ML20129B941
| ML20129B941 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1985 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507290305 | |
| Download: ML20129B941 (106) | |
Text
i QO GL UNITED STATES v . _ _ _ , NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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l 1 i $
IN TIIE MATTER OP:
g DAVIS-BESSE INCIDENT 4
(INTERVIEW AND MEETING)
(CLOSED) l Status Report on Quarantine Equipment
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LOCATION: OAK IIARBOR, OIIIO r ugh 90 Pages:
DATE: July 11, 1985 c, c .-
i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS
.- Official Reporters
,, 444 North Capitol Street
( _) Washington, D. C., 20001
}, (202) 347-3700 ggo720305850719 T DOCK 05000346 PDR L s
1 I
L
- SuhWalsh 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA e' 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l j 3 -----
TIIURSDAY, JULY.lli 1985 4
I 5 -----
o 6 MEETING BETWEEN TIIE-NRC FACT-FINDING TEAM AND TOLEDO EDISON
.7 ON 8 STATUS REPORT ON' QUARANTINE EQUIPMENT i
- 9 10 NRC FACT-FINDING MEMBERS PRESENT
! 11 Dr. Ernest Rossi Mr. J. T. Beard 12 Mr. Larry Bell-13 TOLEDO EDISON MEMBERS PRESENT:
]'
i
,. 14 Mr. Kasper Mr. Isley 15 Mr. Mominee i Mr. Grime 16 Mr. L. Iluston Mr. Gradomski 17 Mr. Borysiak Mr. Czuba i 18 Mr. DeSando 1 .-
19 OTHERS PRESENT:
I o '20 .Mr. Land, Delian Corporation 4
Mr. R. Iluston, Delian Corporation 21 Mr. lilldebrandt, MPR
.22 23 24 f
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9-1-Jon W2.1 2 1 (4:25 p.m.)
2 P3QQQQQlEQE
, 3 MR. ROSSI: We are here to talk about the status 4 report on troubleshooting efforts that have occurred since 5 the June 9th event.
O 6 And Toledo Edison gave us a document that gives 7 the current status of all the troubleshooting that has c
8 occurred, and I assume that that has been made part of the 9 record? I 10 MR. GRIME: I would like to make a notation on ,
i 11 that, Dr. Rossi, if we could to get it as part of the record. l 12 If I may. j 13 In response to your request that Toledo Edison
- 14 provide the NRC fact finding team with preliminary status i
15 reports on the action plan, the Toledo Edison Special Task !
16 Force has compiled prelindnary status reports on most of the i i
17 troubleshooting and testing action plans. !
o 18 I will mention specifically the steam feed water ;
19 rupture control system action plans did not have a preliminary; o i 20 status report, since they were just recently approved and do l l
21 not yet have significant work completed on them.
22 Please be advised that these reports are 23 preliminary in nature, and do not represent Toledo Edison's t I
24 final findings or conclusions regarding root causes of the Ace Federal Reporters, f rc.
25 equipment failures which occurred on June 9th, 1985.
9-2-Joe Orl 3 l
i The information contained in these preliminary i 2 reports is based on our findings to date and is subject to
, 3 further modifications as more data becomes available.
4 It is hoped that these reports will sufficiently 5 meet your needs for immediate informational needs, and the 0
6 preliminary status reports provided are for action plans 1-A 7 and 1-B on the auxiliary feed pump overspeed trips, o
8 Plan 1-B on the overspeed trip mechanism of the 9 auxiliary feed pump. Action Plan 8 on the main feed pump 10 turbine, 1-1.
11 Action Plans for 9-A and 9-B on the turbine 12 bypass valve, SP-13A2. j
' i 13 Plan 10 on the PORV. f l
< 14 Plan 12 on auxiliary feed water valves AF-599 l i
15 and AF-608. i 16 Plans 15-A-1 and A-2 on NI 1, source range !
17 nuclear instrumentation, and Plan 15-B, on NI-2 source range o 18 -- count rate, rather, level indication.
19 Plan 16 on erratic pressure control experienced a
20 on the main steam header. l l
21 Plan 18 on main feed water No. 2 startup control 22 valve SP-7-A, and 26, on auxiliary feed water No. 1 23 suction supply transfer.
24 And Plan 27, on auxiliary feed pump turbine 1-1, Acae n.ponen, inc.
25 main steam inlet valve isolation, valve MS-106.
l
4 f-3
.g ur kls k 1 MR. BEARD: May I ask a question? With the 2 exception of the plan for the steam feed rupture control s 3 system, does this package include a status report for all 4 the action items that are on the quarantine list, or is there 5 some missing and being developed, or how do we stand in that 6 area?
7 MR. GRIME: It provides the status on all of the o
8 listed areas.
9 We are developing some additional action plans.
10 In other words, as an example, on the main feed pump issue, 11 we have an action plan that is already approved on the main ,
12 feed pump 1-1. We have in development Action Plan to 13 address the other main feed pump. So, the report that you
. 14 have is on the main feed pump topic, addresses main feed pump i
l 15 1-1, the Action Plan that is already in progress. !
l l
16 So, there are -- if I may relate that, there i
17 are more action plans tnan there are equipment issues, and I o 18 so -- l 19 MR. BEARD: I understand that. l o
20 MR. GRIME: Each issue, each equipment issue
. 21 h other than steam feed water rupture control system is 1) 22 addressed in this package.
23 MR. ROSSI : So you covered everything that is
- 1 24 on the quarantine list in this package, except for the steam l '
Aa-FMed Rnnems, inc.
25 feed --
5 t 9'-4-JoelWal
,1 MR. GRIME: Yes. And to be technical, we 2 ; haven't addressed, for instance, main feed pump 2 which is V , .3 on the list, but we have addressed ~ the main feed pump topic
- 4 -- mainly7 main feed-pump 1, because that is the only. work
-5 done to--date.
6 MR. ROSSI: Okay. But if we go through the 7 quarantine list item by item, we will have the status for 4
8 everything on there except for--the steam feed water rupture 9 -control system. You haven't done anything on main feed water 10 ' pump 2 that you haven't done --
- 11. MR. GRIME: That is correct to the best of my 12 knowledge.
13 MR. ROSSI: Okay. I think that was the question s 14 that he had.
15 One thing I would'like to ask as we go through 16 ~t hese,sif you could tell us where you believe you will have 17 to develop or revise. current action plan.
, o 16 In reading some of these -, it appears that 19 _you have done a lot o" what was in the original action plan o .
i- 20 and you haven't yet identified the problem, and so it appears
- 21 to
- us that you.are probably going to be revising the action
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.22 plans to do some further steps,'and if you could just make i
23 - that clear we would appreciate it.
t
,24 And we would also like to make sure that we get.
!L4e.-F.eesneporiers. sac.
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'25 the revised action plans as soon as they are available.
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9-5-Joe Wal 6 r
1 MR. GRIME : Okay.
2 MR. ROSS1: Okay. So, with that, why don' t ve
< 3 just start with the one on Action Plan No. 10, which is the l
4 PORV.
5 MR. BEARD: Wait a minute. Correct me if I am 6 wrong, but we were told prior to the meeting when we were 7 given these action plans an hour or so ago, that the ones c
8 that the Company was wanting to talk about tonight, in this t
9 one meeting, were only the ones listed on the board, which 10 would be No. 10 on the PORV, 16 on the main steam pressure, 11 26 aux feed suction transfer set on the nuclear instruments, i
and 1 Delta on the trip throttle problem.
12 Is that still 13 correct?
. 14 MR. GRIME: That is still correct.
15 MR. BEARD: Okay. You are not going to discuss !
16 all that today. l i
l'7 MR. ROSSI: Well, you have a copy of all of l o 18 them. And you will make that a part of the record, and
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19 then tomorrow's meeting will just be a continuation of this.
l o !
20 Okay. So, why don'e 7e start with the PORV. i l
21 We understand that you distr ^ 9, d the valve and you 22 inspected it, and you have not been able to find any problems 23 yet, and you are still checking the dimensions on it.
24 MR. ISLEY: That is correct.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. ROSSI: Is there some kind of an analysis
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9-6-Joe W21 7 ,
I that is-going on on the effects of differential thermal 2 expansion?
- .- 3 MR. ISLEY: Yes. Both the vendor and our 4 consultant, MPR Associates, are looking into that along with 5 other possible ef fects.
'O 6 MR. ROSSI: Where is the valve right now?
7 MR. ISLEY: The valve itself is stored in RACA.
o 8 (Radiation Access: ' Control . Area. ) - The valve was radioactive, 9 so we set up a special area in RACA.
10 MR. ROSSI: One thing we would-like to be sure 11 you' do is that- the NRC would like to know in advance before l
12 you decide to put that valve back .on.
13 That information ought to be given to Region III
. 14 some time in advance before you decide to reinstall the 15 valve.
16 MR. ISLEY: What-my plan -- my intention was l 17 to revise the action plan and make that reinstallation part t
-.j 18 of the action plan .when we decide to do that.
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19 MR. BEARD: I think what Ernie is saying is 20 that we-would like to see a hold point and notification' as 21 part of that plan. .The Region would be notified prior to that 22 step being taken.
23 MR. ISLEY: My understanding of the action plan i -
24 was.that was a. normal part of the action plan, that type of
, A ..r e.e.s neporwes,ine.
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~25 -thing would we a hold point.
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9-7-Jo3 W21 8 I MR. ROSSI: Well, are there any plans now to 2 take the valve offsite and do tests of it?
. 3 MR. ISLEY: We have no specific plans. We 4 are looking at that possibility.
5 Wo.are currently evaluating what facilities 6 are available, and wb.it kind of testing they can do, and 7 whether or not they can handle a contaminated valve.
o -
8 MR. BEARD: Let me see if I can understand what 9 the bottom line is, okay?
10 With the exception of some analysis, I under-Il stand you mentioned MPR doing, and some evaluation of the 12 dimensions, would it be a fair statement to say that you 13 basically completed the previous version of the action plan,
. 14 before you start revising it.
3 i
15 MR. ISLEY: That is correct. !
i 16 MR. BEARD: And that -- I don't want to put !
i 17 words in your mouth, but I am just trying to understand, would!
o 18 it be a fair statement to say that there was no conclusive [
19 indication of the root cause? I o l 20 MR. ISLEY: That is correct.
21 MR. BELL: Mr. Isley, do any of the test 22 facilities have the capability of testing that valve at the 23 set point of 23357 I
- l 24 MR. ISLEY: There are facilities out there Ace-Feder) Reporters, Inc.
25 that can do that, yes.
L.
i 9-8-Joe Wal l 9 j 1 MR. ROSSI: llave you talked to EPRI at all 2 about the problem that you had?
. 3 MR. ISLEY: Yes, we have.
4 MR. ROSSI: Have they any ideas or any 5 hypotheses on the problem?
C 6 MR. ISLEY: No. As I stated in our action 7 plan, we reviewed the EPRI test results and there was o
8 nothing in the EPRI testing that would lead us to any one i
9 area or to indicate any problem with the valve.
10 MR. ROSSI: And the vendor?
11 MR. ISLEY: The vendor stands behind the t
I2 EPRI Report.
13 MR. BEARD: What does that mean? ,
- 14 MR. ISLEY: The vendor, from the beginning, j l
15 thought there was no problem with the valve. l 16 MR. BEARD: Well, obviously the valve -- I think 17 it is obvious the valve did not close properly. I o 18 MR. ISLEY: Correct. !
19 MR. ROSSI: So the vendor disagreed that the !
o i 20 valve didn't close properly, or --
21 MR. ISLEY: No.
22 'MR. GRIME: Tom, on that issue of the valve 23 closing properly, was there not one of the hypotheses of 24 some possibility of valve timing and -- coinciding with --
Am-Federj Reporters, Inc.
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25 to be timed when the operator closed manually the blocked valve?
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9-9-Joe Wal? , 10 p 1 ~MR. ISLEY:. Even with that, system pressure was 2 far below the set-point.to'close that valve, and there was
. 3 thirty _ seconds or so. af ter the valve should have closed, there
'd was still flowfindicated through the valve.
5 MR.; GRIME: So there was a definite anomaly 6 ---
7 .MR. ISLEY: There is definitely something o
8 wrong.
9 MR. BEARD: I am trying to reconcile in my 10 mind what the statement means that there is a definite 11 anomany, and that the vendor stands behind the EPRI statements 12 that there was nothing wrong with the valve.
13 I don't know how you reconcile those two
> 14 statements.
15 Maybe-you can.
16 It<seems to imply that one should . expect that-17 f PORV not to close properly, but that is part of its, ' range e.
18 of normal behavior.' Is that what they are saying?
19 MR. ISLEY: No, I don't believe the vendor is e
- 20 -saying that. The vendor came.on site and said that their
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21 experience with the -valve -is that the valve works very well, 22 that they had very-little problems with that valve,.very l .23 -few Problems with that valve sticking open in their other l -
l 24 applications, and that they 'did not expect that there would
' ' Ace-Federd Reporters,'inc.
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25 be-anything wrong with the. valve when they disassembled it.
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9-10-Joa Wal 11 1 MR. ROSSI: Were they here for the disassembly 2 of the valve?
. 3 MR. ISLEY: Yes, they were.
4 MR. BEARD: Are you considering any actions 5 that you might want to take in the event that thr .e is no 6 root cause found for this valve?
7 MR. ISLEY: We are looking at the possibility o
f 8 of replacing our valve with either a similar valve from the 9 same vendor, or going to a newer designed valve from a i 10 different vendor.
Il MR. BEARD: Would that replacement activity ;
12 include testing prior to installation?
13 MR. ISLEY: Yes. j t
1
- 14 MR. BEARD: I realize this is in the consider- l 15 ation stage; apparently no decisions are being made, because '
i 16 you are not there yet. I i
l'7 MR. ISLEY: That is correct. !
o la MR. ROSSI: Okay.
End 9. 19 y SueWal fols.
20 !
21 22 23 24 Ace-FeierJJ Reporters, Inc.
25
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MR. ROSSI:- Okay. I think that is about every-(#10-1-SueWaldh
- 2 thing we have on PORV. Why' don't we go to Action Plan 16 3 on the erratic pressure control and the steam headers.
^
4 MR. BEARD: Oh, I do have one question,-Ernie, 5 .just for clarification.
o -6 In this status report, you say that you are 7 still l'n the process of developing detailed tests to be o
8 run from Mode 3, some hot' testing of the valve?
9 MR.-ISLEY: That's correct.
10 MR. BEARD: Are you still planning to maybe hot Il test this valve prior to making a decision to replace the 12 valve? Or, are you going.to'make that decision.at that 13 point?
14 Or, do you know?
g 15 MR. ISLEY: I don't think we have identified the 16 . point where we want to make a decision.
17 MR. BEARD: Okay. Thank you.
18 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Erratic pressure control.
19 MR. MOMINEE: Okay. Larry went out to get the
- 20 individual.who will be addressing.that.
2I MR. ROSSI: Okay. = Fine.
22 (Pause.)
23 MR..ISLEY: Excuse me, J.T., could I make a
' 24 clarification on the PORV?:
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
g 25 -MR.' BEARD: Certainly.
m; 13
.#10-2-SueWals) . MR. ISLEY: My statement concerning the vendor
. 2 and his support from the EPRI testing, that is about the 3 .only experience the vendor has with the nuclear applications
'4 of this valve.
5 - MR. ROSSI: The EPRI testing?
o 6 MR. ISLEY: Is in the EPRI testing. The vendor 7 does use aLvery similar valve in non-nuclear applications,
.8 and in those applications they have very little problems.
9 MR. ROSSI: Okay. On to the erratic -- is somebod: r 10 else. coming in now?
11 MR. GRIME: . Yes.
12 MR. ROSSI: Okay.' Fine.
_13 MR. GRIME: It may be just a minute before Larry 14 jgets back here.
15 MR. ROSSI: That's no problem, because.I would 16 like to readrthis again anyway.
17 . (Pause.)
18 MR. .ROSSI: Okay. Let..us take-a look and we will 0
19 try to give you some definitive statement tomorrow. But
- - 20 as far as the PORV one, we won't provide any. comments on 21 that one.
22 MR. MOMINEE: You are telling us then that there 23 ist no need~ for you to provide any comments on that?
24 MR. ROSSI: On that one, that's right.
Ace Federal asporters, Inc.
