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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217P2061999-10-26026 October 1999 Forwards for First Energy Nuclear Operating Co Insp Rept 50-346/99-17 on 990928-1001.Insp Was Exam of Activities Conducted Under License Re Implementation of Physical Security Program.No Violations Identified ML20217N3851999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re Licensee 990521 Request for License Amend to Allow Irradiated Fuel to Be Stored in Cask Pit at Davis-Besse,Unit 1.Response Requested within 60 Days from Receipt of Ltr ML20217N2321999-10-15015 October 1999 Requests NRC Approval to Use Alternative to Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(f)(4)(ii).Licensee Requests Extension to Specified Schedule for Implementing Updates to IST Program ML20217G9201999-10-14014 October 1999 Discusses Utils Request for Approval of Quality Assurance Program Changes PY-CEI-NRR-2438, Informs That DBNPS & Pnpp Staffs Have Modified or Withdrawn Several of Positions Proposed within Re Request for Approval of Qap.Revised Positions Encl1999-10-14014 October 1999 Informs That DBNPS & Pnpp Staffs Have Modified or Withdrawn Several of Positions Proposed within Re Request for Approval of Qap.Revised Positions Encl ML20217F8371999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-10 on 990802-0913.One Violation Occurred Being Treated as NCV ML20217A5641999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Davis-Besse on 990901.Informs That NRC Plans to Conduct Addl Insps to Address Questions Raised by Issues Re Operator Errors & Failure to Commit to JOG Topical Rept on MOV Verification ML20212L0691999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards,For Review & Comment,Copy of Preliminary ASP Analysis of Operational Condition Discovered at Unit 1 on 981014,as Reported in LER 346/98-011 ML20216J6701999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Post Examination Documentation for Written Operator Initial License Examination Administered at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station on 990920.Without Encls ML20212D3501999-09-21021 September 1999 Forward Copy of Final Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis of Operational Event at Plant,Unit 1 on 980624,reported in LER 346/98-006 05000346/LER-1998-001, Forwards Rev 1 for LER 1998-001,which Updates Corrective Actions & Revises Completion Date Re Implementation of Changes to Plant Emergency Operating Procedure.List of Commitments Attached1999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Rev 1 for LER 1998-001,which Updates Corrective Actions & Revises Completion Date Re Implementation of Changes to Plant Emergency Operating Procedure.List of Commitments Attached ML20216E5961999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs 3/4.3.2.1,safety Features Actuation Sys Instrumentation & Associated Bases 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2,reactor Protection Sys & Safety Sys Instrumentation ML20211P3001999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards FEMA Transmitting FEMA Evaluation Rept for 990504 Emergency Preparedness Exercise at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant.No Deficiencies Identified.One Area Requiring C/A & Two Planning Issues Identified ML20211K6681999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Copies of Certified Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee (NRC Form 398) for Operator Candidates Listed Below.Without Encls ML20211K6611999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Copies of Operator License Renewal Applications for Individuals Listed.Operators Have Successfully Completed Appropriate Operator Requalification Training Program at Dbnps.Without Encls ML20211K0951999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Fire & Seismic Analyses of IPEEE for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1. Response Requested within 60 Days ML20211H0201999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual FFD Rept for 990101-0630 for DBNPS, Unit 1,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) ML20211D1171999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-09 on 990623-0802.Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20211G3911999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Update to Estimated Info for Licensing Action Requests Through 010930,re Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates PY-CEI-NRR-2411, Informs That Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co Has Developed Corporate QA Program Manual for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station & Perry Nuclear Power Plant,As Discussed on 990318 Between Util & Nrc.Revised USAR Pages,Encl1999-08-19019 August 1999 Informs That Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co Has Developed Corporate QA Program Manual for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station & Perry Nuclear Power Plant,As Discussed on 990318 Between Util & Nrc.Revised USAR Pages,Encl ML20211J9201999-08-13013 August 1999 Urges NRC to Find Funds for Stockpiling Radiation Pills for Residents Living Near Plant ML20211B0161999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Evaluation of Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Request for Relief Numbers RR-A16, RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant,Unit 1 ML20210T1061999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Preliminary NRC Forms 398 & 396 for Listed Candidates,Per Operator License Exam Scheduled for Week of 990913.Encl Withheld ML20210S6071999-08-11011 August 1999 Provides Final Response to NRC RAI Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at Npps ML20210P8051999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-15 on 990712-16.No Violations Noted.However,Several Deficiencies Were Identified with Implementation of Remp,Which Collectively Indicated Need for Improved Oversight of Program IR 05000346/19980211999-08-0606 August 1999 Refers to NRC Insp Rept 50-346/98-21 Conducted on 980901- 990513 & Forwards Nov.Two Violations Identified Involving Failure to Maintain Design of Valve & Inadequate C/A for Degraded Condition Cited in Encl NOV 05000346/LER-1998-009, Forwards LER 98-009-01,IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards LER 98-009-01,IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made by Util Are Encl ML20210H6101999-07-30030 July 1999 Informs That Region III Received Rev 21 to Various Portions of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan.Revision Was Submitted Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(q) in Apr 1999 ML20210H0491999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising TS 3/4.7.5.1, Ultimate Heat Sink, to Allow Plant Operation in Modes 1-4 with Water Temp Less than or Equal to 90 F ML20210G5521999-07-28028 July 1999 Provides Addl Response to 980923 OL Licensing Exam Rept 50-346/98-301 Re OL Exam Administered in Aug 1998.Results of Root Cause Investigation & Corrective Actions,Discussed ML20210G3831999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to NPF-3,changing TSs 6.4, Training, 6.5.2.8, Audits, 6.10, Record Retention, 6.14, Process Control Program & 6.15, Odcm ML20211P3071999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Final Rept for 990504 Biennial Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise for David-Besse Power Station.No Deficiencies Identified for Any Jurisdiction During Exercise ML20210G4391999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs 3/4.3.2.1, Safety Features Actuation Sys Instrumentation, & Associated Bases 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2, Reactor Protection Sys & Safety Sys Instrumentation ML20210G7151999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising TSs 3/4.