ML20129B424
| ML20129B424 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1985 |
| From: | Rogers W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507290159 | |
| Download: ML20129B424 (167) | |
Text
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1 BEFORE THE FACT FINDING TASK PORCE 2 OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 - - - - -
4 Re:
5 Davis-Desse event :
6 of June 9, 1985 :
7 3 _ _ _ _ _
9 INTERVIEW OF WALT ROGERS 10 - . . - -
11 Interview of WALT ROGERS by the Nuclear 12 Regulatory Commission Fact Finding Task Force,
, "x
! 13 taken notore me, Nicholas A. Marrone, a Registered 14 Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and tot 15 ene State of Onio, at the site Emergony Operations 16 Center, Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant, oak Harbor, 17 Onio, on Thursday, June 20, 1985, commencing at la 10:10 o' clock a.m.
19 - _ _ _ _
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- l ~ APPEARANCES
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'4 ~ MEMBERS O F' . T H E .' T E A M
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- - 6' . wayne Lanning' 4
i' 7 Larry sell
-8 ..J. T. Bea rd -
i .9 Ernie Rossi- ,
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3 1 Tnursday Morning session
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'# 2 June 20, 1985 3 10:10 o' clock a.m.
4 - - - - -
5 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Why don' t we begin.
6 Walt, what we are going to do is talk to 7 you about what you comember the day or the event, 8 wnen you found out about the event, and wnat 9 observations you made, and we are probably also 10 going to want to ask you about wnat additional 11 information you have obtained about the event attor 12 it occurred, analyses tna t - you have been involved
'O (j 13 in and so forth or the event.
14 And we will probably also want to get 15 into some of tne more general things.you observed 16 about operation of the plant, maintenance of the .
17 plant and that kind of thing for the time period 18 you nave been here.
19 Why don' t wo start out by getting in the 20 transcript -- ne nas your name. Why don't you tell 21 nim - ,tell us wnst your position is and how long 22 have you been nere, and also wny don' t you after 23 that give a brief discussion of what staff you nave (g 24 horo?
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.1 MR. ROGERS: OXay. Well, I'm Walt Rogers, 2 . senior" resident inspector a t Davis-Besse. I have
.3 been the' senior about.two years now. I have been
~
4- a t Da vis-Besse since day one at joining tne 5 commission a little over five years ago.
6 My original position was resident 7 inspector. At this time or prior to the transient, 8 I had one other individual that I supervised full 9 time, which'was Donald Koslott, my resident 10 inspector, and he's been out here for a little over i
11 a-year, a year maybe tour or five months. And also 12 I nave aJaecretarial statt~part-time, secretary t
O 12 eart time.
l 14 _MR. ROSSI - Okay. Why don't we --
15 MR. BEARD: I;was'Just going to add, you 16 depended on --
if you need technical support or
- i 17 admin support or,other. items like tnat, you would 18 depend on the Region to support you on an as-needed 19 basis?
20 MR. ROGERS: Yes, on an as-needed basis, i
! 21 We of course are in a little ditterent mode in this i
22 facility. Due to their low SALPfratings, we have 23 gone to much -- many more what I call support
./~ 24 inspectors, ourlDRS section-has been. coming out a N)T 4
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3 MR. ROGERS: Division of reactor safety, 4 I believe is what their title is. They basically 5 provide you with your traveling inspectors that 6 come out of the Region. We are on a much more 7 frequent basis of inspection.
3 I thinx our hours out here for the 9 last -- 'since this began operating, you can see a 10 significant increase in the number of inspectors at 11 this facility versus tne other facilities in tne 12 Region III. So in terms of what you would normally
() 13 see in torms of support, you see a lot more support 14 inspectors in the last few months out here than 15 prior to that and at a normal tacility.
16 MR. ~ROSSI: Okay. Why don't wa proceed 17 to the -- do you have anotner preliminary question?
19 MR. LANNING: Yes. Would you briefly 19 describo the responsibilities of a resident 20 inspector.
21 MR. ROGERS: Well, the resident 22 inspector's job is to on a daily basis observe the 23 actions that the licensee is taxing in terms of
,rm., 24 running the plant, control tours, get out in the
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6 1 plant, make sure that the facility is being run in
( .._ ,T 2 accordance with the license. That's one --
that is 3 one or tne primary functions of the resident 4 inspector.
5 The other is to communicate wnat he sees 6 in the field in terms of problems, anything that 7 would be of interest to my management to Know, such 8 as tno reactor trip, to talk to enem about reactor 9 trips, if an unusual event is called. Anything 10 that would be of public interest that would be in 11 tne press, you xnow, we report enat bacx to the 12 Region to xcep Enem abreast of what the real 13 operation of the facility is and how it is being 14 run.
't 15 I guess the senior resident and the 16 resident has boon -- you Know, they are here day in 17 and day out and they are really Kind of the scout 18 to say, hoy, it's time to bring in some more people 19 to loox at this facility. We thinx there is some 20 problems here, we need some more people out here to 21 be looxing at tnings to got management's attention 22 and say, hey, we are seeing some degradation in 23 performance in these areas and it needs to be
(- 24 addressed.
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-1 Those are I think probably the.two, is to
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2 really. inspect for contormance to the license and 3 safe _ operations, and to communicate that back to ;
4 the senior management in Region III.
-5 MR. ROSSI Why don't'you give a_briet i
6 description on your interface with the licensee as
-7 it attects, like, what can the resident statt
- 8 require of the licensee as opposed to areas that i
9 you can just observe what they are doing, and are 10 -there limitations on areas that you can observe 11- what-tney are doing? Can you ~ just'give us that i 12 teel for what your scope is J in terms of being able f() 13 to require-the licensee-to'do.epocific things as 4
l- . 14 opposed to just being able to usy they have done it f-l 15 wrong atter they have done it and as opposed to i
4 16 areas that you can' observe and report the ~ tindings?
17 MR. ROGERS: Well, I think the main point i
l- 18 is.that the things tnat are required by tne
~
, 19 licensee are required'by the law, by=their
. 20 commitments to their standards and by-the license, l 21 the technical speci fica tions. ;
22 The resident inspector doesn't -- is not
! 23 .the law. I mean, we are just_here to say,.now, j ' 24 this is what the law says, tnis is what you did.
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6 1 We don' t think you are in conformance or it's 2 apparent, you know, tnat you nave. violated the 3 procedure or you haven't performed a procedure. -
4 So it's.not like wa require. The law 5 requires, and those'are the requirements.
6 In terms of observation, you'can pretty I
7 mucn observe anything you want. I~ guess about the 8 only tning is there would be s ta tt mee ting s, ' tna t I l
9 type of thing, .tha t the resident inspector would 10 not normally a ttend,; senior sta tt meetings, tna t 11 . type of-thing. we do on a1 routine basis attend l 12 their daily statua meeting, their 2:00 -- it used-
'( ) 13 to be 2:00, it's now-1:00 meeting.
14 We have full roam ot1tne control' room, 15 access to the.snitt. supervisor, access to.all tne 16 lower echelon, supervisors, managers, plant ~ manager 17 and also to the assistant VP nuclear and to the VP 18 nuclear it we feel it is necessary to-discuss 19 matters with them.
'20 That's about as high-as I have ever gone.
21 I never nave really needed to push something up to 22 ,tne Chairman of the Board. The Chairman of the
~23 Board has.more or less set up things'with me to 24 come'down and talk to me about things or give him a O.
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9 1 plant tour. I think tha t's the last time. So in
' 2 terms of my initiatives up that high, it's more 3 their initiatives to me than that way.
4 MR. BEARD Wha t's your primary contact?
5 If you find something that seems unusual or 6 noncompliant in your mind, would your typical 7 contact be, say, the plant manager or wno would 8 that be?
9 MR. ROGER $t It would depend. It I see 10 wnat I would consider a tech -- let's say I see a 11 surveillance requirement nas just been missed that 12 was nooded to be performed, I would bring tha t to
() 13 the attention of the shift supervisor at that point, 14 hey, I think thia is what I see, just to notify him 15 sinco no is the one that is supposed to Know wha t's 16 going on in his facility at all times.
17 I would not necessarily push the point lu with him in terms of, you know, on day shift with 19 the plant manager there. It's a little different 20 stury when it is bacK shift and you find something 21 since he is then the senior representa tive for the 22 racility. At that point in time, I get a l-1 my 23 ducks in a row and go to the plant manager and say, r3 24 ney, this is the way it is, this is what the book
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10 1 says, do you agree or don' t agree. And it they
(~#1 2 agree, tnen you will nave to conform to your 3 license, and I expect them to take the appropriate 4 action at that point in time.
5 MR. BEARD So if I understand you then, 6- once all the ballots are counted so to spean, the 7 vote is in and there is an infraction of some 8 degree, you would con ta c t the plant manager. That 9 would be your normal routine?
10 MR. ROGERS: That would be the normal 11 routine.
12 MR. LANNING When do you contact tne
() 13 esjional ottice?
14 MR. ROGERS: It would depend. It it's a 15 matter -- at least my practice has been it it's a 16 matter that we feel that they have exceeded an 17 action statement, that type or thing, and I feel 1
18 there is some, you Know, if it's just black and 19 white, you go and you tell the plant manager and 20 let him know and then you immediately contact the 21 Region, hey, this is what is going on.
22 If it is a gray area where you want to 23 make sure tha t you are right, I normally will 24 discuss that with my management, satisfy myself ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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l 11 l 1
1 talking through with them that this is what it is, O.
\~ 2 and then have my position clear before I talk to 3 the plant manager, that type of thing.
4 It really depends upon the situation. 11 5 you are -- and we are talking about one of the 6 immedia te toch spec violations. Now, it we are 7 talking about something a little ditforent, say wo 8 have got -- le t's taxe an example, a drawing 9 control break down, tha t's a good one to take.
10 Tnat doesn't what I would call require you to shut 11 the plant dono or somotning 11xe that.
12 I normally would discuss it with tne, you
() 13 Know, the immediate supervisor in that area about 14 it and enen up to his boss at the appropriate 15 division director lovel here and let the plant 16 manager Know that, you know, this is wnat I see, 17 that this is a problem.
18 It really depends upon the type of 19 deviation tros the law or whatever you want to call 20 it that you see how you deal with it. Basically 21 you do make sure the plant manager knows what you 22 have found.
23 MR. BEARDS So you keep him informed and 24 work at the appropriate level of supervision or ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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12 1 management that would be the offective place.
l) 2 MR. ROGERS: Yes.
3 MR. ROSSI: How about access to the plant 4 records? And I will just give this one examplos 5 maintenance records on equipment. Do you nave or 6 nave you had limitations on what nort of records 7 you have access to? And I'm particularly interested 8 in limitations to safety related versus nonastety 9 re la ted equipment records.
10 MR. ROGERS: You nave as much accons to 11 the records as they do. Now, it it's not filed in 12 the rignt spot, you don't nave accoms to it, but
() 13 nobody else does.
14 MR. ROSSI: Okay. But you haven' t been 15 limited to only looking at --
16 MR. ROGERS: They have not come to me and 17 maid, no, you can't do that. They really in thin 18 area, they have been very open.
19 I nave my own little computer number. It 20 I w a. n t to go into their computer, they can't stop 21 me from getting access because I have my own little 22 access number and I can go in and picx out whatever i 23 I want.
(~g 24 MR. ROSSI So you nave access to
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. 1 drawings also affecting the plant?
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k- 2 MR. ROGERS: I have a set or P& ids and 3 they are Rept up to date. I Keep a set of i 4 ' uncontrolled into only, schematic electricals. And l
5 it changes so rarely I don't see a need for a 6 control set, but I have access to the control room
- 7 and the shift supervisor's office if I need to see f 8 something immediately, and I nave tull access to 9 the drawing room.
10 MR. ROSSIt Okay. E i-I 2 11 MR. ROGERSt And --
1 d
12 MR. ROSSIt And no limitation ot between I I
() 13 safety related and nonsafety related?
j 14 MR. ROGERS: No. }
) 15 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Do you nave --
- j. 16 MR. BELL Mr. Rogers, regardless whether 17 the issue is black and white or gray areas, both of ,
18 those issues are listed in your monthly inspection 19 report, are they not? e i ,
j 20 -MR. YOUNG: Well, whatever you look at [
l 21 you pretty muen, if you find a violation -- well, !
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j 22 le t's say you are out in the water treatment building 23 and-you find that they are not using the procedure 24 right or something like tha t , that wouldn' t I
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! I necessarily be a violation because it may not be a r~g V 2 safety related procedure or that type of thing, j 3 especially it it doesn' t have really any
- 4 significance.
! 5 -I t's mor e an observation then becauss 6 there is really no requirement it tnat's what you i-
, 7 sean. But in terms of what you tound, you document 8 it and say you find this or that. ,
j 9 MR. BELL But there is several areas in '
) 10 the inspection report line violations, unresolved l
11 items that are documented by you?
12 MR. ROGERS: Oh, yeah. It there is l
() 13 something that 1 feel that, let's take an example, ,
14 something that they -- tnero is a couple ot
(
15 examples I can use. Say there is an LER and they l 16 say they are going to do a tacility change request, l 17 1980, well, I will continue to control that through j 18 an open item. I will follow up and make-sure that i 19 they do that facility change when they say they are 20 going to do it.
4 21 It it is an item that I feel that is 22 not a violation but it's not really a very good 23 situation, say they -- 1 got one today, they got a 24 5 DCN rule around here.
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15 1 MR. BEARD For the sake of the record, 2 could you be a little more clear, is it S DCN7 3 MR. ROGERS: Oh, yeah. Drawing change 4 notices, they pretty much internally say they are I 5 not going to have over five drawing change notices 6 on a drawing and if they exceed that, they will go l
7 off and get the drawing revised so -- and they have 8 a time frame in which to do it in.
1 9 If you found, say, one drawing that they
- 10 messed up on and they had six DCNs for over the 11 90-day portod, you would writo it up and call it an 12 open item and see tnem, maxe sure they realize
() 13 where the prob'sm is and get it taxon care of.
14 Tha t's , you Know, things that you tind enat a re not 15 very good, you track as open items, important items, 16 line one PCR is to change out the governors on tne 17 auxiliary feedpump. Tha t's an open itom. They 18 changed one of them out and tney still nave got one 19 to go. Things you thinx are significant tacility 20 cnanges, that type of stuff, or management 1
21 initiatives.
22 MR. USARD: Let me ask you about 23 something that is less specific. You Know, you are (m 24 talking about situations where a procedure says do i
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10 1 sometning and they may or may not nave done it.
O 2 Explain to me now a general situation 3 where a specific case by itself is not terribly 4 significant but wnon taken as a collectior. ot 5 specifics, then the bigger picture begins to form 6 maybe in your mind of somo perception or a general i 7 degradation, and I will picx purely as an example 3 that the maintenance is not of some quality or 9 timeliness or something like that. liow would a
'10 resident inapactor or a senior resident inspector li address tnis issue in terms of dealing witn a i
12 utility and dealing with a region and otnor peoplo?
() 13 MR. ROGERS I thinx in something line 14 that wnen you can see somothing going downhill, 15 you -- tnere is a couple of things you do.
16 No. 1, it goes in the SALP report. It 17 starts building up. Those are starting to be the 18 cornerstones of some of the things tnst will be set 19 in the SALP report for your trending and also to 20 give you a good perception of where you really do 21 stand in terms of categories. You let your 22 management xnow, hoy, you s ta r t -- I'm starting to 23 feel things a ren' t going quite right, start to.give i
r'3 24 them -- what you are giving are tne small examplos,
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17 l 'l and you say, hey, it's what I'm seeing, I'm not l
' (2) 2 getting a good-teel.
3 And that has to be tactored into your i 4 management's concern, like when something does :
5 happen, say this particular incident, it was a i
6 violation which though on tne onset'may not be very
- 7 significant to a plant, that it's just an isolated ,
4
) 8 instance, but 11 you can: teel that it's being built 9 up,.then you have.got to look at it ina different i- ;
10 ' light.
i 11 And especially in light of the type of i
! t I 12 corrective actions the licensee taxes. Here you i
f
() 13 can see'that we have over the last years, we have i 1
14 been intensifying NRC concern and NRC management i i l 15 overview in.this -- on the facility. It really i 16 sta rted with the CCAP or-what we call comprehensive l
4
- . 17 corrective action program which dealt with drawing -
18 control areas, the maintenance area and what we 19 call -- I call it the design bases area. And it
- 10 ' has pretty much~ built itself through seeing the --
4 i
- 21 you know, a' couple of'other things in the same area 1 .
l 22 that they tended yo'u to believe the root cause 23 hasn't been taken care of, that is built then into i -
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i program, started with the interim regulatory l
( 2 improvement program after, you know, we say, you ;
4 3 know, commit to it or, you know, they acceded to 4 our wishes to -- and based upon our observations [
5 they said, yeah, we understand your observations 6 and we agree-we are seeing some overall degradation 7 throughout the mission.
8 Tney toon --'they came back with 9 long-term programs to deal, you know, starting to 10 see it, and we say, well, it's apparent you see i
11 some areas that you are not going to be able to 12 address for years. What are you going to do in the
() 13 interim? And then they came bacA and gave us some 14 interim actions to be dono, i
.i 15 MR. ROSSI: They? When you say they in ,
16 this discussion, are you referring specifically to 7
- 17 Davis-Besse or -- l 18 MR.. ROGERS The' licensee.
19 MR. ROSSI -- are you referring to 20 licensees in general?
a 21 MR. ROGERS No. The licensee, this
! 22 licensee.
23 MR. ROSSI I just Wanted to clarify that. ,
24 MR. ROGERS And then built up to the
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19 1 regulatory improvement program, and even after that 2 the SALP ratings came out and they were pretty poor 3 tor this facility and trom what I understand in 4 comparison to other facilities, it was pretty poor.
5 A lot of-category 3s.
6 They embarked than upon another program 7 called their SALP improvement program I guess, I 8 guess their SALP improvement task force to deal 9 with some of these areas that were not directly 10 addressed by their own licensee problem 11 identification program under the regulatory 12 improvement program.
() 13 I guess I should say, tnat regulatory 14 improvement program is sometning that the 11conaea 15 does and it's basically a chance for them to say 16 look at themselves, determine what their problems 17 are, and taxe care of them betore, you Know, the la commission han to really get involved and have to 19 deal with their -- how they deal with their 20 problems. It gives them a lot more flexibility, 21 basically.
22 MR. DEARD: Since you brought it up, the 23 SALP' rating as I have been told on maintenance at i
24 this facility was given the lowest rating of three?
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20 1 MR. ROGERS The last three years running.
O 2 MR. BEARD: Can you give ma some flavor 3 of the characteristics of the maintenance program 4 that you find are a problem.
5 MR. ROSSI Could we delay -- you 6 xnow, I would like to go, after we finish with his 7 description of the scope of his job here and what a 8 resident does and doesn't do, I would like to go on 9 and get the description of the event and then come 10 back to the specific question that you just asnod --
11 MR. BEARD: Pine.
12 MR. ROSSI: -- after that. Does anybody (n) 13 hr ve any more questions on just ene scope of the 14 job 7 15 MR. LANNING Yes. When you identify a 16 po te n t ia l safety concern, whether it be a site 17 specific concern or a concern that may Le generic is to otner operating plants, how do you communicato 19 that concern to other NRC offices, if you do?
20 MR. ROGERS: Other NRC offices, you mean 21 HRR and ABOD, that type of thing? Anything I thinx 22 is pretty much kind of a big thing, sometimes I 23 will talk to Al DeAgazio about it. I try to keep gS 24 Al abreast of wha t's going on in the plant L)
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21 1 operation, you know, wha t's actually happening out
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' ') 2 at the plant.
3 If I think it's something that, line 1 4 say, NRR can help with, I definitely talx to Al and 5 A1 -- I think we have a pretty good relationship, a 6 good dialogue back and forth in terms or, you know, 7 communication and discussing issues and that type 6 of thing. If I tnink I got a generic issue, wo 9 have, I don' t Know if the sheet is still in
~
10 existence, but I still uso it, in terms or a 11 potential generic concern, you ship those into the i
12 Region. You can also write a potential information
() 13 notice type thing or-write up something you fool 14 might be generic tor the industry in the into 15 notico type situation.
16 But most of your correspondance and dealings 17 is really with the regional office and than some of 18- the other resident inspector ottices. Occasionally 19 if you think you got something, you call around, 20 got some of the other plants and Region III and see 21 what they think. And if you think it is only tor a 22 0 & W unit, I'll call Tom Steka down at Crystal or 23 call SMUD or something lixo that and check it out 24 to ~ see if they get the same thing.
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1 22 1 Their primary site system is pretty much
/ 1 2 the samt. Their accondary sito, tha t's whure enore 3 is some modifications, but sometimes you can get a 4 nandle on what's going on that way.
5 MR. LANNING: How about changes to 6 approve design in the plant?
7 HR. ROGERS: You mean when they go out to d a license amendment or something like that?
9 MR. LANNING: I'm really thinking more in 10 the context of once the plant has received an 11 operating licenso, in your review of the operation 12 or the plant or whatever you find system designa l'
( 13 that could be improved or could be changed to 14 improve astoty or required for asfety, how would 15 you handle an issue like that?
16 MR. ROGERS: When you don't think the 17 system is working as well as it should? Well, I 18 thinx probably the first thing you have got to do, 19 you have got to addreas it to tne licensee and say, 20 hoy, the thing really dooan't seem to be worning as 21 well as you waat it to be working here fellowa, you 22 are still meeting -- I'm going to assume you still 23 meet your surveillance requirements, your toch spec 24 requirements all right, but things aren't working ACE FEDCRAL REPORTERS INC.
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23
, 1 quite right. I cninx you better, you know, take a a 2 ~1ook at it.
i 1 3 Usually i t would be sometning lixe an 4 exit or maybe some meeting betore -- not meeting 5 but just say, boy, you know, what is going on here ;
6 that maybe you ought to be taxing some initiatives 4 , .
7 in this area.
8 Hopefully they are appreciative that you -
9 are on base and that they come up with some type of 10 .tacility change which you can tracx as an open item,.
