEMAN: Yes. 1 I 10 MR. BEARD: Having had soma days -- I am t I 11- trying to turn you around to looking back on-wnat 12 happened. Tha t's what I am trying to s a y .'

        '(2)         13                             -Looking'back on what happened, would tnere                                                         <

j' l-4 be some indication'that would put you in the 15 direction of thinking that the-PORV-did not function i 16- properly? What'would be the' indications that would 1 j 17 say it did not tunction properly? ' 4

                                                                                                                              ~

j, 18 MR. WALLEMAN: Well,_the -- you mean the-g , 19 rea son' tha t I say;that I'think it might not have ! ' 20 functioned properly? , 4: '21= MR. BEARD: Yes. 22 MR. WALLEMAN: I. looked at.the alarm i 23 printer and saw that the' valve had actually -- PORV i

    .( )             24       indication that comes offsths flow,.theLacoustic' RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES..(614)445-8477 l

t

                                                         -COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i
                                                                                                                                                        +

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1 61-1 monitor that that closed after I closed block. 2 MR. SEARD: This is the acoustic monitor 3 we spoke about earlier? i 4 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 5 MR. BEARD: You are saying the alarm 6 printer on that computer point indicates that the

7. acoustic monitor went to zero, unquote, af ter the 8 block valve - was closed in timo?

9 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. l

10 MR. BEARD
And from that you are drawing i

11 what conclusion? 12 MR.-WALLEMAN:- And from'that, in-my own l' - 13 mind at least, I am drawing the conclusion that the 14 PORV had probably been,open.

;          15                 MR. LANNING:       Why was it you. consulted the 16  alarm p ric t-ou t?      Is that part 'o f your post trip-17  review or for what reason?

{ 18 MR. WALLEMAN: The reason I consulted it 19 is'because after -- it was about a day later when I i l 20 consulted i t, and after the trip and overything i 21 e v.a n t s were s ta r t'i n g to become somewhat hazy, and I l 22 want-to refresh in my. mind.

          '23                 As a matter of      ~ fact, I dcn't have -   .I
     -( ) 24   wanted.to look at the graphs'for              --  that I had that L                          RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l

1 l L

       .~                         . - _ . _ _  _~ ~ . .-                -        _.     .-

70 4.

  ~

1 ' monitor. pressure and several other indications, but i..' 2 .they were all gone. I wantsd to refresh why I had j 3 done what I had did. 4 And there was, indeed, a lot happening and P 5 it was hard to tell exactly, you know, at what point 6 I did what, and I wanted to see if I could kind of i 7 go over the events in my mind and figure out why I 4 8 had performed the function I did. 9 MR. LANNING. Had the parformance of PORY ! 10 been questioned by other personnel to you?  ; ) 11 MR. WALLEMAN: .No, sir, I think a day i l 12 later technical section called up and said something 13 to the eftect that they asked why I-hsd closed the 4 14 block. 15 MR..LANNING: They asked you why you a 16 closed the blocn? r 17 MR. WALLEMAN - Yes, sir. 18 MR. LANNING: As you review the alarm 19 print-out and you apparently discovered maybe'the 20 PORV was still open when you closed the block valve? 21 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. I 22 MR'. LANNING: What did you do with that 23 bit of information? Did you tell anyone tha t maybe () 24 the PORY was open? RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i . .

i l 71 rx 1 MR. WALLEMAN: I mentioned it to several b 2 people, yes, that, you Know, tha t it might hava had 3 indication that the PORV was open. That is not to 4 say that it was, and I did not know it, in fact, it 5 was. 6 MR. LANNING: I understand. 7 MR. SURNS: Who did you discuss it with? 8 MR. WALLEMAN: Some of the operators on my 9 shift. 10 MR. BEARD: Have you finished your lina of 11 questions? 12 MR. BELL: I have one more. What's the 13 s troxa time of the PORV block valve? 14 MR. WALLEMAN: I could not tell you that. 15 MR. BELL: May I ask Mr. Simon. Is that 16 okay with the Team? 17 MR. SIMON: I don't know. It is not a 18 long, long valve. It is in a ma tte r of second, but 19 I don't Know. 20 MR. BEARD: Let me ask a general question, 21 is it line a few seconds or 60 seconds, do you 22 remember tha t? 23 MR. ROSSI: If you don't romomber, just () 24 say you don't rem 2mbor because this is a pieco of RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

i 72 - 1 information that we really don't need from these. f 2 people because we can go tind that out. [ 2 3 MR. BELL: But we are going to need it 4 trom somebody baciuse I taxe it tha t this computer 5 point that told you that tne PORY opened and that y 6 the PORV closed comes off the same signal source as ) 7 this light that tells you that the PORY is open and 8 closed? i i I i 9 MR. WALLEMAN: It comes off the acoustic  ! I-10 monitor. I 11 MR. S I M o ti : I believe that is accu ra te. i 12 MR. BELL: So it is possible that out open 7 ( 13 indication on the computer actusily indicated that

,                                                                                              i 14     the PORV opened, but our closed indication is                                   ;

I I i 15 actually telling us when the PORY block valve is t- r $ 16 closed. i l 17 MR. ROSSI: These, I think, are design I i f f la details that I beliove we can get trom drawings and ! ( 19 design documents, and what we are mainly interested i l 20 'here is finding out observations. l 21 Although it is useful if you do know these 22 facts to tell us, but if you don't know them, just i 23 say you don't know them because we can find them. () 24 We are mostly interestad in what you did or saw. RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 , COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION , l

l 73 1 MR. BEARD: I would like to ask an 2 operational question if I could. 3 If the plant were in a post trip situstion 4 and maybe with an unusually high prosaure and at any 5 rate, you open the spray valve -- I am trying to get 6 a feel for operating times and how big ettects aro. 7 In this kind of situation it you simply 8 open the spray valve to a hundrad percent as you did, 9 full spray, just ball park it, what type of -- how 10 big of an ettect would you expect that to have on 11 pressure in terms of rate in which the pressuro 12 would decreaso? O 13 MR. WALLEMAN: At normal ope ra ting 14 pressure, just opening up the spray valve? 15 MR. BEARD: With the reactor tripped. I I 16 MR. WALLEMAN: With the reactor tripped. 17 MR. BEARD: We are talking about post trip la situation. 19 MR. WALLEMAN It would depend on what you 20 are doing with the makaup ayatem. 21 MR. BEARD: You had two makeup pumps 22 running? 23 HR. WALLEMAN Yes, sir. ( )) 24 MR. DEARD: Let down closo? RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

74 1 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir.