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, 3/4.3.3.2, Instrument - Incore Detectors & 3/4.3.3.9, Instrumentation - Waste Gas Sys Oxygen Monitor ML20210G5151999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs for Implementation of 10CFR50,App J,Option B for Type B & C Containment Leakage Rate Testing ML20210G3211999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Written OL Exam & Supporting Matl for Exam to Be Administered at DBNPS During Week of 990913.Listed Encls Withheld from Public Disclosure Until After Exam Complete ML20210C4381999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-08 on 990513-0622.Unidentified RCS Leak Approached TS Limit of 1 Gallon Per Minute Prior to Recently Completed Maint Outage.Three Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as NCVs ML20209G3681999-07-15015 July 1999 Advises That Info Submitted in & 990519 Affidavit Re Design & Licensing Rept,Davis-Besse,Unit 1 Cask Pit Rack Installation Project,Holtec Intl, HI-981933,marked Proprietary,Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML20207H6401999-07-0909 July 1999 Discusses Closure of TAC MA0540 Re Util Responses to RAI on GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. Staff Has Revised Info in Rvid & Releasing It as Rvid Version 2 ML20209D1341999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Amend to Operating License.Proposed Change Would Have Modified Facility TSs Pertaining to Allowable as-found Pressure Lift Setting Tolerance of Two Pressurizer Code Safety Valves 05000346/LER-1998-012, Forwards LER 98-012-01,which Is Being Submitted to Provide Addl Info Re 981018 Occurrence.Commitment List Attached1999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards LER 98-012-01,which Is Being Submitted to Provide Addl Info Re 981018 Occurrence.Commitment List Attached ML20209C3981999-07-0101 July 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/98-21.Corrective Actions:Developed Rev to Boric Acid Control Program & Work Process Guideline on Plant Leakage ML20209B5821999-06-24024 June 1999 Provides Justification for Rev to Completion Date for One of Insp follow-up Items Cited in Insp Rept 50-346/98-03, Designated as Inspector follow-up Item 50-346/97-201-10 ML20196G1251999-06-23023 June 1999 Responds to NRC RAI Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20196E5321999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards Addl Info Re Relief Request RR-A16 to Support NRC Approval of Relief Request ML20195K2751999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20196A6601999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Master Decommissioning Trust Agreements Revised After 1990 for Ohio Edison Co,Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co,Toledo Edison Co & Pennsylvania Power Co Re Bvnps,Units 1 & 2,DBNPS,Unit 1 & Perry Unit 1 ML20195F9071999-06-10010 June 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to NPF-3,changing Tech Specs 3/4.6.4.4, Hydrogen Purge Sys, TS 3/4.6.5.1, Shield Bldg Emergency Ventilation Sys & TS 3/4.7.6.1, Crevs ML20195F8851999-06-0707 June 1999 Withdraws 950929 License Amend Application,Proposing Mod to Allowable as-found Pressure Lift Setting Tolerance of Two Pressurizer Code Safety Valves ML20207G0751999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-04 on 990323-0513.Violations Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217N2321999-10-15015 October 1999 Requests NRC Approval to Use Alternative to Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(f)(4)(ii).Licensee Requests Extension to Specified Schedule for Implementing Updates to IST Program PY-CEI-NRR-2438, Informs That DBNPS & Pnpp Staffs Have Modified or Withdrawn Several of Positions Proposed within Re Request for Approval of Qap.Revised Positions Encl1999-10-14014 October 1999 Informs That DBNPS & Pnpp Staffs Have Modified or Withdrawn Several of Positions Proposed within Re Request for Approval of Qap.Revised Positions Encl ML20216J6701999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Post Examination Documentation for Written Operator Initial License Examination Administered at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station on 990920.Without Encls 05000346/LER-1998-001, Forwards Rev 1 for LER 1998-001,which Updates Corrective Actions & Revises Completion Date Re Implementation of Changes to Plant Emergency Operating Procedure.List of Commitments Attached1999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Rev 1 for LER 1998-001,which Updates Corrective Actions & Revises Completion Date Re Implementation of Changes to Plant Emergency Operating Procedure.List of Commitments Attached ML20216E5961999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs 3/4.3.2.1,safety Features Actuation Sys Instrumentation & Associated Bases 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2,reactor Protection Sys & Safety Sys Instrumentation ML20211K6611999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Copies of Operator License Renewal Applications for Individuals Listed.Operators Have Successfully Completed Appropriate Operator Requalification Training Program at Dbnps.Without Encls ML20211K6681999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Copies of Certified Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee (NRC Form 398) for Operator Candidates Listed Below.Without Encls ML20211H0201999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual FFD Rept for 990101-0630 for DBNPS, Unit 1,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) ML20211G3911999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Update to Estimated Info for Licensing Action Requests Through 010930,re Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates PY-CEI-NRR-2411, Informs That Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co