ML20129B912

Transcript of 850711 Closed Meeting in Oak Harbor,Oh Re Steam & Feedwater Rupture Control Sys Training.Pp 1-20

ML20129B912
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Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	07/11/1985
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NUDOCS 8507290295
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UNITED STATES L. 9 ?.

NUCLEAR REGULA'IORY COMMISSION -

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IN THE MATTER OF.

f DAVIS-BESSE INCIDENT . .

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L f (INTERVIEW AND MEETING) .

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(CLOSED) a

_ SFRCS TRAINING B

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LOCATION: OAK HARBOR, OHIO Pages 1 - 20 h

= DATE: July 11, 1985 a _

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ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS Official Reporters 444 North Capitol Street 3"M"n;";A -

8507290295 850711 PDR ADOCK 05000346 .i j,

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-5

-Joe Wal 1

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

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-3 ------

~4 , THURSDAY, JULY 11, 1985 5 ------

6 7 MEETING BETWEEN THE NRC FACT-FINDING TEAM AND TOLEDO ~ EDISON 8 ON 9 SFRCS TRAINING 10 II ~NRC FACT-FINDING !1 EMBERS PRESENT:

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12 DR. ROSSI 13 J. T. BEARD 14 L. BELL 15 16 TOLEDO EDISON MEMBERS PRESENT:'

17 J. LINGENFELTER l 18 R. SIMPKINS 19 W. ROGERS N

21 22 23 24

' Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.

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5 47'-1-SueWalsh I PRO-CEEDINCS

'2 , (12 : 00 p.m. ) *

.3 MR. ROSSI: This is going to be a short discus-4 sion -- I hope a short discussion -- on operator training 5 related tci the SFRCS ' manual actuation. And we had a call i

0 from Wa'yne Lanning, who is a member of our Team, yesterday, 7 ~and he referred to a January 31st, 1985 letter to John' Stoles

'8 on the subject of, I guess, inadvertent actuations of SPRCS.

9 And he indicated that1that letter stated that the

- 10 fact that inadvertent low pressure actuation of the SFRCS

'II could ~1ock all other actuations, and that the main point wo 12 want to talk about-is that the letter indicated that the 13

-operators had been-trained on that potential and that fixes I4 ,w ere being; considered.

15 MR.-BEARD: ,.You know, I would like to make sure we

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. understand th~e first part,[too, what theyLmean by that

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. statement at some --

18 MR. ROSSI: Yeah. And'so with thatzsort of intro-I9 duction, could[you tell'us what you know of statements that s

20 were madefin the letter, and what sort of training'had-the 21 '

operators been'.provided?: 1 22 MR. LINGENFELTER: Okay. 1Let me-lead into that, 23

. because I was the author of the letter.

2

AhFEbd Rga%n,lm.

And the' statement was made describing the fact I

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, that we; knew the' operators who were aware of the misarrangement'

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1 t7-2-SueWalsh of the actuation switches. 4

, 2 'MR. ROSSI: Okay. Now, the misarrangement has to I

3 do with the diagonal arrangement of the two buttons that 4 they would push under certain circumstances, rather than 5 having them located right on the same horizontal line.

6 MR. LINGENFELTER: That is correit.

'7 MR. ROSSI: Okay.

8 MR. LINGENFELTER: And my basis ior making that 9 statement was.that people who have taken the licensed opera--

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10 . tor training in.my group' knew that that training had been 11 provided. In other words, I did not go back and look at all 12 the training records- to find out exactly where it was

.13 covered, but we have people - 'we knew the operators who 14 are aware of that particular problem.

15 And that'was.what my sentence was based'upon'.

16 MR. BEARD: .Okay. Let me ask you, Jack, on this 17 statement -- this state $ent apparently was made that if low-18 pressure manual actuation occurs'it " blocks other inputs.'"