                                   )

2 MR. BEARD: Maybe I am getting so 3 complicated it is going to be impossible to answer. 4 How big of an ettact would the spray bo? 5 MR. WALLEMAN: At the -- I don't believe, 6 tirst of all, if you are talking about wnan I -- 7 when I was up in -- wnen we were up in pressure, I a believe at trat time I only had one makaup pump on. 9 I think I had turned the other one off, 10 2nd you do see a detinite decreasa in spray valve -- 11 it is a very noticeable decrease in RCS pressure 12 when you aro using tha spray valve. O 13 As a matter ot fact, with all of our l 14 neators on and the spray valve just partially open, 15 you can still decrease pressure. 16 MR. BEARD: So it is a strong ottect? ~i 17 MR. WALLEMAN Yes, sir. 18 Ma. DEARD: Different situation, 19 hypothetically or somewnst related to this event, 20 but hypothetically, if the PORV was closed and than 21 it opened snd stayed opened, how big of an effect on 22 the prassure would you expect that to give as a 23 single item? A () 24 HR. WALLEMAN A largo effect, sir. RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 COMPUTERIZBD TRANSCRIPTION

75 1 MR. BEARD: Would you compare it smaller b']' 2 or greator than the effect of the spray? 3 MR. WALLEMAN: I would say larger than the 4 ettect of the spray. Again, maybe not dapanding on 5 the situation that you are in.  ! 6 MR. BEARD: I am just trying to get a faol 7 tor tha operational response. 8 MR. WALLSMAN: Yas, I would say it has a i 9 larger effect on RCS pressure than tha spray leval. 10 MR. BEARD: Now, it they were both on, 11 then I guesa from what you said, you are talking 12 about a very rapid decrease in pransuro? {

   \-   13 MR. WALLEMAN:     Um-hmm.

i 14 MR. SEARD: And tna t's the situation wo 15 were in during the event? P 16 MR. WALLEMAN: At least that I formulated 17 we were in. 18 MR. BEARD: The pressure decrease that you I 19 sctually saw in terms of magnitudes og ottacts, you 20 were there watching the prenourizor, pressure gauges 21 snd this, that 2nd the other. 22 In context of how big effecto are, do you 23 teel like that was the ettect of the spray, do you () 24 tosi liks that the magnituJo of the pressure RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

76 P t 1 decreans was dua to the PORY o r -- how would you 2 associste it magnitudo-wise? 3 MR. WALLEMAN: Again, I could not make 4 that judgment now. It was in thst situstion I just 5 felt that it was only dua to the spray. 6 MR. SSARDt But I tnought you said earlier 7 thst the pressure seemed to be coming down a littlo 8 faster than you were comfortable with or expectsd7 [ 9 MR. WALLEMAN Yes, sir. 1 10 MR. BEARD: So to double-cnock you decidad I 11 to close the block? 12 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. j 13 MR. HEARD: Could that magnitude have been i 14 about tno same magnitude that would navo occurred if ! 15 both tha spray was spraying and the PORV were opan? ! 16 MR. WALLEMAN: I have no ides of that 17 magnitude, but to tell you the truth, it both ot  ! 18 them wore open, I would nave thought it would hsve 19 probably decreased even tsoter than it did. 20 MR. BEARD: If both ware tuli open? 21 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 22 MR. LANNING: Csn you toll me w h <3 t the 23 discussion was about with the shift in your () 24 discovery that the PORV may have remained open. RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 COMPUTERIZED TRANJCRIPTION

77 1 MR. WALLEMAN: Just the fact that I

  )

2 discussad it and th s t, you know, the tset that I had 3 done that even not knowing what the PORV was open ) 4 may nave helped the situstion. t 5 M3. LANNING: Did you place any particular 6 relevant significance to tho fact that the PORY may 7 have atuck open? , 8 MR. WALLEMAN: No, no -- it was just 9 possibly sometning else that und happonad in the i 10 plant that was unforosean.  ; 11 If indeed the prosauro had gono down with 12 ene spray valve having not -- if the spray valve had 13 gone -- 1a clocad and the pressure and I hadn't 14 isola ted the PORV, then I would assuma thst it wa s-15 the PORV. 16 MR. LANNING: There would have been no 17 question in your mind then? 18 MR. WALLEMAN None at all. 19 MR. BEARD: So you really had two or throo 20 of f ects going on at one timo. It is hard to 21 separate them? 22 MR. WALLEMAtl Yea, sir. 23 MR. USARD: I would like to understand a (]) 24 littio bit better about your experience with the RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION _ . _ - - . - . . . . . . , _ , . _ ~ . , = . . ~ , _ , .

70 1 acoustic monitors from an oparational viewpoint, not 0 2 dasign questions. 3 Do you remember about how long they had 4 been installed in the plant? 5 MR. WALLEMAN: About a year. 6 MR. USARD Have you observed in tn0 l 7 control room the operation of tnese things? 8 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir. I have never

9 observed the monitor either the position indication l j 10 ch3nge or tne 110w through the monitor.

j 11 MR. BEARD: Are you aware from other j 1 12 operators the operational experience at theco 13 indicatorn, tho acoustic monitors, have you heard ) 14 that trom any ot your buddies on this unitt or other i

15 anitts?  ;

1 16 HR. WALLEMANt As an advice or -- i 17 dd. BEARD No, just general chit-chst 4 { .18 between operators or amongst operators or tne Pony 19 scoustic monitors tre roltable, hoy, I really lixo l 20 cnom or they operate sporadically or the thing's , 21 alwavs inoperable or sooms to un a very touchy 22 system or just general operating uxperience that ! 23 operators would tend to chat about over a cottoo or () 24 scmething. i RUNFOLA & AUSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTBR14BD TRANSCRIPTION -

l l 1 79 1 MR. WALLEMAN No. Tha reason being is 1

                  )

2 tend to rely on the* equipment, snd tnat is somutning 3 that you hope to never challungo. You hope to never

}

4 challenge that system. It is avaliable. It is 5 tnere it you need it, but it is sometning that you 6 just never expect to amo. , 7 You nevar expect to see the PORY opan in ) 8 Ene tirat place and, in tact, tnst's the tirat time i l 9 tnat I have ever seen the PORV open. " i 10 It is easy to accond guuas myaalt now and l i i j 11 say that I should hsvo looked at those indications, i 12 out I didn't. As tar ao I was concerned, overything () 13 nad gone well to this point. . I t

;                                                               14                                                                            I isolated tor a back up reason just                           l r

l 15 because I thought it is a good thing to do. I let I I 16 them Know I did it. I wasn't even sure if I should 17 have done it at the time, but I did it. When you . i

;                                                              18                                                     opened it back up, lixo I said, tno spray vilve had
19 stopped and the pressure decreased.

