IR 05000266/1983008

IE Insp Repts 50-266/83-08 & 50-301/83-08 on 830509-11 & 0609.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Collect Air Samples on 830331 During Reactor Vessel Head Removal & Cavity Flood Operations & to Install SA-11 Main Steam Line Monitors

ML20076K649
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	06/30/1983
From:	Greger L, Lovendale P, Miller D NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20076K643	List: IR 05000266/1983008
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM, NRC-2020-000157 50-266-83-08, 50-266-83-8, 50-301-83-08, 50-301-83-8, NUDOCS 8307180047
Download: ML20076K649 (8)

Text

,

,

.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/83-08(DRMSP); 50-301/83-08(DRMSP)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; UPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2 Inspection At: Point Beach Site, Two Creeks, WI and WEPC0 Corporate Office, Milwaukee, WI

'

Inspection Conducted: May 9-11 and June 9, 1983 Inspector:

0 S. MNff P. C. Lovendale 6 /30/8'3 Date Approved By:

xA!.77ulL/P L. R. Greger, Chief 6 /-T e / r 3 Facilities Radiation Protection D(te Section Inspection Summary Inspection on May 9-11 and June 9,1983, (Reports No. 50-266/83-08(DRMSP);

50-301/83-08(DRMSP))

Areas Inspected: Special, unannounced inspection of radiation protection activities during the Unit 2 steam generator sleeving outage, and prepara-tions for the Unit 1 steam generator replacement outage. Also, certain licensee events and TMI Action Plan Items were reviewed. The inspection

. involved 26 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspecto Results: Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in four areas; one item of noncompliance was identified in each of two areas (failure to collect air samples - Section 7, and failure to comply with an NRC Order - Section 9).

!

I 8307180047 830701 PDR ADOCK 05000266 O PDR

,_ -. _____ ___-___ _ _ _ _

.

.

DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted

• R. Bredvad, Plant Health Physicist

• F. Flentje, Supervisor, Staff Services C. Krause, Licensing Engineer, WEPC0 D. LeQuia, Radiation Safety Supervisor R. Newton, Superintendent, Reactor Engineering, WEPC0

• J. Reisenbucchler, Superintendent, Technical Services

• P. Skramstad, Superintendent, Chemistry and Health Physics

• J. Zach, Manager, Point Beach Nuc1 car Plant

• B. Fitzpatrick, NRC Resident Inspector

• D. Hague, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit meetin . General

/

This inspection, which began at 9:00 a.m. on May 9, 1983, was conducted to examine radiation protection activities during the Unit 2 steam generator sleeving outage and to review licensee preparations for the Unit I steam generator replacement project scheduled to begin in October 1983. Also, the status of certain TMI Action Plan Items and licensee actions taken in response to certain events were reviewe . Licensee Action on Previous Iiscpaction Findings (Closed) Open Item (266/79-04-01; 301/79-03-01)s Tritium in the subsoil drainage system. This matter was reviewed during a previous inspection (50-266/82-06; 50-301/82-06) and it was determin'ed that additional sampling was needed to help identify the source of small amounts of tritium that have been found in the subsoil drainage system. The licensee has conducted further sampling and has compiled and analyzed all data collected to date. The exact source of the tritium can still not be determined. The licensee continues to monitor and quantify these very small releases and reports the releases in their semi-annual effluent repor . Unit 2 Steam Generator Sleeving Activities The radiation protection aspects of the Unit 2 steam generator sleeving project were reviewed. At the time of this inspection, the licensee had completed decontamination of both steam generators and had installed about 80 percent of the sleeves in steam generator "B".

The licensee's health physics staff has been augmented with sixty-three contracted radiation protection technicians and five record clerks. Many of the contracted technicians have worked at Point Beach during previous outages. A selective review of technician qualifications and utilization was conducted; no problems were note ._ .. . . _ ._ _ _ _ - _ _

.

,

.

