ML20129C105
| ML20129C105 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1985 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507290347 | |
| Download: ML20129C105 (309) | |
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.y UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
( ) NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l In the matter of: BEFORE THE FACT-FINDING TASK FORCE RE: Davis-Besse Event of June 9, 1985 (Closed Session) Docket No. i f3 !
\ _j Location: Bethesda, Maryland Date: Thursday, June 27, 1985 Pages: 1 - 133 8507290347g"$0 346 PDR ADOCK PDR T
ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES p_ ( ) Court Reporters 1625 I St., N.W. Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
1 BEFORE THE FACT-FINDING TASK FORCE 2 OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 4 CLOSED SESSION 5 6 16 : 7 Davis-Besse Event 8 Of June 9, 1985 9 10 Proceedings before the Fact-Finding Task Force 11 in re the above-mentioned event, held at 4340 East-west 12 i Highway, Room 255, Bethesda, Maryland, commencing at 10:35 13 ) a.m., on Thursday, June 27, 1985. 14 TASK FORCE MEMBERS PRESENT: 15 E. Rossi, NRC 16 J.T. Beard, NRC 17 W. Shafer, NRC 18 ALSO PRESENT: 19 W. Lanning 20 W. McCurdy (MPR) 21 PRESENT FROM TOLEDO,EDISONy 22 J. Wood B. Beyer 23 P. Hildebrandt C. Rupp 24 D. Wilczynski R. Gradomski 25 T. Isley S. Jain L. Stalter S. Wideran
2 PROCEED I NGS
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1 2 MR. ROSSI: We are now starting with the meeting. 3 What we are going to do is we are going to talk 4 about a number of action plans for troubleshooting the 5 equipment that you have sent to us in the last couple of days, 6 and this is in accordance with our agreement that we would 4 7 comment on these before you started to work. 8 Before we go into that, I have got a couple of 4 9 things that I want to discuss that are sort of general 10 things. One of them is that we want to make sure that we are ] 4 11 provided promptly with copies of revisions, the latest i 12 revisions of these action plans, and specifically I want to
- w 13 ask somebody to check on what the latest revision is to Action 4 14 Plan No. 12, which is one on auxiliary feedwater system valve 15 problem analysis.
16 It is the one on Valves 599 and 608. The latest one 17 that we have is marked Revision 0, and it is dated June 14th 18 of 1985. 19 Jtan, could you call back during an appropriate i 20 break and verify that that is the latest one, and if it isn't 21 the latest one, get a copy of the latest one to us as quickly 22 as possible? ( 23 MR. WOOD: Okay. We have brought Revision 2, dated
) 24 6/26/85, with us for distribution.
l ! 25 MR. ROSSI: You have. Okay. I w s 3-----g --- .,-.m- 7 ,m __ , ,_, ,__ ,,,p,,g m ,,
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MR. BEARD: What about Revision 1, John? Let me 2 review the bidding. Revision 0 is the one you brought to i l 3 us in the meeting and we commented on. 4 MR. WOOD: That's correct. 5 MR. BEARD: And as a result of that discussion and 6 meeting, you revised it and it became Revision 1. What I i 7 think I'm hearing is that you have an additional revision and j 8 now you are up to Rev. 2, dated yesterday. ~ 9 MR. WOOD: That's correct. 10 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Well, in any event, we have the 1 11 latest one now. Let's make it a part of the transcript right 7
,_ 12 now, the latest one, and note that we want Revision 1 so we 13 will have a complete record of changes. So you ought to get 14 us Revision 1 because we apparently do not have it, but at 15 least we have Revision 2, and that will be marked in the 16 transcript.
4 17 (The document referred to, marked Exhibit No. 1, 18 follows:] i 19 , 20 21 22 23
) 24 25
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N,] ACTION PLAN # 12 TITLE: Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Problem Analysis (AF 599 & AF 608)
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[x. -) , APPR. CHAIRMAN FOR REV DATE REASON FOR REVISION BY TASK FORCE IMPL. 0 6/14/85 Initial Issue for Approval lSeeRev.O General tormat changes. Claritications
" result of discussion with the See Rev. 1 for Approval 1 6/16/85 NRC Revise Hypothesis #7 and add step 12 2 6/26/85 to the action plan. J. Long .// p
4 i TITLE: -Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Problem Analysis (AF 599 & AF 608) _ } REPORT BY: James W. Long PLAN NO.: 12 4 DATE PREPARED: June 16, 1985 PAGE 1 of 2 i I - This report has been prepared in accordance with the " Guidelines to follow i when troubleshooting or performing investigative actions into the root cause surrounding the June 9, 1985, reactor trip", Rev. 2. INTRODUCTION i j The following report is the analysis and evaluation to support the action
, plan for determining the root cause for the failure of AF 599 and AF 608
. (AFW to SG isolation valves) to open during the June 9, 1985 reactor trip.
l
SUMMARY
OF DATA i
! AF 599 and AF 608 are normally locked open valves and were open prior to l the transient. During the transient, both valves went shut automatically l because of the improper initiation of SFRCS. After the SFRCS was reset, i both valves failed to open automatically. Operators were then sent to i- open the valves manually. According to the operator, the valves were j placed in manual and the handwheel turned in the open direction. The l
~ handwheel was hard to turn and was only moved 1/2 turn in the open direction. The handwheel was then turned in the close direction 1/2 ; turn to try and get a hammerblow in the open direction. This was repeated 4 a second time, and when turned in the close direction the second time a
- rattling noise came from the operator and the valves were opened electri-
! cally. This rattling noise was probably the tripper fingers being kicked l out by the act.or and is to be expected. The actual differential pressure (DP) ,seen by these valves at the time
- they were attempting to open is unknown but they are designed to open assinst a 1050 PSID. At 1515 on 6/9/85, both valves were cycled satisfac-
- torily within their required stroke time. At that time S/G pressure was t 850 PSIG.
i ! A review of maintenance and surveillance testing history shows that the torque switch settings were changed in March 1984 per FCR 84-0039 as a
- result of the Limitorque actor operated valves study and both valves were
- satisfactorily tested per ST5064.01 (CTMT Isolation Valve Post Maintenance i Testing). During the 1984 Refueling Outage, the motors and magnetic j brakes were replaced on both valves per FCR 83-0067. The brakes were replaced as part of the environmental qualification of safety related electrical equipment program (10CFR50-49 Rule Requirements). In addition,
! AF 599 was disassembled,-3 bearings replaced, relubricated, and reassen-bled. During the testing of AF 599 following this maintenance, a loose l spacer was found in the spring pack. This was corrected and both valves were tested satisfactorily. The only normal testing for these valves is a
- stroke time per ST 5071.02 (AFW System 18 month refueling test), which was j performed on 12/31/84, with satisfactory results. The brakes were replaced l
during the outage as noted above. l I
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AFS Analysis Ccn'd. 2 l i p CHANGE ANALYSIS t g - The only changes identified from the testing performed on 12/31/84 and the i. 6/9/85 reactor trip is the plant condition when the valves were cycled. On 12/31/84, the plant was in Mode 5, therefore, the plant was cold and at low pressure so the valves did not see a high DP across them. During the 6/9/85 reactor trip, the plant was in Mode 1, therefore, at normal operat- i
- ing temperature and pressure. Because of their location in the Mechanical Penetration Rooms, they would probably have been close to the ambient 4 temperature of the rooms. However, they would have seen full S/G pressure I when shutting. If the upstream check valve leaked, any pressure trapped j between the check valve and AF 599 (AF 608) would have bled off. This would have caused a high DP across the valves when attempting to open. >
HYPOTHESES 1 Based on the information collected before, during and after the transient, i it appears that both valves torqued out when opening. The following is a list of the hypothesis that could cause a valve to torque out. The Action Plan Item that will prove or disprove each hypothesis is listed. ! 1. Improperly adjusted torque switch bypass contact (this hypothesis , ! covered by Action Items 3 and 5). i
- 2. Improper torque switch setting (this hypothesis covered by Action Ites 2).
lO 3. Wrong or improperly adjusted spring pack (this hypothesis covered by Action Item 7). } 4. Failure of motor brake to release when energized or engage when l deenergized (this hypothesis covered by Action Items 3 ar.d 4). i l S. Improper torque switch setting calculations (this hypothesis covered
! by Action Items 8-11). ]
- 6. Improper torque switch installation (this hypothesis covered by 4
Action Item 6). , i 2 7. High DP across valva (this hypothesis covered by Action Ites 12). , i !O i, b
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(3 ACTION PLAN "PL AN NUMRE H PAGE 12 a' 3 ocm ,_ _ Rev. 2_ 1 ISTLE DATE PREPARED PREPARED BY AIN SYSTEM VALVE PROBLEM ANALYSIS (AF 599 and 608) 6/26/85 M. Bajestani SPE CIFIC OBJE CTIVE Ta Determine the Root Cause of Motor Operated Valve AF 599 and 608 Failure to Open STEP PRIME ASSIGNED START TARGET DATE A Tl N STEM RFSPONSIBILITY TO DATE DATE COMPLETED NUMBER ALL STEPS OF THIS ACTION PLAN ARE TO BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LATEST REVISION OF "CUIDELINES TO FOLLOW WHEN TROUBLE .. - SHOOTING OR PERFORMING INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS INTO THE ROOT CAUSES SURROUNDING THE JUNE 9, 1985 REACTOR TRIP". 1 Before beginning troubleshooting work, document the as-found J. Long - - condition of the valves (limit to those conditions which can be recorded without changing conditions - i.e., valve position, general condition, environmental conditions). 2 The torque switch settings were changed for MV 599 and 608 J. Long under FCR 84-039 v.5 open and 1.0 closed). These settings should be verified. 3 The stem thrust load should be measured to verify the thrust J. Long calculation. MOVATS (Motor Operated Valve Analysis & Test System) should be used to measure valve stem thrust, time of control switch actuation, and dynamic motor current). cp 12
!D PLAN N UM.', E n PAGE ACTION PLAN a' 3 e x.. )
Rev. 2 12 2 _ p p AFW SYSTEM VALVE PROBLEM ANALYSIS (AF 599 and 608) 6/26/85 M. Bajestani SPE CIFIC OBJE CTIVE To Determine the Root Cause of Motor Operated Valve AF 599 and 608 Failure to Open STEP PRIME ASSIGNE D START TARGET DATE NUMBER RFSPONSIBILITY TO DATE DATE COMPLETED 4 MV 599 and 608 are fast speed operators. A magnetic brake is J. Long provided to oppose the motor inertia after the power is removed - from the motor. The brake and motors were replaced last refuel-ing outage. These brakes should be checked for proper operation. 5 Verify nurber of turns on the handwheel of the valve from fully J. Long closed position, the limit switch contact 33/AC bypass; the torque switch contact 33/TO. 6 With valve in midposition (spring pack relaxed) verify that the J. Long torque switch is not preloaded. 2 NOTE STEP 12 should be performed before STEP 7. 7 Verify by visual inspection the spring pack model number. J. Long If the heavy spring number 60-600-0068-1 is used - no problem. Ilowever, if light spring number 60-600-0062-1 is used, the torque switch should prevent valve opening. c8 Motor horse power calculations should be performed in order to J. Long _ determine if the motor is capable of providing enough torque.
= _ . _
cp 12
ACTION PLAN PLAN NUMHEH PAGE
"_ _ __ ._ _ _ _ __.._. _ _ = _. E *1 b _-=.-- - 2 _ _
I p p p AFW SYSTEM VALVE PROBLEM ANALYSIS (AF 599 and 608) 6/26/85 M. Bajestani SPE CIFIC OBJE CTIVE Ta Determine the Root Cause of Motor Operated Valve AF 599 and 608 Failure to Open STEP PRIME ASSIGN E D START TAHGET DATE ACTION STM RFSPONSIBILITY TO DATE DATE COMPLETED NUMBER C9 Actuator size should be checked to determine if it is capable of J. Long operating against a 1050 psi differential pressure. 010 Tortional stem stress and tensile stress should be checked to J. Long verify that these stresses do not exceed the ASME design allow _ able values. __ _ _ cl1 Torque dial settings should be established by opening and J. Long closing positions based on the extreme stem operation loads expected during the hot and pressurized condition. 12 Test operate the valves individually with up to a 1050 PSIC J. Long
~
.2 pressure differential across the seat.
- Steps 8-11 are not dependent on Steps 1-7 and can be performed in any order n.-.-..
-- r_t 2- aT.- _ _ . . . _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
rp 12
4 t 1 MR. SHAFER: Revision 2 is dated 6/26, so this is
- 2 not the Action Plan you used to actually do the job; is that 1
3 correct? 4 MR. WOOD: Revision 2 is to reflect the desire to do . 5 a test to confirm the failure mechanism. 6 MR. ROSSI: So Revision 1, then, was used to i 4 7 actually do the troubleshooting, and when the MOVATS man was ! 8 there to work with you, and then after that, Revision 2 is to
, 9 run the test.
19 MR. WOOD: That's correct. 11 MR. ROSSI: And have you definitely now decided to 12 run the test? 13 MR. WOOD: We have decided to run the test. We are
; 14 sti11' reviewing the schedule and the content for the test. I 15 am not prepared at this moment to discuss, really, the details ,
16 of that. That has been on' going back in Toledo. 17 MR. ROSSI: Okay. 18 Now, while we are talking about these valves, I 19 guess this is a good point to bring up the next subject, and
- 29 that is, when you have identified the root cause of each of 21 the problems with the equipment, you are supposed to inform us 22 promptly. I assume -- or let me make it a little stronger.
23 You are going to prepare a written document
) 24 discussing what the root cause is and justifying that'that is ,/
25 the root cause on each of these.
d 1 5 I (s 1 MR. WOOD: That's correct. i 2 MR. ROSSI: That's your plan? 3 MR. WOOD: That is our plan. d 4 MR. ROSSI: And that can be the mechanism while we
- 5 are here in Washington and you are there, for us to be
6 notified that you found it. It may be appropriate that you f l
- .7 send us the document and then we can look at it and have one !
8 series of meetings the next time we come to Davis-Besse to 9 talk about the root causes. j 19 MR. WOOD: That's fine. 11 MR. ROSSI: Okay, fine. So if you can get those 12 root cause documents to us along with the appropriate 13 justification as quickly as possible, that would be good. > l 14 MR. WOOD: It is also our intention to discuss with 15 Region 3, as we are into the actual troubleshooting when we 16 find significant items, to discuss that with the region. 17 MR. ROSSI: Okay, fine. 18 MR. LANNING: The record should show that Action 19 Plan No. 12 is Exhibit No. 1. Its title is Auxiliary i i 20 Feedwater System Valve Problem Analysis.
- 21 MR. ROSSI
- Okay. I guess we are ready to go on to a 22 the auxiliary feed pumps overspeed trip action plan, and the 23 first thing we need to note is we were sent in the mail an 24 initial draft of this, which is dated June'24, 1985, and that I)
U 25 should be marked and put in the transcript so we will have {
6 1 that, and that will be Exhibit 2. O' 2 Then today we were provided with a document that 3 has a cover sheet on it dated June 25th, and that will be 4 marked as Exhibit 3. What we are going to do is our marginal 5 notes and comments are marked on the one you sent us in the 6 mail, obviously, but we will attach both of these to the 7 transcript, and you ought to point out to us anything that 8 is significantly different in the June 25th version from the 9 one that was sent to us in the mail so that we don't have 19 surprises later on when we read it. 11 [The documents referred to, marked Exhibits No. 2 12 and 3, follow:] 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 29 21 22 23 () 24 25
4 j (Tgdn GlU'f 5 s ch TITLE: AUXILIARI FEED PUNPS OVERSPEED TRIPS REPORT BY: Dan Wilczynski, Chuck Rupp Plan No.: 1A and IB DATE PREPARED: 6/24/85 Page 1 of 11 ; This report has been prepared in accordance with the " Guidelines to Follow 8 When Troubleshooting or Performing Investigative Actions into the Root Causes Surrounding the June 9, 1985, Reactor Trip," Rev. 4. These guide-lines were developed in response to Confirmatory Action Letter 85-05. ; i i I. IN1'RODUCTION i l On Sunday, June 9, 1985, normal feedwater flow to the steam generators i was interrupted. The reactor was automatically shutdown and reactor heat was removed via steaming through the main steam safeties and the i atnospheric vent valves. The water level in the steam generators was i decreasing and at 1:41:03 a Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) full trip was initiated on Channel 1 due to a low j water level in Steam Generator #1 (SG #1). This SFRCS actuation t attempted to initiate auxiliary feedwater flow by opening the steaa supply valve, MS 106, from SG #1 to auxiliary feedwater pump turbine l 1 (AFPT) #1. Five seconds after the initial SFRCS (1:41:08) the i reactor operator inadvertently initiated an SFRCS low pressure trip ! on both channels and both steam generators. This low pressure trip l of SFRCS is intended to respond to a steam line break or other j equipment failure resulting in depressurizing a steam generator. The manual low pressure SFRCS trip initiated 'the following, as designed: t l 1. Sent a close signal to MS 106 (which was partially open at the i time) and MS 107 (which was closed at the time). i i 2. Sent a close signal to AF 608 and AF 599, containment isolation valves on auxiliary feedwater path to steam generator #1 and #2, respectively, i 3. Sent an open signal to MS 106A (steam supply for AFPT #1 from steam generator #2) and MS 107A (steam supply for AFPT #2 from steam generator #1) in an attempt to operate both AFPTs on s opposite SGs. 1 ! 4. Sent an open signal to auxiliary feed pump discharge valves AF 4 i 3869 and AF 3871. 1 i l 5. Sent a close signal to auxiliary feed pump discharge valves AF 3870 and AF 3872. i
- Each AFPT tripped on overspeed (4500 RPM) approximately 25 seconds after initial roll. ,
f L I l i
- . = . - - - - - - -. - - __ . . - _ - .
4 i P 32 2 of 11 ; i ! This report documents the review of data from previous unit trips, '
- the 6/9/85'Erip AFPT testing, and other utility overspeed trips to ;
determine possible causes of the overspeed trips which occurred at Davis-Besse on 6/9/85. Based on this review, this report presents hypothesized causes of the observed overspeed, b Based on review of currently available information, we conclude that the most likely hypothesis of those considered is introduction of water slugs into the AFPTs causing overspeed. Based on discussions with Terry Turbine, water slugs flash as they pass through the
- turbine inlet nozzles resulting in acceleration of the turbine rotor.
(It appears that introduction of excessive amounts " cold" water (greatly subcooled) may slow down the turbine.) Although introduction of " hot" water slugs is judged to be the major cause of the observed overspeed, other factors may have contributed j and will be further investigated. These other factors include: i l 1) AFFT governor problems 1 2) " Double start" due to switchover of steam supply for AFPT #1.
- 3) Pump discharge flow was through the minimum recirculation path i only. .
i II.
SUMMARY
OF DATA In order to determine possible causes of the overspeed trips on ! 6/9/85, the following data were collected and snalyzed. A summary of j } 4 O the analysis for the 6/9/85 plant trip and several previous trips is provided.
- For each plant trip and surveillance test, the specific sequence of events was reviewed with particular attention to the following parameters.
AFPT speed vs. time ,
- AFP flow and discharge pressure j - Steam generator pressure and level
- Specific valve line-ups :
l i l Figure 1 and Attacbeent 1 provide a summary of pertinent steam and feedwater system features associated with the AFPTs (for reference). A. June 9. 1985 Plant Trip Summary During the June 9, 1985 trip transient, the following sequence i of events regarding auxiliary feedwater flow initiation occurred:
- Steam flow was initially provided to AFPT #1 via the normal path through MS 106 and turbine speed began increasing.
[ This was initiated by a steam generator low level trip in i the SFRCS at 1:41:03. Steam flow to AFPT #2 was not immediately initiated since a low level condition did not exist in SG #2 at this time.
Pes 2 3 of 11 l
- As a result of an operator initiated low steam header 4
pressure SFRCS trip (1:41:08), the steam supply to AFPT #1 ' was switched to SG #2 through MS 106A. The SFRCS also I initiated steam flow through the MS 107A flow path from SG t
#1 to AFPT #2.
j - The low pressure SFRCS trip resulted in switching the i discharge path from the auxiliary feedwater pumps (AF 3870 i closed, and AF 3869 and 3871 opened) and AF 599 and AF 608 ] were closed. The net result of these actions was to
- isolate the feedwater discharge path of both auxiliary i feedwater pumps leaving only the minimum recirculation path 3 available.
1 } A review of the speed vs. time characteristics for AFPT #1 shows ; the typical characteristics of several oscillations prior to reaching rated speed but the final oscillation was uncontrolled i and increased turbine speed to the overspeed trip setpoint. The q speed characteristics are shown on Figures 2 and 3 of Attachment [ 4 2. , L i A review of the speed characteristics for AFFT #2 shows an . l uncharacteristic leveling off at approximately 2500 RPM for ,
)
about eight (8) seconds from which point turbine speed quickly ' 1 increases to above 4100 RPM, decreases slightly and then continues ' to increase to the overspeed trip setpoint. The pause at 2500 RPM could be due to excessive water induction into the turbine. . It should be noted that no previous testing had been performed to date to simulate a " quick start" using only the cross connects (MS l j 106A and'MS 107A) for steam supply to the AFPTs. r B. Past Plant Trips and Surveillance /Testina Data i Based on our evaluation of previous plant trips and surveillance testing, we have the following observations: i
- 1) The AFPT speed vs. time characteristic is relatively uniform for each trip (See Attachment 2).
l l
- 2) The specific steam supply and feedwater flowpath configura-tion encountered during the 6/9/85 trip transient has not
- previously been duplicated. ,
The similarities and differences for each of the previous trips f and tests compared to the 6/9/85 event are described below with l particular attention to the hypothesis judged most likely to > have caused the overspeed condition. e i 1. March 2. 1984 Plant Trip l l A review of the trip data indicates that a SFRCS low j hk./ pressure trip was initiated during the event due to a stuck open Main Steam Safety Valve. This STRCS initiation closed 4 1 ( l l
i l r r. Page 4 of 11 [ the steam supply valve (MS 107) from SG #2 to AFPT #2 and opened the cross connect valve MS 107A to supply steam to f AFPT #2 from SG #1. This switch of steam supply occurred : 21 seconds (12:37:55) after both AFPTs had been started via l i i MS 106 and MS 107. A review of the speed vs. time character- , { istics (see Figures 4 and 5 of Attachaer,t 2), show that ! 4 AFPT #2 experienced a decrease of approximately 1000 RPM at i sixteen (16) seconds after the SFRCS low pressure trip. l This speed decrease may be attributed to excessive water { being picked up from the MS 107A line and being carried to ! the turbine. l-5 j The following differences between the 3/2/84 event and the > 6/9/85 event assist in explaining why the AFPTs reached the 1 overspeed trip setpoint on 6/9/85 but not on 3/2/84. }
- On 3/2/84, since MS 107 was open and heating the line,
- opening MS 107A introduced only 250' of cold piping, '
thereby reducing the amount of water introduced to the ! turbine. l'
- On 3/2/84, additional water may have been introduced
- by opening MS 107A because the steam lines were not J drained periodically at this time.
I I 1
- On 3/2/84, since AFFT #2 was pumping approximately j 1000 GPM, if a slug of water occurred from opening of
- MS 107A, there would have been more resistance to a ,
a speed increase as compared to the 6/9/85 event when l only a sin-recire flow path was available. i ' - On 3/2/84, both ATPTs had the Woodward PG-PL sovernors l f ! installed. ? ) l 2. January 15. 1985 Plant Trip ! This event initiated a SFRCS trip on low SG level which, l due to valve control changes made during the 1984 refueling l outage, opened all four stema supply valves'to_the AFPTs. L Also, AFPT #2 had the new PGG governor' installed during the l 1984 refueling outage. The speed characteristics are shown on Figures 6 and 7 of Attachment 2. i I l The following differences between the 1/15/85 event and the l 6/9/85 event assist in explaining why both turbines tripped l on overspeed on 6/9/85 but not on 1/15/85.
- On 1/15/45, due to the pipe configuration, initial ,
steam flow to both turbines would have been via the (
- normal flow paths, MS 106 and MS 107. Therefore. ;
l initial heating of the respective lengths (360' and i 125') may have occurred prior to steam flow through the cross connects resulting in less total mass of
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I Pass 5 of 11 ; i O _ water introduced to the AFFTs than postulated for the 6/9/85 event.
- On 1/15/85, both pumps had a flow path other than minimum recirculation available, therefore, speed l increases would be accompanied by corresponding flow l increases, thus maintaining loading on the pump. This ,
flow path was not available on 6/9/85.
- 3. March 21, 1985 Plant Trip .
This event initiated a SFRCS trip on lov SG 1evel that resulted in all four steam supply valves opening at the same time. The speed characteristics are shown on Figures 8 and 9 of - Attachment 2. A review of the speed characteristics for i AFPT #1 show the typical characteristics consistently seen ! on AFFT #1 (i.e., several oscillations prior to reaching , rated speed). I The following differences between the 3/21/85 event and the ! 6/9/85 event assist in explaining why both turbines tripped I on overspeed on 6/9/85 but not on 3/21/85.
- On 3/21/85, due to pipe configuration, initial steam flow to both turbines would have been via the normal O
flow path,- 118 106 and MS 107. Therefore, initial heating of the respective lengths (360' and 125') l would have been done prior to steam flow through the cross connects resulting in less total mass of water l introduced to the~AFPTs than is postulated to have , formed during the 6/9/85 event. i
- On 3/21/85, both pumps had a flow path available other I than the minious recirculation, therefore, any speed '
increase would be accompanied by a corre.ponding flow increase, thus maintaining loading on the pump. This " flow path was'not available on 6/9/85. A review of the speed vs. time characteristics show that ; AFFT #2 indicates a constant rate of acceleration until i appronimately 35 seconds after initial roll at which time l- there was an 400 RPM decrease in 2 seconde followed by an 1800 RPM increase in 3 seconds. This oscillation may be i due to slugs of water. t i ! 4. April 12. 1985 Testina < Af ter the change-out of the speed setting bushing from a 30 second rated bushing to a 15 second rated bushing on AFFT
#2 governor, two quick start tests were performed to verify operability. This changeout was performed to ensure flow O was provided by AFFT #2 within 40 seconds as required by , . . . , .w v.- . , - , .-,~.s.r-r----,w-.--,-ee-...s., .,,--e,----.e, a-e,,,,--m,,.-- . - - , = , y wye,- m.-. . e -+.e--m e--,...--.o-..mm,, --i-+.,wp,--v - m me w ,, r-r y r m . q,e,
E i l Page 6 of 11 s i 4 T_echnical Specifications. These tests were run on the ! normal steam supply path via MS 107 and with the pump i discharge valves closed (i.e., min-recire path open). Less j than 24 hours priom to these two (2) tests some additional i testing was done on this same turbine using the same valve line-ups. This prior testing was performed for trouble-l shooting. Due to the prior testing, the steam lines may , a not have been cooled to ambient conditions prior to the two ; (2) operability tests being run. The speed characteristics : are shown in Figures 10 and 11 of Attachment 2. A review of the speed vs. time characteristics shows that l the first run exhibited speed increases which appear to be i a series of step changes rather than a constant acceleration i to rated speed. The second run (performed immediately l after the first) shows a constant rate of acceleration to f rated speed. This is attributed to the fact that the steam lines were already heated, therefore, there would have been less condensation.
- 5. June 2, 1935 Plant Trip This event initiated a STRCS actuation on low SG level.
i Both ATPTs were supplied steam from their respective steam j generators via MS 106 and MS 107. , I
- The speed characteristics are shown on Figures 12 and 13 of Attachment 2. A review of the speed characteristics for AFPT #1 shows the typical characteristics consistently seen i on AFPT #1 (i.e., several oscillations prior to reaching t- rated speed).
j A review of the speed vs. time characteristics for AFPT #2 l shows a fairly steady increase to rated speed but the speed
- continues past the high speed setpoint (3710 RPM) to
! approximately 4000 RPM for about three (3) seconds. The
- turbine then decreased speed and controlled at the high i
speed setpoint. During the initial increase to rated r ! speed, the speed increases are seen 'as step changes rather than a straight line. Thesa step changes, 3nd the increase i to approximately 4000 RPM, may be attributable to water slugs. l l The following differen es between the 6/2/85 event and the 6/9/85 event assist in explaining why both AFPTs reached the overspeed trip setpoint on 6/9/85 but not on 6/2/85.
- Both AFFTs were running on the normal steam supply pathe via MS 106 and MS 107, therefore, there could be less condensation reaching the turbines.
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Paga 7 of 11 l i Both pumps had a discharge path available other than i the minimum recirculation path, therefore, any speed - increase would be accompanied by a corresponding flow increase, thus maintaining loading on the pump. This flow path was not available on 6/9/85.