11 sometning 11xe tnat. Tnose are tne types of tnings -
{
12 you see what happens. If note then you just Kind 1 () 13 of got to pass it'up to your management and say, j 14 you know, tnis is-what -- 1:see some problems, 15' maybe if sometning happens later on, then we can 16 get some momentum to get something'done about it if 17 -they don't seem to De taxing the initiative.
4 la Those are the type things tnat really get 4
19- pretty tricky. You got to know how to nandle them i -
20 in the best way. It's really a case-by-case basis.
i 21 There is no cookbook on tha t. .
22 You talk to NRR,:you talk to Al and say, 23 hey, A1, next. time you talk license amendments: or I
l r 24~ something to these people or what type of
, k]/
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2 in this area and try to give him some tiold da ta to l 3 back him up to say, you xnow, give him a good warm 4 feeling wrother, you know, you are getting what you 5 want out of him.
6 MR. LANNING: Based on your experience, 7 has this been an offective method for doing this?
8 MR. ROGERS: I think you get some things --
9 it's a mixed bag. It always seems that things are 10 never as -- you know, once you think you see what 11 it is, to get it completely fixed it always sooms 12 to take another refueling outage or something like (O) 13 Enat. I t's just a fact of life, sometimes i t's 14 difficult to get it that day or wnatever. So I 15 guess in that respect, tima seems to be the biggest 16 thing.
17 I don't know how to phrase it quite right, 18 what I'm trying to say, but --
19 MR. HOSSI: Well, let me ask you. You 20 have got an area where there are flat out 21 requirements, there are the technical 22 specifications, there is the PSAR commitments, 23 there are the license requirements, and in those
/'~ 24 areas it's very clear what you do. The licensee
(_)T ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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25 1 nas to collow them. If ne doesn' t, you mignt --
'o# 2 rather tnan nod your naad.
3 HR. ROGERS: Tha t's rignt. You got the i 4 hammer.
5 MR. ROSSI: You have got the nammer you 6 need. You nave another area where you observe 7 things not being done perhaps in the optimum way 8 but they aren't in violation ~of license 9 requirements, tecnnical specifications or 10 regulations, and in those areas you are involved by 11 discussing them with the licensee, pointing them 12 out to nim, you don't have a hammer, but you can
.( ) 13 point them out and they.would probably also como 14 into.the SALP rating?
15 MR. ROGERS: They-come into the SALP 16 rating. I uninx you are getting into what I call 17 tne batting average. You say, hey, that doesn' t 18 looX quite right, that one doesn't look quite right, 19 and down the road, you know, what you say comes 20 true, you have a lot higner credence and batting 21 average and the licensee listening to you.about 22 wha t 'you .a re sa ying than if you go in there and say, 23 well, this is going to happen'and tha t's going to 24 happen'and.you are off in left field.
ACE FEDERAL' REPORTERS INC.
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,s 1 And I think this is where you are dealing C-2 in tne area of -- into a certain amount I think
.l
- 3. your personality, your ability to present an 4 adequate land a good technical argument to the 5 licensee. I thinn-that you probably have mixed 6 results" depending upon the personality, the 7 . licensing personnel and the. resident inspector.
. 8 There are other methods you can use, you 9 xnow, where you thinx.there is problems and that' 10 deals'with through . your SALP rating and also !
11 through your discussions witn NRR and.with your
.12 management.
l) 13 ~
MR. LANNING: I guess I would like to 14 come back to this area after-we get through the 15 discussion of the event.
16 ' MR. ROSSI: I' wanted to.get kind of"a 4
17 general' definition of the scope of your job,_what 18 .tnings_you canido and what tnings you . ca n' t do.
19- And I 'thinX:.we have gotten that. Why . don' t we go 20 on to the 'day-of-the' event now.
- 21 MR.fROGERS: Oxay. You can' t backfit
, -?
S22 -them. Tha t's one thing you can' t do. I 23 MR. ROSSI: -I understand.that. .Tha t's ;
s .
- f )
24 .another limitation that'you have in. terms of what
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I 1 you can and can' t require. You cannot -- you 2 cannot require nor can the Region require you to go 3 out and actually change something without going 4 through a formal procedure.
5 MR. ROGERS: Yes.
6 MR. ROSSI: Why don't we go to the 7 morning of the event, June 9th, and why don' t you 8 start'by telling _us when you first found out tnat 9 there was a problem and then j ust describe what you 10 did after that.and your observations and actions j 11 and so fortn?
i l
12: MR. ROGERS: Oxay. Well, I.was wonen up
-( ) 13 by Rebecca Osborn at what I think is probably
- 14 .around 2
- 30, 2:20, 2:30, something-line~that in-15 the morning, and Rebecca, started talxing to me and .
16 finally--- I had a little difficulty because she f 17 just_ said this is Rebecca.
18 MR. ROSSI: Rebecca~is in the control ;
i 19, room?
20 MR. ROGERS: She's the admin assistant.
21 She says Teddy Lee wants to talk to ~you, wno'is the i !
~
22 _ shift supervisor. Then I said, oh, this is the -
23 plant. talking to me now.
24 -Then~ Teddy Lee came on the line and sa'id ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS'INC.
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28
'l they had a loss of feedwater, total loss of O 2 teedwater, they had gotten auxiliary speed pumps 3 bacx. I said basically at that point, after his 4 first statement, I Know that I was going to be 5 going to the plant very directly because I knew it 6 was not a good situation if they had actually lost 7 both main feedpumps and the auxiliary feedpumps, S even~11 it was for a limited period of time.
- 9. I at that point in time asked a couple of 10 questions, you know, is the plant stable, I thinx 11 there was a few words about that. I believe at 12 that time I asked Teddy Lee wnether they popped tne
() 13 PORY, 'he said yes, they popped the PORY. And tnat 4-14 was something I would nave expected to. nave happen 15' at tha t - point, given the type of training --
'16 MR. BELL Excuse me. Teddy Lee is Teddy 17 Lehman?
i 18 MR. ROGERS: Yes. Ted Lehman,'the shift i
- 19- supervisor that was signed'in the book that night.
l 20 I hung up the phone and Don Koslo'ff 21 called.me and eaid that Steve Que'nnoa had called 22 him and; maid something had happened at ~ the plant
. 2 3: and evidently Steve'Quennoa, the plant manager, 'nad 24 given Don'a rundown.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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29 I 1 I cut nim off fairly short and said, yeah,
('_) 2 you Know, go to the plant. And I tninx it was 3 pretty -- tnere wasn' t much discussed otner than 4 that, you know, why don't you go out to the plant, 5 I'm coming out now. I hung up the phona, went 6 downstairs, pulled out my little book, got Nick 7 Jackiw's telepnone number, 8 MR. BELL: Nick Jacxiw?
9 MR. ROGERS: Is my section chief and my 10 immediate supervisor.
11 MR. BEARD: He's regional office?
12 M3. ROGERS: Yeah, ne's back in Glen
() 13 Ellyn. Went bacs downstairs, called him. Informed 14 nim tnere had been a loss or main toedwater and 15 loss of auxilia ry feedwater and that I was and Don 16 was going to the facility.
17 And then I got in my car --
I had gotten 18 my pants on and all that beforehand --
and it takes 19 about an hour for me to drive out to the plant.
20 And so I would guess it was somewhere in the time 21 frame of about 3:50, I would say 3:45 to 4:00 that 22- I probably got to the plant. I can check the card 23 file when I actually logged in, but that's an
(~ 24 estimato about when I got to the plant.
\ >)
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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30 1 Want up to the control room, waixed in,
('" !
2 loomed, tiest thing I saw was subcool meters, saw 3 they were reading rignt, they had not lost subcool 4 margin, so I knew enat was a good sign. Tnero were 5 a lot of senior --
6 MR. ROSSI: When you say you read the 7 subcool meter and found they hadn't lost subcooling 8 margin, was that an instantaneous reading or did 9 you look at a recorder over the term of the event?
10 MR. ROGERS: When you walk into the 11 control room, as you walk in, probably the most 12 prominant thing you see because you are actually
( .,
() 13 walking into the side of tne control room is the 14 STA panel or tne postaccident monitoring panel, and 15 it nas two digital display meters on it enat are 16 red, that have red indication on them and tney are 17 good size. And then there is a little lignt tnere 18 too, so when you walk in and see the numbers, you 19 know rignt then whetner you got subcool. It's 20 instantaneous, you just -- that's what you look at.
21 MR. ROSSI: So it was the subcooling 22 value at tnat time?
l 23 MR. ROGERS: Yes, at that time. I could i
(~) 24 tell there were a lot of senior reactor operator L;
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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. 31 1 licenses in the control' room and, you know, 2- management personnel, had the reactor operator's 3 licenses.
- 4 MR. BEARD: Walt, how many people were in 5 .tne. control room roughly when you-arrived, just a 6 number?
, 7 MR. ROGERSt I would say,-as I recollect, B Quennox, O'Connor, Louis Simon, Dick Crouse, Scott o
,. 9 - Wise I believe was already there. I'm not sure 10 wnetner I can recollect Scott's face right that 11 instant. I Know it was pretty soon, you know, in 12 that first nour ' tha t I saw Scott, the-Rom, snitt
(). 13 sup, Feasel, 1 would say -- I-thinX there were a 14 couple of equipment operators running around plus 15 - Rebecca, so I would say le t's call i t - e l e v e n' . t o r 16- right now.
- 17 MR. BEARD
- So roughly a dozen' people?
18 =MR. ROGERS: OXay, a dozen.- 1.didn't 19 count hea ds ,: but'I would say- tha t's about right.
2OJ MR. BEARD: I just wantedito get a feel, 21 that?s all. .
, 22 MR. ROGERS: .Okay. I could see -.I just 23 Kind?ct~ stood back to see.what.was. going on. Saw' 24' the J MSIVs were closed,'saw the guy was on-the ACE FEDERAL. REPORTERS INC.- .
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f 2 MR. BE ARD s ' Excuse me, Walt. When you
.3 saw the MSIVs closed, was this something you would d 2 4 expect to see or was it. unusual?
! 5 MR. ROGERS: I would expect to see it 6 because on a total ~ loss of -- well, a loss of'the 7 main feedwater pumps tolla me'that they nad a steam f ~
8 -feed rupture control actuation which would close 4
I 9 -the Main Steam Isolation Valves. So I would have 10_ expected-the_MSIVs to bef' closed.
11 MR. BEARD This would be on the
, 12 parameter-of low level in.the generators?-
() - 13 MR.--ROGERS: Yes. Low level is what.I 14- 'would have expected-it to-be on. I saw that they i '
i 15 had atmospneric vent valves and were worxing those.
r 16 Went over, checked pressuriserLlevel and pressure,
' 17- maxe!sure they were reading okay. Thenr1 just,_you
, 18 anow, things looxed_like it was the way it should 19 ~ be . Looke'd-like theyEhad steam genera tor . level 20 'where they wanted, startup. f eedpump was on. So i . -
- 21' things looxed' normal.
22 MR. ROSSI: Were the auxiliary teedwater
- 23 . pumps
- on too orJjust the startup' feedpumps?'
24' MR. ROGERSt ~ I'm-going to -- at my~
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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4 33 1 initial.loox there, I'm going to say that I wasn' t V 2 sure.that the auxiliary'feedpumps.were actually on
-3 at that original look.' I Knew they had level and 4 startup-feedwater pumps were on, you know, a minute 5 or-two later. -You know, I was'able to look and see 6 .the auxiliary-feedpumps were, you know, on.
7- MR. ROSSI Okay. So they.were on a 8 couple of minutes later? t. .
9 MR. ROGERS: They were in manual.
2 10 MR. BEARD What about ECCS equipment?
. 1 11 MR. ROGERS: At that point HPI:and LPI 12 -were'off.- So -- I looked there,-Quennos started 13 talking .to me , :giving me a rundown on what had 14- happened, I went okay, and I: basically did what I 15 call my normal panel;waixdown. I started on the
. -16 bacx and just started.looking.
1 i
17 Saw the reactor coolant pumps were on, .
l 18 went-over, looked and saw where that SFRCS, you i 19 know, some of:the valves that were -- that was
'20 probably the.first time'I saw what-7. would call 21 :something abnormal in that both the steam valves to
, 22. both: auxiliary-feedpumps were open. ;
23 MR. ROSSI: By both stetamLvalves,.you 24 mean all four segregation: valves w'ere open. ;There-ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS'INC.
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2 M R . R O G E R S : 160, lO6-A, 107 and 107-A.
3 MR. BEARD: And these are the four valves :
4' that-are between the steam genera to rs and the 5 turbines for the aux food?
6 MR. ROGERS: Yes. And I would not have 7 expected to see all tour valves open. 1.would nave 8 expected to see 106 open and. feeding the No. 1 9 turbine,'and 107 open feeding the No. 2 turbine.
10 Looked at the ECCS schematic, looked oxay, took a 11 good nard look at tne tour RCS-pressure indicators, 12 you nave all tour of the SFAS parameters and sach
) 13 of'them have' tour indica tors that indicate their 14 condition at that point. And.I looked ~at all.four 15 of tnose and made sure - tha t's uWSTi level, 16 . containment radiation,-containment pressure, and
-17 RCS pressure -- 'and they. wore all-reading normal.
18 So'I would,not have expected to see SFAS actuated 19 given those condAttons.
1 20 'Then I went over ~ and looked a t. tne -
21 electrical. ;Alsa I guess when.I looked -- you loox 22 at TSa t meters and then-probably something-else, I a
23' Anew they had NNIc because tnere is-tour little 5 24- lights on the back of the right-hand. panels that (w) ~
. ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
l (202) 347-3700 i
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4 35 1 give you DC, AC, X and Y indication. They were all
~) 2 on.
-3 Want over and looked at that, everything 4 was the way you would have expected it. They were 5 on the startup transformers and that the diesels 6 weren' t on. Things looked normal there. Pretty
, 7 much came back around and I don' t remember -- I 8 think they already had the RCS pressure recorder 9 pulled out of -- on the front panel. I'm not 10 really sure whether it was actually then or if they 11 pulled it out for me. But I was able to get a good 12 line on seeing what.RCS' pressure 1was. I could see
. () 13 that seventeen nundred was low, and high was --
14 MR. ROSSI That prossure recording was 4 15 during the event that you are speaxing of now?
16 MR. ROGERS: Yes. I had.already looked 17 and saw that it was okay by indication prior to 18 that, that it was all.right. But this is what I 19 was looKing at was -- maybe I was.looking at the.
20 tracing. Anyhow, I verified in my mind that 21 pressure was okay. And I was just xind of-getting 2 21 a feel for what pr,vasure had done during the
- 23. transient. So it went down to seventeen hundred.
(s
\]
24 I said that shouldn't na ve Jac tua tad SPAS . Tha t's ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC. ;
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36 1 good.
-( 2 Also I got a feel it went high. I think I
3 ~ I'saw-24 --I don't Know. I ended up'actually ;
4 d rawing-- tha t trace for my own personal knowledge.
- 5. I'as pretty sure..that Tave was around 555, 550 as I _
6 remember it. It may have been a 'little lower. But
- 7. I guess I shouldn't say, it's not so much you l 8 remember numbers'as much-it it'looks normal. It's j 9 almost like.the' number:that pops in your nead is
! -10 enelone that isn' t~ normal. So I guess maybe I i
1 11- should notHaay what the exact numbers wero I was
' il2 ' looking at because'I guess I / don' t have a real. ,
I
( ). =13 perception!on saying that'was the-number.
14~ MR. BEARD: -Normalipost-trip 1Tave would t h 15. . be something'line 5557 16 MR.' ROGERS: 550, 555. _
17 ~ MR. ROSSI - But it :wa s ' in ' tha t range?
18 MR.; ROGERS: Yeah.; Something like that.
19 MR. SEARD - What about'the-secondary site' 20' parameters? Did you look 'a t . any ' of 'those?' I'm i
- 21. particularly; interested in which secondary site 12 2 parameters had1 recorder. tracers so you could I ,
23' de te rmine what had the plant"been through? :
1 24 -M R . ROGERS: ~Un-hun.- Well, in toras-of ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS: INC. ,
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2 don't really have that good a deal because all you
- 3. really got is throttle pressure and that's it. The 4 actual pressure in the steam generators are -- in l 5 each generator are nothing but an indication.
6 MR. ROSSI: No recorders for steam 7 generator pressure? -
8 MR. ROGERS: . Tha t's right.
9 MR. BELL: ~ Throttle pressure would have d
- 10 been reading zero because the MSIVs had gone closed 11~ earlier in the incident?
?
! 12 MR. ROGERS: That should be the case. .
() 13 MR. BEARD: So-they really don' t have a 14 roceeding --
15 MR. ROGERS- I c'a n ' t tell you tor sure l
16- that it was reading zero.because I didn't looR at 17 it.
. 18 MR. BELL N o t-' z e ro , but at the low end.
I 19 MR. ROGERS . Low end, whatever. Yeah, 20- whatever the low setpoint for that thing is.-
21 MR. BEARD - So what I'm trying.to 4
22 unde r s ta nd , Walt, is in terms of your assessment of 23 . where the plant 1had been, you were really notiable *
~
24 to get~ an assessment of steam generator pressure.
)
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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38 1 Is that what you are saying?
(' i 2 MR. ROGERS: Yesh. You don't know where 3 it had gone. All you know is where it is. Pretty 4 much about that time --
5 MR. HEARD: Excuse me. If you are 6 getting ready to shirt, I would like you to also 7 address the same question for steam generator level.
8 MR. ROGERS: Okay. Level is a little 9 different because you have got recorders for level.
10 You have also got -- I guess in terms of level, I 11 wasn' t maybe -- I Know they had gotten SFRCS. I 12 didn't really go and look at the level indication
() 13 because I knew it had gotten down low. I didn't 14 need them to tell me it went low from what t r.s y 15 were telling me. They had lost main readwater, 16 they had lost aux, they had been out for about 17 twelve, fifteen minutes, whatever the time. I knew 18 it was not lixo a minute.or sometning like that.
19 So I knew levels had dropped down.
20 HR. ROSSI: Do they have recorders for 21 steam generator levels?
i 22 MR, ROGERSs Yes.
l 23 MR. ROSSI: They do have recorders?
l e 24 MR. ROGERS: They do have recorders.
N...s]
l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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- 1 MR. ROSSI: Can you tell us how accurately 2 they can determine the lovel from those recorders?
3 I mean, you know, what sort of resolution do you 4 have from the recorders in terms of being able to 5 tell what the level is, especially when it gets low?
6 MR. ROGERS: Well, tha t's the thing.
7 when it gets low,.I mean, you are dealing with --
8 I think like operating level, you are dealing' with 9 a pretty large vertical dis ta nce that you are 10 actually measuring. Now you are measuring, you
' ll know, a couple of inenes here and tha t's -- it's 12 the cost guess. What you really got a key on, the
- 4) 13 closest thing you have got to really see leve'l of 14 all of them is startup level which is what SFRCS is l
15 really looxing at, but even that is, you Know, it's 16 not line you got.zero,.one, two, three, four, five, 17 six, seven, eight, nine, ten. You got zero to ten 18' and you just kind of -- you maxe your.best guess 19 where your level is.-
20 MR. ROSSI: Can you give us your own 21 description or now easy it is to tell the 22 difference between, say, twelve inches of level, 23 ten-inches of level, and eight inches of level, l
24 just your description of tha t? And~if you don' t
)
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40 1 know, say you don' t know.
2 MR. ROGERS: I guoss you look at the 3- meter. I guess it really depends how tall you are 4 how easy, given the directions you look at it. You 5 can tell whether you are above the carrot and below 6 the carrot.
7 MR. ROSSI: And the carrot is ten?
8 MR. ROGERS: Ton.
9 MR. ROSSI: So you can tell if you are 10 above ten or below ten?
11 MR. ROGERS: At that point. The thing is 12 going to be wiggling a little bit, so to actually n
(,) 13 draw it out yourself, I think you can call which 14 side of the carrot you are on. But what the 15 indicator reads and what you really got in the 16 generator aren't necessarily the same thing.
17 MR. BEARD: Why is that, Walt?
18 MR. ROGERS: Because you.have got a 19 certain amount of instrument error associated 20 there. And when you are talxing about this type of 21 cutting nairs, lee's say, you Know, i n s tru me r. t 22 error is definitely involved in something like that.
23 MR. BEARDS. Can you give us a feel for (N 24 the magnitude of the error that one could V
ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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41 1 reasonably or typically expect on the level change 2 of this' type? Are we ta'l k i n g a couple inches, a 4
3 foot or wha t?
4 MR. ROGERS: ,I would say a couple of 5 . in e n e s ., 'More_than-just a couple inches, calling a 6 coupleftwo. I sometimes use couple for more than
.7 enat. I would'say.it's not like you are talning three feet here, but we are ta lking three~or four, 8 ,
i
- five' inches, in there for probably a difference.
.9 i
10 You can see it on - -you can.see it on -- even on i l 11 SFRCS setpoint during:the event.
t
, 12' You are talxing a difference of six
, () 13 ~ seconds betweenyactuation channel one and -- o r'
- . 14' eight seconds. You can'see there is a. time frame 15- between Actuation. Channel 1"and Actuation Channel 2.
16 Even though both. actuation channels are reading the l .17 -same generator level,-they are just.different 18 transmitters to get-their set points =and all that.
-19 So there is a certain ' amount of inaccuracy that-20 goes into all this. '
- 21- .MR. . BEARD
- Well, Walt, you brought up a
- 1 22 subject I heard alluded to:many times in these 23' interviews and I.would.11xe to. pursue that a bit.
- 24 The opera tors tha t we have talked to that. alluded ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC. '
(202) 347-3700 ,
42 l 1 to, yeah, the instrument reads this but really 2 what's out there is something else?
3 MR. ROGERS: Oh, yeah.
4 MR. BEARD: And I would like to 5 understand a little better than I do now why the 6 . operators don't take the other approach, which is 7 to say, yeah, it's a little ditterent, we all 8 recognize'nothing is perfect or absolutly accura te, 9 but my best'information is I'm above' ten inches on 10 level, for example, and it's not'important to know
} 11 that it might really :be eleven or might really be 12 nine. I'm curious about this-philosophical
-( ) 13 approach.