! 20 MR. DEARDI Ono laat question in this area,  ; i 21 are you aware of what sort of miintenince experience l 22 nas been on thu acoustic monitors in terms of . i 2J troublo report writton or maintenance work requesto j l 24 written treguently or rarely or do you have any feel l() f 1 RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 l COMPUTBRIZdD TRANSCRIPTION l i e

80 1 for that? 2 MR. WALLEMAN: I drn't nave any fasl for 3 that at all. 1 4 MR. USARD: I want your impresnion. I 5 would not want Louio's on t na t one. l 6 MR. WALLEMAN: My own impression was that ,. 7 it is not worxed on very often at all. d MR. BEARD: So it is -- would it be a fair 9 statsmant of your opinion to say tnat as tar as you 10 know, they haven't been called upon to ope ra te very 11 ottan, but as car as you know that thay are reliable 12 and should be trusted? O 13 MR. dALLEMAN Yes, sir. 14 MR. ROSSI Your experience with ths 15 opsning of the PORY at the plant I thougnt I naard 16 you say that you had no previous experience witn it , 17 opening while you were on shift at the plant? id MR. dALLEMAN No, sir. 19 HR. ROSSI: You had no -- 20 MM. WALLEMAN No, I hsd none. 21 MR. ROSSI None. So your 4xperience with 1 22 the offect of thr P0HV is based entirely on training 23 and the simulttor and not sny experience on the O 24 vi a=> HUNPOLA & A3SOCIATES (614)445-0477 COMPUTER 14ED TR ANSCH I PT IC,H r

lJ 81 1 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir. > ' r^) koi

2 MR. ROSSI
I assume you have nad ,

t 3 oxperienco with th. spray and not PORY at the plant? 4 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, it is a typical thing , 5 to dagss, and you learn witn the noaters energized 6 snd xoup prosaura norms 1.  ! 7 MR. BEARD: Rick, I think we are at a d logical oreixing point. Would you like to take a 9 five or ton minuto break. I suggest we declare a

 ;                                                                      10 tive or can minute recor.s.
,                                                                       11            (Thoreupon, a recoms was taxen.)

i 12 MR. ROSSI: Let's go bscK on the record. j 13 MR. uEARD: I guess we were continuing the

l 14 interview. It noemed line share we woro, Rick, 2

15 things wore pretty well steadied out. 16 MR. WALLEMAN: It seemed lins pressure had  ;

17 pretty 'nuch stesdied out and I had overheard -- 1 l la was nind of listening in tor wnat was nsppening in I

i 19 on feedwater, and I had overhosed that we had got i 4 20 the start-up toedwater, and tnst liri.4n was -- hsd i 21 been initiating tiow. 22 And at this point I wasn't sura, but it 23 seemed like the pressure had been steady, but than () 24 all of a sudden it started dropping again. And I RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 j COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

82  ; 1 assumo it was due to him initiating flow. I 2 MR. ROSSI: You are tairly sure that the 3 block valvo had been closed and the pressure had 4 been retsonably stable tor some period of time and

!    5 then it started to drop?

'I 6 MR. WALLEMAN Yes. 7 MR. ROSSI Again, atter you had overheard  : 8 that they were getting start-up toedwater available? 9 MR. WALLEMAN Yes, sir, in fact, that was I out or my mind at that time. 10 i 11 MR. BEARD: Didn't you reopen the block i

12 valve at some ti.us?

i 13 MR. WALLEMAN Yes, sir. , 14 MR. UEARD: So at the time you were j 15 talning about was the block reopened or had it boun 1 ! 16 st tnat point? i 17 Ma. WALLEMAN When I opened the block  ! Ad valve was when it was steady, and I didn't notice i 19 any decrease in opening the -- 20 MR. uBARD: The decrosee that you 21 attribute to the stusm generator, was that after the 22 block valve had been rooponad? I don't mean as a , 23 result og, just did it occur subsequently?

'() 24            MR. WALLEMANs                                            I believe it was atter th?

RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZ8D TRANSCRIPTION - 1

d3 1 block valve had been reopened. I knos that it was a 2 steady state wnan I opened tne block valve, and it 3 didn't cnange after I opened tha blocx valve and so 4 that was out of my mind. I informed the ship sup, 5 and I wont on from there. 6 MR. BEARD: I understand tha t things wero 7 relatively steady beyond that, but at some point did 8 you do any operations rela ted to the high pronsuro 9 injections pumps or the low pressure injections 10 pumpa? 11 MR. WALLEMAN Yes, sir. After they l l 12 startad feeding the generatorn, pressure was [ O 13 dropping rapidly. The heaters were all on, and I, 14 at tnis point, when pressure was dropping rapidly I 15 believe at this point was where I started the second 16 makeup pump agsin and I had that oft. 17 And then the pressure got down, and it 18 seemed to slow down the pressure decreano and but wa 19 were getting close to the SPAS not points for 20 pressure which was 1650. We wore getting clone to 21 1700 pounds but steadying out.  ;- 22 I informed the assistant shift supervisor 23 who was in there that pressure was getting low. It i () 24 seemod to be steadying out but that it was down near f HUtlFO L A 6 ASSOCIATES (614)445-0477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION t

l 84 1 1700 pounds. Ho, at this point, suggested that wo i 2 ougnt to try piggybscx operation ot the ECCS system. 3 MR. LANNING: What do you mean by 4 piggyback operation? 5 MR. WALLEMAN This is where you start the - - 6 you have both the low pressure injection and high 7 pressure injection pump running with a piggyback a valve open tnat allows low to go to nigh to incrosso 9 tne head discharging of high pressure injection pump. 1 10 MR. LANNING: What is now in this 11 contiguration, what is the shutott head at the pumps? .i 12 Ma. WALLEHAN At that point, the shutoft 3 13 head with both pumps worxing together I believe the f 14 shutott hvad would be around 1730 pounds.

15 MR. LANNING And you did this alignment 16 because of the decreasing pressure not becauss of i

! 17 procedures is thst -- l 18 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, it allows you to use 19 piggyback as an operator aid whenever you feel tnat 20 you need more inventory into clie RC3. And wo juat, i 1 21 at that point, we had had teedwater back. l 22 Wo didn' t want to initiato the satoty 23 teatures actua tion system so as an operator tid he () 24 just decided to hulp with the prosauro control by J RUNPOLA 4 ASUCCIAT*.3 (614)445-0477 COMPUTER 14dD TRANSCRIPTION

i OS l l l 1 initisting piggybsck mode of operation. 2 MR. uSARD: when you say initiate, are you 3 talking about lining up the system in preparation , 4 tor operation into this piggyback contiguration or  ! 5 are you talning about sligning it and actus11y , t 6 turning tna system on? l 7 MA. WALLEMAN Wo lined it and actus11y l i i S turned tne syntam on. . 9 MR. USARD: The system pressure in the i 10 reactor coolant system was on the order et 1700. j i 11 Tne naad of tne piggyback contigura tion was 12 somewhere approaching 1300. Do you know wnother you i O IJ got any flow into Lne system at this t iin e ?  ; 14 Md. WALLCMAN I am not sure. I didn't 15 see the low tiow alarms clearing on the enunciator l l 16 psnois. I was really monitoring pressure more. And l i l 17 the assistent shift supervisor, I told him to la initiate the piggyback mode while I was monitoring l 19 that, and he was actually in the tront doing that. j l 20 And do it was ahortly atter no did it l l 21 though we had boon stat,dy it seemed like at 1700 22 pounds, and it was shortly 4tter he did th-st it j 23 started increasing pressure I assumed on my own ' l l() 24 maybe we did get a little help from the HP1 pump. ! t ! RUNPOLA 6 ASSOCIATMS (614)445-3477  ! C0i190T6H1200 THANdCHIPy10N i

