ML20206R718
| ML20206R718 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1986 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1527, NUDOCS 8607070210 | |
| Download: ML20206R718 (249) | |
Text
'
ORIGlNA'- Alt- Ec2 O UN11ED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMlSSION IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DAVIS-BESSE RESTART O -
LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D. C. PAGES: 1- 110 DATE: FRIDAY, JUNE 27, 1986 rp r?, t'".1?5 i F r,g
(. [j ."n rp g2 F-n !h )!Y [b d"IJ}{.)'y r bn) b[:j b !!!JL bU{s 5 DoJ@U,.lemov.efrom
..wu.: a ACRS0iice' ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
cs O OfficialReporters 444 North CapitolStreet Washington, D.C. 20001 8607070210 860627 (202) 347-3700 PDR ACRS T -1527 PDR NATIONWIDE COVERACE j
PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE UNITED STATES NUC EAR REGULATORY COMMISSI NERS' i
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS FRIDAY, JUNE 27, 1986 The contents of this stenographic transcript of the proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions recorded at the meetin,g held on the above date.
No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at
() this mee' ting accepts any responsibility for errors or inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this transcript.
l O
t
CR27355.0 REE/sjg 1
- - - - - 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4 SUBCOMMITTEE ON DAVIS-BESSE RESTART 5
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6 Room 1046 1717 H Street, N.W.
7 Washington, D. C.
8 Friday, June 27, 1986 9
The meeting of the subcommittee convened at 8:30 a.m.,
Dr. Forrest J. Remick, chairman, presiding'.
12 PRESENT:
,m
! .! ACRS MEMBERS: -
13 14 FORREST J. REMICK CHESTER P. SIESS 15 GLENN A. REED HERMAN ALDERMAN, Designated Staff Member 16 17 ON BEHALF OF TOLEDO EDISON:
18 JOE WILLIAMS, JR.
STEVE SMITH 19 JOHN WOOD SUSHIL JAIN 20 PHIL HILDEBRANDT a
21 ON BEHALF OF NRC STAFF:
CONRAD McCRACKEN DREW PERSINKO 23 CHRIS VANDENBERG RICK KENDALL 24 ED TOMLINSON i
i 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
i 27355.0 2 p)REE
\_
1 PROCEEDINGS 2 MR. REMICK: Will the meeting come to order, 3 please. This is a meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on-4 Davis-Besse restart. I am Forrest Remick, chairman of the 5 Subcommittee on the Davis-Besse restart. The other members i
6 in attendance are' Dr. Siess and' Glen Reed on my left. The 7 Subcommittee will review the startup activities for 8 Davis-Besse. Herman Alderman is the ACRS Staff member for 9 this meeting. The rules for participation in today's 10 meeting have been an announced as part of the notice of 11 this meeting that was published in the Federal Register on 12 June 9, 1986.
13 It is requested that each speaker first identify 14 himself or herself and speak with sufficient clarity and 4
15 volume so that he or she can be readily heard.
16 We have received no written comments or requests 17 for time to make oral statements from members of the public.
18 We will now proceed with the meeting'.
19 Do any Subcommittee members have any comments at 20 this time?
4 21 MR. SIESS: None from me.
22 MR. REED: None.
23 MR. REMICK: Thank you very much. As we
- 24 indicated at the last Subcommittee meeting, we would 25 continue with a review of those activities not previously-k,m,))
2 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-3366M6
i
'27355.0 3 GREE ,
1 reviewed and having.to do with the Staff's safety 2 evaluation report for the start-up of.the Davis-Besse plant.
{ 3 Also, use this meeting as a preliminary session for what i
4 4 will be presented to the full Committee, which is scheduled 5 for 8:30 to 11:30 on July llth. That is a Friday. You 6 should have an agenda. We will start out with Toledo 7 Edison presentation, followed by Staff presentation of 8 their review.
9 Mr. Williams, do you want to take the lead.
i 10 MR. WILLIAMS:- Thank you very much. I want to i 11 inform the Subcommittee of the organizational changes.
12 There are some differences since last we talked to you. I 13 thought you ought to_be brought up to date on particularly 14 the ones that interest you. The company nuclear review 15 board 's inembership, which last time we met with you was 16 totally in-house board now has four outside representatives d
17 on it, which we.think is a good thing. One from Duke Power I
- i. 18 and somebody -- help me, I forget the ---Boyce Greer. So 19 we brought in some outside viewpoints.
, 20 You asked that we establish an independent 21 safety engineering group and we have done that. They 4
22 report directly to me and under Mr. Sushil Jain who is head-23 of our -- he will be speaking later. That is the group 4 24 that reports directly to us. The only change in the 25 nuclear direction was they took it out from under him and.
O ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202d47-3700 ~ Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 4 l SREE x) l 1 moved it to me.
2 In the engineering, Mr. Phil Hildebrandt, I do
. 3 not believe at the last meeting that you were head of
- 4 engineering, were you? Mr. Phil Hildebrandt comes to us 5 from Rockwell. He is heads up our engineering and last 6 time we talked to you, these two people reported to a 7 manager who reported here and Phil has just taken those out 8 of there. There is a change there. .They are reporting 9 more directly to him. The nuclear engineering director has 10 been established and that, too, is under Mr. Jain. This is j 11 such a large program, it reports directly up the chain end 12 not to any others.
13 With the marriage with the Cleveland 14 Illuminating into the company interior, we have-capitalized 15 on their considerable information system. We are using 4
16 their mainframe in Cleveland for our data processing and we 17 have pooled our talents in the computer support area,-
18 programmers and everything else. So we have a good link 19 with them and we will be using the same types of programs 1
20 in that area mostly unless we have already got them on line 21 that will be used in Perry. So it will be a money saving --
j 22 MR. REMICK: Is that now in-effect?
t 23 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
I 24 MR. REMICK: Has it in any way affected the 25 operating organization? 4 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 5 g ,REE V
1 MR. WILLIAMS: Not at all.
2 And the quality assurance director, we have 3 expanded that organization some since we last talked to you.
i 4 We have staffed a quality verification manager, an 5 engineering assurance manager. That is the reorganization 6 and we have expanded it to 55.
7 The last time -- I will talk about that later.
8 The manning status. We have 644 on July 1 this year and on-9 June 18 we were up to 806. We have 197 vacancies, we have 10 114 contractors. 58 of those are engineers. We did pretty 11 well in our recruiting. 1986 acceptance is through June 9.
12 61 management, 50 nonmanagement. It is really a pretty 13 tight recruiting assessment process we-go through. We are 14 very tight on educational checks. Assessment and career 15 development testing and all that is done with the two days 16 that we bring the applicants and their wives in Toledo.
17 This shows you how we -- the last time I was 18 here I had put our commitment date to the NRC to be up to a 19 930. We have since grown to 1008. Part of that is going 20 to data processing activities and out of corporate and on 21 into the nuclear mission. But the other is expansion and 22 quality control, the nuclear safety area and this area. So 23 1008, we will not now get that done until April of 1986.
24 But we will meet our previous commitments to the NRC to be
- 25 manned and at the level we said it would be manned in the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
27355.0 6 ,
-REE
.3 J
l course of action document.
2 Here is where we stand today. Engineering is 3 kind of the hard area. If you are looking for talented 4 people -- we have 125 to date. Our requirements are pretty 5 strict. Those that we are bringing directly in out of 6 college are a minimum of 3.4 average on a scale of 4.0. We 7 -- 3.2. Thank you. But as a result, our engineering l
8 recruiting is not quite up to where it should be. A.few-9 short.
10 MR. REMICK: Do you have any problem convincing 11 young engineers to work for a utility?
12 MR. WILLIAMS: No, sir. We -- last week -- I
()
\,_e 13 hate to say this. We had about 20 and I think we may have 14 made offers to only six or four. And we have got-to stop 15 that. But the applicants far exceed the number that we 16 will take. But we are not weeding out enough of them, you 17 know, up front in the process. We have got to somehow 18 figure out how to do that.
19 MR. REMICK: You indicated earlier that you will 20 meet your commitment to the NRC. I assume that is, that 21 the total number is not being dictated by the NRC.
22 MR. WILLIAMS: Absolutely not.
23 MR. REMICK: It is a company commitment that you 24 have indicated you will meet.
25 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir. We just said in our ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
27355.0 7
)
1 course of action, here is the type of organization we are 2 going to have and the commitment fell out. These will be 3 the numbers. So it was listed -- I am not quite sure if I 4 fell two or three short nobody would say anything.
5 MR. REED: I am a little surprised at the 6 numbers. You are talking a single-unit plant, 1001 7 operating maintenance and support people.
8 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Nobody at corporate now, 9 Glenn. This is material support.
10 MR. REED: That is probably one of the higher 11 numbers, if not the highest for a single _ unit and it is of 12 course much different from my own background. I am
( 13 wondering if in your, shall we call it, your misery, you 14 are moving to too high a level and will have brought in I 15 frustrated people who are trying to create problems a 16 couple years out if you ever get to a stable situation.
- 17 MR. WILLIAMS
- Well, I would love to reach that 18 problem and have to solve it. Sure enough. But Perry is 19 more than we are. Waterford 3 is greater than we are. I 20 have not worked at a utility lately that isn't on this 21 order. Even for a single utility.
, 22 And the more and more.the reason is, they are 23 moving as I am, they are moving their engineering more 24 in-house. All the dollars that you never saw that went.to-25 pay consultants is disappearing and now they are putting it i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
1 27355.0 8 R
O EE.
2 1 in house so they can get-their people where-they are loyal 2 and accountable. So that is one reason it is growing.
3 Plus I think the data process and the 4 information management' system, part of that set up by the 5 regulation, is'very obviously-these days, if you don't have 6 tight configuration control downstream, you'will not be
, i
.7 able to answer questions that will cause you to (g) into a 8 backfit frenzy or a recovery frenzy such as we are in now.
f _
j 9 If we had had a lot of the data that I have had to pull out 10 on systems readily available, we wouldn't be in the agony 11 that we are in. I don't consider it to be excessive. I 12 think it is probably, you will find Sacramento going in the
() 13 same direction. Your point-is a good one about frustration.
14 What I have done with engineering is I put all engineering, 15 1 pulled them out of the plant and put them under the head 16 of engineering. And I will think'of his name in a minute.
17 MR. SIESS:. Let me ask a question --
4 18 MR. REED: I am still.not through. I am just 19 wanting to hear that these large numbers being built up and, I
20 of course, the regulatory has caused it to a large. degree
! 21 by their demands and by their: paper-building and the 22 emphasis on paper, rather than the-emphasis on standup l 23 quality of people at the throttle, shall-wetsay. I hate --
t 24 I think that paper. empires tend to feed themselves and to 1 1
1 25 build themselves and balloon themselves. I am not so sure o
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
$ 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 i,,,-
7,- . . _ .. _,
.-c . .. ,,._,-..,._..__,_m_,._., _
, _ , . _ _ _ , , , , , . ._,.y,,___., .. ,,, . . . _ , , ,
27355.0 9 g sREE U
1 that that really genuinely couples to nuclear reactor 2 operating safety. I am sorry to hear it. You are seeing 3 other people doing it. Personally, I would reflect on it 4 long and hard. I have always believed in the small tightly 5 coupled organization and know that it is being challenged 6 every day by the paper empire builders.
7 I know that in my heart I feel it is not the 8 most safe direction to be moving.
9 MR. WILLIAMS: The regulatory process has done 10 it. I think the regulatory process is necessary to insure 11 the saftty of the public. I don't think that today in the 12 marketplace -- it is just like the Chrysler cars versus n
(s' 13 Toyota, we are coming out of this quality morass. But you 14 know that quality does not exist on the deck plates that 15 l let's you turn your back and say, do that work in 16 accordance to skill or trade.
17 That was going on at Davis-Besse when I got 18 there. They said to the mechanics, skill of trade. What 19 the hell did that mean? Here we had maintenance mechanics 20 that had never had any examination to find out what they 21 could'do because they are unionized. They had had no 22 training. When you get that, you invariably have problems 23 that you put people over to look at to mr :- sure there are a
24 no problems because it is very difficult to get that
- 25 quality down on the deck plate.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6 .
)
27355.0 10
)
1 MR. REED: But now you belatedly are evaluating 2 these people for whether they have mechanical comprehension 3 skills.
4 MR. WILLIAMS: I can't fire them, Glenn, because 5 they are union. I have to go live with-them and teach ~them.-
6 You know I have got those around my neck like-an albatross.
7 I am in a strike right now, _have been for four weeks. Okay? l
- 8 And SH3 are going to get'them back. I am going to have to --
9 you should have seen the resistance when we got.our labs 10 and maintenance training classes suited up. We put those 11 mechanics through. Man, the failures, couldn't add two and 12 two. Ask them to multiply three by three and it was'a 13 disaster.
14 But that is the problem that generates this type 15 of thing. I tell you, a lot of_these utilities, it is a i
j 16 dilution; they have more people hired with' consultant money 17 that the public commissions never see. I know you'didn't 18 do that up there, but most of.them do. If you look under 19 the rug, the people are there under another guise.
- 20 MR. SIESS
- Mr. Williams, you have got a level 21 of 1008 for a single unit plant.- How many would you'need
! 22 with two units?
23 MR. WILLIAMS: Probably another 500.
24 MR. SIESS: That many for the second?
1 25- MR. WILLIAMS:- Yes, sir. That is a station 1
i j
! H ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
-)
27355.0 11 7- REE
( .
M./
1 manning. It would be probably another 600, but if they 2 were separate stations. If they were together and had some 3 commonality, probably less than that.
4 MR. REED: Sometime you ought to sit down and 5 ask yourself, after you get fully acquainted with all your 6 people, how many people would I like to fire at this 7 organization because they are not efficient or skilled 8 really and they are albatrosses around your neck, as you 9 say? I asked myself that question once. I didn't want to 10 let any of them go hardly. Seven out of 150.
11 i MR. WILLIAMS: I haven't fired many there. I l
12 put some round pegs over in some round holes instead of (m
(_) 13 square holes. We got rid of a few and we are going to get 14 rid of a few more. But you are right. You get to where 15 you love the size of that organization. And you love the 16 people in there and it is hard to get rid of them.
17 MR. REMICK: How many of that 1008 are security 18 personnel?
19 MR. WILLIAMS: None. When I said corporate, 20 that is provided totally by the corporate.
21 Since we were last here, we have introduced our 22 company wide drug and alcohol policy; Toledo Edison has 23 always had a good fitness for duty program. We pushed it 24 one step further and a step that we went to was random drug 25 screening for all our employees. We are going to go to ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationside Coverage 800-33466*6
I 27355.0 12 g REE
(/
1 arbitration on it. But of the 127 employees tested, that 2 was 113 percent of the work force, one employee tested 4
3 positive. The contract employees tested -- these are the 4 trades people that come in -- all contract peop13 work out 5 there must submit to the random testing, four have been 6 tested positive. All of them have been discharged.
7 MR. REMICK: If I may ask you a ques. tion related 8 to that, that fitness for duty program you have presumably 9 does not apply to NRC employees who might have access to 10 your vital areas. Would you prefer that they have the 11 equivalent fitness for duty program?
12 MR. WILLIAMS: Absolutely. That fitness for 13 duty applies to new job applicants, annual physical 14 examinations for the nuclear-security officers, biannual 15 physical examinations for licensed operators. Any employee 16 absent more than 30 days in a 12-month period. Employees 17 arrested for off-work drug activity. Employees who have
- 18 completed the employee assistance program for drug and 19 control abuse. Employees transferring to Davis-Besse from 20 other areas of Toledo Edison. And random drug screening, 21 behaviorial observation. We are trying to make sure that 3
22 our people are reliable.
23 Procedures were requi*ed for restart 6/29. We 24 have 508 done. How could you start up in January? A lot 25 of ther.e procedures, they feed. on the new problems, of O
i ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6M6
27355.0 13 REE i
i l course, that we find that we have plus the fact there are a 2 great many of them connected with the FCRs and with the 3 operations of the area that cannot be done until the last 4 couple weeks, but all the FCRs are done. You can see how 5 they affect us. So we have no problems with our procedures.
6 We have 1156 to complete. That says " additional in '86."
7 It will really be additional in '87. I slowed down the 8 effort because we are working a lot of overtime. I pushed 9 that procedure effort out into '87.
10 Our training, most rewarding has been the, our 11 laboratories and our maintenance training that has been 12 ' ongoing. I won't steal Mr. Smith's thunder, but I do want 13 to point out that we had committed to INPO accreditation in 14 the maintenance area in December. We have had the team
.i 15 visit already. We pulled that back. Progress has been 16 very good. They were in last week, the week before. So we 17 will get our maintenance program well ahead of schedule.
18 All the rest of our accreditation is on schedule.
19 Our dedicated training labs are in operation and 20 we have our facilities that are as good as any in the 21 nation and our contract will be signed for our simulator 22 this month. I told you last time I was here it.was going 23 to be signed in March, but we got into an arrangement with 24 Florida Power & Light and Sacramento where all three of us 25 were trying to go in with the same guy and save money. We 1
O 4
! ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
- 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800_336-6646
27355.0 14 (qJREE l have managed to do that. So it has paid off to wait where 2 we could get that kind of a contract done.
3 You asked a question last time about operators.
4 Here is our operators. This blue says that that is initial 5 examination of an RO. This is the requalification exams of 6 both ROs and SROs. In 1985 we had five that failed. The 7 question was why it dropped. The examiner that we had in 8 preferred for the people to work not by procedures. And 9 our people weren't used to doing that so they had some 10 problem. On the reexam this should read 4/4. This is all 11 we have done in '86. These are reexams for the ones that 12 failed. This should read 4/4. The fifth one decided he O
- () 13 didn't want to be in the game anymore. He is gone.
14 MR. REED: Are you happy that he is gone or do 15 you think it was a crime?
16 MR. WILLIAMS: No. He was marginal.
17 I would like to present Mr. Steve Smith now, 18 I head of maintenance.
19 MR. REMICK: Is anybody going over their 20 procedures to make sure there is consistency? I used to 1
21 find that facilities where one procedure would say " unit."
- 22 The next procedure would say " facility." The other would 23 say " site." And there, that was just an example of many 24 inconsistencies from one procedure to another because maybe
- 25 this one was purchased from this vendor and this one was s_-
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80 4 336-6646
27355.0 15 REE t
I written by this Staff member and nobody ever sat down and 2 read over these things to see if there was any kind of 3 consistency in the format of the procedures; if there were 4 such things as the operators were told administratively, 5 they had to know the first three emergency action steps.
6 There is nothing in the procedure to tell them by a simple 7 line that these are the three we mean and there might be 1, 8 2A, 2B, 3A and B, and they didn't know if it was 1, 2A and 9 2B that they were supposed to learn or if it was all of 10 them. Is anything trying to do --
11 MR. WILLIAMS: One of the hardest things we had 12 to get off the ground was the procedure by which we would
( 13 write procedures.
14 They didn't have any. So it was easy to go in 15 and establish a hierarchy of procedures. And a great deal 16 of the time of write-up is this meeting in groups that are 17 from each one of these responsible departments to insure 18 that one procedure, what it impacts on across the board and 19 that these procedures do mesh. And that is one of the very 20 time-consuming things. We are trying to build a set of 21 procedures where you don't have that conflict.
22 And then in the configuration management area, 23 procedures are picked up where if there is a change in a 24 procedure, we know what other procedures we must go look at.
25 So we are doing it -- we are making every effort.to avoid i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 8 % 336-6646
L 27355.0 16 wREE 1 that.
2 The average cost of procedures today is $4000.
3 That is the magnitude of the effort that is going into it.
4 MR.-REMICK: Are you also -- do you have your s
5 procedures matrixed to your training programs, so if you 6 change your procedure you know where in your training 7 program that should be revised?
) 8 MR. WILLIAMS: Absolutely, right. And when you 9 do an FCR, you, what procedures must I now go change. That 10 whole matrix is being built as we generate the procedures.
11 MR. SMITH: We developed procedure writers' 12 guide which establish content and format and keep all of 13 the procedures of the various procedures very, very well 14 sequenced with each other.
i i 15 MR. REMICK: How do you try to get the same j 16 terminology? Do you have a limited --
17 MR. SMITH: We have a standardized terminology.
4 i
18 Right now we are working on standard terminology for 19 equipment because we found it varied in the plant also.
, 20 MR. REMICK: Thank you.
a j 21 MR. SMITH: I am Steve Smith. I am assistant 22 plant manager for maintenance at Davis-Besse. Since our
! 23 last meeting, we have made additional changes and 24 improvements in the following areas: Organization and ;
! l g- 25 staffing, training, maintenance activities, and engineering l l V
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nation *ide Coverage 800-336-6M6
27355.0 17 p REE
%,/
1 interface and support.
2 The area of organization with the revised 3 organization, we completed staffing those positions at 4 about the first of the year. We have added the additional 5 position of training foreman as a permanent full-time 6 position. We are currently authorized 199 permanent 7 full-time Toledo Edison employees of maintenance. We are 8 staffed at 185. The remaining 14 are craft personnel that 9 I can't replace until the strike is over with. So all of 10 our technical and management positions are filled at this 11 time.
12 We additionally have somewhere between 90 and 13 150 contractors that assist us on a part-time basis.
14 Our organization chart is -- this is our current 15 organization chart here. The new position is the training 16 foreman position. That had been a collateral function of 17 one of our permanent foreman at our last meeting. The 18 activity has been so large and the importance of this 19 position has been recognized to the point that we have 20 decided to make it a permanent position. We have staffed 21 three of the four permanently; the fourth one, the one'we 22 are working on right now is in the electrical area. There 23 is an individual that is serving in that position and his 24 paperwork is being processed for his permanent assignment 25 to that.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage Bak3364686
i 27355.0 18 4
REE (a~h 1 MR. REMICK: Is that training foreman qualified 2 to sign off on call cards? Is he a qualified individual?
3 MR. SMITH: Yes,' sir. But that is not his i
1 4 primary function. His primary function is to coordinate j 5 the individual craft participation in the training program i
- 6 and to assure that they are keeping up with their training r
7 schedules and that they.are not dropping tests. He 8 arranges for remediation if they do drop a test. . He makes l
1 9 sure they progress to the qualification program.
10 MR. REMICK: But he could if you wanted him to
.[ 11 do that.
12 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir.
/'N j (_/ 13 MR. REED: 190 people is a lot of people. In 14 fact, that is more people for maintenance than Point Beach 15 runs at or used to run at., They might have slipped over
] 16 200 for a total organization.
l 17 That is a single unit.. That is a lot of. people, 1
18 and idle hands can cause problems. Are.-these people MAST
! 19 tested, MAST, M-A-S-T exam tested.
20 MR. SMITH: We have just received certification 21 from EEI to do the MAST testing. One of the drawbacks of i
22 the program is that I cannot go back and baseline our
, 23 organization because they will withdraw the certification.
l 24 I can only do the MAST testing on the new people coming in
- 25 and individuals that transfer into the nuclear mission from
(
{
f-i ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS,1NC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646 -
-27355.0 19 3 REE 1 outside of the organization.
)
i 2 MR. REED: Your union contract won't allow you i
3 to do anything with-what you have got.
i 4 MR. SMITH: Our union contract does not preclude 5 us from doing testing. It is just at this point in time we .
6 have not found a test similar to the MAST test --
7 MR. WILLIAMS: The MAST test from EEI, the
- 8 agreement with EEI is that that test will only be given to 1
. 9 new hires.
1
- 10 MR. SMITH
- Or transferees.
11 MR. WILLIAMS: I am addressing that issue. I j
i 12 talked on the phone yesterday, trying to get that changed.
13 But I don't think I am going to get it' changed. So EEI --
I 14 if I give that test, EEI will withdraw their permission for
]
- 15 me to use it.
- 16 MR. REMICK
- What is the rationale for that?
- 17 MR. WILLIAMS
- Well, there was a lot of hate and
) 18 discontent when they wanted to invoke'it to begin with. It
! 19 had a lot to do with EEO. The agreement was it would not I
20 be backfitted or given to people. And that is -- I didn't
- 21 realize this until last week when I said, when my people 22 get back on strike, I need to baseline. Let's take an 23 extra day and give them this test. .
j 24 MR. SMITH: The MAST testing does not test for I 25 technical competency._ It tested for baseline learning
(:)
, i ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
{
27355.0 20 (
r REE Ny]
1 ability.
{
2 MR. REED: It tests for mechanical comprehension.
I t
l 3 Just like the Japanese are doing it at the new Nissan plant I l
4 in Tennessee and at the other Mazda plant in Michigan.
5 Joe Williams may recall this or something about l
6 this, but I am thinking of an early day in instrumentation 7 and control on the S1W at the site when it was my opinion j 8 that one person in an organization of 23 instrument and l 1
9 control engineers broke more instruments every day than the I
10 other 22 could repair. And that is called lousy l I
11 comprehension or aptitude for that job. j 12 MR. WILLIAMS: l You are right. '
I("\
_/ 13 MR. REED: When you see 190 people on a 14 single-unit plant for handling, I guess it is 15 instrumentation and control, electrical and mechanical 16 maintenance, you just wonder if you have got some people 17 that are not very efficient or maybe are noncontri~utory o 18 and make work.
19 MR. SMITH: Part of our qualification program 20 includes indoctrination feeds into the program. We have 21 achieved the union's agreement that all personnel will 22 participate in that preliminary training and testing I l
23 portion of our qualification program. We have structured l l
24 it such that it includes the mathematics and the testing of '
~ 25 mechanical dexterity that is included in the MAST program.
U ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 804336-M46 L
27355.0 21 REE O
1 It is not coined that way. When we first 2 implemented this program, we sent a total of 20 people 3 through it, and-11 of them failed it. So we have not 4 lowered the standards of the program. We have created a 5 program of remediation where we are bringing them up to 6 that required level.
7 MR. REED: You have an indicator of maybe a 50 8 percent failure rate.
9 MR. SMITH: That's right. Currently our failure 10 rate is less than one person in every class of 10. Less 11 than 10 percent. That is, the last two classes we had no 12 failures at all.
( 13 MR. WILLIAMS: That large number reflects a 14 training shift that the people are nothing but on training.
15 And this requirement reflects the requirements to increase 16 training requirements that we are committed to to INPO.
17 MR. REED: A lot of it is for a year or two --
18 MR. SMITH: Three years.
19 MR. REED: Uplifting. But for the long-term,-
20 you will have great difficulty changing the number.
21 MR. WILLIAMS: I know.
22 MR. SMITH: 15 percent of our manpower is 23 committed to training full time. We have maintained that 24 commitment throughout this.
25 MR. REMICK: That is for the maintenance ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 L
ii
(
27355.0 22
,f- REE C/
I 1 '
organization?
2 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. In the area of training, 3I as I said, each person, each discipline new has has 6 4 permanent training foreman. We used the training shift ,
5 concept. That concept paralle).s a continuous service 6 staffing that we have for the plant where two individuals -
7 in each discipline and a foreman are around the clock shif t 8 coverage at the plant. The training senedules, the shift 9 schedules are set up to coincide and mesh with those shift 10 schedules.