14: MR. ROGERS: Tha t's something you know 15 about'the instrumentation. You always believe your 16 ' indication until your indication is proved wrong.
17 MR. BEARO Now, are you talxing about
- 18. your ~ personal philosophylor what you observed with 19 the operators in this control room?
20 MR. ROGERS: I think tha t's my. personal.
21 philosophy. I would.say that it is the perception b
22 of_the operators,Ithat'it's their philosophy too.
I
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23 _that they rely on their indication that that is an 24 accurate indication unless,'you know, they have ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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- 43 1 enough preponderance or information to disallow 2 that.
3 MR. B E A'R D : All right.
4 MR. ROGERS: -But that also means that 5 they nave to believe'if something is.out of service, 6 it's out of'aurvice.
1 7 MR. BEARD: Right.
8 MR. ROGERS: LiAe in that instance, there 9 was source range-come on. Both source ranges
- 10 weren't dead. There is' one reading something, but 11 they didn' t' look at that source range and say that
, '12 source range says that, I'm-going-to believe that i
() 13 source range, because theyixnew it was out or 14 service.
i t
15 MR. BEARD: -It had been declared out of 16 service 7
. 17 MR. ROGERS: Tha t's right. So.there was la no doubt in my mind what they7 did.
'19 'MR.-BEARD: What ~ I'm trying to get a 20 handle'on, We l t,: is this. I'm fishing trying to f 21 understand what happened during this event and 22 being_aole to analyze what happened.
23- But could.it be'that the knowledge.that- ,
24 the actual level is somewha t different may be from O, s ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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44 1 the indicated level by whatever ina c cu ra cy is
- 2 involved, that an instrument say reads signt or ten 3 inches and an operator concludes, well, but the 4 ,r e a l level out there might be fifteen inches or 5 some value like that because of the uncertainties 6 associated with the instrument? Could tnat --
7 could you describe for me to what extent enat type 8 of. thinking could or you have soon exist in the 9 control room before?
.. 10 MR. ROGERS: Well, I guess I am just 11 going to give my opinion here. You would have,to 12 talm -- and you all have talked to the operators
- () 13 themasives and eney.can.tell;you wnst they do. I-14 would assume-th'ay would use their indication and 15 celieve their indication. Even thougn tney, you -
16 Know, they Know wha t's going on there, they still 17 have got to.believe that indica tion and rely on it 18 to perform safe opera tions of the facility. If i
l' 19 they see it's. reading, you know, 20. inches and they
'20 look up and see SFRCS is in trip, they would go 21 trip SFRCS.
i l 22 MR. BEARD: T ha t's because the setpoint l
-23 is 26 and a' half,. so thereLis a significant 24 difference?'
l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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45 1 MR. ROGERS: Yes. And they have done
- ")
2 that in the past. They will look and see those 3 indicators and know ~it is close and they will go 4 ahead and say I know by my indication what tne 5 plant responso is and if it's not responding as it 6 should, then they taxe that, what they consider the 7 automatic action. Sometimes the automatic action 8 does it before they do.
9 MR. ROSSI: Well, in terms of instrument 10 errors that might be there, they wouldn't have any 11 way of Knowing whether or not the level indication 12 is reading high or low. I mean, if it's reading
() 13 con inches, it might just as easily be off, 14 sctually nigher than that as lower. So they 15 wouldn' t Know whien way it's off.
16 MR. ROGERS: Tha t's true. But you would 17 never take the nonconservative approach when you la maxe an assumption. If you are going to do 19 anything, you always err on the side of the angels.
20 MR. ROSSI: So in this caso, 'they saw 21 given the level of ten inches, it would certainly 22 be improper to assume it was above that.
23 MR. ROGERS: Tha t's - rig ht.
24 MR. ROSSI: It might be proper to assume O(^x ACC FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
(202) 347-3700
46 1 it was below that and begin the action based on it C) 2 being below that, that being the conservative 3 assumption?
4
, 4 MR. ROGERS: Tha t's my personal ;
5 perception, and I think I have seen tha t's the way
, 6 they normally handle-themselves. I can't thinx of 7 any glaring instance where they haven't done that.
8 MR. ROSSI: Larry, you nave a. question?
9 MR. BELL: One more. question on the level 10 and then hopefully we can get back- to the incident.
11 Are there level recorders installed on tne_startup
- 12 level transmitters?-
() 13 MR.. ROGERS: Are there' level' recorders?
, 14 You mean on the startup, 'the steam generator level?
4 15 MR.-BELL: _Yes, sir.
16 MR. ROGERS: I Enow they.are normally 17 there or they were stuck in as a result of -- that 18 would be in the back panels?'
19 MR. BELL ThatLaceJn3rmally available 20 for control room. operator use. '
21' M R .- ROGERS That is'opur ting level. '
7 22 Startup level-Indon't think so. I would nave to
, .23 ' l o o k , a t-- - t h e prints,_but just right.now'I don't i
, .r> 24 :think so.
4
()
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47 1 MR. BELL That was unclear to me. I f~h
~
2 thought that only the operating range had lovel 3 recorders.
4 MR. ROGERS: I would have to loon at the 5 drawings myself or go back to the control room, but 6 my perception is right now that the indication you 7 have, you have wide range, you have got startup, a you have got operating level, but what you have got 9 on the recorder is operating, not s ta rtup which is 10 what SPRCS works off of.
11 Now, thoro is in the back panels, there 12 is also indication of lovel tha t's I think very
() 13 close to startup. There has at times been 14 discrepancies between what is on the SFRCS in the 15 bacx and what is on tne back panel -- on the front 16 panels, but I think they finally got that syusred 17 away. Thoro used to be an inch or two difference 18 or something. ,
19 MR. BEARD: Okay.
20 MR. LANNING: With regard to indication, 21 how would.ono define dried out steam generator?
22 MR. ROGERS Dried out is anybody's term.
23 There is no official datinition of what dried out (m 24 is from what I know of.
N._/
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48 1 Now, I guess a lot of what is canned
(,_)
'~'
2 around here as No. I level is not really level.
3 Level is differential pressure scross that 4 generator. If you flip-flop some pressures around 5 there, you can make the level look lixe it does 6 anytning.
7 By the time that water that comus in by 8 feedwater gets down to the tube sneet, it's a 9 combined net mixture of steam and feedwater because 10 of the a spira ting steam ports. So in terms of you il thinking you have got water in that steam generator, 12 it's really a combination or steam and water, if
() 13 not almost all steam.
14 Now, if you are dried out, there is some 15 s ta temen t tnat eight incnos, some people say tna t's 16 dried out because then there is no -- I would guess 17 what they are saying there is no sa tura ted, there 18 is no water in there. It's all steam.
19 In terms of the thermal nature of the 20 beast, I don' t think it really makes that much 21 difference in terms technically. The big thing 22 here is if you depressurize this thing, and tha t's 23 when you get yourself into trouole is, whethor you r^s 24 nave got steam or water in nere, is if you
'%)
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49 1 depressurize and then you come in with saturated 2 water, then you have got to watch it because you 3 may fracture your tube sheet and your tubes.
4 That may be a little bit more than what 5 you are really saying. I guess if you want to 6 really get down to what dried out would be, it 7 would be I guess when there is no saturated water 8 at all in there. The term really doesn't have much --
9 it's just a nice thing to talk about as far as I 10 know. It doesn't have any legal bases or any legal 11 requirement.
12 If you get below eight inches, it does n
(_) 13 mean you have got to taxe a hit in tech specs, 14 tnough. I thinX tha t's pretty much what overybody 15 has come to the conclusion, I thinX TAP and B & W 16 makes them do that if they get below eight inches.
17 MR. ROSSI What do you mean a hit on 18 their tech specs?
19 MR. ROGERS: You are only allowed so many 20 things. You can have so many heatups, cooldowns, 21 reactor trips, so many times --
22 MR. ROSSI: Go below eight inches?
23 MR. ROGERS: Yeah.
24 MR. ROSSI: So you have to count the
(~}'
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50 1 number of times you go below eight inches?
2 MR. ROGERS: That's what I mean by taking 3 a nit. And after that, I guess trom what my 4 understanding of the way they do it is they ta xe 5 the ASME codo and design the pressure vessel or 6 the genera tor and then they design in so msny 7 thermocycles into what they do, and then you can a take that many thermocycles and be oxay given tnat 9 you can have all your thermocycles taken and then 10 have a significant design -- the design basis 11 accident against enat component, and it still in 12 fact performa its safety function. And it may not
() 13 perform its function afterwards but it will at 14 least get the plant down to a safe condition and 15 cool down, long-term cool and all that. And 16 everything supposedly is analyzed. That's my 17 perception. That may not be the way it really is, 18 but tha t's Kind of the way I always looked at it.
19 MR. BEARD: Walt, I would like to 20 understand a little bit better. In terms of your 21 response to Wayne's question about dried out, what 22 that means, was your answer your perception?
- 23. MR. ROGERS: My perception.
rx 24 MR. BEARD: Personally? And how might L!
ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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51 1 tha t compare with wnat you think the operators view
~
2 that as or ATOG procedures or things of this nature?
3 MR. ROGERS: Well, dried out could mean 4 it's the point in time wnero you are below eight 5 inenes and you actually see some type of -- you
-6 actually do a depressurization of the generatora, 7 so now you don' t have anything in the generator, 8- whether it be steam or water. That could be one.
9 It could be the point at which when you 10 start to see the curves, your pressure temperature' 11 curves s ta r t to peal off, that says you don't 12 really think you nave got anything in there in
() 13 terms of. saturated condition. In terms of ATOG, 14 maybe I just don' t know it-they actually use the 15 word dried out in ATOG itself. I just nave given ,
i 16 what'I would guess some people think it is. I 17 don't think there is a real definition for it.
, 18 MR. BEARD: I'm particularly interestod 19 in your comment to the general effect that levels 1
20 are not an important variable: as ~ mucn as I thint 21 you said the depressuriza tion is really the big 22 cning. Is that your opinion or do you tninx that's 23 generally the opinion of the operators?
24 MR.' ROGERS: Tha t's my opinion. I could
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52 1 not speak to the operators, per se. Some of the s
( ! '
2 senior people I think would probably agree with me, 3 that depressurization -- some of the senior
'4 licensee people. I'm not so sure I could really 5 speax in terms of some of the younger ROs and SROs.
6 MR. LANNING: What do you menn wnen you 7 say depressurization in the steam generator?
8 MR. ROGERS: That you-get a situation 9 where let's say you open turbine bypass valves, all 10 steam goes away, you got a stuck open safety valve, 11 all tne steam goes away, that your pressure 12 actually starts to go'away.
()
13 I guess if you left it there long enough, 14 that you could get ---that steam in there would, in 15 tact, condense and return back to water because you 16 don't have a completely closed system. Then you 17 could depressurize that way 11.you were decoupled.
18 MR. LANNING: Are you talxing about 19 pressures below the post-trip steam pressures or 20 what?
21 MR. ROGERS: Yeah. That and pressures 22 that would take you down towards atmospheric 23 pressure.
s-24 MR. BEARD: Just as information, what
,.s' ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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53 1 would be a nominal post-trip ~ pressure level, just O
# 2 to give me a numerical teel for it?
3 MR. ROGERS: Well, I guess the way things 4 go, you are running along there-and all ot the 5 sudden, especially.anything above I guess 50 6- percent power,.you are' going to be starting to pull 7 safeties. By that I mean you'are going to'be opening 8~ up the' code safeties on the' secondary side.
9 MR.'ROSSI: That is for any reactor trip, 10 you would normally expect to lift the code sstaties 11 if you are above 50 percent power?
12 MR. ROGERS Would be: my guess. That's
() 13 Just a gut feel.- S c 'I would'say your original 14 response ia you'would see pressure jump up:to 1150, J
15 maybe up to -- I mean, 1050 and then maybe all the 16 way up to 1150, something in there. Tha t's where 17 you would expect-pressure to go. They would ressat.
i l 18 Eventually you would get control. . Assuming you
~
19- don' t get SFRCS, you.would be controlling 20 ~ atmospheric vent valves-and they would try to-l 21 modulate pressure. And-let me think, what'is that,
'2 2 ' I'm going to say 890 plus'125. I think tha t's j 23 about right.-
> w 24 'MR.-BELL Around 10107
~A ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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54 1 MR. ROGERS: I think that's it. 1010. I
,m
\~~'
' I 2 just can't add right now.
3 MR. BEARD: In terms of those values, 4 what do you mean by an abnormal pressure on tne 5 depressurization?
6 MR. ROGERS When you start to drop below 7- 1010. Say you are getting down in the 900s, tha t's 8 not that unusual here, then it recovers Decause you 9 have had cases where you will get some excessive 10 blowdown on the secondary side safeties. When you 11 are starting to get down below 900, you are getting 12 in your eight-and seven hundreds, then you are O)
(, 13 starting to get into some problems. And then the 14 next thing you Know, you are down where you are 15 going to get SFRCS which is going to try to bottle 16 you up and then you are really in trouble in terms 17 of pressurization because that means you probably 18 got a --
tnat is an indication of a steamline break 19 or, well, tha t's what it is really there for.
20 That steamline break can come through a 21 number,of sources. It could really be the turbine 22 bypass valve is coming open, it could be the 23 atmospheric vent valve is sticking on you, it could
(] 24 be the code safety sticking on you. It doesn't L'
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55 1 necessarily mean a pipe is in rupture. It could 4
A\ >
2 mean a, valve failure.
3 MR. BEARD: You are saying normally you f 4 would expect to see it under a thousand pounds, you 5 have seen it in the 900s, but somewhere in the 800s 6 you would say, otay, I think we have 90t'sometning 7 you need to deal.with?
8 HR.-ROGERS: .You are starting to listen 9 then, because then~you are saying is that code 10 safety going to seat now. .Because you can hear --
11- that's one of the. things, you have got your 12 indication, but there is another indication in the
() 13' control room and that's your ears. And you nave 14 got a lot of things that you can'actually hear 15 going on.
16 Lixe the shift sup, let's-say the plant 17 hasn't really tripped yet, but ne can hear 18 sometning starting going on because no can actually 19 hear something rolling down the'steamlines tha t's ;
20- abnormal. He can hear MS, some of these steam J
21 supply valves tor the auxiliary feedpumps opening 22 up, he.can; hear CCW switch over, if there is 23 something like'that, an abnormal thing there, codo rN 24 safety' blows. :There'is a definite difference V
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56
-1 between the secondary side safeties opening up and
_O 2 the atmospheric vent valve opening up and you can --
3 -and also when the, I forget, the 235 header blows i
4 on the aux boiler, you can tell kind of wha t's 5 going on with your steam.and wha t's really happening.
4 6 You hear the MSIVs slam close.
1 7 MR. ROSSI: Le t's see. I wanted to go 8 back and ta1K about the auxiliary f eedwa ter pumps 4- 9 and what you observed when you got to the plant.
10 You told us you observed all four steam supply 11 valves to the auxiliary feedwater pumps open.
12 Could you tell~us, were.the pumps -- I think you
! () 13 mentioned they-were in manual at one point in time.
14 MR. ROGERS: Yeah.
15 MR. ROSSI: Could you expand on whether 16 they were being manually controlled from the 17 control room or whether they were being controlled 18 locally or what did you observe about_that? And it
, 19 you don't remember or-didn't observe it, which is
- 20 probably a more likely situation, just_say that.
21 HR. ROGERS: I guess I can say some 22 things about that because.at some point in time I 23- went down into.the auxiliary feedpump room because 24 there has been some concerns and.these people have l ACE FEDERAL: REPORTERS INC.
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57 1 experienced it since their last refueling outage,
2 they did some modification in tnat system, water 3 hammering in the steamlines and they have round 4 some steamline hangere deformed and snubborn busted.
5 Anyhow, at that point in time I really 6 wasn't terribly focusing in on the auxiliary 7 feedwater pumps at that time because of steam 8 generator lovel being the way it was. It's just my 9 perception at that point that both of them were in 10 manual. As you go through --
11 MR. ROSSI: Both in manual from in the 12 control room?
gm
() 13 MR. ROGERS: Yes. As you go through it 14 later on, it became apparent that one of tnem was 15 being controlled down in the room itself.
16 MR. ROSSI: One was being controlled 17 down in the room, and you observed that after you la had been there.
19 MR. ROGERS: Yes.
20 MR. ROSSI: Which one?
21 MR. ROGERS: Well, baJed upon the one 1 22 was looking at, I couldn't tell you because there 23 was tno guy with the headset on and no had the door (m, 24 open and looking a t both of them, I can't right now
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.e 50 1 tell you-which one it actually was. I thinx Steve
-O 2 had told me some things about the auxiliary 3 f eedwa ter system originally that may have tended, I 4 tninx -- I think they were botn in manual. I'm.
S just going to say that was my perception. I just 6 have a visual image --
7 MR. ROSSI: In any event, you are not too
-8 sure what the-control was based on your 9 observations when you got-to the control room?
10 MR. ROGERS: Right. The main point was 11 that steam generator level was where I.would expect 12 it to be. At tha t point in time, it was all over.
() 13 but the shouting, really, because you are down low 14 enough the startup teedpump can hack it and the 15 startup-feedpump was on, so that~ was the one really 16 controlling level.
17 MR. ROSSIs~ I want to ask one more 18 question and then we can taxe a break. Did you 19 aobserve anything about the auxiliary teedwater pump --
20 feedwater valves? Were they what you would expect?
4 21 _MR. . ROGERS: They were what I would have 22 expected to see.
. 23 MR. ROSSI There are four of those also?
24- MR. ROGERS Well, no. There.is four --
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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59 e
1.
- 1 what I call the four digit valves and they are 0
'\! 2 actually on the front panel and eney are rignt up --
3 right below the CRTs, and then there is two other 4 valves that are discharge valves, that are 5 containment isolation-valves.
6 MR. ROSSI: Tha t's the 599 and 608 are 7 the last two?
8 MR. ROGERS: -And then there are-another 9 two discharge valves ~that are always open on the --
. 10 by the pump along_with the suction valves'for the i
11 pump. 'I do know at'some point in the event I came
~
12- over and I' looked at those valves, and I do have a
() 13 visual imsge-that-those valves-were in fact opened, 14 all four, the suction'and the immediate discharge 15' valves. In terms of the others, I. don't remember-i 16 anything abnormal with them.
i 17 MR. ROSSI's It's not lixe.the steam 18- valves wnero you remember all tour being open?
19 MR. ROGERS: Tha t's right.
20 MR. ROSSI: Well,-normally, the normal 21 thing to'have expected would be the valve feeding 22 Steam Generator 1 from aux feed one being open?
23 MR. ROGERS Tha t's ' correct.
24 MR. ROSSIt- 'The one that feeds Steam ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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60 1 Generator 2 from auxiliary feedwater pump being 2 closed?
3 MR. ROGERS Right.
4 MR. ROSSI: And vice versa for the other 5 pump?
6 MR. ROGERS: What you would expect to see 7 is two green lights and two red lights.
8 MR. ROSSI And you don't recall seeing 9 anything different from that, but you don't 10 specifically remember noting that they were normal?
11 MR. ROGERS: Right. You know, it'a one 12 of those things as far as finding 599 and 608, they
() 13 were in_the position they were oxpected to bo. At 14 some point during that night, I do know the 15 operator said they had to nand crank at least one 16 of them and crack it off the seat before the 17 limitorque can taxe it all the way open.
18 MR. ROSSI I'm ready to take a break.
19 Why don't we take a ten-minute break.
20 (Thereupon, a brief recess was taken.)
21 - - - - -
22 MR. ROSSI: We are back again to continue 23 the interview. I guess the next question I wanted
(^s 24 to ask was about the source range instrumentation.
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61 1- MR. ROGERS: Yeah. When I did that first
/m U 2 walkdown of the back panel, the recorder, tha t's 3 not right. You know, it wa sn' t reading right. I 4- think they had already identified that from, you 5' know, when I said this one looks like it's busted, 6 it looked like they already identified tha t i 7 .themselves.
8 MR.'ROSSI: What do you mean by busted?
9 MR. ROGERS: You could sit there and you 10 saw the recorder and you saw the way the paper was 11 not laying glat, it was back out and you look at 12 the reading, it was zero. You would-expect to see O ^ 13 a few counts.
14 MR. ROSSI Was it the pen that didn't 4
15 read what you.would expect, or was it the paper 16 wasn't working right or --
17 MR. ROGERS: The first thing I noticed, 18 because you are going, as you are walking,.I just
' 19 - looked and I saw the paper wasn't laying right
! 20- before I could actually see the indication. I i
21 looked a little closer, okay, that's not right.
22 The first indication was the paper, though.
23 MR. ROSSIt Okay. Tha t's one ot the two 24 channels. What about the other one?
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62 1 MR. ROGERS: Well, the other one was out
! )
\# or service, so I wouldn't 2' --
3 MR. ROSSI: It was out of service before 4 tne start of the event?
5 MR. ROGERSS Right. It nas been out of 6 service off and on f o r --
7 MR. ROSSI: For how long?
8 MR. ROGERS: Sofore I went ott training, 9 because I had -- the week before the incident, I 10 was actually in Chattanooga, nad flown home that 11 Friday night and was actually Sunday night there at 12 home. I really wasn't supposed to be there.
e (m) 13 I was there for a management meeting with 14 some of my people that were going to be in on 15 Sunday. I told Steve that, and fortunatoly a let 16 of times that does happen, they will continue using 17 the call list even though I'm not there and call my 18 wife. Just by happenstance I was there. There is 19 no doubt in my mind I wouldn' t have got a call, 20 because obviously Don Kosloff called me atter I 21 talxod to the shift sup. He_ Knew where I was.
22 I lost my train of thougnt there.
23 MR. ROSSI: You were telling us sbout the r~g 24 channel that had been inoperable in the sourco
, %_]
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, 63 l~ range.
- 2 MR. ROGERS: So before I had lett -- it's 3 had a history of problems. It was doing something,
- 4. butoyou can just take it with a grain of salt.
