ML20072B158

Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR72 on List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks:Addition

ML20072B158
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	08/09/1994
From:	Kline C Sierra Club
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-59FR28496, RULE-PR-72 59FR28496-00007, 59FR28496-7, NUDOCS 9408160018
Download: ML20072B158 (6)

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(54FR2k/%) 00CiUED S SIERRA CLUB

• Connie Kline, Northeast Ohio f i

Nuclear Committoa i 38531 Dodds Landin0 Dr .a^3

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Wiloughby Hills, OH 44094 pag.n= brand tax transrnittat rnerno /on lm=va " (p 216-946-9012 (Ph. & FAX) .

8/9/94  !

po pou 4 T/Nfr4 'SEgf7c4 COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE ' LIST OF APPROVED SPENT FUEL STORAGE CASKS: ADDITION" 59 Federal Register 28496, 6/2/94

1. The following excerpts from 10 CFR 72 deal directly with siting issues and indirectly with pefwianency issues which are the subject of several current lawsults (Kelley v. Sehn filed in May 1993, State of Michigan, et al v U S. DOli et al, and Northern States Power Co., et al v. U.S. DOE, both of '

which were filed 6/20/94.) Discushion pertinent to Davis Besse follows.

72.24(al 'A descriptio:. and safety 9msessment of the oito on which the ISFSI or MRS is to be located.. Ifthe proposed ISFSI or MRS is to be located on the site of a nuclear power plant or other licensed facility, the potential Interactions t;etween the ISP51 c,- MRS and such other facility must be evaluated?

72.40fc) 'For facilities that have byen covered dnder previous licensing actions, including issuaned of a construction permit under Part 50 of his chapter, a reevaluation of the site is not required except wher6 new information is discovered which could after the original site evaluation findings. In this case, the site e t-dation i

factors involved will be reevaluated.' .

Soh=t E - 79 Sofe)(f) " Pursuant to Subpart A of Part 51 of this chapter for each proposed site for an ISFSt...the potential for radiological a@ other environmental impacts on the region must be evaluated with due oonsideration of the characteristios of the popu'ation, including its distribution, and of the regional environs, including its historical and esthetic values. The facility must be sited so as to avoid to the extent possible the long-term and short twem adverse Impacts associated with occupe.ncy and modification of floouplains.'

72 96folf2)(31' Consideration of prpsent and projected future uses of land and water within the regio,and any special characteristics that may mfluence the potential consequences of a rmense of radiomotive matalal during the operational Itfotirrie of the ISFSI or MRS?

72.100 fbi'Esch site must be evalysted with respect to the effects on the regional environment...both usual and unusual regional and site charadertstics must be taken into account? ,

N 1'"fal(1)(d)* East of the Rocky Mt. Front, sites will be acceptable if the results from on alte foundation and geological investigation, literature review, and regional geologloal reconnaissance show no unhable  !

geological characteristes, soll stabily problems or potential for vibratory ground motion a the site in excess l of an appropriate resporne spectrun1 anchored at o 2g.... Site spectfM investigations and laboratory an es 4 must show that soll conditions are a$ equate for the proposed foundation loading?

72,122(b)(4Mgl'lf the ISFSI or MRS is located over an aqutfor which is a major water resource. mm ouros must be taken to preclude the transport of radioactive materials to tne environment through this po.tential pathway...An ISFSI or MRS located n par other nuclear facilities must be designed and operated to ensu(e that the cumulattva effects of their combitted operations will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the heal @ and safety of the publio? ,

D_2S6fm) 'To the extent practledble in the design of storage casks, considera compatibility with removal of the storkd spent fuel from a reactor site, transportation, and uttimate dispon by the Department of Energy?

DispuSSION OF DAVIS BESSE BITE I As you know, the Environntental Impact Statement for Davis Besse was done some 20iyears ioldor ago before the Standard Review Phn was instituted. According to ractors were I; censed under currantly outdated environmental guidelines and couldn't be built o the Army Corps of

) present sites today. At the reqyest of the International Joint Commission (which has califc for  ;

! aliminston of radioisotopes from the Great Lakes ecosystem), the Army Corps of Engineers trade a

( dstalled study of the Great Lakeg shoreline which was published in 1993. However, the de{ta for

Ottawa County, Ohio were never published e4 thor because the Corps ran out of time or money.