- 6. June 9. 1985 Testina (Post Trip) l After the plant trip, a quick start test was performed on
- each of the AFFTs. These tests were run on the normal
- supply paths via NS 106 and MS 107. Both pumps discharge valves were closed such that only minimum recirculation
! flow was provided. These tests were run approximately ten (10) hours after the AFPTs had been shut down, therefore, the lines were still warm and condensation would not be expected. The speed characteristics are shown on Figures 14 and 15 of Attachment 2. 4
- A review of each speed vs. time charactes!stic shows a l
! constant acceleration to rated speed. AFIT #1 does not
- enhibit oscillations seen at other times. The " smoothness" of these graphs may be attributable to the fact that -
minimal condensation would be expected since the lines were already heated.
) C. Modifications
- 1. During the 1984 refueling outage, the #2 AFPT governor was i changed out from a Woodward PG-PL governor to a Woodward '
j PGG governor. The new governor was supplied with 7 15/in i buffer springs and a 30 second speed setting bushing.
- Prior to startup from the 1984 refueling outage, the 7 lb/in buffer springs were changed to 26 lb/in buffer [
springs by a Woodward Governor representative. The speed j l i setting bushing was changed from a 30 second bushing to a 3 15 second busing on 4/12/85 to ensure that ATPT #2 could 1 reach rated speed and deliver flow to the steam generators ! in less than 40 seconds as required by Technical Specifications.
- 2. During the 1984 refueling outage, the cont-ol logic for the steam supply valves to the AFPTs was changed to allow all four valves (MS 106, 106A, 107 and 107A) to open simultaneously.
i After the 3/21/85 plant trip, the change was revised so J that MS 106A and MS 107A would open only on a SFRCS low
- pressure trip. This revision was made based on the hanger damage found after the 3/21/85 trip. This was considered a prudent action, the hanger damage was potentially attributable i to water slugs.
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- Page 8 of 11 D. Maintenance History The maintenance work done excluding oil replacement since the 1984 refueling outage for AFPT 1-1 is as follows
1
- 1. Replacing of governor control motor, (6-2-85),
MWO# 1-85-1876-03. NOTE: Investigations are currently underway to determine cause of motor failure.
- 2. Adjustment of governor slip clutch (6-2-85),
NWO# 1-85-1878-00.
- 3. Replace low speed stop roll pin (6-2-85),
j_ MWO# 1-85-1378-01. ! The maintenance work done excluding oil replacement since the 4 1984 refueling outage for AFPT 1-2 is as follows: I f 1. Changeout of speed setting bushing-(4-12-85),
! MWO# 2-83-0136-11 (See Modification Ites C.3, above).
- A review of these maintenance records does not reveal any I evidence that could support the overspeed trips of 6/9/85.
E. Investination of Overspeed Trip Problems at Other Utilities Various resources have been used to determine if other utilities have had similar failures of the AFFTs on overspeed. NPRDS had only one overspeed trip reported. This occurrence was the result of the failure of a Woodward Governor ramp generator. A ramp generator as discusspd above is not incorporated in the design of either the PG-PL or PGG governor.
" Nuclear Power Experience" reported a total of 10 overspeed trips which are summarized below:
- 1. Four (4) AFPT overspeeds were reported due to condensation j
in the line.
- 2. One (1) overspeed was reported due to a " double start" (i.e., interruption and re-introduction of steam supply
! when the turbine is already rolling). l 3. One (1) loss of suction overspeed was reported (i.e., pump i loses suction pressure which effectively reduces pump loading).
- 4. There were four (4) overspeed trips due to governor problems as listed below l
Page 9 of 11 () -- Low uil level in governor Mechanical misadjustments Failed speed sensoe (applicable to EG governor only)
- Apparent governor valve sticking The final source of information was the Nuclear Network Systes.
One (1) response was received which indicated the possibility of q turbine overspeed due to water in the steam lines. III. CHANGE ANALYSIS The differences associated with the 6/9/85 trip compared to previous trips and actuations are listed below (conditions listed below existed only on 6/9/85 trip).
- 1. Both auxiliary feedwater containment isolation valves (AF 599 and 608) were closed when overspeed occurred. Pump flow was Itaited to the min-recire flow.
- 2. Both AFPTs were running solely on the cross connect stese supply
> valves (MS 106A and 107A) at the time of the overspeed trips.
- 3. AFP #1 was started on steam from MS 106 but then was switched to steam from MS 106A.
These differences are discussed in more detail in Section II, O IV. Summa ry of Data. HYPOTHESIZED CAUSES OF OVERSPEED From the above data and from discussions with the turbine vendor, Terry Turbine (Ken Wheeler); MPR Associates Inc. (Phil Hildebrandt, Bob Fink, and Tim Clarke); the following list of possible causes of overspeed was developed.
, A. Water slums in steam pipina to the turbine due to residual condensation or rapid condensation of steam while heatina lona, cold steam supply path to AFPTs This hypothesis is judged to be a viable description of the cause of the observed AFPT overspeed trips. Terry Turbine indicates that the introduction of water slugs which flash through the nozzles may result in an overspeed condition.
The piping between the steam isolation valves (MS 106, 106A, i 107, 107A) and the AFFTs is at a temperature near ambient conditions. When the isolation valves are opened, steam at i about 500* to 550*F is introduced.
, Steam will be condensed in these lines during initial steaa introduction and line heating. Preliminary calculations indicate that several hundred pounds of watte may be formed in these 7-~) lines. This condensate is expected to form water slugs, parti-( j l
l
Pass 10 of 11 l cularly in the long, approximately horizontal crossover lines
- downstrema of MS 106A or MS 107A. l
) It is noted that damage to pipe hanger supports on these lines l has been experienced previously, apparently due to transient , operational loads. Steam flow loads would not be expected to
- resu.*. in hanger damage. Water slug formation or water hammer l
may produce these loads. (Investigation of the pipe hanger support problem was in process prior to the 6/9/85 event.) The design for the AFPTs is a single stage turbine configured i similar to a bucket type " water wheel". This design is considered susceptible to increased speed excursions when water slugs are introduced. Analyses are currently being performed to confirm this hypothesis. B. AFPT 1-1 rollina on steam from MS 106 prior to receiving steam flow from crossover (" Double Start") ! This mechanism may be a contributor to the overspeed trip on ! AFPT 1-1, however, it is not considered likely. Discussions , I with Terry Turbine, as well as another utility, indicate that if
- the turbine is rolling, and steam flow is stopped and restarted, the turbine may overspeed. This is because by the speed setting t bushing (the internal _ piece that controls the acceleration to ;
j rated speed) being ineffective due to the prior rotation of the l l turbine which has increased the governor oil pressure to its , l operating pressure. Since the governor oil pressure is established and controlling, loss or reduction in steam flow results in the governor valve opening in an attempt to increase steam flow. When full steam pressure and flow is reestablished, the governor ; valve is open further than necessary and cannot close quickly enough, resulting in an overspeed condition. l This sequence may have occurred for ATPT 1-1 as a result of initial roll of the turbine on steam from MS 106 followed by closure of MS 106 coincident with opening of MS 106A. However, examination of the trip event sequence suggests that steam flow , would.not have been intderupted during switchover from MS-106 to MS 106A as the steam source. Although considered unlikely,.this hypothesis will be tested. C. Sudden decrease in pump loaf due to sudden flow reduction when discharme flow is abruptly 9;<pped at the closed valves AF 599 and 608
.This hypothesis, although viable, is judged unlikely to have caused an overspeed trip because discharge piping is assured to !
be full at all times thereby causing the pumps to operate at - min-recire conditiona until the discharge valves are open. O l 9 P
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Pass 11 of 11 It is noted that pump operation or min-recire only may be a O' contributing factor to the overspeed because of the decreased pump load. D. Governor problems (low oil level, improper settinas, etc.), includina Rovernor valve and linkane AFPT #1 has the previously used Woodward PG-PL governor which has experienced speed control oscillation problems, AFPT #2 has the new Woodward type PGG governor design which was installed during the 1984 refueling outage which has not indicated any oscillation problems. Neither governor apparently could respond to prevent the cause of the turbine overspeed, l.owever, it is not considered that failure or malfunction of the governors was the cause based on the following:
- 1. The speed graphs for the trip indicate that the governors were controlling speed as designed during the initial turbine acceleration. ,
j 2. Post trip testing shcws proper operation of both governors. l 3. The governor on AFP #1 is a PG-PL model with enternal Bodine motor for remote speed setting, while the AFPT #2 has a nee PGG model with an internal motor for remote speed , s/ setting. It is considered unlikely that both of these governors would faf \ at the same time in a manner capable of causing an overspeed trip on the turbines. < 4. The governor valve was free to move during the trip as evidenced by the initial-decrease in speed after both AFPTs ' began to roll. However, since we have limited experience with the PGG governor (installed during 1984 refueling outage), we plan to further evaluate whether problems with this governor could have contributed to the overspeed. Prior to installation, an engineering evaluation l was performed on the PGG governor, which concluded that this governor should be functionally stailar to the PG-PL governor. E. Loss of r"-r suction source, resulting in no pump load This is not considered a viable hypothesis, since the control room alars printer shows no evidence of low pump suction pressure prior to the overspeed. Also, the 1 psig pressure switch on the pump suctions did not close the steam supply valves. Further, there was no decrease in discharge pressure as would be expected if the suction pressure were lost. DW:CER:lrh l l
ATTACHMINT 1 O Stes: Supply Piping Layout to AEPTs
~
Figure 1 presents a schematic representation of the steam supply piping to the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbines. The piping configuration downstream of the 4 steam supply isolation valves are described in more detail below.
- 1. MS 106 (SG #1 feed to AFPT #1) - The pipe length of this run is approximately 360 feet. Lamediately downstream of MS 106 is a downhill run. The length of the pipe run has several vertical drops interrupted by horizontal runs. Total vertical drop is from elevation 623' to elevation 565'. Any condensation is expected to become entrapped in the steam flow or be carried as small slugs.
- 2. MS 106A (SG #2 feed to AFPT #1) - The pipe length of this run is approximately 650 feet. Immediately downstream of MS 106A is a
. 290 foot length of essentially horizontal pipe. After the steam / water has traversed the initial length of pipe, it ties , into the length of pipe described in item 1 above, which is immediately downstream of MS 106. The 280 foot length of horizontal pipe could allow large water slugs to form prior to entering the downhill run. () 3. MS 107 (SG #2 feed to AFFT #2) - The pipe length of this run is approximately 125 feet. Immediately downstream of MS 107 is a downhill run. The total length of the pipe run has an almost continual downhill flow (i.e., very few long lengths of horizontal pipe) dropping from elevation 623 to elevation 565. Any condensa-tion is expected to become entrapped in the steam flow or be carried as small slugs.
- 4. MS 107A (SG #1 feed to AFPT #2) - The pipe length of this run is approximately 375 feet. Immediately downstream of MS 107A is a 250 foot length of essentially horizontal pipe except for a 7 foot rise near the end of the run. After the rise is a short horizontal run and then the steam supply line has a 14 foot drop and is tied to the steam supply pipe described in item 3 above, immediately downstream of MS 107. The rise, after a long horizontal run, will enable water slugs to form at the bottom of the rise and be carried downstream after filling the pipe.
l i Page 1 of 2
ATTACHMENT 1 [ D ( D Steam Steam Generator u; Generator No. I H V No.2 MSIO7A MSIO6A y V
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t ATTACEIENT 2 AUX FEED PUMP 1-1 SPEED DATA JUNE 9, 1955 - TRIP .
======================================================
DATA TIME AFP 1-1 SPEED POINT ( S008 ) ]
======================================================
!= 1 01:41:06 07.9 4 2 01:41:07 405.9 3 01:41:08 807.1 4 01:41:09 948.7 5 01:41:10 1415.1 1 6 01:41:11 1793.7 7 01:41:12 2240.5 8 01:41:13 2472.5. i 9 01:41:14 1700 3 10 01:41:15 NO DATA 11 01:41:16 1793.7 j 12 01: 41:17 2675.2 13 01:41:18 0090.6 .. .; 14- 01:41:19 2011.2 15 01:41:20 0471.3 le 01: 41:21 2404.2 17' 01:41:22 0801.0 19 01:41:23- 4052.9 19 01:41:24 4616.6 20 01:41: 05 0315.0 21 01: 41:26 1915.8 22 01:41:27 1002.3 20 01:41:28 1024.4 4 1 i i \ i l i , Page-1 of 28
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ATTACHMENT 2 AUX FEED FUMP 1-2 SPEED DATA" JUNE 9, 1985 - TRIP . .
======================================================
DATA TIME AFP 1-2 SPEED FOINT ( S018 )
======================================================
1 01:41:11 05.4 2 01:41:12 565.3 3 01:41:13 570.2 4 01:41:14 1500.6 5 01: 41:15 NO DATA , 6 01:41:16 2399.0 7 01:41:17 1766.6 8 01:41:18 1923.1 9 01:41:19 2152.6 10 01:41:00 2355.3 11 01:41:21 2089.5 12 01:41:22 2091.9 10 01:41:20 2408.3 .. 14 01:41:24 24c0.3 15 01:41:25 2396.8 1s 01:41:2s 2379.7 17 01:41:27 2428.6 18 01:41:28 2400.5 s,/ 19 01: 41:29 2987.8 20 01:41:00 4118.4 21 01:41:01 4360.6 20 01: 41:02 4172.2 20 01:41:33 4162.4 24 01:41:34 4418.8 25 01:41:35 4540.9 4 26 01:41:36 4655.7 27 01:41:07 4748.5 28 01:41:08 3820.5 29 01:41:39 2120.9 00 01:41:40 1476.2 . 31 01:41: 41 1175.8 3 u Page 3 of 28 _~ . _ _ . _ ,_ _ _ .
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AUX FEED PUMP 1-1 SPEED DATA . MARCH 2. 1984
======================================================
DATA TIME AFP 1-1 SPEED POINT ( SOO8 )
======================================================
1 12:07:09 18.0 2 12:07:40 40.0 3 12:37:41 000.9 4 12:37:42 1605.6
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. 7 12:07:45 NO DATA 8 12:07:46 787.5 9 12:37: 47 768.0 h 1070.0
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% 17 12:37:55 1080.4
\ 18 12:07:56 1001.0 J 19 12:07:57 1071.2 20 12:07:58 1070.6 21 12:07:59 1060.9 22 12:08:00 1059.0 23 12:08:01 NO DATA I 24 12:08:00 NO DATA 25 12:08:00- - 2057.4 26 12:08:04 2318.7 27 12:08:05 2072.4 l 28 12:38:06 NO DATA I 29 12:08:07 2606.1 00- 12:08:08 2782.7 j 31 12:08:09 2929.2
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ATTACHMENT 2 G I Q - AUX FEED PUMP 1-2 SPEED DATA . MARCH 2, 1984
======================================================
DATA TIME AFP 1-2 SPEET POINT- ( SO18 )
==============================================su======
1 12:07:09 23.2 2 12:37:40 25.6-0 12:07:41 155.1 4 12:37:42 431.0 5 12:07:43 1905.0 NO DATA o 12:07: 44 7 12t37: 45 NO DATA 8 12:37: 46 1363.9 9 12:37: 47 1666.7 10 12:37: 48 1947.5 11 12:07: 49 NO DATA 12 12:37:50 2267.4 .. 10 12:07:51 2443.2 14 12:07:52 2489.o 15 12:07:50 2584.9 16 12:37:54 2701.4 17 12:07:55 2850.5 I 18 12:37:56 2948.7
' 19 12:37:57 OQ41.5 20' 12:07:58 0078.1 21 12:37:59 3207.6 22 12:08:00 0256.4 20 12:08:01 NO DATA 24 12:08:02 NO DATA 25 12:38:00 3034.6 26 12:08:04 0385.8 27 12:38:05 0407.8 28 12:38:06 NO DATA 29 12:38:07 3451.8 00 12:38:08' 3424.9 31 12:38:09 0488.4 32 12:38:10 NO DATA 30 12:38:11 2004.0 34 12:08:12 NO DATA 05 12:38:13 NO DATA 36 12:08:14 NO DATA 07' 12:38:15 0105.0 38 12:08:16 0078.1 39 12:08:17 NO DATA 40 12:08:18 NO DATA 41 12:08:19 NO DATA 42 12:08:20 3027.2 40 12:08:21 3068.7 s 44 12:38:22 3412.7 .s) i 45 , 12:08:20 0495.7
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ATTAC10fENT 2 AUX FEED PUMP 1-1 SFEED DATA . JANUAhY 15, 1985
======================================================
DATA TIME AFP 1-1 SPEED POINT ( S008 )
======================================================
1 12:28:35 20.8 2 12:28:36 494.5 3 12:28:37 777.8 4 12:28:08 1210.0 5 12:28:09 NO DATA 6 12:28: 40 r40 DATA 7 12:08: 41 2240.0 8 12:28:42 1681.0 9 12:08: 43 1073.6 10 12:28: 44 1783.9 11 12:08: 40 NO DATA
! 12 12:28:46 1915.8 ..
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AUX FEED PUMP 1-2 SPEED DATA . JANUARY 15, 1985
======================================================
DATA TIME AFP 1-2 SPEED POINT ( SO18 )
======================================================
1 12:08:54 35.4 2 12:28:55 282.1 3 12:28:56 1197.8 , 4 12:08:57 2118.4 5 12:08:58 1473.7 6 12:23:59 1390.7 7 12:29:00 NO DATA 8 12:29:01 1593.4 9 12:29:02 1549.4 > 10 12:29:00 1527.3 11 12:29:04 1515.3 12 12:29:05 1490.8 .. 13 12:29:06 1476.2 14 12:29:07 14eo.4 15 12:29:08 14c8.9 16 12:29:09 14o8.9 s 17 12:29:10 1471.3 18 12:29:11 1517.7 i
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DATA TIME AFP 1-1 SPEED
. POINT ( S008 )
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- JUNE 2, 1985
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=m=m= mama ==am=mmmmm=ammmmmmmmmmmmmmm=m=amm=ME=m=m=mm=3 DATA. TIME AFP 1-2 SPEED FOINT ( 5018 ) a samammumm=mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmerumm==amma 1 12:04:52 35.4 12:04:50 382.2 0 12:04: 54 NO DATA 4 12:34: 55 2089.1 5 12:04: 56 1610.$
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20 12:05:11 NO DATA 21 12:05:12 0702.6 22 12:05:10 0713.1 23 12:05:14 0680.8 24 12:05:15~ NO DATA 25 12:05:16 0627.6 26 12:05:17 0571.4 27 12:05:18 NO DATA 28 12:05:19 NO DATA-29 12:05:20 NO DATA 00 12:05:21 NO DATA 01 12:25:22 NO DATA 02 12:05:23 NO DATA 33 12:35:24 3271.1 04 12:35:25 NO DATA-35 12:05:26 0219.8 06 12:35:27 NO DATA 07 12:05:28 3122.1 08 12:35:29 3092.8
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om _._ _.. . _ _ _ _ _ .._ - _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . . DATE PREPARED PREPARED BY 8 TITLE AUXILIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT).fi OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) 6/24/85 C. E. Rupp_ sPEciric oa>Ecrive Wilczynski ; D. Missig Varify hypothesis to support root cause determination. PHIME ASSIGNED STAHT TARGET DATE STEP A Tl N STEPS HFSPONSislLITY TO DATE DATE COMPLETED NUMSER I ALL' STEPS OF THIS ACTION PLAN ARE TO BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LATEST REVISION OF " GUIDELINES TO FOLLOW WHEN TROUBLESHOOTING OR PERFORMING INVESTIGATIVE 1
; ACTIONS INTO ROOT CAUSES SURROUNDING THE JUNE 9,1985 REACTOR TRIP". _ _ .
Wilczynski Wilczynski No Act ton Required 1.0 Test of Hypothesis D: Governor Halfunction Caused AFPT #1 to Overspeed. _ . . Prepare Maintent.nce Work Order (MWO) for removal of Wilczynski Thompson 1.1 governor cover, inspection, and reassembly of governor. All work to be performed by a representative of Woodward Governor Ca _ Remove governor cover on AFPT #1. Wilczynski Thompson 1.2 _ i Perform a visual inspection to determine any obvious Wilczynski Thompson 1.3 damage.. . 1.4 Check oil level and cleanliness. Wilczynski Thompson 1.5 Document the as-found condition. Wilczynski Wilczynski
-.-.--_~- -
. - . .AUXII.IARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT) #1 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1)
\
PLAN NUMetE H PAGE ACTION PLAN lA- 2d 6 , PREPAREo sY DATE PREPARED AUKILIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT) #1 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 3.) 6/24/85 C. E. Rupp_ SPk CIFlc OS JE CTevE WilC2ynski D. Missig Vsrify hypothesis to support root cause determination. PHIME ASSIGNED STAHT . TARGET DATE l STEP ACTim STEM HFSPONSislLITY TO DATE DATE COMPLETED NUGAsER I Wilczynski Gradomski 1.6 Using Woodward Engineering Representative, determine if any repairs are required prior to testing the _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ governors. The basis for this determination will be: _
"If the repairs are required to preclude further damage _
to the governor, turbine, or pump, then the repairs shall _ _ be made. If further operation of the governor will not cause further damage, then the repairs will be made after - the test for overspeed is run to determine if the failed _ item could have caused the overspeed on 6/9/85". Document _ all decisions. Prepare MWO and perform repair work as determined in Step Wilczynski Thompson 1.7 1.6. All work to be done by Woodward Representative. Install a remote manual trip device in case of failure Wilczynski Thompson 1.8 _._ . of the overspeed trip. i 1.9 Perform " quick start" test of AFPT #1 using ST 5071.02 Wilczynski Missig f Phase 1 to test Hypothesis D.
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2,i t e g , ,gn , , g g, u et 1r i ie p in' ' 4'of ulHn 4 I Y Io Un 8 i DA i t. NOUrst n ._. - - _. . _. _ . . . Test of Ilypotheuls A: Conitensate in t he Ma in 'it einn Wilczynskt Ullezynski No A c t 14 in ite rpi t i c.1 2.0 I Crossaver I.ine Caused M *T #1 to Overspeed. l Develop a Test Procedure (TP) to simulate .is close ae Uilczynski 111 ss i g 2.1 i practical the actual conditions of the . lune 9,19t!'; AFPT #1 overspeed trip. .s brief outline of the TP is shown below: _ _ _ PURPOSE: ___
- To verify hypothesis that condensate in the cross ._ ._
connect steam supply lines (MS 106A) can cause an . _ _ _ _ - - overspeed trip of AFFT f1. EQUIPMENT NEEDED: __
- Existing plant instrumentation _
- Back-up system for tripping turbines manually _
l
- Instrumentation to monitor the thermohydraulic ,
conditions in the steam supply piping to the AFPTs. ,
" AUMI LI ARY-PEED-PUNP" TURBINE"(AFPT)~"#l'OVERSPEED-TRIP =(Rev=-1)~~~~ ~~ ~~~
- . _ . . . ~ _ . _ . _ . . . . . .. . _ . _ . . _ . . . - _ _ _ - . _ . . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . _ _ . _ _. _ . _ . . , __ _. . ,
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- - . . AUXII.I ARY F.EED-PU.MP 'IURRINE (AFPT) #1 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. !)
D. Hisulg Verify hypothe' sis to support root cause determir.atlon. _ _ _ _ _ ,_ _ _ _ ._ _ _ , 2 I' Pfit Mt- AS:sNNL I) SI Alti - IAH6t!' DAlt. SIEP NUMetE tt ACil m S H W 19 SPONSlulLITY IO DA I L DA I E
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,i PREREQUISITES: __ __ . .~ . _ . - _. i.
.- Covernor is at its high speed stop.
-}SteamsupplylinestotheAFPTsareatambientconditions.,
- Pump discharge valves are _ closed. - . . . . _
c
- Verify min-recirc valves are open. ,
! - Steam Generator (SC) pressures.are greater than 870 psig. 4 1 NOTE: SC pressure will be less than 1050 psig and decreasing, , __ ___ during testing. This.will not, exactly duplicate the conditions ,_ _ _. _ i of , '.'9 /85. . . _ - _ 2.2 Perform Test Procedure Wilczynski Missig - -- - - - - 1 2.3 Review test data to verify applicability to hypothesis. Wilczynski Wilczynski _ l .. t 2.4 Repeat Test Procedure Vilczynski -- -
- - -Missig -. - --
7
.. .. . . . + -
} 2.5 Review test data from second test to verify applicability' Wilczynski Wilczynski , i i to hypothesis. _ . - . . -
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- AUXII.IA4i FEED-PUMP TURhitit tatt1/ # 1 UVERSl'htli TR IP (Hev. 1)
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Illt t AUXil.lARY FEED-PUMP'TilRBINE (AFPT) #1 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev..;l) - 6/24/85 - C. E. . HupgL i D. !!!ssig Verif y hypoti. asis to support root'cause determinarion. _ _ ..___ ___ .__ __ . _ _ . _ , . _ __ - . ~ PetiML ASSIGNE D !.I Alt i I At%[ I Hall
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Test liypothesis R: " Double Start" due-to cycling of Wilczynski. {- 3.0 . ... . ',i ~ . valves MS 106 and MS 106A.
- 3.1 Develop a Test Procedure -.(TP) to sinnulate the cycling. - . ._-
Wilczynski .- Hissig.- .. 3 of valves MS 106 and MS 106A as occurred on 6/9/85. Prerequisites to be the same as showa in Step 2.1. t 3.2 Petforis the TP developed above. Wilczynsk1 _ _Missig-3.3 Review test data to verify applicability to hypothesis. Wilczynsk1- _ Wilczynski
. 3.4 Perform the-TP again. Wilczynski Hissig , ,
t Review test data to verify applicability to hypothesis. Wilczynski Wilczynski i 3.5 ' 4.0 Write final ~ report to document root cause. Wilczynskf _
.Wilczynski .
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m p , , f I ( ( i V \ v' Pt an suuni n P ai .t ACTION PLAN I 11 1 "'- 5 i n u. . - AUXil.l ARY FEED-PUtlP TURBINE (AFPT) #2 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) 6/24/85 C. E. Rupp m cun: i,uincieve Wilczynski 11 Misalg Vcrify hypothesis to support root cause determination. l PfHMt ASSKif4tD LIAHI IAHGli l>All site ^'""S"" W $PONSlun tT Y IO DAlt DAlt COMPS & It D Nouut H _ _. . _ , _ _ _ . . AI.I. STEPS OF Tills ACTION Pl.AN ARI: TO HE PERFOktliD IN ACCORDANCE WITil Tile I.ATEST REVISION OF "GillDEl.INES TO Fol.l.OW WilEN TROUBl.ESilOOTING OR PERFORMING INVESTIGATIVE AC'flONS INTO ROOT CAllSES SilRROlINDING Tile JllNE 9, 1985 REACTOR TRIP". 1.0 Test of flypothesis D: Govern malfunction caused Wilczynski Wilczynski No Action Re<luired AFPT #2 to overspeed. _ l.1 Prepare Maintenance Work Order (!!WO) for removal of Wilczynski Thompson governor cover, inspection, and reassembly of governor. . . _ . . All work to be performed by a representative of Woodward - . Covernor Co. _ . _ l.2 Remove governor cove.c on AFPT #2. Wilczynski Thompson Perform a visual inspection to determine any obvious damage. Wilczynski Thompson 1.3 _ l.4 Check oil level and cleanliness. Wilczynski Thompson Document the as-found condition. Wilczynski Wilczynski 1.5 AUXia.lAet FEl.0-PilMP TURh t.4r. taF 'r) #2 OVERSPEED TRIP (kev. t)
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~ ~ ' ~ ~ ^ ~ ~
sri on ic ou n c t iva D. Missig V rify hypothesis to support root cause determination. PitiML A$',tt ,NL () SI Alt i I Aht ,i i e)A g e SgtP 10 DAll DAlt L AiMe*t i Il D NUMt3 Lit H} t,PUNSitill lI Y 1.lu Repeat step 1.9 to prove repeatability. Wilczynski Missig 1.11 Prepare MWO for repair of governor for all items that Wilczynski Thompson were not repaired under Step 1.7 as determined by Step 1.6. Wilczynski Wilczynski l.12 Review data to verify applicability to hypothesis. Test of Ilypothesis A: Condensate in the M. sin Sty m Wilczynski Wilczynski No Act 1< >n Re<pii red 2.0 crossover 1ine caused AFPT #2 to overspeed. Develop a Test Procedure (TP) to simulate as close as Wilczynski 111ssig 2.1 _ practical the actual conditions of the June 9, 1985 _ AFPT #2 overspeed trip. A brief outline of the TP is shown below: _ PilRPOSE:
- To verify hypothesis that condensate in the cross connect steam supply lines (MS 107A) can cause an . . _ ,
overspeed trip of AFPT #2. -
~ ~
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PLAN HUMSER PAGE ACTM PLAN 1B 4 5 es e.ee OATE PREPAREo PREPARED BY T8TLE AUEILIARY FEED-PIRIP TURRINE (AFFT) #2 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) 6/24/85 C. E. Rup L sPEcienc cr.;EcrivE Wilczynski
~
D. Missig Verify hypothesis to support root cause determination. O A T TAM DAM STEP ACT. Oft STEPS RF.SPONStalLITY TO DATE DATE COMPLETED toutesER i Wilczynski Missig EQUIPMENT NEEDED: , _ _
- Existing plant instrumentation.