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19 What does that mean?. >

20 MR.- LINGENFELTER: No, no. It doesn't block other 21 inputs.- Well, it woul'd override actual inputs,.just like 22 _in the' event that happened on the 9th.

23 This statement was - made that_ if you push -- in a 24 non-diagonal'-fashion,-you. push the low pressurefbutton.so

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25 that one channel recognizes one. steam generator is bad and

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.#7-3-SueWalshi the'other channel recognizes the opposite generator is bad, ~

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, 2 then both steam generators get isolated; 599 and 608 go

,3 closed. So that cuts off:the-feedwater.

4 ~ MR. ROSSI: That was the meaning of your statement?

5 MR. LINGENFELTER: Yes.

6 MR. ROSSI: That was the meaning _ of your statement?

7 MR. LINGENFELTER: It doesn't change anything 8 ~ else. .I mean, all the' main feed isolation occurs,'everything.

9 else. ~ But the problem becomes that you don't have any-10 auxiliary feedwater.

11 -MR. BEARD: So, you are really, if I understand you

'12 right, referring to the fact that the way the. system is de-13 signed all the low pressure actuation inputs have priority over 14 all'other-inputs. And in that sense it-sort of blocks other 15 s ignals and also cuts off aux _feedwater input?

16 MR. LINGENFELTER: Right.

17 MR. ] BEARD: Okay.

18 MR. LINGENFELTER: That's fair.

, -19 ~MR."lBEARD: I think.I u'nderstand what you were-

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l 20 referring ~to.:

- 21 MR. ROSSI: Okay. 'Now, what can you today -- what L 22 do you know about the' training of.the specific' operator'that

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23 was on duty that: pushed the switches incorrectly on June 9th? ~

24 Do you know anything.about whether he had had l

Aes.deral it.porten, lac 25 training related to-the switches? If you don't know --

, , . .,. , , , , ~-, - - , . , .,

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1. 7-4-SueWalsh] 'MR. SIMPKINS: I'm pretty sure that he had. I  :

, 2 can't verify it positively. But I know that -- how the 3 licensed 1 group that he went-through -- I can't verify that.

4 I know how the licensed group that he went through had the 5 trainin'g on the SFRCS and also the ATOG training that was 6 conducted later, last year, the November / December time frame.

7 IIe had a f specific transient where -- in fact, it 8 was a B&W'run transient that ran on a computer printout, all 9 the stuff with the safety bit to verify when they got in 10 that section>of the emergency procedure that they would actuate 11 on low pressure.

t 12 MR. ROSSI: IIad they -- what sort of general train-13 ing do you give to the operators related to the switches? 'Do 14 you take them into the control room and show them the switches or -- 7 15 16 MR. SIMPKINS: Th'is training,-the ATOG, we physically 17 walk them through a mockup control room.

18 j MR.!ROSSI: A mockup; control room?. 4 19 MR. SIMPKINSi Yeah.

20 MR.;LINGENFELTER: You know, the control room mock-

- 21 up was' prepared for the control room design, to be used as a' 22 training -- sort of a training aid.

23 MR. ROSSI: Okay.- So you walked them through a 24 mockup control' room, and there you have the switches mocked'up.

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25 And do they -- do you know if those switches on that c -

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1. 7-5-SueWalshi mockup have the little red tape under the fourth buttons 2 down that are used for. low level?

Do you happen to know?

3 MR. SIMPKINS: I would have to,look. I don't

'4 know or don't remember what time the. pictures'were taken.

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5 MR. LINGENFELTER: I couldn't tell you on,that.

~6 MR. ROSSI: Is the mockup here now? Is it at 7 the' site? Is it in this building?

8 MR. LINGENFELTER: It's over towards the plant.

9 It's outside the protected area.- It's a little -- not that

'10 direction. It's in a little warehouse building.

11 MR. ROSSI: Is it a full-scale mockup?

12

. MR. LINGENFELTER: Yes.