25 MR. BEARD: We choose to give no comments and 8
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- 10-3-SueWal l lyou can proceed.with the work that you have scheduled.
j 2 MR. MOMINEE:. Okay.
3 Okay. We are now ready to begin the
.,, MR._ROSSI:
- '4 discussion'on tho' erratic pressure con' trol. And this one, c
5 it's'our understanding that you have done some checks of l'*. 6 'the ICS.-
7 MR. BEARD: ICS being the integrated control f {
8 system.
i- -9 '
i M R ..- R O S S I : You found one' module I guess that was 10
] out of calibration. Two modules. But you don' t ' feel- that i
i -'II - either one of those explains the erratic pressure behavior.
12 l [And you've had' meetings with the safety. valve [
i
. 13
- vendor. r.. These _ safety _ valves - that you.have here, you have I4
! . 'had experie'nce .'in the past'with-it not resetting properly l.
_15 and that kindLof thing; is,that correct?
16 '
Do you have any -- I mean, do you now believe 17
.that_that was the problem, or are you still in the process 18 .of'trying;to do further evaluations to determine this?
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II MR. IIUSTON:
We are still doing further evalua-20 h ~*' .tions'.- Some of the work on the ICS that is involved with
! ' 2I main steam header pressure control we a jus _t _ completed about
. 22 an ' hour -- a _little over: an hour ago. And I don't have it 23
- . .all' sorted out 1" 'I own mind yet.
24 Indeed, . there could have really been a contribu-
, AceFedomi W, im 25 f, .
tion'from the-integrated control system, not~so much.from-l
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- 10-4--SueWaldh ~ the. work referenced there that you have in front of you which
' ~. 2 .was completed yesterday late, but from'some additional test-3 ing that.we.did during the day today.
]
4 Well,.were the vent valves'during the MR..ROSSI:
'5 event being controlled by the integrated control system?
O 6 MR. IlUSTON: Part of the time they were, yes.
7 Part of -the . time they were under operator manual control.
.8 ^
.MR. ROSSI: -Do you have any way of telling whether 9 a safety-valve could have been not rescated'or leaking 10 significantly during'the event? Any instrumentation or II anything of that sort?
I2 MR. IIUSTON: We don't have any instrumentation on 13 the safety valves to indicate position. -We are looking into I4 that.
15
.MR( ROSSI: No temperatures downstream or any-16 thing of that sort?
I7 MR. IlUSTON: No, not on the safety valve exhaust.
18
. You can get some real good idea by looking at the pressure I9 traces, however.
4 20 MR. ROSSI: . You have a statement"in-the status 21 that-says that.the inlet bore size to the MSSVs is smaller 22 than Dresser states is ' basis for the valve rating.
'23 Does that effect the valve rating? I'mean, is 24 Lthat another problem that --
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25
, M R . 'lI U S T O N : It's --
16 1910-5-SueWaldt .MR. ROSSI: -- you have?
- 2 MR.-HUSTON: It's more of a problem making sure that'you have board certification of the. valve.
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3 As far as
/4 effecting performance, it's -- we have done some preliminary 5 work.on.that. I was working on that late last night. It
- 6 appears at this time this is not completed-work yet, but
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7 that has no effect on valve performance.
.o 8 MR.lROSSI: Okay.
9 ' MR . HUSTON: 'The difference in bore is minimal; 10 -the length;of that: inlet pipe is'short.
11 MR. BEARD: Wo'uld this difference in bore'really 12 .only, say, effect flow 1 capacity?
13 [Iassume.thatbyboreyouaresayingthatthe ,
14 valve throat size is a little smaller than-maybe it was 15 thought to have been? A'm I misunderstanding?
10 MR. HUSTON: The valve itself, no, is of-the 17 s'ize'that Dresser wanted.
. It's where'the' valve mounts to 18 the main' steam header.
19 MR. BEARD: So it's at the interface there?
- 20 MR. HUSTON: There and down to the main' steam 4
21 line, from the-interface on down. Nonetheless, in any case 22 it's larger-than the nozzle of the valve itself. So, you 23 are' restricted the minute you go past that; or the inch 24 you go past that interface, you are restricted right there.
Ace-Fedorol Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. BEARD:- Okay. Let me see if I can somehow l
17
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summarize in my mind at least this action plan. My memory
. #10-6-SueWalsh
- 2 is the action plan addressed three major areas that were 3 - ccnsidered possible_ sources of the erratic pressure response.
4 One was a problem with the MSIVs -- I mean, yeah,
-5 'a. prob 7em with maybe some leakage through-the MSIVs or by e .6 'the MSIVs, 'or misoperation or. something on the main steam 7 safety' release, safety valves.
o 8 The second problem was-a problem with the 9 atmospheric vent valves, . in the valve itself.
10 And a' third; aspect, as I remember the action II plan, was it's possible~there was a " operational problem"
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-12 .with the vent. valve which, to me,. suggests the possibility 13 that it was manually ope' rated in less than the optimum 14 fashion. <
15 Have you had a chance.to look at all of these 16 areas?I Because I guess what I'm trying to understand is 17 you.have addressed looking at some of the-automatic. controls 18 'for the vent valve, you have looked at some of the aspects 19 of the' safety valves themselves . I don't see anything on:
- 20 the status. report as to what you have done, or have not 21 done, with regard to - the MSIVs and operator actions cn1 22 the control of the atmospheric vents.
. 23 Should I deduce from that there is no action l 24 .th'at has been'done in those areas?
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR..IIUSTON: That is correct. I was not planning 0
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)#10-7-SueWalqh .to address the-main steam isolation valves or MSIVs, as 2 you were calling.them.
3 MR. BEARD: Was that not part of the original 4 action plan? Or,.is my memory just getting weak?
5 MR. HUSTON: I don't believe that wis part of e' 6 my original action. plan, no.
7 MR. BEARD: Okay.
8 MR. BELL: I need some information from you, 9 Mr. Huston, in order ~to understand the steam generator 10 pressure traces.
11 MR..HUSTON: Okay.
12 J
MR.* BELL: I.think:you# stated earlier that during 13 the event that the valves were either under RCS control or 14 operator controli 15 During the early part of the event,'immediately 16 after the reactor trip, is there any reason that the 17 atmospheric vent valves would open?
18 MR. HUSTON: Yes. There is a circuit that will C
19 open the atmospheric vent valves at a. set pressure when r
- 20 that is reached beyond the main steam pressure caps. They 21 will get an open signal from the ICS.
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22 MR.-BEARD: Is that open signal operable in 23 :the condition the plant was in at the time? Or, is it' 24 bypassed or blocked?
Ace-Fedorol Reporters. Inc.
, 25 MR. HUSTON . That would not have been blocked at e___ . _ . .:--_-__
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19
- 10-8-SueWalgt the ' time .of the trip, no.
2 MR. ROSSI: Well, the SPRCS I believe was.
3 MR.HUSTON: Okay. Whether or_not that was 4 operable is a question that came up just an hour ago in our 5 -testing of the ICS. There is one channel' there that we le 6 don't know about yet.
7 MR. BEARD: -I guess what I'm trying to understand
' ~
8 'is, in context with Larry's" question, in a post-trip 9 ' situation which I assume would'also include the actuation 10 of the SPRCS, I~ understood that that: actuation forces the 11 control -- overrides thd control ~of.the ICS and,causes the.
12 atmospheric vent' valve to be closed unless the operators 13 take special_ action to take manual control.
14 MR. HUSTON: That is correct. Upon_SFRCS 15 actuation, the AVVs will close.
16 MR. BEARD: Right. And wasn' t that the situation 17 before he took manual control?
18 MR. HUSTON: We have alarm printouts to show on a
19 the -- on one steam generator that indeed they were not
+ 20 closed. ife get a closed and a not closed printout.
- 21 MR. ROSSI: Larry, why don't you go ahead?
22 MR. HUSTON: Maybe I'm missing your question, 23 Larry.
24 MR. BELL: My question really. addresses the Ac.-Fed.r i n. porters, lac.
. 25 adjustment 'of header pressure bias on a reactor trip. I
20
- #10-9-SueWalsh was under th'e impression that the turbine bypass valve
'2 received an additional bias when a reactor trip signal was 3 generated, that increased the turbine header pressure set-4 point to somewhere~in the neighborhood of ten hundred and ten ;
5 psig.
, , 6 MR. HUSTON: Right. That is correct.
.7 MR. BELL: Now, we-assume that that. action takes !
4 8 place from the pressure ' curves.
i; 9 . MR. HUSTON: Uh-huh.
a 10 MR. BELL: LThen, following the closure of'the main 11 steam isolation valves or_the mainesteam stop. valves, your 12 ICS analog and digital logics show that if those valves are .
g 13 closed then header' pressure control is transferred to the 14 a tmospheric vent valves.
15 MR. HUSTON: .That is' correct.
f 16 MR. BELL: I wanted to make sure of that, because i 17 as I said before I am trying to go through these curves. r
. o 18 The third thing that would get a signal . to those _
19 atmospheric vent valves-is the. steam and feedwater rupture :
- e. 20 contro1: system. When that system was actuated, either on low 1
21 steam generator level or -low steam generator pressure then those 4
22 valves should close.
! 23 MR. HUSTON:
Yes.
i 24 MR. BELL: Regardless of the demand from the
- AceFedwal Reportm, Inc.
, 25 integrated control system?
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21
- 10-10-SueWa$ MR. HUSTON: Right.
2 MR. BELL: -Finally, when the steam and feed rupture 3 control system was reset, then the valves would revert to 4 RCS control or manual control, depending on the position of 5 the selector switch?
e 6 MR. HUSTON: That is correct.
7 MR. ROSSI: Was it under ICS control for some 8 period of time after they reset the SFRCS or not?
9 MR. HUSTON: I don't know. I asked the operator 10 about that, and he was so busy. I spoke to the operator 11 twice, and he couldn't recall.
12 MR. ROSSI: And you can't tell from the data 13 printouts?
14 MR. HUSTON: No. We don't have printout there.
15 It may return -- upon the operator putting in the block, it 16 may return to a preferred state. And I'm not sure. I can't 17' remember what I came up with on that.
18 You would have to ask one of the operators about G
19 that. -
0 20 MR. BELL: Okay.
21 MR. ROSSI: We have probably got your status on 22 this. Are you developing another action plan revision on 23 this one? Or, are you still within the current action plan?
24 MR. HILDEBRANDT: May I ask for a point of clarifi-Ace-Federal Reporters, lac,
, 25 cation? Larry, when you were mentioning what the SFRCS full
22
- 10-ll-SueWa3s trip does,-asIfar as the atmospheric vent valve is' concerned, 2 I-believe the statement was on any full trip, or a trip --
3 excuse me, you? ve . been using the term trip of the SFRCS, the 4 AVV,'the atmospheric vent valvo, would be closed automatically.
5 I believe -that is only on a low pressure trip of
, 6 the SFRCS,-not onLa level.
7 MR. BEARD: Okay. We thank you'very much.
8 MR. ROSSI: Okay.. Can we go on to Number 26 on the 9 inadvertent auxiliary feedwater suction --
10 MR. BEARD: Wait a minute.' I didn't hear the answer
.c ,
11 to: the question 'you asked before -Larry wanted his point of 12 clarification.c ,
13 Are you developing a revised action plan?
14 MR. IIUSTON: No, we are not.
, We are still within 15 the scope of this one, as far as the testing that we are 16 going to.do.
17 MR. BEARD: Thank you. Do we have to wait for the 18 appropriate individual for this plan?
19 MR. GRIME: They should be here.
- 20 MR. BEARD: Right outside-the door?
21 MR. GRIME: Should be.
22 (Pause.)
END-#10 23 Simons flws 24 Ac. w .i n e i,Inc.
. 25 i
i e
n,- -- _._._. . - - - - . - _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - - - - _ . , _ - - - _ . - . - . - - - - - - _ - - . . . -
23 Sim 11 ,1, .
MR. ROSSI: All right, why don't we start then a d talk about inadvertent Auxiliary Feedwater pump No. 1 2
su tion supply transfer.
3 I-guess the thing that I noticed was that you 4
.have done some looking at the time response of pressure switches and concluded that they respond faster than the computer scan rate, which could explain you indicate lack 7
- of a computer alarm. Does that then mean that it is possible that you could have gotten.some sort of a rapid indication 9
f a loss of suction when you transferred it over'that 10 jj wouldn't show up on the computer?
MR. CZUBA: Correct.
12 g MR. ROSSI.= Ilow does it seal in? How does the g circuitry seal in for doing that?
g MR. CZUBA: That alarm switch, PSL-503, doesn't g seal in. It will reset if pressure is restored.
MR. ROSSI: But that is a different switch than 37 18 is used to do the transfer? ,
o MR. CZUBA: Right. The setpoint on the alarm 19
- 20 switch is 11 psi. .The setpoint on th'e actual pressure switches that actuate your transfer is 2 psi.
21 MR. BEARDir Well, are these two that we are 22 talking about, 503 is the one that sounds the' alarm?
23 24 MR. CZUBA: 'It gives you an enunciator alarm and
"[g then a computer alarm.
24 ,
L Sim 11-2' 1 MR. BEARD: Okay. But that is at the 11 psi :
2 . point?. ,
i l 3 MR. CZUBA: Correct. l 4 M T. BEARDF And the same thing for 507? t 5 MR. CZUBA: Correct. 507 is on the 1-2. side
{
- , 6 and 503 is on the 1-1 sido..
4 7 MR. BEARD r. I guess I am still trying to under-l 8 stand this thing about the response of those alarm switches 9 is faster than the scan reads it. I understand the computer 10 scan rate is about one second.
l
! 11 MR. CZUBA: One second, correct.
l
}' 12 MR. BEARD s . And you are saying that this thing 4 !
13 can come in and go b..:k out before the thing has a chance 14 to siphon around ant get to it?
- 15 MR. CZUBA
- It can actuate and reset - .:the total i 16 time response of the actuation plus reset was approximately l 17 -200 milli-seconds.
18 MR. BEARDr So that would be total cycle time?
- o 19 MR. CZUBA: Correct. So,;therefore, if there F
- 20 was a spike or a low pressure in the suction line ---
i l 21 MR. BEARDr Ict me see if I understand this. So i 22 the problem is that since it doesn't seal in that the alarm, i
i 23 or the scanner, which takes a second to come around, could j 24 miss it during that interval? '
t A+ ww. hpwws, w.
.- 25 MR. CZUBA: Right, but you also have your t
9
25 Sim 11-3
~
1 enunciator alarm which the operator did see come in prior
- .. 2 to swap-over. So they did have indication that 503 actually 3 actuated because of the enunciator.
4 MR. BEARDr But wasn't that an occurrence that 5 took place, was completed and reset several seconds prior o 6 to the transfer starting?
7 MR. CZUBA: That did happen, but it happened again 8 prior to'the actual swap-over.
9 MR. BEARDr Oh, okay. On some of the enunciator 10 inputs I was told that because of previous spurious actuatione i 4 11 that the. enunciator had been modified to provide an intentional i j 12 hold-in or delay on clearing or something of that nature. Was 13 that only done for inputs related to the rupture control !
j'
-14 system or was it done generally for all the enunciator inputs?
r i
15 MR. CZUBA: I am not sure. ;
L 16 MR. BEARD: Because I get the feeling that that
~
17 is not applicable at lea'st for these inputs. L i 18 MR. CZUBA: I am not sure on'that.
i 0
i 19 .MR. ROSSIr What.are the consequences of an i
- 20 inadvertent transfer of the suction?
21 MR. CZUBA: Well, what do you mean by 22 consequences?
b l' 23 MR. .ROSSI: The' consequence to the plant. Does [
24 it simply get water of poor quality into~the steam generators?
AceFedecel Reporters, Inc.
, 25 Is that the consequences?
r J
26 Sim 11-4 i MR. CZUBA: Yes, if you consider that a 2 consequence, that-service water in the steam generator, I 3 gues s that is what would happen.
i 4 MR.. GRIME: Y(u.mean the long-term consequences 5 as opposed to no immediate safety consequences that you are
- o. .6 switching to an alternate source of water?
f 7 MR. ROSSI: Yes, that was my question. Is it a j;
g long-term chemistry problem?
i 9 MR. GRIME: To the best of my knowledge, that i
j 10 is correct.