- Back-up system for tripping turbines manually.
- Instrumentation to monitor the thermohydraulic conditionP in the steam supply piping to the AFPTs.
PREREQUISITES: - . _ - . . . . _ - .-
- Governot is at its high spee.1 stop. ... -
- Steam supply lines to the AFPTs are at ambient conditions. _ .
- Pump dischatge valves are closed.
- Verify min-recire valves are open. . _ _ _
- Steam Generator (SG) pressures are greater than t$10 psig. -
~
NOTE: SG pressure will be less than 1050 psig and elecreasing during testing. This will not exactly duplicate the conditions of 6/9/85 Wilczynski Hissig 2.2 Perform Test Procedure. ; 2.3 Review test data to verity applicability to hypothesis.
~
Ullezynski Wilczynski AITXII.I An t t Eta-PliMP Tl!Rts s t.r. t/st s a f :re (tVFHSPEFD TRIP (Rev. 1)
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ACTION PLAN # 1A,1B TITLE: Auxili y Feed Pumps Overspeed Trips O LJ . APPR. CHAIRMAN FOR REV DATE REASON FOR REVISION BY TASK FORCE IMPL. l 0 I 6/20/85 Initial Issue See Rev. O for approvals 1 6/25/85 General Rewrite l ! I i l l
TITLE: AUXILIARY FEED PUMPS OVERSPEED TRIPS l C 4 REPORT BY: bane'ilczynski,ChuckRupp Plan No.: 1A and IB DATE PREPARED: 6/24/85 Page 1 of 11 This report has been prepared in accordance with the " Guidelines to Follow When Troubleshooting or Performing Investigative Actions into the Root Causes Surrounding the June 9, 1985, Reactor Trip," Rev. 4. These guide-lines were developed in response to Confirmatory Action Letter 85-05. I. INTRODUCTION On Sunday, June 9, 1985, normal feedwater flow to the steam generators was interrupted. The reactor was automatically shutdown and reactor heat was removed via steaming through the main steam safeties and the atmospheric vent valves. The water level in the steam generators was decreasing and at 1:41:03 a Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) full trip was initiated on Channel 1 due to a low water level in Steam Generator #1 (SG #1). This SFRCS actuation attempted to initiate auxiliary feedwater flow by opening the steam supply valve, MS 106, from SG #1 to auxiliary feedwater pump turbine (AFPT) #1. Five seconds after the initial SFRCS (7:41:08) the reactor operator inadvertently initiated an SFRCS low pressure trip O, on both channels and both steam generators. This low pressure trip of SFRCS is intended to respond to a steam line break or other equipment failure resulting in depressurizing a steam generator. The manual low pressure SFRCS trip initiated the following, as designed:
- 1. Sent a close signal to MS 106 (which was partially open at the time) and MS 107 (which was closed at the time).
- 2. Sent a close signal to AF 608 and AF 599, containment isolation valves on auxiliary feedwater path to steam generator #1 and #2, respectively.
- 3. Sent an open signal to MS 106A (steam supply for AFPT #1 from steam generator #2)~and MS 107A (steam supply for AFPT #2 from steam generator #1) in an attempt to operate both AFPTs on opposite SGs.
- 4. Sent an open signal to auxiliary feed pump discharge valves AF 3869 and AF 3871.
4
- 5. Sent a close =ignal to auxiliary feed pump discharge valves AF 3870 and AF 3872.
- Each AFPT tripped on overspeed (4500 RPM) approximately 25 seconds after initial roll.
l l l
. .__ .-- ._ . _ . . _ _ _ . . . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
t Paga 2 of 11 l This report documents the review of data from previous unit trips, ! / the 6/9/85 trip, AFPT testing, and other utility overspeed trips to 3
\ determine possible causes of the overspeed trips whi;h occurred at Davis-Besse on 6/9/85. Based on this review, this report presents
- hypothesized causes of the observed overspeed. I l
Based on review of currently available information, we conclude that the most likely hypothesis of those considered is introduction of water slugs into the AFPTs causing overspeed. Based on discussions i with Terry Turbine, water slugs flash as they pass through the turbine inlet nozzles resulting in acceleration of the turbine rotor. (It appears that introduction of excessive amounts of water may slow , down the turbine.) ' Although introduction of water slugs is judged to be the major cause , of the observed overspeed, other factors may have contributed and will be further investigated. These other factors include:
- 1) AFPT governor problems
! 2) " Double start" due to switchover of steam supply for AFPT #1. ! 3) Pump discharge flow was through the minimum recirculation path
- only.
i II.
SUMMARY
OF DATA In order to determine possible causes of the overspeed trips on 6/9/85, the following data were collected and analyzed. A summary of l l O. the analysis for the 6/9/85 plant trip and several previous trips is provided. l For each plant trip and surveillance test, the specific sequence of events was reviewed with particular attention to the following , parameters. j i AFPT steed vs. time l AFP flow and discharge pressure Steam geoerator pressure and level Specific valve line-ups 1 t Figure 1 and Attachment 1 provide a summary of pertinent steam and feedwater system features associated with the AFPTs (for reference). ' { A. ' June 9,1985 Plant Trip Summary i During the June 9, 1985 trip transient, the following sequence ! of events regarding auxiliary feedwater flow initiation occurred: i Steam flow was initially provided to AFPT #1 via the normal path through MS 106 and turbine speed began increasing. This was' initiated by a steam generator low level trip in the SFRCS at 1:41:03. Steam flow to'AFPT #2 was not Lunediately initiated since a low level condition did not I exist in SG #2 at this time. l l~
Paga 3 of 11
- As a result of an operator initiated low steam header , Pt.cssure SFRCS trip (1:41:08), the steam supply to AFPT #1 was switched to SG #2 through MS 106A. The SFRCS also I initiated steam flow through the MS 107A flow path from SG
! #1 to AFPT #2. The low pressure SFRCS trip resulted in switching the , discharge path from the auxiliary feedwater pumps (AF 3870 - closed, and AF 3869 and 3871 opened) and AF 599 and AF 608 1 were closed. The net result of 'hese actions was to isolate the feedwater discharge pu h of both auxiliary i feedwater pumps leaving only the minimum recirculatica path i available. ! The speed characteristics are shown on Figures 2 and 3 of Attach-l ment 2. .A review of the speed vs. time characteristics for i
; - AFPT #1 shows the typical characteristics of several oscillations t t
prior to reaching rated speed but the final oscillation was un- ! controlled and increased turbine speed to the overspeed trip setpoint. 1 l A review of the speed characteristics for AFPT #2 shows an
! uncharacteristic leveling off at approximately 2500 RPM for }
about eight (8) seconds from which point turbine speed quickly + increases to above 4100 RPM, decrease's slightly and then continues i to increase to the overspeed trip setpoint. The pause at 2500 RPM could be due to excessive water induction into the turbine. 4 B. Ps'i Plant Trips and Surveillance /Testina Data ) ed on our evaluation of previous plant trips and surveillance ! . sting, we have the following observations: f
- 1) The AFPT speed vs. time characteristic is relatively ;
l uniform for each trip (See Attachment 2). i l 2) The specific steam supply and feedwater flowpath configura- ! tion encountered during the 6/9/85 trip transient has not , previously been duplicated. l 3) No previous testing had been performed to simulate a " quick ' i start" using only the cross connects (MS 106A and MS 107A) for steam supply to the AFPTs. : The similarities and differences for each of the previous trips ; and tests compared to the 6/9/85 event are described below with particular attention to the hypothesis judged most likely to have caused the overspeed conditica.
- 1. March 2, 1984 Plant Trip ,
A review of the trip data indicates that a SFRCS low O, pressure trip was initiated'during the event due to a stuck open Main Steam Safety Valve. This SFRCS initiation closed
- . -. . - . . - . - . . - , - . - - - - -- .. ~ . - -.
7 Paga 4 of 11 ; the steam supply valve (MS 107) from SG #2 to AFPT #2 and 4 opened the cross connect valve MS 107A to supply steam to AFPT #2 from SG #1. This switch of steam supply occurred 21 seconds (12:37:55) after both AFPTs had been started via ' j 'MS 106 and MS 107. A review of the speed vs. time character- + istics (see Figures 4 and 5 of Attachment 2), show that AFPT #2 experienced a decrease of approximately 1000 RPM at 4 sixteen (16) seconds after the SFRCS low pressure trip. This speed decrease may be attributed to excessive water i being picked up from the MS 107A line and being carried to the turbine.
; The following differences between the 3/2/84 event and the
! 6/9/85 event assist in explaining why the AFPTs reached the i overspeed trip setpoint on 6/9/85 but not on 3/2/84. I j' - On 3/2/84, since MS 107 was open and heating the line, j opening MS 107A introduced only 250' of cold piping, 4 thereby reducing the amount of water introduced to the turbine. , s On 3/2/84, additional water may have been introduced by opening MS 107A because the steam lines were not j drained periodically at this time. I On 3/2/84, since AFPT #2 was pumping approximately 1 1000 GPM, if a slug of water occurred from opening of
- MS 107A, there would have been more resistance to a i speed increase as compared to the 6/9/85 event when only a min-recire flow path was available.
On 3/2/84, both AFPTs had the Woodward PG-PL governors ! installed. " 1
- 2. January 15, 1985 Plant Trip This event initiated a SFRCS trip on low SG level which, j- due to valve control changes made during the 1984 refueling outage, opened all four steam supply valves to the AFPTs.
Also, AFFT #2 had the new PGG governor installed during the !. 1984 refueling outage. The speed characteristics are shown on Figures 6 and 7 of Attachment 2. j The following differences between the 1/15/85 event and the
- j 6/9/85 event assist in explaining why both turbines tripped l
on overspeed on 6/9/85 but'not on 1/15/85. j - On 1/15/85, due to the pipe configuration, initial steam flow to both turbinen would have been via the
- normal flow paths, MS 106 and MS 107. Therefore, initial heating of'the respective lengths (360' and l x 125') may have occurred prior to steam flow through the cross connects resulting in less total mass of
^
1 i
. .- . - - .. . .-. .. - =. - ._ - - - _ . .
Pagn 5 of 11 1 water introduced to the AFPTs than postulated for the 6/9/85 event. 1 ' O - On 1/15/85, both pumps had a flow path other than minimum recirculation available,-therefore, speed j increases would be accompanied by corresponding flow increases, thus maintaining loading on the pump. This , flow path was not available on 6/9/85. i 1
- 3. March 21, 1985 Plant Trip i This event initiated a-SFRCS trip on low SG level that j resulted in all four steam supply valves opening at the same time.
i. The speed characteristics are'shown on Figures 8 and 9 of Attachment 2. A review of the speed characteristics for AFPT #1 show the typical characteristics consistently seen j on AFPT #1 (i.e., several oscillations prior to reaching rated speed). l The following differences between the 3/21/85 event and the 6/9/85 event assist in explaining why both turbines tripped , on overspeed on 6/9/85 but not on 3/21/85. 1 On 3/21/85, due to pipe configuration, initial steam flow to both turbines would have been via the normal () l ) flow path, MS 106 and MS 107. Therefore, initial i heating of the respective lengths (360' and 125') ' would have been done prior to steam flow through the !- cross connects resulting in less total mass of water ! introduced to the AFPTs than is postulated to have I formed during the 6/9/85 event. l On 3/21/85, both pumps had a flow path available other than the minimum recirculation, therefore, any speed increase would be accompanied by a corresponding flow increase, thus maintaining' loading on the pump. This flow path was not available on 6/9/85. A review of the speed vs. time characteristics show that AFPT #2 indicates a constant rate of acceleration until
-approximately 35 seconds after initial roll at which time there was an 800 RPM decrease in 2 seconds ~followed by an 1800 RPM increase in 3 seconds. This oscillatien may be due to slugs of water.
- 4. April 12, 1985 Testina After the change-out of the speed setting bushing from a 30 second rated bushing to a 15 second rated bushing on AFPT
#2 governor, two quick start tests were performed to verify O operability. This changeout was performed to ensure flow was provided by AFPT #2 within 40 seconds as required by i
l l_ .,--_..._.._-,,,,..m_,,-.,___ _ - - . _ , - , , , , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ , . . - . . . _ . . . . . . . - . . . _ _.__.._.___.-.._s._..- _ -. _ _ _ __ '
Page 6 of 11 Technical Specifications. These tests were run on the C normal steam supply path via MS 107 and with the pump discharge valves closed (i.e., min-recire path open). Less than 24 hours prior to these two (2) tests some additional testing was done on this same turbine using the same valve line-ups. This prior testing was performed for trouble-shooting. Due to the prior testing, the steam lines may not have been cooled to ambient conditions prior to the two (2) operability tests being run. The speed characteristics are shown in Figures 10 and 11 of Attachment 2. A review of the speed vs. time characteristics shows that the first run exhibited speed increases 5hich appear to be
~
a series of step changes rather than a constant acceleration to rated speed. The second run (performed immediately after the first) shows a constant rate of acceleration to rated speed. This is attributed to the fact that the steam lines were already heated, therefore, there would have been less condensation.
- 5. June 2, 1985 Plant Trip This event initiated a SFRCS actuation on low SG level.
Both AFPTs were supplied ste.c= from their respective steam generators via MS 106 and MS 107. The speed characteristics are shown on Figures 12 and 13 of O Attachment 2. A review of the speed characteristics for AFPT #1 shows the typical characteristics consistently seen on AFPT #1 (i.e., several oscillations prior to reaching rated speed). A review of the speed vs. time characteristics for AFPT #2 shows a fairly steady increase to rated speed but the speed continues past the high s:eed setpoint (3710 RPM) to approximately 4000 RPM for about three (3) seconds. The turbine then decreased speed and controlled at the high l speed setpoint.- During the initial increase to rated speed, the speed increases are seen as step changes rather ! than a straight line. These step changes, and the increase i to approximately 4000 RPM, may be attributable to water slugs. The following differences between the 6/2/85 event and the 6/9/85 event assist in explaining why both AFPTs reached the overspeed trip setpoint on 6/9/85 but not on 6/2/85. j - Boch AFPTs were running on the normal steam supply paths via MS 106 and MS 107, therefore, there could be less condensation reaching the turbines.
- O
Page 7 of 11 Both pumps had a discharge path available other than , the minimum recirculation path, therefore, any speed i increase would be accompanied by a corresponding flow l i increase, thus maintaining loading on the pump. This j i flow path was not available on 6/9/85. l
- 6. June 9, 1985 Testina (Post Trip)
- After the plant trip, a quick start test was performed on i I each of the AFPTs. These tests were run on the normal supply paths via MS 106 and MS'107. Both pumps discharge l
valves were closed such that only minimum recirculation flow was provided. These tests were run approximately ten . (10) hours after the AFPTs had been shut down, therefore, , the lines were still warm and the amount of condensation j would be less than expected for ambient temperature lines, i The speed characteristics are shown on Figures 14 and 15 of Attachment 2. A review of each speed vs. time charac-
; teristic shows a constant acceleration to rated speed, j AFPT #1 does not exhibit oscillations seen at other times.
The " smoothness" of these graphs may be attributable to the
- fact that minimal condensation would be expected since the j lines were already heated.
j C. Modifications 4
- 1. During the 1984 refueling outage, the #2 AFPT sovernor was changed out from a Woodward PG-PL governor to a Woodward
- PGG governor. The new governor was supplied with 7 lb/in i buffer springs and a 30 second speed setting bushing.
- Prior to startup from the 1984 refueling outage, the 7
! lb/in buffer springs were changed to 26 lb/in buffer springs by a Woodward Governor representative. The speed setting bushing was changed from a 30 second bushing to a ! 15 second bushing on'4/12/85 to ensure that AFPT #2 could { reach rated speed and deliver flow to the steam generators !- in_less than 40 seconds as required by Technical Specifica-tions. l 2. During the 1984 refueling outage, the control logic for the i steam supply valves to de AFPTs was changed to allow all
- four valves (MS 106, 106A, 107 and 107A) to open simultaneously.
! After the 3/21/85 plant trip, tse change was revised so l that MS 106A and MS 107A would open only on a SFRCS low pressure trip. This revision was made based on the hanger l damage found prior to the 3/21/85 trip. This was considered j a prudent action, the hanger damage was potentially attribut-l able to water slugs. !O .
, Pcg2 8 of 11 D. Maintenance History
~
The maintenance work done excluding oil replacement since the 1984 refueling outage for AFPT 1-1 is as follows:
- 1. Replacement of governor control motor (6-2-85),
j MWO# 1-85-1876-03. i NOTE: Investigations are currently underway to determine cause of motor failure. i 2. Adjustment of governor slip clutch (6-2-85), MWO# 1-85-1878-00. j 3. Replacement of low speed stop roll pin (6-2-85), MWO# 1-85-1878-01. The maintenance work done excluding oil replacement since the l 1984 refueling outage for AFPT 1-2 is as follows: i
- 1. Changeout of speed setting bushing (4-12-85),
2 MWO# 2-83-0136-11 (See Modification Ites C.1. above). A review of these maintenance records does not reveal any evidence that could support the overspeed trips of 6/9/85. E. Investination of Overspeed Trip Problems at Other Utilities ' Various resources have been used to determine if other utilities
- have experienced overspeed trips of the AFPTs.
- NPRDS had only one overspeed trip reported. This occurrence was
- the result of the failure of a Woodward Governor ramp generator.
i A ramp generator is not incorporated in the design of either the i PG-PL or PGG governor.
" Nuclear Power Experience" reported a total of 10 overspeed
! trips which are summarized below: l 1. Four (4) AFPT overspeeds were reported due to condensation in the line.
- 2. One (1) overspeed was reported due to a " double start" l
(i.e., interruption and re-introduction of steam supply ! when the turbine is already rolling). f
- 3. One (1) loss of suction overspeed was reported (i.e., pump loses suction pressure which effectively reduces pump loading).
- 4. Four (4) overspeed trips due to governor problems as listed below:
i
Page 9 of 11 ( ' Low oil level in governor Mechanical misadjustments
~
, s_) - Failed speed sensor (applicable to electronic EG gov-i ernor only) Apparent governor valve sticking The final source of information was the Nuclear Network System. I One (1) response was received which indicated the possibility of i turbine overspeed due to water in the steam lines.
, e-III. CHANGE ANAI,YSIS l ,
The differences associated with the 6/9/85 trip compared to previous i trips and actuations are listed below (conditions listed below i existed only on 6/9/85 t. rip).
- 1. Both auxiliary feedwater containment. isolation valves (AF 599 and 608) were closed when overspeed occurred. Pump flow was limited to the min-recire flow.
- 2. Both AFPTs were running solely on the cross connect steam supply l valves (MS 106A and 107A) at&the time of the overspeed trips.
; 3. AFP #1 was started on stest from MS 106 but then was switched to 1 steam from MS 106A.
4
/- s These differences are discussed in more detail in Section II, C
- Summary of Data, i'
IV. HYPOTHESIZED CAUSES OF OVERSPEED ! From the above data and from discussions with the turbine vendor, - Terry Turbine (Ken Wheeler); MPR Associates Inc. (Phil Hildebrandt, ! Bob Fink, and Tim Clarke); the following list of possible causes of
~
overspeed was developed. A. Water sluas in steam pipina to the turbine due to residual l condensation or rapid condensation of steam while heating long,
. cold steam supply path to AFFTs i This hypothesis is judged to be a viable description of the l cause of the observed AFPT~overspeed trips. Terry Turbine , indicates that the introduction of water slugs which flash j through the nozzles may result in an overspeed condition.
i The piping between the steam isolation valves (MS 106, 106A, ' 107, 107A) and the AFFTs is at a temperature near ambient conditions. When the isolation valves are opened, steam at I about 500* to 550*F is introduced. l Steam will be condensed in these lines during initial steam
- introduction and line heating. Preliminary calculations indicate l that several hundred pounds of wtter may be formed in these lines. This condensate is expected to form water slugs, parti-
_- -. - . .-- .- . .- =- . - - . _ . . _. -. - . . ._
- - Pegn 10 of 11 i
cularly in the long, approximately horizontal crossover lines i downstream of MS 106A or MS 107A. , It is noted that damage to pipe hanger supports on these lines l l bas been experienced previously, apparently due to transient
- operational loads. Steam flow loads would not be expected to result in hanger damage. Water slug formation or water hammer ;
4 may produce these loads. (Investigation of the pipe hanger . l support problem was in process prior to the 6/9/85 event.) {
.- e-l The design for the AFPTs is a single stage turbine configured
! similar to a bucket type " water wheel". This design is considered susceptible to increased speed excursions when water slugs are
- introduced. Analyses are currently being performed to confirm
, this hypothesis. B. AFPT 1-1 rollina on steam from MS 106 prior to receiving steam -
- flow from crossover (" Double Start")
This mechanism may be a contributor to the overspeed trip on
- AFPT #1, however, it is not considered likely. Discussions
- j. with Terry Turbine, as well as another utility, indicate that if 1 the turbine is rolling, and steam flow is stopped and restarted, the turbine may overspeed. This is because the speed setting bushing (the internal piece that controls the acceleration to rated speed).is ineffective due to the prior rotation of the turbine which has increased the governor oil pressure to its i
operating pressure. Since the governor oil pressure is established and controlling, loss or reduction in steam flow results in the governor valve opening in an attempt to increase steam flow. When full steam pressure and flow is reestablished, the governor valve is open further than necessary and cannot close quickly enough, resulting in an overspeed condition. ! This sequence may have occurred for AFPT #1 as a result of l initial roll'of the turbine on steam from MS 106 followed by
- closure of MS'106 coincident with opening of dS 106A. However, examination of the trip event sequent
- e suggests that steam flow
- would not have been interrupted during switchover from MS 106 to
- MS 106A as the steam source.
l Although considered unlikely, this hypothesis will be tested. f C. Sudden decrease in pump load due to sudden flow reduction when i discharme flow is abruptly stopped at the closed valves AF 599 ! and 608 r This hypothesis, although viable, is judged unlikely to have ' l caused an overspeed trip because discharge piping is assured to ! be full at all times thereby causing the pumps to operate at I min-recirc conditions until the discharge valves are open. 4 1
. - . _ - . , , . _ . , - - . _ . . , _ . .._,..,......_.]_,., . . - , . . . , . , , , . , , . , - - . . _ . _ _ _ , , , _-,_y,.~,_ -,_,..mmm.___,.,
t Pega 11 of 11 i-It is noted that pump operation on min-recire only may be a ;
. contributing factor to the o arspeed because of the decreased pump load.
l D. Governor problems (low oil level, improper settinas, etc.), j includina novernor valve and linkane i AFPT #1 has the previously used Woodward PG-PL governor which i has experienced speed control oscillation problems, AFPT #2 has the' new Woodward type PGG governor design which was installed i- during the 1984 refueling outage which has not indicated any i oscillation problems. I Neither governor apparently could respond to prevent the cause
, of the turbine overspeed. However, it is not considered that failure or malfunction of the governors was the cause based on j the following:
I i 1. The speed vs. time characteristics for the trip indicate . that the governors were controlling speed as designed i during the initial turbine acceleration.
- 2. Post trip testing shows proper operation of both governors.
. 3. The governor en AFP #1 is a PG-PL model with external l Bodine motor for remote speed setting, while the AFPT #2 j has a new PGG model with an internal motor for remote speed l setting. It is considered unlikely that both of these , governors would fail at the same time in a manner capable ! of causing an overspeed trip on the turbines. l 4. The governor valve was free to move during the trip as ! evidenced by the initial decrease in speed after both AFPTs l began to roll. i Prior to installation, an engineering evaluation was performed l on the PGG sovernor, which concluded that this governor should , be functionally similar to the PG-PL sovernor. However, since ! we have limited experience with the PGG governor (installed during 1984 refueling outage), we plan to further evaluate
- . whether problems with this governor could have contributed l to the overspeed.
l l E. Loss of pump suction source, resultina in no pump load This is not considered a viable hypothesis, since the control l room alarm printer shows no evidence of low pump suction pressure C prior to the overspeed. Also, the 1 psig pressure switch on the l pump suctions did not close the stese supply valves. .Further, there was no decrease in discharge pressure as would be expected if the suction pressure were lost. DVW:CER:1rh
- i. . - . -. - . - - - . - , - . . - - . - - . _ - - - - .
- -..- -,,, - . - - a,-
ATTACHMENT 1 ( Steam Supply-Pipina Layout to AFPTs Figure 1 presents a schematic representation of the steam supply i piping to the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbines. l The piping configuration downstream of the 4 steam supply isolation valves are described in more detail below.
- 1. MS 106 (SG #1 feed to AFPT #1) - The pipe length of this run is approximately 360 feet. Immediately downstream of MS 106 is a downhill run. The length of the pipe run has several vertical drops interrupted by horizontal runs. Total vertical drop is from elevation 623' to elevation 565'. Any condensation is expected to become entrapped in the steam flow or be carried as small slugs.
- 2. MS 106A (SG #2 feed to AFPT #1) - The pipe length of this run is approximately 650 feet. Immediately downstream of MS 106A is a 290 foot length of essentially horizontal pipe. After the steam / water has traversed the initial length of pipe, it ties into the length of pipe described in item 1 above, which is immediately downstream of MS 106. The 280 foot length of horizontal pipe could allow large water slugs to form prior to entering the downhill run.
O' 3. MS 107 (SG #2 feed to AFPT #2) - The pipe length of this run is approximately 125 feet. Immediately downstream of MS 107 is a downhill run. The total length of the pipe run has an almost continual downhill flow (i.e., ver pipe) dropping from elevation 623'y to few long lengths elevation # 565. of horizontal Any condensa-tion is expected to become entrapped in the steam flow or be carried as small slugs.
- 4. MS 107A (SG #1 feed to AFPT #2) - The pipe length of this run is approximately 375 feet. Immediately downstream of MS 107A is a 250 foot length of essentially horizontal pipe except for a 7 foot rise near the end of the run. After the rise is a short horizontal run and then the steam supply line has a 14 foot drop and is tied to the steam supply pipe described in item 3 above, 0mmediately downstream of MS 107. The rise, after a long horizontal run, will enable water slugs to form at the bottom of the rise and be carried downstream after filling the pipe.
G
ATTACHMENT 1 Figure 1 O ( ) r 3 e - MS107A MSlO6A e IMSl06 I MSl07 AF 608 AF599
./ u 1 I AF3870 ,, AF3872 A N
, .s AF3871 r,
AF3869 Aux. Steam } Id AS273 g( yd MS733 MS728 h
~
\ % /
/ A c- ----- - - - -
-3 AFP AFP No.1 No.1 No.2 No.2 SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF AUXIUARY FEED PUMP TURBINE STEAM PIPING SYSTEM Page 2 of 2
. ATTACICIENT 2 AUX FEED PUMP 1-1 SPEED DATA JUNE 9, 1955 - TRIP
======================================================
DATA TIME AFP 1-1 SPEED POINT ( S008 )
======================================================
1 01:41:06 07.9
-2 01:41:07 405.9 0 01:41:08 807.1 4 01:41:09- 948.7 5 01:41:10 1415.1 6 01:41:11 1793.7 7 01:41:12 :40.5 8 01:41:13 2472.5 9 01:41:14 1700.0 10 01:41:15 NO DATA 11 01:41:16 1790.7 12 01:41:17 2675.0 10 01:41:18 ::co.6 .
'14 01:41:19 2011.0 15 01:41:00 - 3471.;
16 01:41:01 2404.0 17 01: 41:22 0801.0
. 18 01:41:20 4:52.9 19 01:41:04 4616.6 20 01:41:25 0315.0 21 01:41:26 1915.8
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\d AUX FEED PUMP 1-0 SPEED DATA JUNE 9, 1985 - TRIP .