13 MR; ROSSI: Okay. If we were to go over and 14 look at it today and what'ever the status is of the red tape,:

15 would there'be any guarantee or assurance that iftthe red 16 tape is not there today that it wasn't there then, or vice-I7 versa?

18 MR. LINGENFELTER:, No, there wouldn't be any

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assurance,,but,myf feeling is that-the red tape was.put 20 there .for the serious contmal room fire!which came~ up in --

21 that evolution occurred.in '84.'

22 MR. SIMPKINS: Late '84-I believe.

23

. MR. LINGENFELTER: And'the mockup was based on 24

.the status of the plant as of '83. There have been some

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25 changes made:to it that I doubt-that that tape addition was-

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!#i-6-SueWalsh l made.-- in fact, I'm sure that the tape addition would not

, 2 have been made.

3 14R . ROSSI: So the tape would not have been there

-4 lwhen.they were' training? And really the training on the 5 manual actuation of the SFRCS is primarily based on the

..6 mockup:and not in the control room training?

7 MR. SIMPKINS: Well, for this particular training 8 lit was only because we had a mockup available. We hadn't 9 had it before.

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'10 MR. LINGENFELTER: The tape you'are referring to 11 is on the low' level?

12 MR. ROSSI:- The -- yes.

13 MR. LINGENFELTER: Okay. Now, the particular 14 question we are talking.' about here, - of course, is:the' cross 15 pattern-of the low'p'ressure switches. The tape --

16 MR. ROSSI: Would have no distinguishing marks 17 ..there other;than just knowing. '. >

18 MR. SIMPKINS: The operators'were. walked through-19 the control . room for differe'nti pr'o' edures J

c and shown the red -

20 tape from the low level. trip buttons in: the actual control 21 ~ room.- But I can't swear that this guy that pushed the wrong 22 buttons was'a reactor operator at'the~ time that he did that 23 - or-not.

24 I'm not sure.

keFeared Remem, lac. J l

25 'MR. BELL: In your training lecture for the' steam l

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'.#7-7-SueWal and feedwater rupture control system, do you point out to

. 2 Ethe operators that ifLthe-two end line buttons are pressed 3 ,

that part of-the SPRCS design is-adversely effected?

4 MR. SIMPKINS: The last time it was given in 5 requalify the.SFRCS lecture was in '83, and the information i,

6 I found ~ on that, there'is nothing that specifically said,

7 you know,

that'this is required. All the design basis I 8 ' 'think was gone through'as'far as how it actuates on low.

9 pressure.- But I can't guarantee.

I.

1 3 10 I: sat through.the lecture, but-I just can't 11 remember if he specifically said.two low pressure buttons 12 one on each side would enable the~ aux feed system.

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.13 The lecture going,on currently now,.which is 14 -after the fact, certainly/ points it out.

15 MR. ROSSI: So there may'not h' ave been a lot of 16 . stress.in the' training on all those problems with the

, 17  : butt'ons? ,

-18 MR..SIMPKINS: I knowfit was brought.up that i 19 you have to' cross the'bbttons. - But I' can ' t verify that it

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120 was" brought up,lwhat happens-if you don't.

'21 LI know that'it was brought up, _the actuation-on

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low level if you only hit one:and only hit one actuation

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, channel. ..But I can't.: swear if that was_ covered.

4 24 MR.~. BELL: . Jack, had your. department. considered

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25 the possibility of this incident; prior .to its occurrence?

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)7?8-SueWalsh 1 MR. LINGENFELTER: You mean in specific terms 2 of having a guy push the top two buttons?

3 MR. BELL: Or -- yes, the top two buttons.

4 MR. LINGENFELTER: Okay. The top two buttons, 5 -as opposed to if you were trying to push .it on low pressure,

. 6 diagonal. That was specifically.what we had been concerned 7 with when we -- in the human engineering discrepancy,.the HED, 8 that we had.

9 .In other words, we never -- we never contemplate'd 10 ~ that'-he would hit the top two buttons instead of the fourth 11 ones down, if that's what you are aiming at.