Davis Besse was built in a marthy wetlands floodplain. You are undoubtedly aware of the revere r 9408160018 940809 PDR PR 72 59FR28496 PDR v1f l/

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Lake Erie storm in October 1972 which caused 300 feet of dike to break, submerging the entire plant site, including the reactor building and forcing people to be evacuated by air or boat; fortunately the plant was pre-operational. There has been serious subsequent flooding of Davis Besse, particularly during spring thaws when roads leading to and from the plant are impassable due to water lpels.

Given the fact that there is not now und thtne may never be a permanent HLRW repository for commercial reactor fuel and the fact that the NUHOMS 24P and 52B casks are non-transportable, any distinction between so called " temporary storage" and " permanent disposal" of this waste is rt}oot.

The Davis Besse site cannot even meet the NRC's bare minimum siting criteria for an above or b;.ow-ground " low-level" radioactive waste disposal facility per 10 CFR 61 which "contains connmon conse siting twquirements (that) the NRC views as minimum...whether or not engineered enhancements (concrete) are used. The NRC siting requirements are primarily directed at aspects to be avoided:

A. Sites should be avoided (with) known natural resources.

B. A prospective site must be well-drained and free of flooding or frequent ponding.

C. The otto abould be located far enough above the water table to prevent ground water intrusion.

D. Sites and areas where seismic activity and erosion.. occur...must be avoided." (1) ,

In several documents, the NRC, itsett, opposes at-reactor storage of LLRW *tjeyond 5 years us u significant safety and environmental matter that would oivert the plant operator from its main task of reactor operation and make it difficult to determine if radioactive releases were from the reactor or the i foo!!ity * (2) From 10 CFR 81, " Bites must not be located in areas where nearby facilities...could signlicantly mask or interfere with the disposal facility's enWronmental monitoring program."

A May 24,1988 study (attached) entitled "An Evaluation of the Four Licensed and Operating Nuclear Power Plant Sites in Schigan for Co-Location of LLRW lsolation Facility' prepared by Environmental Resources Management for the Michigan LLRW Authority concluded:

None of the four nuclear pow plants in Michigan are suitable sites for co-location j of a LLRW isolation faclity (due to) intense geological processas such as mass wasting, erosion, poor drainage...the shoreline setting of each of the nuclear power plants does  !

not offer the safety and secug'ity of altemative non-shore sites. Wind driven flooding and solches will undoubtabt/ play an important role in the integrtty and longevity of the site and facility throughout its life.

The NRC is also aware of the 12/30/93 letter (attached) from U S. EPA Region 5 Regional Administrator Valdas Adamkus to the NRC which states:

Your agency has assessed dry cask storage systems genoncalty and has also evaluated the environmentalimparts of them Genericaly. We believe the potential for significant adverse impaal to otther Lake Michigan or the Mississippi River (valuable natural resources providing drinking water and recreational opportunit4s for many people) is real and was not fulty assessed in the generic environmental assessrnent prepared for the dry cask etoinge process...The alte specific conditions and the valuable resources of Lake Michigan and the Mississippi River warrant a tuli and comple:e evaluation of the impacts and review oy other Federal and State agencies as well as the interested public.

The 1/30/94 reply to Mr. Adarpkus from the NRC's Robert Bemero is completely inadequate as is the NRC's March 1994 ' Draft Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant impact" because no consideration is given to the site's unsuitability even for LLRW per the NRC's own admission, and "new information which could alter the original site evaluation findings" (see holow) is ignored. Per recent phone conversations, the U.S. EPA considers this matter unresolved.

Below are several findindof fact from court documents presented during the September 1986 and June 1987 hearing's regarding LLRW sludge disposal on site at Davis Besse wnich the State of Ohio vioorously opposed. These constitute "new information...both usual and unusual regional and site characteristics...which could after the origina! site evaluation findings...and must be taken into

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account."