======================================================
DATA TIME AFP 1-0 SPEED POINT ( S018 ) *
======================================================
1 01:41:11 05.4 2 01:41:12 565.0
- 0 01:41:10 570.2 4 01i41:14 1500.6 -
5 01:41:15 NO DATA 6 01:41:16 0099.0 7 01:41:17 1766.8 8 01:41:18 1900.1 9 01:41:19 2152.6 10 01:41:00 2055.0 11 01:41:21 0089.5 12 01:41:00 2091.9 10 01:41:00 2408.0 . j 14 01:41:24 2460.;
- 15. 01:41:25 0096.8 is 01:41:Co 0079.7 17 01:41:07 0409.6 j 18 01:41:28 -
2400.5 19 O 20 21 01:41:29 01:41:00 01: 41:01 0987.8 4118.4 4062.6 20 01:41:02 4172.2 00 01:41:00 4162.4 24 01:41:34 4418.8 25 01:41:05 4540.9
; 26 01:41:06 4655.7 27 01:41:07 4748.5 28 01:41:08 08:0.5 l 09 01:41:09 21:0.9 00 01:41:40 1476.2 01 01:41:41 1175.0 s
Page 3 of 28
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ATTACHMENT 2 i' a h . \- } d AUX FEED PUMP 1-1 SPEED DATA . I MARCH 0, 1984
- ======================================================
J- DATA TIME AFP 1-1 SPEED POINT ( S006 )
======================================================
l 1 10:07:09 18.0 2 12:07:40 40.0 0 12:07:41 000.9 j 4 10:07: 40 1605.6 5 10:07: 40 1010.1 6 10:07:44 NO DATA ! 7 10:07:45 NO DATA i' 8 10:07:46 787.5 9 12:37: 47 768.0 10 10:07:48 1070.8
-11 10:07 49 NO DATA 1 10:07:50 1549.4 ,
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N AUX TEED PUMP 1-0 SPEED DATA MARCH 2, 1954 1
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DATA TIME AFP 1-0 SPEED POINT ( S018 )
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1 12:07:09 20.0 2 10:07:40 25.6 O 10:37:41 155.1
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ATTACEMENT 2 4 r AUX }EED PUMP 1-1 SFEED DATA
- JANUARY 15, 1995
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DATA TIME AFP 1-1 SPEED l POINT ( S009 ) ,
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-DATA TIME AFP 1-2 SFEED FOINT ( S018 ) *
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APRIL 10. loS5 - SECOND RUN i
======================================================
DA7A TIME AFP 1-0 SPEED FOINT ( S018 )
====================================================== < 1 04:17:06 20.2
! 04:17:07 25.6 0 04:17:08 387.1 ' 4 04: 17:09 0199.0 m1 5 04:17:10 1347.4
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t ! ======am============================================== j DATA TIME AFP 1-1 SPEED , i POINT ( S008 ) - j ====================================================== 1 06:05:06 45.0 : 06:05:07 105.8 i 0 06:05:38 707.0 )l 4
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s. i 1 i AU A -FEE: FUMF ;-! 5FEIO' DATA JUNE 2. 1985
======================================================
CA7A TIME AFP 1-0 SFEED FOINT , ( S019 ) !
- ======================================================
, 1 06:05:01 40.0 i 06:05 :: 40s.6 j 0 06:05:00 1627.6 i
- 4 06
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- Co CE:Co 2110.o f 7 06:05:07 207o.9 I f 9 06:05:08 01:0.0 I i 9 06:05:29 24o0.0 i i 10 06:05:00 2575.1 11 06:05:01 2619.0
- 10 06
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. 10 06: 05:00 0641.0 l 14 06: 05:04 2687.4 !
, 15 06: 05:05* 0741.1 ,
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; 20 04:C5:40 0146.5 -
21 06:05:41 0149.0
- 06:05: 42 0158.7 20 06: 05:40 0170.9 i
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AUX.-FEED PUMP U L 5 g - DATE: 6/2 /as (m) -- -- Q o 45 -- -- ---
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ATTACIDfENT 2 I AUX' FEED FUMP 1-1 SPEED DATA o N JIINE 9 1985 - TESTING DATe+ iINE AFP 1-1 SPEED 4 POINT < SOCS ) 1 10: 49:40 42.7 0 10:49:44 NO DATA 1 O 10: 49:45 600.9 4 10:49: 46 , 1007.0 l 5 10:49:47 1940.6 6 10:49:48 1376.7 i 7 10:49:49 NO DATA j S 10: 49:50 1412.7
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, 06 10:50:18 NO DATA 07 10s"0:19 NO DATA 08 10:50:00 06:2.7 09 10:50:21 NO DATA
- 40 10
- 50s : 0609.8 41 10:50:00 0609.8
! 42 10:50:24 0607.4 40 10:50:25 06 2.5 i s ' Page 25 of 28 4
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\ AUX FEED PUMP 1-0 SPEED DATA JUNE 9, 1965 - TESTING
======================================================
DATA TIME AFP 1-0 SPEED POINT ( S018 )
========================================.=============
1 1334: 50 35.4 0 10:34:50 380.0 0 12:04:54 NO DATA 4 12:34:55 2089.1 5 12:04:56 1610.5 6 10:34:57 2054.9
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14 10:05:05 3000.8 15 10:05:06 NO DATA le 10:05:07~ NO DATA 17 10:05:08 06:5.0 19 12:05:09 0691.1 19 10:05:10 0715.5 20 12:05:11 NO DATA 21 12:05:10 0700.6
- 12:05:13 0713.1 20 10:05:14 0680.8 24 10:35: 15 NO DATA 25 10:05:1o 0607.6 26 10:05:17 3571.4 l 27 10:05:18 NO DATA l 28 12:35:19 NO DATA 29 10:35:00 NO-DATA 00 12:05:21 NO DATA f
31 10:35:22 NO DATA 0 12:05:00 NO DATA 30 12:35:24 3271.1 04 12:35:25 NO DATA 35 12:35:26 0 19.8 36 12:35:27 NO. DATA 37 12:05:28 31:2.1 08 12:35:29 0092.8 39 12:35:30 0036.6 40 12:35:31 NO DATA 41 10:05:32 2951.0 42 12:05:33 2914.5 40 10:05:04 0868.1 44 12:05:35 0794.9 [N 45 12:05:06 2765.6 Page 27 of 28
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o 's ACTION PLAN ALAN NU PAGE awa IA 1 o' 6 TITLE DATE PHE PAHED PHEPAHED sY AUXILIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFI'T) #1 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev.1) 6/24/85 C. E. Rupp_ SPE CIFIC Os>ECTIVE WilCzynski D. Missig Varify hypothesis to support root cause determination. STEP PHIME ASSIGNED START TARGET DATE ACTION STEPS HFS*ONSIBILITY TO NUMBER DATE DATE COMPL E T E D t ALL STEPS OF TilIS ACTION PLAN ARE TO BE PERFORMED IN _ ACCORDANCE WITH Tile LATEST REVISION OF "CUIDELINES TO FOLLOW WHEN TROUBLESHOOTING OR PERFORMING TNVESTICATIVE ACTIONS INTO ROOT CAUSES SURROUNDING Tile JUNE 9,1985 REACTOR TRIP". 1.0 Test of Hypothesia D: Covernor Malfunction Caused Wilczynski Wilczynski No Act Lon Required AFPT #1 to Overspeed. 1.1 Prepare Maintenance Work Order (MWO) for removal of Wilczynski Thompson _. .-- governor cover, inspection, and reassembly of governor. All work to be performed by a representative of Woodward Governor Co. _ l.2 Remove governor cover on AFPT #1. Wilczynski Thompson 1.3 Perform a visual inspection to determine any obvious Wilczynski Thompson damage. 1.4 Check oil level and cleanliness. Wilczynski Thompson 1.5 Document the as-found condition. Wilczynski Wilczynski e nyn v .nv vern n. n m , , , , , , , . . . i.,,'" 9 OV ER S P F ED "'" # "'
~
ACTION PLAN PL AN NUMBE H PAGE 1A 2 a' 6 TITLE DATE PHEPAHED PHEPARED sY i AUXILIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT) #1 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) 6/24/85 C. E. Rupp_ SPE CIFIC OBJECTIVE Wilczyn8k1 D. Missig Varify hypothesis to support root cause determination. STEP PRIME ASSIGNE D START TARGET DATE ACTION STEPS PsUMsER HFSPONSIBILITY TO DATE DATE COMPLETED l 1 1.6 Using Woodward Engineering Representative., determine Wilczynski Gradomski if any repairs are required prior to testing the governors. The basis for this determination will be: 4 "If the repairs are required to preclude further damage
- to the governor, turbine, or pump, then the repairs shall
- be made. If further operation of the governor will not cause further damage, then the repairs will be made after i
the test for overspeed is run to determine if the failed _ item could have caused the overspeed on 6/9/85". Document all decisions. 1.7 Prepare MWO and perform Tepair work as determined in Step Wilczynski Thompson
- 1.6. All work to be done by Woodward Representative.
l.8 Install a remote manual trip device in case of failure Wilczynski Thompson i of the overspeed trip. 1.9 Perform " quick start" test of AFPT #1 using ST 5071.02 Wilczynski Missig Phase 1 to test Hypothesis D. i
~
j ==AUNY LIARY= FEED-FUMF = TURBINE = (AFFT) = f 1" 0VER5 FEED = TRIP'(Retr =1)
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p y e W r t a t H i R h s a d A e p I y t r e w L f a a r e N I i e p i A X r p e t v L U e e r o e P A V R P n R m N R O ** P E 0 1 2 _ I T ** E B 1 1 1 - C TM . . . . SU 1 1 1 A N
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l L ,] \ l ACTION PLAN PL AN NUMilE H PAGE see _ IA 4 o' 6 TITLE DATE PREPARED PREPARED BY AUXILIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT) #1 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) 6/24/85 C. E. Rupp sPE ciric on>EcTivE Wilczynski D. Missig V;rify hypothesis to support root cause determination. STEP PHIME ASSIGNE D START TARGET DATE A COMPLET ED NUMBER H F SPONSIBILIT Y TO DATE DATE i 2.0 Test of Hypothesis A: Condensate in the Main Steam Wilczynski Wilczynski No Action Required Crossover Line Caused AFPT #1 to Overspeed. 2.1 Develop a Test Procedure (TP) to simulate as close as Wilczynski Missig practical the actual conditions of the June 9, 1985 AFPT #1 overspeed trip. A brief outline of the TP is shown below: PURPOSE: ..
- To verify hypothesis that condensate in the cross connect steam supply lines (MS 106A) can cause an overspeed trip of AFPT f1.
EQUIPMENT NEEDED:
- Existing plant instrumentation
- Back-up system for tripping turbines manually
- Instrumentation to monitor the thermohydraulic conditions in the steam supply piping to the AFPTs.
---~
==AUXI LI ARY- FEED-PUMP TURBINE'(APPT)= f1 - OVERSPEED-TRIP =(Rev==1)
l \ s / ( ACTION PLAN 7LAN NUMHEH PAGE IA 5 a' 6 TITLE DATE PREPAHED PHEPARED BY AUXILIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT) #1 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) 6/24/85 C. E. Rupp_ sPE cific ossEcTavE Wilczynski D. Missig V;rify hypothesis to support root cause determination. STEP PHIM E ASSIGN E D START TARGET DATE A TION STEM H F SPONSIBILIT Y TO DATE DATE COMPLE T E D NUMBER 1 PREREQUISITES:
- Governor is at its high speed stop. ._ - - -- _ - -_- - -- - . . - _ _ _ - - . . __ - --
- Steam supply lines to the AFPTs are at ambient conditions.
- Pump discharge valves are closed.
- Verify min-recirc valves are open.
^
- Steam Generator (SG) pressures are greater than 870 psig.
- O NOTE: SG pressure will be less than 1050 psig and decreasing during testing. This will not exactly duplicate the conditions of 6/9/85. __
2.2 Perform Test Procedure Wilczynski Missig 2.3 Review test data to verify applicability to hypothesis. Wilczynski Wilczynski 2.4 Repeat Test Procedure Wilczynski Missig 2.5 Review test data from second test to verify applicability Wilczynski Wilczynski to hypothesis.
== AUXILI ARY- FEED-PUMP -TURBINE"( AFFT) = f f = 0 VERS PEED =TR I P = (ReWI)
ACTION PLAN PLAN Nuuse n PAos
*ee _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. _
1A 6 6_ AUX 1LIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT) #1 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) 6/24/85 C. E. Rupp_
$PEC8FIC OBJE CTIVE Wilczynski D. Missig Vzrify hypothesis to support root cause determination.
STEP PRIME ASSIGN E D START TARGET DATE
^ I "
NUM8EH H F SPONSIBILITY 10 DATE DATE COMPLET ED 3.0 Test Hypothesis B: " Double Start" due to cycling of Wilczynski Wilczynski No Action Required valves MS 106 and MS 106A. 3.1 Develop a Test Procedure (TP) to simulate the cycling Wilczynski Missig of valves MS 106 and MS 106A as occurred on 6/9/85. Prerequisites to be the same as shown in Step 2.1. _ -- 3.2_ Perform the TP developed above. Wilczynski ' Hissig 3.3 Review test data to verify applicability to hypothesis. Wilczynski Wilczynski 3.4 Perform the TP again. Wilczynski Missig _ 3.5 Review test data to verify applicability to hypothesis. Wilczynski Wilczynski 4.0 Write final report to document root cause. Wilczynski Wilczynski i = AUXILIARY-FEED-PUMP-TURBINE-(I.FFT P F1'0VERSPEED= TRIP'(Rev F1)
,Q
/ )
k~ ACTION PLAN PL AN NUMBE H PAGE e wees , _ IB 1 o' $ TITLE DATE PHEPAHE D PHEPAHE D BY AUXILIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT) #2 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) 6/24/85 C. E. Rupp_ SPE CIFIC oBJE CTIVE _N11Czynski D. Missig V:;rify hypothesis to support root cause determination. STEP PHIME ASSIGNE D START TARGET DATE A TI N STEPS H F SPONSIBILITY TO DATE DATE COMPLETE D NUMBET ( ALL STEPS OF TilIS ACTION PLAN ARE TO BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITil Tile LATEST REVISION OF " GUIDELINES TO FOLLOW WilEN TROUBLES 1100 TING OR PERFORMING INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS INTO ROOT CAUSES SURROUNDING THE JUNE 9,1985 REACTOR TRIP". 1.0 Test of Hypothesis D: Govern malfunction caused Wilczynaki Wilczynski No Action Required AFPT #2 to overspeed. 1.1 Prepare Maintenance Work Order (MWO) for removal of Wilczynski Thompson governor cover, inspection, and reassembly of governor. All work to be performed by a representative of Woodward Governor Co. ._. 1.2 Remove governor cover on AFPT #2. Wilczynski Thompson 1.3 Perform a visual inspection to determine any obvious damage. Wilczynski Thompson 1.4 Check oil level and cleanliness. Wilczynski Thompson 1.5 Document the as-found condition. Wilczynski Wilczynski == AUXI LI ARY -FEED-PUMP = TURBINE = ( AFFT) = f 2" 0VERSFEED' TRIP"(R ev7"1 ) --~---~- -
7Q ( ! w ._ - --- ACTION PLAN PLAN NUMHE H PACE 87** O _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _._ __ _ _ _ _ __ . _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ . IB ., _2 ' _ b TITLE DATE Pt.. PA RE D PHEPARED BY AUX 1LIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT) #2 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) ~ 6/24/85 C. E. Rupp_ sn ceric ou2E cTivE Wilczynski D. Missig Varify hypothesis to support root cause determination. l STEP PHIME ASSIGNE D START TARGET DATE
^ " RFSPONSIBILITY TO DATE DATE COMPLET E D NUMB E'J t
1.6 Using Woodward Engineering Representative, determine Wilczynski Gradomski if any repairs are required prior to testing the governors. The basis for this determination will be:
"If the repairs are required to preclude further damage to the governor, turbine, or pump, then the repairs shall be made. If further operation of the governor will not cause further damage, then the repairs will be made after ._ _.
the test for overspeed is run to determine if the feiled item could have caused the overspeed on 6/9/85." Document _ _ _ all decisions. 1.7 Prepare MWO and perform repair work as determined in Step 1.6. Wilczynski Thompson All work to be done by Woodward Representative. 1.8 Install a remote manual trip device in case of failure of Wilczynski Thompson the overspeed trip. 1.9 Perform " quick start" test of AFPT #2 using ST 5071.02 Wilczynski Hissig Phase I to test Hypothesis D.
= AUXILIARY-FEED-FUFTURBINE"(AFFT)=f 2"0VERSPEEDTIP=(ReW1'l
(
)
ACTION PLAN PLAN MUMHE H PAGE no c4ee IB 3 a' 5 TITLE DATL PHEPARE D PHEPARED BY AUXILIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT) #2 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) 6/24/85 C. E. Rupp_. SPECIF IC OBJE CTIVE WilCzynski D. Missig V:rify hypothesis to support root cause determination. STEP PHIME ASSIGNE D START TARGET DATE A DATE NUMBE; H F SPONSIBILIT Y TO DATE COMPL E T E D i 1.10 Repeat step 1.9 to prove repeatability. Wilczynski Hissig 1.11 Prepare MWO for repair of governor for all items that_____ , _ _ _ Wilczynski_ Thompson _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ ___ vere not repaired under Step 1.7 as determined by Step 1.6. 1.12 Review data to verify applicability to hypothesis. Wilczynski Wilczynski 2.0 Test of Hypothesis A: Condensate in the Main Steam Wilczynski Wilczynski No Action Required crossover line caused AFPT #2 to overspeed. -- 2.1 Develop a Test Procedure (TP) to simulate as close as Wilczynski Hissig practical the actual conditions of the June 9, 1985 _. AFPT #2 overspeed trip. A brief outline of the TP is . - - . - --- . - _ _ _ . - shown below: PURPOSE: - . _
- To verify hypothesis that condensate in the cross _. .._
connect steam supply lines (MS 107A) can cause an _.. overspeed trip of AFPT #2.
-~~
=AUXILY ARY - FEED-PUMP = TURB I N E - ( AFPT)" # 2" 0 VERS P E ED NI P = (R ev== 1 )
,, q
( ) I ) ACTION PLAN NAN NUMM H PAGE IB 4 a' S AUXILIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT) #2 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) 6/24/85 C._E. Rupp_ srsceric ositcTeve Wilczynski D. Missig V;rify hypothesis to support root cause determination. STEP A IGN D START TARGET DATE ACTION STEPS TO DATE NUMs ET_ H F SPONSIBILITY DATE COMPLE TE D 1 EQUIPMENT NEEDED: Wilczynski Missig
- Existing plant instrumentation.
- Back-up system for tripping turbines manually.
- Instrumentation to monitor the thermohydraulic conditions in the steam supply piping to the AFPTs.
PREREQUISITES:
- Governor is at its high speed stop.
- Steam supply lines to the AFPTs are at ambient conditions. ._
- Pump discharge valves are closed. _ _ __
- Verify min-recirc valves are open.
- Steam Generator (SC) pressures are greater than 873 psig.
NOTE: SG pressure will be less than 1050 psig and decreasing during testing. This will not exactly duplicate the conditions - _ of 6/9/85. 2.2 Perform Test Procedure. Wilczynski Missig 2.3 Review test data to verify applicability to hypothesis. Wilczynski Wilczynski == AUXILI ARY -FEED-PUMP- TURE I NE"( AFPT) = f 2- DVERS PEED = TR IP =(R ev71) -
r ( ACTION PLAN PL AN NUMist. H PAGE lB 5 *' 5 TITLE D A T E. PHEPAHED PHEPAHED BY AUXILIARY FEED-PUMP TURBINE (AFPT) #2 OVERSPEED TRIP (Rev. 1) 6/24/~85 C. E. Rupp sreceric osse cievt Wilczynski D. Missig Verify hypothesis to support root cause determination. STEP PHIME ASSIGN E D STAHT TARGET DATE ACTION STEPS RFSPONS8BILITY TO DATE DATE COMPL E T E D NUM8ER i 2.4 Repeat Test Procedure. Wilczynski_ Missig _ _ 2.5 Review test data from second test to verify _ applicability _ _ _ . Wilegynsici Wilczynski _. _ _ . _ . _ . __ . _ _ _ . _ to hypothesis. __ 3.0 Evaluate the design of the PGG governor versus the PG-PL __ .Wilczynski_ _Gradomski - _ governor to determine diffe.rences that may_cause undesired performance characteristics. (This action to be independent of all other action steps.) ___. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. 4.0 Write final report to document root cauea. . Wilczynski__Wilczynski. m m,o , ..mm+m m w.-
%.. . --%. w... ,-=y *w- - - ~ --wmm**--W***** ' * ""N'""" -
. . .. _ _. . . _ - - . - .. ..= . - - . . _ .._ ... -_ _ - -_
7 f 1 MR. ROSSI: I guess I am ready to begin. 2 What I would suggest we do is just to go through 4 3 page by page of the document, and anybody on the team that has 1 4 got a question or a comment on it, just bring it up as we go , 5 through. 6 Some of the things are just questions of i 7 verification, and I have got one of those right now. The 8 first page. Valves 3869, 70, 71 an 72, those are normally 9 closed until you get a signal to operate the auxiliary 19 feedwater pump; is that correct? All four of those are 11 closed. All right. 12 Does anybody have anything.else on page l? l
'-- 13 MR. BEARD: Just a point of clarification. Up in ! 14 the first paragraph there, it says 5 seconds after the initial 1
- 15 steam feed rupture control system, 1:41:08, the reactor i
l 16 operator inadvertently initiated the steam feed rupture , 17 control system low pressure trip on both channels and both i 4 18 generators. 19 We are really saying one channel on each of the two 29 generators, are we not? 21 MR. RUPP: Well, I think the main point is that it 22 did cross-connect the two steam generators to the opposite i 23 sides. () 24 MR. BEARD: But he did not initiate actuation' 25 Channo(. 1 and actuation Channel 2 for both steam generators, i
8
~'s 1 did he?
(b 2
~
MR. JAIN: I think J. T. is correct. We only 3 tripped Channel 1 on steam generator 1 and tripped Channel 2 4 on steam generator 2. 5 MR. BEARD: Okay. I just want to make sure that you 6 aren't telling me something new here, that's all. 7 MR. WOOD: This is describing the same item that we 8 have talked about before, pushing the two top buttons. 9 MR. ROSSI: Okay. 10 Going on to page 2, in the second paragraph you 11 talked about the discussions you have had with Terry Turbine. m 12 Can you give us any more details of how much Terry Turbine has
- 13 done to verify that these water slugs can indeed cause 14 acceleration of the rudder? I mean have they done 15 calculations? Is this engineering judgment, or exactly what 16 have they done?
17 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Since we talked last, we have 18 talked to Terry Turbine again and we have found out what they 19 have done in this area, and it is purely their engineering ; 20 judgment and their expertise as the turbine designer. 21 MR. ROSSI: So they have not done an actual simple 22 calculation to determine whether this phenomena could explain 23 the overspeed? It's just engineering judgment and nothing A 24 more? 25 MR. WILCZYNSKI: That's what they told us, yes.
9 1 MR. ROSSI: Have they indicated that other plants 2 have reported this problem or that they.have experienced it on 3 other Terry Turbines? 4 MR. WILCZYNSKI: They knew of no other plants that 5 had had this problem, but we were able to get other data 6 throughout the industry, as shown in the report from NPRDS, I I 7 nuclear power experience and the nuclear network system.
! 8 MR. ROSSI: Okay. We will get to that when we get I
9 to the page that has that on it. i
! 10 Have you considered asking either Terry Turbine or i 11 someone else to do a simulation calculation or something of a
12 that sort to see if this is a feasible mechanism? 13 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes, MPR Associates is in the 14 process of doing calculations of that type.. r I 15 MR. ROSSI: Okay. So you are going to do a i i 16 calculation to try to verify that this is a plausible l 17 explanation for the amount of overspeed that occurred; is that 1 18 right? , 19 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Yes, sir, both in terms of 1 20 formation of the water in the lines and acceleration of that : 21 water through the determine and determine whether indeed it is 22 a viable mechanism for overspeeding the turbine. l 23 MR. ROSSI: And that will be obviously documented - () 24 and will either be a part of your root cause documentation or , 25 we can get it if it's referenced in there then. 1 i
. __ . . _ . _ ._. _ . . . - . =_ _ __ _. __ ._. . . _.
10 1 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes, definitely. V(S - On this discussion with Terry Turbine, 2 MR. BEARD: 3 the last time we met you had stated that you had talked with 4 Terry Turbine initially, told them your experience during the i 5 event, and they said, well, that could have been caused by -- 6 and went on to describe this flashing phenomenon, if I can use j 7 that term. 8 Is it still your opinion that Terry Turbine was 9 aware of this phenomenon at the time you called him? i 10 MR. WILCZYNSKI: I can't say that they were aware 11 of it, but as soon as it was brought up in conversation, then l 12 he did lead into the thought that yes, indeed, that could l 13 cause an overspeed condition. i 14 MR. BEARD: I guess I am trying to just understand f 15 who suggested this concept, that's all. The last time we met, 16 I was given the distinct impression that Terry Turbine 17 suggested this as a possibility when you called him, and now 18 I'm not sure I know whether they suggested it to you as an i 19 explanation of their equipment behavior or maybe you had i 29 suggested it and they confirmed it, or -- 21 MR. WILCZYNSKL: I guess the way it came up into i 22 the discussion was we related that we did have an overspeed ! 23 condition, and discussior led to the fact that water is () t 24 presumed to be in our steam lines because of the hanger damage 25 that we had experienced earlier, and we had asked if that
11 1 could be a contributor to the overspeed condition. And then, (~' V 2 of course, their response said yes, indeed, it could. i 3 MR. ROSSI: Now, I gather from your analysis of 4 speed curves and so forth that, depending on the temperature 5 of the water that might go through the turbine, it could 6 either slow it down or speed it up. That's the hypothesis, 1 7 right? If'it's cold water, it slows it down; if it's hot 8 water, it speeds it up. , 9 MR. WILCZYNSKI: That's true. The definition of I 10 hot and cold is yet to be determined. There were some very 11 rough calculations done by MPR yesterday or the day b'efore a 12 yesterday showing that cold water, as we had thought before, k h I (~~)
\s- 13 being somewhat below the saturation point, could'indeed also 14 speed up the turbine. So we are not sure exactly what the i
) 15 definition of cold water is, and that will be part of the MPR 16 analysis. l 17 But there are times when we have seen water going i j 18 through the turbine as evidenced by the sentinel relief valve l 19 lifting and spraying water throughout the room, and at that' I 29 time you see turbine RPMs. slow down. 21 MR. ROSSI: I have in my marginal notes here that in 22 the sequence of events, there was Steam and Feed Rupture i 23 Control System Channel 2 actuation at 1:35 and 31 seconds into () 24 the thing. Could that have done anything in terms of starting I mean you talk-about providing flow 25 the motion of valves? 1
. . _ . _ . . -~ _ _ _ . _ -_ .
12
/s 1 initially to the number one auxiliary feedwater pump through 2 MS 106. Are you sure that a similar kind of thing didn't 3 happen with the other pump?
4 That's really my question. 5 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes. There was no indication J 6 that MS 107 had gone open to supply steam to the number 2 aux 7 feed pump. 8 MR. ROSSI: And you have an actual indication that 9 MS 106 did open? 10 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes. 11 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Do you have anything on page 27 12 MR. BEARD: Well, I guess page 2 is where you 13 reference Attachment 1 and Figure 1, and maybe this is the 14 time to jump over and cover that information before we get it 15 out of context. 16 As I remember, as I turn the pages here, Attachment 17 1 is really two pages, a one-page description and narrative 18 and one page of figures, which, by the way, I think is.a 19 pretty. clear figure. 20 On the narrative page of Attachment 1, a couple of 21 things that I find, just to make sure I understand. The linec 22 from 106 and 107 valves are 360 and 125 feet each, whereas the 23 lines from the cross feed steam valves, MS 196A and 196B, are 24 650 and 375 each, which means that they are significantly (O) 25 longer and, as you have-indicated, have long runs of
13
-1 horizontal pipes, a 2 You had said earlier, I believe, that these pipes 3 are also not insulated, and I believe you had indicated that 4 they may not have the best design in terms of steam traps or 5 drains or something like that. Can you make sure that we are 6 up to date on that? Are they insulated?
7 MR. RUPP: They are insulated. 8 MR. BEARD: All pipes insulated. 9 MR. ROSSI: And the reason they are cold is not le because they aren't insulated, just simply because they have ! 11 no flow through them for long periods of time. 12 MR. RUPP: That's correct. 13 MR. BEARD: What about steam traps or water drains J
! 14 or things of that nature?
15 MR. RUPP: There are steam traps, and the drains off 16 the traps, but we really h'aven't done a whole lot of analysis 17 to determine how efficient those are in terms of how much 18 water they can take out. Just from preliminary, it doesn't I 19 look like they are going to be able to take out anywhere near 20 the amount of condensation that is going to be generated. 21 MR. BEARD: And I believe that someplace else in-22 this document.you mentioned-that you had not prior to this 23 event had a program to periodically drain or flush the system () r 24 or whatever'these pipes. 25 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Sometime in mid-1983, Operations
14
/"'} l began a program by which they do periodically drain these G
2 lines. 3 MR. BEARD: So that has been in effect since 4 mid-1983, roughly? 5 MR. SHAFER: Would you explain how that is done? 6 MR. RUPP: That's what we got from Operations, 7 mid-1983. Essentially, all they do is uncap the drains and 8 let the water run out. 1 9 MR. SHAFER: What is the periodicity on that; do you a 10 know? 11 MR. RUPP: No, we don't. 12 MR. ROSSI: Well, let me make sure I understand. T } 13 The mechanism that is being hypothesized is not so much that 14 you have water in the lines at the start but that you get 15 water in the lines as the initial steam flow comes down and 16 condenses; is that correct?
- 17 MR. HILDEBRANDT
- Yes, sir, that's correct.
18 MR. ROSSI: So the fact that you have drains in 19 there to keep them drained all the time when there isn't any 20 flow through may not help if the drains don't have the 21 capacity that is sufficient to carry out the condensation that 22 occurs when the steam flow comes down the line. 23 MR. HILDEBRANDT: That's correct. Any residual () 24 water would tend to worsen the effect. We don't know if there 25 is_very much residual water, but what you just said is
.- . - . . - - -. . ~. - - .- - ~_ .. .-_ _-
15 1
~'N 1 correct, and we do not expect that the existing traps have (Q 2 sufficient capacity to handle the large amount of condensation 3 initially involved with entering steam into the cold lines.