Total occupational exposure for the sleeving project to date is about i

360 person-rems which is only slightly higher than licensee pre-outage estimates. The slightly higher than planned exposures may be due to

,

the low steam generator decontamination factors (DFs) achieved. The DFs were 3.5 and 2.25 for steam generators "A" and "B", respectivel i Based on experimental data, the expected DF was 4 to The inspector toured the Unit 2 containment and observed the radiation

. protection activities associated with the steam generator sleeving project. The ace.ess control station for steam generator area entries was observed as teing well equipped, and functionally efficient. All

steam generator activities could be clearly monitored remotely with numerous video cameras and monitors. A worker hold area has been established within a low level radiation area where workers remain while waiting to enter the work area. Air sampling, radiation / contamination surveys, and personal monitoring appeared

adequate, i

j No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . Unit 1 Steam Generator Replacement Preparations

'

The licensee's health physics related advanced planning and prepara-tions for the Unit I steam generator replacement were reviewed. Most i facility construction appears to be progressing well. The steam I generator mausoleum is currently under construction and construction of the containment access building is scheduled to begin about June 1,

'

198 The licensee's proposed health physics organization for steam generator replacement was reviewed. The subcontractor (Morrison-Knudsen) has filled all key health physics positions within their proposed organiza-j tion. These individuals are primarily responsible for operational health

'

physics activities associated with the project. The prime contractor

] (Westinghouse) has been slow to fill several key health physics positions within their health physics organization. These positions include the

Health Physics Director, the ALARA Coordinator, the In-vivo Count and

', Respirator Test Coordinator, and other key individuals primarily responsible for health physics support activities. This matter was discussed during the exit meeting.

i

,

6. Reactor Coolant Filter Venting Incident The inspector reviewed licensee actions taken in response to a personal

,

contamination incident which occurred while changing a reactor coolant filter on March 25, 1983. While filling the filter housing following filter replacement, the filter inlet valve became stuck so it could not

be shut using the remote operator. Because he was concerned the vent i

hosc may disconnect under excessive pressure causing coolant to spray

into the cubicle, a worker entered the cubicle and shut the reactor coolant filter vent valve. This action stopped the flow of coolant from the vent hose. This hose drained into a floor drain and then to i

'

,

radwaste. No respiratory protection was worn.

i

!

.

l

, _ = , - . - - _ _ _ _ _ .- ._- . _ _ _ - - , _ _ ---

. .. .. . . ... . . _ . __

.

+

The-coolant that flowed from the reactor coolant filter vent to the l t floor-drain degassed causing high airborne activity (primarily noble gas) within the cubicle. The licensee conservatively calculated the airborne radioactivity within the cubicle based on reactor coolant i activity. Based on this calculation and the worker's stay time, cal-culations of MPC-hrs, skin dose, and whole body dose were conducted, i These calculations indicate that the 40 MPC-hr control measure was not exceeded. The skin and whole body doses based on submersion in a semi-infinite cloud were calculated to be about 180 mrads and 90

,

mrems respectively. The inspector reviewed the calculations; no problems were noted.

>

Following the job, .the worker was found to be contaminated with noble j gas daughter products on his face, throat, and arms. The maximum level

'

of contamination was about 1000 dpm/cm on his face. The worker was successfully decontaminated and was whole body counted. The results show that no significant uptake occurred.

4 'As corrective actions, the licensee is revising the reactor coolant filter change procedure to preclude the possibility of entries into i

. the cubicle while venting the filter. A modification is being con-

, sidered which would direct gases from the venting operation to the ventilation system.

s Also, respirators will be worn during any entry into the cubicle.

Previously, respirators were only required while the filter housing was open. No problems were note No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. . Elevated Iodine in Unit 2 Containment Air

'The inspector reviewed licensee actions taken in response to elevated iodine levels in the Unit 2 containment air immediately following reactor vessel head remova ! At about 1:00 p.m. on March 31, 1983, several workers. leaving contain-

'

ment were found to be slightly contaminated. Nasal swabs indicated possible airborne radioactivity. These workers had been working in the vicinity of the seal table and it was initially assumed that there ma be a radiological problem in that area. However, air samples collected

.near the' seal table did not indicate any significant airborne radio-

'

c.tivity. Whole body counts conducted the following day indicated small

. uptakes of I-131 by the workers.

'

Earlier in the-day on March 31, 1983, the reactor-vessel head was removed and the cavity flooded. These~ operations began at about 8:40 a.m.

and the' vessel head was placed in the laydown area at about 11:20 a.m.