Has Developed Corporate QA Program Manual for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station & Perry Nuclear Power Plant,As Discussed on 990318 Between Util & Nrc.Revised USAR Pages,Encl1999-08-19019 August 1999 Informs That Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co Has Developed Corporate QA Program Manual for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station & Perry Nuclear Power Plant,As Discussed on 990318 Between Util & Nrc.Revised USAR Pages,Encl ML20211J9201999-08-13013 August 1999 Urges NRC to Find Funds for Stockpiling Radiation Pills for Residents Living Near Plant ML20210T1061999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Preliminary NRC Forms 398 & 396 for Listed Candidates,Per Operator License Exam Scheduled for Week of 990913.Encl Withheld ML20210S6071999-08-11011 August 1999 Provides Final Response to NRC RAI Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at Npps 05000346/LER-1998-009, Forwards LER 98-009-01,IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards LER 98-009-01,IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made by Util Are Encl ML20210G5521999-07-28028 July 1999 Provides Addl Response to 980923 OL Licensing Exam Rept 50-346/98-301 Re OL Exam Administered in Aug 1998.Results of Root Cause Investigation & Corrective Actions,Discussed ML20210H0491999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising TS 3/4.7.5.1, Ultimate Heat Sink, to Allow Plant Operation in Modes 1-4 with Water Temp Less than or Equal to 90 F ML20210G3831999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to NPF-3,changing TSs 6.4, Training, 6.5.2.8, Audits, 6.10, Record Retention, 6.14, Process Control Program & 6.15, Odcm ML20210G4391999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs 3/4.3.2.1, Safety Features Actuation Sys Instrumentation, & Associated Bases 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2, Reactor Protection Sys & Safety Sys Instrumentation ML20210G7151999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising TSs 3/4.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, 3/4.3.3.2, Instrument - Incore Detectors & 3/4.3.3.9, Instrumentation - Waste Gas Sys Oxygen Monitor ML20210G5151999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs for Implementation of 10CFR50,App J,Option B for Type B & C Containment Leakage Rate Testing ML20211P3071999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Final Rept for 990504 Biennial Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise for David-Besse Power Station.No Deficiencies Identified for Any Jurisdiction During Exercise ML20210G3211999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Written OL Exam & Supporting Matl for Exam to Be Administered at DBNPS During Week of 990913.Listed Encls Withheld from Public Disclosure Until After Exam Complete 05000346/LER-1998-012, Forwards LER 98-012-01,which Is Being Submitted to Provide Addl Info Re 981018 Occurrence.Commitment List Attached1999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards LER 98-012-01,which Is Being Submitted to Provide Addl Info Re 981018 Occurrence.Commitment List Attached ML20209C3981999-07-0101 July 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/98-21.Corrective Actions:Developed Rev to Boric Acid Control Program & Work Process Guideline on Plant Leakage ML20209B5821999-06-24024 June 1999 Provides Justification for Rev to Completion Date for One of Insp follow-up Items Cited in Insp Rept 50-346/98-03, Designated as Inspector follow-up Item 50-346/97-201-10 ML20196G1251999-06-23023 June 1999 Responds to NRC RAI Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20196E5321999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards Addl Info Re Relief Request RR-A16 to Support NRC Approval of Relief Request ML20196A6601999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Master Decommissioning Trust Agreements Revised After 1990 for Ohio Edison Co,Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co,Toledo Edison Co & Pennsylvania Power Co Re Bvnps,Units 1 & 2,DBNPS,Unit 1 & Perry Unit 1 ML20195F9071999-06-10010 June 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to NPF-3,changing Tech Specs 3/4.6.4.4, Hydrogen Purge Sys, TS 3/4.6.5.1, Shield Bldg Emergency Ventilation Sys & TS 3/4.7.6.1, Crevs ML20195F8851999-06-0707 June 1999 Withdraws 950929 License Amend Application,Proposing Mod to Allowable as-found Pressure Lift Setting Tolerance of Two Pressurizer Code Safety Valves ML20207F4231999-06-0202 June 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to DBNPS Emergency Preparedness Evaluated Exercise Manual 990504, IAW 10CFR50.4.NRC Evaluated Exercise Has Been Rescheduled for 991208,since NRC Did Not Evaluate 990504 Exercise ML20207E9561999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Update to NRC AL 98-03,re Estimated Info for Licensing Activities Through Sept 30,2000 ML20207E2521999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Rev 18,App A,Change 1 to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1,industrial Security Plan IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20207E7801999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,allowing Use of Expanded Spent Fuel Storage Capacity.Proprietary & non- Proprietary Version of Rev 2 to HI-981933 Re Cask Pit Rack Installation Project,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld ML20206N0231999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards License Renewal Applications for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 for ML Klein,Cn Steenbergen & CS Strumsky.Without Encls ML20206D2421999-04-28028 April 1999 Forwards Combined Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept & Radiological Effluent Release Rept for 1998. Rev 11, Change 1 to ODCM & 1998 Radiological Environ Monitoring Program Sample Analysis Results Also Encl PY-CEI-NRR-2382, Forwards 1998 Annual Rept for Firstenergy Corp, for Perry Nuclear Power Plant & Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.Form 10-K Annual Rept to Us Securities & Exchange Commission for FY98 Also Encl1999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Rept for Firstenergy Corp, for Perry Nuclear Power Plant & Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.Form 10-K Annual Rept to Us Securities & Exchange Commission for FY98 Also Encl ML20206B8831999-04-17017 April 1999 Forwards 1634 Repts Re Results of Monitoring Provided to Individuals at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station During 1998,per 10CFR20.2206.Without Repts ML20205K5641999-04-0707 April 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 980415 RAI Re GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Ci During Design-Basis Accident Conditions. Rept FAI/98-126, Waterhammer Phenomena