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t

i 80 1 Ma. DEARD: During the time when the l { 2 pressure was in tne order of 1700 poundo, did you

;                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          l 3                                happen to notice tha asturation mators?

l

 )                                                                                                                                       4                                                         etn. WALLEMAN       Yao, sir, 1 loonad at thum, I

5 and tney woro -- am not sure it tnis la when I saw l 6 47 degrees, but tnay were wall above siturstion  ; 7 pressure. 8 Ma. utARD: Do you hive any teel Cor a t l <> what point in the aconario that tit e plant , i { 10 experienced a etnimum value og maturation?  ! I f j 11 Ma. WALLdetAN It was -- 1 <s m not sure it < a  ! 12 it was -- it seemed to me it wts about that time l j !O j 13 maybe alightly betore that or about tnat t i .n o when , i 14 tno prosaure was coming down, out it wse around that i 15 time and even st that, lino 1 said, I checked it .! j ,! 16 several times hnd it never got below 47 degrees. [ j 17 MH. uuARD: W raa t then caused the pressuro

10 to rtina above the 17007 F

19 HR. WALLEMAN Well, the pressurizer 20 started -- we had started addinJ inventory to tne I 21 pressurider and with Eno nestors on two-told attact 22 that pressure started coming back up. I 23 MR. h 8 Ai4 0 So you had maAoup pumpd thaC [ O 24 - noteia2 ia ia en n e no en a 4= r-  :

RUNFOLA (. A33001ATC3 (614)445-387' l COMPUTEMit.80 P R A N S C 641 P T I ON i

t

I ^ 87 I I h92 ting up and you may have gotten some contribution 2 tros the piggyback CCCS system? l l ' 3 MR. WALLEMAN: Um-nmn. [ i 4 MR. LANNING: After you turned on the il P I t j 5 pumps, does thst constituto s manus 1 actuation or i 6 the satoty injection ayatem? l

7 MR. WALLEMAN: I am not sure. It wam l l l' 3 msnual actuation. That's tuo satoty system.

I 1 9 MR. LANNING: Was it contigured in 4 l l i ! 10 msnnor that would -- that is similar to thi natoty 1 - 1 I 11 injection configuration it it Sctuated ( i ! 12 sutomatically? f il () 13 Md. WALLEMAN An automatic mode, no, it l I 2 i 14 La not in piggyuack in an automstic mode. l L j 15 MR. uRAno It -- let me back up and get i ! 16 it in perapactiva. I gather that you are saying 1 i i 17 that you went to the piggybacx mode because you were . 1 l lo ipproaching the automatic mot point or 16507  !' 1 l 1) HR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. l l 20 Ha. uBAHD It you had done -- not done (' i ! 21 that, and the pressure continued to 2411, didn' t i L I 22 round out abovo it, it ths pressure continued to  ; ] 2J 1411, the emaistant system would autoastically turn { () 24 itself on and start injecting water as it may be I l HUNFOLA 6 ASdOCIATBD (6147445-0477 i COMPUfEH1480 fMANdCM1Pf!ON 2 I I

3 03

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l needed; is that right? 2 MR. dALL8 MAN Yan, sir. ] 3 Md. USARD: Why is it importsnt, in your , l *

]                                                                                                                         4 mind, to avoid that actuation?                               i I

l

 ;                                                                                                                        $             MR. WALLEMAN      For one thing, that            j
;                                                                                                                         6 actuation la an ,tetustian tnit comes in account when

{ h j 7 you nave somehow broached the design of HCS. The 8 system is for the event of a LOCA, and our i 9 indications were not of a LOCA. f

L 10 do didn't want the isolation that tnat l li i 11 cause tot during the LOCA. f 12 Md. BBARD: Containment Laolition. f 1

i 13 MR. WALLEMAN And we had our toadwster. ' I  ! I i 14 de just didn't tool tnat we naeded safety teaturom , j 15 actuation.  ; i 16 MR. DEARD: So there is not any direct i I 17 advarse ottoct of the automstic actuttion other tnsn lu possibly unnecoamary contiinment isolation actions? I t i 19 MR. WALLEMAt4 Yes. i i 20 Ma. hBARD: It the MCC3 system had been i i j 21 ac tua t ed tutomstically or minu, illy wnen you were in j 22 the piggybick mode, as the ayatom operation much j i i 2J that it would have realigned itso11 from tno I i () 24 piggyuack modo into a stranight high pressure

RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (014)445=d477  ;
COMPUTKRIZHD tRANSCRIPr!ON l i

i l i

89 1 injection system and a low pressure injection system I 2 or would that require nome manual operation? 3 MR. WALLEMAN: The low pressure injection  ; { 4 system wouldn't c o :a e on with ths loval of secustion  ! 5 trist he nad -- tnat we had but the high prosauro 6 injection syntam would have. f 7 So it wouldn' t bo the normai line up d because it would not shutoff the low pressuro 1 9 injection pump or the piggyback valve wouldn't i 10 toolate. 11 MR. DEARD: So the automatic acutation I t 12 would not ettect tne piggyback valve and the system i () IJ would have stayed in its piggyback contiguration? , 14 MR. W A L L E c1 A N s Yas.  : LS MA. DELLS out you would have still pumped 16 water into the coolant? 17 MR. WALLCHAN: Yes, sir. 16 MR. DEARD: Were the systems sligned inne il this, this might ut 4 technicality, but with the 20 systems aligned line that, is i hign pressuro 21 injection system and the low pressure injection 22 system in tne contlyuretion required for them to be 23 considered operablet  ;

                                                                       ?

(]) 24 HR. WALLcMAN: Yes, sir. It I may verity R U N P0 f, A & A!J30CI ATUS (G14)445=3477 COMPUfMR12MD TRANSCRIPf!ON  ! i. L

                   ,                                                                        i 90    i r                                                                                             ,

l 1 that tact. f O

 \

MR. BEARD: Certainly. 2 i 3 Ma. SIMON: Yea. f 4 Ma. utLL: I would lika to take you baca  ! 5 into the event a mLnuto, it I may. You said earltor l i 6 that you observed temperatures as nigh as 590 - 1 7 degrees T aversge. 8 Did that give you any concern or any ot  ! 9 tne operating crew sny concern? 10 MR. WALLEMAN Yes. In my own mind and , 11 from being at tne sinulator and watching an ovent 12 where you went on PORV cooling -- , O 13 Md. BULL Would you describe P0HV cooling, ' 14 e tactly wha t that term moins, pidase?  ; i 15 MH. WALLEMAN Onay. PJHV cooling is - r 16 where you open the PORV, and it is like a teed and  ; 17 bloed oparation and the RC3. 10 You are feeding through the makeup system  ! 19 snd tnrough LPI, 2nd you are removinJ hatt through i 20 the POHV. , 21 MR. HELL do we are emptying tne contents 22 of the HC5 Anto tno quench tann? 23 Ma. WALLCMANs Yes, sir. () 24 MR. uBLLI And we are replenishing tho l HUNT 0LA 6 A350CIAT33 (u14)445-0477  ! COMPUTNR!acD THANJCalv710N t