12 MR. BELL: That's what..I wasiasking, yes. .The 13 consequences of inadverte'nt actuation on SFRCS on a low.

14 . steam generator pressure in Number ~ l' steam generator and a 15 low steam generator pressure"in Number 2 steam generator.

16 MR. LINGENFELTER: Ye'ah . With the- HED, we 17 ' identified, we'lo"oked'at'that problem and again as opposed 18 to -- the problem we are ? actually looking at here, is he hit

- 19 the top two buttons instead of the fourth one down. We didn't 20 - think ofEthat as part of the HED I ' guess.

21 MR. BEARD: Let's see if I can summarize and'make

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22 sure I understand. Because of the HED, the deficiency, I.get 23 .- the. impression 'that you .made sure that at your training 24 / program ~you emphasized:to the operators that.if they have a Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.

25 steam generator they had to use the diagonal approach rather f

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10 Ili-9-SueWalshi than'some other approach.

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. 2 MR. LINGENFELTER: Right.

3 MR. BEARD: All right. Now, that's the point 4 number one. Point number two is, I don't think I hear you 5 saying that you emphasize in the training that if he were 6 to push it straight across the impact on what that would -

7 have'on other. actuation signals such as low level.

8 MR. LINGENFELTER: That specific action and its 9 consequences and its impact on plant was probably not pointed 10 .out.

11 MR. BEARD: The point I'm trying to get at is, i

12 .I.think you were emphasizing when you got this situation, 13 here is ' the right way to do - it.

.14 MR. LINGENFELThR: Right.

15 ,

MR. BEARD: And you probably also -- or, I would 16 guess th'e instructor would have said- if hel did + 1t straight 17 across that's the wrong way to do it. You know, I.would 18 imagine that would be a typical part'of the lecture.

19 But, what I'm trying to 'get to is, you .didn' t

' 20 really point 'out that if he does it in the straight horizonta:

21 manner, he not only doesn'.t get what he wanted to get but he, 22 in effect, blocks the SFRCS from.other. inputs, which seems 23 .to be the statement which was made in the letter.

4 24 See, the statement in-the letter, as it was read

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25 to me yesterday,-was -- and it was-read verbatim, and

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1. 7-10-SueWalsh obviously I don 't have it-h1 frontof me, and you don't either - -

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. 2 but it said that we recognize that when you have low pres-3 sure. actuation that this blocks all the other inputs.to 4 the.'SFRCS system. But our operators have all been trained

'S on'this, and they are'all checked out, and they know about 6  : this potential problem.

7 MR. LINGENFELTER: No, that's not the way it

'8 reads.

9 MR. BEARD: Okay. That's where --

10 MR. LINGENFELTER: That was certainly not the II

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Lintent of the' thing. 'And I may have to go back and get-a

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12 copy of tit for you.-

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But, it was -- and it really hadn't to do with ,

14 the blocking ' of other . signals. It was --- we were more 15 ' concerned about the blocking of feedwater specifically with 16 that" activity.

17 And again.we were basing it on the assumption 18 that the only time the guy would even aim his fingers at 19 .those. top buttons would be if he were.trying to actuate i

20 a low-pressure.

21 MR. BEARD:' Okay.

22 MR. LINGENFELTER: 'So, what we'were concerned 23 with'is that he understood that~he had to hit the diagonal.

'24 MR. BEARD: Right.

Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.

25 MR. LINGENFELTER: It wasn't'a. matter.of -- the

i 12

' #'7-11-SueWalsh - thing that we were trying to come across with had nothing 2 . to do'with what happened here in terms of hitting the top 3 buttons .versus the - fourth ones .down.

4 MR. ROSSI: Is part of your standard training 5 and policy at this plant that the operators should manually 16 initiate safety functions when they see that they are on the

-7 way to being automatically initiated?

8 ' I mean, is that something that is a standard 9 policy?