5 MR.'ROSSI It was technically inoperable l 6 from a tech. spec standpoint 71 J
l 7 MR. ROGERS It was technically 8 inoperable, so1you don' t count that.- As I went 9 around I said, Don, did you check the shutdown
.10 margin. He said -- I don' t k now --i f . he actually
-11. cnocked it, b'u t I xnow I glanced at:the paper to i
] 12 make sure they had adequate. shutdown _ margin and 1 --
-( ) '13 later on, I d o n ' t. think that night, that wo -- I
- 14 actually. confirmed they did emergency borate, but i
j 15 if you --
16 MR. ROSSI That night'being June 9th?
4
- 17 MR. ROGERS
- Yeah. If you got.the i 18 shutdown margin, whether they did emergency bora te i
19 or not doesn't matter as~1ong.as you got. shutdown l 20 margin, and tha t's what really counts. Of course, 21 one of the things you check 1when I waix around the 22 back. panel is -- one of the main things is all the i
23 rods are in circuit, which i s what I would have
- 1
- j-w> 24 expected to see,. groups one througn seven inserted x- ]
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I 64 1 and group eignt at somewhere around 28 to 25
- \ 2 percent trom being inserted. Group eignt is APSR; J they don't trip.
'4 MR. BEARD: Oxay.
5 MR. ROSSI: Can you remember anything 6 eise that you noticed when you were walking around 7 that appeared abnormal to you that we ought to know s
8- about'from your initial review of things when you 9 got to;the plant?
10 MR. ROGERS: No. I know'the PORY block 11 was wnere tney were supposed to be. ,
12 MR. ROSSI: The PORY block was open at
() 13 this time?
- 14 MR. ROGERS
- Yean. Red / green, it was 15 red / green. Tnst's wha t I expected to soe. A t: that 16 point in time, about ens only ones that really I 17 could say that were a perceived problem by looxing 18 at the control baseds were the PORY valves open on 19 the steam supply to the turbine and the source 20 range.
21 They had by that time when Steve, you i
22 know,. Steve started going through talxing to me ,
23 there'at the very beginning, it'was apparent there 24 were some otner problems, but at tnat point in time
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65 1 on ths. boards themselves they were the only.two.
3 . steam valves were open? What reason -- I mean, 1
4 . including things that you have learned. subsequent ,
i 5 to that night, do you know why,they were all four i
6 open? !
7 MR.. ROGERS: Well, yeah, to a certain i
! -81 extent-I do. I still would'line.to go tnrough a 9
little more of the SFRCS in my mind to understand l
10 that. tio w they got the original open signal, I ,
t- ,
- 'l l . . understand =that.
i l
12 They ,had SFRCS and tnose tour steam p f>
() 13 supply valves used to work one way. They went r
! 14' through an outage and tnen modified those things so ;
!. 15 that both steam supply valves to each turbine came '
i 1 16 open on a low level.
j 17 Well, when they did that they went in,and
! 18 I'believe 'stucx in the eight h u n d r e d~, nine hundred 1
- 19 series logic modules. Well,-that was one'of.the
- I
} 20- suspects for-the water hammer because this is i '21 something -- they don't see water hammer in'the l 22 steam 11nes, then.all of the' sudden they maxe this 23 modification along with the governor and along with ,'
I
. 24 opening up'the.four-digit valve, and so they started ,
! ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC. l (202) 347-3700
60 l I
1 putting everything back the way it was originally, 1 l
/m
('") 2 but wnen they put it back originally, they didn' t 1
l l
3 quite put it bacx exactly physically the same 4 because tney leave in the eight hundred and nine 5 hundred serios logic modules, which I'm not quite 6 certa in wha t type of cnock close and eneck open 7 signals it givos.
8 It did physically change the SPRCS. It 9 made it so on low level and DP and loss of 10 feedpumps you only have one supply valve reading 11 tne generator, but tne way in which it does it 12 changed and I can' t tell you now. I just haven' t
() 13 looxed at it enough to really tell you. I don't 14 Know if they can even toll you all the story.
15 MR. BEARD: Are you saying they made a 16 design mod and put some equipment in, and when they 17 decided that wasn't what they wanted and they went 18 to restore it to the original, they didn' t 19 physically restore it to the original but mayos 20 they intended to restore it to something that was 21 equivalent?
22 MR. ROGERS Tha t's right.
23 MR. BEARD And tna t's your concern or 24 your area
(-}
v ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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67 1 MR. ROGERS: Yeah. It's supposedly
)
i ~# equivalent, but there is some other things. There 2
3 is some check closes that gets in there, and then 4 there is some eneck close signals that you also get 5 that I'm not sure that are there or now they are 6 there and they weren't there.
7 So at that point in time, I just said 8 tha t's annormal, they say, yeah, tha t's abnormal 9 and they put it on their little list and say, well, 10 when we go through all the SFRCS, because it was 11 a ppa ren t to them that they had had some different 12 enterations, you know, tney Know they already hit
(',S) 13 the SFRCS low pressure buttons and that wasn' t 14 quite right, and tnat not only that, that instead 15 of hitting it --
even when they nit it, if you woro 16 to hit low pressure, you would hit it cater-corner 17 and they hit it straight on, ao basically it totally la gave the logic signals to SFRCS something it had 19 never seen before.
20 MR. ROSSIs You have talked about water 21 hammer pnoblems that they had at the time that they 22 had done moditications to the logic for these steam 23 supply valves to the auxiliary feedwater pumpa?
(~s 24 MR. ROGERS: Right.
b)
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68 1 MR. ROSSI: What were the results of that
()#
2 water hammer? You talked about hanger problems.
3 MR. ROGERS 11a n g e r problems. Well, they 4 started off, it looked lixe it was a line ott tne 5 auxiliary boiler that was feeding the auxiliary 6 feedpumps and they Cound a nangor problem.
7 Basically what we are talking about is bolts backed 8 off so they are a little loose in some ins ta nces.
9 There is a coupla instances where -- boy, I don't 10 xnow what they are called. Maybe you all can nelp 11 me out. It's lixe a metal piece tha t's wolded on 12 to tne pipe tha t's used and tnen you nave lixe a O
(_) 13 steel box around it and then you have tnese metal 14 pieces around the sides ao tnat when -- if tne pipo 15 were to move, it doesn' t hit the pipe directly into 16 tne box, it actually nits tnis little metal piece.
17 MR. BEARD: I know wha t you are talking 18 about. It looxa line loaves on a daisy in snape?
19 MR. ROGERS: Tha t's right.
20 MR. BEARD: And I don't know the name of 21 it.
22 MR. ROGERS: But they had found at least 23 one of those crushed so it didn't look like a daisy g- 24 any more, it was flat.
V) ,
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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69 1 And this was Kind of a progression thing.
2 They found one and they thought they knew wha t it 3 was, and the more they got involved in it and the 4 more tney looked, tne more they found. So they 5 found bolts backing off.
6 And what really I guess started it was 7 they found the snubber was physically broken. And 8 if you want to look at it, it's over in engineering, 9 I believe. I think that's the one. But the rod 10 was broxe off so it was just xind of dangling there, 11 and tha t's probably -- I uninn that was the 12 original indication they had a problem.
) 13 And they found out the reason for that is 14 because it was seeing a tight motion that the 15 anubber was not designed for, because the hanger 16 thet was supposed to restrain it had been pulled 17 out of the wall. So instead of it restraining it 18 from moving this way, it couldn't, so tne pipu 19 would move this way and the snubber will ta ke 20 something directly on its piston. But if you taxe 21 it with any bending moment, you get enough in there 22 and it will breax, and tha t's what they saw.
23 So they have -- we nad them under a 24 confirmation action letter, we had Esa out here to
)
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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70 1- -take a look at it, they walked the system down, 2 done'different testing on it to try to determine 3 where the water nammer is coming trom a couple of 4 times. B u t --
5 MR. ROSSI: Did the water hammer problem-6 ever to your knowledge intertere with the operation 7 or;startup ot_the auxiliary feedwater pumpa a themselves?
9 MR. ROGERS: Actual startup of them?
10 MR. BEARD: During this event. '
11 MR. ROSSI: No, not during this event.
12 I'm talking about --
() 13 MR. BEARD: More in general.
i 14 MR. ROSSI: Prior to this event, are you j 15 aware of any cases where the wa te r hammer problem 16 caused the tripping or malfunctioning of the
, 17 auxiliary feedwater pump turbines?
i 18 MR. ROGBRS: No. I have heard some words
- 19 that the first time -- and this is just perception 20 in my mind. I don't even know wno I was talking to.
I 21 But I think they may have seen a little more water.
22 I think they may have seen some water out of the 23 sentinel valve or somehow or another they saw a 24 little more water rolling on the turbine.tnat first i
)
i ACE FEDERAL R8 PORTERS INC.
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71 1 time. The turbine still worned proporly, but that
\ )
2 was the only -- they nad some problems with tnat.
3 There was a little more water rolling out of the 4 turbine than they normally would expect or they did 5 see water versus that --
6 MR. ROSSI What do you mean by water 7 rolling out of the turbine?
8 MR. ROGERS: You blow some out of the 9 sentinel valve. You could see it. That would be 10 the main point.
11 MR. LANNING: W ha t's the source of the 12 water?
() 13 MR. ROGERSs Well, tha t's the million 14 dollar question or wnatever. Tna t's what people 15 have been trying to figure out. There are some 16 theories that what it is is tnat there is some 17 steam that gets trapped or it's a long run of pipe 18 and for some reason there is some steam that would 19 be trapped from a previous run or something, and 20 then that water condenses and then it doesn't drain 21 out one of the drains for some reason.
22 There are a lot -- at one point in timo, 23 they thought it might have been some water carrying r'3 24 over from the aux boiler line, that that wasn't V
ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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n 72 ,
'l draining' properly. In terms of where the water
, : O- 2- source actually~1a, I think you would probably navo 3 to talk to Wood. I'think they probably have the 4 best up to date engineering evaluation on-what --
5' where'the water is coming from.
. 6' MR. LANNING: Is this sometning that j.
i 7 would be an open item under an inspection report?
i .8 'k..
M ROGERS: Well, it's not an open item.
i 9 We nave got them on our confirmation action-letter.
10 That's a lot more significant than'-- I'm not an l 11 expert on seismic restraints. We do nave a 4
12 gentleman in tne Region named Mr. Yin tha t .comes i
() 13 out and we -- t ha t ' s one.of these where the 14 residents say, ney, this is outside of my 15 capabilities, let's bring in somebody that snows a !
3 16 little bit more, and this is the case. '
- 17 And tha t' a rea , the water hammer and tho' id diagnostics of that attuation and wnat they have
- 19 been doing with the hangers and all, is really in a 1
20 part of Mr. Danielson and -- I think it's Mr.
21 _Danielson's group with Mr.-Yin under him dealing 22 with.that area of.it.
j -23 We have something, I guess the licensee 24 nas been responsive to help out in one way. The i ACE FEDERAL rep 0RTERS INC.
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73 1 trick with the hangers is that you nsve a safety
/
(m) 2 factor associated with the hangers, and if you go 3 below that safety factor, which, okay, the plant is 4 built to a safety factor. However they found out 5 bacx in 1979 -- and I'm going to say 7914 - maybe 6 you all remember whien it is, but there is a 7 bulletin that starts with 7902, you start talking 8 about hanger problems and people finding problems 9 with hangers and not built to tne -- what it is --
10 I'm not just talxing about Davis-Desse, I'm talking 11 ebout it's a generic deal because it was a bulletin 12 in this caso enat went out to all of them, tnat the
() 13 hangers may not nave -- because they are not built 14 exactly to the as-built condition, you may not have 15 ene safety tactora you expect it to have.
16 However there was a position drawn that 17 tnere is an interim criteria that you can drop 18 below this original safety tactor and you are utill 19 okay. Now, if you drop below the interim, then you 20 can -- given a determination or whetner it's 21 accessible or inaccessible, you have got to fix the 22 nanger. You have got to fix the nanger to come up 23 with a better mod basically to find out wnat r^g 24 happened in the hanger, but you have got to do it
(_/
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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74 1 either at your next refueling outage or wnenever it
("') 2 is next accessible or you have got to work on it as 3 expeditiously as necessary if it is accessible.
4 So avery time they got one of theso 5 nangers to drop down below into the interim 6 criteria, John Wood calla me and lets me know 7 because i t' s all dealing with this auxiliary S feedwater. ESA knows about it and we talx back and 9 forth on that type of thing on occasion about it 10 wnen ne's out here, make sure we all have all tne 11 intormation available.
12 The only time this thing has caused any
() 13 problem is one time the hangers gapped when it got 14 ' nit or wha tever nappened to it, it was one of the 15 key hangers in tne line, let's say, such that it 16 drops below the interim criteria and they nad to 17 dociare that system inoperable once they determined 18 that it was not in accordance with their interim 19 critaris.
20 MR. LANNING: What in your opinion is the 21 consequences of a water hammer in the steam supply 22 to the auxiliary feedwater pumps?
23 MR. ROGERS: I t's lixo it says, it's a
(^% 24 water hammer. What it is is water condensing back
(/
' ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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r I I
r 75 l 1- . into the vacuum'and it's like a'nammer. I mean, 2 you pnysically rattle tne pipes. You can damage
~
3 these things.
4 4 MR. ROSSI: Have you seen damage down the i-5 pumps itself, the inlet to the pump or the trip '
6 throttle-valve?
7 MR.. ROGERS: There doesn' t seem to be p damage in _ tna t area.. .It seems to be a little 9 higner up is my perception, but I nave tne actual 4
10 . hanger. It_you all-want to see it,.I have which I
{ 11 hangers.were damaged on tne drawing. i e
12 MR.'ROSSI: Is it in the pump room or do ;
() 13 you know?
) 14 MR. ROGERS: It's a little -bit of
- 15 overywhere. There is one in No. 2 mecnanical and -
16 there is some.up in No. 4 mechanical. Then there 17 is over in auxiliary feedpump rooms themselves, 18 some_of the damages to anubbers breaking I believe i.
19 is in the pump - room.
- l 20 MR. ROSSI
- I'm sure we can get the 1
1 21 . details of where those hangers-are gros the l
, 22 licensee.
l 23 MR. BEARD: I,was going to ask a quica 24 availability question. I realize I'm interrupting 1
I ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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(
n 76 1 Wayne. . tus _ y o u Know it the plant-has isometric O 2 . drawings of the pipe runs of the aux teedwater 3 system? ,
4 MR.-ROGERS: Oh, yeah.
.5 MR. BEARD 2 I mean, sometning it we wanted 6 to xnow'or refresn-our memories with regard to the
'7 way tne pipes are laid out in those rooms, enat 8 something is available, it we should ask for it?
9 ,MR. ROGERS: Sure. It's in the.PSAR. I 10 1have: color-coded pictures i t'you want to see them.
11 MR. SEARDs I think I would.
12 MR.' ROGERS: I will get Don to go get 13 'tnem.
14 MR. LANNING: As I. understand your answer, 15 the consequences.ot the water.. hammer can result in 16 damage to'the piping itself and to its -- the 17 nangers for the piping.
t 18 MR. ROGERS Well, yeah, if you get a big 19 enough water nammer. I don't Know now you put it, 20 what limited thing I have.on i t, the water nammer.
21 It depends upon a lot of ditterent things, but you 22 could have water' hammer on a line and it not damage 23 anytning, but you can also nave one tha t, you know, 24 you'are putting a lot of stress in one particular ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.: I
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77 1 area.
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lt- MR. LANNING: Now, what precautions had 3 been taken to preclude a water hammer in this 4 system while the plant 1 continues to operate?
5 MR. ROGERS: Well, No. 1, the water h 6 hammer itself had not from my understanding, that 7 was.part of it, tne water nammer wasn't a big i
8- serious water hammer that on the hit it makes i
i 9 everything inoperable. -It seems that they would be
^
10 doing testing to determine, you know, what the 11 water sources were, what-the real impset on the 12 system was in terms of long-term degradation.
i
() 13 MR. LANNING: Tnat was the thrust of the
'14 confirmatoryEaction letter?
i 15 MR. ROGERS: I'm not going to say tna t's 16 the thrust. I would rather go ahead and if you all
- 17 want to see tne confirma tory action letter and put j 18 that in the record, I'm not going to sit here and l 19 try to second guess what that thing says because it 20 says a lot. There is a lot of steps in there and 21 it talks on a lot more sophisticated basis that I 22 think I'm going -- I would rather fall back and j 23 actually put a copy in the record of the 24 confirmatory actinn letter on what it does do.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC. -
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78 1 It's not just -- it's not a little nokey-pokay
(' !
2 document or something. It's pretty good size.
3 MR. ROSSI: Larry I think had a question.
4 MR. BELLS Aro low point drains installed 5 in this piping?
6 MR. ROGERS: Yean.
7 MR. BELL Did the utility maxe any B commitment to Olow the water out tnose drains? It 9 seems tna t's the quick and easy fix, to manually j 10 blow tne water out of tne piping while they are 11 investigating.
12 HR. ROGERS: There are drains in the
() 13 lines, but whether the drains are in the rignt spot 14 or not, tha t's anotner --
tha t's a ditferent animal.
15 MR. BEARD: lla v a you nad any experience 16 or information regarding whether or not the drain 17 valves sorn proporly regardless of tnoir locations?
10 MR. ROGERS: I have no knowledge that any 19 of tnam were worxing improperly.
20 MR. BEARD: Okay. I would like to follow 21 up dayne's question with one on tne water nammer in 22 a little bit different vein. I would line to 23 understand a little bit better the eftact of water 24 in the steam supply on the turbino itself, neglecting ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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e 79
- 1 the physical damage the hammer might have. I have 2 heard a lot of different stories and I'm' curious 3 about your assessment because I etspect your 4 judgment.
5 What do you think the effect of. wa ter in i 6 that line would have on the turbine, especially 7 with regard to its speed and consideration of the 8 possibility some of that could clash?
9 MR. ROGERS: I guess I have heard that i
10 nicked around a'little. In terms of.actually
- i 11 having water on that turbine, and this is more just i i 12 not.actually going through tne manuals but people's
() 13 perception,.that that Terry Turbine will run on 14 water. I mean, it's a water wheel if it has to be.
15 MR. DEARD: I've heard that stated.
16 MR. ROGERS: And that's at least my 17 perception. So those things seem to have a pretty 18 good industry reputation in terms og being able to 19 taxe water.
i 20 If in terms of 4 potential water tlashing
- 21 back to steam and that energy assessment overspeeds 22 the turbine, I say that is a physical phenomena. -
r l ~23 Yes, it could happen. -I think people would nave to 24 sit down and give me some calculations on what --
! ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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80 1 how much water you got versus how much is timaning
~
2 to steam and, I mean, do some angineering 3 calculations to prove to me that's what could cause 4 that turbine to overspeed. I guess I would go in 5 upfront saying show me. I have a little Missouri 6 ,
in me there. Tha t's about the way I would look at 7 it.
8- MR. BEARD: I hisar your answer as being 9 like my own position. That is, I heard this -
1C- hypothesis s ta ted , but I haven' t looked into it 11 ,enough to be convinced myself.
I 12 MR. HOGERS: Tha t's a good assessment.
() *3
. HR. BEARD: All right.
14 MR. ROSSI: I wonder it we could proceed 15 on to --
I think we lesened, you Know, wnat wait 16 found out when he first got in the control room, 17 which la basically the status of the plant when ha 18 got there. I wonder it he could describe, you know, 19 what involvement that you may have had in analyzing 20 what happened during the event, the sequence 01 21 events, analyses that you have been involved in or 22 results of reviews or either the licensee's 23 sequence of events or our sequence of events at
(^
\
24 this point in time to see if there is anything we ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS I ll C .
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4 81
, 1 can learn from your personal knowledge of those?
h 2 MR. ROGERS: Okay. Well, I guess to 3 really s ta rt to get into the analysia side, we are 4 'getting a little later on Sunday in terms of they 5 are already out of the unusual event and they are
-6. starting to.do tneir tests of one of the auxiliary 7 speed pumps, and kin'd of now I guess we are talking --
8 I c a n ' t --: I guess very' late in the morning after 9 everything looks normal,.the turbine bypass valve 10 yoxe is already busted and they nave'taken care of l 11 tnat. So they are'in a very safe condition at that.
12 point.
() 13 Of course I guess really -- and'then I ,
14 went over to the tech section because that's where 15 the. computer printouts are really starting to come 16 out and started looxing. And I guess the first 17 . indication that they - - - I knew the PORY would have
! 18 hadito-have-popped. For some reason-I Knew it had ,
1 91 . popped 1a couple of times. Whether I expected that 20 or whether I actually saw that on 'some of the 21 ~ printouts or-just what,- but when I finally was
- 22 -given the pressure trace,- the RCS pressure trace, f
23 . i t' a ' ai g ra ph and I'say - ;I. don't know if it's Stan
.24 - o r J a c qu e L in g e'n t e l t e r o r- J 'im Marley was in at that ACE' FEDERAL. REPORTERS INC.
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d2 1 time, 'someone gave that because they Know what they
-Ig) .
2 are supposed -- that a f ter every trip, I'm going to 3 come ask them for a package, I have been doing it 4 tor years. So I don't even asx them any morn, they 5 just know Rogers is going to want this so they have 6 it ready.
7 Part of it is the alarm printer, part of 8 that is the computer traces and all that. So at 9 least they.had one of the graph traces, and Don and 10 I were there together a t that . time. I said, well, 11 there is PORV, there.is-PORY. I said, oxay, tha t's ;
- 12. third on the PORV. I said there is something wrong-() 13 with PORY.
14 I knew,that, it was obvious tnat the PORY
- 15 didn't close as fast as it should nave closed 16 because it's a three-five, I would call it closer 17 to tnroe, some people say five to make it go closed, 18 but you can tell from pressure.because it's line a 19 little hs11 moon curve you will see on it and'you 20 Know tha t's what it.is, but this one'just mind of 21 keeps-on-going. . You can tell that, you know, it 22 closed, the pressure returns, so you knew that '
23 either they shut;the block or the PORY reseated 24 itself at some~ point in time. Knowing what I knew
' ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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4 83 1 about the control room, I knew the PORV had to have
^ ) 2 reseated itself at some point in time and said, Don, I
4 3 now, tha t ' s -- l 4 MR. ROSSI Why do you say you knew the --
~
5 oh, because the block valve wam open when you were 6 there. Tha t's the-way you Knew-the PORV had 7 resented?