4 MR. LANNING: So why do you dismiss the hypothesis 5 that the water came on to start with? 6 MR. HILDEBRANDT: We don't dismiss that. 7 MR. LANNING: Why do you think it is not that 8 residual water that's the primary source of water that
< 9 adversely affects the turbines? ! 10 MR. HILDEBRANDT: It could be part of the i 11 mechanism. The amount of water that has been drained I 12 periodically out of there is a small amount. Do you recall, i
4 13 Chuck, the amount? 14 MR. RUPP: Yes. For the most part it is just a 15 mililiter or two. There was one occasion where we did have 16 more than that, but most of them, all you are getting is the 17 amount of water out of the actual bucket coming off the pipe i 18 and down the drain line. , 4 4 19 MR. ROSSI: Are these drains continually in 29 operation or are they something that people have to go and are ; I ! j 21 they either capped -- , 22 MR. HILDEBRANDT: -The drains associated -- I'm 23 sorry. () 24 MR. BEARD: I believe you said earlier, and correct 25 me if I'm wrong, that the periodic drain consisted of going
16 , I ! a 1 around and uncapping these drains, so I presume that between j 2 times, they are capped. i '3 MR. HILDEBRANDT: The drains also have traps ; 1 i 4 associated with them. The traps are not designed to be very : i I 5 efficient -- and the word " efficient" has to be quantified and 6 has not yet been -- but they are not very efficient during i j 7 periods when there is very little pressure in the pipe, and I j 8 the drains are aligned the condenser, which is the normal , j 9 lineup for these systems. l j le But the efficiency of the traps in these conditions i I l l 11 has not yet been determined. f I 12 MR. ROSSI: But the real point is that even in a i , ) - 13 drain that has a very small capacity, and as long as it works ! j 14 at all, would probably drain most of the water out that would !
~
15 collect in the piping when it is not being used at all, but l 16 then along comes this transient where you condense a lot of l 17 steam suddenly, and it just wouldn't have the capacity to } 18 handle it. 19 MR. HILDEBRANDT: It appears to be that way so far. ; 29 We do not have the final answer, but it appears to be that way I i 4- 21 so far. i i 22 MR. ROSSI: Wayne, you had a question? l i 23 HR. SHAFER: Yes. It appears that if in 1983 you ' i 24 decided to periodically start draining those lines, then you j j 25 had to know at that time that your steam traps were not , j- , ! ( i____.____.___ . .
L y 17 1 capable of handling the problem. Is that a fair statement? ;
~
i i Os 2 MR. RUPP: I don't think anybody here can answer I
;- 3 that. The decision to start draining was done by Operations, l 4 and we don't really have all the background.
5 MR. BEARD: Is there anyone here representing that f 6 department, the Operations Department? l 7 MR. BEYER: We really don't have any body from the i i 1 8 operations Department. ; 9 MR. BEARD: I had another question. Because they l l 19 are describing the layout of the pipes, it brings it to mind 11 that someplace in the document you say that in the piping -- I i I 12 believe it's associated with MS 197A, where there is, I i i 13 believe, a 259-foot long essentially horizontal pipe, and then 14 a rise -- that this could cause the accumulation of several ! 15 hundred pounds of water? 1 j 16 Can anybody give me any feel for something a bit I I assume you have I 17 more precise than several hundred pounds? I 18 done some calculation or some estimate to come up with that 19 ctatement. I'm just wondering can we get a better feel for [ l 4 L l 20 what we are talking about. ; l 21 MR. HILDEBRANDTt Chuck will get the actual ; l 22 numbers. The calculation is done on a steady state basis, 23 presuming the steam -- that you have taken all the heat
- () 24 capacity available in the pipe and condensed the water and 25 brought the pipe up to the temperature of steam. ;
i f
18 r-) 1 Now, those are very conservative numbers. They do O 2 not consider the transient effects. 3 on that basis, which is very conservative, those are 4 the numbers that Chuck will now read to you. 5 MR. RUPP: On the 107A side -- well, just the 6 250-foot long length pipe, it was about 640 pounds mass 7 condensate. 8 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Can we go on to page 3? 9 MR. BEARD: Yes. I just thought it would be a good 10 way to get that one into context. 11 MR. ROSSI: I do note that you now apparently 12 checked your testing for the whole life of the plant, and your
- 13 conclusion is that the steam supply and feedwater flow path 14 configuration on the 9th had not previously been duplicated in 15 either real operation of the system or a test. When you say 16 that, does that mean both"of them cross-connected to the other 17 steam generator, or does it mean that you have not even tested 18 individual lines cross-connected to the other steam generator?
19 MR. WILCZYNSKI: I'm not sure exactly where you are 20 reading, but it's true that we have not tested either of the 21 cross-connects for a quick start on the turbines. 22 MR. ROSSI: Okay. And that's over the lifetime of 23 the plant. Ii G 24 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes, that's true. 25 MR. BEARD And wasn't there a period of time where
19 ("
.g} l you modified the logic such that on any start, all four steam 2 valves would open?
3 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes, that's true. 4 MR. BEARD: And I believe there were some starts 5 while the system was configured that way. 6 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes. 7 MR. BEARD: And then you had some more water hammer 8 experience so you revised the logic back to something 9 equivalent to what it had been? 10 MR. WILCZYNSKI: That's true, 11 MR. ROSSI: What was the reason for the original 12 modification to open up all four valves at the same time? ! 13 MR. JAIN: It was basically based on the 14 reliability or the PRA study that we submitted to the NRC in 15 1981, which evaluated several options for improving the system 16 reliability versus an optional -- 17 MR. ROSSI: So it was not to solve a water hammer 18 problem; it was really to increase the redundancy of the steam 19 supplied to the pumps. Is that basically the reason? 29 Mk. JAIN: Basically that is correct. And the basic 21 intent there was to provide a redundant path so if an MOV 22 failes to open, you have another path for the turbine to run, 23 and MOVs were found to be one of the most dominant () 24 contributors in the study. 25 MR. ROSSI: Okay. And then after you did that l
20 () 1 2 modification, you did find water hammer problems in the lines as evidenced by hanger damage. 3 MR. JAIN: Correct. 4 MR. ROSSI: But you never had any overspeed trips of 5 the pumps or anything like that? 6 MR. JAIN: Not to my knowledge. 7 MR. ROSSI: The pumps must have been operated in 8 that configuration -- 9 MR. WILCZYNSKI: -They were, and there were no
, 10 overspeeds.
11 MR. ROSSI: Okay. 12 Does anybody have any more questions? O 13 MR. BEARD: I have one. About a third of the way 14 down on page 3, you say that you then reviewed the speed and i 15 time characteristics for pump number 1, and you mention that 16 their oscillations -- and I guess at one point the oscillation 17 becomes uncontrolled, but I would likeoto understand, and 18 maybe this is the right place and maybe not, but I would like
~
19 to understand that these oscillations -- I would like to 20 understand what you believe the cause is for these 21 oscillations. 22 In particular, is it water? Is it governor 23 response? Or is it some combination or something different or 24 what? 25 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Right now we believe that the cause
21 1 of these oscillations is indeed due to water. 2 MR. BEARD: Do you have any experience that says 3 when you don't have water in the lines, the speed curve comes 4 up nice and smooth? 5 MR. WILCZYNSKI: If you turn back to the speed 6 curves, the June 9th testing that was done after the trip, 7 it's page 26 and 28 -- maybe ten back from the back of the 8 report -- shows aux feed pump number 1, 6/9/85 testing. This 9 was done approximately ten hours after the plant trip. 10 Therefore, the lines were still warm, and you see that the 11 graph is quite smooth all the way up to rate of speed. 12 MR. BEARD: So you believe that there was no
\_/ 13 condensate involved in that start?
14 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Right. j 15 MR. BEARD: Okay, thank you. 16 MR. ROSSI: Does anybody have'anything on page 47 17 Page 5? Page 6? 18 MR. BEARD: Page 6. In the second paragraph there 19 it says review of the speed-time characteristics showed -- and 29 here we are talking about an occurrence on April 12, 1985 of 21 testing -- says a review of speed-time characteristics showed 22 speed increases appeared to be-a series of step changes rather 23 than a constant acceleration to rated speed. ' A : 24 I'm just wondering if you had any explanation or t A_/ 25 'more information as to why that occurred.
. . . . = - -
22
- 1 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Once again, we believe that is due 2 to some amount of water going through the turbine. That 3 testing that is talked about there, that first run was done 4 approximately 24 hours after that turbine had been run prior, 5 so --
6 MR. BEARD: Wait a minute. I'm getting confused 7 because you are saying that in this test, 24 hours after the 8 turbine had been run, you felt like you still had water, and a 9 minute ago in another test, you said you felt 10 hours after 10 it had been run you felt there was no water. I'm confused, 11 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Well, the 10 hours -- we would 12 assume that the lines would still be warm and therefore there s ,/ 13 would be less condensation. This test that we are talking 14 about here on page 6 was run in 24 hours. 15 MR. BEARD: Oh, I'm sorry. I am confused this 16 morning, too. All right.~ 17 MR. ROSSI: Anything more on 6? 18 On page 7 I had a question. Have you actually 19 superimposed the movements of 599 and 608 on the-speed curves 20 for the day of the event? I mean have you actually analyzed 21 the' times when those valves started to close and when they got 22 all the way closed and superimposed that on the speed curve? 23 .The reason I ask that question is that I would assume that / \ 24 when the valve is moved from the open position to the closed V 25 position, that the loading on the pump will change and that
23
g 1 that could either be your cause or at least a contributing t-(d 2
~
cause of the event. 3 I am trying to get a feel for the degree to which 4 you carefully analyzed and looked for that possibility. 5 MR. WILCZYNSKI: We did indeed look at the closure 6 of valves'599 and 608, and what we noticed was the valves had
'7 ' begun closing prior to the turbines and pumps even coming up 8 to speed, and those valves have a 9-second closure time, which 9 has them being full closed at approximately 1:41:19, at which 10 time turbine No. 2 was only at 570 RPM and turbine No. I was 11 at 2400 RPM.
12 MR. ROSSI: Okay. So you didn't see an increase in O
\~ / 13 speed at the time the valve went through its last little bit 14 of motion that presumably changed the flow significantly. You 15 have looked at that, then.
I 16 MR. WILCZYNSKI: That's true. { I 17 MR. HILDEBRANDT: There is insufficient discharge 18 pressure on the pumps at this point for both the check 19 valves, which are downstream of that pump before you get to 20 the containment isolation valves 599 and 608. The check 21 valves would have most likely been closed at that point. The 1 22 pump probably didn't realize -- either of the pumps probably l l 23 did not realize the valves were open or closed. 1
/~Tt '
( ' 24 MR. ROSSI: Okay. -So what you are saying is your
</
25 analysis has indicated that the load on the pump was basically 1 l
24
/~N 1 for no flow through that whole time.
2 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Thruogh that period, yes. 3 MR. BEARD: Can I ask a question on that trace? I 4 guess it's page 2 of 28 in Attachment 2, which is the speed 5 trace for pump No. 1 during the 6/9 event. I was trying to do 6 some of the kind of thing that Ernie was just describing i 7 myself, and I had difficulty in relating the time scale to any 8 of the previous information we had with regard to time, and I 9 am wondering if we can establish some way to correlate these 19 things. j 11 It seemed like the peak speed up here before the
- 12 sharp decay should correspond to the time of the overspeed 13 trip. Is that correct or am I missing something there? I 14 need to establish some time reference so that I can then go 15 back and say, okay, because I now have a time reference to the 16 event, I can know when valves close and open.
17 MR. RUPP: The page prior to it has the time in 18 seconds and the related speed. 19 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Data Point 19, which is time 26 1:41:24 H2i MR. BEARD: Okay. So it's 1:41:24 is the time of 22 the overspeed trip. 23 MR. RUPP: Okay. The times as shown there -- I'm () 24 not sure which is which, but there is a 6-second difference 25 between the two computer times, so the actual overspeed trip
., e- . , - . - . - - ., . .., , , - . - - , - , . - - , , - , y -,---
25
- /N 1 for pump No. 1 came in at 1:41:31.
2 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Approximately 6 seconds should be 3 added to the data in Attachment 2. I think that editorial 4 comment ought to be put in here just to make it clear. 5 MR. BEARD: Okay. Well, if I do that, which is what t 6 I had done yesterday, you assume that the peak of this curve 7 is 1:41:31, okay? Then I go back through the alarm printer 8 and ask myself what valves are doing what. What I come up 9 with is that 3 seconds prior to the actual overspeed trip, the 19 discharge valve to steam generator No. 1 is no longer open, 11 and I come up also that at the point on the curve that you
~. 12 have labeled as 10 seconds into the start, that is actually 13 1:41:22, and that is the time at which the steam generator 14 isolation valve -- I assume it is 698 -- is fully closed. It i
15 is 19 seconds into the start. And that causes a little valley l i l 16 in the acceleration curve that appears. 1 17 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Again, there are two check valves 1 18 downstream of the pumps. You will see on one side of them 19 steam generator pressure which is somewhere between 939 and . 29 999 pounds. On the upstream side of those check valves or 21 immediately downstream of the pumps, the pumps are somewhere >
, 22 less than that pressure by several hundred pounds. Yes, sir.
23 MR. BEARD: Right. I was just trying to not draw ( 24 any significance from it, but I understand at least the point 25 in time on the acceleration curve where the valves were , i
26 ' 1 changing position. So it appears that the full cycle of the 2 isolation valve 698 was during the first ten seconds of the 4 3 start of this pump. 4 MR. LANNING: Well, you must be careful with using a 5 the alarm printouts for determining valve positions because 6 they are not by themselves an absolute indication of whether 7 the valve is closed or open. 8 MR. BEARD: Well, let me ask that. I assumed that L 9 there were some position switches where you get like an A and 10 B contact on a breaker so get either a not fully open, open, 11 not fully closed, or closed. You know, those kinds of 12 indications. Is that incorrect or inaccurate? 13 MR. JAIN: It should give you either NC or NO or 14 things like that, which are off the limit switch. 15 MR. LANNING: That's right. And the ones I was 16 quoting a minute ago were either open, closed, or not open. 17 MR. JAIN: If it says not open, that means that it's
; 18 just starting to close.
MR. BEARD: So the pump's discharge 19 That's right. 29 valve was starting to close just as the final acceleration > 21 took place that led to the overspeed. 22 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Which discharge valve are you 23 referring to now? 3879? () 24 MR. BEARD: I think 3879. It's not 698. No. 698 is 25 labeled on the alarm print as the inlet isolation valve, and
27
~
1 the discharge valve is a different beast. 2 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Right. 3 MR. ROSSI: Did you superimpose what was happening 4 to 3879 and'that bunch of valves also, to make sure that they 5 couldn't have closed and and taken load off the pump right 6 before the overspeed trip? 7 MR. WILCZYNSKI: We also did look at that, and if 8 you notice at 01:31:34 and 35 the crossconnect discharge 9 valves, 3869 and 3871 indicate full open at that point. 19 MR. BEARD: But that's after the pumps tripped. 11 MR. WILCZYNSKI: But that shows that they were 12 beginning to open at the same time-the 3879 was beginning to 13 close. So now, that flow path would have been available. 14 MR. BEARD: I understand. 15 MR. ROSSI: Well, in testing that you do, assuming 16 that you go through and yo'u can't prove that it was the water 17 by itself, and that could happen I guess, then I assume you do 18 have the ability to go back and start actually operating the 19 valves at the same time during the pump startup as what 29 occurred in the event. I mean, you would be able to do that. 21 MR. WILCZYNSKIt That's true. We would be able to 22 do that. 23 MR. ROSSI: Okay. I'm not suggesting that you add () 24 it to your plan now because if you go through.and you find the 25 root cause is the water and you prove it's the water and so
.. . _- . -- - . .-. _ = _ . -.. -.
l l l 28 f 1 forth, then that becomes kind of an unimportant point. If you l \ l 2 go through and you can't cause them to overspeed again, then 3 that could be a different problem. 4 Okay. Does anybody have anything on page 7 before 5 we go to page 8? i 6 Okay. The first question that I have on page 8 is I j 7 wanted to get a better understanding of this nuclear power 8 experience reports that you got. 9 MR. BEARD: May we go off the record a moment? 19 (Discussion off the record.) 11 MR. ROSSI: Back on the record. On the nuclear 12 power experience information here, -- and I would like to 13 caution people that you ought to be careful for the transcript 14 purpocos of g! ring specific plant names or anything of that 15 sort that may be considered proprietary. 16 But the nuclear power experience reports that are 17 summarized here. Item 1, the four overspeeds that were 18 reported due to condensation in the line -- can you tell us 19 whether that means the same phenomena as what you believe you 29 had? Those four cases? 21 MR. RUPP Talking to the plants that we've been 22 able to contset, we seem to be unique in that our valves are a f l 23 long distances away. The plants did have what they presume to 24 be condensation build up into their line, but it was because 25 of inadequate steam traps, and whenever they actuated -- the L
29
)
y/ 1 inlet valves are right next to the turbine, and they would 2 have the steam and the water going into the turbine 3 immediately. And they would have overspeeds in a lot shorter 4 time than what we did. 5 They did contribute to condensation in the lines. 6 MR. ROSSI: Okay. And it was more than one plant? 7 I mean, it was not all the same plant. 8 So what you're saying is your summary of experience 9 here, you've contacted -- were they four different plants? 10 MR. RUPPt Three different plants -- well actually, 11 four different plants, yes. One was a similar utility. 12 MR. BEARD: Wait a minute. The information x/ 13 contained in the nuclear power experience -- is that 14 proprietary information? I don't think it is. 15 MR. RUPPt I'm not sure. 16 MR. ROSSI Well, I'm not sure we need -- we can get 17 the plants presumably, if we want to know them. We can get 18 that, but you're saying that there are reports from four 19 different plants that they believe they have had overspeeds 20 due to condensation in the lines that may not have been , 21 exactly the way things worked out for your plant but something , 22 similar. 23 MR. RUPPt Correct. I\ G 24 MR. ROSSIt That gives additional credibility to 25 your hypothesis.
i 30 ) 1 MR. LANNING: Not exactly. What I heard you say was 2 that this was residual water that remained in the lines, not 3 condensation due to steam flow. ) 4 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Wayne, we very carefully said i i 5. earlier that we're looking at both. We think the primary i 6 reason is the one of condensation which would make steam. 7 Both are being. considered. 8 MR. LANNING: But I'm trying to understand the l
! 9 "due to condensation in the line" part of this statement on i
19 number 1. It's not condensation during steam flow; it's l 1 i 11 before steam flow is occurring. 12 There's a difference. I'm trying to understand the j O 13 difference because I don't understand the source of the water !
; 14 yet. I a
15 MR. RUPP: Well, the condensation is going to come i 16 from steam no matter what. The difference in our situation is 17 that we have cold pipe upstream that is condensing the water; 18 theirs is that they have a hot pipe that sits and the water i 19 condenses. 29 MR. LANNING: So in the operating experience the 21 water is in the pipe before the steam admission valves are 22 opened. Is that what you're saying? 23 MR. RUPP: Correct. () 24 MR. ROSSI: So the similarity is really only the 25 flashing of the water as it goes through the turbine. I mean, i
31 ] j 1 that part is similar. How the water got there may be 2 different, but the thing that adds credibility to your 3 hypothesis is simply the fact that they believe the water i 4 going through the turbines, regardless of its source, caused
- 5 them to overspeed on four different plants.
1 6 MR. RUPPt True. 7 MR. ROSSI: Wnat did they do to fix the problem? Do i I 8 you know? 9 MR. WILCZYNSKIt There were various fixes. f 19 MR. ROSSI: But they did, indeed, make fixes based j 11 on the assumption that it was that problem.
- 12 MR. WILCZYNSKIt Yes.
I a 13 MR. ROSSIt Does anybody else have anymore questions 14 on page 87 ! 15 MR. BEARD: The only one I had was, I guess this i 16 being pretty much the end of your review of history, did you , t 17 say earlier that when you talked to the Terry Turbine folks, l 18 the vendor's experiences, that he had none of these problems j ! 19 reported to him previously? , 29 MR. RUPPt Yes, that's true. ,
- 21 MR. BEARD
- Okay, thank you.
, 22 MR. ROSS!! Page 9 ! do have another very 23 closely-related question. You talk about information from the () 24 nuclear network system, and you got one response which l 25 indicated the possibility of turbine overspeed due to water in l l
l 32 r-sg 1 the steam lines. Is that based on somebody's experience, or l V l l 2 their engineering judgment or what? 3 MR. RUPPt It was strictly engineering judgment. l 4 MR. ROSSIt So it's not a fifth occurrence of the 5 phenomena, or s possible fifth occurrence. 6 MR. RUPPI Right. They did not, in fact, have an 7 overspeed, but that was listed as what possibly could happen 8 from it. 9 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Anybody else have any comments on 10 page 9? 11 MR. BEARD Here's the point at the bottom of page 9 l 12 where he said the several hundred pounds of water could have 13 formed. This was a 640 pounds or -- I guess let me ask you a 14 different question. What's the total number that would be in 15 that place for all the different lines and all the different i l 16 places? 17 MR. HILDEBRANDT J.T., let me caution that these i 18 numbers are on the basis we talked about earlier. 19 MR. BEARD: I realize that. I 20 MR. HILDEBRANDTt And they may be misleading, but we 21 can give you those numbers later. 22 MR. BEARD: I'm just trying to get a ballpark feel. 23 Are we talking 5000, 100. l (') 24 MR. HILDEBRANDT I just want to make sure you 25 appreciate how they were done.
l l l ; 33 ! 1 _ MR. BEARD: Yes, I'm trying to do that. 2 MR. WILCZYNSKI Okay. On aux feedpump No. I which is 3 valve MS-196, the calculations show approximately 809 pounds 4 of water in that line. Side No. I crossover, MS-196A, 5 approximately 1599 pounds. Aux feedpump No. 2, through valve . 6 MS-197, 259 pounds. And aux feedpump No. 2 through MS-197A, 7 approximately 999 pounds. [ t { 8 MR. BEARD I think you ought to briefly scope the l l r ! 9 assumptions used for those calculations. l t 19 MR. ROSSI: Here, just for the meeting. f 11 MR. BEARD: Right now, yes. L 12 MR. HILDEBRANDTt I'll repeat what I said earlier. 13 One, that we assumed a cold pipe and ambient conditions to j 14 make steam at I believe between 559 degrees; we take the total 15 heat capacity available to you and you heat the pipe up and . 16 condense the steam, it's basically heat balance, energy 17 balance. And you determine how much water you cc.21d have 18 formed in that condition with no consideration of time; it's a ' 19 steady state -- how much total water could I probably condense 29 in that cold pipe. 21 The actual transient event will, in all likelihood, 22 look different than that. 23 MR. ROSSI So what you did is you took the enthalpy 24 change, water going to steam times the unknown pounds of 25 water, and you said that equaled the heat capacity of the : ( {
34 (} x>s 1 metal of the piping times the total pounds of the piping, and 2 you solved for the pounds of water. Is that a good 3 description? 4 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Yes, sir, that's correct. 5 MR. SHAFER: Let me ask a question because I recall 6 earlier you said that when you did the periodic drain on those 7 crossover pipes that you got about a liter of water out of 8 them. Isn't that so? 9 MR. RUPP Yes. 10 MR. SHAFER: So the residual water then is a very 11 small part of this amount of water that could be in there. Is 12 that what you're saying? I
\~' 13 MR. RUPP To the best of our knowledge, yes.
14 MR. LANNING: I'm having a hard time understanding 15 that, if that's the case. In other words, after you have had 16 steam in those lines and you isolate those lines initially 17 that's going to cool and condense, why is it there's only a 18 liter of water after those lines cool down, compared to 19 hundreds of pounds of water when there's steam flow in those 20 lines initially? 21 That's got to be part of your hypothesis when you 22 get to that point. 23 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Yes, sir. n ( ,j 24 MR. ROSSI: Have you done any even preliminary 25 calculations yet on the turbine overspeed as to how many
-. . . . - . _ . - . _ . - - - _ - - - - - . . . . - . . . _ ~ . _ - - . - . - - . -
i 35
- I 1 pounds of water it may take to cause the turbine to overspeed?
l 2 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Those are being done right now. t 3 MR. ROSSI: So you don't have the same kind of 4 preliminary, back of the envelope calculations on that? I 5 MR. HILDEBRANDT: No, sir. E 6 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Anything on pages 19 and 117 7 MR. BEARD: Yes. I had one on page 19. In Section l 8 B in your hypothesis regarding the double start, at the end of 9 that paragraph there is a sentence there that says the le governor valve is opened further than necessary and cannot 11 close quickly enough, resulting in an overspeed condition. 12 Have you discussed with the vendor, the Terry i 13 Turbine folks, the impact of water in the governor or its l 14 speed capabilities to respond? ; i 15 MR. WILCZYNSK!: There was discussion with Terry 16 Turbine about the water condition in the governor valve and l l 17 the design of the valve was strictly for the steam flow, and 18 they did say that with water in there, the valve would have l 19 trouble closing. I 29 MR. BEARD: So if there was water at that point, it 21 would tend to be reluctant to come off the high speed stop f 22 during the initial acceleration phase, and I suppose that i 23 would suggest, then, that it would tend to allow the motor to () 24 accelerate further than it would if the governor were working I 25 as fast as it normally would. i
i i 36
- i 1 MR. WILCZYNSKIt That's true. If the governor were [
l i i I 2 trying to close the valve with water in it, their feeling is
- 3 that it would not be able to as easily as it could if just the 4 steam were there.
l , ) 5 MR. GRADOMSKIt The governor speed-setting motor at 6 that point in time has nothing to do with it. 7 MR. ROSSIt Have you now looked at the Terry Turbine i { 8 information supplied with their pump and governor specs and \ j 9 that kind of thing as to whether the kind of limitations on ' i i l le steam quality and so forth that they are telling you verbally 11 were there in their written material provided with the pump? i l r 4 12 MR. WILCZYNSKI A cursory glance at the instruction ] j 13 manual did not indicate that they had given us any warning or 1 f 14 told us what the quality of steam should be. 1 15 MR. ROSS!I Have you found anything that indicates a ! l i I 16 quality requirement for the steam going to the Terry Turbine? i i 1 17 MR. WILCZYNSK!! No, not as of yet. ! ! 18 MR. ROSSit Are you ready for page 117 f a ; j 19 Now, the governor valve and the Terry Turbine, l 1 j 29 everything associated with the auxiliary feedwater pump i { 21 overspeed is in this document, so you are looking at the i ! 22 governor and the turbine, and then you are going to test it ! 23 for your overspeed hypothesis. That's all here? 1 ! 24 MR. WILCZYNSK! That's true. , 25 MR. ROSS! And the governor vendor will be there 4
l ! 37 l /~' i for look1ng at the governor, and Terry Turbino people will be bg ,, 2 there for looking at either the governor or the turbino, I 3 would assumo. 4 MR. WILCZYNSKI They will be there for the testing 5 of the turbine. 6 MR. ROSSIt And when you try to reproduce this I l 7 phenomenon, the Terry Turbino people will be involved in that. 8 MR. WILCZYNSK! Yes, sir. 9 MR. LANNING And you will be looking at the 10 governor's performanco not only as it rotates to your 11 overspood but also control of the turbino lator in the ovent. 1 12 MR. WILCZYNSK! There will be an investigation of 13 the new PGG governor that will take place simultaneously with I 14 the rest of the action plan to research its design [ t 15 capabilition. i L . l 16 MR. ROSSIt Late in the event on June 9th, woro you l i 17 finally able to get normal control room control back on both 1 l 18 of thoso pumps? 19 MR. JA!N: It is my understanding that later in the ! 20 event, they were controlling aux food from turbino locally l 21 using the trip throttle valvo. The indication that I have to 22 that tho/ had not attempted to take control from the control l 23 room to infer that the operation from the control room was r I 24 inoperable. 25 MR. IIEARD: Well, maybo you have more recent l
3P
information than we do, but let me recall to your attention
! /N 1
- o Q
- 2 that Friday a week ago tomorrow, we had a meeting with you 3 folks in which we discussed our sequence of events to make 4 certain that we were in factual agreement and that we had the l 5 latest information from you folks, and at your request, we 6 added a statement on here at the time of entry 01:53 22 7 discussing the aux feed pump No. 2 that the pump could not be 8 controlled from the control room.