10 MR. SIMPKINS: No. In fact,-it's specifically 11 not to be done in the safety features.

' 12 The only system that is manually actuated is SFRCS by the proce' dure-which says if the automatic actuation

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13 14 fails'to actuate it on low' level. And that.is-strongly 15  : emphasized throughout. training.

e END #7 16 M.Simons flws 17 ,

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.Sim 8 MR. ROSSI: Is it a policy at the plant or part

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. of the training that when you have a loss of main feedwater a

. 2 transient that the operators should manually initiate the 3

SFRCS low level in anticipation or prior to giving the 4

automatic- signal?

MR. SIMPKINS: It was strongly emphasized to follow the emergency procedure and that guides you into 7

. actuating on low level if SFRCS does not actuate.

MR. ROSSI: 5 Dut only if it doesn't actuate 9

automatically and there is nothing that says do it in 10 anticipation?

) 11 MR. SIMPKINS: That is not true. It does in a 12

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1. r und-about way because if you get into loss of coolant or 13 lack of heat transfer, then you actuate SFRCS and verify your j4

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. raised steam generator levels i to'12'4 inchesa and trip?Ehe #

reactor coolant pump.

16 j7 MR. BEARD :- You are.the guy that trains the 18 perators, right, or one of your guys?

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.j9 MR. SIMPKINS :=' I~was involved in some of the 20 training, yes.

21 MR.: BEARD: .Would your~ training have included 22 consideration of.that if you lose level in the generator 23 f r whatever reason. arid you are approaching the . automatic 24 actuation point that it might be a good idea to conserve

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25 what inventory is in there and that one way one might do .

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.'____.___._________________.._________._____________. __.___._____._____m _____.__1_

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$im.8-2' .1 that-is to go ahead and manually actuate the low level

- 2 actuation? i 3 'MR . SIMPKINSe No.

4 MR. BEARD: That is not part of your training? j 5 MR. SIMPKINS: It is not part of the training.

6 The dead band between low-level limits and the SFRCS trip 7 setpoint is so close that'iteis ---

8 MR..LINGENFELTER: :That:isf_ifnyou are in a< post -

9 trip situation, which we have been in a number of times. I 10 -

think I know.the direction of your question. It is not II uncommon, nor is it prohibited specifically for an operator 12 to manually actuate SFRCS in the situation he was in because 13 the levels were dropping and the speed on the turbine was 14 dropping and he knew he was going to buy it sooner or later.

15 The problem they have-with that is the way the 16 system' works. He turns right around'and fills them right 17 back up to where they already were in'a real-fast fashion.

18 They do not like' the overcoolingLtransient that results from 19 that. So they anticipate it.

20 ,~ MR. ROSSI: So it is'a policy at least at the

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21 plant that they push the buttons _in= anticipation-of low level t

22 for the-kind of transient that occurred?

23 MR. LINGENFELTER:. It is not a firm policy. It 24 varies from shift to shift. It depends on.how they feel l Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.

25 comfortable with-operating in.that particular/ situation.

i t

15

'Sim 8-3 i

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Some shifts don't do that. But we, knowing the way the

. 2 system responds to it, have never specifically precluded 3 somebody from trying to do that, especially given their 1

4 . concern or. potential concern not knowing exactly the status 5 of the SFRCS.

m 6 MR. ROSSI: So maybe a correct way of stating 7 it is that the procedures neither tell them to do it, nor 8 tell them not'to do it.

9 MR. SIMPKINSr I would have to look at the 10 ' procedure. I can't remember the specifics on if for some 11 reason both-feed pumps were tripped at power with the 12 . supplementary steps telling'them.specifically what to do.

13 MR. ROSSIF We have that. procedure anyway.

14 MR. BEARD: Are you talking about the ATOG 15 procedure?-

16 MR. SIMPKINS: I believe that does tell you to 17 manually actuate it on low level if both feed-pumps go away 18 -on a trip and SFRCS doesn't' actuate.