8 MR. ROGERS . Yep. 'So, you know, I said 9 we are going to have.to add that to the list. So 10 we started looking at a few' things. Did they 11 inject,'I guess I.can't tell you how -- through 12 that point it-'had come up-it had been on piggyback. ,
I) 13 ' Did eney inject on' piggyback, we looked at that. >
1 14 They have been saying fifteen gallons but I-think
- 15 they are just being~ conservative-in saying that. ,
l .
16 They.may have - pumped 'in fifteen gallons, but it 17 doesn't real'ly matter. -You took a hit on i t .- I 18 say hit, you give-a thermal shockEto~the.HPI nossle, i
a .
19 and that's=really what: counts. So-then they have 20 - to taxe a hit for=that.
l 21 Just started to get a ' feel tor some.of 22 the things,- knowing 1then Ewha t had happened to SFRCS, 23 you really can't start to guess-what's going on at e 24. that point in time. I guess.at.that point in time,
~
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84 1 we were-Rind of starting to get --
we are going to O 2 need to brief our manag'ement who are flying in, 3 Nick and Wayne, Nick JacKiw and Wayne Shafer who 4 were flying in, and we really hadn't nad mucn sleep 5 at that point in time.
6 We had looked at some of it basically.
7 we knew they weren't going anywhere and they were 8 out-of the unusual event already. They had -- and
~
d 9 by the time we made tnat decision, they had already
- 10 tested auxiliary teedpumps. I talxed to Steve 11- Quennoz on the Gaitronics and no said they passed
-12 okay. And they had performed their ~~ they had
() 13 done tneir surveillance test and it worked oxay.
14 MR. ROSSI - So the auxiliary feedwater 15 pumps at tnat point had been tested to come up to 16 speed and not trip again. They just worked t
17 properly?
o 18 MR.; ROGERS: Right.' At that point'in 19 . time, you-didn't need auxiliary feedwater trom i
20 about.an hour,.nour and a half after the trip. The e
21 startup teedpump would hack it without any problem.
22 So.we -- I went -- I guess this was in'
- 23. the early attornoon, really didn't have a good 24 chance-to sit.down and look through all the~ traces, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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r 85 1 but jus t' enough you knew SFAS wa sn' t going to 2 .a c tua te , it hadn' t actuated, that type ot thing,
'3 reactor protection system hadn't functioned 4 properly. SFRCS, you couldn' t make a guess on that 5 because I already knew they had thrown some 6 different gliches into that and it was going to 7 take a long time to figure out what was going on 8 -there.
9 MR. BEARD: What do you mean by that, 10 result on the Rupture Control System since they 4
11' have thrown 1some different'gliches?
i 12 MR. ROGERS:: By prossing the buttons,
() 13 they had given it a real weird logic. See, when 14 they press the button, they pressed and they told-15 . a c tua tion, they-told the No. 1 channel, hey, one of 16 the generators is busted and then - -which I 17 believe'it says -- I believa it was. telling tha t 18 the No. 1 generator is busted, feed the No. 2 l
. 19 generator. At the same. time on ActuationLChannel 2, 20 tne'y.are'saying, hey, .t h e No. 2 genera tor is busted,
- 21. 'go feed the No. 1. generator.
22 That's what when they-hit those manual-23 = buttons there, tha t's what they told the logic,.
24 which is -- you snould.never -- you could say that,
)
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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SG 1 hoy, you could tell the logic -- you could tell the iN'I 2 two channels tnis gene ra tor is busted or you can 3 tell the logic that generator is busted, but it 4 told each channel a different generator is busted.
5 By busted, I mean it has got a low pressure.
6 MR. BEARD: I understand. If you had a 7 real situation where one generator was busted and B you wanted to tell your Rupture Control System that 9 manually, could you describe what buttons would be 10 the a ppropria te ones to push in terms of tneir 11 physical location, because it seemed lixe the top 12 two in each column are low pressure on some
(,)
/\
13 generator?
14 MR. ROGERS: Yes.
15 MR. BEARD: What would you do 11 you 16 wanted to manually tell the system that No. I 17 generator was busted?
18 MR. ROGERS: OKay. You would press the --
19 you have got two columns of buttons with the top 20 button being the one that you would tell actuation 21 channel No. 1 you are busted, tna t's in the first 22 column. Then you would go down on the second 23 column and you would go down to the second button
(~) 24 from the top and you would press that one.
! (>
! ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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I 87 1 MR. BEARD: So you press a cater-corner 2 combination?
3 MR., ROGERS: I t's cater-corner, that's
.4 right. And if you want .to tell the other one, it's 5 cater-corner that way.
~6 MR.. BEARD 2- You mean the other generator?
7 MR. ROGERS:- The other generator, it.
8 would be just~ a different cater-corner, and then 9 down below you got low DP or DP, and then you got i-10 loss of reactor coolant pumps, and then at the very 11 bottom I believe it is, I tninx it's very bottom 12 you have got low level. I can' t tell you for
- () 13 certain. I know they are.in some order. If you 14 look at them, the way you tell them is not so much 15 the position, but the little rod buttons are the c 16 low level --
not red. There is a'little piece of 17 red tape on the ones tha t are low level.
18 MR. BEARD: Are you saying in your mind 19 the ones that-tne-person would have probably wanted 20 to use were identified by a red marker?
21 MR. ROGERS: Yeah. Now, that red marker 22 is not ~ to identify to the operator that during --
23 that if-you want to msnually press SFRCS, let's say, i
n 24 the MSIVs.go closed or for some reason you want to 4 's ACE FEDERAL. REPORTERS INC.
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.1 press the buttons for low level for otner than the i 2 smart tire or a control room tire, they have little o 3 red pieces of tape throughout the plant and the 4 control room that identity those buttons or 5 controllers that are to be used in what is generally I 6 Known as the smart tire. And enat's wnat it is 7 there-for. It's not to tell the operator on a S normal day-to-day basis these are the low levels.
9 So they pressed them and~it's cater-corner, so that 10 Kind of doesn't nolp, but that nappens. .
11 MR. ROSSI: At this plante do they 12 normally manually actuate safety systems in A 13. anticipation of the automatic actuation? Is that a
( ,/
14 . normal thing that .they do?
15 MR. ROGERS: Well, I have seen them and 16 they nave dono it before as to punch out SFRCS on 4
~
17 low level manually. I don' t remember any time f
18 where tney nave' manually punened out reactor 1 19 protection system.. I know of at least one instance 20 where they-were -- they perceived a problem and 21 tried to~ punch her out, but in rea li ty -- the 22 automatic system boat them to it.
23 SFAS,_as far as I.xnow, there nas not 24 been.any manual initiation-of~SFAS. Tne real ,
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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~ , , - . .
, ~ . . . . . . , - . -. _ . - - ._ . _ . . - _ . __ _. - - _ _ _ _ . . . ._
t i
- 89 1.-
t i __ 1 system'that you-are getting_ involved in is going to '
(' ') 2 b e ' S F R C S', and tha t's where it really gets involved.
f 3 I believe you-eve'n see it in some of the procedures.
i , .
4 It'possible,'they will-try-to, like if you get a i i
! 5 low pressure and you ~ have got -- you can see it is I '
6 ' drifting down and heading towards its trip setpoint, j 7 they will want to manually go ahead and-do it.
. 8 MR..ROSSI: This,is low pressure in what?
9 MR. ROGERS: The steam generator lines.
10 The -s teamlines. - 'They will if they know they have
. l 11 lost'their-main feedpumps,'I thinx-it's probably i
f 12 reasonable to assume tnat they are going.to t r'y to t
.h 13'
~
go ahead and-get on au'xiliary feedwater,cwhich'is -
- 14 wha t's ' going to be your
- supply source. And the i
4 . -
15 fastest and easiest way to de that is go aheadLand
- 16 hit low level on,SFRCS.
!' i 17 MR. ROSSI - H a v e' they had other occasions '
- i. -
18 where they _ have manually initia ted the SFRCS on low 19 pressure that you Know of?
- 20 MR. ROGERS: If-it was -- I would have to i'
l 21 go-back and reviewctne. March.2nd event for exactly I
i 22 what the sequence of events.was there.
i l 23. MR. ROSSI: The March 2nd event was.from i' - .
24 ' March 11984-when-:they had the' stuck open safety .
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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2 MR. ROGERS: Safety valve. I don' t 3 believe they manually hit tno buttons enere but 4 that would be the only time -- I'm just thinking of 5 all the times I've been here, tnat's tne only time 6 I can thinx of that would have even been a 7 possibility. It I remember rignt, I think it went --
8 MR. ROSSI: Well, you don' t need to 9 search your memory. Some of these things where you 10 can' t remember, especially where there is some 11 records someplace presumably that we can go look at 12 it we are interested?
() 13 HR. ROGERS: That would be the only thing.
14 I think it went low level first and then it went 15 out on low pressure.
16 MR. BEARD: Ernie, let me ask you a 17 question. Before tnia interview, I jotted down a la few topics I did want to ask Walt's opinion on or 19 get some answers trom him. And I had three or four.
20 about the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control 21 system in terms of how it works and what equipment 22 would respond to it. Would this be an appropriate 23 time to ask this?
(~) 24 MR. ROSSI: I would like to continue to
%j ACE' FEDERAL REPORTERS'INC.
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2.
J 91 1 find:out what he knows about the analysea and i O 2 sequence of events and tnen we will go on to these 3 other areas at that point.
l 4 MR. BELL: Pine.
5 MR. ROGER'S Oxay. After I lett the site
, 6 on Sunday and briefed Wayne Shafer and Nick JacKiw 7 on the situation, I guess there was a time frame ,
8 where-I believe I went home,.got an hour or two --
9 it .wa sn' t much, I think I got a little sleep there, 10 toox a shower and then met Wayne and Nick. I 11- believe tha t's the way it went. I was to catch a
! 12 plane that afternoon to go back to1 Chattanooga, I
() 13' which turned out I didn' t maxe, and ended up --
14 Monday morning-I. ended up back in Chattanooga at i 15 tha t time. I thinx I had some ---I:may have had 16 the alarm printer or portions o11the alarm printer 17 with me at that time. I think I had some data that 18 I nad jetted down.
F 19 I talked to Don that Monday. We were on
'20 the phone.1 don't know how long Monday night 21- because.during the event, there had been two things-22 'that.ILwanted to talk to him s little more fully i
j 23 .about)and he had the" data, ao:we were on the phone 24 talning;and I was in-my motel room because we wantud
)
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92 I to maxo sure we had as good a acquence of events
/
2 and briefing for the Fact Finding Toam as we could 3 come up with.
4 And we centored it on the PORY to maxe 5 sure that we were on sinque on the PORY and went 6 through that and what the pressure got to and when 7 the Diock valve went closed and all that so we a would have a good tramo of reference for that.
9 I think at that point in time, I was 10 interested in whether the it P I injection was due to 11 the PORY blow-down or not. And I think based upon 12 running t h r o u g h .. t h e numbers back and forth, it r
(,h/ 13 looked like auxiliary food is actually what Knocked 14 pressure down enough to do !!P I injection. That was 15 Kind of interesting.
16 The other thing was I wanted to see when 17 ene switchover to service water took place, and 18 that looked a littiv strange. It looxed like the 19 thing had como up --
auxiliary feedpump turbine had ,
20 come up to speed and it had switched over later on.
21 It wouldn't nave been unusual-to me to see that 22 when the turbine actually got its blast to go -- by 23 that time it was apparent they had some problems 24 with the turbine, I wasn't really sure wha t it was, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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1 1
93 1 but when they wanted to get vetor to the auxiliary --
2 from the auxiliary teedpumps into tne steam i l
3 generators, that it could have soon a low suction 4 pressure which would navn been sensed in that line 5 and cause a switchover from the CST to the service 6 water, but tnat did not loox to be tno case. So I 7 told Don to highlight that for you all.
8 MR. ROSSI: Do.you Know anything more now 9 about why tnat might nave occurred?
10 MR. ROGERS: Not yet. Basically you can 11 look at some things, but other than the chart 12 - recordings -- and we 2re waiting tor tnom to come n
(_) 13 up with their maintenance plan in this area. A lot 14 or tnese were -- I guess we xind of, I guess due to 15 the liaison here, that we are not definitely born --
16 not-born in, but asking the licensee a lot of 17 different questions right up front but letting them 18 do their analysis and come to their conclusions, 19 and then we can inspect on wha t they are doing and 20 verifying that's going along right, realizing you 21 all are the ones that are who they are presenting 22 the maintenance plans to. We don't want to inhibit 23 you all.
3- 24 MR. ROSSI: Do you happen to know
(~/
s.
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94 1 anything about the analyses of the startup feed t !
'# tiow during the initial recovery or the startup 2
3 feed as to indications that might be available to 4 tell whether tne startup feed actually got to a 5 steam generator before an auxiliary feed or not?
6 MR. ROGERS: On, yenn. Startup feed got 7 to the steam generator before auxiliary feed did.
8 MR. ROSSI: Both steam generators or just 9 one?
10 MR. ROGERS: I'm saying No. I right now.
11 I'm not sure whether No. 2 got it or not.
12 MR. ROSSI: What would be your basis for
(,m,) 13 saying tnst the startup foed got there first?
14 MR. ROGERS: Oh, you look at the main 15 foedwater tiow, s ta r tup foodwater flow indication.
16 The feedwater goes through the main foodwater line.
17 Auxiliary foodwater flow goes tnrough its own 18 auxiliary teedwater line wnich is a different 19 connection in the steam generator.
20 So if you look and see no au'iliary x
21 foodwater flow going into tne steam generator but 22 you do see feedwater flow here on the startup range 23 and you slao see steam generator level starting to rN 24 increase or no longer decrease, tna t's the only U
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1 place you are going to get water with the main
~a 2 control valves shut. >
I 3' I mean, you have got the main isolated, 4 the main -- of course, you know'the main feedwater 5 pumps aren't pumping it and you Know what the 6 pressure in the steam generator is,'so you snow tho 7 condenacte pumps aren't pumping any in.
8 RM R . BEARD: Do you Know, is there'a l
! 9 specific data point in one of these sources of hard 10 data that is available that would tell you the flow 11 -ve.caus say-the con trol. : va lve '-- startup control' ;
12 valve's position?
I
(). 13' ^
MR. ROGERS: There is a computer readout l
14 that will give you startup teedwateri valve position.
I 15 MR. BEARD I know, I have that one i n 16 . front of me. I'm really-trying to focus o n -- ,
i l.
17 MR. ROGERS- Whether there is a startup 18 feedwater flow indication?
i
- i. 19 MR. BEARD: - Yes.
I t
20 . MR. ROGERS: Boy,-I' don't thinn there is, 21 You Know, you may :ha've to go to main feedwater flow.
f l 22 - I would have-to~go bacx and look at.it. -I was 23 thinning -- I could have sworn I saw something on --
2'4 somehow or another I got to'the-conclusion that -
-0 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC. -
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96 1 startup teedwater got'there and it was a I
) 2 combination ~of level coming up and also some flow 3 picking up.
4 MR. DELL: But can you! read four hundred 5 gallons per minute on the startup food flow i 6 detector? '
~
- 7 MR. ROGERS
- Oh, I don't think so.
- 8 MR. BEARD
- I think my glance of the 9 curves that the licensee gave us. indicates that, 10 maybe it's my imagination, but there does seem-to 11 be a slight increase on the flow of-the main feed, 12 the composite flow I guess i t's identitied as, and i l
() 13 at a particular point.-there is beginning to be a j -- 14 turnaround of the level signal.
15 M R . - R O S S I t'- Before the auxiliary ;
l 16 feedwater, 17 MR.' BEARD: Y e s s - b e f o r e .' And it's ,
i 18 roughly, if I had to estimate, I would say one and 19 three-quarter minutes prior to when No. 2 aux 20 .feedwater flow-came~on. And I'm looKing at i i
21 generator-one. traces. We had some discussions tha t -
22 the possibility that the' secondary system operator 23 in the control room may'have gone ahead and opened 24 the startup' control valvelin anticipation,'that Mr.
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r' 97 1 Peasel got the pump available and he was ready to
\' 'i 2 inject because they were trying to get feed in the 3 worse sort of way.
4 MR. ROGERS: Yean.
5 MR. BEARD: But in fact, we heard at one 6 of the meetings wnere we discussed this point I 7 guess in regard to our sequence of events that we 8 presented to the liceneen, this would be Rev 0 when 9 we were trying to make sure we had the factual 10 information correct and not misunderstood, someone 11 if I remember correctly s ta ted that they had nard 12 data that indicated the s ta r tup valve was open, (3
(_j 13 thoro was flow.through it to both steam generators, 14 and I naven't had a chance to look into that area 15 myself, but I'm wondering it you Know, tna t's all?
16 MR. ROGERS: No, I know there is some 17 question about SP78, and I kind of have been holding 18 off.
19 MR. ROSSI: 7A, wasn't it?
20 MR. BEARD: The one to Steam Generator 2 21 at this plant is A rather than B, and I think it's 22 the one to Steam Generator 2 tnat was identified to 23 us as apparently -- there were indications at least rN 24 that it did not open.
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, 1 MR. ROGERS: See, evidently tha t's what
( )
2 the licensee -- I ha ven' t looked too fully in tnst.
3 I figured they are going to come back and talk to 4 us thero.
5 MR. ROSSI: You Know, if you can' t sned 6 significant light on these questions, i t's probably 7 not wortn our discussing it. I thinx what we ought 8 to do is maxe a list of questions lixo this for the 9 licensee for our sequence of ovents meeting 10 tomorrow afternoon and give it to tne licensce well 11 in advance of the meeting in tne nopes he will come 12 prepared to answer them. That's probably tne best n
(_) 13 thing to do.
14 MR. BEARD: My intent in asking Walt 15 about it is to rind out 11 he xnew enore was a 16 specitic data point on flow versus valve position.
17 MR. ROSSI I also had those questions on 18 my list, but I think we found out everything tnat 19 wait snows on that issue.
20 MR. ROGERS: Yean. The only thing I Knew 21 maybe different is I know there was some problem 22 witn the reset lights in the back on the west wall 23 for the startup feed valves, that there was some r^s 24 lights tha t were blown and there was also some L]
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99 1 lights blown on the main steam -- I mean, MSIV k "'
2 solenoids they nad to replace at some point during 3 One night.
4 MR. ROSSI: I wonder if this is a good 5 place to stop for lunen?
6 MR. DEARD: I have been holding ott a 7 number of questions so we got tnrough this line a that you are pursuing now of I guess Walt's 9 assessoent of analysis of tno event. Are you 10 finlaned with tnat?
11 MR. ROSSI: You Know, if you havn got 12 more questions on Walt's assessment of the analyses,
(() 13 maybe we can finish those if it doesn' t run too 14 long and tnen we will broax for lunen.
15 MR. BEARD: In that area, I only nad 16 really one question and this I'm asking for just an 17 overall assessment on your part, Walt, and you may 18 not want to do it. But you are the man that is tna 19 eyes and the ears for the NRC and you are close to 20 this plant and you xnow the people and et cetera; 21 it would be valuable at least for me to know.
22 I'm curious about your overall assessment 23 of the severity of this incident in the sense of I
/m 24 would like to term near miss; oxay?
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i 100 1- MR. ROGERS: Yes.
2 MR. BEARD: We wrote that in some NRC l
3 manual chapters and I like it. If you wanted to 4 use the term this is a near miss, how would you
'S assess this in terma of how close the plant was to 6 a problem? Tha t's what I'm trying to get for us, 7 some overall assessment of the severity of tne 8 avant.
9 MR. ROSSI: And you might approach that 10 by giving.us your opinion of how close they wore to 11 severe plant damage which is one thing, and than i
12 another assessment of public satoty issue. Because- ,
i
()- -13 they may nave been close to one and not the other 14 or close to noth', so you might as well give us your i
15 assessment of that.
16 MR. ROGERS: I guess I would s ta rt with
, 17 severe plant damage. I don't think they were closo.-
l 18 And it's a combination of things that makes me say ;
19 that.
20 One is past experience in watching the !
f ,
21 operators during transient performance. And from 22 what I'see, their capability in.getting what-they 23- needed in service'when they needed it in service, 24 realizing they'had a number of. multiple equipment i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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101 1 tailures in this situation, they still overcame
'M 2 those and did in tact their job. They kept tne 3 core covered. They maintained a very significant 4 saturation margin or subcool margin, and tney went 5 and -- went to a number of areas they had available 6 to get water into those steam generators.
7 In terms of what this does, obviously you 8 are not supposed to lose two auxiliary feedwater 9 pumps. This is not analyzed for in the license, it 10 is outside single tailure criteria. This is not 11 supposed to happen. You are not supposed to have 12 to make your man / machine intortace work at this r
(,r) 13 high level in this type of time trame to maintain 14 tne core cover.
15 So in terms of a near misa per se, I 16 think those people were able to do it, and I think 17 just about any of the operating shifts they had out 18 there would have been able to do it. But it's not 19 the type of thing tha t you want to do on a day in, 20 day out basis. Sooner or later you are not going 21 to be able to do it.
22 That would be my assessment, that you 23 have to have your operators trained, properly r~T 24 qualified to a high enough level that they (s/
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1 understand not only the design basis of their O 2 facility but have a-lot of good common sense
.; 3 understanding of the engineering fundamentals you 4 need to know and what it taxes to get water in a i 5 generator or when to put water in a generator, that 6 . type of thing.
i' 7 MR. BEARD: Let me see if I can follow up
- 8. and tocus my question a-little'better, Walt. I I 9. have' heard numbers batted around, comments batted i
10 around in enese rooms that we have nad these l 11 intervi< es whero people-were-talking and saying ,
4 11 2 things like the important thing in their mind la
() 13 that if we know from our' training or something tnat l 14 we need to get 450 gallons por minute'within thirty 1
15 minutes --
16 MR. ROGERS: OKay. Tha t's --
17 MR. BEARD: -- now, with'that Kind of a I 18. comment in tne back of your mind, how close would 19 you assess this situation?