J il MR. ROSSIr No short-term safety problems. '
12 MR. GRIME: No short term.: ;
1 I. 13 MR. ROSSI: ~ Did you have la comment on that, Larry? ,
i r
{ 14 MR. BELL: Tho'e r is a potential safety problem
! 15 there isethe cause of-the low' auction pressures 1s a cloggdd i i
16 suction strainer. Then'the shift to service water would
}
j 17 not supply auxiliary feedwa'ter to the steam generators.
5 l 13 If my memory serves me correctly, somewhere in
] o '
u
) 19 that 24 pages of alarm printouts there is a suction strainer 4
l
!* 20 differential pressure alarm. There are a lot of pages to that l 21 document, and I could be wrong. ;
i 22 MR. CZUBA If I could say something. I think 23 I recall socing one where we did get the alarm and then one
! 24 second later it cicared. Is that the one you are thinkingo
' AwFdwd #9abr4 lac. ,
, 25 of?
I l [
i.
.______-____-----_D
4 27 :
l Sim 11-5 I MR. BELL: Well, as I said, the document is 24
- 2 pages long, and I didn't commit it to memory. But I do recall '
3 that there is a DP alarm on the suction strainer, and I 4 don't recall how long the alarm was in, i 5 MR. GRIME: Do you know which strainer and in i o 6 which line that was?'
i 7 MR. BELL: No, sir.
o ,.
8 '
MR. BEARD: My understanding is the strainer is
- 9 in the common portion of the pipe.
i 10 MR.. GRIME: We would have to look at a PNIV to "
II be certain of that.
! I2 MR. BEARD: We had some other meetings where some i
13 different people said that. .That is what they told me when <
I4 the question came up, that.it was in the common portion of 15 the pipe.
I0 MR. ROSSH Well, the strainers are going to I7 be checked.
l 18 MR. CZUBA ' To my knowledge, the only VP indication i
j 19 across the strainers are'the individual strainers in each.line. ,
- 20 '
j MR. BELL: But you do agree that there was an 21 alarm generated high differential. pressure?
22 MR. CZUBA: I did see that.
23 MR.-BEARD: Are you still working on:the action.
24 plan? In other words, it is not completed yet?
Ace-Federal Reperkes, Inc.
t 25 MR. CZUBA: Yes, sir, we are still working on it.
j
__ . - - _ . . . , _ , . . . _ , - - . - - _ . - ~ , - - , _ - . _ _ _ _ _ - - , _ . - - . . . . -
28 Sin 11-6 1 In fact, today we did pull two of the strainers out and looked 2 at them and they looked clean.
3 MR. BEARDn Do you have any intent or believe it 4 will be necessary to revise your action plan?
5 MR. CZUBA: At this time, no.
o 6 MR. ROSSI: You said that you had looked at the 7 strainers. That is in your summary down here where you say
'O 8 " Auxiliary Feedwater strainers 5201 and 5206," you have 9 looked at some of those now?
10 MR. CZUBA: We have looked at 201 and 206 today 11 and did not find any indication of anything that would clog.
12 MR. BEARDS Down here under the summary where 13 you list the actions to be done yet, is that a complete list?
14 MR. CZUBAs. To date ---
15 MR. BEARD: I mean at the very bottom of the page 16 you have got three paragraphs. One says "None of the above 17 findings establish the direct cause . . . work is continuing."
18 The second paragraph says look at the strainers.
19 The third paragraph says do a functional test.
- 20 Is that the essence of what is left of the action 21 plan yet to be done?
22 MR. CZUBA: We also want to make some high-speed 23 chart recorders across the contacts of the pressure switches 24 to monitor them during the aux feed pump testing.
A.4.d. col n. pori.r , :=.
25 MR. ROSSI: That is when you do which testing?
29 e
j MR. CZUBA: The auxiliary feed pump testing.
. 2 MR. ROSSI: That is after you go back to mode 37 3
MR. CZUBA: Yes.
4 MR. ROSSI: And trying to simulate as near as 5 Possible the actual conditions that existed on June 9th?
- 6 MR. CZUBA: Yes.
i MR. ROSSI: But all of this that is remaining 7
to be done is within the current action plan? [
8 l
l 9 MR. CZUBA: Correct.
10 MR. ROSSI: Including the chart recorders?
! MR. CZUBA: Correct.
ij 12 MR. BEARD: - Let me see if I understand you 13 correctly. This summary is a complete list of what is yet 34 to be done in the action plan?
15 4 MR. CZUBA: . Correct.
1 l 16 MR) BEARD:t If, that is the case, l't seems like I
j7 that if we put aside for the moment the mode 3 part of the 18 testing and a recalibration of this pressure switch that you
. o-4 39 found out, that the only thing loft to be done is the
.*- 20 in8Pection of the rest of the strainers.
21 MR. CZUBA: Yes, sir, besides the fucntional
- 22 test.
23 MR. BEARD:s That is what I mean, the mode 3 test.
l 1
24 MR. CZUBA: Well, the ST-5071.13 does not need
- Ac.-F.d. col n.por,.ri, lac.
25 to be done in mode 3.
I
___.___._________________.___.-______m________-__ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _
30 Sim 11-8
,y MR. BEARD: So that is not the same test as is
.- 2 referred to by the last item?
3 MR. CZUBA: No. The ST is you actually drain 4 down both pressure switches and watch the valves and make 5 sure that the. valves do swap over. .
9 MR. BEARD.= Just for other related information,
- 10 if this suction goes low, do you-know whether or not the 11 system is capable of making -- how long it takes the system 12 to do this transfer to get the. pressure back up, how many
+
13 seconds that would'take? .
I 14 MR. CZUBA: You want to know how long before 15 the -- when it does get an indication of"a low suction 16 pressure until suction pressure is restored?
17 MR. BEARD: Yes, sir', if you happen to know.
i' 18 MR. CZUBA: No, I don't know that offhand.
19 MR. BEARD: Just a ball park. I mean are we
- 20 . talking one second, ten seconds, twenty seconds?
21 MR. ROSSI: If you truly don't know, it is better ,
22 to just say you don't know rather than to guess at it I 23 .think.
24 MR. CZUBAs. I really don't know.
A+Fwed agm*m, lac.
25 MR. ROSSI: I mean if we need to know, we can -
I k____ _ ___._ __ . _____... _ _ __._________..___._._______ _m________ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _-
31 Sim 11-9 ^1 find it I am sure.
2 MR. BEARD: Is there an interlock on that 3 DP, or on that low pressure, that if the pressure persists 4 for some period of time if will shut down the turbine?
5 MR. CZUBA: There is another. set of pressure
, 6 switches that if you get below one psi it will shut your 7 steam supply ~ valves, MS-106 and on the other side MS-107.
o a MR. ROSSIP Anything else?
9 MR. BELL: Mr. Grime.. --
10 MR. GRIME:. Yes.
11 MR. BELL: In reading some events at other 12 utilities,.a switchover to service water has occurred during 13 simultaneous starting of'anergency feedwater pumps. Ilas that 14 over been a problem:hore?
t 15 MR. GRIME:- I may have to. refer back to Tim. I 16 know we have had a service water transfer occur previously 17 at Davis-Besse at least once or perhaps spill. I cannot 18 recall the details of what precipitated the transfer to 19 service water in the previous case.
- 20 MR. CZUBA: To my knowledge, it has happened 21 before in the 1-1 pump. On pump startup they have had 22 the swap-over.
23 MR. ROSSIP JT?
24 MR. BEARD: I have no further comments on this Ace Fedwol Reporters, Inc.
25 section.
, . _. __ _ . _ . - ~
32 Sim ll-10 j MR. ROSSI:' Okay. I guess we are ready for' --
. 2 we are going to take a five-minute break while we get 3 ready for the next'one.
4 (Recess taken.)
5 MR. ROSSI: We are1 going to talk about'15A-1
+ 6 'and 15A-2 and I guess ISB also.
7 MR. BEARD: Yes.
8 MR. ROSSI Okay. Why don't we start with-9 15A-1 and 15A-2. Are you now to the point where you" havoc 10 completed your action, your original action plan?
11 MR. BORYSIAKe No, we are not.
12 MR. ROSSIP Is work with Ohio State University, 13 is that still within the original action plan?
14 MR..BORYSIAK: Yes. -
15 MR. BEARDF Could you outline briefly the steps 16 of the action plan that are yet to be done in the way the 17 plan was written?
18 MR. BORYSIAK: I don't have a copy of my action e
i 19 plan with me. There are four work orders presently written
- 20 to cover as per the summary draft submitted. We have only
' ~
21 completed one-half of 2092-00.
22 MR. ROSSI: This channel, it is still failed 23 at this time? I mean is it inoperable or_ operable?
24 MR. BORYSIAK: It is still declared inoperable.
AceFederal Reporters, Inc.
~ 25 MR. ROSSIP It is declared inoperable and it is i
l --
t
33
~
Simll-11~ 1 still -- at least the failure is still there to investigate;
, 2 is that right?
3 MR.~BORYSIAK: The elevated court rate occasionall y 4 comes and goes. WeLare trying to catch it when it does in 5 fact appear. When'we do catch the elevated count rate data e -6 that we require for 2092-00, we can then complete that ,
7 work order.
MR. BEARD:
"8 I guess that is useful information 9 because in contrast on the next one, ISB, it.seemed like 10 you had trouble reproducing the' anomaly. It just won't seem 11 .to come on for you.
But-in this. case, and I guess these 12 'are all related to NI-1, which is source range channel 2. On 13 this~one you have had occasions where the misbehavior has 14 : occurred for you. ,
15 MR. BORYSIAK: Occasionally it comes and goes, 16 yes.
17 MR. BEARD:s Do you anticipate that you are going 18 to have to revise the action plan to take steps that are 19 beyond those in the present plan?
- 20 MR. BORYSIAK Not at this point in time. We 21 wish to complete these four work orders initially, which is 22 within the scope'of the action plan, and then have Ohio 23 State and ourselves sit down and analyze and take a look at 24 the data and then como up with a possible revision, depending Ace-Federol Reporters, Inc.
25 on what that analysis leads us to.
p.
l 34
'Sim 11-12 MR. BEARD: I am trying to understand somethin.g?
j 2 here. There is a statement in here that says no work orders 3 have been written to investigate action plan 15A-2, and A-2 4 ' relates-to'-- I guess that.is the spiking part of the 5 Problem, right?
w 6 MR. BORYSIAK: That is correct..
7 MR. BEARD:. So really what you are doing is you g are working;on A.1, which is.the elevated count rate?
9 MR. BORYSIAK: That is correct.
10 MR. BEARDr Have you done anything on the -- well, 11 'whatever the numbers are for the other channel?
12 MR. ROSSI: Well', that.is ISB. Are we ready 13 to go on to ISB?'
14 MR. BEARD: Well, wait a minute.- I-am confused 15 because up here,where it says " maintenance work order is-16 written, there are two identified as.having been written 17 for NI-1.and two identified for NI-2. Therefore,-I was~
18 trying to understand ---you-said that the.very~first one 19 ' listed for NI-1, I thought you said it_was about half a '20 . complete.
21 MR. BORYSIAK: That is correct.
22 MR. BEARD: And I was trying to get,the status 23 on1the NI-2.part.: Now is that part of 15A-1 and.A-2, or is i 24 .that part of 15B?
AwFWwd R9wwg inc .
l 25 iMR. BORYSIAK: 2192-00 and-2192 is'part of f
.b
35 ,
Sim 11-13 1
action plan 15A-1.
. 2 MR. BEARB:n And that part is complete or 3 incomplete >or partially complete?
i 4 MR. BORYSIAK:' That has not been started at l
)
5 this point in time, MR. BEARE:: That is right. Okay.
o 6 7 MR. .ROSSIP Are we ready to go to ISB?
'8 Okay. Now 15B, as I understand it, this is 9 one where you haven't been.able to reproduce the failure 10 after a number of attempts.
11 MR. DeSANDO: -Yes, sir.
12 .
MR. ROSSL So essentially all the time since 13 the event-it has worked'with the exception.of spiking problems 14 that mayEbe similar to those on NI-1 that have occurred now 15 .and'then? ,
16 MR. DeSANDO: No, sir.
17 MR. ROSSI: You don't have spiking. It has
. 18 just worked?
19 MR. DeSANDO: Yea, sir.
- 20 . MR . ROSSI: And you haven't been able to reproduce
-21 the failure and you:are still trying to reproduce the 22 failure?
e 23 MR . , De SANDO: That1is correct.
, 24 MR. BEARD:' Is this monitoring that you are Ace-Federol iteporters, Inc.
25 doingi is that like somebody watching it or do you have
l i
36 l Sim 11-14 1 ' instruments recording it or how are you trying to catch .
. 2 this anomaly? ,
end Sim 3 Joe ~fois 4 5
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-8 9 .
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15 16 17 18 19 e: 20 23 24
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25
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~
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r- p , ,,, y- = y', - -
37 12 Jos Wal I MR. DeSANDO: One of the future plans is to 2 install a strip chart recorder to monitor the output of the
. 3 calibrate ' amplifier module, and that is just something that 4 would run continuously in case of a failure.
5 MR. BEARD: Okay. But I guess what I was o
4 trying to understand is .ike on the second bullet here under 7 activities, you said you attempted to reproduce the failure 8 relating to turning the high voltage on and off.
'9 Can you tell me -- did you just go in there and 10
-turn it off one time and nothing happened, or what was it?
U MR. DeSANDO: The detailed procedure for that 12 was to turn off the high voltage to the detector when using I3 the on' and off switch on that detector power supply module, Id leaving it off'for -- well, the first time we did it we left 15 it off for fifteen to twenty minutes.
16 We returned, we re-energized it, hoping to see 17 that it would -- it remained below ten to the minus one state.
- I8 It responded properly to the high voltage. !
19 Then we turned it off again and we let it -- we <
.o
- kept it off for three' days, and we came back and re-energized 21 it, and it again responded as it should.
So, both of those attempts were unsuccessful.
'23 MR. BEARD: - There were - basically two attempts, 24 though. 'It wasn't a continuous monitoring.
25
'MR. .DeSANDO: Oh , no , sir.
12-2-Jon Wal 38 1 MR. BEARD: All right. That is what I was 2 trying to understand.
. 3 MR. ROSSI: Are you still within the original 4 action plan on this one?
5 MR. DeSANDO: Yes, sir. Today I submitted to o
6 our local committee a Rev. 2 to the action plan. The 7 --
o 8 MR. ROSSI: Oh, you did?
9 MR. DeSANDO: Yes, sir. Today. Just today.
10 MR. ROSSI: Oh, okay.
11 MR. BEARD: What would be the general thrust 12 of ' that revision?
13 MR. DeSANDO: The revision is to include
. 14 instructions for an attempt to reproduce the problem by 15 de-energizing the high voltage using the high voltage le cutoff bistables, and the reason for this is to more 17 accurately simulate the conditions that were present during 1 18 the time of the failure on June 9th.
M Basically the same theory that is included 0 -
20 -- cn: that we used in turning on and off the high voltage 21 there earlier. Using the bistable.
22 MR. BEARD: Do you think that the present 23 work plan has a high _ probability of finding the root cause?
24 MR. DeSANDO: From the attempts that we have made A comum nosom sac.
~
25 so.f ar, the channel seems to be - functioning properly at this
, < , . - - --- . - _ . - y - .-e .
12-3-Joe W21 39 1 time, and everything that we have tried so far we have come 2 up empty, and the more we try the more I feel that it is
. 3 going to be harder to reproduce the problem.
4 MR. BEARD: I guess I am trying to carry out 5 a line of questions that say: Suppose that you are unable, o
6 within the scope of the action plan, to reproduce the anomaly 7 or even if you do reproduce the anomaly, not find the cause o
8 for it. ,
9 llave you given any thought as to where you ,
i 10 would go from there? I 11 MR. DeSANDO: Yes, sir. We consulted with 12 Babcock & Wilcox per telecon only so far.
13 There suggestion right from the start would be 14 to replace the count rate amplifier module. That is being 15 taken into consideration along with other possibilities. ,
i 16 We have an SER that is planned to be implemented 17 during the 1986 refueling outage, which is a replacement --
a 18 which is an installation of a new type source range detection 19 system made by Gamometrics.