11 We continue to use some outside organizations 12 and their facilities to provide training. As a matter of Is/ 13 l fact, one of the issues to be discussed here today, the -
14 j Raychem issue was discovered when we brought the Raychem 15 Company in to give us some upgraded training in the use of 16 Raychem. We have formalized the means to review the 17 training records so we can baseline the qualifications to 18 l do maintenance in the plant. That's from the apprentice 19 through the journeyman levels.
20 As the admiral talked about, we recently had our 21 on-site accreditation visit from INPO. There were three 22 administrative items to be corrected in the maintenance 23 area. We have to continue the completion of our course 24 material. We right now have about 50 percent of our course
,s 25 material complete. But we have every indication and U
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage A00 3366M6
27355.0 23 (1)*** 1 1 ! assurance that we will achieve accreditation for those 2 l courses some six months ahead of schedule. The board 3 meeting will probaoly occur in August.
4 In the area of work orders -- work orders for 5 corrective maintenance and modifications, there existed on 6 June 9 a backlog of 1339. 247 of those work orders are 7 currently open. Of that 247, only 40 are actually restart 8 required work orders. That is, they have met the criteria 9 that we established for what work had to be done prior to 10 restart. Since June 9 we have created an additional 7328 11 work orders. Of those, 1364 remain to be completed prior d 12 to restart.
13 In the area of preventive maintenance, on June 9, 14 1985, 405 preventive maintenance work orders existed. That 15 number is now down to nine. Those nine preventive 16 maintenance activities have to be done during power 17 ascension so they will be completed when we move up in 18 modes at the plant. Since June 9 we-have eseated another 19 1904. There are currently 279 of those open. They will be 20 completed prior-to restart also.
21 In the area of preventive maintenance, we 22 implemented the new maintenance or preventive maintenance 23 administration controls in December of last year. Those 24 ,
controls require the assistant plant manager for operations 25 and my an approval for any changes to or additions to the O
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
l 27355.0 24 g)REE V
1 PM-Program. It is a more structured program with a monthly 2 review of progress.
3 MR. REED: I am just amazed at a'b3cklog of only 4 nine on preventative maintenance. What was the preceding 5 slide? It had to do with --
6 MR. SMITH: Corrective. .
1 7 MR. WILLIAMS: On June 9, 1339.
8 MR. REED: That is on modification related --
9 MR. SMITH: No, sir. Of that 1339 very close to 10 1000 of those were corrective maintenance and about 340 l
11 were work orders that implemented modifications.
12 MR. . REED: Preventative. It just socms 13 unusually low. I am trying to relate that to the 190-man 14 work force. What are you going to do with 190 people 15 tomorrow 7 16 MR. SMITH: We don't really have 190 people work 17 force. The actual work force consists of about 152 people 18 I and 15 percent of those people are in training. The other 19 are technical staff that do procedure reviews and answer 20 technical problems within the maintenance group.
21 MR. WILLIAMS: If you look at that 270. 1904 22 work orders open since June 9. He says 270 required for 23 restart. That does not count the ones that will emerge 24 between now and restart on their periodic basis, 25 ' MR. REED: That is still a pretty low number.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
j 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336- % 46
27355.0 25 O,REE 1 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Thank God.
2 MR. SMITH: We have our arms around it. The PM 3 Program right now is in the process of baing expanded with 4 more detail towards equipment that has had recurring 5 failure and recurring problems. We have 50 engineers that 6 are -- their title is system engineers. One of their 7 primary duties and responsibilities is to review all the 8 equipment within their system and help make determination 9 of what PM can be applied to that system or component to 10 improve its performance and serviceability. So the PM 11 Program is growing oven as we speak.
12 In the area of --
( 13 MR. WILLIAMS: I just have to tell Glenn this.
14 I got to tell you, Glenn. Since the strike started, our 15 supervisors and management people have closed more job 16 orders per week than were being closed when the whole darn .
17 work force was there. Part of that was that we got into it i
18 and found out some of our procedures that we were following 19 were roadblocks to really clearing paperwork. But most of 20 it was the technical ability to get out and do the work and 21 the willingness to spend the blood, sweat and tears to get 22 it done. Now I have to figure out how when they come back --
23 MR. REED: I went through two or three strikes 24 and had the same thing happen.
, 25 MR. SMITH: In the area of engineering interface ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
i 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646 i
27355.0 26 j - e- REE-l 1 and support, we have a daily plan of the day meeting. We .
l 2 have complete engineering attendance on the manager level. -
1 3 We have a seven-day-a-week around-the-clock duty manager
- 4 roster; two engineering individuals are on call to solvo
] 5 problems any time, day or night.
6 We have created a station technical support-7 section whose primary function is to review-potential 4
8 conditions adverse to quality and make reportability 9 determinations and initial corrective action.-
i a
10 We have a programithat is called requests for l
11 engineering assistance. That program has proliferated i
12 throughout the nuclear mission. ~ It is now governed by a 13 nuclear mission procedure that is under the direct control.
14 of the admiral. It encompasses all organizations within' 15 the nuclear mission. The actual program provides for.more 1
16 than just engineering assistance. It.even allows'the 17 engineer staffs discussing questions and possibly getting i 18 an answer.
j 19 In the area of preventive maintenarice and 1
i 20 post-maintenance testing, we practically have assured
- 21 engineering support through the system engineering 22 organization. They are presently providing that support.
\
23 And as I said, the program is growing even as we speak.
} 24 Any other questions?
l' 25 Thank you.- I believe the next speaker is John
}
l l.
i i
i ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 L
27355.0 27 REE (v
1 Wood.
2 MR. WOOD: Since we last talked there really 3 hasn't been much new concerning the equipment investigation.
4 You will recall that during the June 9 event there were a 5 number of equipment anomalies that had to be addressed, 6 troubleshooting plans so that we could derive the 7 appropriate root cause and come up with effective 8 corrective actions. And just to refresh your memory, that 9 scope entailed 13 areas, impacting seven systems. I will 10 just briefly run through these. I believe later in your 11 handout there is more detail on these should you want to 12 refer to them.
() 13 You will recall that the main food pump turbine 14 was the initiator of the June 9 event, tripped out on 15 overspeed. We had developed the troubleshooting there to 16 conclude that there was a failed circuit board in the speed 17 control circuit which was replaced to remedy that situation.
18 On the SFRCS or steam feedwater rupture control 19 system, we had a spurious actuation which closed the main 20 steam isolation valves. That spurious actuation came from 21 our low level transmitters which sensed a pressure 22 oscillation, and to remedy that, we put additional 23 filtering into the network.
24 On the auxiliary feed pump turbines, they both --
25 which are steam-driven -- tripped out on overspeed. We Ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33 & 6646
27355.0 28 REE f-~3
(_/
1 found that the overspeed was due to control difficulty 2 because of water ingestion into the turbines. We had long 3 cold inlet lines. So we put in new steam admission valves i
4 4 close to the turbine to provide hot ready steam at their 5 location.
I 6 The operators had trouble using the turbine trip 7 and throttle valves to reset the turbines during the event.
t 8 We found that we had given improper training. So we 9 developed some hot training, which we will be conducting s
10 prior to going into service. We also provided additional 11 aids and instructions to them at the location for pressure, 12 improved communications.
( 13 The auxiliary feed pump valves, AF599 and 608 14 torqued out during the event. That led us into the large 15 motor-operated valve problems that you have heard about 16 where we have had to adjust the limit switches. We have 17 used the MOVATS equipment for diagnostics, gone through and 18 verified dimensions, wiring, EO conditions for those valves.
19 The pilot operator relief valve opened three 20 times during the event, and on the third time, did not 21 reseat properly. We tore that down; could not find a 22 specific problem. We are suspecting that there was foreign 23 material which prevented the pilot from closing. We 24 rebuilt that with new parts --
25 MR. REED: In my opinion, this goes back a long ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 29 m REE Y]
1 time, pilot operator relief valves in borated PWRs can do 2 some strange things and you can tear them down and never 3 find the evidence because in the cooldown, all this, you 4 get redissolving and reflushing and the hydrogen is gone 5 and all these other things.
6 You realize on a pilot-operated relief valve, 7 that is not loop-sealed against the pressurizer dome. You 8 now get pure hydrogen potential and boric acid scum 9 potentials in the pilot part of the system as well as under 10 the disk.
11 Now, these things can disappear on teardown.
12 Is this pilot-operated relief valve now still a p)
(_ 13 ; direct connection without loop-seal connection, both for 14 the pilot and the disk, the main disk, is it directly 15 connected to the top of the pressurizer?
16 MR. WOOD: It is direct connected to the top of 17 the pressurizer. On the June 9 event, there was in fact a 18 loop seal installed. We have since, because of concerns 19 for pipe stresses both upstream and downstream of the valve, 20 elected to eliminate the loop seal at this point and go 21 with a direct connection. Now, there is also --
22 MR. REED: What about the pilot connection? Is 23 that loop-sealed?
24 MR. WOOD: No, sir. There is a block valve
,- 25 which is upstream.
U ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 30 i
()
1 MR. REED: Is it loop-sealed so that the gases 2 from the pressurizer dome that interfaced with the pilot, 3 are they sealed out by a loop seal?
4 MR. WOOD: No, they are not.
5 MR. REED: I think your people should look 6 closer then at the new Westinghouse arrangement where they 7 have loop-sealed the pilot from the gases in the top of the 8 pressurizer and boron in the vapor phase. I think you 9 should look at that. And I think throughout history, 10 beginning with Three Mile Island, very evident, there is 11 something wrong with direct-connected pilot-operated relief 12 valves in this unusual atmosphere of the pressurizer dome.
) 13 MR. WOOD: Okay. Again, we have used a loop 14 seal prior to this.
15 MR. WILLIAMS: The loop seal was for all of it.
16 MR. REED: And the pilot, too.
17 FROM THE FLOOR: The pilot is internal to the 18 valve. The entire valve inlet was loop-sealed from the 19 pressurizer. There is no exterior piping.
20 MR. REED: Well, I think there is something 21 going on. I think perhaps Westinghouse has recognized what 22 is going on. They do not have a loop seal, I think, now on 23 the main disk, below the main disk, but loop-sealed the 24 piping to the pipe.
25 MR. WILLIAMS: I would like to make a correction.
b,s ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 31 sREE 1 On the pilot-operated relief valve, it wasn't that it 2 didn't close improperly, it didn't close in the time that 3 the operator thought it should and he shut it, to block the 4 valve. Had he not shut it - -it is the third blow -- it 5 may have -- we don't know whether it would have shut or not.
6 MR. WOOD: I will connect that just a little bit.
7 The operator was reacting to the system parameters and the 8 pressure was going low, so he closed the block valve. And 9 one of the concerns that we had was that the operator -
10 didn't have the direct information to him that he could 11 make the direct correlation to take the action. We have 12 improved and corrected that.
13 MR. REED: I think the whole area is fuzzy 14 enough so that nobody is going to argue about restart. But 15 I would like to say, all those 127 engineers you have got, 1
16 you ought to have somebody look into the French problems [
17 with their new pilot-operated-relief valves which was 18 supposed to cure everything and doesn't. And you ought to 19 look into what Westinghouse is now doing.
20 MR. WILLIAMS: That is a good idea.
21 MR. REED: And you ought to think about how many 22 times that pilot-operated relief valve functions per year.
23 If they sit there for six months or more without ;
24 functioning, they might get into trouble on a direct 25 connection. Thank you.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 32 f sREE 1 MR. WOOD: All right. Then continuing down the 2 list here, the main steam headers we had some pressure 3 control problems which we traced back to the atmospheric 4 , vent valves, which was an actuation by the operators in 5 response to their consideration for main steam safety 6 valves. So we actually took the main steam safety valves, 7 sent them off-site, had them tested for pressure lift and 8 blowdown sitings.
9 The main feedwater start-up control valve. This 10 was actually more of a nonproblem that was the light bulb 11 in the control circuit. A 6 volt bulb in a 120 volt 12 circuit. This should be the auxiliary feed pump number 1 13 suction supply. You don't want service water fed into your 14 steam generators. And this had to do with the hydraulics 15 and the pressure surges in the line. And in order to 16 correct that, we put a time delay in those switch transfers 17 and also improved the hydraulics by changing some of the 18 trainer arrangements.
19 The main steam valve MS-106. That was a 20 limitorque motor-operated valve problem. We got them into 21 the overall MOV problem.
22 The nuclear instrumentation neutron source range 23 detectors. We had one out of service prior to the event 24 and the other one failed during the event. That was a hard 25 one to. chase down, but we finally did chase that down and ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
.J 27355.0 33 1
~~REE f 1 found that in one case that the detector was improperly l 2 grounded at the preamp. -Wasn't making good contact. In '
4
, 3 another case we had a faulty cable in a containment j
4 penetration that we were able to use a spare and put that-
) 5 one in service. ,
i 6 Turbine bypass valve actually failed sometime
] 7 after the main event. That was found to be a broken 1 f
, 8 actuator caused by the main disk coming loose internally,
! 9 causing a hammer blow up to the' stem and actuator.
i 10 And the safety parameter display system that you
! 11 recall was inoperable during the event, we traced that back 1
12 to a long history of fiber optic problems and corrected l
i
() 13 that by using some spares that were there and also I
14 improving the connections which were improperly done on' i l- 15 that system.
16 So all told, corrective actions entail some 15 17 design modifications, another 13 maintenance and 4
l 18 replacement activities, five procedural training issues.
j 19 Then we took all the generic implications and 20 the lessons learned from this specific list and rolled that 21 into the system review and test program, . the 34 system j 22 review that Mr. Phil Hildebrandt will tell you more about 23 later.
1 24 That is essentially where we stand with the June 25 9 equipment investigation.
1 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
i 202-347 3700 NationwideCoverage _ 800-336-6646 i
27355.0 34 7- REE 1 MR. REMICK: Is the SPDS now completely 2 operational and planned to be functional when you start up?
3 MR. WOOD: Yes.
4 MR. REMICK: And it is integrated into your 1
5 emergency operating procedures now so --
6 MR. WOOD: Yes, it was at June 9 also. But the 7 screens actually weren't working.
8 MR. WILLIAMS: It had failed.
9 MR. REMICK: I see.
10 MR. WILLIAMS: It had to do with optical fibers.
11 But the auxiliary feed pump turbines, we tested them now as 12 far as we could test them until they get hot.
( 13 MR. WOOD: We have taken all the corrective 14 action that we can do under the plant condition.
15 MR. WILLIAMS: Except the motor-operated valves, 16 and we are still slugging away at those things.
17 MR. WOOD: Not related to the June 9 event, but 18 an item of interest since we have been down.has been 19 reactor coolant pumps. This became a concern at the very 20 first of the year when a failure occurred at one of the 21 pumps, the A pump at Crystal River. And as Crystal River '
1 22 got into the situation, they had found that they had a 1
23 severed shaft in their air pump, their A pump. It was 24 severed near the top of the journal bearing. Let me go to 25 a picture, and I also wanted to use this one in a little ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 35 REE
\_/
1 bit.
2 The situation was that this is a Byron Jackson 3 pump, this is a typical arrangement for Crystal River,
- 4 ourselves and Arkansas. This is the top of the shaft.
5 This is the journal bearing and the main impeller. What 6 Crystal River found was that they had the shaft severed 7 right in this region here.
8 Now, this is a little bit incorrect the way that 9 the journal is mounted on here. This shows the journal 10 welded onto the shaft. In actuality we have a shrunk fit 11 sleeve that fits ir. here and if you could just -- I will 12 use this one which is a little cruder but shows the detail
(- 13 here better.
14 There is a shrink-fit sleeve that the side
- 15 plates are welded to and the journal is welded to the 16 sleeves, shrunk-fit onto the shaft. This is shrunk-fit on 17 because this is a nonweldable A 286 material. So this is 18 why this is configured this way.
19 And so at Crystal River they found that the 20 shaft was severed in this region right here. And we called 21 thisthe48-inchregionandwecountedfromthetop0to48, 22 and 52 is right here and we will make more use of 52 a 23 little bit later.
24 So they found that their shaft was severed near 25 the top of the journal bearing. They also found a crack in O
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage - 800-336-6M6
l 27355.0 36 REE O
1 the same 48-inch region on.the B pump by us and they had to l-2 develop this UT process first against the A pump and then I
3 using used it on their other three pumps. So they found i 4 the same condition on B, and though it was less certain, .
5 they felt that they also had the problem on C and D.
6 And this is all transpiring in a very quick 7 fashion between January and, let's say, the March time 8 frame.
9 When they took the A and B pumps apart, they l
10 also found that they had broken bolts holding the main 1
- 11 impeller.
i l 12 These bolts are cap screws. I believe they are
( 13 about 1-1/2 by 5 inches, something like that. There is 14 four of them that hold the main impeller to the shaft.
15 They found on the A pump all four of those were broken, and 16 then on the B pump, I believe a couple-were broken and a 17 couple were cracked.
18 The drive pins _shown here'also had cracks in i
19 them at Crystal River.
20 MR. REED: Which comes first in this situation, 21 the crack of the shaft or the crack of the bolts?
i 22 MR. WOOD: That is a real good question that 23 nobody has really been able to answer to this point. You 24 can certainly make a good hypothesis _that the degrading of 25 this joint can cause excessive moments and stresses into 1
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l l - 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33M446
L -- 844 a
27355.0 37 sREE 1 the shaft that actually propagate the crack. But that has 4
2 not been shown conclusively, to my knowledge, by the 3 Florida Power people.
4 MR. REED: We all realize that this is a very 5 difficult thermal stress scene. Because the impeller on 6 the lower part of that shaft runs at 550 degrees and by the 7 time you get up to the journal, you are probably cooled --
8 you have cooled it to something like 150 degrees. So there 9 is -- there is internal thermal stresses that are very 10 complicated.
11 MR. WOOD: That is correct.
12 MR. REED: I hope that Joe Williams doesn't go l 13 back to canned pump thinking because the same thing exists 14 with canned pumps and there have been some unusual things 15 that you have to do and have happen to canned pumps of 16 larger sizes. What you have to do is make sure that there 17 ara ru) scratches, ripples or anything on that main shaft 18 and that you do shrink-fit, as you just mentioned, anything
- 19 that you put on there to not give any initiating points.
20 MR. WOOD: Those are all very good points that 21 we have in fact taken into account in the new shafts that 22 we have ordered and expect delivery very shortly on.- We 23 are planning on replacing and will end up replacing all
. 24 four of our reactor coolant pump shafts. l l
25 The original Crystal River pumps did not have O
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
207 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage ' 800-336-6646
27355.0 38
- REE 1 this shrink-fit arrangement. What they had is a groove at 2 this 48-inch region that they had a mechanically secured 3 sleeve onto'the shaft.
4 Now, they found during the testing process at I
5 Byron Jackson in the test group that he had problems with 6 that. They had to revert back to this, what-they called 7 the modified design, which is a shrunk-fit design. They 8 had a group in here at the 48-inch region which was the 9 initiation point for the A pump. And Florida and Arkansas 10 have that on all four of their pumps.
11 Davis-Besse came after Florida order and by the 12 time our shafts were made, that groove was not in our i (_/ 13 shafts.
, 14 MR. HILDEBRANDT: We should be careful on one t
15 point. The statement of what Arkansas has or what we have 16 in the other three pumps is entirely based on drawing 17 review. It has not been 100 percent side by side; when you 18 pull a shaft out, it doesn't look 100 percent like your i 19 drawing. So it is important in these areas.
1 20 MR. REMICK: Could you identify yours.
21 MR. HILDEBRANDT: I am Phil Hildebrandt.
l 22 MR. WOOD: On the-B pump at Florida Power,-they l
23 actually found a weld at the top of this shrink-fit onto 24 the shaft, and in fact, you should not ever have that !
25 material welded. So that was the surprise to the people i
- ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
, 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6 l
27355.0 39
. REE I
1 taking that pump apart and of course to everybody who 2 thought they knew what they expected to find in that pump.
3 MR. REED: So you don't think you have a major 4 overhaul issue like something we heard about yesterday on 4 5 these circulators. You have some problems that you can 6 point to or some things that are not quite right with 7 respect to the application here and you think that you are 8 going to get out of this?
9 MR. WILLIAMS: We are replacing all four shafts 10 because we -- the new shafts will not. They are very 11 tightly controlled. As a matter of fact, go ahead.
12 MR. WOOD: I will just stay on this drawing here, 13 but these cap screws are in fact one of the issues. This 14 is really the thing that drives us to having to replace all 15 four because we are concerned with the very phenomena that 16 you talked about, where if you lose the integrity of this 17 joint, you can then cause yourself to have unknown stresses 18 in the shaft which then you cannot predict how long that 19 shaft is of course going to last. Secondly, you don't want 20 to lose the impeller and suffer those consequences.
21 We found that the manufacturer of these was i 22 again this A-286 high-strength material which probably is 23 improper for this application. This is good hindsight, of 24 course. But we found that these bolts are very similar to 25 what we have in the core internals which we had to go-ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 40 REE g3 O
1 through a large program to change out to the A-750. And 2 there is also some reason to believe that the preload 3 applied here was not understood well enough and wasn't 4 properly applied. So that you actually could end up with 5 some alternating stresses here, depending upon your 6 condition. And you did not have really a secured joint-to 7 begin with. So the replacements that were going through 8 have a different material, INCONEL. And they are going to 9 be preloaded adequately and then the preload checked with 10 ultrasonic testing means so that we can guarantee then that 11 this joint will maintain.
12 MR. REED: You didn't have thermal stresses like 13 you had before. Which came first, the chicken or the egg?
14 MR. WOOD: It is, I believe, a combination of 15 the two. That you have the stressorizers here that should 16 you go outside the norm, that you can propagate those 17 cracks.
18 MR. REED: Just as a bet, I will make a bet that 19 the crack occurred on the shaft first and then the impeller 20 got in trouble.
21 MR. SMITH: You might want to explain that on 22 this shaft and impeller assembly that we have removed, the 23 analysis on ours doesn't show a crack, but the pins and the 24 bolts are broken.
- 25 MR. WOOD: I want to also point out that the v
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
! 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
27355.0 41 1 pump cover had axial cracking in the lower region on the 2 Florida pumps.
3 This pump cover -- I hate to refer back and 4 forth. The pump cover is this area here/ actually per5orms 5 the weld at the seal cartridge and sits in and has been 6 held down by the main studs and nuts. And is the pressure 7 boundary. There is a drilled-hole heat exchanger. There 8 are 12 holes drilled on a B pattern or a diagonal pattern.
9 And this is the thermal barrier region. You have seal 10 injection, of course, coming in here and flowing down this 11 region. And you have your hot reactor coolant system and 12 so you could actually, because of some pulsations in the
() 13 fluid from the journal or just from the veins, end up with 14 some washing effect here. So at this bottom area right 15 here, we are -- Crystal River saw some axial cracking 16 indicative of thermal fatiguing which was of the order of 17 100 to 150 mills deep, I believe it was.
18 And as it turned out, it is not a great concern 19 there, but when we looked, we did not find any of that 20 thermal cracking which could be a matter'of the difference 21 in flow rate that we have here to push the mixing out or we 22 do actually run at a higher temperature in our cooling 23 system than Crystal River. So that may'be enough to make 24 the difference.
25 MR. REED: You are on Lake Michigan at 60 o
U ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
l l
l 27355.0 42 sREE b
1 degrees and they are on whatever at 90 to 100 degrees; is 2 that a fact?
3 MR. WILLIAMS: I don't know, Glenn.
4 MR. WOOD: We are on Lake Erie, actually. But 5 the temperatures are correct. But what happens is that our 6 component cooling batteries system is throttled or it is 7 maintained by throttling our raw water system. And at 8 Crystal River, they do not throttle their system. They 9 essentially have their cooling system float on their bay 10 temperature. So seasonally, their temperature will go up 11 and down and it can get as low as 50 degrees or so. Where
/
12 we throttle ours and even though we have the hotter system,
-)
sJ 13 we can maintain it at the 95-degree range.
14 MR. REED: You control, then, the component 15 cooling water temperature to this zone?
16 MR. WILLIAMS: That's right.
17 MR. WOOD: We, of course, and Arkansas, have the 18 same design as Crystal River so we were getting very 19 anxious and concerned about the situation that they were 20 finding. So we had ultrasonic testing of our shafts using 21 the same process that was developed by Crystal River and' I 22 B&W people there in Florida. And we concluded that we had 23 cracks at the 52-inch region on all four of our shafts !
24 based on UT. This UT process was first done longitudinally 25 looking down from the top, and the 52-inch region, actually O l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6 616
27355.0 43 73 REE
\
l there is a small groove in here. If you can imagine the 2 sleeve here. It actually fit underneath the sleeve. So 3 you could see it by just removing it and doing a PT.
4 And then the second UT that was done was they 5 took the seal cartridge out and fitted, at Crystal River, 6 here and looked with an angle beam. That also suggested we 7 had cracking at that 52-inch region.
8 Now, we also knew that we couldn't prove that 9 the bolts were okay without disassembly and so that led us ,
10 into determining that we r.eeded to disassemble at least one ,
l 11 pump to evaluate where we were at with the data. And we ,
12 also embarked then on adding or purchasing additional
( 13 replacement assemblies on the bet that we would have to go 14 in and replace all four.
15 h This next slide then is a result of our l
16 examinations. We chose the 2-1 pump for examination. Sent 17 it off to the B&W Lynchburg research center and we found 18 that we had only very shallow, less than 5 mills deep axial 19 cracking at 48-inch region, which was different than what 20 they had found at Crystal River. And we could find no 21 crack at 52-inch. '
22 And what we had to do, we had to actually mill 23 off the shrink-fit journal and we did a dye penetrant test 24 on the shaft. We did high-magnification visual exam. We 25 tried to load it in bending, load it axially, in case we
. ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 804 336-6646
27355.0 44 REE O
1 had a tight crack. And could not find a crack.
2 Finally,-we ended up sectioning the thing and l 3 doing metallurgical examination and had to conclude that 4 there was in fact no crack at 52-inch. But we did find one 5 broken bolt. We found two bolts cracked and one bolt and 6 all the drive pins were intact.
7 So we had the beginnings of a problem that we 8 didn't like. We also did a dye penetrant test on the pump 9 cover and.didn't find cracking. So we had to make a.
10 decision that based on the information coming out of '
11 Crystal River, the uncertainty as to whether we actually 12 had a crack in the other shafts or not, and the bolt issue,
. 13 that we decided that we needed to replace all the rotating 14 assemblies and are currently embarking on that and planEto 15 have the shafts delivered, I believe the first one comes 16 actually the end of this month. And the other three will 17 follow.
18 MR. REMICK: This month being June?
l 19 MR. WOOD: This month being June. We sent our
- 20 best expediter there to help the process; Admiral Williams 21 went to Byron Jackson to convince them of the urgency of l-22 the matter. They were able to see
- that and have performed 23 well since that time.
! 24 So that is essentially where we stand on the
- 25 reactor coolant pump issue. We have taken the information i
- ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage - 800-336-6646 i - _
3
7-_
27355.0 45 REE v
1 and concluded that we need to, for our purposes, replace 2 the four rotating assemblies with new shafts which have the 3 impeller joint secured to the best of our ability.