20 . MR. ROGERS: Well, it took.them-12 21- minutes.
22 MR. ROSSI: hell, this 450 gallons per 23 minute, perhaps-you-might-say where.
Is that makeup 24 to the primary system or water to the steam i ACE; FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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103
-1 generators? Which did you mean?
2 MR. BEARD: We are ta1Xing feed.
4 3 MR. ROSSI: Feed to the steam generator?
4 MR. ROGERS: I guess from what I have 5 seen of tne analyses, and I guess what they pretty 6 much have been saying, you have got a halt nour, 7 you nave to get water to those steam generators in i
8 a half hour is what it really comes down to.
.i 9 Whether it's 450 g a'1 1 o n s , I think it's always i
10 assumed it's going to be more than 450 gallons.
i- 11 MR. BEARD: Some significant flow, at 1
12' least?
()' la MR. ROGERS: _Some significant flow._ And y 14 .that you have got to do it in a half 1 nour, assuming
- 15 you don't use HPI coolant in the piggyback 4 0 16 methodology. I think you will probably find tho 17 anaAyses are going to push you out to a core damage 18 of probably somewhere 'i n tne 60 minute time frame 19 if you go ahead and put piggyback'in service 20 without secondary side coolant.
21 MR. SEARD: Are you saying that if at the 22 30 minute point they can't regain some-feedwater, l
23 aux feedwater, startup, whatever,'and you enter the 24 PokV' cooling mode, that the analysis would show l- O.
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l 104 1 that somewhere around 60 minutes then you would get
['#')
2 into some sort of core damage situation?
3 HR. ROGERS I thinK Cnat's probably 4 where you would probably be headed. Tnat's just 5 based upon looking at some data to the addenda to 6 tna t May 1979, I believe it's en addends to it, I 7 think that goes with the numbers used.
8 Taxing into accotant the numbers used in 9 two different decay heat loads and I think the more 10 roslistic decay nest load, there are some points in 11 times that I have neard it batted around you might 12 be able to get around on just il P I coolant but it
() 13 gets real nairy there to about three cycles. You 14 are just sitting there watching the PORV stay open 15 for about titteen, twenty minutes and just --
it's 16 not a good situation to be in.
17 But as far as I know, I have yet to ever 18 see analysis that says that you can nack it without 19 some secondary site cooling.
20 MR. BEARD: Okay. The isst aspect of 21 that -- maybe we will delay that one, but would it 22 oe your professional judgment they were in at least 23 for a period of time wha t's classified as a site
(' 24 emergency during this transient?
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-1 MR. ROGERS: -That is an' interesting point.
(~)
~
~# ll I. guess there is some flexibility-in the law that l 3 gives you titteen minutes to make a good judgment 4 on where you actually stand, and'I have always 5 taken that fifteen minutes is for the operator and 6 the shift supervisor, basically, to assure nimselt 7 that he maintains - tha t his primary safety goal at d that' point is to keep the core covered.
9 MR. ROSSI: Whera does that fifteen i
10 minutes come trom?
s 11 MR. ROGERS:- Tha t's just something I 12 believo -- I-can't even remember where in the law
() 13 it is or in the regulations, but I think tha t's 14 pretty muen.the stuff, talking to the EP guys, you l 15 try to make your determination in fifteen minutes..
i 16 And given that your first response, like you look i
17 at it, your immediate response is not -- le t's say 18 the plant does something abnormally.- .
You don' t 19 look in the emergency plan and then-trip the 20 .re a c tor.. You trip the reactor, you look at your i 21 primary indicators before you look at your ,
i 22 emergency plan.
23 And given'that light, I don't know i
24 whether - I know what their=EAL says because they l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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106 1 even talned to me about it-that night. They say, N,] Walt, look, this is wha t our EAL says. It eays wo 2
3 lost main feedwater and auxiliary and that says it 4 is site emergency. However, by the time we got 5 here and looked at this, we already had our 6 auxiliary feedpumps bacx.
7 I said, okay. We consider ourselves in 8 an unusual event right now. I said, yeah, okay, 9 given your parameters and overything, tha t's right.
10 I think you have got to take things and loox a t 11 them in terms of wno is going to maxe tnat decision, 12 and that's that snitt supervisor on wnere you are
(_j 13 in this action plan.
14 MR. BEARD: Let me clarify just tor the 15 saxe of time. I'm not trying to investigste the 16 area of whatner or not they called it properly when 17 they phonod it in or later or whether or not tnoy 18 called it on the basis of their condition at the 19 plant at that point in time or what they nad been 20 through. I'm trying to just learn from your 21 personal assosament overall of the event, what is 22 it at the severity level? Had they been through a 23 site emergency? Tna t's the severity level that you gm 24 believe is the significance of this event?
'%)
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107 l l
1 MR. ROGERS: Oh, I see what you mean.
(~' , ;
2 You mean it you were sitting there, you know, a 3 halt hour later and you didn' t nave auxiliary 4 foodwater or main feedwater, would you tninx that 5 ene proper classification is a site emergency?
6 Ma. BEARD: Hell, I'm just saying 7 independent of reporting and those Kinds of things, 8 nad they been through the conditions that you 9 normally associate with site emergency in your mind?
10 Maybe tney weren't tnere then because they nad ,
11 recovered, but nad they been througn that severe of 12 an overall incident?
() 13 MR. ROGERS: lla d they been through? I 14 don't Know it I can say they had been enrough. If 15 that condition had continued for a period of timo, 16 you Know, longer than twelve minutes or wnstever, 17 fifteon minutes, that it would mandate a site 18 emergency.
19 MR. BEARD: But you are talning -- I 20 perceive now that you are thinking in terms of 21 activation of emergency plans?
22 MR. ROGERS: Yeah.
23 MR. BEARD: It I'm looking at it at ry 24 continuous points of timo, neglecting what I would (J
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108 1 have to do if I called it that, would the severity rm
~
2 of the incident the plant went through at some 3 point in time be what you would consider to be a 4 site emergency? I'm trying to get your overall 5 assessment of how severe tnis incident was or how 6 close to a near miss it was, just your overall toel.
7 MR. ROGERS: I guess I feel that it would 8 be proper to call it a site emergency if you had a 9 loss of main feedpumps and loss of auxiliary 10 teedpumps.
11 MR. BEARD: So at some point they were at 12 that status?
(m
(_) 13 MR. ROGERS: Yes.
14 MR. BEARD: Tha t's all I'm trying to get 15 to.
16 MR. ROGERS: Whether they called it or 17 not, I think --
I think I understand what you are 18 saying. I think that type of situation is 19 significant enough that it should be considered a 20 site emergency.
'21 MR. BEARD: Tha t's all I was trying to 22 get at.
23 MR. ROSSI Can we bresk-for lunch now?
24 MR. BEARD: Tha t's the end of my 7^S J
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109 1 questions.
t' ' )
2 MR. ROSSI: Why don't we broax for lunch 3 and convene back in an hour.
4 (Thereupon, a' luncheon recess was takon.)
5 - - -- -
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 r>
k ..) 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
.]
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.2 June 20, 1985 3 2:00 o' clock p.m.
4 - - - - -
5 MR. ROSSI: Why don't we start.
6 MR. BEARD: We covered the overall 7 assessment analysis of the event, I think. And I 8 think tha t's the point tha t we stopped at the end 9 of the morning section.
10 MR. ROSSI: Wo had also gotten overything 11 that you Know about what happened atter the event 12 because I think you told us everything that you rm
() 13 observed when you got hore and so tortn.
14 MR. . ROGERS: Okay.
15 MR. BEARD: I don't Know how you W3nt to 16 do this. Everyone has a few questions.
17 MR. ROSSI: Hny don't we let Larry go 18 with nis questions.
19 MR. BELL: It's my understanding at the 20 time of the event tnat the startup foodwater pump 21- was isolated?
22 MR. ROGERS: Yos.
23 MR. BELL: It's also my understanding
,r~} 24 that that is a recent range to plant operating-
\m,.
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, 1 procedures, in Maren of '85 time frame?
2 MR. ROGERS: Tna t's wrong.
3 MR. BELLS . When was that change made?
4 MR. ROGERS: That change was-mado I'm 5 -goingfto say in the July time frame of 1984.
l 6 MR. ' BELL: Why was this mode of opera tion 7 changed?
8 MR. ROGERS: The startup feedwater
! 9 suction line discharge line was not' properly-
. 10. analyzed under the license. The line actually goes 11 through the auxiliary.foodpump rooms,_and as such, .
j -12 it you considered its -- I's not g o i n g -- to call it --
() 13 it was either tneinign energy breax.or moderate 14 ' energy, breax, tnere is certain criteria that was
! 15; supposed ito have been mot to allow youHto use theso
. 16 lines'so theyLdo not' impact upon safety rela te d
- 17- equipment. .
18 Well,_they stuck -- they changed the-19 position of the suction valvo-at one' point in time.
20 It.was originally closed; oxay? eAnd when it was --
21' the way.they had the' valves at one point in' time 122 was okay, but_when they opened the-. valves, a; couple t
23_ ogjyears ago-they oidn't do a-proper analysisJot 24 that'line in terms of'what the camifications were.
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i 1
112 1 And as such, they did not meet the requirements
(,,')
'# associated with that system and the piping system 2
3 such as they had to isolate it.
4 Also tnere is some problem wits curbine 5 plant cooling water to cool the startup feedpump 6 It also falls in the situation tnat it is not 7 adequately protected from the high energy plant 8 broaxa. This is pretty well documented in a couple 9 of inspection reports and was part of an escalated 10 enforcement action against the licensee last year.
11 MR. BEARD: Let me see if I understand 12 here. You are saying tnis whole issue arose out or O)
(. 13 one of your inspections?
14 MR. ROCERS: Well, they actually 15 identified it 'e h e m s e l v o s , but as a result of them 16 identifying it and looking into it, tne event, and 17 what. happened when we went back or I went back and 18 looked at what they did in the facility cnange 19 package is you.run across where they changed the 20 position ot that startup feedwater valve.
21 MR. ROSSI: When you say they changed'the 22 position of the startup feedwater valve, you mean 23 they changed its actual valve position, not where i r~s 24 it was located?
(_)
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113 1 MR. ROGERS: No. What they did, they (D
\~# 2 cnanged it on the drawings. See, what tney had was 3 the drawing, the P&ID originally had the valves 4 being closed. Well, tney were never aligning the 5 system with the valves closed.
6 My understanding is their policy is that 7 it you have the auction valve of a pump closed, 8 that they pull the control power fuses or they 9 disable the pump trom starting electrically, and 10 that is a company policy associated with their 11 pumps.
12 Now, the P&ID originally showed the line
() 13 as being closed, but they were nov-r running lixe 14 that because they never pulled the control power 15 fuses, and tne operators identitied it and had a 16 racility change. They wouldn't want the valve open 17 lixe they were really running.
18 Well, when they did that, no one caught 19 on with wnst that meant in terms or the analysis as 20 stated --
words in the FSAR talx about it in a very 21 limited respect for the turbine plant cooling water 22 valves, whien were also being left open.
23 So basically, yeah, they ended up getting
(~g 24 into -- they got a licensed condition that we let L ;'
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114 l' tnem use the stsetup feedpump provided they only
(#)
2 used it to startup, and then when they did use it, 3 that they kept a man in the room to monitor the 4 line for a potential nigh energy or moderate energy 5 Orcax. And that was to go anyway, I believe, as 6 part of their 1986 modifications, that startup 7 feedpump system or whatever you want to call it, 8 tne tnied pump.
9 MR. BELL: The higher moderate energy 10 break, is that associated with any particular 11 pnenomenon such as a seismic event or is this 12 independent or a seismic event?
(')
(, 13 MR. ROGERS: It is my recollection on 14 that that this is independent of a seismic event.
15 MR. ROSSIt Did the licensed condition go 16 back througn NRR7 Was it a NRR licensed condition?
17 MR. ROGERS: Yes.
18 MR. ROSSI: So NRR was involved in the 19 decision to isolate the pump and so forth; is that 20 right?
21 MR. ROGERS: Yes. Well, NRR is the only 22 people that deal with licensed conditions. I & E 23 doesn' t do that. Tha t's NRR's function.
(~) 24 Now, I'm not sure what the license says l \d l ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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115 1 completely, if it calls out specific valves for
'~' 2 isolation or just wnat. I would have to go got the 3 text -- I mean, go get the license itselt, and that 4 would be the easiest way to do that.
5 MR. ROSSI: Okay. But the decision to do 6 all this came trom -- it came to you for maxing 7 sure they did it and not -- and it may nave started 8 from you just finding a problem with it being run 9 not in accordance with the PSAR?
10 MR. ROGERS: Well, see, they wrote the 11 LER and they provided the corrective action 12 themselves. The original LER says what they are rh
(_) 13 going to do and they say they are going to pull the 14 control power tuses and shut the valvoa. Tnay know 15 they were not in compliance with their license.
16 MR. ROSSI: So they identitied the 17 problem, the licensee identified the problem of tne 18 nigh energy line broax7 19 MR. ROGERS: Right.
20 MR. ROSSI: They wrots an LER on it, and 21 than they in that LER identified or proposed the 22 corrective action?
23 MR. ROGERS: Yeah.
24 MR. ROSSI: Tha t's the way it occurred.
e]
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116 1 It wasn't that the NRC found the problem and told
( 2 them to do this. Tne corrective action for it came
\
i I
3 trom them?
1 4 MR. ROGERS: I believe that is true. And i I
5 in the original onset, tnere is some things tha t 6 get --
there is some iterations in this that once 7 they say, you know, we got to do this for high 8 energy line breaks, there was an instance where 9 they ended up opening the valve and they lett it 10 open, the auction valve, for so long, and that was 11 part of tne escalated ontorcement package also.
12 There was a lot of things that went into that
() 13 escalated enforcement package with the valve.
14 But, you know, eventually the license, 15 they settled on tnat for the licensed condition 16 that was -- I think it was essentially nothing more 17 than tne LER.
18 MR. ROSSI: Now, I would assume that you 19 can help us find the LER and the escalated 20 enforcement documentation, that we can get that 21 material and trace through the history of that from 22 the paper?
23 MR. ROGERS: Yes.
i
,q 24 MR. ROSSI: Which is probably the best
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117 1 way to do it rather than try to get it in the (3
2 interview.
3 MR. ROGERS: I guess the main thing is 4 the line should have eitner boon protected properly 5 to start'ott with, given their conditions. If it 6 had been done rignt to start off witn, they 7 wouldn' t have had this problem.
8 MR. BELL: Hnen you got to the control 9 room, what was the attitude of the operators? Were 10 they nervous or had tney calmed down by now?
11 MR. ROGERS: They meomed to be relatively 12 calm at that time. I tnink about tne only timo I
() 13 really saw -- it sounded like Teddy Lee was Kind of 14 pumped up on the phone when he was telling nur about 15 it, out tna t's understandable given the duration 16 and tno proximity of tne event. But by tne-time I 17 got in the control room, it was a calm atmosphere.
18 MR. BELL: Okay. I've got a series of 19 questions on the SALP report. There has been a 20 complaint of the utilities when tney receivo a bad 21 SALP report that the Region' assigns a bad 22 reputation to tnat utility and it's very difficult 23 for the utility to turn the SALP reports around l
l r^g 24 regardless of his pertormanco. Do you think that l '% J
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1 pernaps is the case at Davis-Besse? !
(~h 2 MR. ROGERS: I'm not going to speak in 3 the areas that I do not have direct input. In the 4 areas of operations, maintenance, quality 5 activities, surveillsnce and tests, I'll say their 6 reputation is not involved. It is based upon puro 7 fact as identified in inspection reports and LERs 8 that they report.
9 MR. BELLI All right. I guess that 10 answers that question. Do you ~~ unleas somebody 11 else has tollow-up question on that, we can get the 12 report.
g-)s
(_ 13 MR. ROSSIt. Yeah. I don't have a 14 tollow-up on that.
15 MR. ROGERS: Let me write that down, if 16 you want to see that escalated ontorcement stutt.
17 MR. ROSSI Let's see. Larry, you have 18 more?
19 MR. BELL I have two small questions.
20 MR. ROGERS: Okay. Go ahead.
21 MR. ROSSI: Are there any NRC regulations 22 that in your opinion have a negative impact on 23 safety and would have influenced this event?
24 MR. ROGERSt Regulations?
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l 119 1 MR. ROSSI: Well, that can be expanded to
~
r's 2 regulations, practicos.
3 MR. BELL: Practices.
4 MR. ROSSI: Proceduros, you Know, 5 anything that tne NRC has required of the licensee 6 that would nave -- that you thinx is a signiticant 7 problem, first, related to this event and then just 8 in general aside trom this event.
9 MR. ROGBRS: Woll, I think given the 10 condition of the startup teedpump system at the 11 point in time, it's kind of lixe what-do you 12 defenso against? Obviously I'm sure some or the
() 13 operations people here probably are under the 14 opinion tnat, boy, it would nave been nice it all 15 wa.nad to do is turn that startup feedpump on, boy, 16 you nnow, wny did we have to shut all this and pull 17 these control power fuses and all tha t. And given 18 its condition, yean, it would have Deon a lot 19 easier to get water to the steam generator.
20 llowever, there is another side to that 21 story too. And tha t's very simply that the plant 22 is supposed to be designed to a certain design 23 bases and they didn't design it to that, and that r's 24 at some point in time they have got to ask U
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120 1 themselves a question. They knew what tne 2 ramifications or that startup teedpump wore and 3 just what was going on with that. So in that 4 respect, it's a two-aided story.
5 Tnere is a lot of other things. You 6 protect it -against one thing, but you did increase 7 the time trame in another ovent, but an event that a wac not a part of the license and was not' supposed 9 to happen and not a part of the design basis was to f 10 occur. Now, it's a two-sided edge there. In terms
[ 11 of some or the other things --
+
12 MR. HELLS Technical specifications, is
() 13 -there any ambiguity in the technical specifications 14 for this unit that have given you problems-or give 15 the licenses problems?
16 MR. ROGERS I don' t know if it's given
! 17 the licensee problems, but I know there is a' tech la spec here tha t's given me problems and it has to do i 19 with a definition of what is a steamline break or a .
20 feedwater' break in the tech ~ specs on steam "
i 21 generator.
22 When you: look at.the event as I have seen l 23 it so far,.I'm not terribly concerned _about wha t
-24 the transient was on the primary side tros the ,
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121 1 standpoint of what actually happened, I'm not i
o 2 looking at the what-itar I'm saying.what really did 3 happen. I'm more interested based upon seeing what i 4 I have seen on the secondary side and specifically L
i 5 the generator.
6 It you look at a steam generator, to a i '
7 toch spec it says,.well, thou shall establian an
]
a inspection traquency on a steam generator, on the F
I 9 tubes, a special inspection based upon these 10 particular events.
- L j 11 Well, I mean, in reality a total loss of.
12 feedwater produces -- the genera tor doesn' t care l
1
() la why it doesn' t get water 1 it it is upstream of the-
) 14 check valve. If you brean the check valve, tha t's i i 15 one thing.
16' I guess I'better back up and try to j 17 explain what I'm saying. In the main f ee dwa te r-1 ;
i 18 line you have got a pump, there is a lot of valves, i i
j 19 but basically we.are talning a pump, a check vaive i
20 and a steam generator. If you' break upstream of ,
21 that checx valvo, tnat is basically a feedwater
.[ ;
.22 line break or for some reason you don't get water J
23 through that pipe to the steam generator, he' sees a
, , 24 it, no matter what.
( -
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122 1 If you breax downstream of that chock 2 valve, in ossence even though you are putting water 3 tnrough there, in reality it is nothing more than a 4 stoamline breax because you are going to blow 5 everything down. This would be a blow-down. This 6 would be a deprosaurization event.
7 The main point is a loss of main 8 feedwater, is it in fact -- does it do the samo 9 characteristics that they icok at in a main 10 teadwater Iine break because you are basically not 11 putting water to the steam generator. And in that 12 term, I would guess there is some questions there.
I 13 I t's just like the one on -- say you have 14 a turbino bypssa valve tailure witnout a main stuam 15 isolation valve or you do nave a main steam lo isolation valve closure and you get a main steam 17 side safety stick open or you get an atmospneric la valve sticx opon. To tne generator itself it 19 doesn't care why; all it Knows la it sous a 20 steamline nole. Now, how big these holos have to 21 be, how much of a feedwater lino loss do you havo 22 to nave before you invoxe this teen spec --
23 MR. ROSSIt What does the toch spec r~' 24 specifically any, that it sounds as a cycle or they ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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123 1 have to do additional analyses or additional
- s 5 i
'# 2 inspection?
3 MR. ROGERS: They have to do a special 80 4 current tube inspection is what it amounts to. I 5 guess when we did have the depressurization ovent 6 on tne one generator, part or tne CAL called tor 7 them to do detailed analyses tnat covered and also 8 had them do tube inspections later on because og 9 another problem.
10 I guess that one kind of gives me some i
. 11 difficulty in terms og how do you read that toch 12 spec and what are they coully trying to get at.
4 O)
(_ 13 Even wnon I read tne regula r guide on it, it still 14 doesn't give me the type of clarification I guess I 15 would lixo to see.
16 MR. DELL: Have'you asked this question 17 of sny other people or brought this up in any 18 otner -- with any other NRC group other than this 19 Pact Finding Tosm?
20 MR. ROGERS: I am pretty sure I sent a 21 memo in to talk about it, say, wha t's the size. It-22 not, I'think I mentioned it to my supervision. I 23 will checA my memo file to see 11 I haven' t put q
L.j' 24 something in memoranda.
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124 1 There was a couple og things I put in
(
2 after that steamline -- when the satety opened up 3 that deals with tne way that tech spec reads 4 because of the way you nave got to look at tne 5 curves. Tnis is really more tnan anotner event.
6 I Know I said maybe they ougnt to tase a 7 look at it because at some point in time your 8 cooldown curve in tne very uppor limits as I 9 understand it is really limited by the tubes and 10 not so much by beltline or tne reactor pressure 11 vessel. But when you actually got into reading the 12 words, it really only nas you doing analysis of tne O
(j 13 reactor vossol and not necessarily an analysis on 14 tne more portinent pieces of equipment of the steam 15 generator and the tubes.