O 20 That system was going to be installed and used 21 as a secondary system for a year to see how it performed, 22 and if it performed better than the one that we had, we were 23 going to, at that time, consider replacing the existing 24 instrumentation with that instrumentation.
Aos-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 And I guess the point that I am trying to make
'40
'12-4-Joe Wal 1 -is that.SER can be speeded up.
2 MR. BEARD: Okay. But if you take either of
. 3 those two routes, are you saying that while you were unable 4 to find the root cause, you'would be just putting in replace-5 ment . equipment, either a module, or a whole new chassis , I C
6 guess, you ' are talking about, in the hope that that makes it 7 go:away?
8 MR. DeSANDO: Yes, sir.
9 MR. ROSSI: -Do you have any more?
10 MR. BEARD: No.
11 MR. ROSSI: I guess we will go on to the last 12 ' one . - I guess this is the last one for this afternoon, which 13 is the auxiliary feed water' pump trip and throttle valve.
14 Do you have different people coming in for that?
15 MR. HILDEBRANDT: He is right-here. Mr. Gradomski 16 is here to. address that.
17 REPORTER: Could you spell your name for me, a
18 please?
19 MR. GRADOMSKI: Rick Gradomski; G-r-a-d-o-m-s-k-i.
e 20 MR. BELL: He got that part, it was the Rick 21 that was hard.~
22 :(Laughter.)
23 MR. BELL:
Let Joe settle down'for a bit.
- 124 (Laughter. )
m nepore m ,Inc.
25 MR.jROSSI: Allaright. DWe are going to talk i
i i
12-5-Jos:Wal 1 about.the action plan on the overspeed trip mechanism for ,
. l 2 auxiliary -- the auxiliary feed water pun'p turbines, and I
. 3 . gather you have gone through and checked the trip and throttle 4 Lvalves and found that they -- you found no problems with any 5 of'the. equipment.
6 You found no problems with the adjustments.
7 MR. GRADOMSKI: That.is correct.
o 8 MR. ROSSI: When we went down and looked at the
+
9 pumps, there was -- I guess it is the arm that comes across 10 to the trip throttle valve, trip mechanisms --
II MR. GRADOMSKI:. Connecting rod.
12 MR..ROSSI: Yes, the connecting rod. Is that 13 normal to have it bent, or is that replaced, or what?
- 14 MR .~ GRADOMSKI: 'No, it is not normal for the 15 connecting rod to be bowed, as it was. That has not been 16 replaced.-
'17 We did check the adjustment of the linkage in
. 18 the bowed condition, and the ' linkage was still within the 39 adjustment.
20 MR. ROSSI: So the bowed connecting rod has 21 -- I mean had no effect on the problems.
22 MR. GRADOMSKI: That is correct.
23 LMR.-ROSSI: Okay. And this one, you have --
24
.this one here you really-have come to a final conclusion, m n oonm. inc.
25 I gather,.it is just a matter of writing'the final report?
L m
12-6-Jos Wal 42 i
1 I mean, your conclusion on this one is that 2 the operators didn't have enough understanding of how to
, 3 operate the trip throttle valve and resetting it and opening 4 it, and that was the problem, rather than a problem with the 5 equipment.
6 MR. GRADOMSKI: In the absence of any mechanical
, 7 deficiencies out of adjustments, viewing how the operator O.
8 had attempted to reset the linkage during our investigations, 9 that has pretty much led.us to the conclusion that is stated 10 on the summary.
t 11 MR. ROSSI: Was the problem that he didn't know 12 how to relatch it, or he didn't know how hard he had to open 13 the valve after he-got it relatched?
. 14 MR. GRADOMSKI: Well, the valve ends up being
- 15 step four in the. action plan, which was trying to get it 16 open after they had relatched the mechanism or in some way 17 got the trip hook into the latchup lever to allow them to a 18 open the valve.
19 That comes under Step 4, which we are going to 20 Ltry to simulate that condition when we get to Mode 3 in 21 conjunction with Plans 1-A and 1-B.
22 MR. ROSSI: Okay. So, there is one part of the 23 action plan that has not been . completed, and that is the 24 actual opening.
, Am-reseres neporters, Inc.
25 MR. GRADOMSKI: That is true. 'Under steam
l 43 I
. 12-7-Joe WOl I generators.
2 MR. ROSSI: But you have checked the adjustments
, 3 and so forth for opening the valve. I thought there was 4 some adjustment.
5 MR. GRADOMSKI: There is an adjustment there, o
6 but the only way that we can really make that adjustment is 7 --
.o-8 MR. ROSSI: -- is in Mode 3?
9 MR. GRADOMSKI : Is in Mode 3.
10 MR. BEARD: Rick, you have gone through this 11 action plan with the exception of the part you just described 12 which has to be done in Mode-3.
13 MR. GRADOMSKI: That is true.
14 MR. BEARD: And troubleshot the equipment from 15 a mechanical standpoint, I take it?
16 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes, sir.
17 MR. BEARD: To what extent have you involved the
- 18 operators in your conclusion that the operator made a 19 mistake?
e 20 MR. GRADOMSKI: The operators involved have been ,
21 with us every step of the way in these investigations when we 22 were down in the pump rooms.
23 The operators, in fact, the last time we were
~
t 24 in 'the pump room, had indicated to me that they did not.
Aesessem nepormes, Inc.
25 believe that 'now lthere was a mechanical problem.
12-8-Joe Wal 44 1 That they didn't have a good feel for the way 2 the linkage was supposed to be relatched, particularly in
. 3 the area of the overspeed trip device, which is located 4 directly on the turbine shaft casing.
5 That particular part of this overspeed trip r
6 mechanism is hidden down behind the governors and other 7 components. It is not easy to see. It doesn't command much 8 attention.
9 The only very particular part that they knew 10 about was that that was where the manual overspeed trip lever 11 was. In case they wanted to manually overspeed it.
12 They were generally unaware of particulars of 13 that portion of it. From a human factors viewpoint. The 14 trip and throttle valve, the trip hook and latchup lever, 15 are the points of that system which are the most easily viewed, 16 - and therefore , _ they command the attention, especially when 17 the primary emphasis is to get the hook and the latchup lever 18 together so that you get the valve open.
I9 MR. BEARD: So it is a two step part; you got 20 to reach down behind the governor, and do something in that
~
21 area, and then.go over and latch the trip throttle?
22 - MR. GRADOMSKIr No, not really. What you have
~ 23 to do on the valve is, after it has tripped, you have to 24 rotate the hand wheel to get this latchup lever up into m nepons, anc.
25 position, and then what.you have to do is grab the connecting t
45
.12-9-Joe.Wal <
1 rod and pull that entire device over until the force nuts
-2 'on top of the turbine' resets.
. 3 1R. BEARD: Okay. So, you are saying that the 4 error was that they pulled it far enough to where it latched f
5 at the trip throttle part, but maybe not far enough to clear i 6 back at manual trip. lever?
7 MR. GRADOMSKI: That is true.
8 MR. BEARD: Okay. And you said the operators --
9 are you talking about the equipment operators that were l
10 involved- in this thing during the night of the event?
r II MR. GRADOMSKI: .Yes, sir.
I 12 MR. BEARD: llave t. hey said that they believed 13 that they just didn't understand how to do it?
14 MR.' GRADOMSKI: Yes, sir.
15 MR. .ROSSI: Tell me. The overspeed trips are 16 tested from time to time?.
j 17 -MR. GRADOMSKI: -The overspeed trips are exercised
- 38 under the monthly auxiliary feedwater pump test, and I believe l'
it is surveillance test 5071.01.
20 MR. ROSSI: What does that consist of?
2I MR.:GRADOMSKI: - It consists of laanually tripping 22
, the overspeed device, resetting the device, and. reopening
-23 , the valve.
24 MR. ROSSI: But -all with- no steam, or without
, AseFessess napoemes, Inc.
25 it running at all.
'.1
, ,, , e- - a ,, --
46 12-10-Joe Wa3 1 MR. GRADOMSKI: That is true.
2 MR. ROSSI: And who does the resetting then ?
3 Do the equipment operators do that, or --
4 MR. GRADOMSKI: I am not sure. It is a 5 surveillance test that is conducted by operations personnel.
6 MR. ROSSI: So the equipment operators would 7 do that test?
8 MR. GRADOMSKI: To the best of my knowledge, 9 equipment operators operate those. I can check on that to 10 verify it. Standard practice would be that the operators 11 would run that test, 12 MR. ROSSI: If the equipment operators do 13 that, then doesn't that tell them how to do what they had 14 to do on June 9th? Or is there a significant difference 15 because you had steam to the pump, or -- in terms of resetting i
16 the trip throttle valve?
17 MR. GRADOMSKI: We had reviewed that surveillance-
- 18 test after we had conducted the first round of investigations 19 on June the 29th.
20 We have looked at that surveillance test and 21 procedure that is given to the operators. Quite honestly, 22 . we came to the realization that the surveillance test, the 23 procedure _ that is given. in the surveillance test primarily 24 m nepoam. anc.
emphasizes getting the trip hook and latchup lever together 25 -and- secondarily states that you may have to pull on the
-f12-ll-Joe _Wal 47 1 connecting' rod in order to reset the linkage.
2 When, in fact, that is the only way that you
. 3 are going to reset the linkage is to pull on the connecting 4 rod.-
5 MR. ROSSI: But they must go down and do that 6 every month. Somebody must do it every month when they test 7- the pump.
8 MR. BEARD: Yes.. I hear you saying that maybe 9 the wording in the procedure is not as clear as it could be, 10 but if they actually have to do it every month, it seems like 13 they would know that.
-I2 MR. GRADOMSKI: Well, as I understand it, there 13 is a one shift of operations personnel in the six shift 14 rotation that we' have, one of those shifts are on -- spend 15 a week with surveillance tests.
16 MR. ROSSI: You mean the same shift does the t
17 surveillance test?
- 18 MR. GRADOMSKI: No. No. It varies, depending M upon the rotation. And the time that the surveillance test
[ 20 isEdue.
1 21 1
I don't know how that measures out to tell you 22 how many times a particular operator had gone down there and 23 actually performed that portion of the surveillance test.
MR. ROSSI: Had these operators done this
- m nepons, , inc.
25 be fore? -
12-12-Joe Wal 48 I MR. GRADOMSKI: I don't know.
2 MR. BEARD: But clearly the surveillance test 3
still does not -- still does not give them an operating 4
knowledge, if you will, of the overspeed trip mechanism 5 in general.
6 MR. ROSSI: Well, yeah, but the point is that 7
it may not give them a knowledge of how it works, but if they 8
have to go and actually reset it, it gives them experience 9
in resetting it that I think they would if they had done it 10 a few times they would know how to do. I think that is the II point.
12 MR. BEARD: That is the point I was trying ;
13 t to understand. If the guys who have done this, maybe their ;
i 14 shift happens to only catch it, and the guys have only done 15 it twice in the last five years, or some, even a small 16 number, it seems like that real world experience is going I7 to tell them how to make it work and how to not make it o 18 work regardless of the procedure.
19 MR. GRADOMSKI: It was clear to me that the
~
l 20 operator that was on Pump No. 1 did not have the full l l
21 understanding to pull.that linkage as far to the left as 22 he possibly could in order for the mechanism to reset on the 23 turbine end.
24 Am-Feuseral Reporters, Inc.
MR. BEARD: Okay. Now, during the event, if
. 25 I remember what took place, two equipment operators went to
12i l3-Joe Wel i -.
I the, aux feed water pump rooms: and . started to work on one, and 2 later they went to the second one, but they had this 3 difficulty, and if I remember correctly, some additional 4 people'came to the room -- I believe one of the guys was 5 a-fellow'by the name of Morrison.
~
6 MR. GRADOMSKI: 'That.is correct.
g 7 MR. BEARD: And. Steve Feasel came in.
8 MR. GRADOMSKI: That is correct.
1 End 12. 9 SunWal fols.
10
! 11 l
12 13 14 15
.16 l
?- 17 8 18 1 19 .
20
- 21 22 23 24
{ m neporwrs,inc.
25 i
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50
~
I13-1-SueWalshi :MR. BEARD: Was their coming on the scene what
- -2 actually turned.this thing around?
23 Or,-do you know? In-other words, I'm trying to
.4 understand simply, Rick, is it a situation where the guy that
~
'S was.there didn't' understand it well enough and then when the
~ ~
'6 additional person _ arrived.who happened to understand.it better, 4
7 that's wh'a't turned the whole problem around?
8 MR. GRADOMSKI: Wellk it appears that on pump Number 9 2 and on pump Number 1,there-were two3different things thac 10 hap'pened. s a
. - 3 ( e 11 Clearly, on pump' Number 1 the overspeed trip y -12 mechanism-wasinever reset until;1 ate.
1 i- - - 13 MR. BEARD: On pump Number.l?
14 MR. GRADOMSKI: On pump Number-l. On pump Number 2, the . mechanism 'was reset,: as a : matter of fact, within fifteen
~
15 16 seconds after the: hatch to the auxiliary feed pumps was open.
17 MR. BEARD: I have a copy of the DADS traces, the 18 'page where they talk about the speed , I believe-actually the 19 curves,.on the speed and flow'from the two aux feedwater pumps.
20 MR. GRADOMSKI: Uh-huh.
3
- 21 MR. BEARD: And they indicate that before either punp
[ 22 produced any flow that the speed for the Number 1 aux feed 23 pump hadlbeen up to at least.above a thousand RPM..for maybe
~
i'
- 24 seven or more minutes.
e hFederal itepo,ters, Inc.
25 MR. GRADOMSKI: -Uh-huh.
-.-__...___--2___-. .----__._-_.--.;_._..___-_- ---._______2_-.. -- :---._
51
- ll3-2-SueWals MR. BEARD: And I was trying to see if that
. :2 implies that at least that trip throttle valve had been re-3 set quite:early, like-about seven minutes?
'4 MR. GRADOMSKI: What'that indicates to me is 5 dhat'the' trip throttle valve was opened.
6 MR. BEARD: Yeah.
7 MR. GRADOMSKI: That is possible to do that with-8 out setting the'overspeed trip mechanism.
And what would have -- what would be' 9 -
MR. BEARD:
10 tthe e'f fect - of that, the turbine --
11 MR. GRADOMSKI: That there would not be overspeed i
12 trip protection.
1
. 13 MR. BEARD: But it would function without~the 14' ,
- protection?
-15 MR. GRADOMSKI: That's true.
16 MR. BEARD: Okay. Now --
17 MR. ROSSI: Can you get it all the way open and --
18 MR..GRADOMSKI: Yes..
. 19 MR'. ROSSI: -- run the pump that way?
20 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
21 MR. BEARD: Okay. There was a second --
- 22 MR. GRADOMSKI
- And it was demonstrated that that 23 'could be done, and that is what we have surmised has happen- l l
ed,5by working dtat','the-DADS, the bypass computer alarm 24
- Ac.-F.d.c it.por,.rs, Inc.
25 printer, and with interviews with the operators. j t ,
52
.#13-3-SueWalsh MR. BEARD: Okay. There would seem to be a
, _2 .second part of the problem after you get over the trip 3 thro ttle . And I don't want to get out of your scope of 4 your action plan, but I want to understand how it relates, 5 or if it relates, where _the s' peed on the Number 1 aux feed
- 6 turbine came up tofaround two thousand RPM.
7 And we heard some information that related to 8 the~ guy had the valve open-to a certain point, and it seemed 9 Ilike a ' hell-of a force against' it,' and-maybe he was hesitant 10 for fear of something or another to open it further.
~
~
' ll ' Do7 you have :any idea . of: whether that relates to-12 this, or I mean the speed leveling out at twenty-two hundred, 13 or whether that's part of the trip throttle valve problem?
14 MR. GRADOMSKI: Well, at this point in time, I'
' 15 believe that that was associated with controlling the speed 16 of the pump locally, manually via the trip throttle valve.
~
17 MR. BEARD: 'Okay.
18 MR. GRADOMSKI: Where=they wer'e taking the Delta P 19 across the. trip throttle valve and not across the governor 20 valve.
21 MR. BEARD: Well, was there a concern on the part 22 of the operator that the force he was' exerting may be
. 23 .extrao'rdinary and he might be about to hurt it?
24 MR. GRADOMSKI: The operators had indicated to Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 :me.that'they hadLgot the pump.up and running and they were F
53
- 13-4-SueWalsh happy to get it that far.