. At'about noon, it was noted that' the low volume air sampler on the 66-

!. - foot : level (refueling floor) was unplugged. It is believed that the ,

'

sampler had been' unplugged since the last filter change at.7:00 a.m. on

March 31. -The air sampler was restarted, but the filter:and charcoal

. cartridge were not changed and counted until about 6:20 p.m., nearly ten

,

4 ,_ . . . . - , _ . - , _ . . . - ._ _ _ __ _

.

.

hours after the reactor vessel head lift and cavity flood operations began. In addition, an air sampler which draws a sample from inside the cavity did not have a charcoal cartridge installed. Therefore, no air-borne iodine determinations were made on the 66-foot level or in the cavity during the reactor head lift and start of the cavity fill operation. The results of the refueling floor air sample which ran from 12:00 p.m. to 6:20 p.m. Indicated I-131 concentrations of about one times MPC when averaged over the 6.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> sample run tim Iodine levels remained at about one to two times MFC until about 10:00 p.m. on April 2, 1983. Failure to collect and evaluate air samples during reactor vessel head removal and cavity flood operations is considered noncompliance with 10 CFR 20.103(a)(3), which requires air sampling for purposes of deter-mining worker uptake of radioactive materia (301/83-08-01)

Based on whole body counts of workers in the vicinity of the seal table and the 66-foot level air sample results, workers involved with the head lift were whole body counted. The results of these vlale body counts indicated small I-131 uptakes (maximum was about 24 MPC-hrs) and led the licensee to the realization that the problem was likely caused by the head lift and cavity fill operations and not by any seal tabic area wor The licensee tracked MPC-hrs for all workers entering containment during this period. The inspector selectively reviewed these records; no problems were note On April 2, 1983, the licensee began spraying hydrazine over the cavity water which significantly reduced the amount of iodine coming out of solution. It was later Icarned from Westinghouse that the licensee may not have reduced coolant iodine levels to below recommended levels of IE-2 microcuries per milliliter prior to the reactor vessel head lift and cavity flood operation (Elevated coolant iodine levels had been experienced due to a damaged fuel assembly.) A Westinghouse representa-tive indicated that this information (recommended refueling iodine levels) was made available to all Westinghouse plants, however, the licensee stated that they were not made aware of this informatio This matter will be reviewed further during a future inspectio (266/83-08-01; 301/83-08-02)

This event was discussed during the exit meeting. Licensee corrective actions related to the licensee's air sampling program will be reviewed during a future inspectio . Elevated Containment Noble Gas Levels The inspector reviewed licensee actions taken in response to elevated Unit 2 containment noble gas levels during a reactor vessel refilling operation. During this operation, gas was vented into containment through the reactor vessel head vent and the instrument port conoscal openings. Normally, the gas would have been vented out through the containment purge and exhaust system, but the hose connecting the reactor vessel head vent with the containment purge and exhaust had been removed to facilitate reactor vessel stud detensioning (normal procedure). The maximum gaseous activity concentration was about 3E-4 microcuries per millilite .

.

It was not readily apparent whether the licensee's procedure for head venting was followed and was adequate. Also, it is not clear as to whether having the vent rig installed would have provided the needed negative piessure within the vessel head to prevent the gas from escaping through the conoscal openings. This matter is considered an unresolved item that will be reviewed further during a future inspectio (266/83-08-02; 301/83-08-03)

9. TMI Action Plan Items II.F.1.1 and II.F. The inspector reviewed the status of TMI Action Plan Items II.F.1.1,

" Noble Gas Effluent Monitor" and II.F.1.2, " Sampling and Analysis of Plant Effluents." On March 14, 1983, an NRC Confirmatory Order was issued which listed both of these items as complete based on licensee submittals dated April 26 and July 20, 1982, and verbal discussions with licensee representatives. Except for power supply problems, the submittals indicated that these items would be complete by December 198 As indicated in the licensee's July 20, 1982 submittal, the required vital bus power supply for these monitoring systems will not be avail-able until af ter a bus upgrade project has been completed (currently scheduled for December 1983).