in Containment Air Cooler Swss, Encl ML20205K3871999-04-0707 April 1999 Forwards Copy of Application of Ceic,Oec,Ppc & Teco to FERC, Proposing to Transfer Jurisdictional Transmission Facilities of Firstenergy Operating Companies to American Transmission Sys,Inc.With One Oversize Drawing ML20205J1171999-03-29029 March 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to BAW-2325, Response to RAI Re RPV Integrity, Per GL 92-01,Rev 1,Suppl 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity. Rev Includes Corrected Values in Calculations PY-CEI-NRR-2377, Submits Decommissioning Repts for Bvps,Units 1 & 2,Davis- Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 & Perry Nuclear Power Plant,Unit 1,per 10CFR50.75(f)(1)1999-03-29029 March 1999 Submits Decommissioning Repts for Bvps,Units 1 & 2,Davis- Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 & Perry Nuclear Power Plant,Unit 1,per 10CFR50.75(f)(1) ML20205F5961999-03-27027 March 1999 Forwards Comments on Preliminary Accident Sequence Percursor (ASP) Analysis of 980624 Operational Event at Dbnps,Unit 1, as Transmitted by NRC Ltr ML20205D4791999-03-26026 March 1999 Forwards Rept Submitting Results of SG Tube ISI Conducted in Apr 1998.Rept Includes Description of Number & Extent of Tubes Inspected,Location & Percent wall-thickness Penetration for Each Indication of Imperfection ML20205L2031999-03-26026 March 1999 Submits Correction to Dose History of Tj Chambers.Dose Records During 1980-1997 Were Incorrectly Recorded Using Wrong Social Security Number.Nrc Form 5 Not Encl ML20205C7371999-03-25025 March 1999 Certifies That Dbnps,Unit 1,plant-referenced Simulator Continues to Meet Requirements of 10CFR55.45(b) for Simulator Facility Consisting Solely of plant-referenced Simulator.Acceptance Test Program & Test Schedule,Encl ML20205E3551999-03-19019 March 1999 Requests That Proposed Changes to TS 6.8.4.d.2 & TS 6.8.4.d.7 Be Withdrawn from LAR Previously Submitted to NRC ML20204J6361999-03-17017 March 1999 Forwards Firstenergy Corp Annual Rept for 1998 & 1999 Internal Cash Flow Projection as Evidence of Util Guarantee of Retrospective Premiums Which May Be Served Against Facilities PY-CEI-NRR-2375, Forwards List That Details Util Insurers,Policy Numbers & Coverage Limits for Two Power Plants,Per Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w)(3) Re Reporting of Property Insurance Coverage1999-03-15015 March 1999 Forwards List That Details Util Insurers,Policy Numbers & Coverage Limits for Two Power Plants,Per Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w)(3) Re Reporting of Property Insurance Coverage ML20204E6821999-03-12012 March 1999 Requests That Listed Changes Be Made to NRC Document Svc List for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20065D0491990-09-14014 September 1990 Forwards Operator & Senior Operator Licensing Exam Ref Matl for Exam Scheduled for Wk of 901112,per 900607 Request ML20065D4951990-09-14014 September 1990 Forwards Updated Exam Schedule for Facility,In Response to Generic Ltr 90-07, Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedule ML20059K4681990-09-14014 September 1990 Provides Supplemental Info Re Emergency Response Data Sys (Erds).Data Transmitted by Util ERDS Will Have Quality Tag of 4 & Point Identification for ERDS Renamed ML20059G2341990-09-10010 September 1990 Provides Response to Request for Addl Info Re Interpretation of Tech Spec 3/4.7.10, Fire Barriers. Interpretation Is Implemented & Unnecessary Compensatory Measures Removed.List of Fire Barriers Inspected on One Side Only Encl ML20059G4961990-09-0606 September 1990 Submits Voluntary Rept of Svc Water HX Testing During Sixth Refueling Outage.Expected Flow Rates Not Achieved.Periodic Tests Developed to Check Efficiency of Containment Air Coolers ML20064A6271990-09-0606 September 1990 Requests That Requirement Date for Installation & Testing of Alternate Ac Power Source & Compliance w/10CFR50.63 Be Deferred Until Completion of Eighth Refueling Outage ML20028G8611990-08-28028 August 1990 Forwards Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station Semiannual Rept: Effluent & Waste Disposal,Jan-June 1990. ML20059D4121990-08-28028 August 1990 Forwards Second 10-Yr Interval Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program ML20059D5521990-08-24024 August 1990 Forwards Semiannual Fitness for Duty Rept for Jan-June 1990 ML20059B5291990-08-23023 August 1990 Forwards Updated Fracture Mechanics Analysis of Hpi/Makeup Nozzle,Per 900510 Meeting W/Nrc.Util Believes That Addl Analysis to Assess Structural Integrity of Nozzle Using More Conservative Fracture Model Supports Previous Analysis ML20058Q3911990-08-16016 August 1990 Requests NRC Concurrence on Encl Interpretation & Technical Justification of Tech Spec 3/4.7.10, Fire Barriers ML20058P7801990-08-10010 August 1990 Advises of Intentions to Revise Testing Requirements for Fire Protection Portable Detection Sys at Plant & Functional Testing of auto-dialer & Telephone Line Subsys from Daily to Weekly Testing ML20063P9981990-08-0909 August 1990 Submits Supplemental Response to Insp Rept 50-346/89-21. Util Rescinds Denial & Accepts Alleged Violation ML20056A5341990-08-0303 August 1990 Confirms Electronic Transfer of Payment of Invoice I0942 Covering Annual Fee for FY90,per 10CFR171 ML20058M7791990-08-0303 August 1990 Forwards Rev 10 to Industrial Security Plan & Rev 6 to Security Training & Qualification Plan.Revs Withheld ML20058L1821990-08-0101 August 1990 Forwards Davis-Besse Dcrdr Human Engineering Discrepancy Repts 1988 Summary Addendum 1,Vol 1, Per NRC Audit Team Request ML20056A8341990-07-23023 July 1990 Forwards Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1990 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 ML20055H4601990-07-20020 July 1990 Discusses Resolution of Draft SER Open Item on Voluntary Loss of Offsite Power.Util Preparing License Amend Request Per Generic Ltrs 86-10 & 88-12 to Relocate Fire Protection Tech Specs & Update Fire Protection License Condition ML20055F9681990-07-17017 July 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,adding Centerior Svc Company as Licensee in Facility Ol.Change Allows for Improved Mgt Oversight,Control & Uniformity of Nuclear Operations ML20055F8561990-07-17017 July 1990 Discusses Util Planned Activities Re Instrumented Insp Technique Testing Performed at Facility in View of to Hafa Intl.Relief Requests Being Prepared by Util for Sys on Conventional Hydrostatic Testing ML20044B3001990-07-12012 July 1990 Provides Written Confirmation of Util Electronic Transfer of Funds to NRC on 900711 in Payment of Invoice Number I1050 ML20044B1841990-07-10010 July 1990 Requests Approval of Temporary non-code Repair & Augmented Insp of Svc Water Piping,Per 900626 Telcon ML20055D9701990-06-29029 June 1990 Provides Written