2 MR. BEARD: Yeah.
3 MR. GRADOMSKI: Being a little bit leery of it 4 after it had over-sped. They were satisfied with it being 5 up and running.
- 6 MR. BEARD: Now, this is the point at which it was 7 at twenty-two RPM or something like that?
o 8 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
9 MR. BEARD: Okay. Was this the time when some-10 body came along and used a -- I guess it was referred to as 11 a pipe wrench, but I guess a valve wrench and then opened 12 the throttle valve further?
13 MR. GRADOMSKI: That is true.
14 MR. BEARD: And was it the -- just the opening 15 it further that caused it to be able to go to full speed?
16 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes. As a matter of fact, they 17 did in fact get the Number 1 trip throttle valve fully open 18 at 1:56:08 on the alarm printer.
O 19 MR. BEARD: Yeah.
20 MR. GRADOMSKI: It shows that the Number 1 trip 21 throttle valve was fully open, and the pump speed was 22 approximately thirty-six hundred RPM at that point in time.
23 MR. BEARD: Okay.
24 MR. GRADOMSKI: It was shortly af ter that that Ac} Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 the operator had began to back down on the speed by the trip
54-
.#13-5-SueWalsA . throttle valve, he againlput the valve wrench up on the
- 12 valve hand wheel,-started to back'down on it. And that's 3 whenfthe trip hook and latch was d'isengaged.
~
.4 MR. BEARD: So actually it retripped.
5 MR. GRADOMSKIi -It retripped.
- 6 MR. BEARD: ' Okay.
7 MR. GRADOMSKI: However, it retripped because-
.o 8 Lt he. trip-throttle valve slanmed shut.
9 MR. BEARD: Okay. -But that's tripping?
10 LMR. GRADOMSKI:. Yes,'that's tripping without the II overspeed trip ~ mechanism --
12 MR. BEARD: Right.
13 MR. GRADOMSKI: -- in effect causing that to 14 happen.
9 15 MR. BEARD: Right. I understand. Now, that's 16 Nmmber 1 we are talking about?
17 MR. GRADOMSKI: Number-l'w'e are talking about.
18 MR. BEARD: Okay. Would it be a fair conclusion
-19 to say that had the individuals who.went down there, Mr. X,
- 20 -been familiar with the' equipment that at the time--where this 21 speed was brought up to twenty-two hundred, you know, just-
- 22 that time frame, that had the guy been familiar he could 23 have gone ahead and-gotten aux feedwater flow at'that time?
24 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
Ac7 Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. BEARD: Okay. So I don't want to. criticize
55
!#13-6-SueWalsM the individual but just to understand the event, but had a
- 2 different person done it it's possible that aux feedwater 3 ~ flow. could have been achieved some seven or so minutes 4 earlier?.
- i. '5 MR. GRADOMSKI: . Y'e s .
- i 6 -
MR.' BEARD:~ Okay. That's what I understand.
7 Thank you, t
- 8 Oh, I guess I've got one last. question. I under-9 stand you haven't finished your review process of your final 10 report on this. = But would'it be.?aefair thing for us to take i,
11 lback that.the route cause has been determined, although'we-12 haven't seen the report?
13 Is that essentially where we are?
14 MR. GRIME: We have a draft findings report. We 15 do feel we have a direct cause established for that.
16 MR. ROSSI:- Th'at being the operator not under-17 standing exactly how to do it?
18 (Mr. Grime nodded in the a f firmative. )
l l
19 MR. BEARD: So what I would really want to know ,
20 if I should say is, of the various action plans that have i
21 been reviewed and discussed and. implemented, there is one
{
l 22 of.them'that.is at least-complete to the point where you 23 ' feel like you know the route cause, .and you are in the pro-i 24 cess of finalizing the report to fully justify that and L Ace-Federol Reporters, Inc.
25 . explain it?
l ,
l l . . MR. GRIME: I guess one minor point of clarificatio n.
i
. , , . . . . . - . . -- . . . . . ~
56
~ We may find that. there are other contributors to that which,
~
3 413-7-SueWalsH'
. 2 to.me, are among the root causes.. It's a question of how
.3 cfar you~go there. So, we' definitely have the direct cause, 4 a' problem with it appeared.to be an operator. operating the
~
L 'S equipment not f611y understanding all he had to do in that y P .. '6 process.
.7 .And, of' course, there are' reasons why the operator C . .
18 'did not fully nnderstand that.m And,1to me,-those are where 9 ~somefof the root,causes,are, some. things that were mentioned 10 here today such as.the procedure and perhaps in the discussior 11 >here we have talked about the surveillance test program, 1
- ~
sl2 perhaps they are not getting the esperience from that that 13 - they should be.
14 So, I feel -there .are a few unanswered questions t
15 'yet that we are not ready to absolutely say we are no longer s l
- 16 looking for .any causes. . There were contributors to the 17 incident.
18 .But the direct cause.is certainly known.
19 MR. BEARD: ' Yes. I think that also the areas 20 .that _you mentioned are 'the kind of area's - that one would want 21 to look.at when you say what kind of actions 'are appropriate
~
22
~
u) make sure that that doesn't happen again.
i
' 1 23 .But, you know, . there are levels of root causes
- 24 and there are-levels..
hFederal Itaporters, Inc.
I 25 fMR. GRIME: That's right.
e s
v,- 4 r " - - - --r+ r **-r- e -w-v ."---ev,-+-'*wei - t-- --w-ev---* -e-r- '~+ ~r -*r-- e
l
(
57-
- 13 SueWalshg MR.. BEARD: And it seems to me that you certainly
< - 2 are at'one level.
3 MR. GRIME: We are at that first level. Yes.
i* ;
-4 MR. BEARD: Okay. So, I guess,'Ernie, we can say ,that at least for'one- of these action plans they have,
, 5 .
Vou know, subject to'the, completion ---I guess you have the 3, 6 7 -
hot test You.were talking about you wanted _ to run. .
, But' you basically. feel like you have' found ' the 8
,. 9 root cause.2 .
J j' 10 MR. ROSSI: The hot test is to determine the f
} n amount of 'dif ficulty you have in opening .the valve; .is that 12 true?
13 MR. GRADOMSKI: That's true. It's limited ~to ja the-valve'itself.
i.-
15 MR..ROSSI: Let me'be sure I_ understand one
! 16 thing. IWhen the pump was' running at around-two thousand RPM, ,
17 was the' trip -- was the overspeed device latched then, or is i
18 v ur hypothesis that it was.notLlatched and just had the L^ valve open?
j9 e,
20 -
MR. GRADOMSKI: It was not relatched.
'21 MR. ROSSI: -It was-not relatched.
i
- 22 MR. GRADOMSKI: At that point in time. -
The first
! . 23 place that we get any indicationfof trip reset -is after it i
24 'had slamtred shut, . tripped,. coming back down from the valve MFederol Reporters, Inc. ,
. 25 being full open at. thirty-six hundred RPM.
And being reset t.
l >
n 58
- 13-9-SueWalsp 'by a different operator.
-2 MR. BEARD: A person, you mean?
3 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
4 MR. BEARD: You've'got valve operators and you've 5
got people?
,. :6 x MR. GRADOMSKI: No, no, no. By a different 7 ' operator that was in the pump room. We got up to four
- - perators down there.
8 9 1MR . BEARD: . Yeah,-but.you are talking people, f 10 MR. GRADOMSKI: A different person, yes. After i
ij that had happened, after it slammed shut, a different person l'
12 was then controlling that pump. . And he, in fact, reset the 13 verspeed trip mechanism at 1:58:57..
ja MR. BEARD: Help me' understand something. The 15 computer. point you are referring to, does that get its ,
t 16 signal from this manual trip lever that we are . talking about i
< 1p that may - .you know, you could have it pulled far enough 18 to engage the part over on the trip throttle valve, but not j9 the thing over here?
I le 20 Which does it get its signal from?
21 MR. GRADOMSKI: The.overspeed trip mechanism gets
- - its signal from a limit switch, if you will,'that is --
22
. 23 that changes state when the overspeed trip linkage is reset
) '
24 'in its proper position.
l Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. BEARD: Enough to clear-the manual. trip lever l
L
li
. 59
- 13-10-SueWalsh 'also?
2 MR.-GRADOMSKI: We ran on 7-5, we went down and 3 did some additional. investigations in order to tell us it whether or not the' alarm printer could indicate to us whether 5 they were pulling the linkage far enough so ' that it would re-
--* - 6 3
set.. '
7 ' The indication that there was a mechanical problem 8 in that linkage shows that' it would not reset. On July-5th, 9 we went down and firmly established that that switch would-10 not change sta'te until that linkage was almost in its full
-11 set position. Additionally, we pushed -- manually _ pushed 12 'the trip hook.into the latch-up lever without resetting the 13 linkage'to see what the computer would tell us. And it did-
- 14 En ot show reset.
15 MR. BEARD: Okay. So'that's-helpful, because 16 I'm trying to visualize what this man did down there. And 17 it sounds like,-from what you are telling me, he had this 18 thing rehooked right at the end of the linkage for the
~
19 trip throttle valve'and was opening it.
- ~
20 And even though'he had that position, the computer 21 printout may not have shown it being relatched because maybe 22 the manual lever:or-the s otherfend of the linkage was still 23 tripped. But he was able to get it up to speed.
24 So, - this clearing of: the alarm that you referred Acer.d.r l st.pon.n, Inc.
25 to is.when,__I' guess,-the second individual came on the scene n
S
P T 4
60 and he'reclosed'it enough to clear it, both ends of the
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- 13-11-SueWaldl i
- 2 mechanism, so'to speak.
3 MR. GRADO' M SKI: dh-huh. That's correct. When he 4 reset it' properly then the-alarm'showed the reset on the 5 mechanism and they got the valve open.
. 16
^
MR.' BEARD:- But being unaware'of 6his part over-7 behind the governor,'the individual who was-doing this
.o :. .. . ..
8 probably thought it was cleared and relatched, right?
9 (No reply.)
10 Well, that's speculative. I retract that.
'II Well, tell me, can he. hook it on the MR. ROSSI:
12 one end and not relatchuit on the other --
'13 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
14 MR. ROSSI: -- and leave it that way and walk away 15 and --
16 .MR. GRADOMSKI: Well, he has to-have the valve 17 in some condition of open to provide --
18 MR. ROSSI:- To keep it hooked.
19 MR. GRADOMSKI: -- against the trip --
- 20 - MR.ROSSI: I guess what he did.was he hooked it land' held.it' hooked while he opened'it?
~
'21 22 MR. GRADOMSKI: That's right.
- 23 MR. ROSSI: .Otherwise, he couldn't have opened 1
24 ~it?
Ac F.d. rot hpor,.n. lac.
25 MR. GRADOMSKI: That's right.
,o 61
~ '
- 13-12-SueWald MR. ROSSI: Okay. So, he hooked it, held it
- 2 .diat way, and opened it. But if he had opened the valve 3 .all the way up and.got it all the way'open, then he could 4 have left' and.he would not have had overspeed trip protection, 5 MR. GRADOMSKI: -This'is;true. And it still would
- ~0 have indicated'that the overspeed trip mechanism was not 7 reset in-the control room.
(
co 8 MR. BEARD:- Well,-you know, this kind of a root 9 cause'-has obvious-bearings on' training and on-the-job training 10 and things of that nature, in terms of practical experience,
' not classroom stuff, doesn't'it?
I2 MR. GRADOMSKI: That's true. -That's very true.
- 13 Yes.
MR. BELL: What other signals will cause a closure 15 of the trip. throttle valve other t'han overspeed?
0 Are there any other signals? You stated that I7 'as the operator was closing the valve to slow the turbine 8
. down-from thirty-six hundred RPM that the trip' throttle closed-.
- 20 What caused the valve'to close?
2I MR. GRADOMSKI: As he applied the valve: wrench 22 on.the hand wheel, he.was trying to back it down from the
~23
- full open position. So he was giving quick jerking move-ments on the valve. And-this is such an unstable. state, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 the trip hook andithe latch-up. lever without'the overspeed
62 trip mechanism reconnected. At this point in time, the-li3sl3-SueWalsH
- 2 overspeed trip-mechanism is. applying a constant dis-engagement force to Ehat. trip ' hook.
~
3 4 - So, any slight vibrations will tend to separate l 5 .thatgtrip~ hook.and latch-up lever;if.they are. unstable. And e 6 that'is in fact what happened.
7 ' MR'.g BEARD:
- Rich, help me'u'nderstand?a control o
8 systems interface for a minute, if you will.
9 Assuming this guy has got the thing pulled over 10 far ' enough to rel'atch right at' the trip throttle valve and 11 has' reopened-it but the other part is still tripped, so the 12 -computer thinks its at overspeed and still tripped, how.
. 13 will this condition affect the operator in the: control room 14 attempting to get manual control or'go into auto-essential?
15 For example, if that end of the system-thinks it 16 ' tripped,'would'that cause you not?to be able to go into 17 auto? Or, would"it,cause it not-to respond? Or, what would 18 happen?.
19 MR. GRADOMSKI: No, sir.. It would have no effect. -.
20 It's L just zul alarm that is not. interlocked with any of the 21 Tother equipment.
22 MR. BEARD: So, it's not a functional--alarm other J
23 than just to notify people? '
~
24 MR. GRADOMSKI: 'That's right. <
, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. ,
~
25 . MR. ;; BEARD: So the. controls would have been o
' ' \ \n
.3
, t 1 + d p y ----v.- .cr,- w 4
[ 63
.r
- 13-14-SueWalsR1 uneffected by:the position? ,
- 22 MR.-GRADOMSKI: That's true.
.- 3 .MR..ROSSI:,_ But'it'would have been more likely 4 to: trip just sort of inadvertently'had it been left that
=5 ;.way?; ( , ,
--- ,6 -MR. GRADOMSKI: Oh, absolutely. It was in a
-7 very unstabl'e positiob. '
o.
' END #13 8 Simons flws-
'9
'10 11 _
12
. ~13 14 15
~ 16 17 18 19 ,
I l
o ~20 -
21 22 23 24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
t
'25 i
b
64 19-Sin ?6-1 1 EVENING SESSION
. 2 (6 :00 p.m. )
3 MR. ROSSI: Do you have anything more?
4 MR. BEARD : I guess the only question I have is 5 'you haveJinvolved the vendor on'this problem, ri,ght?
s
. 6 MR. GRADOMSKI: That'is true.
7 MR. BEARD: .Has the vendor given you any indication
~
8 as to whether this' type of condition where you can have_it 9 'last at one endlof the r6d but not clhar the trip at the
].
10 Jother end of-that connecting rod As to whether that is m .t 11 typical of their machines'or unique to this particular one?
12 Apparently.the same thing on Budd pumps,7right, on both
. - 13 . turbines, or something very similar?
~
3 14 IMR.'GRADOMSKI:* .No.; I--think we talked about
- 15 No. 1, but-we didn't got back to No. 2.
16 MR. BEARD:. Okay. Well, let me stay on No. 1
- 17 for a minute. Did the vendor ~give you any indication as to 18 whether this is something unique to this one machine or
<- 19 typical of his equipment or-what can you tell us in that
- 20 area?
21 101. GRADOMSKI: The vendor did not make any 22 -statements regarding that, but this particular overspeed 23 trip' design, being their standard mechanical design, I am 24 sure is.elsewhere in the industry.
Acefederal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. BEARD: 5 So there are other installations g +& ,-+ --e& 4 -
9 ----ar yv y r--p -
65 I that could be vulnerable to a similar situation?
Sim'14-2.
- 2 MR. GRADOMSKI: As a matter of fact, there is, 3 an INPO notice that is out' dealing with this particular 4 piece of' equipment, and a notification.given to other 5 utilities that they could in fact have a trip condition and a '6 .not know it. Therefore, they put out a recommendation that 7 says you should have some kind of alarm switches, et cetera,
~
o 8 -connected to the overspeed trip mechanism to ensure that.
'9 notification:is made.
- 10 - MR. ROSSI: 'This would be similar to what you have 11 now?
'I s . MR. . GRADOMSKI r- - Yes.
. 13 MR. BEARD': Now can you give me roughly the 14 time period'when that notice was issued, like a week ago, 15 two years ago or when?
I0 MR. GRADOMSKIr August the 4th, 1982.