91 l t i l 1 contents with cool water trom the engineered sitety 2 fetture ayatem? i  ! l 3 MR. WALLCMAN Yes, sir. j ) 4 MR. UCLLI do on.  ; i 5 MR. WALLEMAN Where was I at? , i, 6 MR. LANNING You were describing the == [ j 7 MR. URLL 590 degrees T average, and any . 4 i

i
!                                                      u concerns tnat you or the operating statt may have                 [

t i l 9 had about tnis nigh temperature. l  ! 1 , 10 tlR . WALLEMAN: Okay. Well, as 1 said, in [ 1 1 1 11 the back og my mind, and from being at the simul 4 tor, ( , i' j 12 I nnow tnat when you get up towards about 600 j 13 degrees your saturation pressure ot tne RCS is right ) i i 14 around 1000 pounds. j 15 At that point your itP1 pumps and the PORY l 16 with botn of them in that mode or cooling, it is a 4 } 17 touch and go situation on whetner you can == whether f l 10 it will ctuse pressure or tempersture in the RCD to  ; I i 19 cose down or stay at that level tot a long time or l l 20 posaluly go into a condation shore you start super- i i 21 heating becauso when you open the P0HV like that you f 22 bring the estctor cooltnt system down to its [ I 23 sa tu ra tion, whien tne pressure according to whatever 1 () 24 temperature you have in the RC3. Hunr0LA & Assoc 1ATus (014)445-0477  ; 1 C O M P U t d R i tti D TRANSCRIPTION [

I 92  ! l I 1 At 590, I am not sure wnst it would be,

         )

2 but it would be low 2nough tnat the pressure of the

  )              3       HPI pumps would be able to put in multicient amount i                 4        of water to have the 3 good PORY cooling.                                               !

i I L J 5 Ma. uBLL: 30 was the atsti concerned i

!                6         ibout overheating at the coolor?

7 MR. dALLEMANs Yes, there was some t21k. i 8 Drian Young was particularly -- he had been j i <> watching the temperature come up without anytning hu 1 i I L j 10 could do about it, and he was contending that we  : 1 i 11 ougnt to go into the PORV cooling mode.  !' l

)             12                                                  And the shttt supervisor at the time was       !

j i C) 13 on the phone with the operations engineer, and they i

!             14        were discussing, I baltove, the samo incident                                            l I                                                                                                                 I l             15        althougn 1 didn't hear their phone conversation or i

lo anything line that. 30 he made e suggestion to the t l 17 snitt supervisor thit we ought to go into the mode i l 16 og cooling. .. , l '> MR. ROSS! Who made the suggestion? i

!             20                                                  MM. dALLMMAti     urian Young.
!                                                                                                                 f l              21                                                  Ma. udLL    Do you have proceducidi
22 guidance for this mode o r cooling?
!             23                                                  MM. WALLEMAN      Yose as matter of the EP     I 4

i() 24 1202 it gives you guidance tnat it your steam I RUNFOLA & ADSUCLATH3 (614)445-0477 l I COMPdTHR13CD THANSCHIPf!ON

I 93 1 generators go dry without main and aux teadwatte 2 available, then you are supposed to go into that 3 mode ot cooling. 4 MR. UELL: Was anybody using the EP 12027 5 Ha. WALLEMAN: Yes, we were at tnst point 6 wnen Steve lett to go get -- to find out the 7 stnet-up goodwater avnilsuility, and Brian was a watening the indicators tor to see it tne steam L 9 genuestors were dry. i 10 HR. uBLL: You were at wnst point? 11 HR. WALLEMAN: We were at that point in i 12 the procedure when it was determined main and aux O 13 toedsator availibility and cnock if you don' t havo 14 thi availanility in your senam generators and 1 15 indicsto dry -- it nind og let's you try -- it you 16' don' t nave the availability right away but you still 17 nave level in the steam generators, it gives you 18 time to try to get your teedwater back before you i 19 nave to go into the the PORV cooling. 20 Ma. DEARD: Let me interrupt his train og i-21 thougnt and asx one rignt along tnia line.  ; 22 Are you saying that the w<4y you were  ; 23 carrying out the emergency procedure was thnt the I () 24 assistant shitt supervisor was basically reading it HUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (014)445-0477 COMPUTHH1 ZED TRANSCHIPTION

94 , i 1 out and asking you folks as the operators verify l 2 this or do that and than you were giving him a 3 response back? 4 MR. WALLEMAN Through the procedure, yes. 5 MR.. BEARD: And than when he left the room 6 to go down to the start-up pump, did that have the 7 effect of an interruption in that procedure? 4 8 MR. WALLEMAN: We were at a hold point in 9 the procedure, so, yes, I guess it was an 10 interruption in the procedure. 11 MR. USARD: Do you remember roughly how 12 long he was out of the room or before he returned to - 13 that proceduro? , 14 MR. WALLEMAN I imagine approximately , 15 seven minutes, eight minutes.  ! 16 HR. LANNING: When you say tha t .you were f 17 in a hold point in the proceduce, what do you' moan? [ l 13 MR. WALLEMAN: It was at the point where 19 it said in the procedure, determine-main and aux 20 feedwater capability. And if you don' t have aux and 21 main.feedwater capability, our procedure is setup 22 witn the notes or the actions on the left and the 23 guidelines on the right. () 24 On the right on the guideline it-says l HUtlPOLA & ASSOCIATBS (614)445-3477  ! COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION L

95 1 actions can be made to restore aux feedwater or main (V^)

2 feedwater while at this point unloas the steam 3 generators are dry or steam generator level is low 4 and the pressure is decreasing below -- I don't 5 remamber the value but 920 or some value similar to 6 that.

7 MR. LANNING: So when would you g 3t back 8 into the procedure? 9 MR. WALLEMAN: Once you restored your main 10 feedwater, then you would be back at tnat point or 11 aux teedwater, go on from there. I 12 MR. LANNING: If you do not restore main O 13 feedwater? 14 Ma. WALLEMAN: At that point, you wold end 15 up going -- tno way the procedure is setup, if you 16 do one thing it might route you t o a n o t t. s r part of 17 the procadure or if you do snotnar you would go on 18 with the steps just below it. So at that point it 19 would reroute you to another part or tne procedure. 20 MR. BEARD: So is it correct then at this 21 point in the procedure you were maxing the attempt 22 to restoro feedwater? 23 MR. WALLEMAN yas, sir. () 24 MR. BEARD: And that you would continue in RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i

96 1 that mode until you reached a point wnere tne [v~j 2 procedure would then: require you to entor the teod-3 and bleed mode? In other words -- 4 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 5 MR. BEARD: You had some window in tnere. 6 I a m ' t r'y i n g to get at and to restore it. It wasn't 7 an unlimited period of.timo?