Confirmation of Util Electronic Transfer of Funds for Payment of Invoice 0111 Covering Insp Fees for 890326-0617 ML20043H5291990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Plans Re Reorganization & Combining of Engineering Assurance & Svc Program Sections ML20055C7521990-06-14014 June 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-002, Potential Stress Corrosion Cracking of Internal Preloaded Bolting in Swing Check Valves & Justification for Alternate Insp Schedule for One Valve. No Anchor Darling Swing Check Valves Installed at Plant ML20055F2261990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards 1990 Evaluated Emergency Exercise Objectives for Exercise Scheduled for 900919 ML20043G5661990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Rev 9 to Industrial Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043G7811990-06-12012 June 1990 Forwards Info Re Implementation of NUREG-0737,Item II.F.2, Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation, Per NRC 900214 Safety Evaluation.Item II.B.1 Issue Re Reactor Vessel Head Vent Also Considered to Be Closed ML20043F6091990-06-11011 June 1990 Forwards Util Comments on NRC Insp Rept 50-346/90-12, Per 900601 Enforcement Conference Re Core Support Assembly Movement & Refueling Canal Draindown.Refueling Canal Draindown Procedure Provides Specific Draining Instructions ML20043E1301990-06-0101 June 1990 Withdraws 870831 & 890613 Applications to Amend License NPF-3.Changes Requested Addressed by Issuance of Amend 147 or Can Now Be Made as Change to Updated SAR Under 10CFR50.59 ML20043D5601990-05-31031 May 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Spec 3/4.6.4.1, Combustible Gas Control - Hydrogen Analyzers. Request Consistent W/Nrc Guidance,Generic Ltr 83-37,dtd 831101,NUREG-0737 Tech Specs & Item II.F.1.6 ML20043D5691990-05-31031 May 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,requesting Extension of Expiration Date of Section 2.H to Allow Plant Operation to Continue Approx 6 Yrs Beyond Current Expiration Date ML20043D1451990-05-31031 May 1990 Forwards Rev 11 to Updated SAR for Unit 1.Rev Updates Table 6.2-23 Re Containment Vessel Isolation Valve Arrangements ML20043D1621990-05-29029 May 1990 Documents Util Understanding of NRC Interpretation of Plant Tech Spec 3.7.9.1,Action b.2 Re Fire Suppression Water Sys, Per 891206 Telcon.Nrc Considered Electric Fire Pump Operable Provided Operator Stationed to Open Closed Discharge Valve ML20043C2331990-05-25025 May 1990 Forwards Summary of 900510 Meeting W/B&W & NRC in Rockville, MD Re Hpi/Makeup Nozzle & Thermal Sleeve Program.List of Attendees & Meeting Handout Encl ML20043B1701990-05-18018 May 1990 Forwards Revised Exemption Request from 10CFR50,Section III.G.2,App R for Fire Areas a & B,Adding Description of Specific Limited Combustibles That Exist Between Redundant Safe Shutdown Components in Fire Area a ML20043A5441990-05-16016 May 1990 Discusses Status of Safety & Performance Improvement Program Portion of B&W Owners Group EOP Review Project ML20043A2311990-05-11011 May 1990 Responds to Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/90-08. Corrective Actions:Results of Analysis of Radiological Environ Samples & Radiation Measurements Included in 1989 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept ML20043A4901990-05-10010 May 1990 Forwards Summary of Differences Between Rev 5 to Compliance Assessment Rept & Rev 1 to Fire Area Optimization,Fire Hazards Safe Shutdown Evaluation, Vols 1-3.Rept Demonstrates Compliance W/Kaowool Wrap Removal ML20042F9801990-05-0404 May 1990 Provides Written Confirmation of Util Electronic Transfer of Payment of Invoice Number 10716 to Cover Third Quarterly Installment of Annual Fee for FY90 ML20042F5781990-05-0303 May 1990 Provides Status of Hpi/Makeup Nozzle & Thermal Sleeve Program.Nrc Approval Requested for Operation of Cycle 7 & Beyond Based on Program Results.Visual Insp of Thermal Sleeve Identified No Thermal Fatique Indications ML20042F0951990-04-30030 April 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/90-02. Corrective Actions:Maint Technician Involved in Tagging Violation Counseled on Importance of Procedure Adherence W/ Regard to Personnel Safety ML20042F0841990-04-27027 April 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/89-201 for Interfacing Sys LOCA Audit on 891030-1130.Corrective Actions:Plant Startup Procedure Will Be Revised Prior to Restart from Sixth Refueling Outage ML20042E7311990-04-27027 April 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,deleting 800305 Order Requiring Implementation of Specific Training Requirements Which Have Since Been Superseded by INPO Accredited Training Program ML20042F1961990-04-27027 April 1990 Informs of Adoption of Reorganization Plan Re Plants on 900424.Reorganization Will Make No Changes in Technical or Financial Qualifications for Plants.Application for Amends to Licenses Adding Company as Licensee Will Be Submitted ML20043F7261990-04-20020 April 1990 Requests Exemption from 10CFR55.59(a)(2) to Permit one-time Extension of 6 Months for Reactor Operators & Senior Reactor Operators to Take NRC 1990 Requalification Exam. Operators Will Continue to Attend Training Courses ML20042E7091990-04-17017 April 1990 Forwards Annual Environ Operating Rept 1989 & Table 1 Providing Listing of Specific Requirements,Per Tech Spec 6.9.1.10 ML20012F5091990-04-0303 April 1990 Forwards Completed NRC Regulatory Impact Survey Questionnaire Sheets,Per Generic Ltr 90-01 ML20012F6001990-04-0202 April 1990 Submits Supplemental Response to Station Blackout Issues,Per NUMARC 900104 Request.Util Revises Schedule for Compliance W/Station Blackout Rule (10CFR50.63) to within 2 Yrs of SER Issuance Date ML20012E0181990-03-22022 March 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,changing License Condition 2.C(4) Re Fire Protection Mods to Fire Extinguishers,Fire Doors,Fire Barriers,Fire Proofing,Fire Detection/Suppression & Emergency Lighting 1990-09-06
[Table view] |
Text
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l TOLECO
%sma EDISON Docket No. 50-346 Roen P. Cnoust License No. NPF-3 7;'fy" Serial No. 804 m m.sa sm April 13, 1982 A82-288B an to Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation O I
Attention: Mr. John F. Stolz RECgggg Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 g, -
Division,of Licensing - APR19g {g ,
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Egsamer e Washington, D. C. 20555 \
S
Dear Mr. Stolz:
This is in reference to your letter dated February 10, 1982 (Log No. 905) relating to the request for additional information on reactor coolant system high point vents (Item II.B.1 NUREG-0737). Attached is the Toledo Edison response to the NRC request as applicable to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1.