I7 MR. BEARD: August 4, 1982. Is this an SEO?
- MR. GRADOMSKI: This is an SOER.
20 Why don't you give the number of-MR.. GRIME:
21 that.
MR. GRADOMSKI: 82-8.
l 23 So you are saying that INPO put MR. BEARD r 24 out a notice in the summer of '82 that cautioned people
. Ace-Federal lleporters, Inc.
l 25 i
L c _'
66 Sim'14-3 j about_this potential?
. 2 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
3 MR. BEARD: And that is what bit you during.this 4 event?'
5 MR. GRADOMSKIs No, no. Our linkages were
. 6 Properly latched at the time of the event. .It was their 7 relatching evolution that the operators had difficulty.with o.
8 on No.,1.
~
9 LMR. BEARDF 'Okay. 'I guess I am trying to under-10 stand.what the thrust ofsthis INPO notice was versus the ---
11 MR. ROSSI: I.think the thrust of the INPO notice, 12 and' correct me if'ILam wrong,.wasfthat-you could partially
. 13 latch this and. leave it that,way.and not know it.
14 *t ~$
- :MR.-GRADOMSKI: . Tha tr is '. tr ue . t. It--was - notificafion 15 that.:.unless Eyou .h'ad. some. kind of indication.g that thisiin :f act 16 could' hap' pen, you could have it unlatched, yoh :could have it 17 trip:by.:vibrationior whatever,aiahd.no one would know it.
~
'18 MR. ROSSIF So'you.could have two problems. One 19 .of them would be that you^could think-you had it latched and i
- 20 : walk away and leave it in what you thought was.an-operable 21 condition, and in that condition it wouldn t have overspeed 22 protection, for one thing, and aside from that.from two r
23 ~m inutes after-you walked out of the' room it could inadver-
, 24 tently. trip and you wouldn' t: know that.
- Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. GRADOMSKI: That is true.
- +. , r . + - - , , , ,
67
-MR. ROSSI: So those were the two problems Sim 14-4. 1
.in:the-INPO SOER.
- 2
- MR . BEARD: 'Okay. To correct what I said earlier then, Rick, you are'saying that what happened'as
.~4
- far:as you can determin'e during the event was something
- similar to the INPO notice, but not the same in that.he -
e- ~6
. relatched it without resetting-the' overspeed: trip?
7
'
- Or maybe'I:sho ld just say it~this-way. Can 8
you say a few words about;the root cause.you determined and 9
how it relates to the'INPO notice?
MR..GRADOMSKI:. I regard the INPO notice as
[ .
mor'e '-Enot an: operstiohal',rbut ilack'of . indication' that the operator has not correctly reset, or that some spurious activation has-caused the~ trip condition with no notifica-tion in the control room.
- 15 g How it relates to the events of-June 9 was-that
~
clearly they were able to re-engage the trip hook and the g
latchup lever without resetting the overspeed trip mechanism 18
.g to get the trip throttle valve open, but yet the alarm i
- never lear d.in the control room which should have alerted 20 someone at that point in time that the overspeed mechanism 21 was n t in fact reset.
22 MR. BEARD: Okay. In other words, the operator 23
. really set up the kind of situation that.was described in 24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
the INPO notice because it was not relatched properly or 25 t
- _ . - - - - ..-_x_ - _ - . - - - - . - - -
a 68 e Sim:1415 L1 -fully?
. 2 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
3 MR.. BEARD: .Isthat sort of the tie between the 4 two?
5 MR. GRADOMSKI: lI would say-so. When I received J. 6 this INPO notification which talked about limit switches 7 'on the' valve and on the1 mechanism to activate the control 8 room alarm, we-hadIfound that we had~in fact those switches
.9 in' place.
t MR. . BEARD: Okay.
~
11 MR. .IIILDEBRANDT: Prior to the trip on June 9th, 12 .just for clarification, those alarms were E not received in
. 13 .the control room, and presumably the result of the alarms 14 'not being received.in the control. room prior to the trip 15 was the initial overspeed of the auxiliary feedwater pump 16 -turbine.
.17 The latch.was properly engaged both on the trip
!18 throttle valve and on'the overspeed mechanism of the turbine.
19 What we have been discussing is the subsequent difficulty
-* 20 in relatching.
21 MR. BEARE: That is a good point. In other 22 :words, the L INPO notice talked about if you had relatched 23 it improperly or not fully, you might have a condition where
- ~
24 you idid clear the. trip and you would probably want to have-
. Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 an alarm on that condition.
. 69 Sim 14-6 j . Prior to this event-that was not the case, but
. :2 then when'he went down to restore the system, he did 3 apparently not relatch it fully and'that is why the alarm 4 didn't clear.
-5 MR. GRADOMSKI: That is true.
. _f MR. BEARD: So in that sense it is similar to 7 'the scenario' discussed in the.INPO notice.
g MR. GRADOMSKI F Yes.
9 MR. ROSSI: This has an alarm in the control 10 oom. So.that there wouldn't be'a possibility.of them
~
11 thinking' it 'was reset and' it :wasn' t in operating the plant.
12 MR. .GRADOMSKIP -Ye s . ;
. 13 MR. GRIME.= Rick,'doesn't that also address the ja issue of what happens during a normal surveillance test, 15 that the operators would, if they improperly adjusted that 16 during a. surveillance test would still have that alarm, and 17 since_that.was certainy a non-emergency situation, would j 18 like pay attention to it and correct the situation as a part 19 of the testing program.
- I think you alluded to their normal practice.
20 21 There is an alarm there to tell them that they did it wrong, 22 and if'there is nothing demanding their attention, it indeed 23 gets the attention.
24 MR. BEARDF Does your enunciator system in Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 your control room have reflash?
70 Sim 14-7 MR. BEARD: All.right. On some plants the j
. :2 enunciator, system will in a case like this, it will light 3 itself up one time when .the overspeed trip occurs and maybe
~
4 flash' or sound a horn or whatever,- and the operator 5 acknowledges'that alarm,;and then it goes on as let's say
,. '6 a steady light.
.7 Now when the condition clears itself, for example,
- in this case the in'dividual' downstairs ultimately got the 8
9 ' alarm overspeed trip cleared,_in_some plants that will cause 10 _thht" enunciator t'o:reflash back~on-to;tell'the operator 11 that.that condition association with that window has changed
~
at which time the operator typically will hit the acknowledge 12
. 13 . reset button and see if it clears. And if it does, then 14 he knows the reflash was caused and the Si.tua.t. ion has;gone 15 away.
16 My question was, does your enunciator system 17 have that design capability?
18 MR. GRADOMSKI: I am unsure. The one thing that O
19 1 remember from our investigations on July the 5th was in
~
- 20 order to'get the' enunciator clear the operator did in fact 21 have to acknowledge the alarm and then when we reset the 22 linkage, then the enunciator wouldn't clear.
23 MR. BEARDn So the operator would not know from 24 the continuing presence of the overspeed trip enunciator _
hFederal Reporters, Inc.
25 window whether or-not the alarm was still.present because the
71
!Sim14-8 .j thing was not-tripped or.because' he just hadn't had a chance
. 2 to reset the enunciator itself yet.
3 MR. GRADOMSKI: I believe'that is true, but 4 .thefalarm printer I think would have come back as saying 5
reset.
3 '6 MR. BEARD: Well',,I realize that, but:I-am 7 , thinking of the operator control room in real time during-
'- ithisLevent, and he has got..a ,* potential-ambiguity" here.
8 9
MR. GRADOMSKI: _ Unless he had acknowledged that
-10 alarm, I do believe it would co'ntinue to say trip.
11 .I guess getting back to point No. 2, that they 12 did not' experience the reset problems, if you will.
. 13 MR. ROSSI: Problem No. 2, as I understand it, j4 is after they went into the room they immediately got it 9
15 reset.
16 MR. GRADOMSKI: The indication is 50 seconds
- j7 after they had gotten ---
18 MR. ROSSI: 50 seconds or 15?
19 MR. GRADOMSKI: Fifty.
20 MR. BEARD: Now we are going to shift. All the 21 previous discussion has been on Pump No. 1, and now we are 22 going to talk about Pump No. 2 a minute; is that what you 23 are saying?
I 24 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes, that is true. '
, Ace-Federal Reporkrs, Inc.
25 MR. ROSSI: Tell me, was it just one operator A
72 Sim 14-9 1 -thatLhad the problem with not knowing how to reset Pump No. 1,
. 2 cor was there another one involved?
3 MR. GRADOMSKI: There were two operators, one 14 operator on No. 1 and one operator on No. 2. I li MR. ROSSI: So the operator on No.-2 did it
~
- 6 _ correctly and the operator'on No. 1 did not?
~
7 MR. GRADOMSKI:- That is true.
9-8 MR. ROSSIP And there weren't two operators that 9 tried it on No. 1:and:didn't do'it properly, but just one?
10 MR. GRADOMSKI: Just one. ' Fifty seconds after 11 the hatch to the pump' rooms was opened', we received the No. 2 12 overspeed trip reset.
13 MR. ROSSI: The hatch opening is on the alarm 14 printout?
15 MR. GRADOMSKI: It is on the security computer.
16 MR. BELL:
- What time was that hatch opened?t ,
17 MR. GRADOMSKI: 1:45 the hatch was opened. ;
18 MR. BEARD: -1:45~even? ,
19 MR. GRADOMSKI: 1:45 even.
- 20 MR. BELL: And the No. 2 auxiliary feedwater 21 pump indicated that it was relatched at 1:45: ---
22 MR. GRADOMSKI: 50.
23 MR. BELL: And the clocks in both of those 1
24 computers are synchronized?
[ .
l Ace-Federol Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. GRADOMSKI: I don't know that for a fact.
73 Shn!14-10 1 L MR.; BELL: Because we were told that there was
.; 2 a~six-second difference between the plant computer and the 23 DADS computer.
4 MR. . GRADOMSKI: 'Most of the printouts from the
.5 security, computer.are' coming out as on the minute.
'i 6 MR.- ROSSI: You mean it'is-only accurate to the.
7 nearest minute? o 4
i,
-8 ? MR. GRADOMSKIr I don,ih know. ,
, . , a; ;
9 '
MRP ROSSI: ,You don't have any that say seconds, .
4 10 minutes'and seconds? , , ,
II MR. GRADOMSKIF I don't have any that say I2 minutes and seconds. ,
. 13 MR. ROSSI: So that would imply that maybe 1
I4 '
it only is accurate to the nearest minute.
i i 15 MR. BEARD: That certainly would be the :
3 16 suggestion. 'Whether the man did it within 50 seconds or 17 1 minute and 50 seconds I don't think is all that terribly
! 18
, important in my own personal opinion.
~19 MR. GRADOMSKI: No, it is not, but it indicates-t
- 20 to me that-the operator that was on No. 2 knew.enough to 21 reset that overspeed' trip mechanism without a lot of problems and he immediately knew how to do that.
~
22 23 MR. BEARBtr That is the significance I place
' 1 24 on it also.
' Ac+Federot Iteporters, Inc.
25 MR.. BELL: Are the SOE's placed in the reading
..m._. .._..__.-______._____.m___..__._______________.____m-__-._._
~
p ,
74
-file.for the operators or somehow afforded to the training
~
Sim.14-lll j department 'so that information in these SOER's is included
. 2 3
in the requalification programs.
MR. GRADOMSKI: I'am not sure of the process 4
5 that SOERs ----
< 6 MR. GRIME 5 ~SO$Rs are treated on an individual 7
basis and-they are reviewed by the STAS, and the STAS will 9
8 [ designate--usually[thereare,LseveralstepsinanSOER.
9 Steps one through three perpaps might'be engineering 10 related and would go-to engineering.,-Four'and five would ji be training related and go to training. And in some cases 12 there,are overlaps in those SOER evaluations.
In this'particular one, I am not fully aware-
. 13 14 of what the program was, but that is currently the way 15 SOERs are handled. I think we cannot expect an entire 16 SOER to necessarily go to training, but if it involved j7 training, it would go there in their opinion.
MR. BEARBu Is that the way the documents would 18 g
j9 have been handled three years ago in 1982, or was it 20 different?
MR. GRIME:- To the best of my knowledge, the 21 22 SOERs were back-logged so that they should have been handled 23 in that approximate fashion with the SOER.
end' Sim 24
, c Ace-Federol Reporters, Inc. ,
~
Joe' Fols . 25 N '
15-1-Joe Wal 75 (EVENING SESSION)- 1 MR. BELL: Item No. 4 and Item No. 5 in your 2 summary, both deal with operator training.
- 3 MR. BEARD
- -Larry, excuse me. When you say 4 Items No. 4 and 5, are you talking about the paragraph that 5 starts out: Operator dif ficulty -- and then --
6 MR. BELL: No, sir. I am talking about Items 4 7 and Item No. 5 under the summary, e
8 MR. BEARD : Where it reads: Operator 9 difficulty in resetting?
t 10 MR. BELL: Yes, sir. And the one immediately 11 af ter that. Are these going to be factored into the ;
i j 12 OJT program for the equipment operator?
13 MR. GRADOMSKI: Certainly in my mind they 14 -would be.
I 15 MR. BEARD: That would he corrective action?
15 MR. GRADOMSKI: That would be a' corrective d
- 17 action, that is true.
- 18 MR. BEARD: Did we interrupt your story on 19 what you found out about Turbine No. 2's situation? !
e 20 (Laughter.)
21 MR. GRADOMSKI: Okay. Other than the fact 22 that the operator seemed to have been able to reset the over-23 speed trip mechanism, there was -- the overspeed trip 24 mechanista on No. 2 wasn' t. the problem. It was getting the Ase-Feelsrel Reporters, Inc.
25 valve open that seemed to be the more significant problem
n 15-2'-Joe Wal 76 1 on-No. 2.
2 There is a cortain amount of free play in that
'3 . trip ' throttle valve af ter the operator had taken out that 4 free play out.of the valve stem travel, it became extremely 5 difficult.for him to turn it.
6 He found that, he couldn' t get it open by himself.
7 MR. BEARD:- Is this when the guy came running 0-8 with the valve wrench?
9 MR. GARDOMSKI: .This was some six minutes later 10 is when they finally got that valve open. We see speed II indication on No. -- well, 14550 is when the overspeed trip 12 mechanism was reset on No. 2.
-13 We didn' t show any speed on No. 2 until 14 approximately 15221, and that _is DADS time plus six, to 15 ' equal the computer, my count time.
16 l MR. BEARD: So the -- okay.
17 MR. GRADOMSKI: So it would be about 15215 was
=e 18 when we first started'to see speed on the No. 2 turbino.
i 19 MR. ROSSI:
~
That was what, two minutes later, e
20 or --
21 MR. GRADOMSKI: No, six minutes later.
22 MR. ROSSI: Six minutes to get it open'after 23 he got it relatched.
24
.MR . GRADOMSKI: As a matter of_ fact, the third Assamerer naso,ises, Inc.
25
-operator had gone down into the pump rooms just previous to
1 SI 77 l 1R-3-Joe Wal 1 that, and it 'was through his attempts to get the valve open 2 that.they were successful on that effort and got No. 2 3 . rolling.
4 MR. BEARD: Was this Mr. Morrison?
5 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
^
6 MR. BEARD: I bring it up not to be personal 7 about this, but he is I guess a very senior and experienced O
8 individual at the plant, I assume.
9 MR. GRADOMSKI : Mr. Morrison has been with the 10 plant through startup testing.
11 MR. BEARD: So he has been here a number of 12 years?
13 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
14 MR. BEARD: All right.
15 MR. BELL: Is No. 2 turbine in the same room ,
16 as the startup feed pump?
17 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
- 18 MR. ROSSI: No. 2 is the one they would get !
39 to first. That is the one they get to first when they go e
20 down.
21 MR. GRADO!! SKI : That is right. No. 1 is 22 behind that water tight door.
23 MR. ROSSI: You talked about the hatch. You 24 are talking about the sliding grill work?
Ae-rowen nepormes, enc.
25 .
MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes, sir.
5 12-4-Joe Wal 78 1 MR. BEARD: So I guess the bottom line of your 2 problem, your diagnosis so far on No. 2 one was -- I see it 3 as two parts; one, you concluded that the trip throttle valve 4 was operated properly.
5 In other words, you didn't have the problem you
^
6 had on No. 1.