A. State expert witnesses, Mr. Pavey and Mr. Guy, geologists, and Mr. Voytek, a hydrologist, were astonlehed that TE had provided no hydrology study and stated that TC's geological otudios dono in 1970 related to construction of Davis Besse were inadequate and outdated and revealed a limited understanding of soil types, permeabihty, water flow pattems on site, underground aqurfers in the Neverre Marsh aroa and response to changes in Lake Eris levals or to flooding. Former Attomey General Celebrezze described TE's geology studies as ' cursory, flawed, oversimplified, and superficial." (Transcript, p. 49)

5. The State of Ohio testifled that there had been major technical and equipment advancements in th3 last decade in both geology and hydrology. The process of deep excavat!on in the past usua!!y emeared evidence of sand and gravel layers, of cracks, of soll permeability, and of tiny water flow pathways. Bore fogs were frequently deceptive where parts of the core were missing.

C. The State pointed out the simliarity of till, glaciolacustrine, clay and sand pattoms of soils for the whole Great Lakes area and especially for Ottawa County with its widespread marsh areas. The State reviewed evidence of earty glacial movements in soil pattems and concluded that there was an upper tiil aquifer which, when saturated. drained into Lake Erie. the Navarre Marsh, and the Toussaint River.

D. The State cited Indications of drainage pathways - some lateral and then verticalinto ground water and the bedrock lower aquifer. Mr. Pavey insisted that by all indications, the water in the glacial sediments connected to the bedrock. Using "The Soit Survey of Ottawa County" by Gordon and Huebner, the State supponed its findings of cracks, tractures, thin seams, lenses, und former tree root flow paths (from sady forests) to acoount for drainage down to the ground water aquifer from the till above. Even one of TE's own borings (B-125, ATEC Assoc., Inc.,1974) documented the presence of send layers.

E. Both the State of Ohio and TE agreed that the limestone-dolomite bedrock was highty permeable and that ground water levels were responsive to weather, seasons, Lake levels, river lovvis, and marshlands. When high northeast winds raise the Lake Erie water levels at the west end, the groundwater levels also rise. After a storm, the flow of both gradually reverse. TE verified the extent of the ground water systom anct its permoability from the wide radius affected by its dewatering procedures in the earty 1970's. The State observed that ground water was released into Lake &ie through the permeable bedrock that extends into the Lake. The State contended that all of northwestem Ohio depended on the same groundwater bedrock aquifer system which included the entire Ottawa Marsh area.

Duo to the lack of a permanont repository or MRS any time in the foreseeable future, the distinction between so-calloc " temporary storage" and permanent radioactive waste disposal are mere semantics especially in the case at a serious spill and resultant contamination at an environmentally unsultable site like Davis Sosse where 'short and long-term adverse impacts associated with occupancy and modification of (a) floodplain... potential retsase of radioactive material during the lifetime of the ISFSt...(and location) over an aquifor which is a major water resource" have been inadequatery dealt with.

Furthermore,

• projected futura uses of land and water within the region" are impossible to make

'Diven the unknown length of time this waste may remain on site and the options for both capk and reactor license renewal beyond 20 and 40 years respectively and the fact that no known man-made structure can last for the lengtt) of time that this waste must be isolated from humans and the erivironment. If an MRS or repoottory ever become available, this waste may have to be repacked.

Each handl!ng of this waste incresses thelikelihood of an accident, spill, contamination, worker and/or public exposure.

Decommissioning and decontamination of reactors and reactor sites remains uncertain at best.

9.2 and 9.3 of the Dra*t SER state,"At this time, it is not known whether demolition and removal of the HSM can be performed by conventional methods...The reinforced structure of the HSM, for examp!e, will require consloerabio effort to demolish." of course, in its typical fashion of putting off until tomorrow what it cannot deal with today, the NRC considers " ease of decommissioning (a) secondary

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, consideration."

(( You are aware of the controversy regarding whether 10 CFR 72.48 which pertains to Specific Uconses can be used by those issued General Licensue under Subparts K and L. This issue remainr, unresolved because the NRC General Counsel has not issued a legal interpretation despite a 2/14/P4 request to do so from the NHC's Charles Haughney (copy attached). Because this issue can only be resolved through NRC rulemaking; inclusion of tha text of 10 CFR 72.48 as # 9 in Draft Certifice 1004 for the NUHOMS-24P and 528 casks is improper.