4 MR. REMICK: That is installed before start-up?
5 MR. WOOD: That is correct.
6 The best thing we can say about the UT is that 7 it has been conservative through there. There have been 8 cracks that it has been able to show. But in some cases, 9 we don't have cracks.
10 MR. REED: You bring up an' interesting point 11 that the utilities ought to reflect en. That is, how do 12 they run their component cooling water for their main
('N
(_) 13 coolant pump seal coolant? As you are talking about your 14 case, I am thinking of a case between Point Beach and 15 Robinson where Robinson had to borrow the Point Beach pumps 16 because they cracked a shaft. And it might well be that 17 there is this seasonal cycling in water temperatures as you 18 go south in the nation versus the north climates where you 19 have very cold water in places and you can control 20 component cooling in a narrower band.- The EEI committee 21 might want to look at that-somewhat.
22 MR. REMICK: Before starting, I would remind you 23 that we are about halfway through the Toledo Edison 24 presentation time. Are we roughly on schedule.
25 MR. WILLIAMS: I think so, yes.
l b.3 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-334 6646
27355.0 46 REE O
1 MR. JAIN: I am Sushil Jain. I will be talking 2 about the improvements that we have made to the auxiliary 3 feedwater system and the steam and feedwater control system.
4 Then also getting to, later on, the feed and bleed cooling 5 capability that we have demonstrated for Davis-Besse,,and 6 in the end, outline what are the longer-term changes that 7 we plan to make after restart from'this outage.
8 What I plan to do here is go through each one of 9 these one by one and I will show them on the drawings to 10 you. The drawing that I will use is the second one after 11 this stage in the handout, which shows the systems 12 integration at start-up. The very first thing, one of the 13 important things that we have done is provision of the 14 steam admission valves next to the turbine. This 15 alleviates the problems of condensation in the long and 16 cooled steam lines from the generators, thereby preventing 17 automatic overspeed trip that happened on June 9.
18 MR. REED: I am surprised that in the original
> 19 design, they did not have their valves that are going to
.; 20 start the turbines right up close to the turbines with l
l 21 traps and drains just forward of that. I am surprised that 22 the valves are way up beyond there. But that is'the 23 original design and I don't understand why they do those 24 things.
25 MR. JAIN: It has since been corrected by
- - ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
- 202-347-3700 . Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 47
()"""
l putting in the steam administration valves. It did cause 2 -- to make these all the way up to this valve here has 3 resulted in several other modifications which have also 4 been completed.
5 MR. REMICK: Was that 150 feet?
6 MR. WILLIAMS: 600 in one case. 300 in the 7 other.
8 MR. REMICK: Is that right?
9 MR. JAIN: Now we see this away from the turbine 10 itself. Before the June 9 event we used to have different 11 configurations. We used to have a PGG governor on_this 12 turbine. The PGG governor has had a long history of
() 13 problems at Davis-Besse. And we were investigating the use 14 of PGG on this turbine which has been proven by the field 15 to be much more reliable in the actual challenges that it 16 might see in actual transient conditions. So we have 17 replaced the governor on this turbine with a similar PGG 18 type. We are providing a time delay in the transfer of the 19 auxiliary feedwater pumps to the service water system. As 20 John Wood mentioned earlier, we did have a premature 21 transfer of suction for service water on the aux feedwater 22 pumps by addition of the time delay. Only the valid 23 signals of a genuine low pressure condition would cause a 24 transfer and challenge the valves to come open or closed.
25 And also minimize entry of the raw water into the steam ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
27355.0 48 g REE m)
I generators.
2 We also are providing local indication for the 3 trip throttle valve for these turbines. That is to 4 facilitate local manual control by the operator in case he 5 has lost control from the control room and has to maneuver 6 the turbine locally. The suction valve from the condensate 7 st'orage tanks, they don't show on these drawings because 8 power has been removed from those valves to eliminate 9 spurious closure of the valves which could cause the loss 10 of the primary supply. And as part of the overall i
11 motor-operated valve reliability program, we are relooking 12 at all the valves, specifically in the auxiliary feedwater p)
(_ 13 system as well as the other circulary systems in plant to 14 improve reliability, and by increasing their reliability, 15 we are improving the auxiliary feedwater system itself.
16 On the suction side again, just to improve the 17 hydraulic connector state, to minimize transfers of service 18 water, we have removed the baskets from two strainers that 19 used to be in the section of this pump and that pump. The 20 baskets have been removed from the strainers. And this 21 strainer from the condensate storage tank, we have enlarged 22 the holes in the basket to minimize the pressure that could 23 incur across that. l i
24 MR. REMICK: If I recall, you indicated earlier 25 that you have improved the communication in those-cubicles ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
27355.0 49 3REE 1 also with the control room.
2 MR. JAIN: Yes, sir. The operator, if he has to 3 either control the trip throttle valve to control levels in 4 the steam generator, he could be in constant communication 5 with the control room and throttle it accordingly.
6 MR. REED: We ran into another case this week, 7 Rancho Seco, where apparently they wrote up that their 8 radio, the carried radios by the operators wouldn't work in 9 a certain area where they had to function. And you use 10 radios for your people, do you have internal aerials so 11 that the radio coverage is sound? I find radios are --
12 these little hand-carried-type radios work very well if you 13 have internal aerials.
14 MR. SMITH: We do use radios in some cases. But 15 keep in mind that the transmission from a hand-held radio 16 in some cases could be very detrimental to the more 17 sensitive circuitry in the plant. And you have to use 18 low-wattage radios. So we do have an internal antenna 19 system but it is restricted use in some areas.
20 MR. REED: I know that operators don't feel that 21 this is their favorite technique.
22 MR. JAIN: Let me move on to one of the bigger 23 changes. I think I would like to have the slide here also.
24 What I am talking about is just after the three drawings 25 that we have in the handout. This is the change relating ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 50 g REE O
1 to the installation of the motor-driven feed pump which all 2 of us saw when we were there at Davis-Besse. This is a 3 pump that provides more than 100 percent capacity auxiliary 4 feedwater flow as to to the steam-driven aux feedwater 5 pumps. The discharge of the pump would be aligned to the 6 auxiliary feedwater headers during full power operation.
7 The suction for this pump will normally be aligned to the 8 condensate storage tanks. During low power operation for 9 start-up, this pump will be utilized as a start-up feed 10 pump with suction from the storage tank and the discharger 11 line to the main feedwater headers. The pump has the 12 capability of being started from the control room, being 13 loaded on the diesel from the control room, and also, since 14 we talked the last time, we have provided control room 15 capability for the discharge valve in the control room so 16 after an accident, for example, a steam line break or a 17 steam safety stuck open, you could throttle back on this 18 and provide flow to the respective steam generator.
19 The basic purpose that this pump serves is it 20 resolves the high energy line break concerns that we had 21 with the old small start-up feed pump.
22 MR. REMICK: Do you still plan to eventually 23 install that old start-up pump?
24 MR. JAIN: Yes. I will get to that.
25 Let me talk about the SFRCS. This is used as ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
27355.0 51 7~ REE
(.)
I the initiating system for the aux feedwater system. On 2 June 9, '85, we had a turbine trip which caused significant 1
3 pressure oscillation to the main steam line which reflected 4 into the sensitive level control or level transmitter 5 signals going to the SFRCS. The signals magnifed the 6 transient situation and somehow fooled the operator that 7 the level was isolating and caused an SFRCS trip on lower 8 level. To alleviate that concern, we have instituted a 9 filter in the transmitter itself so as to filter out those 10 isolations so that such steam line isolations and certain 11 closure of the turbine stop valves, or the MSIVs, do not 12 result in a spurious actuation of the SFRCS.
) 13 Power supply performance has long been a problem 14 for the SFRCS. The temperature there was of a concern 15 because the high temperature in the cabinets could cause an 16 undesired actuation of the channel. We have provided for 17 additional cooling in the cabinets which will maintain the 18 right temperature for the power supply and minimize the 19 spurious actuations.
20 The bigger changes on the SFRCS logic is this 21 one here and this one. And let me talk about that. We 22 have removed the isolation on a low level signal from the 23 l SFRCS and removed the isolation to remove closure of the 24 main steam isolation valves and the main feedwater valves.
25 That is to preserve the primary source of feedwater that is I
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6M6 l
27355.0 52 g REE V
1 the main feedwater, even if a low level condition were to 2 occur. That also minimizes challenges to the auxiliary 3 feedwater system and doesn't completely disable the main 4 feedwater system. It provides you an additional degree of 5 cooling capability.
6 To alleviate complete isolation of auxiliary 7 feedwater from the steam generators which could occur using 8 the SFRCS, when both steam generators sense low pressure, 9 we have changed the logic such that auxiliary feedwater 10 will be isolated only from the generator that happens to 11 sense the low pressure condition before, and the second one 12 to sense a low pressure condition will not get the l 13 auxiliary feedwater isolated. So thereby you minimize i
a 14 complete isolation of aux feedwater from both of the steam 15 generators.
16 On the ICS low level limit, we have raised it so 17 as to provide for margin between it and the SFRCS low level 18 trip set point.
19 We have improved the awareness of the operator 20 in the control room and we have provided a dedicated reset 21 switch for the SFRCS full trip alarm. On June 9, '85, in 22 the hurry of things in the control room, the operator had a 23 hard time deciding whether the SFRCS trip had already come 24 and gone and he could not verify proper actuation of the 7 ,3 25 SFRCS. It was a partial actuation that occurred and in the l
k.) 1 1
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
y 1,
27355.0 53 4
(:)"""
i 1 hurry of depressing buttons and resetting alarms, after the 2 trip, the common reset for all the things in the control -
3 room also happened to reset the'SFRCS alarm and when he 4 looked up, he couldn't tell whether the SFRCS had come and i
5 gone.
6 This dedicator switch provides calibration for 7 him to reset the strip. So in the hurry of things after 8 the transients, he would be~able to tell whether the SFRCS.
- 9 has come and gone.
] 10 Then on the manual actuation buttons, we have 1 11 reconfigured,_ rearranged and relocated and relabeled all j 12 the buttons in the control room.. Perh'aps the bigger one j ( 13 here is the mechanical interlock which prevents them i 14 against using the-wrong two buttons, which could'cause 15 isolation.or closure of the containment isolation valves 16 from the steam generators.
17 Let me talk some about the feed and bleed l 18 cooling evaluation. We have done' the analysis which shows 19 that a complete loss of main feedwater, auxiliary feedwater, ,
l 20 -the motor-driven-feedwater, which occurs on high pressure j 21 of 15 seconds, an operator action within 10 minutes of_ hot 22 leg temperature reaching 600 degrees and the action being --
1 23 MR. REED: I am a little surprised at your 24 remark that reactor trip wouldn't occur for 15 seconds.
1 25 Wouldn't there be other signals coming in on this losslof ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
- 202-347-3700 - Nationwide Coverage 800-33M646
- . - - _ ~ . . . , _ . - - . . . , . , - . _ . _ . . _ _ , , , , . - . - . . . _ - . . _ . . , - . . . , _ , , . _ . . _
27355.0 54 REE 7s 1 water like mismatch or something like this or turbine 2 capers that would trip reactor in less than 15 seconds?
3 MR. JAIN: This is the worst case that we took.
4 There are other trips that potentially would have caused ,
5 the reactor to trip ecrlier, namely, the reactor trip 6 system. If you lost both main feed pumps which were the 7 cause of a loss of feedwater, the reactor trip system would 8 have tripped the reactor right away. This here we are l
9 talking about just a mismatch where nothing else has
, 10 happened either on the arcs, because arcs get signalled j 11 from so many other things, but the power and feedwater 12 mismatch is there. The mismatch is such that the pressure 13 rises and high pressure trip is the first one to trip.
14 The operator action at 10 minutes or within 10 15 minutes after 600 degrees is to start the two makeup pumps, 16 open PORV and the pressurizer and hot leg high point vents.
17 The results of the analysis indicate that the i 18 collapsed liquid level is 11.9 feet and the mixture height 19 is much above the top of the core. .
20 MR. REED: I guess what you are saying is total 21 loss of feedwater, feed and bleed cooling that you 22 presently have you would rather make it bleed and feed in 23 your case because you sort of got a bleed before you-can 24 feed, because you have the intermediate pressure pumps.
- 25 But I guess what you are saying is, you can cool with this
[3) \
l l
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 202-347-3700 Nationside Coverage 800-336 4 646 'i
27355.0 55 p]REE
\_
1 technique and you don't have to cool based on inventory for 2 about how long, 10 minutes?
3 MR. JAIN: Okay. If you didn't do anything for 4 about 30 minutes, the core would not be uncovered. We are 5 saying if you didn't do anything within 10 minutes or if 4
6 you did start the makeup pumpa, opened PORV, within 10 7 minutes or at 10 minutes after 600 degrees, the core would 8 ,
be covered.
9 MR. REED: You could actually go a little longer 10 than that.
11 MR. JAIN: Yes.
12 MR. REED: For initiation of bleed and feed?
13 MR. JAIN: We don't have an analysis which shows 14 that if I start the two makeup pumps 15 minutes after 600-.
15 degrees, for example, I am not sure what level this is f .
16 going to be. It might be below that. ,
17 HR. HILDEBRANDT: We do have. makeup flow at all-l 18 pressures. It is just a lower flow rate.
19 MR REED: It is your charging system.
20 MR. HILDEBRANDT: It is a charging pump. That 21 is on the order of at the highest pressure of 250.
22 MR, JAIN: Yes.
23 MR. HILDEBRANDT: So we do have appreciable flow.
l 24 It is not as much as you would like.
7- 25 MR. REED: And that is committed by tech specs V
ACE-FEDliRAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 8to-336-6M6
4 27355.0 56 REE
,f-v 1 or can you have pumps cut or --
2 MR. HILDEBRANDT: No.
3 MR. MYERS: Ted Myers. The makeup pumps are 4 tech spec'd for operation, so when they are out of service, 5 it is only allowed for a certain period of time.
6 MR. REED: I don't think you, in a conservative 7 fashion, want to count on makeup pumps.
8 MR. REMICK: In this analysis, did you include 9 the makeup pumps and assume that they were --
10 MR. WILLIAMS: That is what you are using.
! 11 MR. REMICK: I see.
l 12 MR. REED: Those are not your intermediate --
l
- (')T Am 13 MR. WILLIAMS
- Those are the high pressure pumps.
14 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Those are charging pumps.
15 Those are on day after day after day and are used as your 16 source of seal injection into the plant. They are'very 17 reliable.
18 MR. REED: That is not your intermediate?
19 MR. HILDEBRANDT: No, sir.
20 MR. JAIN: Let me move on to the longer-term 21 reliability improvements for overall decay heat removal 22 capability. First thing, there is the incorporation of the, 23 of an emergency in pressurization system by putting in 24 blowdown valves at the top of the steam generator upper 25 hemispnere.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6686
27355.0 57 REE
{
1 This drawing totally attempts to show what-the 1 2 integration is going to be. This system is going to be 3 utilized after you have had a loss of main feedwater, the 4 auxiliary feedwater, the motor-driven feed pump and the 5 start-up feed pump that I will be talking about. Then at 6 20 minutes after 600 degrees or so, this emergency 7 depressurization system shall be utilized.
8 This integration as it shows here is from the
- 9 top of the steam generator from a handhold. We are 10 providing in two trains, single-failureproof, electrically 11 redundant and separate, putting in two motor-operated 12 valves in each train where at 20 minutes after 600 degrees,
( 13 the operator would open one of these and cause significant 14 depressurization of the primary system for the RCS to --
15 for the HVI system, the ECCS side of the HVI system to be 16 actuated and putting into the reactor and maintain pressure 17 and maintain cooling.
1 18 MR. REED: This is the first time that anybody 19 is thinking of and is moving more rigorously to really talk 20 about what I call primary letdown cooling or bleed and feed 21 cooling. I think the company, the two people ought to get 22 a medal for starting to move in that direction on the B&W 23 reactor.
24 I am happy to see it happen. I understand it is ,
i 25 being engineered. I have great hope for it and some
).
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
,_. __ _ . - ~ , __ - - __ .- _ . . . _ _ - _ , . . . . - . _ _ .
27355.0 58 REE O
1 reactors, I think, need it as a reserve parachute in this 2 business with respect to assuring core decay heat removal.
- 3 Now, I heard that it is coming off from a 4 handhold at the top plenum. That is a very nice location.
5 It-is better than taking it off from the top of the candy 6 cane, because I think you can get some water separation I
7 improvements there and get less water going out and more 8 steam going out, but you must plan on two phased flow going 9 out, I expect. But the handhold, normally those are bolted.
10 How do you intend to attach to a handhold. Are you going j
11 to weld attach? j 12 MR. JAIN: Those types of details are presently 13 being worked out. One other issue to be addressed is the i
14 structural integrity of the whole thing.
15 MR. REED: You have to figure that you.are going 16 to get some vibrations and shruggings perhaps, or potential 17 for that on your letdown line, which I guess will sp) into 18 the containment and blast somewhere. And certainly this is 19 a reserve parachute, a quick and dirty way of getting that i
20 extra backup cooling reserve parachute. You have to 21 realize that you are going to get somethit.g and I would 22 worry that bolting wouldn't hold that.
23 MR. WILLIAMS: The engineering has not been ,
24 finalized. It is going to be looked at by a lot of people 25 before we settle on a final design. We are not embarking i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
27355.0 59
- REE ,
1 on, hell, let's get something out in the field. We are 2 going to do it the next refueling.
3 MR. JAIN: Yes, sir.
4 MR. WILLIAMS: That would be in '87.
5 MR. REED: I am glad to see at long last, after 6 many, many years on the PWR and particularly this PWR, this 7 concept being really thought about and moving forward.
8 MR. WILLIAMS: You really didn't think I read 9 that paper you gave me three years ago, did you?
10- MR. REED: Is that right?
11 (Laughter.)
12 MR. REED: I am self-serving, aren't I? Thanks 13 a lot.
14 MR. REMICK: Let's proceed.
15 MR. JAIN: As I discussed just a moment ago,Hwe 16 will be resurrecting the existing start-up feedwater pump 17 and provide capability for the valves for that system.
18 These other valves were locked out after November of 1984.
19 We are addressing some of the high energy line break issues 20 which were caused by those valves being opener, and because 21 this pump happens to be in the auxiliary feedwater pump 22 room.
23 We will also be providing control room 24 capability for the motor-operated valves in the discharge 25 of the motor-driven feed pump itself. So that the operator ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33MM6
i l
l 27355.0 60 ,
esREE j (V 4 1 could control the flow to either steam generator from the 2 control room. We will be further looking at the reducing 3 the number of valves that have to position or reposition 4 after an actuation and these are certainly contributors to 5 the unreliability of any system. By making some of these 6 changes it will make the auxiliary feedwater system 7 essentially independent of all MOVs for all of the SFRCS 8 initiation conditions. Then we will also be concentrating 9 on improving the level control for the auxiliary feedwater, 10 which has traditionally given us some problem. We will be 11 making modifications to improve that.
12 We will be changing the SFRCS low level trip set b
(m- 13 point to further give us more margin between the ICS low 14 level limit and the SFRCS trip point.
15 A bigger change here is the somewhat of a total 16 revamp of the SFRCS logic. The intention there will be to 17 minimize further isolations, either of main feed or of aux 18 feed from the steam generators and a comprehensive control 19 room panel which will centralize the information for the 20 operator in the control room relating to the auxiliary 21 feedwater and the SFRCS. These are very important systems 22 after a transient and this panel will tell the operator 23 which valves have gone to the right place and which valves 24 should have gone to the right place which you will be able 7 25 to verify'it and control it from this panel.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Nationwide CoSerage . 80433MM6 202-347-3700
. ._. . . - - ~ - -_ . - - - - . _ _ - _ _ _ .
4 27355.0 61
- REE 1 MR. REED: Two days ago we heard from Babcock &
2 Wilcox owners group that really primary blowdown wasn't 3 important to other B&W reactors. It was only important to i
j 4' Davis-Besse because they had an intermediate pressure pump.
?
i
- 5 Personally, I didn't accept that because'I have focused on, t
6 most of the time, on the assurance of decay heat removal.
7 How do you people feel? ~ Are you a special case 8 because you have intermediate pumps you have to have or 9 there is more reason for you to have that, what you have 10 labeled depressurization or primary blowdown system? Is it 11 more important to you simply-because you have intermediate 1
12 pressure pumps or because you want to better assure decay 4
) 13 heat removal?
14 MR. WILLIAMS: We have less margin than they do, i
15 obviously. So you need to combat that. But in the end, we 16 want the surety that we can get that pressure down to where 17 we get water in there were with almost any means.
- 18 MR. REMICK
- What is your targetLon these
- 19 various ones, is it all-the next-shutdown?
20 MR. JAIN: Our intention is to complete.all of 21 these before restart from the next refueling outage.
22 MR. REED: I didr't get my rebuttal to that. .
{ 23 Did you say -- I understand what you said, but did you also 24 say or imply in-that that the high pressure safety-25 injection pump, BAWs, don't need primary blowdown?
f l ~ ACE-FEDERAL- REPORTERS,' INC.
l 202-347 3700 Nationwide Cmerage 800 336 M46
27355.0 62 7~ REE V
1 MR. WILLIAMS: No. But one of the things that 2 Sushil and his task force looked at was to put in the high 3 pressure pumps in lieu of this blowdown. And we looked at 4 doing both of them. Then we looked at this one. And I 5 don't know, Sushil, you go ahead.
6 MR. JAIN: Let me kind of recapitulate the 7 evolution we went through. We thought-that some sort of 8 enhancement to feed and bleed at Davis-Besse could be 9 worthwhile. So we looked at what could be done, leaving 10 the intermediate pressure and PORV that we have, and we 11 looked at what could we do. Should we change our HVI pumps 12 to totally HVI pumps just like other B&W plans or should we
() 13 put in more PORVs. Should we put in one pump 14 nonsafety-grade. And we thought about, how about 15 increasing the blowdown so that we could depressurize to a 16 point where we could use the existing safety-grade HVI 17 pumps -- and we want the capability to be such that it 18 '
would be single-failureproof, safety grade, redundant, 19 separated and everything. So we looked at the entire or as 20 many options as we could come up with and talked to 21 operators, talked to people involved and decided on this 22 option being the best one.
23 MR. REED: Did the issue of pressurized thermal 24 shock come into play as you made these considerations? ,
I 25 MR. JAIN: No.
ss)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33MM6
27355.0 63 sREE
/ )
's._J l MR. REED: You didn't think about pressurized 2 thermal shock? You realize that this makes the pressurized 3 thermal shock thing much less, this arrangement, rather 4 than going to the high pumps?
5 MR. JAIN: That is true.
6 MR. REED: The British in fact have taken the 1
7 position that they would never build a PWR that didn't 8 provide for depressurization to avoid pressurized thermal 9 shock.
10 MR. JAIN: When I said no, I was answering a 11 different question. Obviously, less potential for a PTG, 12 pressurized thermal shock, is in the direction of this 13 option. However, this option does not cause mote potential 14 ,
for PTS. That is why I was answering PTS was not a problem h
15 " in this case.
16 MR. REMICK: I suggest we go on. This is beyond 17 the restart. It is interesting but I think we should 18 proceed with the presentation.
19 MR. REED: We are solving the world's problems.
20 I am sorry, sir.
21 MR. REMICK: Yes.
22 MR. WILLIAMS: I am taking this out of Glenn's 23 time.
24 MR. JAIN: I believe I am all done here.
_ 25 MR. HILdEBRANDT: The last time we met, we went v
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationside Coverage 84WL33&MW>
J i
i 27355.0 64
{}REE 1 through in some detail'the approach to the 34 systems 2 review. I am going to retouch upon that.; One,'as a result
- 3 of.the problems that we determined out of the June 9 event, i
. 4 we sat back and said there was a potential that other j 5 problems might exist within the plant at' Davis-Besse due to 6- the maintenance history and the approach to determining 7 . root causes of problems.over history. 'We-said we are going.
, 8 to take the 34 systems that are important to safe plant.
9 operation and establish a program and look at those to
- j. 10 identify those important recurring design maintenance and 11 operation problems and determine whether corrective actions I
12 are required, part of prior to restart of the unit and what f
f
() 13 corrective actions should be taken over.the long. term.
14 This was done by interviews with maintenance engineering 15 operations personnel. It was done by review of records on
! 16 equipment maintenance and problems at Davis-Besse. .
1 4 i 17 Next was to evaluate the scope of the existing l !
l l 18 periodic. surveillance testing program, identify any
{ 19 additional testing that.was needed to insure the required 1
j 20 functions will be performed on an. ongoing basis overfthe 21 long-term. Thirdly wasito conduct a test program I 22 .specifically to assure that-these 34 systems'important to j 23 safe plant operation are functional at restart ~and1that j 24 also for testing we performed a verified adequacy of J
25 systems modifications that were being completed during this ;
+
i . ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 147 3700 1 . Nationwide Coverage . 8043446e
27355.0 65 cm h.REE 1 outage. This program is laid out here to be completed 2 prior to restart of Davis-Besse.
3 The approach, very briefly, was a team for each 4 system headed by Toledo Edison engineer, that engineer was 5 supported by highly qualified industry personnel and went 6 through this-review of the testing and the problems. The 7 result of their review was then in turn reviewed by the l
8 independent process review committee, the membership of 9 that committee combined a broad background of nuclear 10 industry experience with specific knowledge of the 11 Davis-Besse plant design.
12 Then as a result of the first two reviewers, 13 then detailed test procedures for the restart test program 14 were approved and implemented by the joint test group and 15 the restart test organization.
16 MR. REMICK: How was this integrated into your 17 configuration management program?
18 MR. HILDEBRANDT: The configuration management 19 program is a parallel and long-range and longer program.
! 20 The results of the 34 system review will be used directly 21 in the preparation of the system descriptions for those 34 22 systems. To give you an overview of what was found, I am 23 going to talk just from selected areas. The back of your 24 handouts, it goes on for a quarter or 3/8ths of an inch, a 7- 25 summary of system by system of the types of problems and.
(_/
4 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6M6
27355.0 66 OsREE 1 the resolution for each of those. I am just going to give 2 you a feeling from a selected standpoint.
3 For-the 34 systems there were approximately 150 4 problem areas required resolution prior to restart.
5 Approximately 200 problem areas required resolution over 6 the longer term. Those resolutions range from engineering 7 evaluation to hardware changes in the plant.
8 The necessary paperwork to make'that all happen 9 is in place and is proceeding and those modifications are 10 occurring and we are in the midst of the test program.
11 MR. SIESS: What do you mean by a problem area? '
12 Is this a design deficiency, a design error, a construction 13 deficiency, an equipment deficiency?
1 14 MR. HILDEBRANDT: All of those.
15 MR. SIESS: Do you have any breakdown on.how 16 many?
17 MR. HILDEBRANDT: No, sir. Most of the problems 18 were not four.d to be in the design area. A few of the 19 problems as you pulled on the thread and found that, you 20 found that you were into a design problem, and then we had 21 to treat it as a design problem.