7 And No. 2, that there was difficulty in opening o
8 the trip throttle valve until the guy got there with a valve 9 wrench. That is the reason it took so long.
10 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes, sir. ,
II '
MR. BEARD: Is that normal that you would 12 require this valve wrench to do this manipulation, or is that 13 in itself, abnormal?
14 MR. GRADOMSKI: The operators have said that 15 they did not have a good feel for the way the valve should 16 respond on full steam generator Delta-P. Ilaving not having 17 I had ample opportunity to open it in that condition. They
- 18 were unfamiliar with the way the valve felt, in opening it 19 I guess in full steam generator Delta-P.
i 20 Most of the timo those tests are done in refueling, 21 overspeed tests are done on aux boiler steam, which is 235 22 pounds, and the turbine is uncoupled. That is basically how 23 we do the overspeed trip test.
t 24 So, there are significant differences in the Am-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25
. way that they had to operate the valve on June 9th, and the
1 f 79 11-5-Joe Wnl l
1 way. they normally have a feel for the valve through
'- surveillance . testing and performance tests.
2 3 MR. BEARD: Excuse me. Could I make sure I 4 understand what you said? Normally, when you run tests on 5 aux steam.
'4 MR. GRADOMSKI: For the overspeed.
7 MR. BEARD: .The kind of things where they could o
8 have gotten experience.
9 MR. GRADOMSKI Yes, sir.
10 MR. BEARD: It was on aux steam instead of main 11 steam?
12 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes, sir.
13 MR. BEARD: Of course, there is a substantial 14 difference in pressure, and I believe you said that the 15 turbine was disconnected?
16 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
17 MR. BEARD: And --
- 18 MR. GRADOMSKI: To be able to get it up to 19 4500 rpm on auxiliary boiler steam.
20 MR. BEARD: Right. But, I guess basically 21 the way these tests are conducted, or the -- not criticizing 22 the test'-- but the experience that the operator, the equipment 23 operators might have derived performing those tests, is not 24 similar to the actual situation you would have during a
- 4. resne neerms, Inc.
25 . transient, where they trip, because of the dif ference at 1 cast
.f 80 lk-5-Joe Wal 1 in the steam pressure?
2 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
3 MR. BEARD: Okay. Does the fact that the turbines 4 disconnected have any impact at all. It doesn't seem like to 5 me it did.
6 MR. GRADOMSKI: I don't think so.
7 MR. BEARD: I guess what I am trying to get at o
8 is -- is one of the lessons to be learned from this that 9 one needs to have a valve wrench to do this resetting in some 10 sort of an emergency situation?
i 11 MR. GRADOMSKI: As I understand, the valve
{
12 wrench was --
13 MR. BEARD: In the area. And I am just saying 14 whether that for fortutious or intentional, I am just saying i
15 if this plant were to have another situation where the aux l
16 speed pump tripped on overspeed, would the guy need to have
'l a valve wrench down there to do the job properly and in a ;
- 18 timely fashion?
19 MR. GRADOMSKI I don't know, and I guess I e ,
20 would like to defer answering that question until we have had '
21 the opportunity to try to open it under full steam generator 22 Delta-P.
23 MR. BEARD: That is certainly an acceptable 24 answer. I just wondered if you had a feeling.
Ace Federal Repo#ters, Inc.
25 MR. GRADOMSKI No, we don't. And that is
f 12-7-Joe W21 81 1 one of the things that we would definitely look at.
2 MR. !!ILDEBRANDT : There is one adjustment that 3 needs to be made. Adjust the ballast on the valve. And 4 the setting of that is uncertain at this point as to whether
, 5 that is correct or incorrect. It would potentially help
~
6 to make it easier to open. The answer is not known at this 7 time, o
8 MR. BEARD: That is a good point you brought 9 out about that setting on the ballast. Itave we gotten to the 10 end of your story on No. 27 11 MR. GRADOMSKI: I think so. l 12 MR. BEARD: On No. 2, are you at the point 13 like you were on No. I we talked about, where you feel like 14 you know the root cause. You are just in the process of 15 finalizing the write up?
16 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes. I i
17 MR. ROSSI: Well, you still have the step of l 18 opening the valve when you go back up into Mode 3.
19 MR. GRADO!! SKI That is right.
l 20 MR. ROSSI: Which is key to the point you brought; 21 up, which is whether the ballast is adjusted properly.
22 MR. GRADOMSKI: That is true, but from the 23 portion of this action plan dealing with the overspeed trip 24 mechanism, that is what the troubleshooting investigation Am Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 L.
r 8-Joe Wal 82 1 report is concentrating on now.
2 MR. ROSSI:- And there will be another one on the I 3 other part.
4 MR. GRADOMSKI: There will either be another 5 one, or the one that I am presently preparing will be revised 6 for the inclusion of that.
7 MR. ROSSI: Okay.
o 8 MR. BEARD: Did this six minutes it took the 9 guy to reopen it, is that because he couldn't get to the
- 10 wrench, or didn't realize he needed it, or was afraid if 'he 1
II
- forced it too much he is going to damage it, or do we know?
12 MR. GRADOMSKI: My opinion at this time is 4 13 that I don't think the operator that was down there initially Id realized what he needed to do.
15 That third operator arriving at the scene 16 quickly diagnosed that the mechanism was reset.
l That the f 17 free play was out of the valve, and that it was just sitting
- 18 l there waiting to be taken -- the disc off of the seat in i
HE ' order to get steam into the turbine.
)
20 Which, in fact, happened shortly af ter he got j 21 down there.
j 22 .MR. BEARD: So that in a sense this guy on No. 2 23 pump really lacked an optimal degree of experience on these
] i ,
24 things?
j m neswere, ene.
25
! , MR. GRADOMSKI: 'One could certainly draw that
f 83 12-9-Joe Wal f
I conclusion.
2 MR. BEARD: I mean, that would not be con.trary 3 to your determinations at this point?
4 MR. GRADOMSKI: No.
5 MR. BEARD: So, to a certain extent operator 6 training or on the job training, I guess, versus classroom 7 training was involved in both?
o 8 MR. GRADOMSKI: I think that is a fair statement, 9 yes.
10 MR. BEARD: I am trying to be careful not to 11 put words in your mouth, but seeing if I can condense several 12 minutes of discussion into one sentence.
13 MR. GRADOMSKI: I understand.
14 MR. ROSSI: Do you have anything more?
15 MR. BELL: Yes. I think you stated that had ,
l 16 No. 1 feed pump trip throttle valve been opened as soon as I
17 the operator had reset the trip latch mechanism, that that I
a 18 turbine could have been brought up to speed, and flow 19 established. :
I t
20 MR. GRADOMSKI : I think what we had discussed l t
21 was that if he had gotten the valve open all the way at that 22 point in time , that the flow could have been established.
23 MR. BELL: Doesn't that really depend on the 24 position of 599 and 6087 Acelederal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes, that is true.
, It does.
f 84 f 14-10-Joe Wal 1 That is true.
2 MR. BEARD: That is a good point. Get the 3 thing up and running, and not have any place to put it.
4 MR. GRADOMSKI: 599 and 608 were not open.
5 MR. BEARD: I don't remember offhand the times 6 on those resets. Yeah, I have it right here.
7 The times on the reset on the valves -- here o
8 we go. I am reading from the sequence of events that the 9 team published identified as Revision 2, Preliminary, dated 10 June 24th, and on page 3 it indicates that the valve 599 II was opened at 014748, and that was cf course the first one 12 opened. That was No. 2.
13 No. I was opened something on the order of Id a minute and a half later. So, that if one asks the 15 question: Was the valve open at that point in time? You 16 go back and look at it, the 47 time was like one minuto af ter '
17 No. 1 was -- trip aux valve was opened.
18 Let me say this differently. At the point in 19 time 14748, according to the curve, you had just gotten 20 up to the 2200 rpm speed on No. I within that last minute, 21 so that those were pretty close together; it is not like 22 one was offset by five minutes from the other.
23 They came together fairly close.
24 So, that had the guy done the job right, No. 1 Am-Federal Repo,ters, Inc, 25 would have been available at the time the valve was opened.
t
.f 85 f lf-ll-JoeLWa l
- (EVENING' I MR. GRADOMSKI
- It appears that way.
SESSION)'
2 MR. BEARD: Is there ' anything else that you 3 think you ought to tell us. Ilave we covered everything?
4 MR. GRADOMSKI: I think we have covered just 5 . about everything. Do you have any other questions?
4 6 MR. BEARD : Oh, I guess the last question is 7 an administrative one.
o 0 I don' t know who is the best person to answer ;
9 .this, but can you give us some feel for the time ' frame for 10 when this report will be fin,alized and sent to the team?
" MR. GRADOMSKI: Certainly I want to have a 12 thorough technical review of this report done before it I3 leaves Toledo Edison.
Id I would certainly think that by the middle 15 of next week that that review will be completed.
IO MR. BEARD: So the middle of next week would II It be -- let's see -- it would be - a wook from the 10th.
~
I8 will be Wednesday, right. So you are talking about roughly I'
the 17th.
20 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yes.
II
, End 12 ,
( Su;Walfolg.
I 23 24 AmfmWW Phpows, lrw. f 25 ,
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v 11 86
!6't30P.M. -
- 16-1-SueWalsh MB. GRIME:' I think'the other thing on this report
. 2 thht sua ought to at least recognize, it's the first one of 3 th'e findings reports that we.will see and there may be
~
4 some additional delays due to that' process. -And also if
-5 . indeed in the review there is a major problem. found with it,
- 6 either additio'nal work possibly, andfthere are all kinds of 7 possibilities there of where we might really feel that we "o
8 could best serve this overall purpose by significantly de-9 laying it.-
10 MR. BEARD: I guess I was really.trying to under-
~
11 stand whether or not that report would be received by us, 12 or whether there is a fair chance of it being received by
, ' 13 us before we release our report, which is scheduled to be 14 released on the morning of'the 22.
15 MR. GRIME: The _ morning of the 22nd is your 16 last time?
17 MR. ROSSI: .Our report is due the 22nd. You
, 18 know, we could finish it'perhaps next Friday. So, it sounds 19 like there is some possibility we will have their report.
20 MR. BEARD: Yeah. There is always the chance 21 that something will come up, especially the first time 22 .through the barrel.
- 23 But I guess I'm getting the flavor that it's also
~ a fair chance it could be finished and we could receive it 24 Acer deral Repo,$.rs, Inc. -
25 like the middle of the week.
1-87
- 16-2-SueWalsh MR. GRIME: Uh-huh.
. _2 MR. BEARD:. Which would be maybe before we -
3 finich the report so that'we might be able to read over
-4 Jand.at least be'..able..to say that we had' received the report, rather than just the oral discussion we have had at this 5
meeting.-
o 6 7 MR. GRIME: I-haven't seen the detailed report,
' but I would; guess it is quite a bit of detail in there so 8
9 that I think it would be quite advantageous to you to have 10 Ithat. So, maybe'we are saying we will try to do our best to jj get that to you.
12 And,we can follow it up with a revision to the
~ 13 report. ,
14 MR. BEARD: I certainly am not trying to push.you.
15 I am just trying to get some feel for when it's likely- to 16 come off the presses.
- MR . GRIME
- I would agree with Rick's Wednesday's 17
~
18 . projection if there is not a snag of some kind.
j9 MR. BELL: Since. Rick was referring to his draft-i 20 of this report throughout our discussion, is it fair to l
. 21 summarize that we have most of the information of the report i
I
, 22 on our' transcript?
- 23 MR.'GRADOMSKI:
Yeah. I would say that you have i
! the important points. We'did touch upon the important 24 Ac+F.d.r.1n. pore.rs,Inc.
25 Points here. But I think the report does lay it out in a i
L ,
Y' 88
~#16-3-SueWals) much~ easier fashion.:
, 2 MR. BEARD: I'm sure you have written a report 3 that'-lays it out in .a very< systematic and orderly way x i.i ,
4 instead of the way we were bombarding you with questions.
5 i MR. GRADOMSKI- I:do my best.
., 6 MR. BEARD: Okay. Now, since.this is your first 7 report, you know, I would just say that our expectation of '
s 8 these reports will be that they will not only report the-9 root cause and termination results but-they will, in essence, 10 'present an engineering. justification or defense that this 11 ;is really the root cause. 4 12 MR. GRIME: Again, I haven't seen Rick's. We l
13 .have set up a report scenario that in many cases would have 14 us get only reports that give findings without the report 15 addressing the corrective' actions. 'It would relate back to 16 .how the hypotheses that were originally made were either 17 proved or disproved.
,. 18 It's purely' findings. And you may find there will 19 be reports of that nature which will,be followed by a separate
- 20 report that-would address the corrective actions and possible 21 generic implications.
22 MR. ROSSI: I think his point is that when we get 23 .the root causes that there will be a technical justification 24 t hat that is the root cause, and then the corrective action --
Ace-Federal lleporters, lac.
25 that's fine -- can como later. 'You know, when we get the s
.m -
, l 89
- I6-4-SueBalsp root cause-we want to - I
-2 MR. GRIME: We would expect to have information 3 there that substantiates'that-indeed they have found the 1
- 4 . root cause. It would not necessarily be substantiating 5
corrective action or those types.
, 6 MR.. BEARD: .Right. I guess what I'm really trying 7
to get to -is in the sense of an' engineer presenting the
~o argument that he found the root cause, the obvious question 8
9 is the., question of completeness. And I don't know that it-10
. applies in this' action plan..
jj But- I -think in some of the equipment, it may be 12 that there are several contributory.causes and that there 13 are a c uple f them that have not even been identified yet.
ja MR. GRIME: Uh-huh.
15 MR.-BEARD: - So I'm really saying that that defense 16 f the conclusion that. this -is the root cause is really a --
j7 the word slips out of my mind, but an argument that this is 18 in fact the root cause to support that, j9 MR. ROSSI: Well, _it's all the root causes if 20 there.is more than one problem.
21 MR. BEARD: Sure. It may be, you know, like the 22 main feed pump situation is a better example of that type of thing.-
23 .
24 But I was really trying to -- because this is.the hr.dwel n.petwo lac.
25 first one -- throw that out an a general comment to let you
t 90 w
- 16-5-SueWalsd know what our expectations ~are. And then you -- just to
. 2 hakesurethereisnomisunderstanding. That's all.
~
3 I think we have~said this several times in other 4 meetings. But now.you areeat.the point of doing the first
~
5 one.
- 6 MR. GRIME
- Doing the first one.
7 MR. GRADMOSKI: I think there are some action 8 plans or some reports that: are going to rely and reference '
9 analytical work and calculations that were done in defense 10 of what:they actually-found..
-11 I believe that you are going to get that, J.T.
'I2 MR. BEARD: I.think that we have' thoroughly
-13 covered this matter. ' nd A I would like to just suggest,~ sir, I4 that we adjourn'immediately'if not sooner.
15 PR. ROSSI: Larry,~do you have anything more?
10 MR. BELL: No, sir.
17 MR. ROSSI: .Okay.' -Then, we will" reconvene in
- 18 7the morning' I guess at-Iaround 19.
I9 .MR. BEARD: I-would:like to say while we are
- 20 still.on_the record, just-thank you for the'pr'esentation~.
21
. y:think it was a very helpful presentation.
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' 22 3 MR .' GRADMOSKI: Thank1you.
. 23
.'R.
M ROSSI: 'Thank you,. gentlemen. We will see 24 you inithe morning, then.'.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 L(Whereupon,7 the meeting is concluded at 6:35'p.m.,
LENDDDDD: to reconvene:atJ9 a.m.,1 Friday, July 12, 1985.-)
- a. .l
Preliminary Status Report on Action Plan IA, IB July 10, 1985 J
Action Plan
Description:
To identify the root cause for the Auxiliary Feed Pumps overspeed trips.
MWO's Written: 1-85-2131-00
, 1-85-2132-00 Activities: Step 1.0 thru 1.7.of the Action Plan have been completed. Both AFPT governors were inspected by
'*~
the Woodward Representative on 7/3/85. No problems were found. The governors were then reassembled.
The remote trip device (Step 1.8) is being procured. The mounting and linkages must be designed and fabricated.
The test procedure (Step 2.1) rough draft is completed.
The data needed to compare the PGG governor vs.
the PG-PL governor (Step 3.0 Action Plan IB only)-
is being obtained.