In a 10/1/92 NRC memoranduryi regarding a 7/24/92 meeting with Pacific Nuclear Fuei services

nc. (now VECTRA) regarding certification of the NUHOMS cask, the NRC states. "The only way ttlat j 10 CPR 72 48 mav De involved is via a site-soecfic license."  ;

in a 1/31/94 NRC letter, the NFC states. "Subcarts K and L of 10 CFR Part 72 are silent on cas_k l JAR and certficate chances after the final rule. The NRC staff is currentht contemolatino rutemdina ,

m clartfv these issues." l A 6/3/94 rnemorandum from Mr. Sturz to Mr. Haughney regarding a 5/19/94 meeting between the NRC and SNC stated:

8taff indicated that it had wntten a memo to the Office of Generaj Counsel requesting an interpretation of the applicabi; tty of 72.48, that it had not yet receNed a repty to the request, that tne licensee can make its own interoretation of the reautationt and that rulemaking rnay be considered to clanty the regulation.

Pacific Serra Nuclear (SNC) re%ed that the Arkansas Nuclear P! ant (ANO) need to load two casks before its next outap presently scheduled for March 1995. The utility wants to us,e the longer VSC 24 cask currently the subject of the requested amendment 1 to the SAR. In order to meet this schedule, caska are needed by this fall.

A 6/2/94 louer from Entergy Op' erations informs NRC's Robed Bemero that it intends to make modificatons to the VSC 24 SAR for use at ANO by applying the provisions of 10 CFR 72.48, that based on its 10 CFR 72.48 evaluat>on, Entstgy had directed SNC to begin fabricating fourteen casks of increased length to accommodyte ANO's longer CE 16 x 16 fuel, and that Entergy intends to ,

continue using 10 CFR 72.45 in the future. I in his 214 cleerty arefno/94 memo to the NRC's General Counsel, Mr. Haughney states, "This section lles to soecific licensees issued individual licencan under Part 72." Yet the 6/3/94 NRC memorenc um from Sturz to Haughhey cooms to give General Ucensees the green light to interpret 10 CFR 72.48 as they see fit before the General Counsel rules on that part of the Code.

There is no provision in Subparts K or L of 10 CFR 72 that permit a General Ucensee to change o vendor's SAR. Nor do subparts K or L allow a vendor to modify its SAR or C of C. Cask vendors ara not licensed under 10 CFR 72;40. The site specific license provisions of 10 CFR 72 apply to operators of spent fuel storage installations not to cask vondors.

Since the Code la silent on a process to change a generic cask design by changing an SAR or a C of C, the NRC must use a rulemaking procedure which provides for public comment and proprietary release To issue a general license to a car k vendor so a cask can be used anywhere and then to permit virtually unlimited site specific changes is contradictory and not in keeping with the intent of gene'ic rulemaking. The cask vendors, the NRC, and the utilities can't have it both ways.

/ Trenefer cask and related lesyse:

A.10 CFR 72.234(c) states, "Fabrigation of casks under C of C must not start prior to receipt of the C of C for the cask model." Tho NRC has just granted VECTRA an exemption to begin tran6fer cask fabrication (but not use) "to have the necessary equipment.available for use by DBNPS in mid-1995, cnd thus enable DBNPS to ma:ntain cornplete full-core off-load capabiltty in its spent fuel pool fonowing the refueling outaos scheduled for early 1996." This is yet annthar example of the NRC allowing the vendor to put the cart t)efore the horse, bending NRC rules to facilitate the perpetuation of the indus*ry. Seeking public comment appears to be nothing more than going through the motions and providing comments is an exercise in futility because cask approval seems to be a fait accompli.

aM r -x e 08/11/94 05:18 2169469012 Page 5 of 6 - Kline The situation is similar to utilities supposedly proceeding at their own risk under limited work authorizations prior to issuance of a reactor construction license. Once the investment was made, a construction license was was a certainty as is a certificate of compliance.