              >8                           MR. WALLEMAN:                                                            No, sir.

9- MR. BEARD: And that window would be, I 10 guess, the end point- of : tha t window would be at the 11 point thst not one but-both steam generators had 12 quote, dried'out, unquoto? O 13 MR. WALLEMAN:. Yes, sir. 14 MR. BEARD:' Do you beliovo you ever hit

            ' 15      ,t h a t as far as you were aware, that and point?

16 MR. WALLEMAN: I don't believe.so because 17 ' Brian was monitoring that, and he said we'still had 18 it available. 19 MR. BEARD: Okay. 20 MR. WALLEMAN: I didn't look at'the gauges 21 myself. 22 MR. BEARD: I understand. So as far as-23 the emergency procaduras go, .you woro in the part of () 24 it that said you don' t "have main and. auxiliary feed, RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-6477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION L_--- u---.-.---__..-__--.--._._..___.___-.-----------_____.-..-___----___________-------a

97

    -~            l  'you should try to restore it?

2 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes. 3 MR. BELL: I am satisfied with that, those

                 -4   answers.         May I go to another area now.

5 -Rick, you said you went on this shift as a 6 rea c tor opera tor. in January-of '857-

                 ~7                    MR. WALLEMAN:            Yes.

8' MR. BELL:- When did you rocaive your 9 license? 10 MR. WALLEMAN: January of '85. 11 MR. BELL: So you received your license 12 one day, one day you are a non-licensed ope ra tor and 13 the next day.you are a licensed operator? 14 I realize tha t's a simplistic s ta temen t, 15 'but:did you have sny training period between the t-16 time you were licensed and the time you were

               '17    assignad shift responsibilities as.a reactor 18    operator?

l 19 , MR. WALLEMAN:. Well,' you go through a 20 training program before you -- 21 MR.' BELL: I understand that. ' . 22 MR. WALLEMAN: I will answer-thafguestion. 23 N o '. . 24- ~MR . BEARD: 'No-additional ^ training. t . .

l. RUNFOLA &-ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477

( LCOMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION L -

93

      'l              MR. WALLEMAN:     No, sir.

{" v 2 MR. BELL: No additional training after 3 receiving your license. 4 Now, you are required to spend three 5 months on snitt under tha guidance of a licensed 6 operator as one of the conditions to obtain a 7 license. 8 MR. WALLEMAN: 480 hours I believe of on 9 shift instruction. I am not sure if that is three 10 months or not. 11 MR. BELL: Your number is probably closer 12 than mine. (b

  \  13              MR. SIMON:     520.

14 MR. WALLEMAN: Sorry. I knew it was a lot 15 of hours. 16 MR. BELL: Was that beneficial? 17 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 18 MR. BELL: In this 520 hours that you 19 spend on shift are casualty proceduras studied on 20 the guidance of the reactor operator? 21 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 22 MR. BELL: Is there any qualification, 23 guide or cards that you have to complete during this

  ,m q) 24  520 hour period?

l RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (G14)445-8477 j COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l

4 99

                        'l                          MR. WALLEMAN:                    Y6s, sir.

1 2 MR. BELL: Do they include a discussion'of i 3 control room ins trumen ta tion and when it would be i l' 4 used and what it would be used for? ' Yes, sir. 5' MR. WALLEMAN: e 6 MR. BEARD: Is that instrumentation 7 section~ divided out'into safety related 8 ins trume n ta tion andethings such as the non-nuclear l' , 9 ins trumen ta tion system? i . . . i

                                                                                    .T h. e whole control room is 10                          .MR. WALLEMAN:1 11     se tup' into different systems and each time'that you 12     get a system-checke-d out.--it aska-for interlocks the i.

Q 13 otner. system, control room indications, functions of ' 4 i

14 the system and-it is pretty complete.

l 15 MR. ~ BELL: You told us you were in the i i 16 Navy for eight years.- 7 l 17 MR. WALLEMAN: 1Yes, sir. i. 18 -MR. BELL: What was yourLrank when you I 19 were discharged-from'the. Navy? L 20 MR. WALLEMAN: E-6. 21 MR. BELL: Wha t - ra ting?

                      '22                           MR. . WALLEMAN:                 ' Nuclear electronica 23     technician, but'I was a. reactor operator.

( - 24 MR. BELL: You weresa reactor operator J. RUNFOLA'& ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED' TRANSCRIPTION-t

             ,,,,l-,8              . . - - , - , ~ ,     .,    -, ,. ,-,.i              .., ~ . -                , - . .   . . . - ,       , , , ,         . . . , . - - . ~ , . . . , .
   . _   .       ~  .
                             ~ _         _ - -                     .._.        _.               ,.--.__._,_.___._m.

t 4 100 i i

. 1 there?

I Yes, sir. 2 MR. WALLEMAN: 3 MR. BEARD: If there'are no other 4 .: 4 questions? Anybody around the table have a question? . 5 MR. BURNS: I have just got a couple at 3 6 the end I will ask. 4 7 MR. BSARD: Okay. I would like to be sure 8 that you have tne opportunity, Rick, either with d

 ;                        9    ' Louie hace or without, as you may preter, to just                                                                                               ,

10 for us to ask you the question and let you respond i 11 .as you may choose, is there anything that you would i 12 care to share'with us that you think wo need to know '

i - o 13 to understand the event or~the plant situations that 14 may have lad to the even t
or -is there anything else  ;

i 1. 4 15- that you would like to just say: to us of.anything

16 related at all?

f

                      - 17                         Just, we have been asking you questions.

l 18 I want to be sure you have an opportunity to toll i j 19 this panel, this - Fact Finding Team,'anything you ( 20 would lixe for us to know?; 21 MR. WALLEMAN: I wodld~like you-to,know 22 that,I have done this of myfown volition. They have 23 not prompted me into -this, a ttending this interview. '

     'O                 24       1 am very nervoes about ie.                                                        And I have- been -- I
                                               ' R U N F O L A'_ & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION t

101 1 have tried to De very straight forward with you. (N

  %)                                                                                                      \

2 And as f ar as the incident that day, that 3 was my first trip. It was awesomme. I was really ) 4 surprised, but I was never worried not during the J + 5 whole incident that we had ever released radiation 6 to the public. 7 I did not want to get into PORV cooling, 8 but I realized that may ~become a necessity oecause l 9 of the clean up involved but during the whole 10 incidant tha t happened I felt worried but relatively 1 11 calm.