Analyses investigating steam condensation in cold steam supply to the AFPT and possible effects on turbine response are in progress.
Summary: The remaining steps of both Action Plans require the plant to be in mode 3. The actual testing will be at that time.
4 4 DW:did o
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J i .C_ERTIFICATE O? PEOCEE_D_.I::05
\ 2 I
3 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 4 "RC 0000tX222XX FACT FINDING TEAM.
3 In the matter of: DAVIS-BESSE INCIDENT.
Date of Proceeding: July 11,1985
- Place of Proceeding: Oak Harbor, Ohio.
7 a
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 9
t ansC d pt for de W e of de Com O S M .
10
- MYRTLE H. WALSH GARRETT J . WATSH . JR.
Official Reporter - Typed Official Reporter - Typed 12 m.% }l. h&)J Offl ial Reporter - Sigt.
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- Officiadfeporter-Si ture i4
. 15 16 17 MARY SIMONS
'8
. Official Reporter - Typed
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19 20 f(wz , p;f
'Offici p Reporter Signature 22
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.23 24
\
25 J TAYLOE ASSOCIATES REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS NORFOLK, VIRGINIA i
Preliminary Status Report on Action Plan ID July 10, 1985 Action Plan
Description:
Determine the root cause of the problem in relatching the Overspeed Trip Mechanism (OTM) and of opening the Trip and Throttle (T&T) valves of AFPT 1-1 and 1-2 on June 9, 1985.
MWO's Written: 1-85-2063-01 (AFPT 1-1) 1-85-2065-01 (AFPT 1-2)
Activities: Completed steps 1, 2, and 3 of the Action Plan.
s Step 4 of the Action Plan to be conducted in plant Mode 3 in conjunction with Action Plans IA and IB.
Summa ry: There were no mechanical deficiencies noted that would prevent the OTM from resetting.
The OTM was properly adjusted.
All mechanism pivot points and components were sufficiently free.
Operator difficulty in resetting the OTH was noted during the investigations. This difficulty is attributed to incomplete understanding of the operation of the OTM.
Existing instructions do not accurately reflect the proper operation of the OTM.
When properly operated, the OTM demonstrated stable, positive resetting.
o A complete report of the troubleshooting and investigations conducted to identify the root cause of the problem in relatching the OTH is being prepared.
RJG:lrh.
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Preliminary Status Report on Action Plan 8 July 10, 1985 Action Plan
Description:
To identify the root cause for the Main Feed Pump Turbine (MFPT) 1-1, June 9, 1985 trip.
, NWO's Written: MWO 1-85-1997-01 was generated to perform Action Plan steps 1, 2, and 3a.
. , Activities: Troubleshooting started on 6-20-85.
During troubleshooting an electrical check of circuit board 4 was performed. The frequency to voltage (F/V) converter on this board, which provides a voltage corresponding to actual turbine speed, was found to be faulty.
Application of a representative varying input signal to the F/V converter yielded a constant l zero voltage output.
. Summary: The failure resulted in a zero indicated turbine speed, which in turn resulted in an " increase speed demand" error signal.
This speed error signal will cause the control valves to open further. With control valves farther open then actually required, the MFPT's speed will continue to increase until the emer-gency governor trips the turbine.
During the week of July 8, 1985, the circuit
. board will be tested at General Electric Factory, Fitchburg, MA to confine that the direct cause is an electronic failure of the F/V converter. A troubleshooting and investigation findings report e will be submitted after the board has been tested.
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Preliminary Status Report on Action Plan 9a & 9b July 10, 1985 Action Plan
Description:
To determine the cause of the Turbine Bypass Valve 2.2 (SP13A2) failure.
MWO's Written: 1-85-1942-02 1-85-1942-03 1-85-1942-04 1-85-1942-05 1-85-1942-06 1-85-1942-07 1-85-1942-08 Activities: 1. Disassembled and inspected steam traps ST3 and ST3A and solenoid actuated drain valve MS2575. These steam traps and drain valve are located on the same main steam header as turbine bypass valve SP13A2. The following conditions were noted:
- a. ST3 strainer was clo'ged g and considered inoperable,
- b. ST3A strainer was deformed and the steam trap had failed open.
- c. MS2575 was found to be in an operable
. condition with no sign of obstruction.
Preliminary, it appears that while ST3 may not have been operable, drainage of the header could have occurred through ST3A and MS2575, if actuated.
- 2. Disassembled SP13A2 actuator.
- a. Available actuator piston travel was determined to be 1 9/32 inch. (This compares to a design travei of 1 9/16 inch.)
- b. Discoloration of the yoke was noted at the break location.
- c. Positioner showed no damage other than broken linkage.
l l
- 3. Disassembled SP13A2 valve.
l
( a. Stem was scored at several locations, l apparently due to clamping in vise.
1 l
l P' )
1
- b. Main plug was found in bottom of valve I body and separated from stem.
- c. Belleville springs and spacers found jammed together on pilot plug.
- d. Main plug nut, cotter pin, washer, and spacer found to be missing.
- e. 3" of water found in bottom of valve.
y 4. Broken or scored parts from both valve and actuator sent to Fisher for further analysis.
Summary: The observed condition of the turbine bypass
$ valve is consistent with the primary hypotheses discussed in the Action Plan report.
Destructive analyses and evaluation of possible cause are being performed by Fisher.
Investigation of differences in temperature between No. 1 and No. 2 main steam header downstream of MSIv's prior to repressurization is being performed to evaluate importance relative to turbine bypass valve damage.
, HER:1rh P
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Preliminary Status Report on Action Plan 10 July 10, 1985 Action Plan
Description:
To review the operation of the PORV.
NWO's Written:
Activities: The PORV was removed from the system and disassembled 9 on 7/6/85.
- Valve inspection was completed. No corrosion products or debris was found that could have s caused the valve to stick open.
- Measurements were taken on the valve.
All clearances appeared proper. We are still evaluating the dimensions to determine if they are acceptable.
Summary: We have compared the pressure signal to the PORV control circuit to the other pressure signals and verified it tracked those signals during the transient. Even though the signal tracked during the event, we plan to verify proper calibration.
. We also plan to verify the control circuits are functioning properly.
, We are currently planning to reinstall the valve and perform a functional test. We are still in the process of developing the detailed tests to be run in Mode 3.
TRI:lrh P
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Z Preliminary Status Report on Action Plan 12 i
July 10, 1985 i - .
Action Plan
Description:
To identify the root cause for the failure of AFW valves AF599 and AF608 to open.
f MWO's Written: 1-85-1941-01 Inspect and test AF599 1-85-1941-02 Test AF599 at 1050 psid 1- 1-85-1945-01 Inspect and test AF608 1-85-1945-02 Test AF608 at 1050 psid Activities: - 6/18/85 - AF608 was inspected and tested using MOVATS at 0 psig
- - 6/19/85 - AF599 was inspected and tested using MOVATS at 0 psig
- 7/5/85 - AF608 was tested using MOVATS at 1050 psig
- 7/6/85 - AF599 was tested using MOVATS at 1050 psid
- 7/8/85 - The spring packs for both valves were j inspected i
NOTE: MOVATS provides detailed information about valve operator performance.
Summary: The motor operator torque limit switch bypass
! contacts on both valves were determined to be opening prior to the valves unseating. This bypass switch is used to permit higher torques during initial valve opening. The premature opening of the bypass contacts is considered to be the ,
direct cause of the valves failing to open.
Based on the test results, it also appears that t
the reconnended torque switch settings and the procedure for setting the bypass contacts may be erroneous.
g The spring pack locknut for AF599 was installed backwards with no' setscrew installed. The AF608 spring pack was lightly preloaded. These two j findings had no~effect on the June 9th anomalies.
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Preliminary Status Report on Action Plans 15A-1 & 15A-2 July 10, 1985 Action Plan
Description:
To identify the root cause for the intermittent elevated count rate of (15A-1) and the intermittent spiking (15A-2) of NI-1, Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation.
1 MWO's Written: 1-85-2092 Pulse / Noise data for NI-1 1-85-2092-01 Cable checks for NI-I 1-85-2192-00 Pulse / Noise data for NI-2
, 1-85-2192-01 Cable checks for NI-2 Activities: Commenced troubleshooting NI-1. Obtained baseline traces of pulses and noise using both plant equipment and a vendor supplied, faster response digital oscilloscope (per Action Plan Item 1A) without presence of elevated count rate.
Met with Ohio State University personnel cognizant of pulse instrumentation to discuss possible causes for NI noise spiking and inopernbility.
Summary: No MWO's have yet been written to investigate the spiking problem as outlined in Action Plan 15A-2.
No root causes have yet to be identified for the elevated count rate, Action Plan 15A-1. The data obtained for these MWO's will be presented to OSU personnel for evaluation and analysis. The results obtained will determine / plan next step in identifying root cause.
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Preliminary Status Report on Action Plan ISB July 10, 1985 Action Plan
Description:
To identify the root cause for the failure of NI-2 Count Rate level indication during and subsequent to the June 9, 1985 trip.
MWO's Written: 1-85-2030-00 4
Activities: Completed source range functional test, ST 5091.01, to demonstrate operability of NI-2 on 6/9/85.
Commenced troubleshooting NI-2 on 7/5/85.
Attempted to reproduce failure on NI-2, Count Rate level indication by switching Detector High Voltage "0N" and "0FF".
Attempt was unsuccessful.
Attempted to reproduce failure of NI-2 Count Rate level indication by tapping on associated modules and connectors. Attempt was unsuccess-ful.
Attempted to reproduce failure of NI-2 Count Rate level indication by opening and closing RPS cabinet doors. Attempt was unsuccessful.
Summary: Plan to continue attempts at reproducing the failure of NI-2 Count Rate level indication. We
, will be unable to determine root cause of failure without first reproducing the failure condition.
Future plans include installing a strip chart recorder to monitor the output of the Count Rate Amplifier module and attempting to reproduce the o failure of NI-2 by tripping and resetting the high voltage cutoff bistables.
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Preliminary Status Report on Action Plan 16 July 10, 1985 Action Plan
Description:
Determine root cause of erratic pressure control experienced in both main steam headers following closure of main steam isolation valves.
NWO's Written: 1-85-2190-00 9 1-85-2152-00 Activities: Performed visual inspection of non-nuclear instrumentation and Integrated Control System (ICS) cabinets containing control circuitry fo'r the atmospheric vent valves. No abnormalities noted.
Performed string check of ICS modules (Item 4.a) controlling atmospheric vent valves (AVVs). Two 4
modules associated with AVV #2 were found to be out of calibration. As a result of the out-of-calibration condition, the AVV open setpoint would be at about 1030 psig rather than 1015 psig as desired. This condition would not explain the erratic pressure control observed during the
, June 9, 1985 event.
Performed operational check of hand / auto station
' in Control Room (Item 4.b). Satisfactory operation observed.
Held meeting with MSSV vendor (Dresser) and MPR l Associates to review MSSV operating and mainten-ance history. Determined that inlet bore size to MSSVs is smaller than Dresser states is basis for valve rating. Initial judgement is that this should not affect proper operation of MSSV.
Summary: The findings to date do not explain the observed conditions. The action plan for investigating and troubleshooting is continuing.
LH:dd 4
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.. . _. - . _ . _ ~ _ ~. . _. . _,
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1 Preliminary Status Report on Action Plan 18 July 10, 1985 Action Plan
Description:
To determine if there were problems with the operation of the Main Feedwater #2 Startup-
, Control Valve (SP-7a) or its controls.
MWO's Written: 1-85-2112-00 in Closcout y 1-85-2113-00 in Scheduling Activities: Work Completed:
4 F-868, Main Feedwater loop 2 startup uncompen-sated flow instrument string was checked for proper calibration and found to be within speci-fied tolerance for low flow (below 25 inches of water pressure differential over the flow element).
4 FTSP3A, the associated flow transmitter, was pressurized to 1000 psig to check for a shift in the output voltage at operating pressure. A maximum shift of 50 av was noted, but in the negative (toward 0 flow) direction. This shows that the indicated flow was lower than the actual
. flow. Indications are that this was not a contributing factor to the anomaly.
[ ,
Summary: Calibration checks show the indicated flow
- through SP-7A to be accurate for the flow range indicated after the SFRCS trip during the transient.
Preliminary study of computer point output, shows that there was flow through SP-7A as the valve opened upon demand.
!- Projected Work:
Operate SP-7A and verify proper response to
, control signals, and trip reset.
Check calibration of SP-7A to determine if the valve position is what the demand signal is calling for.-
f TG:did l.
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r Preliminary Status Report on Action Plan 26 July 10, 1985 Action Plan
Description:
To determine the root cause for the inadvertent Auxiliary Feedwater #1 suction supply transfer. -
MWO's Written: 1-85-2130-00 in Closcout 1-85-2133-00 in Closcout 1-85-2144-00 in Scheduling Process y 1-85-2146-00 in Scheduling Process Activities: Visual inspections and photographs taken of the following:
PSL4928A, PSL4928B, PSL503 (Auxiliary Feedwater 1-1 suction pressure switches)
PS4929A, PSL4929B, PSL507 (Auxiliary Feedwater 1-2 suction pressure switches)
Calibration check and time response on the following Auxiliary Feedwater suction pressure switch'es:
Pressure switches in Auxiliary Feedwater 1-1 r
suction supply were found in tolerance.
Pressure switch PSL507 in Auxiliary Feedwater i . 1-2 suction supply was found out of tolerance.
This finding does not identify a direct cause because this pressure switch is in Auxiiiary Feedwater 1-2 suction header.
Pressure switches PSL 4928A and PSL 4928B were found in tolerance.
The time response (actuation and reset) of the 11 psi alarm pressure switches PSL503 and PSL507 is quicker than the computer scan rate. This could explain the lack of a computer alarm prior to the
, auxiliary feedwater #1 suction supply transfer.
Summary: None of the above findings establish the direct cause of the Auxiliary Feedwater suctica supply transfer. Work is continuing to complete the action plan.
Auxiliary Feedwater' strainers 5201, 5206, and 5257 will be removed and inspected.
ST 5071.13 (Auxiliary Feedwater System channel functional test) will be performed for Auxiliary Feed Pumps 1-1 and 1-2.
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(_ ; :..
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A corrective action plan and NWO will be written to recalibrate PSL507.
Auxiliary Feedwater 1-1 and 1-2 suction pressure switches will be monitored during Auxiliary Feed Pump testing by connecting chart recorders across
, the pressure switch contacts.
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Preliminary Status Report on Action Plan 27
'*tly 10, 1985 Action Plan
Description:
To determine the root cause for the apparent interruption of the open control circuit to Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine 1-1 Main Steam Inlet Valve Isolation Valve MS-106.
NWO's Written: 1-85-2105-00 Action Plan 27 - MS-106 Activities: - Commenced testing and inspection of MS-106 valve, starter D135, and PSL-4930A
- Performed wiring checks of MS-106, starter D135 and PSL-4930A
- Performed as-found calibration check and functional check of PSL-4930A
- Stroked MS-106 with MOVATS monitoring operation of MS-106. NOVATS provides detailed information about valve operator performance.
- Steps 1 through 17 summarized above, of Action Plan 27, Rev. I are completed. Step 18 is yet to be completed. Step 18 requires valve testing under system operating parameters. -
Preliminary Findings: 1. A loose connection was found between the wire terminal and the stud on the limit switch contact which is used for MS-106 alarm position indication.
- 2. Wiring discrepancies between as-found wiring of MS-106 and wiring diagram.
- 3. Wiring discrepancies between as-found wiring of the starter D135 and wiring diagram.
- 4. Unnecessary gap between the spring pack locknut and outer thrust washer.
- 5. Packing gland flange cocked to one side.
I Summary: Of the findings, items 1, 2, and 3 do not appear to have had an influence on the operation of MS-106 during the June 9, 1985 transient.
Item #4'may have had an influence on the operation but to what extent is not yet known.
A preliminary assessment indicates that MS-106 probably stopped opening in midstroke due to open torque switch activation. MS-106 would then have driven closed. This would account for the apparent shorter operating stroke time noted on
. + .
the alarm printout. This preliminary assessment is based on finding 5 (possible binding) and the MOVATS test data report. The data collected so far is insufficient and any assessment should be considered inconclusive. Further analytical assessment and testing to gather data will be
, performed prior to making any final conclusions of root cause.
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