B. It is our understanding that one transfer cask will be shared by several nuclear power plants around the country. We are concerned that in tho event of problems and the need to off-load the fuel (as le Mrrecent situation at Palisades), a transfer cask may not be available in a timely manner due to inclement weather or beccuse the TC, itself, has experienced problems or is being used elsewhere.

C. We are concemed that the crane used for fuel handling in the spent fuel pool building is a single failure-proof device. The C of C and SER discuss drop analyses of 15" up to 80'. There is no discusalon of dron accidents within the spent fuel pool building ouch as a drop onto the building floor or a drop of the TC into the spent fuel pool, itself, which would surety damage the fuel assemblies in the pool. Both those drops are considerably greater than 80 inches!

D. We remain concemed about possible lamming of tbg transfer cask in the scent fuel oool What would happen to the cask if the jammed fuel could not be extricated? Would the entire 40 ton TC be left in the fuel pool?

@dconducted it is our understanding that the test revealing the faulty welds at the Palisades plant was in July just before the cask was filled, but the test was not reviewed. This raises serious questions about NRC oversight and requiroments for proper cask fabncation by licensees.

7. We are concerned about the presence of burrowing and other nuisance animals that have posed problems at other waste sites. It seems likely that insects, animals, and/or birds will be attracted to tho warm air coming from the outlet vents. We remain concemed about vent blockage particularly from insects such as paper wasps which build huge nests and swarms of midges common to the Great Lakes which can completey cover and block screening and vents.

6C1 We remain concemed that the fuel will not be tested for leaks using penetrating dyes, eddy current, sipping or ultrasound prior to canister loading despite the fact that some of the rods in the opent fuel pool will be nearty 20 years old. Exactly how will ' grossly breached' fuel be ultimately  !

handled and shipped off site?

(o 9. We think additional radiation monitoring should be required, particularly in light of 8.3.1 of the Draft SER which states, " Dose rates calculated by the vendor for different locations around the standardized NHUHOMS design are significantly higher than those determined for previous NUHOMS designs...the relative dose rates for this desi0n are still axpected to be higher than comparably calculated dose rates for earlier NUHOMS designs. These relatively higher dose rates are not consistent with the objective of maintaining occupational exposures ALARA. Sito-spooifio applications with this design should provide detailed procedures and plans to meet A1. ARA guidelines and 10 CFR ,

20 requirements wrth respect to the operation and maintenance of this standardized NUHOMS ISFSI design."

7 th We question how the higher 55,000 MWD /MTU burnup fuel now being used in PWR's will be handled since ths NUHOMS 24 is rated to handle only 40,000 MWD /MTU bumup fuel.

S W. We remain conoemed about the possibility of insufficient drying of the fuel before placement in the DSC. We do not feel that the issue of corrosion of stainites steel has been adequately evaluated especialty under conditons of indefinerte duration. While stainless steel corrodes less rapidly than carbon steel, even the plumbing fixture industry is finding unexpected stainlets steel pitting and corrosion under condrlions far less intense than those in a DSC.

7 9. The lesus of sabatoge does not seem to be adequately addressed in the Draft SER particulary l in view of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and the ease with which a i disturbed individua! recent!y breached security and remained undetected at a U.S. reactor. Explosive technology has become very sophisticated in the last 15 years since the NRC and Sandia 1.tboratories studied the effect of sabotage on shipping casks in the March 1979 NUREG 459 " Generic Adversary

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. Characteristics Summary Report'. t (1) AAon Assoc. inc., Mnatory Guide to 10 CFR 61 " U.S. NRC, Dht. of L1W and Decommissioning, Ofke of Nuoknar Makttal and Safeguards Washington, D.C.,1989, pp $ & 6.

(2) U.S. NRC Generic Letter 81-38,1/10/81; Generic Letter 85-14, 8/1/85; NRC Information Notice No. 90-00,2/5/90; SECY-00418. S/12/90: Midwest Compact Treguenth Asked Questions and Answers About LIRW ninpnami and the Midwest Compact." St. Paul, MN, Fall 1991, Question 1.6.

• Afhabon for identification purposes These ocessanta vill im mailed  ;

with attachmente. '

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