22 The example of recurring problem areas is there 23 was a general inattention to heating ventilation and air 24 conditioning requirements. This is both in terms of 25 maintenance and in terms of attention as plant ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coserag- 8M33MM6
i l
27355.0 67 !
g xREE b
1 modifications were made, did not appear to be the attention 2 necessary in these areas. There was widespread problems 3 with inoperable nitrogen regulators. There was inadequate 4 maintenance for the hydra motor actuators. These are the 5 local hydraulic electrically controlled' actuators for 6 ventilation. There was inadequate tracking and replacement 7 of limited life components. The last four are really all 8 maintenance items, valve packing, leakage, steam trap 9 maintenance and I&C preventive maintenance and calibration 10 problems.
11 Giving you some examples of the problem areas 12 that were found in the system review. I will divide that
) 13 l into three parts. One is the review of the systems based i
14 e on interviews and record review and what was found.
i 15 Secondly, review of the testing that is done periodically 16 l.n this plant to confirm continued function. Thirdly, what 17 problems we are finding as we do the test program because 18 as you do a test program, you begin to find additional 19' things that you need to resolve.
20 First of all, just picking a couple.from this.
21 The first is the control room emergency ventilation system.
22 The control room emergency ventilation system was 23 effectively inoperable at Davis-Besse on June 9. It had no 24 direct relationship to what occurred on June 9, but we 25 found that on that date, possibly for the time before that, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33M/A6
27355.0 68
- REE 1 it was inoperable. I expect it was inoperable for a long 2 period of time. There was inadequate ventilation of the l 3 service water pump. As a result of modifications, initial 4 shields in the ventilation for the service water pump room 5 basically ended up with an order of magnitude too low 6 ventilation to the service water pumps and inadequate 7 distribution of that ventilation to the service water pumps.
~
8 This was a major modification to come back and correct that 9 situation.
10 MR. SIESS: Did you discover that by observation 11 or analysis?
12 MR. HILDEBRANDT: That was by observation.
13 There had been periodic high temperature alarms on the 14 motor on the service water pumps that occurred in the 15 summertime. And it never --
16 MR. WILLIAMS: How did you determine that? You 17 got this through interviews.
I 18 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Yes, sir. Interviews. We had 19 kind of a feeling we have had this problem. They started 20 pulling on the thread, on that thread of this problem. And 21 you start looking then at the design. This became a design 22 problem. We start pulling on it and you find that design 23 was inadequate. We confirmed that through testing. We 24 said, this doesn't look right, let's go run some quick 25 testing and see what airflows do exist. We found the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS,'INC.
- 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-334 6646 ,
- = .. . - . - - - -
27355.0 69 1 airflows were inadequate, distribution _was also inadequate, I
2 then proceeded to change th'e design and correct the: problem.
3 MR. WILLIAMS: What was the design airflow?
4 MR. HILDEBRANDT: 20 per fan which was 26,000 5 SCFM and we had about 4- to'10,000 SCFM.
6 This one down here, I am addressing specifically
- 7 the ones that led to design problems for you. We are 1 8 looking at temperature indications that came outoof testing 9 associated with the containment air cooling fans, and as 10 the gentleman was going through this, we had odd readings.
11 Those same readings had existed for a long time, but he had 12 odd readings. He found that the alignment in the setup for
- 13 which. valves opened and which valves closed, the. basic 4
j 14 design was wrong. We had to go back and change that design i l 15 from the standpoint of which valves automatically relied on j 16 the containment air cooling system.
i j 17 We talked about the last one, this was the power 18
~
! operated relief valve. It was not qualified for the 1
19 environment for feed and bleed. We have since qualified it 20 for those conditions.
l 1 21 The problem of lack of configuration control in
- 22- the safety features actuation system. We have, we made 23 modifications and we are intending to make modifications to 24 that system. We are having difficulties making those 3
25 modifications. As a result of a. loss of configuration 1
- ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202-347-3700 - Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 70 73 REE s !
'%.)
l control, we had to regain that by very painstakingly going 2 through and tracking where we were in the design of that 3 system and then making the modifications in testing and 4 confirming the changes were adequate. l 5 The last one down here, just for one other one, 6 we found as we got into the post-accident sampling system, 7 that the time-motion study that is associated with the 8 operator taking the very high activity sample and 9 evaluating that situation for a post-accident condition, 10 the time-motion study had not taken into account all the 11 things that need to be taken into account. We are doing 12 some modifications associated with this system as a result.
)
[/
s_ 13 From a test review standpoint, the procedures, 14 we are finding several problems. Each of these now have 15 been rectified. There was incomplete testing of the SPAS 16 logic at the module level. There was inadequate 17 performance testing requirements for safety-related heat 18 exchangers to follow the degradation or potential 19 degradation of such heat exchangers. Similarly on 20 safety-related pump testing, there was a lack of a good 21 acceptance criteria for a performance trending of these 22 pumps.
23 The piggyback mode for the low pressure -- the 24 decay heat removal pump, high pressure injection piggyback
,- 25 alignment which would be used for feed and bleed once we G
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coserage 8(n 336 W 46
27355.0 71
- REE V
1 brought the pressure down was inadequate. Operability a
2 checks of the flow paths that would be necessary to make 1 3 that occur.
4 This is -- we have gone through the test review.
5 We are now embarked on the test program. This is during 6 initial system testing then, we found that we had 7 improperly wired containment air cooler fans. They ran 8 backwards in the low speed condition which was the safety l 9 condition for the fan. And also found that in these 10 conditions we had less than designed flow capacity for the 11 fans when they are turning in the right direction.
12 MR. REED: Was that a construction wiring error 13 or was it a design error?
14 MR. HILDEBRANDT: I believe it is construction 15 or subsequent maintenance. Did we ever track that that we 16 know?
17 MR. SMITH: We were never able to ascertain.
18 MR. HILDEBRANDT: The design was correct.
19 MR. REMICK: What do you mean by "found during l
l 20 initial system testing"?
21 MR. HILDEBRANDT: This is a testing, initial, in 22 the case that -- it is our testing, testing going on now.
23 We are not complete yet.
24 MR. REMICK: I see.
25 MR. HILDEBRANDT: On the emergency diesel t
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage W3-3366M6
27355.0 72 REE
,S b
1 generator, improper lower air pressure limits for multiple 2 starts. The set point was too low. We would not have been 3 able to achieve the number of multiple starts that we
- 4. should be able to with the diesel generators. Improper 5 setting of the turbine hydraulic control system. We were 6 having problems with spurious trips of the main feedwater 7 pumps. We went in and specifically looked at what could be ,
8 the cause of those props. Part of the problem was 9 potential spurious tripping due to inadequate sizing of 10 orifices and was the problem most likely affecting the wear 11 monitor that is on the turbine. So we are changing the 12 orifice size to be correct.
13 I think that is it.
14 Just to give you a feeling very briefly on the 15 restart test activities and where we stand at this point in 16 time, the test procedures required to do all the testing 17 necessary prior to restart, we have 109 of 111 approved and 18 through the circuit. Of the total number of tests to be 19 performed, this is both the surveillance tests which will 20 be ongoing to be redone in the plant and the specific test
. 21 procedures that are specially written for this restart test 22 program, the total of 283 of those, we have completed 102 23 of those. Obviously all of those within mode 5 in our 24 shutdown and cooldown condition, many of those tests, you f- 25 can see here, as we qa from cold to critical and power
(./
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33MM6
27355.0 73 REE 7S V
1 operations, we have a test to be done in each one of those 2 modes with the majority being at the cold condition.
3 This is a separate problem area.
4 MR. WILLIAMS: It is the most recent rock we 5 found a worm under.
6 MR. HILDEBRANDT: The Raychem supplies problem, 7 this is the potential for improper-installation of the 8 Raychem shrink tube go that is used on electrical power and 4
9 instrumentation cabling.
10 If you could put up that little picture. If you 11 would. This is very simple. This is only an example of 12 the kind of thing. Basically what we have is cables to be 13 connected via lugs and a bolting arrangement. The 14 insulation that is provided has been already slipped onto 15 the cable ahead of time. You bring the insulation back i
16 down, this is the Raychem device. That Raychem insulation 17 is then shrunk onto the cables and over this area by 18 application of heat. It is just shrunk right onto the area.
19 We have the potential areas of problem. These j 20 were in the area of what the overlap was between this area 21 and the end of that shrink sleeve and how much this
- 22 particular sleeving was pushed out by the mechanical
{ 23 connections at this point. Those are the major areas of 24 concern.
25 MR. WILLIAMS: Did the bolt go too far?
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationeide Coverage 800-336 6646
j 27355.0 74 f~s REE
- k.
]
1 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Yes, did the bolt protrude?
4 2 MR. WILLIAMS: The other area was the diameter 3 of the sleeve, to begin with, vis-a-vis the diameter of the 4 cable.
5 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Yes, sir. The configuration I 6 here is very simplified. There actually may be a 7 multiplier and the diameter choice compared to the cable 8 size, et cetera, is very important, as you do this.
9 The -- if you could give me the mechanics slide.
10 Our first step into this was, the way this 11 started is a training program that Steve Smith mentioned to 12 you before, we are having a training program for work going
( 13 on in the plant, because Raychem installations are part of a
14 doing maintenance work and repair work in the plant. One 15 of the inspectors said, gee, what you just explained to me 16
) is the'way this, it is supposed to be installed, is not the 17 way I think I have seen it installed in the past. That was 18 then elevated to, do we have a problem? We needed to go 19 find what our problem was and to what extent it existed.
20 We established a pilot program for one system to i
21 inspect the Raychem installations and electrical hardware.
22 This was the decay heat train which includes a decay heat 23 removal system. The component cooling water system,.the 24 service water system and the emergency diesel generator
! 25 associated with that side of-the plant, one train.
() We i
t l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
1 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6 4 6
27355.0 75 m REE ,
L]
1 proceeded then to determine the quantity and locations of 2 the Raychem in the applications important to safe operation, 3 not just in this train, but elsewhere in the plant. Then 4 we are evaluating, conducting testing based on what we are 5 finding, to see if we can go to a different configuration 6 than has been previously qualified by Raychem, but, 7 depending on the results of this work, in combination of 8 what we have found, we will then make repairs of everything 9 that doesn't fall within well established qualification of 10 Raychem devices, either previously or by the specific 11 testing that we are doing at independent laboratories. We 12 are doing that with a national testing service in Acton, 13 ; Massachusetts. That work is just now beginning.
14 As we -- for this pilot program I mentioned to 15 you, what did we find? I described what the extent of that 16 inspection was. And we found we had 21 Raychem splices, 17 all 21 failed the current Raychem requirements regarding 18 such things as the overlap, the so-called holdout, which is 19 the bolt size and how much you have stretched it, whether 20 you have picked the right size of sleeving for the size of 21 cable involved. We have completely repaired that loop. ,
22 Just went straight through and repaired all those 21.
23 MR. WILLIAMS: On this Raychem, the criteria 24 that Phil talks about, when Raychem set up their procedures 25 for the installation of their material, they had a test O,
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80433M4m
27355.0 76
(])"""
l program that established the criteria and they tested that.
2 And.they never backed off and said, how much margin do I 3 have in this? And so we don't know that -- you know, how 4 much back down the ladder you can walk and depart from 5 their overlap and their diameters and all. And when Phil
- 6 says we are testing, what we are doing is looking at what 7 you have in the plant and making some like -- cutting some 8 out and sending it back and seeing whether there is any 9 margin there.
10 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Mr. Smith has just passed out 11 for you some examples of the Raychem shrink sleeving as 12 installed. We do not have any before, do we, this is all 13 after; right?
4 14 MR. SMITH: Right.
15 MR. HILDEBRANDT: . Basically we are going-to be 16 going through all the lE and any non-lE electrical cabling l 17 that can affect the lE buses in the plant and determine 18 what we have in concert with the testing decided that we 19 need to repair. That-is all being done prior to restart of 20 the unit.
21 Any questions in this area?
22 MR. WILLIAMS: That is it, Mr. Chairman.
23 MR. REMICK: Any questions from the Subcommittee?
24 I think -- well, it comes to mind, thinking 25 ahead for the full Committee, I think those examples that O.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Natio.iwide Coverage 80fA346M6 4 A
T' 27355.0 77 REE v
1 you have are extremely interesting. I suggest that maybe 2 on some of the slides you pick out one or two to describe, 3 the Committee might want to have a question on others. But 4 that is probably an area where it is important that you 5 give them examples but not necessarily go down item by item 6 and say a few words. Some members will ask for them.
7 MR. WILLIAMS: Were you speaking just to 8 Hildebrandt's presentation or everybody's?
9 MR. REMICK: I think everybody. We took about lu just two hours. We are going to have three hours at the 11 full Committee and you are going to have 14 members asking 12 questions. I think Glenn has all of his asked now.
() 13 (Laughter.)
14 MR. REMICK: But you will probably have to cut 15 out some of your presentation somewhat and some of that I 16 think you can do by just picking out examples. I think you 17 have done a good job of picking out the important items, 18 but I don't think you need to discuss every bullet on the 19 slide.
20 MR. WILLIAMS: I think probably I can say that 21 the organization that we have is functioning and the 22 manning is going well and leave out mine altogether. What 23 do you think of that? The drug screening and that stuff?
24 Do you really want that?
25 MR. REMICK: No. I don't think. The fact that l
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nathmwide Coverage 800-334-t6:4 ;
.I
27355.0 78 REE 7S Q ,)
1 you have implemented drug screening you might mention it.
2 But I am not sure you need the slide.
3 MR. WILLIAMS: I won't show any slide. I will 4 open with 35 seconds.
5 MR. REMICK: The next month we will be taking up 6 the Commission's policy statement on fitness for duty. You 7 might have questions, so you might be prepared with your 8 slides as backup in the case questions come up.
9 MR. REED: I think because the ACRS is so 10 perceptive and futuristic and all these things, that you 11 should make a good presentation on this new system that you 12 might incorporate called primary blowdown on heat
(~%
(./ 13 pressurizers because --
14 ; MR. WILLIAMS: We will keep Sushil. If I throw 15 mine out, I can give the really important people another 15 16 minutes and I can cover that.
17 MR. REED: This is earthshaking and the ACRS is 18 I right on top of it.
19 MR. WILLIAMS: If we don't strap it down right, 20 it is going to be plant-shaking.
21 MR. REMICK: I agree. It is something you 22 should mention. I will point out, though, it is beyond the 23 restart, so we don't want to spend too much time on it.
24 But I think everybody will be interested in the fact that
,3 25 those are your plans and how you envision doing it.
(x- ;
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 8@33MM6
27355.0 79 h
1 We are past our break. points. Let's take a 4 2 15-minute break until 10:45.
3 (Recess.)
4 MR. REMICK: There was a question I wanted to 5 ask and forgot. . What is your current schedule and what is 6 your lead item on that schedule?
7 MR. WILLIAMS: It is the reactor coolant pump F
8 shafts. We anticipate about the first of November.
9 MR. REMICK: Approximately 1 November for 10 restart?
11 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.
i 12 MR. REMICK: Another thought came to mind on j ) 13 your presentation, the pump shaft crack problem is 14 something you will need to mention so forth, but that is 15 probably se.nething that too could be abbreviated, not in as 16 quite as much detail, and the Raychem problem you could 17 probably abbreviate. 1 18 We are ready for the Staff then, update on their 4
19 evaluation of the restart. Conrad McCracken will take the 20 lead for the Staff.
21 MR. MC CRACKEN: I immediately went to slide 3 22 because I assume you know what today's date is, which was 23 the first slide, and the fact that we have had a meeting or 24 two before. The third slide gets down to what we intend to 25 talk about. I have divided this up a little bit. The i ,
ACE-FEDERAL. REPORTERS, INC. ,
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 8m3%6M6
27355.0 80 REE 1 first six issues I will go over which are significant 2 changes to the safety evaluations since you saw the draft.
3 The remaining two issues, maintenance will be covered by 4 Drew Persinkc as a separate presentation. And system 5 review and test program by Chris Vandenberg.
6 We did it that way because in our opinion, the 7 real big issues that needed to be resolved at Davis-Besse 8 were the maintenance and the -- I am the proof positive 9 that this has worked -- is the systems review and test 10 program. We consider those to be extremely important in 11 providing ourselves assurances that the unit is ready.for 12 restart.
13 The one big issue-we had on motor-operated 14 valves last time was that we had not yet received from the 15 licensee where they were going. They did have a failure on 16 motor-operated valves in the June 9 event, which did lead 17 to the problem, and gave us concern that other 18 motor-operated valves may not have worked. At that time we 19 didn't have a complete listing of every valve they had, all 20 the design pressures they had to function at, what the 3 21 . limiting conditions of operation were, and they went 22 through a process of getting that for all valves, 23 determining which valves in fact would be limiting valves 24 and doing tests on representative valves to demonstrate
- 25 that after having gone through the MOVATS program, that in-ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 l
I 4
27355.0 81 REE G
1 fact a valve that has been fully tested by MOVATS will j 2 function under the design-basis conditions that it needs to 3 function under. That has been done now. We have reviewed 4 that and we have bought off on that in the safety 5 evaluation you currently have.
6 The next area that we had not got final 7 resolution on was main steam safety valves and atmospheric 8 vent valves. There were pressure fluctuations in the
! 9 system that was a problem with the transmitters that might 10- have led to a partial trip of SFAS that didn't stay lit.
11 This is a rather interesting slide because I prepared it 12 last week. It shows how the system review and test program
, ) 13 is working. The automatic vent valve control system was 14 repaired. They found that there was some drift in the ICS 15 modules. This was the initial root cause determination.
16 They have gotten into this particular area and 17 gone in with their systems test program and made a 18 determination that in fact they still have some problems 19 with the atmospheric vent valve. It may be associated with 20 the spring tension on the back lift pressure for the valve 21 lift. But they are looking into it. So even though they l
22 had gone through a cause determination, the system review 23 and test program is working because now when they are going 24 back and doing testing, they are testing components that 25 they thought they might have repaired and said, hey, there ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
i 27355.0 82 4
l ()
l 1 .was something else we didn't catch. So I think this 2 demonstrates the process is doing what it is supposed to.
~
3 In the. case of the main steam safety valves, 4 they were removed, reworked, retested. They had a whole 0
O 5 series of. problems with those on valves blowing down too 6 much. Not enough chattering. They have reworked them and L i j 7 they have committed to give us a long-term maintenance plan i
8 which tells us how frequently they intend to rework the 9 valves and demonstrate the fact that they will lift when 10 they are supposed to and blow down the percentage they are 11 supposed to.
J 12 The safety features actuation system, prior to
( 13 the June 9 event there was a concern that SFAS did not have i 14 sufficient independence to meet the single failure. That 15 was associated with the fact that the system had a common i
16 ground perhaps and could lead to a common failure mode.
i 17 They have gone through their SFAS system and have i
j 18 incorporated modifications to meet the channel independence
)
19 criteria of IEEE standards and we agree.that that now is 20 the case.
21 In the area of safety significant and human i
}
22 engineering defects, prior to the June 9 event, in the 23 detailed control room design review, they had identified 29 24 HEDs. Because HEDs were part of what had gone on in the i 25 event, the inadvertent isolation of the wrong, pushing the
{ -( )
i i
i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 83 ,
REE J
l wrong, but even which resulted in isolation of the aux feed 2 valves, we considered this an issue that we wanted to see 3 resolved before restart. We have gone through the 29 HEDs !
l 4 they have. They have instituted permanent fixes for I 5 believe six of them. The other ones they have interim 6 fixes where, if it is a mechanical deficiency, they have in l
7 an interim, trained the operators such that the operators 8 are aware of it, know how to operate it, and can control it 9 until they can make the changes they need to, which will be 10 either during the fifth or the final changes made by the 11 sixth refueling outage.
12 MR. REMICK: Is the fifth the 1987 --
(3 s_) 13 MR. NC CRACKEN: Yes. And the sixth is the 1989.
4 14 And the other they looked at on single failure 15 considerations was that they were concerned about the 26 reactor protective system. They went through a complete 17 reevaluation of the reactor protective system and our 18 conclusion after reviewing what they have done is that 19 their evaluation does show acceptable single failure.
20 MR. REMICK: Without fixes?
1 21 MR. MC CRACKEN: Without fixes. I believe that 22 is true.
23 MR. JAIN: Thr SFAS, not the RPS.
24 MR. MC CRACKEN: Okay. And lastly, I have some 25 of the commitments, if you go through our safety evaluation a
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
A 27355.0 84 l
I )REE 1 and read it, you will see that there are a rather large 2 number, I just tried to pick some of the significant 3 commitments that will be accomplished either prior to or 4 after restart. One that I realize this morning that I left 5 off of here -- it was inadvertent -- was the one on the 6 blowdown capability. I was making.up new slides and I 7 forgot to put it on.
8 Prior to or during restart, they will go through 9 the final rework and testing of all safety-related 10 motor-operated valves. And again some of those can't be 11 tested until they get to mode 3 or so, and completion of 4
12 the systems test program which, again, we believe is a very
() 13 significant part of what gives us assurances that the plant 14 is ready to operate.
- 15 MR. REED: They haven't committed to this 16 primary blowdown prior to restart?
17 MR. WILLIAMS: No.
18 MR. MC CRACKEN: That would be next. After 19 restart. Next circle down on the left. i t
20 After restart, as I said before, the resolution 21 of the control room human engineering deficiencies. Plan 22 for retune inspection of. main steam safety valves. They 23 will submit that within 90 days of restart. 1 24 Turbine stop valve closure time technical 25 specification, 90 days following restart. That was one II ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-3364646
o 27355.0 85
)
1 associated with the single failure concern that occurred in 2 the IIT NUREG where they thought-that if you had a failure 3 of one steam line, you could actually blowdown and 4 depressurize both steam generators, blow 600 pounds and 5 cause an isolation. That has been taken care of two ways.
6 One, they put in a block signal so that you will not 7 isolate the second steam generator depressurizer. In fact, 8 you will continue to feed that. And secondly by changing 9 the tech spec on the stop valve for the curtain from 5 10 seconds which it currently is to 1 second which it really 11 runs at, they actually will isolate that second generator 12 sooner than it could depressurize the 600 pounds.
( 13 They have a comprehensive auxiliary feedwater 14 reliability study which will incorporate all of their new 15 components, some of their plant-specific data, and that 16 will be in 90 days following restart.
17 And final one they are putting in is technical 18 specification for the motor-driven feed pump 60 days after 19 restart. That will be similar to other plants that have 20 tech spec 3 pumps.
21 Those are the major issues outside of the 22 maintenance and system review and test. Were there any 23 questions anywhere at all outside of systems review or 24 maintenance?
25 MR. REMICK: I believe not.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide coverage 80 4 336-6646
1 Y
27355.0 86
)
l You are Drew Persinko?
2 MR. PERSINKO: That is correct.
3 I would like to discuss the Staff surveys that 4 were conducted in the area of maintenance at Davis-Besse.
i 5 Two surveys were conducted: one in September 1985, second 6 one was conducted in March of 1986. The team was comprised 7 of interoffice group of people. September survey consisted 8 of two members from NRR, two people from Region 3, one 9 person from the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, and 10 we also had two contractors with us from Pacific Northwest 11 Labs.
, 12 MR. REMICK: What type of expertise did the 13 contractors have?
4 14 MR. PERSINKO: They had been in the area of 15 maintenance at Pacific Northwest Labs. They had been 1
16 working on the NRR's maintenance and surveillance program 17 plan. They had developed the protocol which we used in 18 September survey. So they had been familiar with the area 19 of maintenance. Maybe this, one point to be noted, this is l 20 a programmatic review of the maintenance program. It is 21 not in the -- how often should the pump be service varied 22 and that type of area.
4 23 On the March survey, the same five people 24 excluding the contractors also -- who had participated in 25 the September survey -- were also in the March survey.
f
- ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage H00 336-6M6
-- - -- , . . . . . ~ . . . - - . . . . . - - , - - -- .. - , , - - . -, , . , , , - .-.
27355.0 87
. - REE 1 Both surveys we utilized extensively interviews 2 with plant personnel. We interviewed people within all 3 levels of the organization, all the way down from Joe 4 Williams all the way down to, I think, the craft workers 5 themselves. So we got a good cross section of people 6 within the plant organization.
7 By doing so, we were able to confirm our 8 conclusions, what we -- our conclusions were not the basis 9 of what one person had told us; rather, it vas obtained 10 from the cross section; what you heard from one level of 11 the organization was often confirmed from another level of 12 the organization. The person at another level saw it from
() 13 a different perspective, but yet the same problem existed.
14 So -- as I said, the September survey utilized 15 the protocol which was developed as part of the maintenance 16 and surveillance program plan in NRR. The survey was, the 17 protocol was intended as an information-gathering tool 18 because that was the purpose of the Phase I of the MSVP was 19 to gather information as to the, what comprises a given 20 maintenance program at a plant.
21 The March survey we also used -- we also 22 interviewed personnel extensively. However, we did not use 23 the protocol as we did in the first one. The interviews 24 were more pointed, based on the results found in the 25 September survey. Our questions were more pointed to the
( i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 88 73 REE 1 problems that we had discovered in the previous survey.
2 In addition, the March survey, we had two 3 members of the team review MWOs that were outstanding and 4 that would nct be completed prior to restart. We, near the 5 latter part of the week, we broke up into various groups 6 and individuals and we accompanied various site personnel, 7 just to see what their activities consisted of and how they 8 went about doing their job. We also attended the plan of 9 the day meeting that is held and it is run by the head of 10 the planning and scheduling group. We also attended the 11 weekly status meeting that is run by Joe Williams.
12 The findings that we came up with were the Q(_, 13 consensus judgment of the team. The NRC's regulations are 14 general and not very specific in all instances and so, 15 therefore, the findings are a consensus judgment.
16 I would like to discuss what we found and 17 . concluded as a result of the September survey and then I l
18 I will do the same thing for the March survey, and if there 19 are any questions about any particular, then we can discuss 20 them.
21 The September survey, after conducting all the 22 interviews with the plant personnel, we, the team concluded 23 that there were weaknesses in the following areas: The 24 area of corporate commitment, spare parts material 25 i readiness, supervision, preventive maintenance, maintenance (7_)
v ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationside Coverage 800-336-6646
~ .
d 27355.0 89
()
I work order backlog, the area of maintenance procedures, l 1
2 communications within the organization -- that would be i
i 3 communication not only within maintenance but ;
i 4 communications with operations as well; some weaknesses in
{
5 the area of responsibilities, and also in the area of [
l 6 training.
- 7 After the September survey our conclusions were 8 that the modifications that the licensee was pursuing were :
9 addressing the above nine weaknesses. They, we maybe took ,
I 10 a different cross section than they did, but it ended up t
l 11 that the actions were addressing those nine areas. !