9 If you are talking hours later, that may be true, 10 but during the course of the event, up through, say, four 11 minuto after 2 a.m., our present understanding is that at 12 least No. 2 could not be controlled from the control room, and 13 I believe the man who developed your sequence of events for 14 you -- I want to say Stan -- also indicated that on pump l 15 No. 1, that one was questionable because he didn't attempt I 16 it. It either could be or could not be, but since he didn't 17 try it, we don't know. l l 18 Now, are we in conflict here? Do you have some l l 19 more recent information that causes us to change our sequence 20 of events again? l 21 MR. JAIN: Well, let me tell you my reasoning for 22 disputing that. I haven't been able to subatantiate that we 23 indeed had a problem with the No. 2 control from control O l ( ,) 24 room. Unfortunately, the operators who were handling this, 25 they were not available for the last few days. There is
I 39 , () 1 2 nothing that told me from the computer output or anything that they were attempting to control it from the control room. 3 MR. BEARD: I believe that there is'some information 4 on computer output, and I'm talking from memory now, but there 5 are several places, at least two or three, where it says i 6 manual essential switch, and the flag is trouble, and then it 7 would say normal. I assume that is where they would try it, 8 and then apparently take it back out. Because a switch was in 9 an abnormal position for that condition of the plant, the flag l 19 came up trouble. .i j 11 From that, we deduced that he had tried it in 12 manual; for one reason or another, he took it back out. 13 MR. JAIN: Your deduction is correct, but the 14 timing, I think, is from 1:46 to 1:59, one o' clock, 46 15 minutes, to one o' clock, 50 minutes. At that time he did 16 indeed have a problem with taking control from the control 17 room, but we correlated that to not being able to open the 18 trip throttle valve. 19 This here is 1:53, and I cannot correlate that with 29 anything at all. 21 MR. BEARD: Well, I guess what we need to do is go 22 back to John over here and says John, if you are the senior 23 person and therefore the spokesman for the company, we would t ) 24 like to get one story from the company, and we trust that you 25 as the senior person will coordinate all your people and tell a r- , ,..-..~.--n - - . - - , _ , -,-.,-.--n, , - . . , . .----r
40
/% - 1 us if the sequences need to be revised.
2 MR. WOOD: We will need to caucus and get that -1 3 story uncrossed. 4 MR. ROSSI: ~Well, in any event, the governor and the 5 turbine are currently under quarantine, and anything that is i 6 done on those as part of troubleshooting for whatever reason 7 is -- there will be the records and so forth kept of it. I f 8 mean it is entirely possible that when you start looking at i 9 the governor, you may find some additional problem that wasn't 10 even recognized that probably occurred during the event, or 11 some problem that may have-been unrelated to the overspeed 12 condition that would have caused it not to be operable later 1 O 13 in the event after they reset the trip throttle valve. i
< 14 Do you have anything more until we get to the back?
15 Do you have anything on curves that you want to ask 16 specifically, J.T. or Wayne? 17 MR. BEARD: I have no questions on the curves. 18 MR. LANNING: I want to understand why there is 19 going to be an analysis done in lieu of or in addition to 29 actual tests to try to quantify water in the steam line 21 problems. 22 MR. WILCZYNSKI: I'm not sure I understand what it i 23 is you are looking for. Yes, it is true we are going to do an
'() 24 analysis. At the same time --
25 MR. LANNING: Are there also plans to do a test of
. ~. . - _ . _ _ . _ _. _
. ~ ____ _-~ _ . - , - - -- .
41 the auxiliary feedwater system using all the valves in the
.[N 1 b 2 steam emission lines?
3 MR. WILCZYNSKI: As detailed in the action plan. 4 First there will be a test using the normal valve lineup 5 through MS 106 and 107, and then there will be a test using 6 the cross-connect valve lineup through MS 196A and 197A. 7 MR. ROSSI: Were the temperatures allowed to reach 8 appropriate values that are consistent with what they were 1 9 during the event, I assume, after the first test? 10 MR. WILCZYNSKI: That's true. Right. 11 MR. BEARD: Are you referring in the detailed action 12 plan lA to item 2.17 This would be page 4 of 6, I guess. Is 13 that what you are referencing? 14 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Right. Item 2.1 is the test using 15 the cross-connect valve MS 196A. 16 MR. BEARD: And you said there is another place 17 where you are going to do it on 1967 18 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes. The first test, if you turn 19 back to page 1, is the test using Valva MS 106. Actually, the i 20 test is Step 1.9. 21 MR. BEARD: Oh, I see. So you are saying something 22 that is really not written on the page here, aren't you? 23 MR. WILCZYNSKI: That's true. Our normal ST 5070 () 24 102 is using the normal valve lineup, and that is not clearly 25 stated here.
42 1 MR. BEARD: So this would be using MS 106 only? (~/]
\_
2 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes, sir. 3 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Did that answer the question? 4 MR. BEARD: No, I was just trying to lead up to it, 5 but -- 6 MR. ROSSI: Well, Wayne's question, as I understand 7 it, was simply are you going to do a test as well as do 8 analyses? And the answer I heard was that you are going to do i 9 both. You are going to do the analysis and you are going to le do the test, and I would assume you are going to get the 11 analysis done before the test. And if you find out from your 12 analysis that none of this hypothesis makes any sense, then i 13 you are going to be back looking at the hypothesis again, I 14 would think. 15 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Yes, sir. There are two major 16 reasons for doing an analysis. One is the one you just 17 stated, and two is there is no direct way to measure water 18 slugs in the pipe even if we managed to recreate an
- 19 overspeed. You are measuring indirectly the other 20 instrumentation in the line. We are trying to make a 21 comparison between what can be measured, which you can show 22 analytically, and what you observe in terms of an overspeed.
23 You have no direct way to measure the actual phenomenon. () 24 MR. BEARD: What about uncapping the drains? 25 MR. HILDEBRANDTt I can see water. I still don't t
\ 43 1 know that the water says that is the problem. I have to make : 2 some sense analytically and empirically, and by empirically, ! 3 both in terms of finding perhaps an overspeed plus other 4 indications of pressure, temperature and other measurements be 5 made on the line. ! 6 MR. BEARD: Well, is it a correct assumption that 7 your. plan would include some way of getting whatever data is 8 available on the amount of water that is accumulating? Maybe 9 it is crude, as you were saying a minute ago, but is that part 19 of the plan, is what I am asking, and I think that is what 11 Wayne was asking. 12 I didn't read that into it, but maybe it's an O 13 implication that the thing of using MS 196 only is in there 14 somemplace, but -- i 15 MR. HILDEI3RANDTt- I'm not sure ! can deduce that 16 information, but we can go think about that because the water 17 does not stay in the water state. It will evaporato as it 18 exhausts or, you know, it doesn't stay in the turbine or 19 anyplace else. I mean as I exhaust to the atmosphere, it l 29 again evaporates. As I expand it to the turbine, it ! 21 evaporates. I'm not sure that I can get any quantitative ; 22 information from that, but we can look at that further. We ! 23 hadn't tried to use~that particular indication. 24 MR. ROSS! Well, you know, needless to say, when 25 you come back with your identification of the root cause, i
44 h 1 that's g.o.ing to got much more fine-tooth-comb reviewed by us 2 than the action plans because that is going to be the crux of 3 the whole thing, you know. l f 4 Wo have got to make sure we know what caused theso ! 5 problems, and I just caution you again to koop very careful 6 records of everything you do; and where it is practical to do l 7 tests to prove your hypotheses that are conclusive, that is 8 obviously the best way to do it if you can do that safely 9 because I think that is far more believable than analytical 19 work. 11 And that is one of the reasons why we are asking you 12 to look at the test on the valvos because it appears that 13 what you have got here is several piccos of equipment that you 14 may not find any broken parts in but you have sort of strango 15 phenomena that occurred because of very special conditions on 16 June 9th, and it was in three or four different piecus of 17 equipment, so your root causus are going to be looked at i 18 pretty deeply. 19 Do you have more on the plan? I don't have anything 29 more. l l 21 MR. BEARD: ! think just a couple of real tiny 1 22 questions. In Stop 1.1 where you are taking apart the 23 governor, is it part of your plan to have photographs of this 24 ares? 25 MR. WILCZYNUK!: That will be done. It's not
45 l () I 2 written there, but yes, that will be done. MR. BEARD: On Step 1.6 on the next page, this is ; r 3 part of your program where you say you are looking to see if 4 the governor is the culprit, and you have a statement in hero , 5 that says if repairs are required to preclude further damage 6 to the governor, turbine or pump, then repairs shall be mado. 7 I have two questions in this area. One, wouldn't l t 8 this constitute a hold point for your lead individual to be 9 advised and to come in and decide what to do further? And 18 secondly, if you got to that point, wouldn't that be prima 11 facie evidence that you have a governor problem? l l 12 MR. WILCZYNSK!! Yes, that's true. If we do find a ! 13 problem with the governor, that will be a hold point. 14 MR. BEARD: And ! suppose at that point you would 15 also want to advino the NRC in the form of either your senior i 16 resident inspector or Region 3 because of the gonoral l 17 guidelines under which all those troubleshooting action plans 18 are developed. 19 MR. WILCZYNSK! That's true. 29 MR. ROSS!: Let'n see. The testing of the water 21 phenomena can only be done with the plant hot; is that 22 correct? 23 MR. WILCZYNSK! Yes. We might get to Mode 3 -- l O)
\s , 24 MR. H008! When are you planning, schedule-wise, to 25 do this?
I l
i I 46 1 MR. WILCZYNSK!t I'm not sure that we have any O 2 restraints on Mode 3. , 3 MR. WOOD Well, it somewhat depends on how we go i 4 about come of the other action plans, and if we need to l 5 sequence such that we have some of the other things identified 6 and under control before we take the plant into a hot 7 condition. We have not put that whole sequence together of 8 what it would take to get to Mode 3. 9 MR. ROSSI: Do you have even any rough idea of the l 1 19 kind of schedule you are thinking of? l t 11 MR. WOODI No, we don't. ! t 12 MR. ROSS!! Do you have any comments on the Mode 3 13 or atything more? ; 14 MR. SHAFER No. It's fairly obvious that some of 15 the other action plans will have to be completed before they i 16 go to Mode 3. I can't postulate when that is going to happen. 17 MR. BEYERt I would even think that we may find some ' l 18 of our corrective action plans will have to be completed to 19 assure operability before we have done Mode 3, and some of 28 those may be extensive where we nave generic implications. [ 21 It's difficult now to even guess at when Mode 3 would be. 22 MR. REAMD Well, I guess one of the considerations ! 23 is that at the time where you have accumulated some [ 24 significant results on items of major interest as a result of l 25 your troubleshooting and are prepared to give us the story on <
47 /N 1 the root cause and defend whatever that position turns out to Q
~
2 be, we are thinking along the line of maybe comeing to the 3 site to hear that presentation and also, if possible, to see 4 the equipment; so we are beginning to think along the line of 5 what time frame that might be, but I get the general 6 impression it's not going to be this week or next. 7 MR. WOOD: I think that's probably a safe 8 assumption, and I will also say we are not precluding going to 9 Mode 3 and coming back down again. It's not our intent, 10 necessarily, to proceed from Mode 3 right on up through the 11 sequence. You know, we are considering heating the plant up 12 and then bringing it back down. ( . \- ' 13 MR. ROSSI Do you have any more on the action plan? 14 MR. LANNINGt Depending on what we find out about 15 the governor valve and control of the aux feedwater pump 16 turbine late in the event will determine whether that specific 17 area will be also included in this action plan. 18 If you find that you could not automatically control 19 the aux foodwater pumps, that will be factored into this 20 action plan. 21 MR. WOOD It probably would not be factored into 22 this action plan, but there may be a couple of action plans 23 that would have to be integrated in order to sequence the (O,/ 24 thing properly, if I am understanding your question. 25 MR. LANNINGt Let's assume for a moment that because
48 l the governor valve was malfunctioning, you could not assume
}
2 automatic control of the pump. 3 Now where would you diagnose the reasons why the
- 4 governor valve malfunctioned?
1 5 MR. WOOD: You have an action plan for the trip 6 throttle valve that I believe you have seen, and we have 7 another action plan dealing with the problems or non-problems 8 with auto central control from the control room. I 9 MR. BEARD: We have not seen this? 10 MR. WOOD: That's right. 11 MR. BEARD: One of the problems that we are running
- 12 into, John, is that the way -- we are not familiar with that I
j 13 piece of paper. How you have broken it up has never been 14 presented to us. So we are now taking time to ask questions, 15 like this one we are on now. 16 MR. WOOD: The way that was broken up is addressed 17 in our action items list that was provided very early. There 18 is listed a 1(a), 1(b), 1 (c) . 19 What we have been discussing is Action Plan 1(a) and 20 1(b). You have discussed Action Plan 1(d), which is the trip 21 throttle valve. 1(c) is the auto central control. 22 MR. LANNING: I don't ever recall seeing a list of 23 action plan numbers with the equipment at this point. ^ () 24 MR. BEARDi I think it's fair to say that if we ever 25 saw it, we don't remember it. And it's very possible we never
49 T~N 1 saw it.
~
2 MR. ROSSI: That is your latest one that we have 3 just put in the record now? 4 MR. LANNING: Would you state what that is? 5 MR. WIDEMAN: This is the action item list from the 6 6/9 reactor trip that was developed by Toledo Edison, and the 7 current revision of this list is Rev. 2 dated June 18, 1985. e
-8 MR. BEARD: Does someone have a copy that we can use 9 to put in the record?
19 MR. ROSSI: Well, we will simply have a copy made of 11 it and give it back. . 12 How many total action plans are we now talking about c':)
'- 13 for quatantined equipment? ! 14 MR. WOOD: I can tally that up and get back to you 15 very shortly on that.
16 MR. ROSSI: Well, if you don't know off the top-of 17 your head, we can count them, I guess. 18 MR. WIDEMAN: Understand that this says 26 on it, 19 but not all of this is items that deal with equipment on the 20 freeze list. There are other items that Toledo Edison is 21 looking at that you will not be getting action plans for. l 22 MR. WOOD: A typical example is the steam generator
- 23 integrity. We evaluated the steam generators because of a
() 24 concern for delta-Ts, and that would be an entry on our action 25 items list. 't
, -- - - - , - - - . .c w on , ~ r -m . + , - . -
i 50 I () 1 _ MR. ROSSI: And that is to satisfy Region III, 2 rather than this fact finding team. 3 MR. WOOD: That is correct. 4 MR. ROSSI: If we don't have any more specific 5 comments on this, why don't we take a break and caucus? Or 6 the other thing we can do is take a break, caucus, and eat 7 lunch. 8 Which do you want to do? 9 MR. BEARD: I vote for eating lunch. 10 [ Chorus of " seconds."] 11 MR. ROSSI: Okay. We will break for an hour. 12 MR. WOOD: Can we just discuss what the course of 13 events is for this afternoon? 14 MR. ROSSI: Yes. We will talk about whether we have 15 got any comments or anything more we want to make-on these 16 auxiliary feedpump overspeed trip documents,'and then we're 17 going to talk -- I guess people want to talk about the PORV 18 next. So we'll talk about the PORV next. Then the steam. 19 feedwater rupture control system, and then the startup 20 .feedpump valve. .That's all we had copies of.
- 21 MR. BEARD: Let me say before we break, if this is a l
22 convenient time, as we said earlier, there was a meeting last 23 Friday when we were out there at your place to make sure that 24 we had the latest and greatest information on the sequence of 1!5 events. As a result of that, some other information.
4 51 1 We have issued -- the team has issued a Revision 2 2 .to our preliminary sequence of events, and we would like at 3 this time to let you know there is a stack here for your 4 accesa. 5 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Ernie, if you wish, as we come 6 back -- we went past one point of Wayne's with regard to i 7 residual water sitting in a line, and when we come back from 8 -lunch, there'is a possible explanation, and we could perhaps 9 go through that and see if he understands that point, if you le wish. 11 MR. ROSSI: Okay, fine. We can do that. We can 12 start with that. 13 So why don't we break now? 14 (Whereupon, at 12:00 o' clock, noon, the meeting was 4 15 recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 o' clock, p.m., this same day.] 16 17
-18
~ 19 20 , 21 22 , 23 , ) 24 25 i
.. . _ - . _ , .,w _ . . . . _ , _ . .,.-,,,7 y ~_ y
52
/~T 1 _
AFTERNOON SESSION 2 (1:10 p.m.) 3 MR. ROSSI: -All right, let's go back on the record. 4 We. caucused on the auxiliary feedpumps overspeed 5 trips, and I guess we have no more comments on it at this 6 time. And we will be waiting for your identification and 7 justification that you found for the root cause, and we will 8 obviously go through that very carefully. So just make sure 9 it's all well-documented and supported by tests and analyses 10 as needed. 11 MR. LANNING: The record should show that prior to 12 the recess for lunch, that we were discussing an action item O 13 list, and that should be Exhibit No. 4. 14 [The document referred to, marked Exhibit No. 4, , 15 follows:] 16 17 J 18 . 19 20 21 22-23 () 24 25 l
e
,em
) ACTIS EH LIST 'f I
f'N m-FROM 5 Rx TRIP Pzg'f~1 ef 6 NRC TED LEAD SUPPORT EVAL / CONCUR COMMENTS
- ISSUE / CONCERN
- 1. AFW Pump Turbine Governor Control
- c. #1 AFWPT - Wilczynski liartigan
- 1. Establsh cause(s) of inad- Missig vertent trip (CAL Item 3a) MPR
- 2. Determine and implement corrective action to pre-vent recurrence (CAL Item 3b)
- b. #2 AFWPT -
- 1. Establish cause(s) of inad- Wilczynski Hartigan vertent trip (CAL Item 3a) Missig MPR
- 2. Determine and implement corrective action to pre-vent recurrence (CAL Item 3b)
- c. Auto / Essential Control Problems Jain Yarger
- d. Trip Throttle Valve Problem Gradomski Terry Turbine SG Integrity / Cycle Impact Due Chen B&W N/A Preliminary info. from B&W indicates 2.
To SUFP Initiation of Water no problems. Draft report due from B&W on 6/19/85.
- Evaluation of thermal shock considerations on both S/G's (CAL Item 5)
- Maximum S/G shell differential temperature (CAL Item 5)
Rev. 0 - 6/11/85 Rev. 1 - 6/14/85 Rev. 2 - 6/18/85
x ' ACTI' TEtt LIST l I (
~- FROM L_ /8 5 Rx TRIP pey7;'2of6 NRC TED LEAD SUPPORT EVAI/CONCUH COMMENTS
- ISSUE / CONCERN
- 3. Actions of Operators O'Connor Derivan Adequacy of Procedures Scott-Wasilk O'Connor Complete 6/13/85 (A85-20411)
- 4. Classification of the Event Under the Emergency Plan (EAL Pg. 3 of 37)
- Basis for event classification (CAL Item 5)
SFRCS lialf Trip On One Level Yarger Stalter Problem appears to be analytical,
- 5. new bistables and response to Input secondary pressure upset after turbine trip.
- 6. SFRCS Alarms Miller Lingen-felter .
Hiller Jain MSIV's may have properly responded
- 7. MS1V/SFRCS Response to low level SFRCS trip which Yarger cleared quickly. Related to Item 5.
- Establish cause(s) of unexpected valve closure (CAL Item 2a)
- Determine and implement correc-tive action (CAL Item 2b)
- Conduct testing to ensure operating as required (CAL Item 2c)
Rev. 0 - 6/11/85 Rev. 1 - 6/14/85 Rev. 2 - 6/18/85
P ACTIS TJi LIST FROM 6 [} 5 Rx TRIP Paga 3 of 6 NRC SUPPORT EVAL / CONCUR COMMENTS
# ISSUE / CONCERN TED LEAD Blay J. Johnson Action plan ready for NRC FFT
- 8. MFP Control System Missig on 6/18/85.
- Establish cause of inadvertent Topor trip of #1 MFP (CAL Item 4a) Isley G.E.
- Determine and implement correc-t tive action'to prevent recur-rence for both MFP's (CAL ltem 4b)
Damaged turbine bypass valve Raynes Hiss 9.c. Lammon
- b. Water hammer indication during transient
- 10. PORV Condition - Cycled 3 Times Isley Straube (3rd cycle looked inconsistent) Marley
# of Stress Cycles Scott-Wasilk N/A Completed - 6/11/85 at 1:00 p.m.
- 11. Discuss Event With Ottawa (A85-203H)
County Commissioners (Significance) Long Bajestani 6/14-Action Troubleshooting expected to begin
- 12. S/G Isolation Valves capability To' Open Against Large D/P plan ap- 6/18/85.
proved for (AFW 599 & 608) trouble-shooting. Rev. 0 - 6/11/85 Rev. 1 - 6/14/85 Rev. 2 - 6/18/85
r 555 a a 888 r v /// w C e 1 48 1 1 1 R w N d o /// 6 o eh 666 f 'G r t ney o n - - - e / S f e pa . S . m oMm 01 2 s ,4 T d y p e
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/
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' ACTI' TEM LIST
) FROM L,_s85 Rx TRIP (
P;g'f5 cf 6 NRC TED LEAD SUPPORT EVAL / CONCUR COMMENTS
- ISSUE / CONCERN
- 20. Complete Items 1-5 of CAL. Wood Wideman Obtain concurrence of Regional Administrator Prior to Restart, Mode 2 (CAL Item 6)
- 21. Perform Testing and Demonstrate Topor Blay that the AFP's Will Operate as G.E.
Required (CAL Item 7a) Perform Testing and Demonstrate Gradomski Hartigan 22. that the MFP's Will Operate as Missig Required (CAL Item 7b) Appropriate Test Results, Con- Wogd Wideman 23. clusions and Corrective Actions Shall be Reported to the NRC Resident Inspector (CAL Item 7c) -
- 24. Obtain Concurrence from Regional Wood Wideman Administrator Prior to Exceeding 5% Reactor Power
- 25. Main Steam Walkdown (Outside Containment)
- Document any walkdown performed Hiss Raynes Completed - info. given to NRC.
- prior to June 12 approx. Dieterich 5:00 p.m.
Rev. 0 - 6/11/85 Rev. 1 - 6/14/85 Rev. 2 - 6/18/85
i 5 555 8 88S r / /// ed8 1 48 pn1 1 1 1 c/ /// 6 5 6 666 8 w f /ed - - - e S 4i e 1 vt 012 m T /er ; N 6 ra . . . i E t vvv eee g M d os c M et RRR P O t s C elt l el pt u mhs oce cer B n n w o o .i d7t k3i l0 s a - o wC p I s cpi QQd R U C N O C
/
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mt t o i g N a aW i t c R df wF t e . i E o A c t s C a e a re N n . co rt e . O t wm it f - oa vt C coe vrn i e t ci r ni i u
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ACTIt EM LIST ( ) FROM 5 Rx TRIP p;gr-g cf 6 NRC TED LEAD SUPPORT EVAL / CONCUR COMMENTS
- ISSUE / CONCERN
- 1. AFW Pump Turbine Governor Control
- a. #1 AFWPT - Wilczynski Hartigan
- 1. Establsh cause(s) of inad- Missig vertent trip (CAL Item 3a) t
- 2. Determine and implement corrective action to pre-vent recurrence (CAL Item 3b)
- b. #2 AFWPT -
- 1. Establish cause(s) of inad- Wilczynski Hartigan vertent trip (CAL Item 3a) Missig
- 2. Determine and implement corrective action to pre-vent recurrence (CAL Item 3b)
Jain Yarger
- c. Auto / Essential Control Problems
- d. Trip Throttle Valve Problem Gradomski
~
SG Integrity / Cycle Impact Due Chen B&W 2. To SUFP Initiation of Water
- Evaluation of thermal shock considerations on both S/G's (CAL Item 5)
- Maximum S/G shell differential temperature (CAL Item 5)
Rev. 1 - 6/14/85
5 8
/
4 1
/
6 6 f - c S 1 2 T N ! . i E v E M e Z M R P O C R 6 C N O C
/
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/
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/
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i't' ,) ACTI
FROMb_,[EMLIST 5 Rx TRIP Pcg2 6 cf 6 NRC SUPPORT EVAL /CONCUlt COMMENTS
- ISSUE / CONCERN TED I.EAD
- 26. Review service water transfer Marley of suction to AFW pumps.
- Determine if actions were appropriate.
- Determine corrective actions if appropriate.
Rev. 1 - 6/14/85
53 l () 1 2
. MR. ROSSI: Does anybody want to talk about the auxiliary feedwater pump overspeed anymore before we go on to i
I 3 the powe:-operated relief valve -- pilot-operated relief i 4 valve? 5 [No response.) l 6 MR. ROSSI: Okay. 7 MR. SHAFER: You have an outstanding question with 8 regard to the sequence of events. ) 9 MR. BEARD: Help me remember. i l 19 MR. SHAFER: They were going to caucus. 11 MR. WIDEMAN: Right. The item was, what is Toledo { f-~ 12 Edison's position on the control of the aux feedpump turbine , 13 from the control room. And I think our position is that we l 14 would like to get back to you later on that. I don't think at 1 15 this point that we have had time to talk with the operators to I j 16 verify that, and we would either -- if we are going to be here i 17 tomorrow, at that' time, we could possibly address that. 18 MR. ROSSI: Is that whole issue covered in this , i 19 Action Plan 1(c) on auto essential control problem? i 29 MR. GRADOMSKI: As a matter of fact, it is covered 21 in 1(c), talking about the auto essential non-control. t l 22 MR. BEARD: But I think the issue was that the 6 i 23 gentleman who prepared that action plan has a little different ~i O(s/ 24 perception of what took place than the operators told us. So 8 i- 25 I think -- and correct me, if I.am stating your plan wrong --
..-e -_- .~ . . ~ w. - - - - . - ,e .- - w -- c....-4--.~..,.w ._-._-a., ,,.- ,--..y--, . ~ = , ,
. . - - . - _~..- - -. . - . -_ - . - .. - . . - . - . - - - - - . . -. .
4 ! 54
- I 1 it's based on one premise, and we are trying to resolve the
[
)
2 two different points -- or what appears to be two different l 3 points. And that's what we asked John to research for us and I 4 have the company come to one position. i ! 5 So I think while it is discussed in that action i j 6- plan, yours is based on one side of the discussion, and we : i 7 have been told a different side. j Yes. We need to verify that. ; 8 MR. JAIN: l ) . j 9 MR. WOOD: It creates a problem with the sequence of 1 i 19 events, i l 11 MR.. BEARD: You say it does or does not?. i l 12 MR. WOOD: I say it does. As we have discussed it iO z i 13 in this meeting today, there is a concern whether the sequence 14 of events needs to be changed as a matter of this information, , i i 15 and that's what-we intend to get back to you on. !- 16 MR. BEARD: All right.- 1
. 17 MR. ROSSI: All right. Why don't we go on to the 1
i 18 PORV action plan,.and we can do it the same way that we did I f 19 the other one. We'll just start and go through it. ] I 29 MR. WOOD: Could we pause for a minute and reshuffle .i { 21. our players? 22 MR. ROSSI: Yes, we can do that. If we're going to 23 do that, we probably ought to stop the stenographer for awhile () 24 until she;gets the names of everyone. So'why don't we do i 25 that, and then we'll start again. i
55 1 [ Discussion-off the record.] 2 MR. ROSSI: Okay. We're back on the record. So 3 everybody speak one at a time and clearly. a 4 MR. BEARD: Could I ask that the new players 5 identify themselves and sort of give us a brief statement as 6 to what your position is with the company? 7 MR. ISLEY: My name is Tom Isley, Maintenance 8 Specialist, Instrumentation Control Department, Station 9 Maintenance. i 10 MR. McCURDY: My name is Bill McCurdy, Engineer 11- working for MPR Associates, and we are acting as a consultant 12 to the Toledo Edison Company. 13 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Does anybody have any questions 14 or comments on the first page? 15 MR. LANNING: We are now talking about Action Plan 16 No. 10? 17 MR. ROSSI: Action Plan No. 10, Review of the 18 Operation of the PORV. 19 MR. LANNING: That will be Exhibit No. 5. 20 MR. BEARD: It's a document dated June 22, 1985. 21 (The document referred to, marked Exhibit No. 5, 22 follows:] 1 23 , '() 24 25 i
- - , , -- -. - - - - - --e,
. n, - - - - - r
i
, J'~
l 1 + .! ACTION PLAN # 10 i TITLE: REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE PORV p T O ; i i
- CHAIRMAN l REV DATE REASON FOR REVISION BY TASK FORCE s
4 0 6/22/85 Initial Issue T. Isley [ 1 5
- O ^"' - ' ' ' ' - ' "-
N i
-,-+e-e -n---, , . , - -, - . . , . w.-,-,- - - - .---r,, , - , , - - , -w,., , - - , - , .mw,~,,-,e,n,,. , - - , , . , , , , . .w,----,- - - - - - . .,.--- - -
TITLE:' REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE PORV
- O REPORT BY:
Tom Isley PLAN NO: 10 1 DATE PREPARED: 6/22/85 PAGE 1 of 4 1 This report has been prepared in accordance with the " Guidelines to Follow When Troubleshooting or Performing Investigative Actions into the Root Causes Surrounding the June 9, 1985 Reactor Trip", Rev. 4. I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT: This report describes the way the PORV responded during the transient on 6/9/85 and identifies analysis and actions needed to identify root
- cause(s).
II.