Toledo Edison had planned to install the high point hot leg and pressurizer vents during the current refueling outage. On March 23, 1982 (Serial No. 795), we identified that installation of the pressurizer vent line would be delayed until the 1983 refueling outage. Excessive outage demands related to other post-TMI modifications have delayed completion of both the hot leg and the pressurizer vent activities until the next scheduled (Refueling III-fall 1983) outage after the current refueling.
This is consistent with the recent revision to Title 10 of the code of l
Federal Regulations, Section 50.44(c)(3)iii which modified the required l
implementation date to the first scheduled outage beginning after July 1, 1982.
Very truly yours, RPC:SCJ l
Attachments cc: DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector bt a/4 p ik Ch9 Si k
THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY EDISON PLAZA 300 MADISON AVENUE TOLEDO. CH!O 43652 l 8204190211 820413 i PDR ADOCK 05000346 l
P PDR
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 804 April 13,1982 ATTACHMENT 1 TO TOLEDO EDISON RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HIGH POINT VENTS
- 1. Submit operating guidelines for reactor operator use of the reactor coolant system (RCS) high point vent system. Also provide a copy of "Small Break Operating Guidelines for Davis-Besse 1," 69-1106003-01 (or latest revision), Babcock and Wilcox. The operating guidelines should include:
- a. Guidelines to determine when the operator should and should not manually initiate venting, and information and instrumentation required for this determination (reference NUREG-0737, Item II.B.I, Clarification A.(2)). The guidelines to determine whether or not to vent should cover a variety of reactor coolant system conditions (e.g., pressures and temperatures). The effect of the containment hydrogen concentration on the decision to vent I
or to continue venting should also be addressed considering the balance between the need for increased core cooling and decreased containment integrity due to elevated hydrogen levels.
- b. Methods for determining the size and location of a noncondensible gas bubble (reference Position (2) and Clarification A.(2)).
- c. Guidelines for operator use of the vents, including information and instrumentation available to the operator for initiating or terminating vent usage (reference Position (2)).
- d. Required operator actions in the event of inadvertent opening, or failure to close after opening, of the vents including a description of the provisions and instrumentation necessary to detect and correct fault conditions (reference Position (2) and Clarification A.(2)).
Response
The operating 8uidelines for the use of reactor coolant system high point vents are included in Attachment 2 - Supplement to Davis-Besse Unit 1 Small Break Operating Guidelines (Document No. 77-1130302-00 as revised by Toledo Edison, April 1982). Note that these guidelines refer to the use of the hot leg and the pressurizer vents. Following NRC approval of the attached guidelines and installation of the vents these guidelines will be incorporated into Davis-Besse operating / emergency procedures.
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Dsckst No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 804 April 13, 1982 Attachment 1 The Small Break Operating Guidelines for Davis-Besse 1 (Document No. 69-1106003-00) were submitted to the NRC through Serial No. 566 dated December 27, 1979, portions of which are now superseded. For your reference, Attach-ments 3 and 4 herewith include a copy of the latest revision of the Davis-Besse Emergency Procedure, EP1202.06 (Loss of Reactor Coolant and Reactor Coolant Pressure, Revision 19) and AB1203.06 (Inadequate Core Cooling Guidelines, Revision 4) respectively.
- 2. Demonstrate that the RCS high point vent system (including the pressurizer vent) flow restriction orifices are smaller than the size corresponding to the definition of a loss-of-coolant accident (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A) by providing the pertinent design parameters of the reactor coolant makeup system and a calculation of the maximum rate of loss of reactor coolant through the RCS high point vent orifices. For those new portions of the RCS high point vent system that are within the LOCA definition (i.e., upstream of the flow restriction orifices), verify that previous analysis or a new analysis has been performed to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.46 (reference NUREG-0737, Item 11.B.1, Clarification A.(7)). Justify why the flow restriction orifices are not placed upstream of the RCS high point vent valves to limit the amount of new piping that is within the LOCA definition (reference Clarification A.(4)).
Response
A loss-of-coolant accident is defined as a hypothetical accident that would result from a loss of reactor coolant at a rate in excess of the capability of the reactor coolant makeup system, from breaks in pipes in the reactor coolant pressure boundary up to and including a break equivalent in size to a double ended rupture of the largest pipe in the reactor coolant system.
The excess capacity of the reactor coolant makeup system during normal operation is 45 gallons per minute (GPM) at 2500 psig and 200*F. The venting path of the RCS high point vents is through 1" pipe, 2 control valves and the flow restriction orifice.
For conservatism in the calculation of the maximum flow through the restriction orifices the pressure drop across the valves and piping was neglected. Also, the downstream pressure of the restriction orifices was taken to be absolute zero instead of containment atmosphere pressure.
Credit is not taken for the fact that the volume of water provided by the makeup system expands once discharged into the RCS. Consequently, the l
flow restriction orifices are sized for a flow rate of 45 GPM at 2500 psig and 670 F (3.5 lb./sec.). The makeup water is supplied at a minimum of 45 GPM at 2500 psig and 200 (6.03 lb./sec.).