12 At the time of the survey, many of the changes f
() 13 l that were being implemented were very new and consequently 14 it was too early to really judge whether it was functioning I l
15 as it should be functioning and how effective it would be.
i [
16 The conclusion of the team, which the licensee also l
17 subsequently requested, was that another survey be i
18 conducted at a future time. ;
19 During the March survey, we went back for 20 follow-up visit. We reviewed the same nine areas as before. '
21 Our questions were more pointed in those nine areas. In !
4 l
- 22 addition, as a result of the first survey, there were some i
- 23 concerns about whether the planning and scheduling group ,
F 1 :
- 24 would be able to function effectively and efficiently. i j 25 There is a new concept there. It is a !
i i
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. I 202 347-3700 Nation *ide Coverage HM3%664
l 27355.0 90 7S REE U
1 centralized planning and scheduling group now, where as 2 before it was not centralized as it is now. So there was 3 some concern of the team as to whether or not the planning 4 and scheduling group would be effective since, if it wasn't, 5 it could be a major bottleneck in carrying out of 6 maintenance.
7 We also reviewed the area of administrative 8 procedures briefly.
9 Conclusions were that considerable progress had 10 been made in implemencing the new program by the utility; 11 that, as a result of reviewing the maintenance work orders i 12 ! that would be outstanding at restart, we concluded that the
() 13 ,
i utility is consistently complying with the stated basis for determining which MWOs would be required for restart.
14 l 15 The team did note some problems, but they were, 16 I guess I wuuld look at them as wrinkles in implementing 17 the maintenance program, not as major programmatic 18 l weaknesses that would be pervasive throughout the I
19 organization.
20 MR. REMICK: Could you mention a couple examples 21 of the type of problem?
22 MR. PERSINKO: Yes. The team noted that there 23 did not appear to be a wealth of spare parts on hand at the 24 time. Future inventory needs should be noted. One of the 25 problems in the previous conduct of maintenance was that ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Cmcrage 8to-336-M44
i
! 27355.0 91 r REE I
O 1 the foremen were inundated with paperwork and were not able ,
2 to spend as much time in the field as would be desired.
3 Many people, through this conclusion, were aware il a 4 at this time that the foremen field time was still less 5 than the desired amount. It has improved, but it is still 6 less than desired. And the utility, the licensee believes
- 7 that the reason for the less field time is that they 8 experienced a problem in closure of MWOs. And that i
i 9 required more time on the part of the foremen than had been 10 anticipated. They are hoping that the foremen field time 11 will increase once the closure process is done.
- 12 MR. REED: Well, you know, what we do is create, 13 the NRC creates a catch-22 situation. We keep running up i
, 14 the paper flow and then we ask the foreman and make him j 15 address the paper flow and get involved in the paper flow 4
16 and then we want him to be out on the job where he ought to l 17 be in his standup job activity. So that catch-22 is a real l 18 problem. And we keep talking about and stamping all kinds
! 19 of things with paper reduction act, but I don't ever see us j 20 act. So really, we have our own regulatory to blame a 21 great deal on that. I just don't know how we solve the l
l 22 dilemma but to have efficient paper and get those foremen
! 23 out in the field. That is where they should be, five out l
- 24 of the eight hours of their shift.
I 25 MR. PERSINKO: I am not disagreeing with you, i
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ;
- 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4646
i l
4 j 27355.0 92 REE
.f 1 but part of the reorganization was that the general foremen i
j 2 were supposed to handle a large part of the paperwork l 3 rather than the foremen.- As it turns out, I imagine that l 4 the general foremen were doing their paperwork but this j 5 unanticipated paper problem came up also.
! 6 MR. WILLIAMS: I think the process is -- if I 7 may say something. The process that we followed in this l
]
J 8 outage and the vast numbers of MWOs as you saw, have l
j 9 generated paperwork. What we found in the strike that we 10 have some bottlenecks down there that we will now eliminate.
11 The way we found it was, because the foremen were out doing i
12 the work and trying to do the paperwork trail before. So i
i O u w-e the memeg-s . Se 1 beneve thet we win euminete j 14 some of that. We learned a good deal about our system by
] 15 the people having to go out and do the work. So now they --
i j 16 MR. SMITH: Keep in mind one thing. When I 17 arrived at Davis-Besse, the first of July last year, they i 18 had a total of four foremen for the entire maintenance j 19 department. That number is now 23.
l 20 MR. REED: What are these plants going to do l 21 with four for two units?
I j 22 MR. WILLIAMS: I don't believe they exist today.
i
) 23 MR. REED: I think you have a catch-up situation. l l
l 24 I really think that you may have overstaffed. ;
I' 25 MR. REMICK: I wonder if the procedures here <
1
)
l l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 2 336 6646
27355.0 93 REE 1 that are causing the difficulty aren't licensee generated.
2 MR. WILLIAMS: That is right.
1 I 3 MR. REMICK: They are not NRC necessarily. NRC 4 doesn't tell them how to clear work orders.
t 5 MR. WILLIAMS: That is our, it is our system.
6 MR. PERSINKO: In defense of the foremen, even 7 though they did have this additional paperwork, we did ask l
I 8 the craftsmen who report to the foremen, are they available i 9 when needed. The answer almost always was yes. Even t
10 though they do have these additional work, we need them on 11 a job, they are there. So --
J 12 A few of the other items -- I won't go through
( 13 them all -- the foremen and the general foremen have been 14 working long hours for extensive periods of time. And we 15 thought that that could be taking a toll on the workers.
( 16 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.
j 17 MR. PERSINKO: We brought these items up with 18 Toledo Edison.
1 19 MR. REMICK: I assume Toledo Edison is fully j 20 aware of the type of problems that you have found in the l 1l 21 survey?
! 22 MR. PERSINKO: Correct. Everything on this 23 slide has been discussed at the exit meeting with Steve 24 Smith.
I i 25 MR. WILLIAMS: That's correct; everything but
!O 4
ACE. FEDERAL, REPORTERS, INC.
mm.non sanon.iac co,crage m o u-ua6 l
< 27355.0 94 REE l
O l
! I the long hours.
i 2 MR. REED: On the spare parts issue, which seems 3 not to be really an NRC function, but are you people a j 4 member of some group, B&W owners group or is there any
! 5 similarities between your units and anybody else's so that 6 you can be a member?
7 MR. WILLIAMS: Not really. We are a member, but 3
8 that wasn't our problem. Our problem was that the bins 9 were just empty. We had no inventory that had been defined 10 that was worthy at the time. The material though has not, 11 is not holding us up. The current redoing of the material 12 control has been, I think, one of the most spectacular 13 achievements out there. But the 'ong range -- it says our q
14 configuration management -- that really final inventory has l 15 to await on that. We have an interim going in and we will i
- 16 probably over-buy some things. We will stock some things l
17 we don't need and we will forget some, too. But that is l
, 18 the process. I am really pleased with the comparison i
l 19 between inventory now and what we had then.
20 MR. PERSINKO I don't think I need to go
- 21 through all the rest.
22 MR. REMICK: No.
23 MR. PERSINKOt Maybe one point to note. This 24 bullet right here. The craft people we spoke to did file f
- 25 that the quality of their work is now considered a number I
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
j 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 3%6M6
27355.0 95 f~s REE t
1 one concern by their management, whereas before they felt, 2 they perceived that the concern was, the major emphasis of 3 management was completing the maintenance work. So --
4 MR. REMICK: Do they sense that quality of work 5 is also one of their most important concerns?
6 MR. PERSINKO: Yes. I think -- if management 7 feels that, they feel it, too.
8 The further conclusions by the NRC team were 9 that that the maintenance organization now is functioning 10 as intended with no major identifiable weaknesses. There 11 are areas which can change over time, and as a result of 12 that, Region 3 will monitor outstanding MW0s to assure that
) 13 ; continued control of the MWO backlog is maintained and that l
14 progress is made on completing those MW0s.
l 15 i In addition, Region 3 will also continue to 16 monitor the conduct of maintenance at Davis-Besse.
17 That concludes my presentation. If you have any 18 questions, any specific areas -- I would be happy to 19 entertain them.
20 MR. REMICK: Glenn? None. Thank you.
21 Mr. Vandenberg next.
22 MR. VANDENBERG I am Chris Vandenberg. I work 23 for Region 3. I am a reactor inspector and a team leader 24 for the system review and est program review group.
25 I have a little bit of a review here. As was Acc FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 37tX) Nationwide Cmcrage *XF336-6646
27355.0 96 REE b
us 1 previously discussed at the last meeting, the Staff decided 2 to outline an eight-point program for review of the system 3 review and test program. The first four of these items, as 4 are delineated here, were: first, to evaluate the progress 5 of the SRTP to determine which degree we thought it could 6 achieve the stated program objectives; the second would be 7 to assess whether the list of systems important to safe 8 plant operation is sufficiently complete to provide 9 reasonable assurance of safe plant operation; and to 10 specifically evaluate justification for excluding any 11 safety-related system; to review the list of systems 12 function important to safe plant operation to determine 13 whether they are complete; review selected test outlines to 14 ; ensure that they encompass all the system functions. All 15 four of these items were completed and to the maximum 16 extent possible and discussed in the safety evaluation 17 ,
report. The safety evaluation report identifies a few open I
18 I items an commitments and we are following those on a 19 regional tracking basis. They will be closed as the work 20 is complete and --
21 MR. REMICK: Was the system review an test 22 program one of the items identified in the 50.54(f) letter 23 last August?
24 MR. VANDENBERG I believe the 50.54(f) letter 25 requested action, didn't specifically refer to a test ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nation,ide Coverage Nn33MM6
27355.0 97
, REE 1 program. The COA addressed the system review and test 2 program as a response to the generic concerns of the 54(f) 3 letter. I 4 MR. REMICK: What addressed it?
5 MR. VANDENBERG: The course of action plan. In 6 that original course of action, they identified a broad 7 objective. They didn't have specific details on how this !
8 would be achieved. So what they have done is developed a 9 system review and test program, a volume of procedures, 10 implementing and administrative procedures which are not 11 docketed at this point. These are the procedures which we i
12 have reviewed and discuss here. They discuss how to do a
() 13 system reviest, how to document a system review, how to do a 14 test review, how to document it. All the procedural l
15 requirements on how to meet the program objectives was the j 16 focus of the first half of our review process.
17 The second half of our review process had to do 18 mainly with system testing. We had originally committed to 19 review and witness and evaluate the results of , elected
- 20 system tests, verify that the licensee had demonstrated 21 performance of the testing, do various audits of the 22 personnel, the records reviews, the team leader f 23 qualifications to insure that they were meeting the j 24 objectives and fulfilling the commitments of the system
, 25 review and test program. And continue to observe JTG i
e i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
t 27355.0 98
, REE i 1 meetings, IPRC meetings,'any other activity that we felt l 2 was necessary to assure ourselves that the program as 3 delineated was being maintained.
l 1
4 All of these items, and there were problems with l
! 5 these items, are discussed in the regional inspection 6 reports. They are docketed and there are many specific 7 open items and concerns which have been resolved which are 8 too detailed to go into right now.
]
)<
9 To implement the last four items, the Region has j 10 decided to have the 34 systems -- we committed to i
j 11 internally review 10 of the 34 as an audit basis. Review 12 these systems' review reports to insure that they are j ) 13 accomplished within the guidelines of the SRTP. Next was 14 to review the licensees test program. That is, we would i
j 15 review and evaluate and witness four of the six integrated i
16 tests the licensee has committed to perform, review witness l 17 and evaluate 10 of the 34 systems deemed important to safe 18 plant operations. That is, of the same 10 of the 34 19 systems, there may be 60, 80 tests to implement those i
i 20 system reviews. We would witness, review and evaluate
- l j 21 those specific tests. We have not told the licensees which 22 of those 10 systems we chose. It is an audit basis. I
,i I
l 23 Lastly, just to make sure the licensee has performed and l l
l' 24 evaluated the rest of the test results. So that was our 4
i j 25 regional commitment to follow up on the program. !
(:) !
1
, l 1
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646 1
27355.0 99
, REE
\ /
1 Since September, we have had four NRC inspectors 2 and seven contractor inspectors involved in this 3 participation. We have provided weekly coverage up until 4 about May, and we slowed down at that point because of 5 testing slowed due to main coolant pump investigation.
6 Even with the strike, testing activities have picked up and 7 we have a number of test results packages which are 8 time-intensive so we anticipate at least weekly coverage 9 until restart and through restart.
10 Our revieu status at this point, is that we have 11 committed to 10 of 23. We have completed 16 of 34 system 12 review reports with minor comments. One of six integrated 7_
(_/ 13 I tests, there have been three tests approved, there are none 14 have been performed as of this point.
15 They have ident,ified, as they discussed, 111 16 test procedures and 172 surveillance tests. That is not to 17 l say that these are the only surveillance tests required in 18 l, their tech specs or in this program. It is just that there 19 are 172 surveillance tests which they feel take credit for 20 demonstrating specific system functions.
21 Out of the 111 they performed 68 tests. We have 22 reviewed 60 of those and witnessed 41. They have approve 23 the results of 37 test procedures and we have reviewed 76 24 those packages. They have performed 24 surveillances.
25 They have reviewed six and witnessed four. As of last 7_
(_)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationside Coverage 800-336-(M6
27355.0 100
[ )
1 Friday there were no surveillance test results available.
l 2 I understand this morning there are about nine. We will 3 take a look at those as soon as we get a copy of them.
f 4 In the system review reports, there are 34. The 5 ones in blue are the ones that we have identified. So you 6 can see they had divided these up into groups and on an 7 audit basis, we picked ones that we thought were of general 8 interest to us and important to safe plant operations and 9 more importantly, safety-related.
10 So as I mentioned before, not only were the 11 system review reports reviewed, but the testing associated 12 with these, with at least 10 of these systems have, are in i
() 13 the process of being reviewed and witnessed.
14 MR. REED: I notice security system on there.
15 MR. VANDENBERG: What we did on security and 16 fire protection, we took these packages - personally, I
- 17 didn't look at the package. Wo gave it to our security
! 18 people in the Region and had them review it to insure that 19 there were no abnormal results indicated and that they 20 agreed with the conclusions of that report.
21 MR. REED: In other words, the security system 22 as it was functioning before the incident has been audited i 23 to see that it is still functioning that restrictively 24 after the incident. Were there any downgradings or 25 reductions in demands made on the --
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 80433(>6646
i 27355.0 101
) ,
- 1 MR. VANDENBERG
- I can't address that. l 2 MR. REED: We just heard here the other day on 3 the Rancho Seco situation where, in order to help get the i,
4 valves and do things, a man jumped the security fence. I 5 hope he did well.
i 6 MR. VANDENBERG: I wish I could answer your
! 7 question.
[
8 MR. REED: That is a catch-22 situation, too.
9 MR. WILLIAMS: That would depend on how big a
) 10 bolt cutter you put near the lock, Glenn.
11 MR. KOSLOV: I don't want to get too deeply into i
12 specifics in this area. But there was at least one j
i
/~}
(- 13 significant method used to make operator access to i
14 equipment simpler. And in addition, there were other 4
15 modifications made on a specific basis that makes access to
- 16 individual areas more operator friendly.
17 MR. REED: We are watching now very closely the
- 18 interferences that are possible from security systems and I, 19 quite frankly, I am all for psychological testing and i
20 inside, as you recall, is people upgrading versus hardware
- 21 upgrading of security systems to block operator action.
22 And I guess the hardening up of security systems is sort of 23 on a plateau right now.
24 MR. VANDENBERG Once again, from our 25 perspective, our review at this point was to determine ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 8m336-6646
4 t
27355.0 102 I whether the review, the system review was done in 2 accordance with the stated program requirements and that we i
3 agreed that on this specific corrective actions that were 4 identified, that those were adequate resolve any problemn.
i 4
5 So I am sure the licensee is correcting any
}
6 further identified problems.
i
! 7 MR. REMICK: Let me ask the question: We did l
8 have a security, a briefing at one of our full Committee 9 meetings in a closed session. Has anything changed j 10 dramatically that we should redo, that we should plan to do 11 with the full Committee?
l 3 12 MR. WILLIAMS: I think we have now done what we
( 13 told you we were going to do-then. I will take a look at I
14 that. Okay? But I think we have accomplished those things.
15 We feel much better about our ability to cope with problems 16 with the system we have today.
17 MR. REMICK: Okay.
18 MR. VANDENBERG Just continuing here. We had 4
19 four additional systems that we proceeded to review as well.
] -
20 Just to show you which systems we have picked to review.
t 21 In terms of the internal commitments, not i
22 looking at the licensee's entire test program, just looking 23 at the systems that we committed to review, in the status i 24 of the NRC progress in doing our review, you could see that 25 we are about a third done on the integrated testing only i i
j 1 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 37(X) Nation *ide Coverage 8(Nk3364M6
4 l
27355.0 103
)
1 because there is very little that has been approved and i
2 performed.
3 Test procedures, the licensee has performed 4 quite a few of those. They only have 10 they haven't 5 started and 14 maybe mode dependent. We reviewed and 6 witnessed quite a large percentage of those. The results 7 of review and test procedures and surveillance tests of 8 course are very slow, but you can see that the STs again 9 have nothing to conform to to a large degree and the 10 results packages will follow. That is th; next really
- 11 large phase of our review effort. We will take a look at i 12 the test results as they become available.
( 13 So in terms of the NRC's review of progress, we 14 are very close to being completed with test results -- test 15 review and test witnessing. We have a lot to do on 16 surveillance tests and as well as test results review.
17 As we go through the system review process, one 18 of the indicators that I gained personal confidence that 19 program is working is twofold the number of problems that 20 the system review identifies that the licensee previously 21 discussed in the system review, test review and testing l
I 22 themselves, as well as the methodology and the adequacy of 23 the licensen's corrective actions of problems that we 24 identified.
25 In terms of program implementation, and our team
! ()
1 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 80lk33 M M 6
27355.0 104
, REE 1 got together and we reviewed the programmatic requirements 2 of the system review program and to insure that the program s
3 is implemented in accordance with those requirements, we
! 4 maintain a review. We have identified a few problems as t
5 this program is ongoing. In each case the licensee has 6 taken adequate corrective action to insure that any l 7 unidentified or any identified problems ate adequately
! 8 corrected.
9 They have previously committed to issue IPRC 10 meeting minutes that we used for the review process. They 11 were rapidly provided for back review. A chronological log j 12 was not required for surveillance testing as was originally
() 13 anticipated. Once that was pointed out, a minichronological i 14 log is now required.
. 15 50.59s were not required for each test procedure f
16 performed. That has been adequately resolved by a new 3
17 requirement and an audit was performed at the licensee's 18 I own initiative, to insure that safety evaluations were s 19 provided for each and every test procedure performed in 1
j 20 this outage.
l 21 Problems identified in the test review may not i
22 have been reported to the NRC in the time required, and the 23 licensee is taking adequate corrective action to insure
- 24 that anything that they have found in this program, if it 25 needs to be reported under the current regulations, is i !
I i
- ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Cmerage 800 336-66 4
8 i 27355.0 105
, REE 1
I being done so. So the bottom line here, in my estimation, i 2 is that they are taking adequate corrective actions on each 3 and every identified concern.
4 MR. SIESS: Did I understand you to say that if 1 !
- 5 they did a review and didn't find anything wrong, you would 6 conclude that their methodology wasn't good?
c 7 MR. VANDENBERG: No. It gives me added 8 assurance that if somebody does a review and finds some 9 problems, it helps me believe that they did the right depth 10 of review. By characterization of the problems they find, 11 I can determine how deeply they have looked into a system.
12 MR. SIESS: Okay.
1 13 MR. VANDENBERG It tells me that by some of 14 these problems, which the licensee -- I won't go into now, 15 although it is on my charts, the system problems that they
- 16 have identified. But you can see from the level of those 17 problems that they had to do the detailed technical review.
18 MR. SIESS: Not just the obvious ones?
i 19 MR. VANDENBERG Right.
t 20 MR. SIESS: You are finding subtle ones?
21 MR. VANDENBERG: Right.
- 22 The rest of my slides just reitorate the l
23 licensee's presentation in terms of what was identified in i i
24 terms of system test reviews. System reviews and actual 25 systems testing.
l t
i j ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-3%fM6 -
1
27355.0 106
)
1 The regional conclusion at this point is that l
- 2 the program is working; it is being implemented properly.
3 The conclusions from the NRR, from the SER can be said that 4 the program should meet its stated objectives if 5 implemented. The program is continuing, albeit slowly; to 6 a large extent, the situation is outside the licensee's 7 control and we anticipate continued monitoring, and if the 8 licensee maintains the present attitude and the commitment 9 to correct the problems as they are identified that they 10 have shown in the past, I don't anticipate any problem with 11 the restart.
12 MR. REMICK: Now, that statement you are making,
() 13 are you talking about, when you say " program," are you 14 talking about the system review and test program or the 15 overall course of action?
16 MR. VANDENBERG: My specific expertise is the 17 system review and test program and only that.
18 MR. REMICK: Okay, any questions? If not, I 19 would like to ask the Staff of your overall position and 20 conclusion, what is your bottom line, what do you see is 21 needed for the licensee to get approval for restart and are 22 they meeting all of the things that were specified in the 23 50.54(f) letter?
24 MR. STOLZ: John Stolz talking. We concludo 25 that the licensee has met all of the programmatic ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
1 27355.0 107
{}
l requirements described in 50.54(f) letter. And we will be 2 relying on the Region to verify implementation, the l
3 maintenance work that is left and the systems testing. I 4 think that that would be sufficient then to warrant restart 5 of the Davis-Besse plant.
6 MR. REMICK: You don't see any major problems at 7 the moment.
4 8 MR. STOLZ: No, sir.
9 MR. REMICK: All right. Does Toledo Edison want 4
10 to make any response to anything the Staff has said?
i 11 MR. WILLIAMS: No, sir. Appreciate being asked 12 in to give an opportunity to update you.
)
i
() 13 MR. REMICK: One of the problems we will have at 3
.; 14 the full Committee, we are updating the Committee from the 1
4 15 last presentation, yet somehow we have to give kind of a 16 comprehensive overview. I think in the Toledo Edison-17 presentation, unless I am overlooking something, I think 4
18 what you are doing, when you talk about the systems and a i 19 little bit about training and manning and so forth, I think 20 you have the entire picture. How about the Staff? Are you.
21 -- what kind of a presentation do you envision for the full
\
22 Committee? .
23 MR. STOL2: We would plan to present the same 24 level of detail that we presented here. Perhaps back off a
- 25 little on some of the detail. But we did not plan on
( l l
! l
\
l l
~
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. )
202 347 3700 Ns-ionwide Coverage 800 3361646 l
27355.0 108 REE
%)
1 presenting information that we had previously presented to 2 the committee the last time.
3 MR. REMICK: Okay. And you would then give your 4 bottom line on the overall program?
5 MR. STOLZ: That is right.
6 MR. REMICK: Do any of the Subcommittee members 7 have any suggestions for things that, for the full 8 Committee presentation?
9 MR. REED: I have already made mine.
10 MR. REMICK: I am sure it will be in there.
11 MR. SIESS: Forrest, I assume you could try to 12 bring the full Committee, remind them of what they heard --
() 13 they haven't heard anything on it?
14 MR. REMICK: The full Committee has heard 15 everything up to where we are today. We have had two 16 presentations.
17 MR. SIESS: You could try to remind them of what 18 they heard. It is not going to stop them from asking 19 questions, but it might help. And the Staff and licensee 20 can start off from there like they did today.
21 MR. REMICK: Yes.
22 MR. SIESS: Okay.
23 MR. REED: One thing that I didn't quite 24 understand until fairly late, that you might want to change
- 25 the sequence in making that statement, I didn't understand V
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
27355.0 109 e REE 1 what was governing the schedule. Toward the end, I find 2 o u't it is the reactor coolant pumps. I don't think that 3 the rest of the Committee necessarily knows that.
4 MR. REMICK: No, they would not know that. That 5 is something that I can put in the opening comments or can 6 be part of Mr. Williams's presentation, whichever.
7 MR. WILLIAMS: Make a note. Let me address that 8 up front, one of those things.
9 MR. REMICK: I think that would be better if you 10 made the statement.
11 MR. WILLIAMS: You know, the Subcommittee might 12 be interested to know that if it hadn't been for the main
() 13 coolant pumps -- there are a lot of things controlling --
14 but the one thing that marched right down the path this 15 whole time has been those motor-operated valves. That has 16 been a really very laborious, tedious area which to resolve.
17 I It goes into the design of them and into the whole ball of 18 wax. Design basis. It has been going back to vendor, 19 engineering packages, engineering evaluations. It has been 20 one hell of a job.
21 MR. REMICK: There are no challenges to restart 1
22 or requests for hearing or anything like that --
23 MR. WILLIAMS: Not that surfaced so far. !
l 24 MR. REMICK: Well, those are the only thoughts ;
25 that I have. If there are not other suggestions or l (a"~A ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 80 4 336-6646
27355.0 110 C)***
1 comments from Staff, licensee or Subcommittee members, I 2 wanted to thank both the Staff and the licensee for the 3 presentation. We will then plan on a total of three hours 4 on July 11. You will need to compress, I think, some of 5 your presentations, cut out some of the detail, be prepared 6 to answer questions.
7 I think we will be a little pushed for time, but 8 I think three hours should be adequate.
9 This is a matter that there is no statutory 10 requirement that the Committee write a letter, but the 11 Staff has invited ACRS to review the start-up plan. The 12 Commission knows that we are doing that and my guess is, I 13 think there is a 99'9 . percent chance that the Committee 14 will want to write a letter to the Commission, and I would 15 anticipate that we would do it at this July meeting. So, 16 nothing further, thank you very much.
17 (Whereupon, at 11:30 p.m., Subcommittee meeting 18 was concluded.)
19 20 21 22 23 24 l
l 25
() i 1
l
. ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. I 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6 )
. - , .-. . . _ - . -. . . - . . . . i
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER O
This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:
NAME OF PROCEEDING: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DAVIS-BESSE RESTART 4
DOCKET NO.:
i PLACE: WASHINGTON, D. C.
DATE: FRIDAY, JUNE 27,.1986 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United State's Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
! (sigt) /
j (TYPED)
- REBECCA E. EYSTER
- Official Reporter ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Reporter's Affiliation f
O l
\
e
Yt o
ACRS Subcommittee / Toledo Edison Meeting Agenda June 27,1986 Joe Williams, Jr. Update of Mission Senior Vice President, Activities Nuclear Steve Smith Update of Maintenance AssistantPlant Activities Managet; Maintenance John Wood Summary of Eventinvestigation NuclearPiant Reactor Coolant Pump Status Systems Director O SushilJain Auxiliary FeedwaterSystem NuclearEngineering Modifications and Decay Heat Director Removal Phil Hildebrandt System Review and Test Program NuclearEngineering Group Director Joe Williams, Jr. Closing Remarks O
O O O
. i Manning: 806/1003 Nuclear Mission Organization President Neclear
" Assistant Viro
[" Presidem I
i- _________
W Fm E ring Groep Director
- I I I I I I
"ay ,* EM eroep cerector
- d* ""'T.M %'*"** Pi m ager O oiresser Enversemental and Emergency Specisi Programs 7 manager 4
1 l , ,. .s e i
1 l 1
s II t
e I i
I.
11 !
11 l
i O ij~
!Ij E
ll!
111 I
c.
= 111 E
s l 31 O !l!