.           12             MR. BEARD:                      Was your assessment after 4

13 naving gone through it of this a very severe 14 situation or medium transient routine thing or what 15 did you feel like a bou t -wha t' you had been through? s 16 MR. WALLEMAN: I was, to be perfectly 17 franx, I was surprised that tne amount of things 18 that went wrong during the trip. 19 MR. BEARD: Are you talking about 20 equipment failure or other. types of failures? 21 MR. WALLEMAN: Just the equipment failures. 22 -I was surprised at the amount but -our equipment 23 operators did a fine job. Steve-Feasal, our (') 24 assistant shift supervisor,"did an outstanding job, RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES _(614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

I 102 1 and I believe that.we recovered fairly well. 2 I think that the problems had to be 1 3 figured out, but I nave no doubt tnat I would go 4 back into the plant today with no worrios. 5 MR. BEARD: As I sit here looking at you 6 concantrating on your answer I can't help but notice 7 you have got on a blue shirt. I will just be very 8- blunt and ask you straight out, it is my personal

         '9   understanding at least that the re < - - the union 10    contract is about to expire and that management has 11    introduced some changas that would relate to, say, i

l 12 the blue shirt, rumors about the possibilities of a 4 o 13 strike may occur next month. 14 Can you tell us anything of your own l 15 feelings as.to what this environment may'have } } 16 related to the event or may have been' independent of I 17 the event? 18 MR. WALLEMAN: I think it ~ was totally 19 unrelated to'the event. Once you are in a situation-

20 like that, your total concentration is on that.evant, 21 and I bear no; animosity for'.the-wearing of ~ t h's t

f 22 uniforms. My job is my . job, and.I try_to do it as

23 'best I can.

() 24 MR.'LANNING: Has-it made any. impact on

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, COMPUTERIZED. TRANSCRIPTION L

t 103

  -~

l plant operations or maintenance activities or other i' I 2 day-to-day activities prior to the event? 3 MR. WALLEMAN: No. Granted whenever you - 4 have a contract dispute there is going to be a

.                                                                               5       little animosity, but I have seen nothing in respect 6       to paople paying any disrespect for equipmant or for 7      . their supervisors or anything like that.                        I.have
8 found that not to be the case.

.; 9 MR. LANNING: Do you believe that the l 10 equipment is maintained adequately and in a timely 11 fashion 7 l 12 MR. WALLEMAN: That's a tough question 13 with anything like that, because with any type of -- { 14 wnenever something is broken, you have in the back 15 of your mind that the feeling that it can.De down,

!                                                                     16                could be fixed quicker or this is our gaar and we 17                 are important; it snould be fixed rignt away.
18 I think that we have a good maintenance j 19 de pa r tm en t , and the plant does its best. See, I am 20 Kind of used to eight years in the Navy. . When f

21 something broke, you shutdown tne engine room.- You l 22 fixed it right then, and you stayed still in the 23 watar unti1'something was fixed, and it is not quite () 24 . that fast in the civilian world. I RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

              ;-        - - -      .-.     . . - -- ~ . - . - - -        .               . - - . ~ . .                       ~ .                        .

104 MR. ROSSI: Do you find a signiticant { l 2 difference between how long it taxes to fix 3 equipment tnat you find a problem with nere tnan you 4 found in the Navy then? 5 MR. WALLEMAN: It taxes longer.

6 MR. ROSSI
Can you say by how much?

7 MR. WALLEMAN: No, it would depend on what s ! 8 it is and the availability of it. I wouldn' t even- , 9 be able to tell you. I just know that it is Kindsof i j 10 nard to gauga it. I did that. I. don't know if I  ! I 11 should nave, r f i 12 I did that because I was used to that f o r' i 13 eight years, and it is not as tast, but I think that i 14 it is done to the best of the ability.of the people I 15 and the_ availability of supplias in this area. 16 MR. BEARD: Along that line, what type _of-17 snip or craft were you on in the Navy, was it a 18 surface vassel or submarines? 19 MR. WALLEMAN: I was on two ditteront 20 submarines. 21 MR. BEARD: Submarine duty? ' 22 MR. WALLEMAN Yeo, sir. 23 MR. BEARD:~ Rick, going back to your Navy 4 () 24 experience in. submarines, I was not in the Navy. I RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 ! COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 4

                                                                   ,w ..,-.g ,,-..--e          ,n  - . - - , - . , - , - , -w--.--,   , - - - - - - - -

105 (' s 1 was in the Air Force so tha t's why I want you to 2 help me understand. 3 But here at the Davis-Bosso plant we are 4 ta1xing about a largo land basad commerchal electric 5 generating station. We are not t a l f. i n g about a 6 submarine. 7 And I believe I would like to ask you it 8 tne submarine situation is not of a different 9 significance than for a commercial olectric power 10 generating station and hence the importance of 11 prompt maintenance may be differont? 12 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, it is very much O 13 different. Your lite is directly on the line, and 14 this is probably why I don't even though it was my 15 first trip and everything, I didn't get quite as 16 nervous as I have been in the service cocause there 17 are times when you trip tha t you botter respond 18 quickly in the service. 19 And it is not the same here. It is the 20 same, but it is not -- the me it is safer. 21 MR. BEARD: I understand. I wanted to get 22 in perspectivo my own feeling that the promptness of 23 . maintenance in a tactical situation lixe a submarino (A) 24 is not necessarily tnat is required for a commercial RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l l

106 1 generating situation. 2 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir. 3 MR. BEARD: ll a v a we finishad that? I have 4 the one question I snapped my finger a t a minute ago. 5 Somsbody brought up the question with 6 maintaining the uquipmant. As I unde rs ta nd it, 7 during the operation prior to the event one of the 8 source range nuclear instrumentation was 9 misbahaving'and declared inoperable and that would 10 be on your wa tch~ s ta tion , so to speak, right? 11 MR. WALLEMAN: Um-hmm. 12 MR. BEARD: Was that true? 13 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir.

 ~

14 MR. BEARD: I unde rs ta nd also that during 15 the decay of the nuclear systam you went through the

                                                                 ~

16 intermediato nuclear ranga changes and decayed down 17 and got into the' source _ range channals? 18 MR. WALLEMAN:. Yes,' sir.- 19 MR. BEARD: Can you toll us how the source 20 range nuclear instruments behavod? 21 MR. WALLEMAN: The one that had been

         .22 I do cla red inoperable was indicating a level, but
23 since it had-bean declared inoperable we.didn't 4

l () -24 trust it. The other sour:e range.was not indicating l RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 l ' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION l r I L _

Y 107 (~S 1 a lavel at all. V . 2 MR. ROSSI: I t. was down scale or up scalo? 3 MR. WALLEMAN: It was down scale. i 4 MR. BEARD: So that was obviously an 5 inordinate reading. 6 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. I went in tha 7 back. This was after the aituation had been 3 remadiod and prassure was c o n t r o ll i tig normal, and wa 9 nad taad costor2d. I wont in the back and looked in 10 the RPS cabinet where the power supplies are for the 11 detactor, and I noticed that it d :L d have tha normal 12 power supply and that the detector was not in test. O 13 So I don't know wnat was wrong with it, 14 but it was definitely wrong at the time. 15 MR. BEARD: Thun as I understsnd it, you 16 are in a situation wnere tna neutron level is in 17 range for which you are not covered by operabla ld ins trumon ta tion? 19 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes. 20 MR. BEARD: Does that Kick you into some i 21 emergency procedure of sny typo? 22 MR. WALLEMAN: The assistant shift 23 suparvisor got out the AB for tnat and we -- no () 24 determined that we should omergency borato. RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