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I'9 MR. ROSSI: Well, there is a difference between what 20 .you said and,what he did. What I have heard you say several 21 times is that the procedure spedifically says that if you 22 don't.get the automaticiactuation'o,flSFRCS, then you manually

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23 initiate it. And the question is does the procedure tell 24 him:to manually initiate-it before he gets the automatic Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.

25 initiation in anticipation ---

l i-t__. _

16

,Sim-8-4

'I MR. SIMPKINS: It does because it doesn't mention'say the words-if SFRCS does not automatically

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. 2 3 initiate in the places I am' thinking of, and it is just 4 : recalling from memory-the action that I am referring to.

5 .One of the. supplementary action steps is that you verify 6 proper feed water response. If not, you go to the next step 7 which asks has SFRCS actuated.

8 .MR. ROSSI: Well, we can check on the procedure 9 there. We don't really need to depend'on overybody's memory

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10 of the procedure because we can look. .; -

.11

-NR. BEARD: Well, I guess the only thing that

'12 .

. I would like to make sure that I understand is that I gather-

.13 .

that'as'farlas the general training that all operators get, 14

.you do not emphasize or bring up that one should try to 15 manually actuate on low lcvul in anticipation of some 16 situation like Jack-referredsto, but that certain shifts 17 may.be more comfortable in choose to operate in that manner.

18 Is that a fair statement?-

19 -

MR.7 LINGENFELTER: J That would be my perception.

20 '

'I won't" speak fo'r: training.

21 MR.~ROSSI:',I.also heard-the statement that 22 '

the procedure may be written to.tell' them that if they have 23 SPRCS

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a loss of' feed,that they should manually initiate 24 hFedoroI Reporters, Inc, and it doesn't say if--'it isn't initiated automatically or 25 anything. It may just say if I have lost main feed to

_. ._ ___ m . _ . - . _. ._

17

- Sim 8-5 j manually actuate SFRCS, but we can.look.

2 MR. SIMPKINS: I believe it uses the words

. 3 verify proper SFRCS actuation. I really can't remember.

4 MR. ROSSI: Well, we can check the procedure.

5 MR. BEARD: But it would be a follow-up action, 6 as I understand the way you are describing.it, to something 7 having not happened automatically.

8 MR. ROSSI: That is the question though. It may 9 or may not be, depending on how it is worded.

J 10 10R. BEARD: But what I hear the gentleman saying i

y r. is from memory, for whatever that is worth. What he 12 remembers is that the part that tells him to actuate is the 13 follow-uP to having him check to see if it happened already -

i 14 automatically.

15 MR. SIMPKINS.* Yes,

i. <

, 16 MR. BEARD: Okay. And we can check the procedures j7 and_look at it. -

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18 MR. ROGERS:. .In y'our training an operator manually

, j9 actuating SFRCS on. low level, would/it be considered a 20 Procedural violation or-~in any way an imprudent operation 21 by-the operator, given the training.they have been-given ---

22 MR. SIMPKINS: To manually actuate SFRCS, no, by

- 23 no means no.

j- 24 MR. ROGERS: That is okay,

' Ase-Federal Reporters, Inc.

25 MR. ROSSI:- So the procedure doesn't prohibit I

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- S'im18-6 j it either.

2 MR. SIMPKINS: Right.

3 MR. ROSSI:t . There is no prohibition in either 4 the training policy or the procedure for doing it. It is 5

left up to the operator's discretion basically.

MR. SIMPKINS: I can't remember the exact words 7 of the procedure. I am.sorry.

8 MR. ROSSI: We will have to check it.

9 MR. SIMPKINS: I don't_know if that is a fair 10 . statement to make.

gj MR. ROGERS: I guess I am just look at it from an i

12 operating phil' sophy. o for ' people that' hav'enhad: operator. licenses 13 and the general tradition that it happened given your'feedwater y problem and the problems you have had with rapid feedwater -

15 reduction. It is not an uncommon occurrence for your operators 16 to punch out SFRCS manually.

j7 MR. SIMPKINS: .Right.