The design parameters used in this analysis for the hot leg vents and the results are as follows:
2 i
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Docket No. 50-346 l License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 804 April 13, 1982 Attachment 1 Upstream pressure of restriction orifice 1bs/in 2 = 2,500 2 = 360,000 lbs/ft Downstream pressure of restriction orifice 1bs/in 22 = 0
= 0 lbs/ft Maximum temperature, *F = 670 Makeup flow, normal Gallons per minute = 45 lbs/sec = 6.03 Formulas used 2
W1 = CYA2 2g, (P 3-P,3) p) y 1-B 4 W i = flow rate through restriction orifice, lbs/sec C = coefficient of discharge of restriction orifice, dimensionless A2 = cross sectional area of restriction orifice bore, ft2
~
g = dimensional constant, Ib , . ft Ib f . sec 2 Pi = pressure upstream of restriction orifice, lb g/ft 2 P2: Pressure downstream 2 of restriction orifice, lb /ft f
pi = density of fluid upstream of 3 restriction orifice, lb/ft Y = expansion factor of steam, dimensionless 3
Dock 2t No. 50-345 ,
Licenza No. NPF-3 . (
Serial No. 804
.'3 i
~
April 13, 1982 Attachment 1 -
1-B = beta ratio, ratio of restriction , -
orifice bore to internal pipe
' 'z" i 'A\
diameter, dimensionless s s , . , -
W2=VsAP2 ~,
W2= flow rate of hydrogen, ft 3/sec ,
', s
(, -T V = maximum velocity, ft/sec u T- l s
\s' A = orifice area, ft2 P2 = density of hydrogen, lb/ft 3
~
l,
, , ss R =- D V Pt orifice e - a p 7 ;s u
R = Reynolds number, dimensionless -
(needed for calculating C) ,
D = diameter of restriction orifice bore, ft v = velocity of fluid upstream of restriction orifice p = absolute dynamic viscosity, centipoise RESULTS ,
Beta ratio required, B = 0.2364 In 1 inch schedule 160 pipe, the required flow restriction orifice bore is +
0.1927 inches. ,
i ,
The pressurizer vent is sized so as to relieve 3.3 lb./sec. of steam as il;,u. ; i outlined in response to item 9 below. This is within the capability of '(,
one make up pump and therefore inadvertent opening of this vent path * '
during normal operation will not result in a LOCA. ,
REFERENCES
- 1. ' Fundamentals of Classical Thermodynamics' 2nd Ed., by Gordon J. Van Wyler and Richard E. Sonntag; John Wiley and Sons.
- 2. ' Chemical Engineers Handbook' 5th Ed., by Robert H. Perry and Cecil H.
Chilton; McGraw-Hill.
The flow restriction orifices are placed so that maximum protection from flashing and cavitation is afforded to the RCS high point vent valves.
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Dockst No. 50-346 Liccusa No. NPF-3 Serial No. 804 April 13, 1982 Attachment 1 Also, Clarification A.(4) requires double valve isolation for new or existing vent lines whose smallest orifice size is larger than the LOCA definition. The flow restriction orifices are sized smaller than the LOCA definition. In addition, the vent on the pressurizer is designed such that the inadvertent opening of both valves could not cause the RCS to depressurize when all pressurizer heaters are energized. This along with
- double valve isolation for each vent is above and beyond the requirements of NUREG 0737, Item II.B.1, Clarification A.(4). The new piping for the RCS high point vents is the minimal amount required to have the hot leg vents exhaust to the containment atmosphere and the pressurizer vent exhaust to the pressurizer quench tank (see Toledo Edison letter, Serial No. 795 dated March 22, 1982 for details of the pressurizer vent routing).
Since the design of the RCS high point vent system allows for adequate protection provided by the isolation valves and the routings of the vent system are short, placing the restriction orifices upstream of the isolation valves would not have limited the amount of new pipe within the LOCA definition substantially.
- 3. The following items apply to the portions of the RCS high point vent system that form a part of the reactor. coolant pressure boundary, up to and including the second normally clored valve (reference NUREG-0737, Item II.B.1, Clarification A.(7)):
- a. Verify that the piping, valves, components, and supports are classified Seismic Category I and Safety Class I.
- b. Provide the design temperature and pressure of the piping, valves, and components.
- c. Describe the instrumentation that has been provided to detect and measure RCS high point vent system isolation valve seat leakage (reference Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criterion 30).
- d. Describe the materials of construction, and verify that they are compatible with the reactor coolant chemistry and will be fabricated and tested in accordance with SRP Section 5.2.3,
" Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Materials."
- e. Although you have stated that the vent system valves are protected against damage from missiles, demonstrate that internal missiles and the dynamic effects associated with the postulated rupture of piping will not prevent the essential operation of the RCS high point vent system (i.e., at least one vent path remains functional) (reference Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criterion 4).
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_ __ _ . - . . . __-- - - - = - _ -
1 Dsckst No. 50-346 Licznta Ns. NPF-3 .
Serial No. 804 April 13, 1982 Attachment 1 I
Response
- a. All piping, valves, components and supports of the RCS high point vent system up to and including the second normally closed 1
valve are classified as ASME Section III, Nuclear Class I and are Seismic Category I.
- b. The design pressure and temperature of the piping, valves and components for the RCS high point vent system are as follows:
pressurizer vent 2500psigat67b*F hot leg vents 2500 psig at 650'F
- c. Instrumentation is not provided in the design of the RCS high point vents because of the low seat leakage attained by the isolation valve design. Double isolation further precludes the l
leakage of the RCS high point vents to such an infinitesimal amount far below the flow monitoring capabilities of existing flow detection technology. Additionally, the isolation valves have positive open/close indication in the control room, and RCS pressure, pressurizer level and pressure indications to show RCS status while venting.
- d. The materials of construction for the piping and components are as follows:
'c l
pipe, ASME SA-376 Type 316 stainless steel fittings, ASME SA-182 F316 stainless steel i
valves, ASME SA-182 F316, SA-240 type 316, SA-479 type 316 stainless steel I
f restriction orifice, ASME SA-479 type 316 stainless steel.
i All these materials are compatible with the reactor coolant chemistry. The fabrication and installation specifications meet the requirements of SRP Section 5.2.3 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.44,
- e. The routing of the vent system precludes any damage to it from missiles and postulated pipe breaks as discussed in Davis-Besse Unit #1, FSAR Volume 2, Sections 3.5 and 3.6.
- 4. Verify that the following RCS high point system failures have been analyzed and found not to prevent the essential operation of safety-related systems required for safe shutdown or mitigation of the consequences of a design basis accident:
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Dock 2t Ns. 50-346 Lic nsa No. NPF-3 Serial No. 804 April 13, 1982 Attachment I
- a. Seismic failure of RCS high point vent system components that are not designed to withstand the safe shutdown earthquake.
- b. Postulated missiles generated by failure of RCS high point vent system components.
- c. Fluid sprays from RCS high point vent system component failures.
Sprays from normally unpressurized portions of the RCS high point vent system that are Seismic Category I and Safety Class 1, 2, or 3 and have instrumentation for detection of leakage from isolation valves need not be considered.
Response
- a. The isolation valves, flow restriction orifices, pipes and supports in the RCS high point vent system are designed to withstand the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE); therefore, no analysis is required.