16 MR. ROSSI: But this is a question really 17 of a toch spec that attects, you know, that there 10 is some time in which to go back to NRR or back to 19 the Region and get an interpretation of it. I t's 20 not a tech spec. It nas to be acted on like tna t?
21 MR. ROGERS: No.
22 MR. ROSSI: So even though it may be 23 unclear, it doesn't creatu an immediate safety (m
() 24 problem 7 ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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r 125 1 MR. ROGERS: Yean.
(#)
2 MR. ROSSI: I think we are more interestad 3 in things that might cause the operator a problem 4 during an event that might mane tne event worse 5 than would otherwise be.
6 MR. BELL: The reason I asked about 7 technical specifications is tnat if I road the 8 specification correctly, there is some limit --
9 minimum feedwater tempwratura limit for using tne 10 main feedwater noaales, and I was wondering if 11 mayne that technical specification was in the minds 12 of the operators when they made the decision to
() 13 either go with auxiliary feedwater to tne steam 14 generator or startup feedwater to the steam 15 genera tor.
16 MR. ROGERS: Yean. There is another tech 17 spec, and that one deals in using the main la teodwater nozzles and it basically, it gives you 19 only a maximum -- you nave to be I believe i t's 20 greater than 110 degrees feedwater to the steam 21 generator. It nsa to be greater enan 110 degrees 22 if you are greater than 235 pounds in the generator.
23 I would almost line to reter -- is that a problem 24 for me to break and just get the tech specs and
()N
(
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126 l 1
l 1 actually read that just f or a second?
O 2 MR. ROSSIt' Why don' t we go ott the ,
l l' 3 record while he gets the tech specs.
i 4 (Discussion held ott the record.) '
I 5 MR. ROSSI: We'll go back on the record. .
- 6 MR. ROGERS Tech spec 3.7.2.1 states the ,
} l l 7 temperature of the secondary coolant in ~tne steam j
l 8 generator shall be greater than 110 degrees l l i 1 9 Fahrenheit when the pressure of the secondary i i i ,
10- coolant in the steam generator is greater than 237 ,
11 psig.
) {
l 12 I guess that was.tne one that I~was kind ;
.i
() 13 of. wondering about in terms of how this is 14 spplicable, it in fact they had injected via'the !
15 startup feedpump CST wa ter which is around 90 16 degrees through the main'feedwater noaales into the
{
J l 17 steam generator.
i l 18 I t's kind of a strange toch spec in that i l I
19 .even t:iough, I mean, like you actually end up sticking 20 auxiliary teedwater into t'h e steam generator during
{ 21' a steam teed r u p t'u r e control actuation and that
{ 22 water is CST water also, I guess.I have some i
, 23 wondering as to'whether, you'Know, the words here 24 are just.quite what they want. You can read the l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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127 1 bases and I xind of doubt thst, given the condition
[~)
'~ 2 they are in, tne bases reslly is -- it's 3 appropriate at tnis time that this tech spec would 4 be invoxed.
5 MR. DELL: My point of asking you that 6 question, do you tninx tnat the operators had that 7 in mind when they were foeding the steam generators 8 or they decided that eitner pump they could get in 9 service to the steam generators would be good 10 enough to provide plant cooling features?
11 MR. ROGERS: Well, I guess, No. 1, I'm 12 going to taxe a best guess because I nad not talxod
() 13 to tne operators. I would guess that the tecnnical 14 specification itself probsbly was not in the back 15 of their minds. My guess is tnst tney and " rom 16 what little I do understand, I think I Know who tne 17 individual that was doing this --
18 MR. BBLL: It was Mr. Feasol.
19 MR. ROGERS: Okay. That he is no dummy.
20 ti e ' s a pretty smart cookie. I don' t know if, No. 1, 21 the valve to open to got on off of the deaerators 22 is the closer valve. I'm sure, you know, tha t's 23 one thing. Whether he also in the back of his mind
(~s., 24 knows at that point in time it's probably battar
\_/
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128 1 from a thermal anocx standpoint to feed using the
/'l
'# 2 deserators which is significantly higher, couple 3 hundred degrees temperature higher into the steam 4 generator at that time, I Know tha t at losst it's 5 my purception then that it is pretty dangorous, 6 that it it was a depressurized stuam generator and 7 they were trying to hit that cold water, that tney 8 could do some substantial damage to the generator 9 itself.
10 But I would have to guess that even 11 though he may have been going for the closest valvo, 12 it may be in the back of his mind he also was
() 13 thinking tha t's tne best thing for that generator 14 at tnat timo.
15 MR. BELL Okay.
16 MR. ROGERS: But that is speculation and 17 you all proosbly --
18 MR. BELL: I understand. And we will
^
19 review the transcripts and see it we have any 20 amplifying information. My final question has to 21 do with the training that was provided to you by 22 the NRC. Do you feel the NRC provided you adequate 23 training in properly performing inspections and 24 monitoring transients in modern plants?
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129 1 MR. ROGERS: I think training and O
J 2 inspection, your training for tne most part is 3 training for ayatems. Tha t's your formalized sit 4 down across the table type training, your classroom 5 training.
6 What you do to unduratand now to be an 7 inspector is really -- i t's more an approntice a program type thing, I think. Tha t's my perception.
9 You in the claaaroom, they can give you some basis 10 of inspection, but to really do inspection and 11 underatsnd what you are doing, it is more an 12 apprentico type deal.
() 13 In terms of transiont behavior, I guesa 14 in one way I'm Kind of --
I have had a lot more 15 experience at this racility than other people. It 16 this transient had happened to someone else wno had 17 not been here f or a long time frame, I think that 18 his assessment of the transiont would have been 19 probably tairly severely hampered. Transient 20 analysis on tnia particular facility is not like 21 any other facility. This la -- and I'm gojag to 22 use some slang here. This is the raired loop plan, 23 and it's probably the only raised loJp plant tha t's 24 proombly ever going to get built of the 177 vintage.
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130 1 The other plants are droop loops, so the design 2 basis of the droop loop plan and the design baats 3 of the raised loop plan are not the same because oi 4 the nature of things. It deals with the nign trean 5 injection pumps, it deals with the capability and 6 natural circulation here, it deals with the 7 necessity to have the auxiliary feedpumps in what 8 appears to be small break LOCA considerations that 9 in other places you probably don' t need. So in 10 terms of really understanding that and trying to do.
11 wha t's going on in transient analysis against tnia 12 racility or the nellotont facility which I nave
() 13 boon trained on in tna simulator, it is rather --
14 there in some things there, but it would be greatly 15 enhanced if you had site specitic training.
16 MR. BELL: Tha t's my questions.
17 MR. ROSSI: Wayne?
Id MR. LANNINGt Do you know of any ettorts 19 by the licensee to improve the coliability of the 20 auxiliary feedwater system?
21 MR. ROGERS: Yoan. In terms of what I 22 think they have been doing, reading some of their 23 FCRs. No. 1, they started out -- and I'm not talning (N 24 no much just TMI auxilisry feodwater availability
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131 1 study hero. I'm going to kind of talk about all of f's
2 this stutt and maybe not being able to tell you 3 whicn one they are claiming for TMI and which ones 4 tney are not, taxe enat into acccunt.
5 The auxiliary feedpump governors around 6 here, the original design wasn't too good, to put 7 it politely. They.went and they modified -- what u they did is tney took a governor tna t's normally 9 run on air, they went to the manual speed knob and 10 they toon tno Knob ott of it and tney put a Bodine 11 DC motor on it that would do the same thing tnat 12 the air system would do. And that caused some
() ;3 problems. And then they --
14 MR. ROSSI: Who nad that done? Was tnat 15 tnrough the vendor for the governor?
16 MR. ROGERS That was the way it 17 originally camo. Tna t's the way they designed it la originally. I don't xnow it that was nocntel or 19 TECO or just who it was, but tha t's the way it came.
20 It wasn't exactly what I would call your 21 run of the mill governor to start ott with. They 22 nad some problems with it. So'they took out part 23 of the guts of the governor to make it respond a 24 little bit better.
r^)
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132 1 Well, part of the probism is it does a
( '
2 couple or things. One, it seems line the history 3 is that the thing would nang up on his high spead 4 and low spuod stop because wnat is really happening 5 with the auxiliary toodwater system is it's got a 6 level control system in, but i t's kind or sloppy in 7 that wnat you are really doing is you are putting 8 slug flow in. You don't have a nice constant tiow 9 of suxiliary teedwater to these generators.
10 Basically you have got it up on your hign 11 spaed stops to start ott with, so it toads it till 12 it gets to a certain level and then it cuts ott and
() 13 then it boils ott, and then all of the sudden it 14 toeds it so you xeep slugging it in there.
15 Well, tnat puts a lot of movement on that 16 governor so it's going from its hign speed to its 17 low speed stop bacx and torth and bac!. and torth.
18 And tney nave had instances where tnat roll pin 19 will hang up either on its high speed or low speed 20 stop inside the governor.
21 Also tney got a clutch assembly tha t's a 22 piece or plastic and some aluminum. I shouldn't --
23 it's a system by which there is a slip clutch in
,q 24 there, and ths t's wha t it is, it's a set of teeth
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133 1 on the -plastic and the aluminum couplings that also i (d) 2 have some attact in nere to work properly. If the 3 alip clutch slips too early, then you don' t get tno 4 signal trom the Bodine motor to the governor to 5 actually get it up to speed or bacx it bacx down.
6 So once tnat slip cluten starts s11 ping in tnero, 7 things go away.
8 Well, they had gotten the slip clutch 9 problem it looxa like taken care of. The history --
t 10 you got a tairly long nistory. These are the 11 things they saw.
12 They went in, they have been doing for a 13 couple of years now preventive maintenanco on tno
, 14 slip clutch to maxe sure it is at the right torque.
15 So choy nept that up to spaod. Then they went in 16 and they tinally just took one of their governors 17 out because tha t was kind of long term. Tney 18 oventually got around to do that, decided we would 19 just get rid of these things. They threw -- well, 20 they didn' t throw away, they replaced one of them 21 and they went to one of these hydraulic governors.
22 They had some problems with that when they 23 inatalled it.
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l 134 1 pushing in there, so they nad to replace that and
(~)
l 2 they got that taken care of. I wish I could havo 3 analyzed this one a littlo closer. Maybe you could 4 holp me out to tell me how did that hydraulic 5 governor work at this time, but evidently there is 6 somm problem with tnis event. I thinx it hung up 7 on its high speed stop and probably when they get 8 inside, they are going to find that roll pin bont.
9 So with the governors there has been some 10 problems. I guess you can say -- I don't tnink 11 it's been terribly thrilling for this slug flow to 12 the generator because nero a couple years ago they
() 13 tound the auxiliary teedwater header detormed and I 14 thinx they found this at Crystal and I ws ' t to say 15 SMUD, and that was internal suxiliary foodwater 16 headers. Tney were getting water into those 17 headers and something was going on. I don't Know la it they even tully understand the dynamica and, 19 stress curvos in there, that was actually deforming 20 tne neaders. So tney eventually pulled it out and 21 now they have an external header. So that was a
- 22 problem.
23 Also the limitorque valves haven' t been --
l 24 and I'm not going to say it just was in the aux ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
l (202) 347-3700
135 1 teedwater system. There are probably a lot of 2 problems industry wide here with the limitorques.
3 I think seeing some of the information notices tha t 4 we nave been coming out with, tne limitorque valves 5 were a problem.
6 MR. ROSSI The limitorque valves, that 7 would apply to the 599, 608 valves; is that correctt 8 MR. ROGERS That would apply to the MS 9 106, 106-A, 107, 107-A, 3872, 71, 70, 69, $99, 608, 10 those valves were problems, or at least those 11 valves are limitorque valvos it's my understanding.
12 You are also ta1xing it used to be, tney
() 13 don't seem to be a problem now, but the very ticet 14 discharge valves on the purp, they are now set so 15 they don't hive to go open on tne signs 1 -- and 16 it's line a 399 number, I thinx. I can't tell you 17 right now wnat thosw numbers are. Anyhow, the 18 limitorque valves there has been problems with.
19 So they ended up doing a Torrey Pinos 20 study. Torrey Pines is a consultant and tney 21 worked up a way in which tney can evaluate, because 22 wnst they originally got on torque switch settings 23 was uechtel~had given them a one, like a one number.
24 Well, tha t's one for opening and one for closing.
l ACE PCDERAL HEPORTERS INC.
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n 136 1 Well, tha t's fine, only it's not really what you 2 want. You want sometning a little different 3 between opening and closing. So Torrey Pines went 4 through and did a study and said, if you are having 5 trouble with valves and the things don' t seem to be 6 working right, here is a way in which we will giva 7 you what we thinx is a good engineering judgment on 8 wheru you ought.to set your torque switches, but 9 you got to couple that with your maintenance 10 histories, you know. If you don' t have trouble 11 with the valve, don't use this thing, you Know.
12 Tnere is no reason to tix something tnat doesn't
() 13 need to De fixed.
14 So there has been problems with the 15 limitorque valves wnich they -- we ended up writing 16 them up in one of the SALP reports because they 17 weren't neoping the management overview they should 18 have at least I guess what I consider on that type 19 study and getting tnam implemented, and they have 20 since put the type of management attention 21 appropriato to it and I think they have gotten at 22 least all the sa f e ty related ones and I thinn 23 almost all ot the nonsafety related valves under r~s 24 the Torrey Pinos study that they felt needed to be (J
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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137 1 implemented implemented.
"# 2 MR. LANNING: Do you Know if the Torrey 3 Pines study included the opening ot these valves 4 when there is a large differential pressure across 5 these valves?
6 MR. ROGERS: I don't tninx so. I'm not 7 going to say that. I don't Know. I just don't 8 Know so I'm not going to speak to it.
9 MR. LANNING: All right.
10 MR. ROSSI: To what extent had they tested 11 like valves 599 and 608 for the not conditions, you' 12 Know, like cycled them and opened them again? Is
'T
('_j 13 that something they would do?
14 MR. ROGERS: I don't Know of any time 15 they have over done them in a hot condition. As 16 far as I know, they have only been tested -- a 17 strone time test done on them in a cold condition.
la Boy, I think they are even listed as passive in tne 19 IST testing. I can checx that. I think tney are 20 passives. I don't think they can get a stront 21 signal when they are running.
-22 MR. ROSSI: They are listed as passive 23 because tney are normally open and they are at the 24 position where they would serve their safety
(^)
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S 130
. I runction? '
MR. ROGERS:
1 2 Yes.
3 MR. ROSSI: Never expected they would be 5
4 cycled closed and have to open again?
5 MR. ROGERS: The analysis says they have i.
6 got to be -- you.know, it you look at the analysis, 7 they would be cycled to close and then have to come 8 open at some point.
9 MR. ROSSI: The analysis does say that7 10 MR. ROGERS: Well, the FSAR, tha t's the a
11 reason the system is built. It gets into SFRCS 12 design.
! () ~ 13 See, it you get a steamline break, a 9 14 big one, what will happen is you.will actually 15 depressurize both generators at.the same time so 4
16 everything-basically goes down, bottles up, shut
, 17 down, nothing happens. 'One-of them.repressurizes.-
18- -. W h e n . t h a t one repressurizes, the two a uxilia ry 19 feedpumps.both feed that~ good generator that P
20 repressurizes.
3
. 21 MR. ROSSI: ~So'for1a real' steamline break 22 without1the. operator error that occurred here, ' tor 23 :a real steamline break, 599 and 608 would Lb'e expected
[ '24- 'to close early in-the. transient':and then r e o p e n .' -- -
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS.INC. ,
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41 139 1 MR. ROGERS: One of them would reopen.
O 2 MR. SIMON: One of them would reopen. So !
3 you go'through something not terribly different 4 than what occurred in tnis transient?
4 5 MR. ROGERS: You are right.
6 MR. ROSSI: So those valves to serve
} 7 - their actual safety function under some events 8 would have to have gone through the cycle that they 9 did here?
'10 MR. ROGERS: Yes.
- 11. MR. BELL: In the close time critical on
, 12 those valves following that steamline break?
l () 13 Bocsuse 11 it is, then there should be Section 11 14 testing on those-valves to determine close times, 15 shouldn't there?
i 16
~
MR. ROGERS: Well, I would think so. I 17 also thinx'tnat would be called out in tech specs 18 too.
19 MR. BELL: If I. remember technical 20 -specifications, they are so' geno cal, under spec 1404 21' they have to test. safety-related equipment under 22 the ASM3 Section ll' code.
23 MR. ROGERS: Tha t's true. There is some
! 24 words.in. tech specs --
and this gets.co some other ACE-FEDERAL'REFORTERS INCJ (202) 347-3700.
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140 I ,
1 things -- is that your response on the Steam and i
f 2 Feedwater Rupture Control system doesn't 3 specifically call out response times for valves.
4 What tney do is they call out a response time in i
5 seconds for the auxiliary feedpump to be it says 6 actuated equipment at loss than 40 seconds. It
~
! 7 says it has to be less than or equal to:40~ seconds.
4 8 That means, 'or a t least the real intent I
9- behind that is that the valves have to be open'and 10 the-pump has to-be up to the discharge pressure ,
11 that is called out in the surveillance requirements i
- 12
- toe the auxiliary feedpumps,nso those-valves have- ,
I) 13. to be opened in that time reame or.they.are i 14 normally opened, but they also-navento go c l o s e'd .
2 15 Now,-the closing time I.believe you will- ,
l 16 find is because they a re con tainment isola tion .
- 17 valves. But in terms o f' this other function, I i .
, . 18 don't t hink ..i t's addressed in any; technical J
- 19 specifications. .
20 'MR. ROSSIs. -Can you-' tell me whe th'e r ' they 21 had a problem with either 599-or'608lduring'the 22; event ~that occurred in Ma rch .of .1984 , where they t hed
.2 3. ' a. stuck open' safety valve andfblew one steam-
, 2'4 generator dry during the recovery?
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141 1 MR. ROGERS: It's my understanding I
\ 2 believe it was 599 that went closed and then tusy 3 could not get it open pretty much. I tnink they 4 had to got it open by hand crank, and I don't know 5 it it was another instance wnero they had to crack 6 it off the seat and limitorque would take care of 7 it from there or wnether they hand cranxed it all S the way open. That was -- to my best recollection, 9 that was 599.
10 My understanding on the maintonance 11 sctivity was that this was one of the things that 12 brought to light tne Torrey Pines study because
() 13 that valve had been identified as one of tne Torrey 14 Pines valves and had not in fact had its torque 15 switch settings changed. And it did, in fact, 16 change the ~ torque switch settings at that time 17 under facility change request and then the valvo 18 stroked and was declared inoperable.
19 MR. ROSSI: We can check and find the 20 details of that possible 599 problem during the 21 March '84 ovent. Tha t's something I guess that can 22 be chased down.
23 MR. ROGERS: I know it is one of the two
(~S 24 discharge valves and I'm pretty suro.it's 599. But
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ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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142 1 I can have that checked.
2' MR. LANNING: It was. .
1
, 3 MR. ROSSI: You Know it was?
4 MR. LANNING: Yes, it was.
4 5 MR. ROSSI: Okay. t 6 MR.-LANNING: During your five years at 7 this plant, have you identitied any satety concerns 8 associated -- potential safety concerns associated 9 with~ the aux feedwater system?
10 MR. ROGERS: I think the governors are a
11 ~something.that we have mentioned on occasion to 12 them.
() 13 MR. LANNING: Mentioned how? ,
14 -
MR., ROGERS: I think it'has.come up in-a 15 couple of management meetings and in tnat respect 16 it i s an open item that I carry on the booxa still 17 for the changeout of the governors.
- 18 The ---I'm trying to think if there is ,
19 anything else tha t would be on that that would be 20 documentation files. . There may ba-something in'the-
- .21 ' SALP report that says, I think'maybe at least a
- 22 plus-that, hey,1did you. finally-changeout one of 23 the-governors I-think was-maybe an. example. I rw- 24 .would-have to check tne-SALP' reports-to?be absolutely.
A_)
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' ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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4 143 El certain of that.
2 Tne Torrey Pines study, I think you will 3 find some words in - tha t was carried as an open
- r. 4 item by me in terms offimplementation after the I
5 March 2nd event for tnem to maxe a timely
'6 resolution to it. And I followed that up, verified -
- - 7 they did do it. Is that the type of thing you are ;
S talking about? !
9 MR. LANNING: Yes. Besides having .tha t s
! 10 a s' a'n open item.in the inspection' reports, did you 11 communicate-those concerns Co other>;NRC ottices? .
-12 MR. ROGERS: 'I' nave'talKod to Al DeAgazio
,() 13 about'tnem.
14- MR. LANNING - .tle's-the-project manager 15- for Davis-aesso?
l 16 MR. ROGERS: Yes. I-showed him some 17- drawings of'them,. this-is what it loons lixe, it 4
~
! 18 doesn' t seem-to-be really doing:its thing, to xind :
19 offhelp out. And his d i s c u s s i o n s ,_. I .,t h i n n he's-
- . L2O been'-- I don't'want,to talk-about.what Al' has b e e n'.
41 21 - doing,'but-I>think.-you can.see;some of'the -
i .
i
., . 22 correspondence that'has been,trying to get thia l l
23 pump . ins ta ll'ed!-and I'm sure tha t's part of it. The i l
24 reliability study talks: about it and it's; pre tty
(~) ;
f- ACE F8DERAL REPORTERS INC.
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144 1 clear in.the reliability study, I tninx tha t's part .
O 2 of the' problem is governora and limitorque valves.
3 I'm not going -- I am just drawing on memory right now on some of the conclusions on that reliability 4
5 study.
4 6 MR. LANNING: Are you aware of an NRC 7 requiremont or any licensee initiated activities 8 with regard to a third auxiliary feedwater pump?