       .       . . ~_     -       -                 -    -

108 l MR. BEARD: Would that action occur on (~ 2 your watch station? 3 MR. WALLEMAN: Yas, sir. 4 MR. BEARD: That would be something you 5 would do? 6 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 7 MR. BEARD: What did you do? 8 MR. WALLEMAN: I initiated boration. 9 MR. BEARD: Initiated boration? f 10 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes. 11 MR. ROSSI: That'e through the makeup? 12 MR. WALLEMAN: It is not -- what it is is , 13 just oorating above a certain level, a cartsin rate. 14 Tha rate is like la gallons per minu to . I was about 15 25 gallons per minute. 16 MR. ROSSI: Tha t's through the makeup 17 pumps you do that? 18 MR. WALLEMAN: I do the makeup pumps, but 19 it wasn't through that. It was through the msxeup 20 system. You have boric acid pumps available which 1 21 and up getting recycled into the RCS. 22 MR. BELL: By makeup pumps? 23 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. () 24 MR. BEARD: So I guess I just want you to RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-3477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

109 S 1 continue that smorgency procedure or abnormal (G 2 procedure whatever it was, it required emergency 3i caration. Tha t was done. Was there anytning alse? 4 MR. WALLEMAN: I don't know. I initiated 5 tns boration, and I Know that wa had an NINC person 6 troubleshooting the event, and it was later that we 7 ended up gatting our NI's back. He was in the 3 procedure, and I assume that ne would taxe care of 9 tha t portion of it. 10 MR. BEARD: Did this failure of the source 11 ranga ensnnel occur during tne middle of tha event 12 or after things had stablized? 13 MR. WALLEMAN: It nad occurred during tha 14 middle of tne event. At least I think so, after 15 tnings nad stablized was waan I noticed it or when 16 it wss noticed, but it had occurred -- I assume it 17 nad occurred earlier. la MR. BEARD: But you didn't notico it until 19 atter things had stablized? 20 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 21 MR. BELL: I nave one final question? 22 During this ovent you have had one and sometimes two 23 max 2up pumpn running. (]) 24 Have you nad to make up to the makeup tank RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION i

110 1 or do you have an alternate source ot suction to the 2 maxeup pumps at this point? 3 MR. WALLEMAN: It is tnrough tne BWST, an 4 alternate source. 5 MR. BELL: Did you use that from tha 6 bora te d water storago? 7 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 3 MR. BELL: Yot another manual action you 9 had to perform? 10 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 11 MR. BELL: And the boric acid in the 12 borated water storage tank is higner tnan tne O 13 concentration in the manoup tank? 14 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 15 MR. BELL: So you had additional shu'tdown 16 margin from thit? 17 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. As a matter of 18 tact, when we received our first asmple from C&HP 19 for RCF boron, I did a shutdown margin calculation 20 and without considering any of the effects due to 21 Xenon we were approximately one and a half to 22 two-tnirds snutdown. 23 MR. BELL: And you are required to be one (( ) 24 parennt shutdown? RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 , COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

111 1 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir.

       )

2 MR. BEARD: So as far as you are concerned 3 the boration did adequately mitigated any concern

4 about loss of nuclear instrumancation?

i ' 5 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. i 6 MR. LANNING: Ara there high point-vonts 7 on the cooling system? i 8 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. ! 9 MR. BEARD: Are they operable? i i } 10 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. i l 11 MR. LANNING: Arc there procedures for i 12 their use?

- 13 MR. WALLET 1AN
Yes, in.the emergency

{ 14 procedure when you get during the la ter stages of -- 1 j 15 I think it is during insdoquate core cooling it was ! 16 not normally used and something I would.have to i s 17 review to tell you tnat. e 18 MR. BELL: . I t'h i n k it should be pointed 19 out tha t tna t's not an immediate action so you are f 20 not required to commit that to memory. Tha t's a l 21 supplementary action and procedure. l 22 MR. LANNING: The intent of the question i 2 23 was-was there a procedure for the use of the high. I i

h. 24 point vents?

! RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION { i.

                                                           .2

112 r' 1 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. (_) 2 MR. BURNS: Did you discuss wnst you were 3 going to say here today with anyone before tne 4 interview? 5 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir. For one thing I 6 didn' t know want I was going to discuss noro today. 7 MR. BURNS: So no one trom the licensaa or 8 licensee council has told you wnat to say here today? 9 MR. WALLEMAN: No, sir, I was just 10 prompted to be nonest. 11 MR. BURNS: You discuaned interviews of 12 Brian Young or Stove Feasel or Ted Lehman had with 13 tnem? 14 MR. WALLEMAN: Not the questions they were 15 anxing but how did the interview go. 16 MR. BURNS: How it was conducted and how I ! 17 it went? 13 MR. WALLEMAN: Yes, sir. 19 MR. BURNS: Thank you. 20 MR. ROSSI Are wo finishod? 21 MR. BEARD: I think so other than I would 22 lixe to enank Rick for coming, and I would lixo to 23 tusnk him for his honesty. I think it was obvious () 24 you are making a valient attempt to be as honest and RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)44S-8477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

+

113 1 tax your memory. 2 I think you have done an outstanding job. 3 Thank you. l 4 MR. ROSSI: Off the record. 5 - - - - - 6 Thereupon, tne interview was 7 concluded at 1:45 o' clock p.m. a - - - . . 9 10 , d 11 12 ' l 13 14

;            15 16 17 i

i 18

  • 19 20 21 22 23 O 24  :

RUNPOLA & ASSOCIATES (614)445-8477 ' COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION 7

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114 1 CERTIFICATE 2 I, Kim E. Snyder, a Registerad 3 Protossional Reporter and Notary Public in and tor 4 tha State at Ohio, do hareby cortify that I took tho 5 intarview ot Richard Wa11 aman and tnst tne toregoing 6 transcript or such procaadings is a full, trua and 7 correct transcript or my stenotypy notas as so taxan. 8 I do further cortity that I was esllad 9 thero in tne capacity of s Registered Proteselonal 10 Reporter, and am not otherwise in tu res to d in this 11 proceeding. 12 IN WITNESS W it E R E O P , I nave hereunto sat my ('" ) 13 nand and attixad my saal or ottice at Columbus, onio, 14 on this 17 day of 3J_j,__

                                                           /       _ _ _ _
                                                                            ,  1985.

15 /) 16 _,_ Kip d _ __ _ E. SNYDQt, Ra Latered [_ ___ _______ 17 Pr tassional Reporter, Notary Public in sad tor the State of onio. 10 19 My Commission oxpiros Janusry 12, 1389. 20 21 22 23 2: k_/ RUNFOLA & ASSOCIATES (014)445-6477 COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION

Pa,o Linn

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