O O O M nning:85/115 Assistant Vice President, i Nuclear Personnel Administrater Informatten Centerior Nuclear
! Management ------ - Inic mation
! Director Systems i
i l
l n
! Envivenmental & E Emerge Special Programs Neclear Records Document Centrol Davis-Besse l
n mana.e, sy. Computer ms mana.or -r -r ,ana,o, s,.ms
- P,og,.ncy,p i
e 9
a i
l
O O O Manning: 41/55 l
I Quality Assurance Director I
I I I Quality Engineering Operatiens Quality j Verification Assurance Assurance
- Manager Manager Manager 1 1 i
I I I I I l Quality Osalltv Engineering Engineering Quality Control Quality Systems Vendor Quality Code inspection Verification Vertficallen Assurance Assurance Superviser supeMeer Superviser Superviser Superviser supervisor Supervisor Superviser
]
l 4
)
I i
l 1
t l
l O
Manning a Manning Status 644 July 1 806 June 18,1986 197 Vacancies 114 Contractors seconded 58 Of those contractors seconded are engineers.
m 1986 Acceptances through June 9 O 61 uanasement 50 Non-management m Recruiting Assessment Process Security background check Drug screening Psychological testing and evaluation .
Education check !
Assessment and career development testing Personalinterviews O
O O O Nuclear Mission Staffing 1100-
! 1050-I Approved- April 1986
,i 1008
- 900-900-85b 802 797 779 800- 769
! 754 l 750- 706
- 679 l 700- 657 6%
i 650-
~
600-June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec l Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec l Jan Feb Mar Apol May June July
! 1985 1986 1987 l
I
O o o Nuclear Engineering Group
~
- Regular Employees I
i 1
220 -
l 210 -
200 -
190 -
- Approved-188 180 -
i I 170 -
i 160 -
I 150 -
140 -
125
~
j 114 120 -
07 110 - p 100 -
9h .
I E
! Nov Dec l Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec l Jan Feb Mar Apnl May June
! 1985 1986 1987 i
i
I O
Drug and Alcohol Program i Schedule: !
Dec.1985 -Jan.1986: Introduction of Company Drug and Alcohol Policy byletter and employee meetings.
j Feb.1986 Random drug screening began for Davis-Besse
! employees
! March 1986 Random drug screening began forcontract employees 127 Davis-Besse employees tested (13% of workforce)
! 1 Employee tested positive (1%)
- 121 Contract employees tested (8.3% of workforce) 4 Contract employees tested positive (3.3%) '
All positive tests were marijuana.
- All disciplinary actions to date have resulted in termination of employment l
i 4
lO
i 1
1O f
Drug and Alcohol Program Fitness for Duty Examinations:
a Newjob applicants
, a Annual physical exaniinations for Nuclear Security i
officers a Bi-annual physical examinations for licensed operators
! a Any employee absent more than 30 days in a 12 month period
" Employees arrested "off-work" for drug activity O a Employees who have completed the Employee Assistance Program for drug and alcohol abuse a Employees transferring to Davis-Besse from other areas of Toledo Edison a Random drug screening a Behavioralobservation a Postindustrialaccident onsite O
i i
_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ , , _ . _ _ _ . . . . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ . ____...._.__,._____-_..._.__J
O Davis-Besse Procedures Effort Required For Appnwed Additional Restart 6/13/86 in 1986 Nuclear Mission Procedures 14 14 60 Division Procedures Station Administrative 20 18 90 Maintenance 198 198 425 Operations 120 87 304 Test 111 102 Chemistry / Health Physics 85 Environmental Qualification 22 8 Sub-Total 360 311 904 O sasia riaa Environmental Qualification 12 12 41 Administrative 8 5 Sub-Total 131 119 41 Quality Assurance 10 6 1 NuclearTraining 3 16 NuclearServices 4 85 Nuclear Projects 2 16 Nuclear Safety & Licensing 4 1 Information Management 11 11 27 Industrial Securfty 4 5 Other FCR Affected Procedures 86 47 Total 629 508 1,156 Complete 508 -
In Process 63 -
O
O Training Enhancements a Staffing 8/84 8/85 6/86 Approved Positions 24 41 56 Toledo Edision Staff 17 35 47 Contract Training Support 2 10 18 A professional and capable staff is in place.
Additional staff is being added to support the simulator.
a Program improvements O INPO Accreditation--All programs ready by 12/86. ,
Operator Programs (Non licensed, RO, SRO) -
Accreditation Team visit conducted 6/86. Awaiting report.
Maintenance Programs (Elect., Mech., I&C -
Accreditation Team visit conducted 6/86. Awaiting report.
, STA, Technical Staff and Managers, Chemistry, Health Physics-ready by 12/86. Accelerating schedule as resources allow.
Clarification of responsibilities for training functions using Nuclear Mission Procedure has been completed.
O
O Training Enhancements (Cont'd) u Facilities Dedicated training labs have been integral part of ,
training since 1/86. l New training offices and classrooms.
Plant specific simulator will be built on site.
Contract signing scheduled for 6/86. Will be ready fortraining 12/88.
O O
O O O License Examination '
- Summary 100 100 100 100 100 100 - 954 = 93 9 =
91 6 =_ g=E 92 0 90 0 EEE 917 917 EEE 89 6 90 - EEE EEE = EEE EEE 88 8 88 2 EEE EEE
_=_ EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE
= = = 78 3 = = =
80 - = = = = = = = =
73 3 -
EEg i
G -
EEE EEE
=
EEE
=
EEE
EEE
=
EEE
=
=
a 70 -
g _= EEE _= EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE 66 7 EEE em a a a a a em s = s 60 - EEE EEE EE EEE EEE =
=
EEE
=
EEE EEE
=
mEE
=
C. = =
s
=
a
=
a
=
s a a
=
a em a o
a
= = = = = = = =
m 50 - a a a
- e a em em em me s s em s
=_
em em em m= = Em o . 40 - mm = = = = = =
em
=
em
=
m -
a em
=
a
=
em
=
em
em
=
eEE
= = -
em
=
m 30 -
=
em EEE Egg EEE
=
g = EEE EEE EEE -=gg i n. -
= EE em
= -
em em EE em EEJ em
mm
=
=_
20 - a
em
em em
=
=
=
= = = = = = = =
10 - EEE EEE BEE EEE EEE EE: EEE EEE EEE . EEE
= = = = = = = =<
= = = = = = =
0- -= -
22/24 7/7 18/18 4/4 23/25 , 9/10 21/22 11/15 18/23 f/5 31/33 11/12 22/24 8/9 26/29 10/15 30/34 3f3 3
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 i Year l 5 Initial Exams Requalification Exams j E_EE TotalInitialExams Total Requalification Exams
= 90/104 = 87% 189/208 = 90.9%
l
}
\
I
l O
Maintenance improvement Program Update Additional changes have been implemented in these areas:
m Organization and Staffing a Training a Maintenance Activities a Engineering interface and Support O
i 6
O i .
- , - - - - - - - , ,... - - .- - .,-- ,- ,, ,..,-,_ _ _ ,_ _.,._,--n ,, -.__ . , . _ _ . _ _ , , . ,
O Organization New Management Personnel e Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance aI & C Superintendent a Mechanical Maintenance General Foremen increased supervisory pensonnel for each discipline:
a Superintendent a General Foreman a Lead Engineer m Foreman Q
improved supervisor / craftsman ratios:
a Mechanical,1/10 (was 1/23) m Electrical,1/6 (was 1/26) m I & C,1/7(was 1/19)
Total Maintenance Department manning a Toledo Edison:199/185 m Contractors: 90-150 i
O I
O 1 I
l 3 i}n .
{ 1
$~
i=
th a.-
~ 3 .
- M, p
i-3 n
t* .h ,11 I
1 II
- !! i 1 3 t G
O .
C In I -
CG ! .
25 { a C -
G - li l
- ss a O .E 551 m
i1 11 -
= 3- ii - 1 2 si 13 i
I
.p C 1
=5 CO I
t U
n: a r
u
- b 1
u-
. - :s 3;
i 3
m1 3"
O
O Training a Each discipline has a designated Training Foreman a Training shift concept has been implemented a Training Councils formed in each discipline a Outside organizations or facilities are utilized to provide training a Training Records Review has established levels of qualification for maintenance personnel a INPO accreditation process started a Site accreditation visit successfully completed on June 20,1986 m Awaiting scheduling of accreditation board meeting l
O
O Corrective and Modification Work Orders Backlog:
1339 Corrective work orders open on June 9,1985 1092 Of those closed as of June 13,1986 247 Current number open 111 Facility Change Requests open on June 9,1985
, 57 Of those closed as of June 13,1986 O 54 Current number open Current:
7328 Corrective work orders issued since June 9,1985 5143 Of those closed as of June 13,1986 2185 Currentnumberopen 1195 FCR's issued since June 9,1985 762 Of those closed as of June 13,1986 433 Currentnumberopen 1364 Requiredforrestart l
l O
l
l O
i Preventive Maintenance Backicg:
405 VWbrk orders open on June 9,1985.
396 Of those closed as of June 13,1986.
9 Current numberopen Allwill be closed priorto restart Current:
1904 Work orders open since June 9,1985 1634 Of those closed as of June 13,1986 270 Currentnumberopen O At restart - no backlog PM work orders will be outstanding 279 Required for restart l
l O
O Engineering Interface and Support s Engineering attendance at Plan of the Day meeting u Duty Manager RosterSystem a Station Technical Support Section ,
m Request for Engineering Assistance Process l NMP and Engineering procedures have been issued a Engineering support programmatically required in preventive maintenance and post i maintenance testing ;
O :
I t
9
- O
l O
l l Equipment Investigation Summary
Purpose:
Determine root cause of equipment malfunctions to implement appropriate and effective corrective actions.
Scope: 13 Areasimpacting 7 systems Main Feedpump Turbine SFRCS
- Auxiliary Feedpump Turbines l Auxiliary Feedpump Turbine Trip & Throttle Wives Auxiliary Feedpump Wives AF599 and 608
]O Pilot Operated Relief Wlve Main Steam Headers Main Feedwater Startup ControlWlve Main Feedwater Pump #1 Suction Supply !
Main Steam Wlve MS-106 i Nuclear Instrumentation Neutron Source Range Detectors i Turbine Bypass Wlve i
Safety Parameter Display System Corrective Actions Prior to Restart:
15 Design Modifications 13 Maintenance / replacement activities 5 Proceduraland/ortraining issues O
l l
l l
\
O ,
Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP's) a Crystal River l Failure occurred at Crystal River in "A" Coolant l Pump on January 1,1986.
Investigationr found shaft was severed near top of journal bearing.
Also found crack in same 48" region on "B" pump.
Possibly also problems with "C" and "D" pumps.
Broken bolts holding on main impeller found on
, "A" and "B" pumps at Crystal River.
O Pump cover was found to have axial cracking in lower region.
m Davis-Besse and Arkansas-1 have same design Byron-Jackson pumps as Crystal River.
i e Ultrasonic testing (UT) at Davis-Besse concluded -
that shafts in all four pumps have cracks at 52"
! region.
s impeller bolts cannot be evaluated without pump disassembly.
s Procuring four additional replacement assemblies.
Deliveryin July and August. .
O i
1 O
Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP's)
(Cont'd)
- Removed shaft from RCP 2-1 for further examinations. l Examination at B&W Lynchburg Research Center 1 showed axial cracking at 48" s 5 mils deep, no crack at 52".
One bolt broken, two bolts cracked, one bolt and all pins intact.
Dye penetrant exam showed no pump cover cracking.
O = Installed spare rotating assembly in RCP 2-1.
m Planning replacement of remaining rotating assemblies July-September.
a B&W investigating anomalous UT indications.
i O
O Reactor Coolant Pump Design Data item Data perunit Numberof pumps 4 D? sign pressure 2500 psig Design temperature 650*F Operating speed (nominal) 1185 rpm Shaft dimensions 8" x 68" Capacity 90,670 gpm ;
Overall unit height 25'7" Motorstator frame diameter 8ft.
Motordata:
Q Voltage Phase 13,200 3
Frequency 60 Hz input (hot reactor coolant) 5400 KW Input (cold reactor coolant) 7200 KW Part or Assembly Approximate Weight (Pounds)
Motor 101,300 Case, with Case Wear Ring and Studs Assembled 40,000 Cover, with Heat Exchanger assembled & Hydro. Bearing 8,000 Motor Mount 24,000 Shaft-Journal Assembly with Impeller & Cover Wear Ring 4,000 SealCartridge Assembly 800 Coupling Components 1,000 O
O AFW Reliability improvements a Provide hot steam lines to AFW pumps.
mInstall PGG governor on AFPT-1.
m Provide time delay in AFW pump suction transfer scheme.
m Install local AFFT Trip Throttle Valve indication.
l m Eliminate deaeratorsuction path.
m Depowersuction valves from CST. !
= Valve motor operator improvements.
l = Remove AFW pump suction strainers.
O .Resize strainerfrom cSr.
l l
l l
h O
O v
Davis-Besse Auxiliary Feedwater System June 9,1985 Non-Return g MS101 D I,
..~. ,
MS100
. M.in Sle.m..
Restnctor Restrictor Turbene Ste.m 8808 Ste.m N 1 of R
MS103A R
MS106A MS106 MS107 AF39 ~ AF43 8 i 8 MS734 MST38
~
AF3870 *
,, AF3872 AF3869 Ap73
.. a l
- AF74
= _
AF3871 AF360 AF388 S,..m EN m m
_AF,, css. ISR, AF20
" a o .
gMSn0 MSn.g g c. . . . . . . . . . . .
S
,0. A.o 8
,07A.o ..........
..) g, AFPT AFPT No. I No 2 8.,m. , S206"-
SW1343 SW4 AF2 FW790 AFg FW786 $257
- >/..
,s cc, - .
SW1342 X X co,a Co170 geo,.7 coi.3 co,..g
=:
O
Davis-Besse AuxiliaW and Motor Driven Feedwater SYstems O, Start-Up Corifiguration N.o.n-Return . Masa
.,_ Ste.a.m, g MS101 N P
. .e MS100 Restnetor Restnctor TuttHne Steam n e Stop e
n ~ Steam =-
MS107A MS106A MS106 MS107 AF608 AF599 AF39 MS726 MS727 , AF43 8 8
- l l -
MS734 MS735 AF3870 5
,, AF3872
- =
O_ .. w l :
- AF74 AF3871 a
O AF3869 AF360 Ap73 AF384 gu, wa wa AF19 Ms728 MS733 AF20 MS$889A 8
106A-D 8
107 A-D MS54898
x -
,AF,
, c.. .......... ..........
..) AF, AFPT AFPT No.1 No. 2 er v SW1383 SWe - AF2 AFl $257..
$"'/.- '=::'- b ;
SW1382 X X CD170 AF*'
CD187 CD163 CD164 CD I"e
Wat To Main e Feedwater 1P FW1012 FW1010 g.,,2 A ,W,000 Mo,or Dn.e. a
~
,W,00,
' ::, - O,' -g y+) w x
rWiOO. rWss.7 XFW,0,. __
- I FW1002 From FW85 Deserster --
r$ '*
W O
6
- , . - . . - ..c..
Davis-Besse Auxiliary and Motor Driven Feedwater Systems n" Long Term Configuration Non-Return Main Steam Yelve isolation valve MS10s 3 r r MSiOO nestrictor nostrictor Turtiene Steam Stop Steam N No.
e e m
MS107A MS106A 4
MSt06 MS107 599 AF604 MS727 AF39 _ AF43 e
_MS726 e ,
= , , = -
i
. AF72 AF75 MS734 MS735 AF3470 AF3472 l l AF34)f AF3469 kF73 AF360 MM g ,,,,,y wa us MS724 MS733 AF20 Ik
-AFit MS544tA 8106 A-D e
107A-O MS54498 'b s -
ArP c.. ......... ..........
..) gP, AFPT AFPT No.1 No. I Service SW1343 AF2 aW AFg $257..
"Sveiect
_ es _ _. _ <
ene siRC appromeL si.,.,. si ,,,, jg Tone fone SW1342 X X -
C0170 Y AF4' C0167 CD163 CD164 CD168 S'W'C' water pT o,q,,g Mem
,e FW1010
- AF52 FW t000 Moser preven Jk
- ~
Feed Pump FWt009 FW1001 No.1 1 g y +) . rWiOO4 FW1002 From v
1 l
1 O
I i
installation of Motor Driven Feedwater Pump New pump design features:
a Provides > 100% capacity auxiliary feedwater flow.
m Pump discharge aligned to the auxiliary feedwater headers during normal full power operation.
- Pump suction normally from the Condensate Storage Tank.
m Pump manually started from the Control Room.
a Pump discharge valve Control Room operated.
O m Pump motor can be supplied from either emergency diesel generator following a loss of offsite power.
m Can be manually realigned to feed the Main Feedwater System. This will be the normal alignment during low power operation. Pump suction in this alignment will be from the Deaetator Storage Tank.
m Eliminates high energy line break concerns j associated with existing start up feedpump.
f O
1
lO SFRCS Improvements a Filter existing steam generator level signals.
a lmprove SFRCS power supply performance.
m Remove main steam and main feedwater isolation on SG low level.
m Raise ICS low levellimit.
m Disable feed isolation to last steam generator depressurized.
m Provide seal-in manual mset for SFRCS full trip alarm.
,Q s SFRCS manual initiation improvements.
1 l
l l 0
SFRCS O ManualInitiation Switches CHANNEL 1/3 CHANNEL 2/4 Tripped Tripped SG-1/2 SG-1/2 LEVEL HIGH LEVEL HIGH o LEVEL .
O HIGH Trip F Trip F F F
.\._\\\\ \ \ \ \ \ \, \N \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ ,\ N\ \\ ',\ \, \\ \\ \'.\ 'd\ \\ ~\ \ , \, \',\ N\ ',
\ \,\i \\\\\ \ \ \ \\
4 *
LOW Trip F Trip F SG-2 'T ,
',, s \ , '. ', , , '\' i s s i ,N
~
\
\ \ 'I
\ gg,\(\gg, \\ \ \ -
\\ s s \ \ \ \ \ \
Qf) E l 4. Tripped Tripped SG-2 --
' SG-2 STM PRESS PRESS STM PRESS LOW o SG-2 0 --
LOW i Trip F Trip F F F __
\ \ \ \ 's \ \ \_\ \ \ \ \_\_\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ T?, \ \ \ \ T
\\ \ \\\\
gs yggg ,s g(qq,ggggs gi g \ 'g g 'g i gg , \\\\\
1 l dTi ripped , strapped SG-1/2 --
l VELCRO
- i LOCK "~} T 1s i,Ns N'\\\\ u\u\u u u u\u u u\u u\us\\\\\ T,
. , . , x,,,,\,s\ \,\s,s 'x l
, I l
! Tripped Tripped SG - 1/ 2 SG-1/2 LEVEL LOW / LOW LEVEL LEVEL LOW /
, F Trip F F F O
O Feed and Bleed Cooling Evaluation TOTAL LOSS OF FEEDMTER !
FROM 100% POWER Assumptions: Power 1.02 x 2772 MWT Feedwater Main, Auxiliary, Motor driven and Startup Feed-Unavailable ReactorTrip 15 Seconds on high pressure i
i O operator Action Initiator RCS Hot Leg temperature at 600*F i Makeup Flow 2 pumpsinitiated at i
operatoraction time PORV Blocked open at operatoraction time High Point & Vent opened at PressurizerVents operatoraction time i Results: Core Mixture Level 15 feet
! (Collapsed !evel) 11.9 feet 4
'O i
l i
.---_n. , - - - . . , , , - - - . . - -,----,.-,,-..._.--,-,,,_..-n. ~ . , , - - , , . -,n,..n_ ,,
l O -
=
LongerTerm Decay Heat Removal Reliabilityimprovements a Prwision of primary system blowdown valves for
- enhancement of feed and bleed capability.
m Restoration of existing startup feedwater pump and provison of Control Room capability for associated
, valves.
m Prwision of Control Room capability for the motor driven feedwater pump discharge valves to the
m Further AFW valve flowpath reductions.
e improve AFWlevel control.
O . im, ma, gin between SFRCS and ICS low level setpointiL a SFRCS logic revision to further minimize isolation.
m Control Room " mimic" panel for finalized AFW/SFRCS.
1 l
i O
1
l Primary Side O Decay Heat Removal (Long Term)
OO QQ Qg Emergency Depressurization L JL J k JL J _ _ L Jk J System y3y3 l VM V3 Hot Leg V1V3 High Point QQ Vents k JL J f VM V3 A~ ere.su.
/
) Safety Valves Steam Generatot3 (
/ Reactor Coolar. ' '
' Pumps -
y PORV 7
Head Vent QQ L JL J V1 FT Pressurtzer O c N, y" Vent
- Pressurizer Reactor
(
Makeup From Makeup '
Pumps Tank or Borsted (
Water Storage Tank High Pmesure W Pumps StoraYge ankYvia pMT thmughthe Decay Host Pumps _
O
1 O
l j System Review and Test Program For 34 systems important to safe plant operation:
i s identify important and recurring design, maintenance and operations problems and determine whether corrective actions are i required prior to restart or can be taken over long term.
]
! = Evaluate scope of existing periodic and l surveillance testing to identify any additional O testing needed to ensure required functions i i will be performed. ;
i
- a Conduct test program to assure these systems !
! are functional. Testing will also be performed i j to verify adequacy of system modifications !
i completed during outage. !
This program will be completed prior to l j restart of Davis-Besse. ,
i i
2 i !
l !
,O l
O System Review and Test Program Approach a " Team" for each system headed by Toledo Edision engineer supported by highly-qualified industry personnel.
l u Review by Independent Process Review Committee-membership combined broad background of nuclear industry experience with specific knowledge of Davis-Besse plant design. l
- e Detailed test procedures approved and implemented by Joint Test Group and restart test organization.
l l
i i
l
- O l
l
._._--_ _._____ ,,,._,.____._ .__,__--,_. _ _ ._ ,.._._. _-. __-._,...,,_ _ _..,___ _ . - ,_..-___ _ ~ _._.-- ._.~. . . . .
i I
4
- O l
i 1
! Problem Areas identified During System Reviews !
e Forthe 34 systems Approximately 150 problem areas require resolution priorto restart. i Approximately 200 problem areas require resolution overlong term.
- Resolution ranges from engineering evaluation to j hardware changesin plant.
m Facility Change Requests, Maintenance Work Requests or Requests for Engineering Evaluation have been prepared to address all problems that
!O i must be resolved priorto restart.
l 1
l l
1 lO i
l I -_ _ . -____-.-_-__,_ _.- - -__ -.-__.-.-. - - . _ - - . .-
O Determination of Corrective
( Actions Required Priorto Restart u Corrective actions necessary to ensure safe and ,
reliable plant operation. 1 m Based on collective experience and judgment of Independent Process Review Committee )
considering l l m Plant design basis described in the Updated
- Safety Analysis Report.
1 m Technical Specification requirements.
a Reliable plant operation.
l O m Protection of personnel, systems and equipment.
m Prudent engineering practice.
O
. \
O i
i i Recurring Problem Areas a inattention to heating / ventilation / air conditioning requirements.
l m inoperable nitrogen regulators.
- Inadequate maintenance for hydramotor actuators.
m Tracking and replacement of limited life
, components (e.g., seals, elastomers, electrical components).
m Valve packing leakage.
m Steam trap maintenance.
O m iac preventive maintenance / calibration.
l i
l O
l i - _ _ _ _ - - - - - _-- _._-_- _ ._ ,.____.- --. .-- - .-
!O Examples ofimportant ,
Problem Areas Found in i System Review s Control Room Emergency Ventilation System l Inoperable (LER 85-018).
s Auxiliary feedwater discharge piping overpressurization (LER 85-017).
m Startup strainers found installed in HPl pump suction (LER 85-006).
- a Inadequate ventilation in service water pump room
,O (" **'*"')' i a Essential 4160V bus voltage high (LER 86-003).
I e improper terminal wire wrap technique in Steam l Feedwater Rupture Control System (LER 86-009).
a lmproper installation of fire protection boot seals (LER 86-005).
m inadequate post LOCA service water flow to j containment air cooling system (LER 85-002).
1 m improper installation for fire dampers located in
! through wall ducts (LER 86-010).
m PORV not operationally qualified for environment during feed and bleed.
l l
i I
lO l
l u _ -_- _ - _ - _ - _ _ . - - - _ .. . _ _ _ _ _ _ - ... - - -
O .
Examples of important Problem Areas Found in System Review (Cont'd) m Potential flooding of pit containing decay heat
, removal valves (DH-11 and 12 motor operated valves).
m Lack of configuration control in Safety Features Actuation System.
m Widespread station and instrument air system leaks and dependence on temporary diesel air compressor.
O Improper throttle position setting on containment i
spray discharge valves based on allowable pump degradation.
m Inadequate time-motion study for PASS (LER 86-020).
i I e O
l i
- O 1
i l Examples of Problem
- Areas Found in i Test Review e incomplete testing of SFAS logic (LER 85-021).
e incomplete testing for SFAS actuation of HPl system valves (LER 86-004) and DHR system valves (LER 86-023).
- a Lack of venting of HPI system high point in l containment (LER 86-012).
m inadequate performance testing requirements for safety related heat exchangers.
O tack of performance basis for acceptance criteria for safety related pump testing.
i m Inadequate leak check requirements on some
! check and isolation valves (both testing method j and allowableleakage).
m incomplete acceptance testing for RCS hot leg level instrumentation.
! a incomplete operability checks of standby flowpaths
- (e.g., decay heat removal pump /high pressure injection pump " piggyback" alignment).
! = Inadequate testing of the AFW level control system (LER 86-014).
m inadequate testing of MSIV and AW (both tested with instrument air available).
l O
i 1
i !
i l l
O i
i Examples of Problem Areas l Found During initial ,
System Testing a lmproperly wired containment air cooler fan and l less than designed flow capacity (LER 86-007).
m Inadequate flow and distribution of ventilation for service water pumps (LER 86-001). ,
m improper lower air pressure limit for multiple starts of emergency diesel generator (LER 86-002).
m improper setting of underfrequency protective relays on 13.8KV busses.
O m inadequate maintenance and testing to esso,e operability of hydramotor actuators on safety related ventilation systems (LER 86-019).
m improper orifice size in MFPT hydraulic control oil system. ,
a Service water, containment air cooling and Control Room HVAC systems not properly balanced. 1 m Agastat time delay relay settings not repeatable.
m inadequate maintenance on electrical load l breakers. !
O
\ . - _ - - _ . - _ - - _ __ __ _ _ _ - _ _
O Restart Test Activities Test Procedures Mode Required Approved (Test Procedures Only) (By Plant Manager) 5 99 97 4 1 1 3 10 10 2 0 0 Total 1 l
Q Te m Mode To Be Performed Completed (ST's and TP's) 5 216 102 4 18 0 3 23 0 2 16 0 1 10 0 Total 283 102 O
O MOVATS Status .!
NSR (Nuclear Safety Related) Valves !