1 9 MR. ROGERS' Tha't's bao n subj e c t of a lot 10 of discussion over the years. I am ~ aware of it. I 11 xnow they originally'wsnted to try to upgrade the 12 startup feedpump, the existing one-down in No. 2's
() 13 auxiliary feedpump~ room, .and they wantadi to do some 14 worx there, and that eventually was. considered not '
15 viable. And tnen it was a question, well,-let's go 16 to a third nonsafety grade -- basically a. pump that 17 has the same capacity as an auxiliary feedpump, and 18 that was pretty much what was-decided to-be done, -
4 19 you know, this next out,-sometning along those 20 lines.
21 MR..LANNING: Is this an NRC' requirement 22 for the third' pump?
23 MR. ROGERS:
I No. I t's not an NR.-- it's 24 not a requirement of law it's my understanding
, ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS--INC.
L (202) 347-3700 4
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145 1 originally. I thinx it is a condition of the m
k-) 2 license now and now it's an NRC requirement. But I 3 have to check that to be sure that it is now part 4 of the license, but I believe it is a part of the 5 license.
6 MR. LANNING: If it's part of the license, 7 it makes it a requirement.
8 MR. ROGERS: Yes. Originally, I'm saying.
9 I tnink it is a part of the license new and is now 10 a requirement. I think that it was, you Know, they 11 originally discussed and decided tnis is what we 12 will do and.tnen it wasn' t s requirement tnen.
(_j 13 They said, oxay, that's wha t you are going to do, 14- it's a requirement for you to do it now.
15 MR. ROSSI: By a certain time.
16 MR. ROGERS: By a certain time.
17 MR. LANNING: And what is tha t time frame?
18 MR. ROGERS: I believe it's this next 19 refueling outage.
20 MR. BEARD: Can~I interject, Wayne, do 21 you nava any romembrance or when that licensed 22 condition was established, rougnly?
23 MR. ROGERS: I can go back and pull that --
i l
- rm s 24 I am pretty sure it's a licensed condition and I t
NI ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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146 1 can have that veritiod.
2 MR. BEARD: I think you are right on that 3 point. I'm just wondering it it was establishod 4 six months ago, a year ago, four years ago. I'm 5 not trying to pin you down.
6 MR. ROGERS: We are talking less than a 7 year.
8 MR. BEARD: It isn' t last year whon the .
9 licensed condition was established?
10 MR. ROGERS: Yes. It's one of the more 11 recent licensod conditions. In fact, it's about 12 the-only licensed condition, because you don' t get
/m
(-) 13 many licensed conditions at this stage of a 14 racility. It's very rare, in fact.
15 MR. ROSSI: I wanted to ask a question 16 sbout human factors, problems that may have been 17 identitied with three things. One of them is steam 18 generator level indicators and recorders in the
-19 control room, another is steam generator pressure 20 indicators and lack of recorders I guess in the 21 control room, and the third one would be SPRCS 22 manual actuation buttons. Could you just tell us l 23 whether you know of numan factors, problems in 24 control room reviews with any or allHof those three
(._~)
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147 1 items?
i) 2 MR. ROGERS: Well, I guess my main thing --
3 I'm going to talk just previous to reading over the 4 human factors study or portions of it in the last 5 couple of days -- I do know it's a aigh level tning 6 on the SFRCS push buttons to get them changed so 7 they are not cater-corner.
8 MR. ROSSI: That was tht change, make it 9 so they are not cater-corner?
10 MR. ROGERS: Right.
11 MR. ROSSI: Not maKe it so tne level is 12 more distinguishable from tne pressure?
rs.
() 13, MR. ROGERS: That's true. As far as I 14 Know, tha t's the high level thing is to just get 15 the push buttons switch set up so they are one and 16 one and two and two.
17 Really, my biggest perception is the 18 ope ra t io ns people have always nad a real problem 19 with SPRCS from the standpoint it's so spread out 20 in the control room. They havo -- basically you 21 got the pumps on the front panel, you have got what 22 I'm going to call the four digit discharge valves 23 on the tront panel to get control -- I mean, 'the em 24 valves -- tne main f oodwa te r block valves and those (v )
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148 1
i - 1 type valves are on the bacx. panel and the SFAS 2 panol, and..then the_ manual. push buttons are on the i 3 other side of-the control room on the bacx panel, 1
4 so -- a nd then.the startup level is-really on your 5- steam generator and your turbine panel.-
6.- So :i t's all just spread out all over the t
$ 7 place. And I Know'they have been wanting to get 8 SFRCS Kind of'as a schematic line the-ECCS is so i 9 they can h a'v e a better understanding.of t'he whole .
, 10 ' system. That seems to be.the thing. I'm not; going 1
l Ell to7say I xnow every.little' detail of thess -
L -12' particular things, other than IJKnewEthere.was a -
() 13 general discontent with SFRCS1as a whole.
14 MR. BEARD: Was the SFRCS system part of -
1 15 the original: planto design - or.-was it ' added some 16- pointsin the design process?
f
^ It was--added atisome point' 17L MR. ROGERS:
l 18 inithe design process, but it=was a.part'ofsthe ,
< 19: < design' prior to ~the plant-being: licensed in terms
< 20 of ite' operating license. What' happened was the-
~
, . 21 high energy breex letter came out-that talas about 22 .having:to protect --
?you have.got-.to protect
), .
23 against a pipeLbreak in a_high energy,lline, 3p 24 -irrega'edless of its'. position..in the plant. So
- - ACE FEDERAL. REPORTERS INC.
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l 149 l
-1 anything in the auxiliary building or in the l
-~
2 turbine building to a cortain extent nas got to be 3 protected against a high energy line break. And 4 . when that came out, that brought SFRCS, it's my 5 understanding, into being.
6 And that is pretty mucn where it got its 7 roots, which I thinx.is probably in tne '74-75 time 1
8 tesme versus the other stuff that was probably in 9 the '69 and '70 vintages, early '70 vintages.
10 MR. ROSSI: Before we leave that, I still
- 11 wanted to Know about any human factors problems
-12 Enat.you xnew of.tnat had been identified with
() 13 steam generator level indicators or-recorders or 14 steam generator pressure indicators?
15 MR.-ROGERS: Not as specific items.
16 MR. ROSSI: Okay.
17 MR. LANNING: Is this a human factor 18 study that was performed by the. licensee?-
19 MR. ROGERS: Yes. I believe so. If it 20 is not by-the licensee -- I think it is the 21 licensee. I do not know if there wers or are any 22 consultants involved at this point. But it is tne 23 licensee's study.
m 24 MR. LANNING ' Do you know if there has A C E' FEDERAL' REPORTERS INC.
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150 1 been a report on the results of the study?
('"
2 MR. ROGERS: Well, there is a couple of 3 volumes that talk about it in terms of we just had 4 NRR I think it was or someone -- I shouldn' t say it 5 was NRR, but someona came out trom Washington to 6 taxe a loon at that study and see how tnings were 7 going. It's a TMI item and has a certain time 8 frame associated with it, and if you loon at tho 3 correspondence between NRR, on it will give you a 10 much more detailod history on when some of this 11 stuff has to be cono.
12 MR. BEARD: But is it correct that the x ) 13 human tactors officiency was tne criss-cross on the 14 nigh pressure side of the thing as contrasted to 15 the location of all the switenes or the indication 16 of the low level switches?
17 MR. ROGERS: I think there are a lot of 18 things on SPRCS that are indicated on the human 19 factor study. One that was high was the position 20 of the switches. I think there are other things in 21 the human factor study which discuss tne other 22 specific items of SFRCS. I can get copies of.it.
23 MR. BEARD: Tha t's not necessary.
(~ 24 MR. ROGERS: Tha t's just my perception.
V)
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151
,m 1 I may be totally-off base on what all that -- the i
, 2 high level-portion of that is.
3 MR. ROSSI: Well, if.the operator had 4 pushed.the correct low pressure combination of 1 5 SFRCS, .in other words, if he pushed the buttons I 6 cater-corner rather than right across, .or rather it 7 I can put.it another way, if the human factors i * .
{. 8 problem had' bean. corrected so the top _ two . buttons ;
9 are what'is'now* cater-corner, then'that change
~
10 wou1d -not ~ have .-isola ted both steam generators. Is 11 that your understanding?' -
12 MR. ROGERS: Oxay.. Let me just thinkLfor I) 13. 3 second-what you are doing. Le t's -j ust ' pick one.
14 You would be telling botn actuation channels that l
- 15. steamEgenerator No. 1'is' bad. It1would not have L -16 isolated-both steam generators, that is correct.
17 No. 2 generator then would-h' ave'been fed from-both la . auxiliary foedpumps.
19 MR. ROSSI: Okay.
20' MR. ROGERS:- Looxing at allftnis, it's 21 apparent.that if there hadlbeen' indication,.if tne
'22 guy had alroady xnown that SFRCS wast gone, he ;
23 probably'would never have1 pressed buttons in the >
q 24 first place.
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. 152 -
i 1- MR. ROSSI: Or if he pushed even the i
O 2~ correct combination ot pressure buttons, at least
-3 he"would have gotten water to one of the steam i
j- 4 generators except'for the fact that the pump also 5 failed?
6 MR. R'OGERS: Yeah.
1 7 MR. ROSSI: The valves would' nave been 8 aligned. '
19 .MR. ROSSI: The valves would have been 10 aligned so tnat ione steam generator would have. .
4 11 gotten flow, but with.the pump. failures"you still-i-
12 would.have gotten; flow-to the other steamEgenerator?-
-() ~ 13 MR.--ROGERS: Tha t's correct.
. 14 :MR. LANNING: . It a v e' y o u ~ identified any 15 potential safety' concerns associated with'the SFRCS?
= 16 MR. ROGERS: I don't xnow -- well,' the 17 potential safety concern, I got some' questions-18 about SFRCS in terms'of the main steam ~ isolation ;
19 valve. That.is something that-I've talked about-lt 0 oven witn some-of the individuals' prior to-you 21 becoming.part of the ~ Fact Finding Team'inosome
-22 -conference calls-dealing with-the Main Steam l-
. 23- Isola tion - Valves gives a signal to close -- this .
24 .gets - ra ther' complica ted.
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153 1 Basically the Main Steam Isolation Valves
(~\
\'J 2 can got a signal to closa from one of two safety F 3 systems, SFAS, there is a containment isolation 4 valve under that function, or under SFRCS. And 5 what you have got up there are tivo solenoid files 6 that control the air to the valve, and it would 7 really help to show you some drawings, but 8 basically it you get A and a solenoid deenergized, 9 you will shut the valve. If you get C, D and E 10 solenoid, you will shut the valve.
11 And if you get A and E, you won' t do 12 anything. It nas got to be these particular
() 14 combinations. And the thing is the way the testing 14 sequence is on it, they would test it in such a 15 manner tha t all five solenoids get a closed signal 16 at tne same time. So, boom, all tive. So you 17 don' t Know whether A and 8 or C, D and E get closed; 18 okay?
19 Now, they have done some testing and they 20 nave been able in their surveillance test, it just 21 happens --
it's one of those it just happens to be 22 the way tnat they ca n show the A and a solenoids 23 will close the valves with the C, D and E energized. ~
7"N 24 It deals witn their ASME testing and the push.
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154 I 1. button and what the SPAS portion would do. However 2 they have yet to show me the C, D, and E solenoid
-3 incand of themselves will clor_ the valve.
- 4 Now, this gets into a question of design 5 and what is legal and what is not legal -- or I 6
- shouldn't say so much legal, but what was tne 7 original intent behind the LER that was written in 8 ~ terms of the MSIVs and whether you had to have the 2
9 C, D and E solenoids to deenergise to close the l 10 valves. . I t's 1vo ry complicated in terms ot the way
.1 1' you get there,-but basically I had pointed this'out 12 to the licensee snd they have acceded.to testing
' O qf 13 the C,D and E solenoids-exclusively and have
~ 14 . written a procedure to do that.-
- 15 I cannot say that it is.at this
- point I !
- 16 in time a viola tion o f- -the regulations or the "17 requirements associa ted with testing, but at least
- 4 >
la trom a prudent engineering judgment': call,11t is
- 19 prudent to test.those three solenoids to close'the -
20 valve.
l
! 21. HM R . LANNINGs. So-it-sounds like-your
, 22 concern was not a failure of the1 system so-much as i
23 it-was'a testing of--a part of the system to insure 24 .its-function? ,
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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155 ,
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i 1 MR. ROGERS: Tha t's true. In terms of 2 the testing trequency.-- I mean, of what you are
,, 3' . testing up there. Now, this also goes to the 4 startup' feed valves also because you get yourself
). .5 in a. consideration of what the design was.
6- See, in toch specs you are taking credit
- 7. for the main teedwater contral valves, the s ta r tup 8- feedwater-valves,'and'the block valve which are not 9 necessarily in the turbine building ---I mean,-not in the auxiliaryJbuilding. They are in the turbine
~
l 10 i'
- 11 .buiiding.- And-it tcDX me a couple of months to i
12 tigure out wnst you can havo and wnero you can have .
4
()' 13 on the_high energy; break spectrum a n'd it looks like ,
! 14 i t's oxa y',
bu t tnese valves are,. quote-unquote,-not i
15 'in the Q boundary, but they are toch spec: valves 1
[ 11 6 . and as-such'theyshave-to be testediand' assured okay 17 and you have"got to make sure that the quality of
[ 18 the ma 'in te n a n ce 'o t ' .t na m are oxay. 'But it.gots into t
19'
~
l' the design of-them, could you ta ke a . credi t for ;
r
, -20 these, and/I-think I_ resolved t h a t' in;myfeind.
~
- . 21 MR. LANNING Ati this point in time, does -!
2 2-. i the issue that you;-have raised c o n c e r n i n g .7.t h e MSIVs,-
+
l 23, have1anything t'oldo with this'avent that you1are- f i
l~ 24 . aware of?
L 'ACELFEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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. . . - . . ... - .. . ~ -- -
156 1 MR. ROGERS: I cannot say concretely that O 2 .it does have anytning to do with it for tne simple 3 fact tha t they have not performed trouble-shooting l
4 on tne MSIVs. I am not at this point in time S satisfied as to -- the explanation yet is I thinx 6 the licensee agrees -- they did yesterday when.we 7 talked or whenever it was -- on the SOE about what 8 actually closed the Main Steam Isolation Valves.
9 Until they-get in thereland people see what exactly 10 nappened, I'm not-going to say yes or nay on 11 whether this has anything to-do with it.
12 MR. BEARD: Can I ask one --
-() 13 MR. LANNING: Let me tinish mine. Was 14 inadvertent closure of the MSIV part of your 15 concern?
16 MR. ROGERS: 'Actually it's more-the MSIVs 17- not closing I thinx is probably my biggest safety la concern.
19 MR. BEARD: That1was the question I was 20 going.to raise.
. 21 MR. .LANNING: About what period: of time 22 or now-long ago-did you initiate this conversstion j 23 witn'tho'licensea?
- r^g 24 MR. ROGERS
- -About I'm going to try to ;
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i 157 i I say a montn ago. Is that about the right time? l
/^% :
U 2 MR. BEARD: Tna t's my remembrance is about a month ago. :
3 4 MR. ROGERS: A month ago. I think I've 5 been away from the site and it was a couple of 6 weeks betore I'left the site.
7 MR. ROSSi: Can ~ we go off the record.
~8 (Discussion held ~ oft the_ record.)
9 MR. ROSSI Why don't we go.back on the,
- 10 record. JT, why don' t you go ahead and ask your 11 questions.
12 MR. BEARD: Walt, 'I' realize we can talk
. jp
(,/ 13 about~this for hours and hours and hours, but I .
14 would like to ask you-some questions about your
- 15 knowledge and experience.at tne plant..-how some of t-16 tne Key pieces of equipment are performe'd just i n a
, 17 short synopsis. Are you aware of any history or i 18 anowledge of spurious actuations,.either half trips 19 or^ full trips of the Steam and Feedwater Rupture 20 Control System in' the.recent_past? ,
21 MR. ROGERS: Yes.
. 22 MR. BEARD: Would you say the frequency'
-23 of.these is very frequent, rare, how would.you ,
. 24 classify _tnis? '
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1 MR. ROGERS: .In the last -- since'they 2 started up from this refueling outago, I have soon [
3 at least two and looks likw maybe this time >also, 4 maybe three spurious half trips of SPRCS looking 5 like.as a result of the post-trip response of the
, 6 facility.
7 MR. BEARD: You say since the last outage, d can you give me a month, how long are we ta ln in g 9 about?
10 MR. ROGERS: December of this year, 11 January 1st, somewhere around'that time.
12 MR. BEARD: We.are talking about six O
is months 2 l 14 MR. ROGERS: The'last six months.
15 MR. BEARD: Would you consider that an 16 extraordinary amount, typical amount,oor when you 17 talk to the guys from tne other B.s W plants 18 unusual or how would you classif y ~ it?
19 MR. ROGERS: You can't really talk to the 4
- 20. other B s-W units;or-anybody_else about'0FRCS. -
21 because thes e - _a re the_only people that have got 2 2' lthis-animal.-
f 23- MR. BEARD: I understand, but they have l ~ 24 an. analogous system. It may.be called'a SLBIC or l .
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4 159 1 . some other name, but they. nave a system.
2 MR. ROGERS: But it's nownere near the 3 complicated nature. I t's very nard to compare. -+
i 4 From what I can see, though, I don' t think these i
5 people get that much spurious problems.
l 6 MR. ROSSI: These people being the other 7 people?
6 -MR. ROGERS: Yeah, the other plants.
9 MR. ROSSI: So you are saying Davis-Basse 10 in.your belief has more spurious problems than i
, 11 other-plants would.have?
1
~
l 12 MR. ROGERS: I think that would be my 13' guess.
- 14 MR. BEARD: I guess one other thing 11 I l'S near you I judge-to be significant in'your opinion i
16 is that Steam Feed Rupture Control System is a very.
17 complex system?
~ 18 - MR. ROGERS: ' Extremely complex.
,19 MR. BEARD: Let me change to tne-second 20 question, basically the same type of question. Do
- 21. you have any knowledge in the recent past of -
e s
22 overspeed trip. problems on the aux speed water f a turbines?
.' '24 MR. ROGERS ' No recent knowledge of any ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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160 1 overspeed problems. The only time I can remember Yh 2 they lost a trip throttle valve was a wnile back 3 and it wasn't an overspeed problem. It was --
4 MR. SSLL: Latch?
5 MR. ROGERS: A latch problem. Trip 6 throttle valvo latch problem.
7 MR. BEARD: I gather from what I remember 8 the general tone of some earlier discussions, they 9 had had governor problems but none -- that was more 10 of a control nature tnan n overspeed I gather?
11 MR. ROGERS: Yeah. The overspeed, when 12 it locked up on its overspeed stop or high speed (n),
13 stop, it still wouldn' t trip out on overspeed.
14 MR. HEARD: This is my last question. I 15 have got a very general question. When we and dRR 16 try_to require something of a licensoe, we realize 17 th.se we may not know the plant as well as the 18 licensee and the options that may be available for 19 working the problems through some alternatives, so 20 we put in typically a statement that says this is 21 wha t we think we want or suitable alternative as 22 you may propose.
23 And my question is in this effort.to try
'"]
24 to provide flexibility and not overregulatw, do you k m/
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161 1 think this has allowed maybo too mucn room for (n)
'# 2 delays and circumvention of the intent, just a 3 token addressing of the intent?
4 MR. ROGERS: I think it depends upon the 5 utility.
6 MR. BEARD: Well, le t's talk about this 7 utility. You have been here a pretty good number 3 of years.
9 MR. ROGERS: I thins 11 you look at some 10 of tne big changes, you say -- well, I guess I have 11 a little f rus tra tion on why it toox so long to got 12 the new auxiliary teedpump governor in. Tha t's not rh
(,) 13 so much something NRR would soe, but I think a 14 judgment on what you are saying is going to be made 15 almost in the puolic domain with regard to the 16 startup toodpump, and that will be the real 17 telltale on that.
18 MR. BEARD: That msy be and you may 19 choose not to answer. I'm just curious trom your 20 perspective, the eyes and ears of t r.e agency at 21 Davis-Besse, do you have an opinion you would like 22 to express?
23 MR. ROGERS: In terms of like the-TMI
(-)
v 24 moda, they seem to move in a fairly -- from what I ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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.1 understand on a lot of the other units, they were 2 very quick in getting their modifications in. In 3 that respect, almost some or the other bigger 4 problems, it seems line they haven't moved in the 5 speed they probably.could have, but it may be just 6 that they were. moving on tnose other things that-
[ -7 caused them some problems. It's hard.to judge, to 8 be really honest.
. 9 MR. BEARD: Okay., Tha t's -- I had some
- 10 other questions about tne operstional experience on 1
$ .. ..8 11 the Rupture Control Sys tem , ' bu t I unue ra t s nd we are i .I
!- 12 going to have a discussionoon tnktm ali a separate
) 13 item 2just to ge t1ms; he tter educa ed on the local 14 ~ . design here, so- I - son' t . bring .those up at .this time.
.13 MR. ROSSI ;Okay. t Then why' don't we end 4
16 tne interview then.
- i. 17 - --- -
1
'18. Thereupon, the interview was f
19 concluded at 3:10 o' clock p.m.
20 - -- --
i 21 i 1
! 2 2-- l I
l 23-([)-
! l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.-
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163 1
,o 2 CERTIFICAPE 3 I, Nicholsa Marrone, a Registered 4 Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for 5 the S ta te of Ohio, do hereby certify that I took 6 the aforementioned interview and that the foregoing 7 transcript of such proceedings is a tull, true and 8 correct transcript of my stenotypy notes as so 9 taxen.
10 I do further certify that I was called 11 there in tne capacity of a Rogistered Protessional 12 Reporter, and am not otherwise interested in this
(~h t,) 13 proc 94 ding.
14 IN WITNESS W il E R E O F , I have hereunto set 15 my hand and atfixed my seal of ottice at Columbus, 16 Ohio, on this day of Jth. , 1935.
17 (
\-
IB _
.s (M , -
,h NICHOLAS A. MARRONE, Registered 19 Professional Reporter, Notary Public in and for the State of Ohio.
20
'21 My Commission expires November 1, 1987.
22 23 ew 24 lj ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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