SUMMARY
OF DATA: During the transient on 6/9/85, the PORY cycled three (3) times. The 4 first time the PORV opened for 3 seconds and then closed at the proper setpoint. The second time the PORV opened at the proper l setpoinc for 3 seconds and then closed approximately 25 psi below the 4 required setpoint. The third time the valve opened at the proper setpoint but did not resent at the proper pressure. The operator manually closed the PORV block valve. RCS pressure stopped decreas-s ing at approximately 2075 PSIG. The block valve was reopened 2 min. 13 sec. later and the PORV appeared to hold RC pressure. When the 4 PORV failed to close, the operator noticed that the close light was
- lit indicating the control circuit worked properly, deenergizing the PORV solenoid. i It should be noted the PORV block valve stoke time is approximately l nine seconds. The accoustical monitor indicated that flow stopped in approximately seven seconds after the block valve started to move to i
the close position. The exact time at which flow stopped is uncer-tain because the accoustical monitors are not designed to indicate accurately at low flow rates. Therefore, it cannot be positively identified if the PORY reset (at approximately 300 psi below the required setpoint) or the block valve closed which stopped the flow l through the PORV. ! Reviewing the previous operations of the PORV shows a total of 91 hot cycles and 17 cold prior to 6/9/85. Adding the 3 hot cycles gives a , total of 94 hot and 17 cold, as compared to an allowable number of 440 hot and 25 cold cycles. It has also been determined that the temperature of the loop seal was 469'F which is greater than the required 400*F (minimum), therefore, no piping analysis is needed. i iO l i _ _ . _ , - , , _ _ . . . . . . - . . . _ . ._._._.___.._____._..__r,.
Pcgs 2 of 4 III. MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE / TEST HISTORY:
%- 12-14-76 The PORV was disassembled, inspected, a'nd the seating surfaced lapped (MWO 2161). The valve had lifted 8 times since it was installed.
08-01-77 The PORV failed to open. Replaced power fuses (MWO 77-1592). 09-06-77 The PORV was disassembled, inspected, and seating surfaces lapped (MWO 77-1903). The valve had lifted 14 times since last maintenance. 09-24-77 The PORV failed open during a loss of feedvater accident. The valve was disassembled and the pilot valve was found stuck open. The pilot valve stem was replaced and the nozzle guide was cleaned. When the valve was reassembled and tested, the valve again failed open on the sixth cycle. The valve was again disassembled and inspected. The pilot valve stem was machined to correct the pilot stem-nozzle j guide clearance, and the stroke of the pilot valve was adjusted. The valve was cycled 12 times at reduced pres-sure and once at 2200 psig with no problems. (Reportable Occurrence NP-32-77-16, MWO 77-2120 and MWO 77-2256.) 01-18-79 Because the PORV was leaking, it was disassembled and inspected. The disc, seat, and pilot valve were found to Os_ have minor cutting. They were lapped and the valve was reassembled (MWO 79-1307). The valve had lifted 67 times since last maintenance. 04-19-79 The PORV actuating linkage was checked for proper operation and proper supply voltage to the solenoid coil was veri-fied. No problems found (MWO 79-1978). 05-17-79 The setpoints for the PORV were changed to open at 2400 psig and close at 2350 psig (FCR 79-169). 10-29-79 Because the PORV was leaking, it was disassembled and 1 inspected. The valve disc and pilot disc warm lapped and the valve was reassembled (MWO 79-3433). The valve had lifted 2 times since last maintenance. 03-24-82 Because the PORV was leaking, the valve was disassembled and repaired (MWO 81-3662). No lifts since last maintenance. 09-01-82 The PORV was stroked per PT 5164.02. No problems found. 09-06-83 The setpoints for the PORV were changed to open at 2425 psig and close at 2375 psig (FCR 79-348). 09-14-83 The bistable setpoints were checked by ST 5040.02 and found to be acceptable.
j Peg 2 3 of 4 i 12-28-84 The bistable setpoints were checked by ST 5040.02 and found ! to be acceptable. j Maintenance and Test Summary ! The majority of the maintenance was to correct for mitor leakage. i The valve failed open one time, was repaired, and had operated I . properly prior to June 9, 1985. The routine testing has not found j } any problems with the PORV. ;
- t i '
i Chanas Analysis l Since the PORV was last operated on September 1. 1982, the only l ! change was to the bistable setpoints. Since the bistable functioned : i properly and the setpoints have been verified twice since they were -l
- changed, this did not have any effect on the operation of the FORV. i j There have been no other changes since the last successful operation. [
! I i Failure Hypotheses Summary ! 1 o ) i A discussion with B&W about the way the PORY operated, produced i f t several possible causes. [ r i 1. During the first two lifts of the FORV. the loop seal could have j emptied which would have allowed the valve to pass only steaa j j . during the third lift. The hot steen could have caused the disc j l to expand more rapidly than the valve body causing the disc to ' j stick. After the valve temperatures had equalized, the disc t I would free up and then reseat. Subsequent Toledo Edison calcu- !
- lations have shown that the loop seal would have been emptied i i during the first lift of the PORV. ;
I l 2. The linkage for the pilot valve could have broken allowing ' closed indication but the pilot valve would still be open. l keeping the PORY open. i ! i
- 3. One of the solenoid coil guides could have broken causing the i i valve to stay open. This has happened on a similar valve by a !
4 different annufacturer. j i f I 4. Possible corrosion or boric acid buildup on the solenoid coil ! f linkage causing the linkage to stick. {
- 5. A piece of foreign material inside the valve caused the disc or !
jl pilot valve to stick open. { { j 6. The possibility exists that pressuriser level was high enough to !
- put water through the valve. This has been rejected as a l i possible cause for the failure because the valves tested by EPRI ;
i all worked properly when tested with water. 2 I l l The Crosby Valve and Gage Co. was contacted and they were unable to < j provide any additional information about possible failure modes for i i ! l l I
- - - . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . - _ _ .- _. _ ,. - _ _. _ - _ , _ ... .__.__ _ O
r Pego 4 of 4 the FORV. They reminded us that their valve worked very well in all of the testing done by EPRI. We have reviewed the EPRI test data to determine if the testing done would provide any information. The testing done by EPRI used a similar Crosby valve with a 1 3/8" bore while ours has a 1\" bore. They had _ some problems initially with the pilot valve bellows crack-ing or being improperly machined but the valve functioned properly after those problems were corrected. Previous maintenance has detected no prob?see with the bellows in the valve at Davis-Besse. The EPRI test demonstrated that the tested valve closed in 0.1 to 0.2 seconds. The EPRI test set up did have a loop seal. In one test, the condi-tions were very close to the conditions experienced on June 9. 1985 immediately prior to the first lift of the valve. In the EPRI test the valve closed properly, however, they only did one cycle while we experienced multiple cycles. Our review of the NPRDS data since TMI 2 found a PORY failed open at another utility one time. The valve that failed is a different design and that failure is not believed to be related to the failure we experienced. IV. EYPOTHESES: The FORY stuck open due to differential expansion of the disc O 1. and body.
- 2. The valve mechanically malfunctioned causing it to not close during the transient.
- 3. The solenoid coil linkage could be broken or have corrosion buildup causing faulty operation.
- 4. .A piece of foreign material caused the disc or pilot valve to stick.
l Attacheent 1
ACTION PLAN b G Rev. 0 EAN uuuaE e~ PAGE
.eg e . . .. . _. _ __
go 1 TsTLE DATE PRE PA RE o PREPAREo ey REVIEW OF T11E OPERATION OF THE PORV 6/21/85 ,T. R. Isley_ specie sc oen cisvE STEP Si N D AH AR ET DATE ACTION STEPS NUM8ER RFSPONSIBILITY TO DATE DATE COMPL E T E D ALL STEPS OF THIS PLAN ARE TO BE PERFORMED IN_ACCORDANCE WITH TEk LATEST REVISION OF " GUIDELINES _TO FOLIAV WHEN __ _ _ __ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ ___ __ __ TROUBLESHOOTING OR PERFDRMING INVESTIGATIVE __ ACTIONS INTO THE ROOT CAUSES SURROUNDING THE JUNE 9 -1985 REACTOR TRIP". 1 Perform a visual le_apection of the PORV and associated linkage. Isley Check for broken or missing parts, boric acid buildup, or _ other abnormalities. 2 Under the direction of the Crosby representative, disassemble Isley the PORV. Check the internals for damage, proper cicarances, abnormal wear. or foreign material. Also check the bellows for proper fit or cracking. 3 Analyze the results of the inspection and data surrounding Isley the transient to determine if differential expansion caused the valve to stick open. This analysis is expected to take several weeks and will require the results of the valve inspection before proceeding.
56
/ 1 MR. BEARD: I had a question on the first paragraph i
l 2 under " Summary of Data," and I had asked Bill Rowles to see 3 what could be done about bringing some supplemental 4 information about the controls of the PORV to this meeting, , 5 and it deals with the subject here. And the sentence in your 6 report says, "When the PORV failed to close, the operator l 7 noted that the close light was lit, indicating the control ; 8 circuit worked properly deenergizing the PORV solenoid." f 9 Was Bill successful in getting this information to
- 19 you folks, or do we have it here today?
11 MR. ISLEY: I have a copy of the control circuits - I 12 diagrams. lT !
\' I 13 MR. BEARD: A copy that we may keep?
14 MR. ISLEY: If you'd like. I 15 MR. BEARD: That's what we had asked for. I just 16 want to make sure. ; 17 MR. ROSSI: Well, maybe you could start out by l 18 giving a little, brief explanation of how the thing works. Is I 19 that the appropriate thing to do? l l 29 MR. BEARD: Well, yes. My question is that I'm not ; 21 sure that I understand that the light coming on or going off i 22 tells whether that's the input to the solenoid or the output j 23 from the solenoid, and that's the reason I asked for the , () 24 information. 25 MR. ISLEY: Certainly.
57
/~ 1 The bistable that controls the solenoid valve itself
( . 2 is not monitored. It energizes the solenoid valve to open the 3 valve and deenergizes to close the valve. On the solenoid 4 itself, we have mounted a limit switch. When that solenoid is 5 energized, it provides an "open" indication on the operator's 6 console. When that solenoid is.deenergized, it provides a 7 " closed" indication on the operator's console. i 8 Due to the construction of the valve, it does not
; 9 mean the valve is open and closed. It merely means that the 19 solenoid is energized or deenergized.
l 11 We have installed additional monitoring in the form
; 12 of acoustic monitors on the discharge piping to provide a more O 13 correct indication that the valve is either opened or closed.
14 That indication is not available to the operator directly on 15 the console where the control switch is, but is available on 16 indicating lights on our post-accident indicating panels, 17 which would essentially be to the operator's left as he is 18 looking at the control switch. 19 MR. BEARD: This is that vertical panel where your 29 T-sat meters are, and it's something like six feet to his
. 21 left?
22 MR. ISLEY: That's correct. 23 MR. ROSSI: The operation of the light that the () 24 operator noticed, can that lue verified from any of the 25 sequence of events printouts or any of that kind of thing,
58
/~' 1 that that actually occurred, or are you totally dependent on V}
2 what he remembers? 3 MR. ISLEY: Totally dependent on what he remembers. 4 MR. ROSSI: Okay. And he feels -- well, you just 5 have to make your judgment on what he remembers, I guess. But 6 your whole action plan is based on the solenoid and control 7 circuit working properly, and if there is a problem, it's in 8 the PORV? 9 MR. ISLEY: That's correct. 10 MR. ROSSI: And you aren't looking at any other 'T 11 hypotheses on control circuits? 12 MR. ISLEY: That is correct. O l U 13 MR. ROSSI: Is there anything more on the first 14 page? ) 15 MR. LANNING: I'd like to ask a question about the 16 second paragraph on that p" age where you talk to whether or not 17 you could positively identify if the PORV reset. 18 If you look at the quenchtank data for level and 19 pressure, that data showed that there appears to be flow to 20 the quenchtank until the block valve-was closed. So doesn't 21 that imply that the PORV was still at least partially open? 22 MR. ISLEY: Yes. And based on the response of the B 23- acoustic monitor, it also indicates that there was flow to the O) (, 24 PORV until very close to the same time that the block valve 4 25 indicated " closed."
59 1 MR. BEARD: Do you have a separate printout on when
]
V 2 the block valve was closed, other than the acoustic 3 monitoring? 4 MR. ISLEY: Yes, sir, I believe I do. 5 That should have been on the computer a? arm 6 printout. 7 MR. LANNING: Okay. So to summarize, then, is it 8 accurate that the PORV was at least partially opened until the 9 block valve was closed? 10 MR. ISLEY: I think what we are saying there is, 11 we're not positive of that. We have some indication that says 12 we believe it was open. The indication is that it was. 13 MR. ROSSI: That's the acoustic monitor, primarily, 14 that showed that it was open until about the time that the 15 block valve was closed? 16 MR. ISLEY: That's correct. And supplemented with 17 the quenchtank data that Wayne had quoted. 18 MR. BEARD: Tom, I think the question that has 19 arisen is that with the stroke time of roughly nine seconds, 20 and seven seconds later you get-the acoustic monitor indicator 21 of flow below its setpoint on low flow, it's possible that the 22 PORV could have closed simultaneous with reaching that time. 23 But I think what I hear you saying is that -- well, l
) 24 let me ask it.
(' J 25 If the stroke time is nine seconds for the block
60 jT 1 valve, and if the setpoint for no flow in terms of trips for G 2 alarm purposes for the acoustic monitor is 20 or 22 percent of f 3 full flow,.then it would be very reasonable that the block l 4 valve closing would give you the acoustic monitor 22 percent i 5 value at seven seconds, is it not? 6 MR. ISLEY: That's correct. 7 MR. BEARD: So except for the possibility, which is 8 get'ing t to look, in my view, more and more remote, that the 9 PORV happened to close at exactly the same time, all the 10 indications seem to suggest that it was the block valve that 11 terminated the flow through the PORV and not the PORV itself. 12 I mean, the majority is clearly in that direction.
'- 13 MR. ISLEY: That's right.
14 MR. ROSSI: Well, we know that the PORV stayed open 15 too long. There's no question about that. I mean, you can 16 tell that from the acoustic monitor signal and the reactor 17 coolant system pressure. 18 MR. ISLEY: That's right. I don't think we tried to 19 say that it has not. 20 MR. ROSSI: So nobody has a question that it was 21 open too long, maybe by 20 to 30 seconds, and there's no 22 question-that when he reopened the block valve, that at that 23 time it was closed? j O
-( ) 24 MR. ISLEY: That's right.
25- MR. ROSSI: ~ So it closed sometime between when the
61
~) 1 block valve got closed at or equal to the time that the block (G.
2 valve got closed or up until the time he opened it again. But 3 in any event, it now functioned to some extent. 4 MR. ISLEY: That's right. 5 MR. ROSSI: Page 2. 6 MR. BEARD:- I had a couple things I really wanted to 7 just ask about and see if this is really true. 8 There's an entry here that says date 9/6/77, that 9 the valves lifted fourteen times since the last maintenance, 10 which I read to be one month previous to that. And that says 11 it's open every two days on the average? Is that really true? 12 MR. ISLEY: According to the data that I had, that n#
\" 13 was during startup testing. The PORV settime was below our 14 actual trip setpoint. Any kind of transient that we did --
15 load rejection testing, plant trip testing, even for very low 16 power -- would cause the valve to open. 17 MR. BEARD: And then there is a further entry that 18 says January of '79, the valve has lifted 67 times since the ! 19 last maintenance, and the maintenance looks like about fifteen 20 months prior, and that means four times a month, is that 21 right? 22 MR. ISLEY: Yes, sir. 23 MR. BEARD: Once a week on the average roughly? O) (, 24 MR. ISLEY: That's what the numbers work out to. It 25 was quite frequent.
62 l MR. BEYER: Would it be fair to say that on some (V}
- 2. transients the valves may have operated more than once in a 3' given transient, as opposed to necessarily on some given 4 frequency?
5 MR. ISLEY: That's right. 6 MR. BEYER: I think I recall during the discussion
-7 on the 9/24/77 event, I believe it operated nine times, if I 8 remember right.
9 MR. ISLEY: Yes. Now this 67 times includes the 10 thirteen times we did the test cycling for the 9/24/77 11 maintenance. 12 MR. ROSSI: Well, it lifted a number of times during O r
\ some of these transients and receded all those times. Were 13 14 there changes made to the valve dimensions and that kind of 15 thing prior to the June 9th event?
16 MR. ISLEY: The only changes to the valve concerning i 17 dimensions were related to the 9/24/77 maintenance where the 18 valve failed open. There were some dimensional changes made i j 19 on the pilot valve stem, and there were some adjustments made 29 to the solenoid actuation of that stem, and those should be 21 outlined in the 9/24/77 maintenance. 22 MR. .ROSSI: Now, after that time, were there any 23 events where the valve may have lifted several times like it
- ( ,f 24 did in the June 9th event?
25 MR. ISLEY: There were a couple of times when the
l l 63 1 PORV lifted more than one time and the valve operated as 2 expected. , 3 MR. ROSSI: I'm just trying to get a feel for how 4 likely your hypothesis is because if it had done the same kind 5 of thing on several other occasions and worked properly, your 6 hypothesis really is that you got differential expansions in 7 the body and the disk and that's what caused it to stick. And 8 presumably, if it had operated several times during other 9 events, that same thing could have happened. 10 MR. ISLEY: That's right, and it had operated 11 multiple times and worked properly. > 12 MR. ROSSI: On other events? 13 MR. ISLEY: On other events. 14 MR. ROSSI: And you don't know of any changes that 15 were made to dimensions of the valve between those times and 16 the June 9th event? 17 MR. ISLEY: There is nothing in our records to 18 indicate that. 19 MR. BEARD: Tom, on the entry on, I guess it is, the 20 fourth month 1979, it says the PORV actuating linkage was i 21 checked and the power supply voltage to the solenoid was 22 checked. Can you tell me why a maintenance work order was 23 issued and on that date what was the symptom or why thene () 24 checks were made? 25 MR. ISLEY: I could not find any reason, no definite
64
~
l reason to do this. It appeared to be either manufacturer's 2 recommendation or something to that effect because the checks 3 that were done on 4/19/79 were later turned in to items that 4 are checked on the surveillance tests that we had done later. 5 MR. BEARD: So these are checked periodically? 6 MR. ISLEY: Yes. 7 MR. ROSSI: Any more on page 27 okay, page 3. 8 The f.irst one I have is just a verification 9 question. I gather from what you say under the change 10 analysis that the PORV had not been operated either for tests 11 or during any transient prior to June 9 of '85 since it was 12 operated on September 1 of 1982. Is that what this is saying? O
\/ 13 MR. ISLEY: That's correct.
14 MR. ROSSI: So you don't have any periodic testing 15 or anything like that of the valve? 16 MR. ISLEY: The last time it was stroked was for a 17 periodic test, and that was 9/1/82. 18 MR. ROSSI: And how often do you do a periodic test 19 of it if it was September of '82? 20 MR. ISLEY: That was the only time it was stroked 1 21 for that periodic test. I could find no definite scheduling 22 for that test. 23 MR. ROSSI: Okay. So it's not really a periodic () 24 test; it's a preventive maintenance test that's not scheduled 25 at uniform intervals. That's really what you are saying, I
- . _ . - _ _, __ _._J
65 (
\m 1 guess.
2 MR. ISLEY: That's what I found. 3- MR. ROSSI: Okay. Is there some reason why this kind 4 of a component wouldn't get a more frequent test, like maybe 5 every refueling? 6 MR. ISLEY: No, I can't say. 7 MR. BEARD: You have a statement in here someplace 8 that in the testing that EPRI did, which is brought up by item 9 6 on page 3, that in those tests there was a single opening or 10 lift of the valve, as contrasted to three lifts as this event 11 experienced, and I guess you had some prior experience with 12 multiple lifts also. 13 MR. ISLEY: That's correct. 14 MR. ROSSI: Have you discussed with EPRI your 15 hypothesis for the problem that you had on June 9th? 16 MR. ISLEY: Not with EPRI, no, sir. We talked to 17 B&W, who originally brought up that hypothesis. We have 4 18 discussed that with Crosby Valve, and we have also discussed 19 it with MPR. Crosby Valve said, yes, that might be true, and 20 that's about all they would say. 21 MR. ROSSI: And B&W said? 22 MR. ISLEY: B&W was the one who originally proposod l 23 that and said that that possibly is what happened in causing p) 24 the valve to stay open. 25 MR. ROSSI: Has anyone done any scoping calculations
. - , ~ . . . - _ - - . . _ - -.. - _ - . . - . . . _ - - . . . . _ . . . .
^ 66 ( .
.1 on the dimensions and differential expansions to see how 2- likely this hypothesis is?
i 3 MR. ISLEY: Not as yet. I believe that is item 3 on 4 our Action Plan as one of the things that we are going to be l 5 doing.
- 6 MR. BEARD: All right. Does that take us to page 47 (
) L j 7 MR. ROSSI: Yes, we are on page 4. 1 I 8' MR. BEARD: I have a general comment that I would ! 9 like to' throw out. It's not related uniquely to this
- 19 particular troubleshooting plan, but I notice that you are I 11 consulting with NPRDS data, and I would just'like to remind
- 12 you, if-you didn't know, that the number of utilities j
O 13 participating and the degree of participation in NPRDS at the 1 4 14 time we developed the new LER rule, which I guess went into + 15 effect at the beginning of '84, initially was very, very low. i 16 So.if you are looking at NPRDS data, you should i i 17 realize that it's very, very limited before mid-1984, so you 18 are not going back very far if you cover the whole nine yards f 19 in NPRDS. So you may want to consider for other efforts -- 4 j 29 I'm not suggesting you revise this at all -- but for other 21 efforts, going through some vehicle to look at LER data 22 because the statement here that says "our review of NPRDS data ! 23 since TMI-2" is very misleading because there is no NPRDS data
) 24 to amount to anything between the years of the accident-and i 25 mid-1984, you know.
1 i _ , _ , ,,..,_...,.,m._ __
1 i 67 [ ) 1 ~ MR. ROSSI: Is your leading hypothesis the one of Q ,/ 2 the differential expansion? i 3 MR. ISLEY: Yes. 4 MR. ROSSI: That is your leading hypothesis? 5 MR. ISLEY: Yes. 6 MR. ROSSI: And if that turns out to be the problem, - 7 we are dependent only on analyses to try and tie it down as 8 the problem? 9 MR. ISLEY: Well, no. There are two additional le hypotheses there, No. 2 and No. 3. Well, and No. 4 also. 11 Those four hypotheses, or three additional hypotheses,
~
12 will require that we check them out before we actually get (' 13 into our No. I hypothesis. 14 In order to disassemble the valve, there is a chance 15 that we might destroy the evidence that would lead us to prove 16 Hypothesis 2, 3 or 4, so even though we have picked our lead 17 hypothesis as the differential expansion, we realize that we s 18 need to check out those other hypotheses first. 19 MR. BEARD: Would operation of the PORV have the 20 similar effect of maybe destroying the evidence on the other ) 21 hypotheses? 22 MR. ISLEY: I think it would on Hypothesis 4 if 23 there was something inside the valve. We might move that out O) (m, 24 of there. 25 MR. BEARD: I had a question as to even though it's r _ _ - . , . _ , . -__ _ m- __
68 1 not certainly an hypothesis at this point, but would it be v
"')
2 worthwhile to check out your control channel, the pressure 3 channel that drives this thing in terms of rechecking 4 setpoints, and, in fact, that the output signals are all 5 proper, because it appears that it hasn't been checked since 6 September of '82? Or I guess you said it was checked a 7 couple times after that, but it hasn't been checked recently. 8 MR. ISLEY: The last time that we checked the 9 setpoints of the bistable was 9/14/83. That's when we is actually checked the bistable setpoints. Oh, I'm sorry. 11 12/18/84. December of '84, December of '84 we had checked 4 12 bistable setpoints. I
\- / 13 MR. ROSSI: Well, the bistable presumably worked 14 correctly two times during the event.
15 MR. ISLEY: That's right.
~
16 MR. ROSSI: Anything more? 17 MR. BEARD: No, other than that very general 18 comment, and that is that I personally am concerned that this 19 -particular troubleshooting Action Plan on PORV is likely to 20 lead us to the situation where you can't reproduce the 21 failure, so to speak, and we are depending on analysis to be 22 determining the root cause. And if you are, I'm not so sure j 23 how favorably that is going to be perceived. () 24 It clearly is going to be the subject of extremely 25 tight scrutiny, and Toledo Edison is going to be expected to
l r 69 1
-1 defend.their positions. I am just leery that we are coming L 2 upon a number of these where it is analysis only that is I
.3 showing the root cause, and I am uncomfortable with that. ;
4 I don't know what to do about it. I am uneasy. 5 MR. ROSSI: Is there any additional testing that 6 EPRI could help with on-this if you get to the point where you 7 are dependent on analyses only? 8 MR. MC CURDY: I think you could attempt again to 9 review what tests were done at EPRI. Tests were done with a l 19 Crosby relief valve, which is very similar in design to the 11 valve used at Davis-Besse, and this valve was tested on a 12 range of conditions, including steam, water, both saturated : 13' and subcooled and this transition situation, going from 14 ~ subcooled water to steam.. 15 I think the response of the valve that we found in 16 those tests, particularly tests with a similar valve, the
-17 Dresser valve, indicated that it was very valve-specific 18 response. And there may be a difference in tolerances from 19 one valve to another that could, in fact, produce different 20- results; or, you know, subsequent tests under-identical ,
21 conditions with a valve with tolerances slightly different 22 could show a stuck-open valve; and subsequent tests could show 23 the valve worked properly. () 24 So I guess what I am concluding is that tests could 25 be done but, again, chances for those tests being conclusive, - (
79 1 cs 1 I think there would be a slim chance. (] _ . 2 MR. BEARD: What about pretesting a new PORV and 3 then replacing the one that is installed? 4 MR. MC CURDY: I think, again, any valve like this, 4 5 its behavior depends on close tolerances and, you know, close 6 clearance between the parts -- for example, the disk and the , 7 guide for the disk -- and to behave properly, that clearance 8 has to be very small. As a result, it is susceptible to this 9 mode of failure with differential expansion between the parts. ! 19 Now, I note that at Davis-Besse, the water i 11 temperature upstream of the valve was, I think, in excess of i 12 450 degrees, so as a result, the differential expansion for s, 13 this valve would be only several hundred degrees versus from 14 perhaps 150 to 659 degrees for a valve on our cold water seal. 1 15 So I think as far as the installation, it would be i 16 less susceptible to the problem, you know, than if installed 4 17 on a cold water seal. 18 Now, another valve -- I guess there would be an i 19 alternative valve, or this particular valve, depending on j 29 the results of the inspection, could determine if the 21 clearances were not adequate, and the clearances could be l i 22 readjusted to, you know, provide additional room for j 23 differential expansion between the parts. j () 24 MR. BEARD: Well, I guess what I am thinking of is 25- more along the line that if we end up or if you folks end up,- 4
. 71 () 1 Toledo Edison ends up that it is only through analysis that 2 you can identify the root cause, and if people are 3 uncomfortable with that, I am trying to ask would it be 4 possible to take a new PORV, run it through a test program to 5 show that that one's adjustments have been tested up on side 6 and down the other and known to be good, and then take that 7 one that has.been tested and put it on Davis-Besse so that we 8 then end up in a situation where even if the people are 9 uncomfortable, we now have a known good PORV on that plant? 19 one of the messages that I got from what you said 11 earlier is the valves may vary not only amongst manufacturers 12 but amongst the units manufactured by one manufacturer, from i O 13 Crosby to Crosby to Crosby. 14 MR. MC CURDY: That's right. That is correct. And 15 I think what you propose could be done. I think the problem 16 is that, you know, to really assure with a high degree of 17 confidence that in fact your valve would not exhibit that 18 behavior in later transients. 1 19 MR. BEARD: Well, let me make clear that I am just f 20 thinking out loud with you, and I'm not suggesting that this i 21 be in the troubleshooting plan. If anything, you may want to 22 consider that when it comes to corrective action time. , 23 MR. ROSSI: Yes. The scope of this team really is 24 to find the root cause, and if we can't definitely identify _ 25 the root cause, that's going to be a problem and we are going i
-m , , - . , ,- r - . - - r ,e ,-,
72
' ~ '
'i 1 to be back looking for other ways to try to identify the r3ot
[G The corrective action per se will be handled as part 2 cause. 3 of the normal office's work. 4' MR. SHAFER: Can I ask, with regard to EPRI, did 5 they do multiple cycles on any of the valves? 6 MR. MC CURDY: By multiple cycles, you inean --- 7 let's say in any 30-second period, lifting the valve a number 8 of times? 9 MR. SHAFER: Yes. 10 MR. MC CURDY: No, that wasn't done. The tests were 11 done, you know, by perhaps a 20 to 30-second test where the
,, -~s 12 valve was opened, flowed, water, steam, whatever, and then i ) \# closed, and the pressurizer feeding the valve was then brought 13 14 up to initial pressure and the transient was repeated.