I Valve Quantity Complete "To Go" Engineering Obtain valve and actuatordata 165 165 0
- Finalize limiting conditions for valves 165 92 73 Valve vendor questions to be resolved 165 156 9 Define valves to be DP tested 26 26 0 Define valves to be flow tested 5 5 0 ,
Evaluation ofinitial MOVATS data 165 165 0 i Evaluation of DP tests 26 16 10
, O Awalting MOVATS retest results - -
21 lasue final data evaluation packages 165 74 91 Maintenance Rewires 148 134 14 "
EQ rewires 116 116 0 Stem checks 113 113 0 Initial MOVATS test 165 165 0 l
Valves being retested 21 -
21 DP tests 26 19 7
- Calculations for all 165 are being reviewed and finalized for clarity and consistency.
"Of these 14,4 are in work; and 10 have work completed and are in the paper closure process.
I O
Y i
O Raychem Splice / Termination i
Evaluation Programs Problem:
Potential improper installation of Raychem shrink sleeve installation.
l Program:
- The Raychem problem is being addressed by the ~
System Review and Test Program. IPRC
- concurrence with the problem identification and l solution will be obtained.
i O
i O
i
O
! Raychem Splice / Termination :
j Evaluation Programs Objective:
! a Establish a pilot program for one system to inspect Raychem installations and electrical hardware.
a Determine quantity and locations of Raychem in j applications important to safe plant operation.
, a Evaluate / conduct testing of selected existing Raychem installation at an independent laboratory.
! a Repair as required.
!O 4 i
J l
J i
4 l
l ,
O 1
1 i
O Raychem Splice / Termination Evaluation Programs l Progress to Date !
a Decay heat loop 2 selected as pilot program '
includes CCW, EDG and service water for train operability.
m Decay heat loop 2 inspection complete.
Results ofinspection All 21 Raychem splices failed inspection All repairs complete as of 6/23 Currently Q m inspecting decay heat loop 1 and related trains of CCW, EDG and service water.
m inspecting containment penetrations by area.
m Evaluating test criteria and selection of samples for
- laboratory testing.
l
, O I
I
- .. _ . . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - -- _ - -_---_ A
-- -- -.-.a e O
6
- - l
/ /
/ / j
/ /
l
/ /
/ /
]
/ /
i
/ /
/ /
- i i /
I
/ /
- i
/ -i /
/ /
/ -
l / /
/ /
/ /
lgl /
/
/ -
/ /
/ / l
/ /
/ /
/ /
/ /
- u.
m lO i
l l
l.__ - , _ . _ . - . - _ . . - - . . _ . _ . . . - . - . - _ _ . . - - - - - . - . - _ . - -l
O 13 Areas of Equipment Concem O
i l
e O
L _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ .
O I
Equipment Concems a Main Feedpump Turbine a Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System a Auxiliary Feedpump Turbines u Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine THp & Throttle Wives a Auxiliary Feedwater Valves AF 599 and AF 608 m Pilot Operated Relief Wlve m uain Steam weadere O
a Main Feedwater Startup Control Wlve l m Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #1 Suction Supply a Main Steam Wlve MS 106 l
m Nuclear Instrumentation Neutron Source Range j Detectors m Turbine Bypass Wlve l
a Safety Parameter Display System l l
l O
O :
- Main Feedpump Turbine i (MFPT)
- Concem: Overspeed tripping of MFPT 1-1 initiated a plant runback.
Findings: Failed circuit board capacitorin General Electric controlsystem. I Corrective 1. Replaced faulted board. 3 Actions: 2. Checked and willtest control circuits for both MFPT 1-1 & 1-2.
Generic None-problem is specific to MFPT implications: control circuits. l O
l l
l O
O Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS)
Concem: Spurious SFRCS cctuation closed both main steam isolation valves and isolated steam to main feedpump i turt>ines.
Findings: Turbine trip caused pressure oscillations which SFRCS detected as low steam generatorlevel. Level pressure tap was made more sensitive due to transmitter changeouts.
Corrective Added electronic filtering to signals.
O Action:
Generic Increase in sensitivity / response can implications: result due to transmitter changeouts.
Installed filtering in Reactor Protection System flow transmittercircuitry.
i O
O Auxiliary Feedpump Turbines Concem: Both auxiliary feedpump turbines tripped on overspeed - this prevented supply of waterto steam generators.
Findings: Condensation in long steam inlet lines disrupts properturbine control.
Corrective 1. Installed new steam admission Actions: valves close to turbines to keep lines hotwith steam to greatly reduce waterformation.
- 2. Increased steam trap capability.
Generic None-no other quick start steam implications: driven turbines.
l l
O
l O
i l
1 Auxiliary Feedpump Turbine Trip and Throttle Valves Concem: Operators experienced problems resetting the valves - delayed initiation of auxiliary feedwaterto steam generators.
Findings: Procedures and priortraining not sufficient.
Corrective 1. Provided placards and local Actions: indicators on T&TV to help operators.
- 2. Enhanced communications between pump rooms and from pump rooms O to Controi noom.
- 3. Will provide hands-on hot training prior to restart.
Generic Other crucial operatoractions 1
Implications: performed locally. Covered by Operator Actions review.
l l
6 O
i O Auxiliary Feedpump Valves '
AF 599 and AF 608 Concem:. Valves failed to open on demand after-i closing eariier - would have prevented auxiliary feedwaterflow. ,
- Findings
- Motor operators on valves were not properly adjusted allowing valves to
" torque out".
Corrective 1. Readjusted AF 599 and AF 608.
Actions: 2. Evaluating and readjusting other I
nuclear safety related motor operated valves priorto restart.
O 3. Testing selected valve with full ,
differential priorto restart.
4.Provided new maintenance procedures.
Generic Applicable to other motoroperated Implications: valves.
1 O
l
O Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORO Concem: During transient POW failed to close l property after third opening - closure i of the blockvalve isolated the POW and it reseated.
Findings: No physicalevidence found to explain improper closure-foreign material in pilot cannot be ruled out -
performance similartoindustry experience.
Corrective 1. Tested valve.
O Actions: 2. Added acoustic monitorflow indication light on POW control panel.
- 3. Changed POW annunciatorlight from white to red.
- 4. improved panellabeling of j solenoid open/close switch. l
- 5. Provided for POW exercising :
during shutdowns. l
- 6. Rebuilt POW with new parts. ,
- 7. Qualified solenoid for operating l environment.
l Generic None-no valves of similar design. !
Implications: j f
f o !
-- _ _ _ _ _a
O i
Main Steam Headers Concem: After closure of main steam isolation valves, pressure control problems were experienced in the main steam headers.
Findings: Manualactuation of atmospheric vents valves (AW) causedlarge pressure dropin header #1 - AW control circuitry on header #2 is a ;
lesserconcem. Switch contacts l corroded on ICS module. '
O Corrective 1. Full clieck-out and adjustment of Actions: AW control circuitry.
- 2. Tested and refurbished all18 main steam safety valves.
- 3. Refurbished ICS modules for AW l circuitry. l Generic Switch contacts being evaluated and implications: refurbished on otherICS modules.
I
- O l
1
O Main Feedwater Startup Control Valve Concem: Operators were uncertain of status of controlvalve SP7A due to blown light bulb.
Findings: Valve operated properly - technician inserted incorrect voltagelamp during event.
Corrective Provided additionalinformation to Action: operators.
Generic None-no significant findings.
O '* P " "*:
1 6
O Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
- 1 Suction Supply Concem: Pump suction transferred from normalto backup watersupply about 20 minutes after reactortrip.
Findings: Noimpact to steam generator-transientlow suction pressure caused transfer.
Corrective 1. Revised strainer arrangement.
Actions: 2. Revised transfer switch setpoints.
- 3. Provided time delay.
O Generic Implications:
Other pump suction transfer systems.
l O
O Main Steam Valve MS-106 Concem: Valve position indication recorded as 1 closed to not closed to closed in about one-third the expected time - this valve is used to admit steam from steam generator #1 to auxiliary feedpump i turbine #1. !
Findings: Motor operator on valve was not '
proper 1y adjusted. Wedge was found to be steam cut.
rre tive 1. Readjusted torque and limit O switches.
Actions: 2. Installing new wedge prior to restart.
- 3. Testing valve with steam flow prior to restart. :
Generic Other motor operated valves.
Implications:
l i
a h
O
O NuclearInstrumentation Neutron Source Range Detectors l Concem: Prior to event NI-1 was inoperable and !
NI-2 failed during transient - previous problems had been experienced.
Findings: NI-1-inadequate grounding of shield found at preamp due to paint and lack of starwashers.
NI-2-intermittent failure of containment penetration cable center conductor.
Q Triax cable connectors also found degraded in each detectorstring.
Corradive 1. NI-1-proper ground established.
Actions: 2.NI-2-replaced penetration /
module.
- 3. Replaced / refurbished connectors ;
as required.
, Generic Preventive maintenance program implications: needed for source range, intermediate range, and power range connectors.
O l l
l
! O Turbine Bypass Valve Concem: Pneumatic actuatorassembly cracked and failed during cooldown operations several hours following reactortrip.
Findings: Intemalvalve components became disengaged and caused hammer blow forces which damaged actuator. l Corrective 1. Repaired damaged valve.
Actions: 2. Repaired steam traps and drains. l
- 3. Refurbished otherturbine bypass j O v ives. !
- 4. Revised operating procedure to l assure proper drainage of headers. l Generic Applies to both turbine bypass valve implications: headers. '
l I
l lO l
I
i O
Safety Parameter Display ;
System (SPDS)
Concern: Both SPDS Control Room display devices were inoperative during event -
they areintended to be used by the -
operators during transients.
Findings: Bad fiber optic cable and faulty terminations on data transmission cable.
Corrective 1. Utilized spare cable.
Actions: 2. Corrected terminations.
- 3. Replacing obsolete terminal prior to
, O restart.
Generic None-no otherfiber optic systems.
Implications:
6 l
O i l
l
O System Review and Test Program Summary of Corrective Action items for Davis Besse l
l l
O 9
l 5
l O
. . , - _ , , , - , . ~ . - _ _ _ . _
O Reactor Coolant System PriorTo Restart
)
l u Test operability of PORV actuations solenoid for l extended feed and bleed environmental conditions. !
= Repair / replace and calibrate PORV discharge line temperature element.
minstall PORVloop seal drain line.
m Modify PORV statusindications. i e improve stroke time on containment isolation valve.
m Repair leakage from RCS to nitrogen system.
m Realign hot leg Rosemount RTDs to TSAT meter.
O i.ong Term a Repair end plugs on out-of-service pressurizer heater elements.
m Improve maintenance capability for RC drain tank.
m Repair / replace nitrogen regulator for RC drain tank.
m Repair / replace Tave digital readout. ,
a Evaluate RC pump seal or motor parameters to be used forsecuring pumps. l 8 Calibrate RC pump vibration instrumentation. I e improve core exit temperature measurement '
capability.
m Modify pressurizer heat bank operation to handle i larger heat losses.
l l
O
O Qualification of PORV .
a Successful completion of operability qualification for PORV solenoid for conditions expected during i extended feed and bleed operation.
mTest Conditions
- Testing environment at 220*F and 15 psig. l
- Initial 20 minutes on/off cyclic operation.
- 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> continuously energized. l
- Solenoid mounting bracket connected to thermal source at 650*F.
O - Solenoid plunger loaded to represent valve I operation.
I t
i l O
O l
High Pressure injection System PriorTo Restart l I
a Confirm HPI pump capability at high flow, low head conditions.
8 Confinn HPI pump capability at high suction temperature.
a lnvestigate standing water from unidentified ;
sources in several areas (e.g., ECCS room #1; ;
containmentvessel annulus floor).
m Remove startup strainers from HPl pump suctions.
8 Modify HPl pump suction check valves (HP10 and Q HP11) to facilitate proper disk seating. '
= Verify proper operation of several HPI pump .
component cooling water stop check valves. I a Revise plant documentation to reflect higher design pressure capability of section of piping downstream of discharge check valve HP23.
8 investigate increasing trend in inboard bearing vibration for HPI pump 1-1.
l O
- - - , . - - - . , - - , , _ , , - ~ , - _ _ , , . - , , - - - , . -
._,e,,
O High Pressure injection System (Cont'd)
Long Term a Evaluate need for design modification to HPl pump component cooling water stop check valves to preclude " sticking".
m Calibrate HPI pump motor temperature instrumentation.
m Eliminate low flow nuisance alarm on HPl pumps.
- Replace improper flow measurement orifice in HPI pump 1-1 minimum recirculation line.
g a Relocate control cable for AC lube oil pump for HPl pump 1-1 per Appendix R requirements.
m improve communications capability between ECCS rooms and Control Room.
m Resolve means of leak testing for back-t@ck check valves in HPI discharge valves.
m Evaluate cyclic life of % inch elbowlets attached to HPI discharge line.
1 5
O
. O Core Flood System PriorTo Restart a Confirm location of level taps on Core Flood tanks.
m inspect / repair nitrogen regulator for Core Flood tanks.
Long Term m Prepare calibration procedure for Core Flood tank levelinstrumentation.
m Evaluate required purge time for sampling of Core Flood tanks.
O Caiibrate sampiing purge fiow meter.
4 O
- _ . - - . , - . . - . . - . . . . - . - . _ , . . - . - - - , . - - . . - . . . . . . - . - . . , - . . . . - . - ~ _ _ _ .
O Decay Heat Removal System PriorTo Restart u install level indicating capability for DH11 & DH12 valve pit.
m install modified packing in DH11 & DH12.
m Modify procedures to preclude overpressurization >
of decay heat pump suction.
a lmprove cold weather operation of BWST levelinstruments.
m Reinstall mis-assembled studs on decay heat pump.
O caiibrate baron diiution fiow transmitter instrument strings.
l 5
O
O f I Decay Heat RemovalSystem (Cont'd)
Long Term a Evaluate means of eliminating sealed pit design for valves DH11 & DH12.
m Evaluate possible system modifications to preclude decay heat pump suction overpressurization.
m Ensure spare parts availability for BWST recirculating pump and heater. :
m Add temperature alarm on BWST; evaluate improved temperature control.
s Evaluate attemative means of precluding over-O ranging of low range decay heat pump suction pressure gauges.
- l. m Evaluate more easily read oil level indicators for i decay heat pumps.
i m Evaluate means of reducing leakage from cyclone i separators on decay heat pumps.
m improve preventive maintenance for pneumatic valves DH13A & B.
m investigate means of improving disk seating for check valves DH76 & DH77.
6 O
O i i
I Containment Spray System l
PriorTo Restart 8 Verify torque switch and torque switch bypass settings for two Containment Spray System valves I
(CS1530 and CS1531).
a Determine specific operator response required when containment emergency sump level indicator lights areilluminated.
Long Term a Evaluate adequacy of oil level sight glasses for O containment spray pumps.
m Evaluate need for containment spray pump discharge pressure indication in Control Room.
h O
---.., - - . . , - - - - , - - - - - - - - , , , . ,_,,,_,,,_,__,___,_,-----_,_,,__..__,-.--.n,
O Containment Emergency Ventilation System q PriorTo Restart u Provide weather shield for EVS fan controller ,
sensing line to ensuring operability. i a Replace seals on hydromotor actuator for ventilation damper. l Long Term a Provide protection for instrumentation controls for fans.
O
,O l
l l
O Containment Air Cooling System and Hydrogen Control System PriorTo Restart a Repair backdraft dampers for Containment Air Cooling System fans.
m Confirm proper operation of fans when shifted from high to low speed (overload indication is being neceived).
m Bench test hydrogen dilution system relief valve.
Long Term I
a Confirm flow balancing of Containment Air Cooling
, O System.
m Replace failed retum bend on cooler C1-1.
u Evaluate installation of flow meter in purge test line to facilitate performing surveillance tests.
m Install soft seat for valve CV210 (containment isolation checkvalve).
m Confirm hydrogen recombiner is compatible with Davis-Besse system and can be made operable within required time.
.O
,-w n,-- ,., -,- e- , - - , , _ _ , -, ,_n-, ._-,. _ y..,- m --,_,y~._, ,,,-o,-,,-,-,-g -
l O
l Makeup and Purification System PriorTo Restart a Repair or replace failed containment isolation valve MU33. l 8 Remove any startup strainers in system. l 8 Confirm correctvalve trim in MU32.
m Repair or replace leaking reactor coolant letdown pressure reducing valve (MU6) and controls.
m Provide indicator of makeup flow for use during !
feed and bleed operations. i O = Remove Inoperable and unused reactor coolant l pump (RCP)sealleakageindication. i i
l l
J O
l l l
O Makeup and Purification System (Cont'd)
L.ong Term a Repair / replace leaking reactor coolant batch makeup flow control valve, MU39 (currently isolated).
a Repair / replace batch controller.
I' a Repair minor oil leaks on makeup pumps.
s Evaluate and repair leaking valves MU19 (RCP seal injection valve) and MU216 (RCP seal injection i bypass valve). l a Evaluate and repair boronmeter. l O a Perform review of problems with hydrogen system (for maintaining makeup tank overpressure).
m Repair MU1903 (Cation demineralizer inlet isolation valve).
m Repair / replace seal injection stop check valves.
m Replace letdown block orifice.
m improve communications capability between makeup pump room and Control Room.
m Evaluate intended function of boron permissive light.
m Perform review of failure modes of makeup system equipment (e.g., power supplies) and ability of operators to recognize problem and take corrective action.
5 O
. - - - - ~ - - - - , - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - , , - - . ,. .- - ,.,,, -,,- ,-- - ,,, -
l l
O 1 o
250/125 Volt DC System PriorTo Restart aNone Long Term a improve temperature control in battery room.
m improve ground fault detection and location.
m Evaluate design change for low voltage relays to reduce failures.
O
- O l
l l
O 4160 Volt AC System PriorTo Restart a Confirm operability of several breakers with original levering-in device.
= Replace CVE synchrocheck relay with different design.
m Resolve tap setting for 4160/480 Volt transformers and reset alarm accordingly.
Long Term a Review consequence of paralleling bus tie O transformers out-of-phase.
m Visually inspect all 4160 Volt breakers in "Q" cubicles for"E' Iring damage.
m Control noni'Q" 4160 Volt breakers to ensure they are not utilized in essential applications.
m Provide improved control of circuit breaker and relay setting records.
, 1 s
I O 1 l
l I
J
m _ - m O
480 Volt AC Distribution System PriorTo Restatt a Confirm operability of switchgear cabinet door and stab withdrawal interlocks to ensure 480 VAC breaker operability.
Long Term a Evaluate removal of stab withdrawal interlock feature. 1 m Evaluate attemative means of providing ground fault protection for 480 Volt AC motor control O centers.
m Establish program for tracking limited life components in motor control centers.
m improve preventive maintenance on switchgear cabinet door hardware and gasketing.
l O
i l
O :
13.8 KV System PriorTo Restart n Investigate cause of fast transfer breaker failures and calibrate relay timing.
Long Term a improve method for racking in/out of 13.8 KV 4
breakers.
m Repair small oil leak in Auxiliary Transformer.
O l
l 6
O I
1 l
I
!O Emergency Diesel Generators l PriorTo Restart a Eliminate electrical noise problems associated with diesel govemor to improve stability.
m improve temperature control for diesel generator room by changes to control / alarm system and maintaining ventilation damper actuators.
m improve reliability of lubricating oil soak back l Pumps.
Replace set.
O Check condition of filters and strainers.
s Test multiple air start capability of diesel generator.
m Calibrate low cooling water flow alarm switch.
m investigate cause of SCR diode failure nuisance alarm.
m Minimize ice buildup on diesel generator air intake.
O
l O
Emergency Diesel Generators I (Cont'd)
Long Term a Evaluate improvements to diesel generator air start system and improve reliability of air compressors.
e implement improvements for emergency diesel fuel
- oilsystem.
m Replace cooling water flow gauge.
m Perform evaluation of overall improvements to diesel generator air intake configuration.
O Improve diesel generator speed and electrical frequency controlcapability.
m Correct erratic bearing temperature indications for
' diesel generators.
m improve Control Room / diesel generator room communications capability.
i O
1
O 120 Voltinstrument AC Power PriorTo Restart u Install larger power rating resistors in essential inverters YV1, YV2, YV3 and YV4.
Long Term a install ventilation fans for inverters.
- Evaluate installation of static transfer switches and/or tank circuits to reduce potential for losing an inverter when a ground fault occurs.
O l
O
l l
O l 1
l i Anticipatory Reactor Trip System i PriorTo Rostart a Evaluate adequacy of no actuation of annunciator alarms when ARTS cabinet door is open.
Long Term a Modifylamp test circuit.
a Provide labeling to minimize problems in correlating channel and breaker designations.
m Evaluate separating ARTS channel signal inputs to computer to facilitate determining which parameter
,O initiated an ARTS trip.
! a Review main turbine stop valve testing as potential j source of spurious low pressure ARTS trips.
4 l
!o I
I
O Control Rod Drive Control System PriorTo Restart a Determine improved power supply fuse size and design; perform inrush current and current !
waveform test.
a lmprove cleanliness of CRDCS cabinets to reduce :
contact fouling problems.
m Ensure adequate forced air cooling of reactor service structure.
O lO l
L- _ .
O Control Rod Drive Control System (Cont'd)
Long Term u Evaluate attemate control rod direction error circuit design. .
m Evaluate control rod motion momentary interrupt circuit. !
u Review overall service structure cooling design. j m improve power cable mating and handling
. procedures. i a Evaluate use of higher temperature silicon power ,
O cabies. !
j u Inspect all control rod leaf spring anti-rotation l
! devices at each refueling outage. j u Evaluate improved control rod drop time test !
techniques.
s To preclude low voltage problems, check voltage output of CRD transformers frequently; clean and inspect inductrol voltage regulator and lubricate i motor-generator set every refueling outage.
u Evaluate means of minimizing occurrence of low l Insulation resistance in CRD stators.
O l
l l __ ._ __..._ _ _____ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . -
O
-Incore Monitoring System PriorTo Restart a Determine proper correction factors for neutron l detectors.
Long Term a improve reliability of incore neutron detectors for 15% to 30% reactor power.
- Evaluate need for two incore instrumentation multipoint recorders.
O
!O i
1 O l l
i Reactor Protection System PriorTo Restart ,
i a Repair / replace defective components in NI Source Range string contributing to erratic noise and loss I of signal problems.
m install electronic filters on reactor coolant flow transmitters to reduce flow turbulence noise.
Long Term j u Evaluate Technical Specification change to permit ;
placing a defective channel in manual bypass. '
1O e Evaiuate providing more reiiabie pc.er range l
- signal to integrated Control System. l u Eliminate noise spikes in NI Source Range channels apparently due to door alarm switches on '
RPS cabinets.
i 1
i I
l O
l
l O t 1
Steam and Feedwater Rupture .
Control System (SFRCSD l PriorTo Restart a Provide filtering of steam generator level transmitter signal.
m Modify SFRCS to preclude isolation of main feedwater and main steam on low water level in steam generator.
- Modify SFRCS to isolate only first steam generator i for which low pressure is detected.
m Modify SFRCS such that atmospheric vent valves
-Q are closed by a full SFRCS trip (actuation) rather than % trip.
m Modify SFRCS to provide open signals to MS106A and MS107A for all SFRCS actuation conditions.
- Rearrange manual SFRCS actuation switches and provide protection against inadvertent actuation.
- e improve Control Room annunciator indication of l which steam generator has been source of SFRCS l actuation.
l u Remove and replace all wire wrap terminations on
- logic boards and card racks.
i
'O
~
i
)
1 O
Steam and Feedwater Rupture !
ControlSystem (SFRCS)
PriorTo Restart (Cont'd) a Relocate reset buttons for startup feedwater valves ;
to the control board.
m improve temperature control of SFRCS steam generator pressure switch sensing lines.
m Revise labels on manual resets for indicating lights i
associated with steam generator level l instrumentation.
= Provide separate manual reset for "SFRCS Full O Trip" alarm-a improve SFRCS power supply operation.
i installforced cooling to cabinets.
i Measure power supply loading and estimate useable servicelife.
m Perform engineering evaluation of and measure response time for replacement amplifier / calibration ,
boards for steam generator level transmitters.
l l
2 l
i '
iO .
, O ,
1 Steam and Feedwater Rupture
, Control System (SFRCS)(Cont'd)
Long Term a Remove automatic close signals to AF599 and AF608 and leave valves open to improve overall l reliability of AFW System.
m Modify SFRCS to preclude isolating both steam generators if coincident low pressure signals are ,
received for both steam generators.
s Evaluate modifying control circuitry for main steam isolation valves to improve reliability. l
- Q m Evaluate several additional changes to SFRCS to improve system reliability and improve decay heat
removalcapability. l m Evaluate additional improvements of Control Room annunciator indication of SFRCS actuation.
m Evaluate removing SFRCS close signals to atmospheric vent valves.
s Establish improved record keeping for SFRCS power supplies and trend to better determine
- expev=d service life.
m Monitor, periodically, the 125 Volt DC bus to ensure
- noise is at acceptablylowlevel.
m Modify steam generator level instrument monitors.
6
- O I
r
, ,----~w~ene- ---- , - - - - - - , - - - . , - -- --, - - --na- -- -,s
4
- O f,
- Safety Features Actuation System PriorTo Restart a Modify SFAS to avoid ungrounded power supply I
common problems by installing separate sensor channel power supplies. Accomplish by completely I rewiring power supply wiring to sensor logic.
a Confirm AC and DC contact cunent in SFAS output relaysis within design capability.
, a Repair / replace surveillance light cards with damaged components or electrical connections.
O = Perform complete logic, calibration and response time testing of SFAS channels.
Long Term a Evaluate attemate surveillance card design.
m Evaluate elimination of SFAS closure of main steam isolation valves.
m investigate spurious SFAS incident level 1 trips due
- to spildng of radiation monitor strings. ;
e improve human engineering considerations l
! associated with relative location of SFAS manual !
trips and associated reset pushbuttons (2) location i of reactor coolant pump seal injection and seal l retum valve control switches.
i s
O
- O i
integrated Control System
! Non-NuclearInstrumentation PriorTo Restart a Perform additional review of ICS and Non-Nuclear Instrumentation to evaluate plant and operator response on loss of powersupplies.
- a Remove and replace improper wire wrap terminations.
= improve main feedwater pump runback control upon unit trip (rapid feedwater reduction circuitry).
m Replaceinoperable fuse holders.
m Calibrate selected control modules.
m Perform action plan 16 requirements.
.O a uodify ioad baiance controi for turbine bypass vaives.
a Upgrade selected control modules, j Long Term a Evaluate alternatives to rapid feedwater reduction
- control scheme.
m improve preventive maintenance system.
e improve proportional and integrating module response.
m Provide additional cooling for ICS cabinets.
m Provide monitoring capability for selected ICS parameters (diagnostic).
m Replace powerselectorswitches.
- e improve transfer capability for pressure inputs to ICS l for turbine bypass valves. '
s
!O 4
O Security System PriorTo Restart '
s Evaluate / modify security requirements to improve operatoraccess.
m Review electrical loads on uninterruptible power supply.
- Revise procedures in event of loss of ventilation to Central Alarm Station.