18 MR. ROSSI: That hastbe~ e n :youriobs6rvatipn -is that;

, j9 they generally do do that.

20 MR. ROGERS: They are very concerned because of the 21 way rapid feedwater reduction operates. There is a two-minute 22 timer in there and there are some questions'in that two-minute 23 time frame when you are sitting there watching the feedwater 24 and.trying to get a feel for what is really going on, and as hFederal Reporters, Inc.

i 25 levels came.down, and if they feel that rapid feedwater

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8:

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'Sim'8-7 :1 _ reduction isn't going to take over and do what they want it 2 to do, I think it is a safe assessment ~to say that they go 3 ahead and take the system into SFRCS by manually actuating.

4 I think there have been cases where before the 5 manual actuation takes place, which they have intentions of 6 doing, the automatic system eventually takes over. There have

~7 been cases where they have been in that transition before.

8 Correct me if I am wrong.

9 MR. ROSSI: Larry.

10 MR. BELL: Would you tell me the length of the 11' lecture on the SFRCS system in the hot license training program?

12 MR. SIMPKINS: 'I believe it is four hours.- I am 13 pretty: sure that is about ' the length of it.

14 MR. BELL: Earlier you didn't mention the fact 15 that 'it was even included in the hot license program. You only 16 addressed a requalification lecture. So I wsanted to make 17 sure that it was included in the hot license program.

18 MR. SIMPKINS: There are also specific signoffs 1 .

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19 before th'ey even go into the hot license class that that system 20 is checked out by a reactor operator. .

21 MR. BELL: On a slightly different subject if 22 you are in the training department. Would the area that you 23 work with include training on aux feedwater systems?

24 MR.'SIMPKINS: Yes.

AseFederal Reporters, lac.

25 MR. BELL: All right. In association with the

m 20 Sim 8 j training that you give the people, and I am referring

- 2 specifically to non-licensed individuals, is that in your 3 jurisdiction?

4 MR. SIMPKINS: Yes.

5 MR. BELL: Okay. Does that training include 6 recovery type operations, such as relatching the turbine 7 trip throttle valve?

g MR. SIMPKINS: Yes.

9 MR. BELL: So that from a training perspective 10 if a guy has been through your course and his card is 11 signed off, so to speak, on aux feedwater, one would expect 12 that=the guy knows how to reset the trip throttle valves?

13 MR. SIMPKINS: Yes.

14 MR. BELL: Thank you.

15 MR. ROSSI: .Anything more?

16 MR. BELL: No.

17 MR. ROSSI: Okay, that is the end of that then.

18 (Whereupon, at_12:10 p.m., the. meeting concluded.)

j9 ******'

~

20 ,

21 22 23 24 hr.d.e. hp.<=es, ix.

25

J .,__ _

, CERTIFICATE O? P RONELJ '. 35 k 2 3

This is to certify that the attached procee:iings before the 4  ::RC COCXXKEXIEX FACT FINDING TEAM.

3 In the matter of: DAVIS-BESSE INCIDENT t

Date of Proceeding: July 11, 1985 [

a Place of Proceeding: Oak Ilarbor, Ohio 7

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 9 transcriPt for the file of the Commission.

10 GARRETT J. WAYSil, JR. b MYRTLE II. WALS!!

Official Reporter - Typed Official Reporter - Typed 12

.Qy k, j $W *

• l*-.. .

9 Offl ial Reporter - Sigt. Officiadfeporter-Si ature 15 16 17 MARY SIMONS  ;

to Official Reporter - Typed e

- t 20 g_ MA

'OfficipReporter-Signature 22 ,

~

. 23 2A e'

23 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES REGISTERED PROFESSION AL REPORTCRS NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

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