15 Now, the time between those two actuations perhaps 16 was half an hour to an hour, minimum. 17 MR. ROSSI: Well, this is clearly a case where you 18 want to make sure you do everything and keep track of all the 19 parts, keep a record of everything that is done so that when 20 you get to the end, you will at least know what you have 21 looked at and what isn't the problem, even if you at that time 22 haven't identified the problem. This could be one where, you 23 know, we may want to have somebody independently look at the n ( _
,,) 24 parts and try to verify your hypothesis.
25 MR. LANNING: I would like to sugget that you go and 1
73 ,
, 1 relock at the operating experience again to make sure that you
*']
%)
2 have a good grasp on the failure of this valve that has been 3 experienced by other utilities. I think there is a lot more - 4 than one PORV failing open in NPRDS. 5 MR. ISLEY: The problem with that is we are the only 6 one with a Crosby valve. I realize there may be other 7 failures. In the review that I did, there was only one 8 failure, and from what I can tell -- I could not determine who 9 the manufacturer was, but from the description of the event 19 and the corrective actions taken, it seemed to be a 11 significantly different type of construction. I 12 MR. LANNING: Okay. I understand that now. You did 13 your research only for the Crosby valve. 14 MR. ISLEY: Well, that's not true. We did search 15 for other -- we just looked for generic PORV failures, but we 16 were limited in our scope. As J.T. pointed out, we used NPRDS 17 and we only looked since the Three Mile Island incident 18 occurred, and as J.T. pointed out, NPRDS before mid-1984 -- or 19 mid-1982, was it -- was very limited in its participation. 29 MR. LANNING: Well, back to my original comment, 21 then, if you didn't limit your search to only Crosby valves, I 22 there are a lot more PORV failures in NPRDS than one since l 23 TMI.
) 24 MR. ISLEY: Well, are we talking about just the 25 valve failing or the valve failing open?
h ( 74 1 MR. LANNING: Failing open.
) _
2 MR. ISLEY: Okay. I only found one in our review. 3 We can go back and recheck that, but I only found one. 4 4 MR. ROSSI: Do you have any comments, Wayne? 5 MR. SHAFER: No. 6 MR. ROSSI: All right, if nobody has anymore 7 comments on it, I guess, or advice to give you how to find the 8 problem. 9 Why don't we take a five-minute break and then we'll 19 go on to the next one. 11 (Recess.] 12 MR. ROSSI: We have one more question on the PORV, f) , 13 and that question ist have you thought about taking the valve 14 out and testing it? And what is involved with taking it out 15 and testing it? 16 MR. BEYER: How about if you re-ask the question for ^ 17 Tom? 18 MR. ROSSI: Have you thought about taking this valve 19 out and testing it somewhere? I mean, assuming that you don't 29 find one of these other kind of problems when you look at the 21 valve. 4 22 MR. ISLEY: We have discussed the possibility of 23 reactivating the EPRI test facility. We have not gone any b ( 24 farther than that. 25 MR. ROSSI: So you're hoping you'll find the problem 't
i ! ? , 75' (~'N 1 short of_that? g 2 MR. ISLEY: Yes. If, in fact, we don't find ; j 3 something, that's one of the things we will consider, is 4 possibly retesting that valve either at another facility or 5 even at our own facility. 6 MR. BEYER: If the flange valve is removal without 7 cutting and welding. 8 MR. ROSSI: Okay. I guess we are done with the 9 PORV. No one has any other comments on the PORV, so shall we 10 go on now to the action plan 5, 6 and 7 on low steam generator 11 level trip of the SFRCS. e 12 So if you want to go through this one the same way l O 13 we did the others, we can start on page l. The first question r 14 I had is a very basic one. You seem to have already concluded t 15 that the closure of the MSIV's was due to a signal from the 16 SFRCS system. I mean, your entire plan is based on that as an 17 ingoing assumption. 18 MR. STALTER: That's correct. Our review has been 7 19 done and we feel that that did happen, and that's the 29 assumption we're going with. 21 MR. BEARD: Is there another action plan that deals 22 with the MSIV and other sources of control signals? Or is 23 this everything that deals with the MSIVs? l () 24 MR. STALTER: This is everything that deals with the l 25 MSIVs. l . l
1 76 1 MR. ROSSI: It seems to me that there ought to be ()T q - 2 .something that would at least check that the MSIV other 3 circuitries are all operating properly, and control circuits, 4 because -- I mean, you've assumed that conclusion right at the 5 very start, and that is, you go through the action plan for 6 the SFRCS. It appears that that whole plan is basically a 7 relay race story. I mean, that's what it really is, right? 1 8 You've got noise spikes that affected some things but didn't 9 affect others. 1 i 19 MR. JAIN: Thore are reasons for concluding that the 11 SFRCS trip may nave been the cause of the MSIV closure. Based 12 on past experience you see the MSIV closing almost exactly
\- 13 five seconds after the SFRCS trip. Exactly the same thing was 14 seen on-this one. We saw actual indication of a full SFRCS 15 trip occurring, which would have resulted in closure of the 16 MSIV.
17 So the indications that were available in the review 18 process directly led us to believe that it was an unwanted, if 19 you will, SFRCS trip that resulted in closure of the MSIV. 29 MR. ROSSI: Your hypothesis is you got the spurious 21 SFRCS trip and then it reset before it sealed in? 22 MR. JAIN: Correct. MR. ROSSI: But it was actuated long enough to close 23 b) (, 24 the MSIV. 25 MR. JAIN: Exactly.
77
/ MR. BEARD: Can I follow that up a little bit? I I
b} l' 2 was under the impression last week when we were out at your 3 plant that you had prior experience with, I will call them, 4 spurious actuations of the rupture control system that had led 5 to MSIV closure, you felt. But when I resd this write-up here 6 in this particular troubleshooting plan, I get the impression 7 that you had a full actuation of at least one of the actuation 8 . channels on the 9th of June, but your prior experience on June And
~
. 9 2nd and April 24th of this year were only half trips. 10 that there were no previous spurious low-level trips prior to 11 the 1984 refueling outage. 12 Now if I understand correctly the design -- and I'm 13 not sure that I do, but if I understand it correctly, a half 14 trip should not cause the MSIVs to close. l 15 MR. JAIN: Exactly. t 16 MR. BEARD: So that this prior experience that 17 you're talking about of seeing the MSIV closed, I am confused 18 about it. 19 MR. JAIN: I don't recall personally a closure of the MSIV on a spurious SFRCS trip. 20 21 MR. BEARD: Before June 9th? 22 MR. JAIN: Correct. 23 MR. BEARD: Okay. I guess I had the wrong b ( ,/ 24 impression. I thought you told us a minute ago that you had 25 prior experience at this plant with those occurring. 4
-e + , - -
- - , - - . , e > .----.e- - - - - - . - - -.-e- ,
78 1 MR. JAIN: I may have to look further, but I don't (~' _ V 2 recall any such occasion. 3 MR. STALTER: What you were saying, as far as I 4 recall, is that the full SFRCS trip when it occurs, five 5 seconds later the MSIV closes. Now that full SFRCS trip has 4 6 . occurred in the past, and we have received MSIV closure as a 7 result of that. Did that help you any? That's what Suchel I 8 was saying. 9 MR. BEARD: Well, I guess you had a refueling outage 19 in 1984. 11 MR. JAIN: Right. 12 MR. BEARD: Do you remember what months really or 13 when he came back from the 1984 outage? 14 MR. JAIN: From September to January. 1 15 MR. BEARD: He came back in September? 16 MR. BEYER: Wait' a minute. The 1984 refueling 17 outage was completed in January of 1985. 18 MR. BEARD: Okay. So you returned to power in 19 January of 1985 and you were running about, say, five months 29 before.this event, roughly. 4 21 MR. JAIN: Correct. 22 MR. BEARD: So what you're saying is during that 23 five months you had two occasions where you had half trips, () 24 and then this particular event where there appears to have
- 25 been a full trip.
. . . . - - . - . - . . - .-. . _ . ~ . - - . - .. . .. . - -
4 i , 79
/~N 1 MR. JAIN: Exactly.
2 MR. ROSSI: Well apparently, you got a full trip 3 alarm on June'2nd, also, right? 4 MR. SHAFER: That's what I recall. i ) 5 MR. ROSSI: Yes, that's what your plan says here on 6 page 1, item no. 3, bottom of the page it says you got a full 7 trip alarm on June 2nd and no devices were actuated. , 8 MR. JAIN: Okay. We chased that back, the SFRCS l 9 full trip alarm, the Q963. The problem was chased back to a 19 faulty contact in the alarm circuitry. I think it did say j .11 ' that somewhere. 12 MR. STALTER: It's in the maintenance section, next 13 page, page 2, no. 6. i 14 .MR. ROSSI: Okay. So you found a definite problem 15 with the circuitry, then. j 16 MR. BEARD: Is that what you meant by the words in
! 17 here that say the connection was reterminated?
i 18 MR. STALTER: In the process of troubleshooting they 19 lifted a connection and when they reterminated that t 20 connection, the problem cleared. 21 MR. BEARD: Well, I guess I would have read that -- ! 2 j .22 in fact, I did read that -- as the thing disappeared on its .1 23 own; not that you actually found a smoking gun. () 24 MR. STALTER: I don't know what you mean by that 25 exactly. When they were troubleshooting they lifted the wire i
L 80 1 and in the process when they reterminated that, they no longer 2 had that problem. It cleared itself. The assumption there i 3 was made that in the process of that troubleshooting action i 4 that they cleared the problem. S- MR. BEYER: Suggesting that maybe we had a bad 6 connection there. 7 MR. SHAFER: But then the 9th occurrence again would 8 suggest that it didn't clear the problem again. Is that what l l 9 happened? l l 16 MR. STALTER: We don't feel that we have that same 11 problem. 12 MR. JAIN: On June 9th there was other evidence i l t A- 13 which led us to believe that there were actual full SFRCS i 14 trips. Howsoever spurious, but they were full trips. ; l 15 MR. BEARD: At the bottom of the first page, I would 16 like to correct what may be a misunderstanding or whatever. 17 When we were out at your plant last Friday, I thought I 18 remembered being told that you had been made aware of this 19 phenomena I will call a pressure wave that may occur when a ; j 29 turbine trip occurs prior to this event. That was my I 21 impression last Friday. l 22 And this write-up indicates very clearly that l 23 subsequent to the event you had a discussion with B&W and () 24 suggested that it was at that time that you became aware of 25 this pressure wave phenomenon. Could we at least get clear on I l l
81
#N I when you --
Q 2 MR. JAIN: Yes, I think it was after the transient 3 when we were trying to determine what exactly could have gono 4 wrong, and we were in the process of talking to B&W and B&W 5 then forwarded us the data. 6 According to my knowledge, it was after the trip. 7 MR. BEARD You say they did forward you somo data? 8 MR. STALTER : Yes, they provided us with some data.
] 9 Maybe it would help -- I think as a result of analyzing the 10 ovents in the past we have soon pressure transients occur 11 following turbine trips.
. 12 MR. ROSSIt On your plant?
\~ 13 MR. STALTER: On our plant. And they have soon 14 level oscillations in the steam generator levels occur and 15 never really was that attributed to be a plant operational 16 problem. It's something that just happened after the trip and 17 it was not looked at as being a problem.
18 Now, one of the things that occurs is that the data 19 that is taken, the ono-second timo interval data on 29 Davis-Bosso and the transient data that D&W mado us aware of 21 was data that was taken on a two-tonths of a second timo 22 interval. And it clearly showed that there woro different ! 23 things going on in the steam generator than what the
/ '\
( ,) 24 one-second timo data showed. 4 25 MR. ROSS!! Those wore taken at TMI-17
82 1 ,, MR. STALTER That's correct. 2 MR. BEARD: Can you give us some feel for the 3 magnitude of those variations? Maybe in terms of percent on 4 the operating range or something? 5 MR. STALTER I don't want to quote really the data 6 without having it in front of me and that was the one curve ! 7 didn't bring with me. But it clearly showed about an 80-inch 8 reduction in the startup range level indication. 9 MR. ROSS! Only the indication? 19 MR. STALTER Well, it's the transmitter output that 11 they recorded. 12 MR. BEARD: This is on the startup range. Did it 13 appear on the operate range?
'14 MR. STALTERt It did appear on the operate range. I 15 don't remember the numbers off of that curve.
16 MR. ROSS!! Do both of these speed the SFRCS, or 17 just the startup range feeds the SFRCS? 18 MR. STALTER Just the startup range for
-19 Davis-Besse, that's correct.
28 MR. BEARD: ! guess I have a real problem in the 21 sense that it's like some of these other troubleshooting plans 22 that after the event, you call back to the vendor and the 23 vendor says oh, yes, let me tell you about something. And so, 24 we're talking about a phenomenon that's really new to me. 25 Maybe I'm the only one that didn't know about it.
83
T 1 How much trouble would it be to get some sort of b 2 documentation on this testing that occurred at TMI as to 3 exactly when it happened? Or is there a copy of a test report l
or something of this nature to substantiate this situation? 4 5 MR. STALTER: I don't know how much of a problem 6 that would be. I would have to check with B&W and see what it 7 would take to release it or where it is. I 1 l 8 MR. ROSSI: So far all they gkve you were traces and 9 no report or anythir.77 la MR. STALTIM: That's correct, they just gave us a 11 copy of the traces and said, here's what we found. t l 12 MR. ROSS!: Do you have any idea over what timeframe 1 i I i I 13 they made those recordings? I mean, were they during the 14 TMI-1 startup testing? 15 MR. STALTER: My impression was that it was the 16 TMI-1 startup testing, but I don't know that for a fact. 17 MR. SHAFER: Well, could you test this on your 1 18 system and see, with that kind of signal coming in for that 19 length of time, whether you'd get an MSIV closure? Do you 20 know how many cycles, 1 guess, per second those oscillations 21 are? l 22 MR. STALTER: Part of the action plan was to do 23 response time testing of the various components to try to () 24 build that scenario. i 25 MR. SHAFER: I realize that, but there was no
84 1 discussion, I don't think, with regards to trying to validate 2 this information that you got from B&W. l 3 MR. JAIN: You mean during the TMI testing? Is that 4 what you're suggesting? 5 MR. SHAFER: Well, if you could input a signal to 6 your startup range, because that's where the oscillations took 7 place, you said. I think you said 1.2 to 1.3 cycles per 8 second. Would that cause an MSIV closure? 9 MR. STA LTER It would depend on the magnitude of 18 the signal, and the magnitude of the signal that was in the 11 TMI data may not be the same magnitude signal we would see at 12 Davis-Besse. We feel that it's very close but we don't know 13 exactly how close it is. 14 MR. BEARD: Have you taken the data from the June 15 9th event and plotted it or analyzed it in any way to see if 16 this oscillation was present on June 9th? 17 MR. STALTER: There's indication from that data that 18 there was oscillation present, and again, it's difficult to , 19 say that it's exact oscillation because the frequency of the 20 data that we have is one-second time intervals, and the 21 frequency of the signal is about that same thing. So you 22 could get low peaks a bunch of readings and then something 23 high, and I think that's what we saw there. () 24 MR. JAIN: It is in the DADS data after the SFRCS 25 trip the level went down to, say, about 96 and then 74, 78,
. . _ -. - - . - . . - ._. . ~ . . _ . - - . - -
I .
+
\ 85
- +
1 82, 84, 82, 74. So it was going through -- f l 2 MR. BEARD: Which computer point are you looking t 3 at? 4 MR. JAIN: That would be L883. ! 5 MR. BEARD: And this is the startup channel?
- 6 MR. JAIN: Startup, yes. And L893. The first one 7 being for the No. 1 generator, the second one for the No. 2.
8 MR. ROSSI: And the setpoint for the SFRCS is 26 -- 9 MR. JAIN: 26 by 5 inches. , 19 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Those oscillations were far'from 11 the 26.5 -- 12 MR. JAIN: One clarification here. These outputs 13 here in the DADS data is from different transmitters than 14 those that feed the SFRCS. ; 15 MR. ROSSI: Oh, that explains one thing, then. 16 MR. BEARD: The DADS data is not the same i 17 transmitters that feeds SFRCS. 18 MR. JAIN: They are, however, connected to the same 19 taps. 29 MR. ROSSI: Well, your whole plan here is all based 21 on nothing but analyses this time. I mean, what you're going, 22 as I understand it, is go through and figute out what the time 23 .rssponse is for all the instruments, and make a hypothesis () 24 about the mysterious oscillations and try to demonstrate 25 that you could close the MSIV's without actuating other I t
5 86 Is that a correct ( l equipment that didn't get actuated. 2 overview? No testing at all. 3 MR. JAIN: No, no, this is all testing. 4 MR. STALTER: There is testing in here. 5 MR. ROSSI: But I mean no testing to try to actually 6 reproduce the MSIV closure signal. 7 MR. BEARD: I think it's all response time testing, 8 not trying to replicate the disease as proposed.
; 9 [iMR. ROSSI: It's not testing to reproduce the 10 failure. Or reproduce the MSIV closure signal without 11 actuation of the other equipment.
12 MR. SHAFER: I would add on page 1 of 4 of the 13 action plan, item 1B indicates corrective action that you're 14 going to take. 15 MR. BEARD: Are you talking about Item 1(b), as in ~ 16 Baker? 17 MR. SHAFER: Yes. 18 MR. BEARD: I didn't read it that way, but maybe we i 19 could get a clarification on it. I read it to say that there 29 would be some -- I will call it study performed, to determine
- 21 what the appropriate or acceptable response time should be.
22 MR. BEYER: That's exactly right. We, the group i
! 23 that reviewed these plans, raised the same question about the
') () 24 word " establish" when we reviewed it. 25 MR. BEARD: It was not physically an adjustment of l 1
- _ - . , _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _. --.. _ . _ - , . - -. _ . . ~ .- . . _ . _ . . _
87 l any equipment? (} 2 MR. BEYER: That's correct. That is to determine a 3 value. 4 MR. BEARD: On paper. 5 MR. BEYER: On paper. 6 MR. BEARD: Well, let me ask, how confident are you 7- in this situation that you understand occurred at TMI-l? 2 8 MR. STALTER: You mean the data? 9 MR. BEARD: Yes. 19 MR. STALTER: I feel confident that it is good data 11 input that we are looking at. 12 MR. BEARD: And that it applies to Devis-Besse? O 13 MR. STALTER: That that kind of an oscillation does 14 occur, and that we could use that as an indicator of what does 15 happen at Davis-Besse. 16 MR. BEARD: Have you looked at the data on your 17 transmitters here to see if it has an oscillation that even 18 approaches the right frequency versus a ten-second frequency 19 -- I mean, ten-second periodicity -- versus one second? t 29 MR. STALTER: It is a little bit difficult. There a 21 is a ten-second frequency that is in there, and then a 22 one-second that rides on top of that. l 2 23 MR. BEARD: Have you analyzed the DADS data is what 24 I'm getting to? 25 MR. STALTER: The DADS data we've looked at in. l 4 I
i I l 88 l relation _to that, and it's really hard to say you can exactly [} 2 fit a point in there, but you can see that that type of thing 3 is going on. 4 MR. BEARD: Have you analyzed it in any way other 5 than eyeball scanning it, like we just did a minute ago here? 6 Have you plotted the data? 7 MR. STALTER: We've plotted it, yes. , 8 MR. BEARD: Does it show any indications that would 9 confirm the presence of some harmonic or signal in there at a 19 rate like one cycle per second? - 11 MR. STALTER: No, it doesn't. It would be difficult 12 to do that, because the one-second scan is what we used to O 13 take the data. 14 MR. BEARD: I understand there's a difference. 15 MR. STALTER: So you don't get in-between points. 16 MR. BEARD: Yes.' But that theorem has to do with 17 how faithfully you can reproduce it. And what I'm suggesting 18 is, if there really is one there -- let's say, just 19 hypothetically, you have'got a one cycle per second or one and
'20 - a half cycle per second. sine wave going through there, and you 21 sample it once a second, you're not going to be able to
-22 reproduce what that interference is, but you should be able to
- 23. detect that there is some interference in.there.
l 24 And what I'm trying to understand is, have you done 25 the' analysis.to show that-there is some interference in there,
89 l or has it just been this eyeball look-see run-down like we j
}
2 just had a minute ago?
-3 MR. STALTER: There hasn't been any in-depth 4 analysis done of that DADS data. We did plot it. We did see 5 that there were oscillations in it.
6 MR. BEARD: Of the one or two-second variety or the 7 ten-second variety? 8 MR. STALTER: It was a longer frequency than one or 9 two seconds, because we felt that that system didn't pick up 10 -- 11 MR. BEARD: Would it be a correct statement or a 12 fair statement to say that your analysis of the data does not 13 indicate any one or two-cycle-per-sacond interference, , 14 separating out the ten cycle business? But there is no 15 analysis of the event tha' shows the presence of a one or one 16 and a half cycle, interfering signal? 17 MR. STALTER: That's correct. 18 MR. ROSSI: Tell me, is.it possible with the plant 19 shut down to go in with test signals at some point in this 20 circuitry and try to reproduce what happened during the event 21 in' terms of actuating some of the equipment and some of the 22- alarms and not others? I mean, do you follow what I'm saying? 23 At some point, you know that you've got certain ( 24 things actuated and certain alarms came one, and you know 1 25 about how long they were on, I gather. And it seems like you
90 1 might be able to go in with test signals and try to simulate 2 spikes that would do that same kind of thing and actuate the 3 equipment that was actuated and not actuate the other, as some 4 kind of support for the analyses that you are about to begin. 5 Is that possible to do with the plant shut down? 4 6 MR. STALTER: I think we would have to look at 7 that. I believe it could be done. 8 MR. ROSSI: I think -- you know, my opinion is that 9 on this one, if you come back with just an analysis and a time 10 response measurement on components and a hypothesized pressure 11 transient from some time in the history of TMI-1, that that's 12 going to be very difficult to convince at least me that you 13 found the root cause. And I am probably easier to convince 14 that J.T. 15 MR. BEARD: Let me tell you another thing that 16 really bothers me. 17 The pressure wave transient that you report in this 18 troubleshooting plan was news to me. I mean, the phenomenon I 19 is credible, but the magnitude of it and this, that, and the 20 other, that it would interfere with trip setpoints was news 2:1 to me. 22 I talked to the TMI folks themselves, and they have 23 no memory of any such event. They have no memory of any such () 24 testing. .They have no memory of any such traces. And as far
-25 as-they are concerned, it never happened at their plant, or
_ - _ ~ _ ._
91
/~1 1 they are not able to retrieve any such information.
O _ Now this was done on a short timeframe, but that's
, 2 3 where I'm coming from.
4 They even pointed out that during the startup test 5 program at TMI-1, they had a reactor turbine trip from 74 6 percent power. They startup test program obligated them to do 7 it at 90 percent or higher, and they hai to go back to the 8 Commission to justify that that was an a.dequate test, from 74 9 to 90. 10 And_one of the guys that I talked to on the 11 telephone yesterday, who said he was there during the startup 12 phase of TMI-1, said as far as he knew, the turbine never 13 tripped from 90 or 100 percent. i 1 14 So we've got a' lot of doubts about whether this 15 phenomenon is occurring in significant enough magnitudes that 16 this hypothesis has credibility. 17 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Who was the conversation with, 18 J.T., so I can follow up on it? 19 MR. BEARD: I'll give it to you after.the meeting. 20 And this is the reason why I asked earlier -- I'm 21 not putting you guys on the spot, but I'm just saying, you 22 know, part of our job is checking out stories, so to speak. 23 It's very important in my mind that you guys firmly () 24 establish the credibility of this information you have 25 received from your~NSS vendor.
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/T 1 MR. STALTER: I agree with you. We, in the V _
2 development of this action plan, we did not provide that firm 3 establishment. But we knew full well that we would have to do 4 that. 5 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Your action plan really doesn't 6 address possible logic problems with the SFRCS, possible 7 control system problems with the MSIVs. You know, you may J 8 have some of those problems, too. You made a lot of 9 modifications to this system, apparently, during the last 10 refueling outage, and I don't know how thoroughly you tested 11 all those afterwards. But it would seem to me that there 12 could be other problems with the SFRCS that might be even more 13 likely than this spike thing, and certainly ought to be looked 14 for. 15 MR. BEARD: Let me ask a different question. 16 The other day, I talked to Bill Rowles and told him 17 that after glancing over this action plan, we. felt it 18 necessary to look over the technical manuals for these two 19 level transmitters. Apparently, the scenario is based largely 20 on the fact that you had Bailey level transmitters previously, 21 and then for equipment qualification reasons, you changed to a 22 Rosemont transmitter, which are reportedly faster, and 23 therefore now this. phenomenon is more noticeable.
-~
(_j 24 MR. STALTER: Let me clarify that problem. As a 25 result of environmental -- for environmental qualification l
93
'l reasons, we had to change out the amplifier boards and
{" U 2 calibration boards in the Rosemont 1152 transmitters that are 3 associated with the SFRCS. Those transmitters were not 4 changed out during the outage, only the boards internal to 5 those. There were no Bailey BYs on the SFRCS system. 6 MR. BEARD: Is that a correction of a technicality 7 on page 2 here? Item 2 under " Change Analysis" says, "As the 8 SFRC level sensing transmitters were changed from BY to 9 Rosemont transmitters." 10 I guess what I hear you saying now -- 11 MR. JAIN: J.T., it is different transmitters. 12 MR. STALTER: Oh, okay. The level transmitters (D
\- # 13 providing startup level indication on the control panel 14 connected to the sensing lines as the SFRCS level transmitters 15 were changed to BYs -- from BYs to Rosemont.
, 16 Now those are different transmitters on'the same 17 sensing lines. 18 MR. BEARD: But these are not the inputs to the 19 rupture control system? 20 MR. STALTER: They are not the inputs to the SFRCS. 21 Those are Rosemont ll52s.. 22 MR. ROSSI: So the inputs to the SFRCS were not. 23 changed? t O 6 24 MR. STALTER: That's correct. 3 j 25- MR. ROSSI: They are the same.
94 1 MR. BEYER: The transmitters were not changed, you ('"%; _ v 2 said, right? The amplifier boards were changed? 3 MR. STALTER: Okay. That's correct. 4 MR. ROSSI: Have you done scoping looks at the time 5 responses to see if they did, indeed, change since you made
- 6. the modifications in the last refueling outage?
7 MR. STALTER: We did response time testing, and they 8 passed all the acceptance criteria. Now of course the 9 acceptance criteria for response time testing is all maximum 10 criteria. There was no minimum criteria. 11 MR. BEARD: Was it a go/no-go type test or a 12 measurement test? 13 MR. STALTER: It was a measurement test. 14 MR. ROSSI: So you must have a record on -- 15 MR. STALTER: We do have that record. 16 MR. ROSSI: Have you looked at that yet to see if it 17 . responded faster? 18 MR. STALTER: We have looked at -- the transmitters 19 themselves? 20 MR. ROSSI: No. The things that you changed. 21 MR. BEARD: Well, the transmitter with the new 22 board. 23 MR. STALTER: Yes, we have looked at it. The r They were in the same T ,)h 24 transmitters were essentially the same. 25 ballpark. There weren't-a'whole lot of changes as a result of
95
/~~N 1 changing out the calibration boards and the amplifiers.
h' 2 The bistables were lengthened somewhat, a little 3 longer response time when we placed the bistables in the 4 SFRCS. 5 MR. ROSSI: Are those bistables used for closing the 6 MSIVs? 7 MR. STALTER: Yes. 8 MR. ROSSI: So they have a longer time response. 9 MR. STALTER: -Very slightly. They went from 3.5 10 milliseconds to about 20 milliseconds. 11 MR. BEARD: And can you give me a feel for what 12 typical response time for your level transmitter is? I mean, s 13 are we talking 150 milliseconds, 500 milliseconds? Just 4 14 ballpark. 15 MR. STALTER: I can get that data for you. 16 MR. BEARD: Is it here in the room? 17 MR. STALTER: I think I have it in my briefcase. 18 MR. BEARD: Maybe after we take a. break, we can get, 19 rather than interrupt. But I would like to know just roughly 23 what kind of numbers we're talking about. 21 I guess at this point, maybe I misread this thing. 22 I had an entire flavor that there was a phenomenon, and that i l 23 because of the new transmitters, which I read to be faster, , (D). 24 now the phenomenon was interfering with the performance of the 25 steam feed rupture control system, and that's why there was a l l
96
, (") 1 spurious trip.
QJ
~
2~ MR. STALTER: Some of the latest information we have 3 now -- and they are working on it even today -- is that the 4 response time was increased, and we don't know by how much, 5 because of the Bailey BY replacement in the sensing lines. 6 Now Bailey BYs act a little different from the 7 Rosemont transmitters in that they are more of a positive 8 displacement type. You actual have to displace fluid in them 9 and move an LBVT to change the signal. 10 There were three of those on that same sensing line 11 that the Rosemont is on, that actuates the SFRCS. And we 12 replaced those three other transmitters with Rosemont ll53s, d O 13 which are essentially zero displacement.
, 14 So you, in effect, had a buffer in there, if you 15 will~--
16 MR. ROSSI: Wi}}