Long Term a Perform evaluation of several operational / reliability
- O improvements for security system.
1 l
l O
l
O Control Room Normal and Emergency Ventilation Systems PriorTo Restart a Modify overall control scheme for water-cooled and air-cooled condensing modes of Emergency Ventilation System (EVS).
s Manually adjust Service Whter System cooling flow to water-cooled EVS condenser to accommodate
- seasonal changes.
. m Replace refrigerant solenoid control valves and iO install additional stop and check valves to facilitate refrigerant controlfor EVS.
mincrease cooling capacity of EVS. ,
u lnstall/ repair gaskets on Control Room door and l l
security room door to limit air leakage. i
, a Calibrate control and indicating instrumentation.
I
\ ,
1
!O 1
l
1 1
O Control Room Normal and Emergency Ventilation Systems
- Long Term a install flow modulating control valve in service ;
watercooling rath for EVS. '
s Further incresee v x ling capacity of EVS.
m Limit use of mw._.al switches on local control :
panels associated with EVS. l a Perform air flow balance of normal ventilation
!O
! system.
- a Review overall adequacy of normal ventilation
- system.
i a Develop improved preventive maintenance l' procedures for entire system including dampers and actuators.
a inspect and refurbish air handling duct work and associated insulation, filters and differential pressure units to improve cleanliness conditions in
! Control Room.
a improve operator indications and control regarding l normaland EVS operation.
- e Clean and repair humidification system. Evaluate attemate designs.
s Evaluate causes of failures of chlorine detectors and station vent air particulate monitors.
O f
O Station Air and Instrument Air i
Systems PriorTo Restart a lsolate and repair leakage in Station Air and instrument Air systems to maximum practical extent.
m Perform required station air compressor preventive maintenance.
m Test setpoints of control valves used to maintain
- instrument air header pressure in the event of j station airsystem failure. ,
!O a Revise procedures and testing to identify the temporary diesel air compressor as the backup air l
l supply. '
s Provide improved reliability of diesel air
- compressor during inclement weather.
m Procedurally blow down drains from SA28 to remove accumulated moisture in station air system.
m Provide filtering of air supply through SA2010 to minimize debris accumulation.
i l
5 lO '
l b :
O
! Station Air and instrument Air Systems (Cont'd) i Long Term a Perform engineering study of Station Air and Instrument Air systems to evaluate several areas for improving overall reliability (e.g., required j emergency air compressor size; isolable vs. non-isolable loads; need for 100/100 psig regulators; !
. leakisolation flexibility).
m install moisture trap on SA28 to improve draining.
u Segregate air intake and diesel exhaust for diesel airC mPressor.
'O s Modify Station Air and instrument Air systems to prevent dumping system air to atmosphere when the dryers are bypas ~-d.
m increase frequency of dewpoint check on instrument air receiver to detect unacceptable moisture leakage from station air headers to l instrument air headers; install permanent air dryer
, around lA408.
m Evaluate providing capability to start station air compressor 1-2 from Control Room.
m Install flow meter to permit trending of air system degradation. l l
l i
O
O 4
i Station Fire Protection PriorTo Restart t
a Provide audible fire alarm in Control Room.
8 Provide fire watches for areas affected by improperty ~
! installed fire dampers.
. Long Term a Maintain fire alarm location backup on ,
security computers. ;
a Revise circuitry for ionization smoke detectors to avoid spurious alarms.
" 5" improving testing and maintenance O accessibility of several smoke detectors and temperature switches.
i e Resolve operational problem with ionization smoke detector installed above control rod drive breakers.
1 m Complete fire protection enhancement program on schedule consistent with Appendix R commitments.
. m Provide time delay for diesel fire pump start to minimize unnecessary starts while the electric fire pump brings up system pressure.
a Resolve power supply problems with Viking fire i
panels. ;
a Modify fire alarm display in Control Room so that both panel number and zone number are provided. ,
a Replace / modify improperty Installed ventilation duct fire dampers.
4 J
. . . ~ . , , . . _ , . - . . . , _ . . . .
r------~.-.--..,-.------ ,__,m_...-,.-,-_.__,.-. ,,, - . ~ . _ , _ . - - , - - . - , _ -
1 l
lO l
I
- Component Cooling Water System PriorTo Restart u Functionally test CCW pump room ventilation fans.
'l m Repair or replace nitrogen regulator for CCW surge tank.
Long Term a Add CCW room ventilation fan periodic test. ;
I e implement attemate pressure control for CCW :
surge tank.
- Fix small oilleaks on CCW pumps.
l l
1 l
l l
O
l l
i O l Service Water System l PriorTo Restart
! a Modify ventilation for service water pump rooms.
j u Perform ultrasonic test of selected portions of piping and fittings.
! a Resolve service water flow through containment air coolers.
Long Term m Periodically ultrasonically test selected portions of Service Water System.
lO
- . Revi.w service water pump shave pe,,ormance
! post-modification.
m Evaluate apparent increased head and flow on
- service water pump 3-1.
a Evaluate tube corrosion / performance in ECCS room coolers.
- a Modify containment air cooler valves to improve i stroke time.
! a inspect tubes in component cooling water heat exchangers. !
l m improve temperature control for Component l
Cooling Water System.
t iO
l l
r lO l
l l Auxiliary Feedwater System PriorTo Restart u Evaluate applicable portions of November 21,1985
- transient t. San Onofre Unit 1 regarding check
! valve inoperability and water hammer. .
i = Install air operated steam admission valve near each auxiliary feedwater pump turbine (AFPT);
resolve associated high energy line break items.
4 m Ensure operability of steam traps on AFPT steam supply lines and periodically reconfirm operability.
m Revise AFW pump automatic suction transfer
!Q
! setpoints for switching from condensate storage j tank to service water.
i a Resolve overpressurization problem for discharge piping from AFW pumps. l
- m Install PGG govemor on AFF #1, as currently on AFPT #2; revise low speed stops to accommodate changesin govemoroperation time.
, m Evaluate coincident AFW and MFP feed to steam i generators.
m Confirm AFW pump discharge valves will open for maximum credible differential pressure.
i l
l e O
1
O I
Auxiliary Feedwater System l PriorTo Restart (Cont'd) s Remove individual suction strainers to AFW pumps and enlarge mesh on common strainer from condensate storage tank.
m Remove control power from suction valves FW786 and FW790 to preclude spurious closure.
l m increase time delay on suction pressure switch j actuation which isolates steam supply to AFPTs.
! a implement improvements to AFFT overspeed trip .
,O mechanism.
s Calibrate AFW pump flow instrumentation.
i e implement controls to preclude steam binding of l AFW pumps (NRCIE Bulletin 8501).
e install pressure switches to detect main steam line breaks upstream of MS106, MS106A, MS107, 1 MS107A.
.; l
,i ,
(
- 0 l
O I
! Auxiliary Feedwater System
- (Cont'd)
Long Term i e investigate means of monitoring for condensate in AFPT steam supplylines.
I e improve steam generator level control capability when using AFW pumps.
i a Evaluate leaving AF3870 and AF3872 open during
- plant operation to further improve AFW System
- reliability.
O e Evaiuate potentiai for contamination from senrice l
WaterSystem to AFW pump suction.
, a lmprove operability of manual mechanical l overspeed trip on AFPTs.
l almprove access to AFW pump #1 room.
I e inspect intemals of AFW pump and turbine during
! next refueling outage.
l m Provide accurate means of monitoring AFW pump j recirculation flow.
! = improve AFW pump rooms ventilation control.
l a lmprove Control Room board control, indication l and reset layout.
O
1 O
l' e
Main Steam System PriorTo Restart l m Refurbish and check setpoints for all main steam
- safety valves (MSSV's).
m instail lift stop collars on "R" orifice MSSV's.
l m Install lateral snubber on "A" main steam header.
u Recalibrate atmospheric vent valve controls.
- Administratively require plant shutdown if both 1 1050 psig setpoint MSSV's on a header are inoperable. !
= Test smaller inlet bore size for MSSV's. l j
.O a estabiish ieak rate for testing of main steam non-retum valves.
Long Term ainstall MSSV monitoring system.
s Improve mechanical design of main steam isolation l valve position switches.
m investigate increased noise and general vibration with full are admission to main turbine.
l 1
iO i
L--.-...__....-----.-. , - . -.,- -. - ..-.- - - ..---.,-...,--- -.---- - - -..-
O Steam Generator System ;
i PriorTo Restart j u Provide engineering analysis regarding !
acceptability of having exceeded procedural !
i pressure / temperature limits during testing.
Long Term a improve reliability and accuracy of steam generator j shell thermocouple temperature readings. l e Evaluate modifications to condenser steam jet air ;
ejector radiation monitors. '
O )
l j
)
1
\
l l
O l
.O Main Feedwater System PriorTo Restart a Evaluate applicable portions of November 21,1985 i transient at San Onofre Unit 1 regarding check valve inoperability and water hammer.
m investigate and correct cause of power supply failures for main feedwater pump turbine (MFFT) controlsystem.
a lmprove reliability of MFPT low pressure drainage '
header pumps.
a Evaluate via testing ability for automatic vs. manual O control of main feedwater pumps between 15% and 45% plant power.
m Minimize potential for overfeeding steam generators after reactor trip by modifying interlocks between startup valve and main feedwater blockvalve.
m improve reliability of MFFT hydraulic oil system.
s Resolve apparent vibration problem on MFPT 1-1 pump end bearing (instrument problem).
m investigate high pressure differential on MFPT thrust bearing wear monitor.
'O
l l
o ;
i Main Feedwater System (Cont'd)
Long Term a Perform overall reliability study of main feedwater system and associated support systems.
u Evaluate modifications to high pressure drain system to minimize flashing and vibration.
m Repair or replace level indicating sight glasses on high pressure feedwater heaters.
m Correct variance among MFPT turbine maeed indicators.
!O e improve reliability of MFFT tuming gear system.
m improve flow control during feedwater cleanup operations performed prior to each reactor plant startup.
1O l
l
O l
l Post Accident Sampling System 1 PriorTo Restart a Perform overall operability testing to confirm ;
adequacy of several previous design changes.
m Correct several component maintenance deficiencies (e.g., sample pump diaphragm replacement; flowmeter replacement).
m Conduct additi6nal training of Chemistry and i Health Physics personnel.
m Confirm time and motion study for taidng samples Q adequately addresses system design changes.
Long Term a Evaluate alternate PASS isolation valve designs to ensure adequate isolation.
i O
l
. - _ _ - . - . . A
O Gaseous Radwaste System l
PriorTo Restart s Revise Station procedures to require periodic sampling of Clean Waste Receiver Tanks for oxygen and hydrogen upcn failure of monitors.
Long Term a Eliminate air inleakage to Gaseous Radwaste System. ;
a Evaluate redundant oxygen and hydrogen monitors on Waste Gas Surge Tank and Clean Waste O ReceiverTanks.
m Evaluate relocation of oxygen / hydrogen monitors for the Clean Waste Receiver Tanks to minimize maintenance personnel radiation exposure.
m improve nitrogen overpressure control on waste gas tanks.
m Obtain reliable operation of degasifier.
i 1
h O
ogf) g1/
4 O
)
i i
MAINTENANCE REVIEW , l i
AT O DAVIS-BESSE l
1 I
O l
O
- TWO MAINTENANCE SURVEYS CONDUCTED BY THE STAFF SEPTEMBER 16-20, 1985 MARCH 24-27, 1986 TEAM COMPOSITION SEPTEMBER SURVEY: 2 NRR, 2 REGION III, 1 OIE, 2 CONTRACTORS (PNL)
MARCH SURVEY: 2 NRR, 2 REGION III, 2 OIE FIVE OF SIX MEMBERS ON MARCH SURVEY HAD PARTICIPATED IN SEPTEMBER SURVEY O
BOTH SURVEYS CONSISTED OF INTERi'IEWS WITH PLANT PERSONNEL SEPTEMBER SURVEY UTILIZED PROTOCOL DEVELOPED IN MSPP MARCH SURVEY REVIEW OUTSTANDING MW0s ACCOMPANYING SITE PERSONNEL PLAN OF DAY, WEEKLY STATUS MEETINGS l
FINDINGS ARE CONSENSUS JUDGEMENT OF TEAM
(])
l
O SEPTEMBER SURVEY FOUND WEAKNESSES IN:
CORPORATE COMMITMENT SPARE PARTS / MATERIAL READINESS SUPERVISION PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE WORK ORDER BACKLOG MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES COMMUNICATIONS O
- DEFINED RESPONSIBILITIES TRAINING CONCLUSIONS MODIFICATIONS TO MAINTENANCE PROGRAM ADDRESSING WEAKNESSES MANY CHANGES BEING IMPLEMENTED T00 EARLY TO JUDGE EFFECTIVENESS ANOTHER SURVEY BE CONDUCTED l 4
O ,
l
s O
MARCH SURVEY REVIEWED SAME NINE AREAS OF WEAKNESS ALSO REVIEWED MAINTENANCE WORK ACTIVITY PLANNING AND SCHEDULING; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES CONCLUSIONS CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS MADE IN IMPLEMENTING NEW MAINTENANCE PROGRAM CONSISTENTLY COMPLYING WITH STATED BASES FOR DETERMINING
([) MW0s REQUIRED FOR RESTART SOME PROBLEMS NOTED BY TEAM - NOT CONSIDERED MAJOR PROGRAMMATIC WEAKNESSES FUNCTIONING AS INTENDED WITH N0 MAJOR IDENTIFIABLE WEAKNESSES
- I REGION III WILL MONITOR OUTSTANDING MW0s TO ASSURE CONTINUED CONTROL AND PROGRESS REGION III WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR MAINTENANCE AT DAVIS-BESSE a l
_ - - - - s.-e-,
Ofb - ___
SYSTEM REVIEW & TEST PROGRAM (SRTP)
Two Phase Program Evaluation The staff has established on eight-point program to review the j
SRTP.
- 1. Evaluate the proposed SRTP to determine the degree to which it can achieve stated program objectives.
- 2. Assess whether the list of systems important to safe plant operation is sufficiently complete to provide reasonable assurance of safe plant operation. This would include evaluation O of specific justifications for exciuding any safety _reioted system.
- 3. Review the lists of system functions important to safe plant opera-tion to determine whether they are complete with respect to both ,
specific system functions and plantwide system safety functions. l l
I
- 4. Review selected test outlines to ensure that they encompass all system functions required for safe plant operation and that the systems are tested under anticipated operating conditions. This would include review of proposed justifications for not testing any system function deemed important to safe plant operation or not testing systems at anticipated system operhting conditions.
- O l Items 1 - 4 discussed in Safety Evaluation Report. ;
l i
s j
n _
~'
[d N, 1
SYSTDi REVEW & TEST PROGRAM (SRTP)
Two Phase Program Evaluation (cont)
- 5. Review, witness, and evaluate the results of selected system tests.
- 6. Verify that the licenses has developed, performed, and evaluated the results of remaining test procedures.
- 7. Audit maintenance record reviews, personnel interview result, test leader qualification, etc.
- 8. Observe SRTP meetings such as JTG meetings, IPRC meetings, etc.
1 LO items 5 - 8 discussed in Rlli inspection Reports.
e e-
t
. i 9
pg _
N' i
Rlll REVIEW :
i l
- Review the SRTP System Review Reports for 10 of the 34 Systems, to ensure the review is accomplished within SRTP quidelines.
G* Review the licensee's test program similar to the methodology utilized in IE WC-2513 for preoperational test programs l,i.e., three-tiered approach).
- Review, witness, and evaluate 4 of 6 integrated tests.
- Review, witness, and evaluate the testing for 10 of 34 1 -
systems deemed "Important to safe planf operafionf.
Verify the licensee has developed, performed, and O evaluated the results of the remaining test procedures.
i ...
ON-SITE REMEW ACTMTIES I
I
- Since 9/23/85, 4 NRC and 7 contractor inspectors have participcted in the program evaluation.
O
.
- Weekly coverage provided from 9/23/85 to 5/23/86 when test activities slowed due to WCP Shaft investigation.
I i .
1
- Weekly coverage planned until restart.
O .
1
NRC REVIEW STATUS )
i i
- Reviewed 16 of the 34 System Review Reports.
- Reviewed I of 6 integrated tests.
3 tests approved.
None performed.
- Licensee has developed test program consisting of 111 test procedures and 172 surveillance l'5tS-O TED has performed 68 test procedures.
NRC has reviewed 60 and witnessed 41 test procedures.
TED has approved the results of 27 test l
l procedures.
NRC has reviewed 7 of these packages.
~
TED has performed 34 surveillance tests.
L -
NRC has reviewed 6 and witnessed 4 o surveillance tests. [No test results are available for review.)
l -
BT5fMS BF0ETANT 10 SAFB OPEREtW Group 1 Roseter Coelant System
- High Pressure injection C=e nadind sistem I
- Decay Heat Removal & Low Pressure lajection l
Containment Spray System Containment Emergency Yentilation Containment Air Costing and Rydrogen Centrol
- Makeup and Purification System i
O Group 2
- Electrical 125/250 YDC (includet Battery BM H&Y) l J
Beetrical 4.16 ET Sys.(13.8/4.1EY Transformers)
- Electrical 480T Distribution (lacludes laverters and Required Transformers)
Bectrical 13.8 EV System (Inctndes Martup and indlary Transformers) '
-
- Emergency Diesel Generators (includes "Q" Fuel Oil Tanks and Diesel Room Yentilation) lastrument AC power (laclude laverters and Esquired
- "'"'"I O * = NBC Reviewed.
" " ~~ me - . - . . ._, __
\
SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFE OPERATION l,! cont) l Group 3 Anticipatory Reactor Trip System Control Rod Drive System Incore Monitoring (Includes Core Exit TC)
- Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System O
- Safety Features Actuation System Integrated Control System
- Security System Group 4
- Control Room Normal and Emergency H&V System
- Station and Instrument Air j
- Station Fire Protection O
- Component Coolant water System Service Water System .
(a
\
SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFE OPERATION (co Group 5 Auxiliary Feedwater System Main Steam ,
Steam Generator System
- fain Fee 6:ater System ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS FOR SEPERVISORY REVIEW i
- Gaseous Radwaste
- Post Accident Sampling Fuel Handling Ventilation
- Miscellaneous Containment Isolation Valves O
- = XRC Reviewed.
L.--- - - . - . . - -
l DAVIS-BESSE Restart Test Program Status l
integrated Testing (4 of 8)
{ . Review 1ai.se j . Witness - e
. Evoluote Results <
e O Sys. Func. Test. (10 Sys)
! c1 '
0 . TPS (Review) < .
so.37 b M !
- ,t . STS (Review) -
10.41
. TPS (Witness) -
45.28 ,
O . STS (Witness) -
s.:ts C)
- g
. TPS (Evol. Results) <
7,55 l g . STS (Eval. Results) - e i O g Verifet. Remain. Tests ie lN . TPS -
E s..52 l
. STS <
1 l
l j Licensee's Testing Progress
! . TPS (Tests Performed) < -
E s2.se i
! . STS (Testa Performed) <
1 s.1 e 4
0 10 20 30 40 50 SO 70 a0 90 10s
. Percentage Completion
O SIGNIFICANT RESULTS OF SRTP [ cont}
Program implementation Review
- IPRC Meeting Winutes had not been provided from 11/15/85 to 4/86.
RESOLUTION: All ba;k minute: have, been provided for revie .
- A Significant Events Log was not required to be maintained for the performance of STs.
RESOLUTION: A rnini-dironologi;ol log is neA required.
O
- A method did not exist to ensure required changes to STs identified in the review process were accomplished prior to test performance.
RESOLUTION: A tracking and audit systern hos been developed.
- A 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation was not required to be performed for each of the new tests developed in the SRTP.
~
RESOLUTION: An audit has been performed to ensure a safety evaluation has been performed for each TP.
- Problems identified in the Test Review were not reported
! within the time period required.
O RESOLUTION: An audit to verify that all identified problems have been reviewed for reportability is ongoing.
\
^
"U h.
SIGNIFICANT RESULTS OF SRTP System Review
- Inadequate cooling water flow to the Containment Air Cooling Unit.
- Inadequate ventilation in the Service Water Building.
i O Test Review
- Inadequate periodic testing of High Pressure injection Valves.
- Inadequate periodic testing of Decay Heat Removal Valves.
- Inadequate period testing of Auxiliary -
Feed Pump Turbine [AFPT) Steam Generator (SG) Level Control System.
- Inadequate venting of High Pressure O Injection System downstream high point vents.
l 1 - - . ,-- -. ._. . .
C O ]
S GN FCAs~ RES _"S 0 SF3 { con:} l Sys':em ~es:inc
- maro3ery wirec Con ~:oinmen Air Coo er
~
00 OnC eSS :'lon Cesicnec 'ow ca30ci:y.
O
- 00CeCu0:e 'ow anc cis:riau: ion :or J
Service Wa:er um as.
- maro3er ower air 3ressure imi; or .
mu :ia e s':ar:s o' Emercency Jiese Genera:or ')G}.
O
- noaeroa e Ven:io': ion Sys:em Jamaers.
.t, L ,
!'O t
l j -
i -
i i
J s 1
a'
+ , ,
I l
,i
! ACRS BRIEFING ,
,i
!, DAVIS-BESSE '
l RESTART FROM 6/9/85 EVENT I JUNE 27, 1986
- O 1
a i :
- CONTACT
j CONRAD I i MCCRACKEN l X28124 l i
Slide 1
,O 1
i l
/
, , _ - . . - , . - _ . . . _ . . _ - _ . - . - _ . . _ , _ . , . _ _ _ _ _ - , __ . . . . , . ..m.- _ m_,_ - . _
f l{
i BACKGROUND o MULTIPLE BRIEFINGS TO ACRS AND DAVIS-BESSE SUB-COMMITTEE SINCE IIT REPORT ISSUED
! o 1/29/86 DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT ISSUED, INCLUDED OPEN ITEMS o 2/6/86 PRESENTATION OF DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION TO SUB-COMMITTEE i
o 6/10/86 FINAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT ISSUED i
i i
O i
.f I
t j
l l SLIDE 2 I
tO
}
j '
I .
-,n--,---,c-~~--,-, , , . . - , - , - . .,. -. - , ,,. ---,--,,---,- -..,,, ,--,r--
' ~
(
4 i
l
, MAJOR CHANGES TO SER SINCE 2/6/86 MEETING o MOTOR OPERATED VALVES Pg. 3-28 1
o MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES AND ATMOSPHERIC VENT VALVES Pg. 3-33 l
i o SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM Pg. 3-52 o SAFETY SIGNIFICANT HED'S Pg. 3-63 o SINGLE FAILURE CONSIDERATIONS Pg. 5-1 o SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENTS o MAINTENANCE Pg. 3-4 O o SYSTEMS REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM Pg. 3-64 i
i f
4 i
t SLIDE 3 O
/
5'
'O MOTOR OPERATED VALVES t
PROBLEM DEFINITION: i
- FAILURE OF AFW VALVES TO REOPEN DURING JUNE 9, 1985 EVENT LED TO ROOT l CAUSE DETERMINATION THAT CONTPOLS WERE IMPROPERLY SET CONCERN EXISTED THAT OTHER M0V'S MAY NOT FUNCTION RESOLUTION:
1 -
ALL VALVES (167) IN SAFETY SYSTEMS AND SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY REWORKED USING M0 VATS REPRESENTATIVE VALVES TESTED AT DESIGN BASIS CONDITIONS i
1 N
SLIDE 4 4
4
- O 4
f e
o -
l j .
MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES AND ATMOSPHERIC VENT VALVES 4
PROBLEM DEFINITION:
- MAIN STEAM PRESSURE FLUCTUATION ANOMALIES DURING THE JUNE 9, 1985 EVENT CAUSED BY IMPROPER OPERATION OF MSSV'S AND AVV'S i .. / c-i .
RESOLUTION: I-AVV CONTROL SYSTEM REPAIRED
- MSSV'S REMOVED, REWORKED AND RETESTED LICENSEE WILL SUBMIT LONG TERM MAINTENANCE PLAN iO T
l SLIDE 5 T
- O s-
. -. __ ._ _,. _-_ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . . . , , ,, . . . , . . - . , _ _ _ , , _ _ . , , - . . , _ ,___m.-___, , . . . . _ , ....
i l
l
)
SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM PROBLEM DEFINITION:
- PRIOR TO THE JUNE 9, 1985 EVENT, CONCERN EXISTED THAT THE SFAS DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INDEPENDENCE TO MEET SINGLE FAILURE
. RESOLUTION:
- MODIFICATIONS INCORPORATED TO MEET CHANNEL INDEPENDENCE CRITERIA 0F IEEE STANDARD 279-1971 i
t O
t
- SLIDE 6 4
O
/
4 g'
'O v a.
et 1
6,
~
SAFETY SIGNIFICANT HED'S -' ' , .- r -
PROBLEM DEFINITION: s' [
- PRIOR TO THE JUNE 9, 1985 EVENT THE DCRDR IDENTIFIED 29 SAFETY SIGNIFICANT HED'S. DUE TO THE EVENT RELATED HED'S RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES WAS NEEDED FOR RESTART RESOLUTION:
PERMANENT OR INTERIM FIXES INSTITUTED FOR RESTART INTERIM FIXES TO BE PERMANENTLY RESOLVED PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF STH REFUELING OUTAGE ALL IDENTIFIED HED'S TO BE CORRECTED BY COMPLETION OF 6TH REFUELING O OUTAGE 4
h SLIDE 7 l
'O
/
O SINGLE FAILURE CONSIDERATIONS PROBLEM DEFINITION: i SINGLE FAILURE CONCERNS WERE IDENTIFIED BY THE IIT FOR THE SFRCS AND AFWS. i BASED ON THIS CONCERN A SINGLE FAILURE REVIEW OF THE RPS WAS PERFORMED. l l
1 1
I J
RESOLUTION:
1 l
LICENSEE'S EVALUATION DEMONSTRATED ACCEPTABLE SINGLE FAILURE PROTECTION l
1 i
i l
l l
l i
- )
SLIDE 8 l i
O
, w i
-w-e'-wwg we 9 ---q g- rPy, w- w-g- + --- ~ y ay*ai -- e --
9 --m --y'E
7
' C'
~
SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENTS .
o PRIOR TO OR DURING RESTART REWORK AND TESTING 0F ALL SAFETY RELATED MOTOR OPERATED VALVES COMPLETION OF SYSTEMS TEST PROGRAM o AFTER RESTART
- RESOLUTION OF CONTROL ROOM HED'S DURING STH REFUELING OUTAGE, CORRECTIONS IMPLEMENTED BY COMPLETION OF 6TH REFUELING OUTA,G g. , 4g
- PLANFORROUTINEINSPECTIONOFMSSV'S(90DAYSFOLLOWINGRESTART)
~
TURBINE STOP VALVE CLOSURE TIME TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (90 DAYS FOLLOWING RESTART)
- COMPREHENSIVE AFW RELIABILITY STUDY (90 DAYS FOLLOWING RESTART)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR MOTOR-DRIVEN FEED PUMP (60 DAYS FOLLOWING RESTART)
SLIDE 9 O
4'