To meet the requirements of Item II.F.1.2, the licensee has installed an isokinetic stack sampling system. Except for connection to the final power supply, installation of this system appears to be complet To meet the requirements of Item II.F.1.1, the licensee has installed an Eberline SPING-4 monitor on each containment vent, a SPING-4 monitor on the auxiliary building vent, and a SPING-3 monitor on the drumming area vent. Except for connection to the final power supply, installa-tion of these monitors appears to be complete. Monitoring of the main steam line pathway is also needed to complete Item II.F. Externally mounted SA-ll gamma monitors were to be installed on each main steam line. During a telephone conversation with a licensee representative on May 16, 1983, the inspector learned that the SA-11 main steam line monitors had not been calibrated and therefore were not operational, and further that these monitors had not been installed by the December 1982 commitment date or the March 14, 1983 Order dat Between the committed completion date of December 1982 and the Order dated March 14, 1983, the licensee apparently did not contact the NRC concerning delays in completion of the main steam line installatio It appears that between March 14, 1983, and the date of this inspection, the licensee had not thoroughly reviewed the status of these monitors for compliance to the Order. This is supported by statements made to the inspector by the WEPCO Licensing Engineer and the WEPC0 Reactor Engineering Superintendent during an interview at the corporate office on June 9, 1983, and during a telephone call on June 13, 1983. Both stated that only the July 20, 1982 letter was reviewed against the requirements set forth in the Order. Both stated that they believed that the July 20 letter to NRR contained the most up-to-date information concerning schedular commitments. However, only the April 26, 1982, letter discusses the SA-11 main steam line monitor installation _

l

-

l

i

)

Prior to issuance of the March -14,1983 Order, the NRR Licensing Project Manager telephoned the WEPCO Licensing Engineer concerning the status of certain TMI Action Plan Items. According to the two individuals, the NRR Licensing Project Manager asked if previously submitted completion dates had been met or if further extensions of those dates were needed. Based on the contents of the July 20, 1982, letter, the WEPC0 Licensing Engineer informed the NRR Project Manager that he thought the previously submitted completion dates had been or could be met. Based on this telephone conversation and the April 26, and July 20, 1982, licensee submittals (among others), a Confirmatory Order which listed item II.F.1.1 as complete was issued on March 14, 198 Upon receipt by the licensee, the Order was reviewed by the Licensing Engineer and the Reactor Engineering Superintendent. According to these two individuals, they did not consider their April 26, 1982, submittal while reviewing the Order contents; this omission resulted in their failure to recognize that the SA-11 main steam line monitors were not operational as required by the Order. A major contributor to this problem is the lack of an effective licensee tracking system for the THI Action Plan Items. This matter was discussed at the exit meetin The March 14, 1983, Confirmatory Order requires the licensee to implement and maintain those items listed as complete. The SA-11 main steam line monitors are needed to complete Item II.F.1.1. Failure to have the SA-11 main steam line monitors operational is considered noncompliance with the Orde (266/83-08-03; 301/83-08-04)

10. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of non-compliance, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Section . Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on May 11, and June 9, 1983. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. Further discussions between the inspector and licensee management were conducted by telephone on May 16, 20, 23, and~ June 10, 1983. Also, a telephone discussion on May 20, 1983, between NRC Region III management and licensee corporate management, resulted in the issuance of a Confirmatory Action Letter, dated May 20,'1983. (266/83-08-04; 301/83-08-05)

.

In response to certain items discussed, the licensee: Stated that Westinghouse would be asked to provide a schedule for the filling of certain key health physics positions. The inspector expressed concern that further delays in filling these key positions may result-in inadequate project preparation. (Section 5)

_ _ _ _ _ . _ . .__ _

.

.

. Stated _that a continuous air monitor will be purchased for the refueling floor and that steps would be taken to further improve the air sampling progra (Section 7) Stated that the SA-Il main steam line monitors would be installed, operating, and' calibrated by June 30, 1983. This date was documented in the May 20, 1983 Confirmatory Action Lette (Section 9) Stated that NRR would be reminded of the fact that monitors installed to satisfy TMI Action Plan Items II.F.I.1 and II.F. will be powered from an interim power supply until completion of the bus upgrade. A date for completion will be provide Acknowledged the items of noncomplianc (Sections 7 and 9)

I s

i u

l

i

• - ' - -:- . . _ _ _ _ ,,

__,,.)