- b. Postulated missiles of the RCS high point vent system consist of the valve stems of the isolation valves. The primary source of energy associated with the RCS high point vents is contained fluid energy. The generation mechanism associated with these potential missiles is postulated by assuming that the seal and fillet welds of the valve stem fails. A material flaw or some other defect may permit this failure to occur and in turn allow the transfer of contained fluid energy into the kinetic energy of the missile generated.
Adequate overpressurization protection of the RCS is provided by the safety relief valves directly connected to the RCS pressure boundary. Additional margin against the generation of these potential missiles is provided by the standards established by the ASME to which these components must adhere and the various tests and periodic in-service inspections the components are subject to. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that missiles would be generated preventing the essential operation of safety related systems required for safe shutdown or mitigation of the consequences of a design basis accident.
- c. The pipe routing for the RCS high point vents was chosen to minimize the unlikely event of fluid spray damage to essential safety-related systems required for safe shutdown or mitigation of the consequences of a design basis accident. The pressurizer vent exhausts to the pressurizer quench tank and the hot leg vents are directed towards the steam generator shield walls.
For fluid sprays from pipe rupture up to the first isolation valve, the analysis revealed no damage to essential safety-related systems.
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Dock 2t No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 804 April 13, 1982 Attachment 1 S. Describe the design features or administrative procedures, such as key locked closed valves, alarms, or removal of power during opera-tion, that will be employed to prevent inadvertent actuation of the RCS high point vents. Also, since the pressurizer high point vent valves are powered by the same power supply, verify that the vent valves fail closed on loss of power, or provide a reliability analysis consisting of a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) or equivalent qualitative analysis that shows that no single active component failure could result in failure to close af ter intentional opening of l
the pressurizer high point vent path (reference NUREG-0737, Item II.B.1, Clarifications A.(7) and (8)).
Response
Each hot leg vent valve circuit is designed as a fail close circuit.
During normal plant operation the valves are de-energized with no power at the solenoid coil. Removal or loss of power during the operation of these valves will cause the valves to close. In addition, each of the two valves in series at each vent point are controlled by separate Class IE power sources, with the cables for each circuit being routed separately.
Any single failure in a circuit would not affect the other circuit.
The separation assures that a fire would not cause inadvertent opening of a vent path, or failure of a vent path if needed. The electrical design assures that a single failure, including interruption of a power supply or hot shorts, will neither prevent the ability to vent through at least one high point vent nor cause the inadvertent opening of any high point vent.
The pressurizer vent valves are powered from Class IE, Channel 2 power supplies through completely separate motor control centers. During normal plant operation these valves are deenergized. Removal or loss of power will cause these valves to close. The cables for each circuit are routed separately.
- 6. Demonstrate, using engineering drawings (including isometrics) and design descriptions as appropriate, that the normal RCS high point vent paths to the containment atmosphere discharge into areas:
- a. That provide good mixing with containment air to prevent the accumulation or pocketing of high concentrations of hydrogen, and
- b. In which any neacby structures, systems, and components essential to safe shutdown of the reactor or mitigation of a design basis accident are capable of withstanding the effects of the anticipated mixtures of steam, liquid, and noncondensible gas discharging from the RCS high point vent system (reference NUREG-0737, Item II.B.1, Clarification A.(9)).
8
Dockst No. 50-346 i Lic nsa No. NPF-3 .l Serial No. 804 i April 13, 1982 !
Attachment 1
Response
- a. The hot leg high point vents discharge inside the steam generator compartments, where the mixture of noncondensible gases will rise due to natural circulation to the top of the compartments at elevation 653'-0" and into the containment atmosphere where
- the containment air coolers will provide mixing and disperse any
- remaining concentration.
I The pressurizer vent will discharge into the pressurizer quench tank where it will mix in the 250 cubic feet vapor space of the tank till the pressure in the tank reaches approximately 85 psig.
At this point the noncondensible gases from the pressurizer vent will flow to the containment atmosphere from elevation 585 feet by natural circulation.
- b. Both hot leg high point vents discharge close to a 1" nitrogen line (Figures 2 and 3). The nearby structures, systems and components are capable of withstanding the effects of the anticipated mixtures of steam, liquid and noncondensible gases which would be discharged from the RCS high point vent system.
The pressurizer high point vent will discharge to the pressurizer quench tank. All vent paths have been analyzed and designed so as not to preclude the essential operation of safety-related systems required for safe shutdown or mitigation of the conse-quences of a design basis event.
- 7. Verify that operability testing of the RCS high point vent system valves will be performed in accordance with Subsection IWV of Sec-tion XI of the ASME code for Category B valves (reference NUREG-0737, Item II.B.1, Clarification A.(11)).
Response
Through a separate letter, Toledo Edison is proposing Technical Specifi-cation surveillance requirements for the RCS high point vents (see Serial No. 803 dated April 1, 1982). Thereupon, the surveillance requirements of Davis-Besse Technical Specification 4.0.5 will be applied to the RCS hot leg vents except that the surveillance will be performed once per 18 months during the cold shutdown or refueling mode.
- 8. Verify that all displays (including alarme) and controls, added to the control room as a result of the TMI Action Plan requirement for reactor coolant system vents, have been or will be considered in the human factors analysis required by NUREG-0737, Item I.D.1, " Control Room Design Reviews."
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Dockst No. 50-346 Liczn=e Ns. NPF-3 Serial No. 804 April 13, 1982 Attachment i
Response
Toledo Edison will consider the addition of all displays (including alarms) and controls, added to the control room as a result of the TMI Action Plan Requirement for reactor coolant system high point vents, in the human factors analysis required by NUREG-0737, Item I.D.1.
- 9. State the venting capacity of the RCS high point vent system, and the design criteria which were used in the selection of the vent system size (reference NUREG-0737, Item II.B.I, Clarification A.(3)).
Response
The venting capacities of the RCS high point vent system are as follows:
Hot Leg, Hot Leg, Loop 1 Loop 2 Pressurizer reactor coolant (GPM) 45 45 Not Applicable steam (1b/sec) 1.2 1.2 3.3 H2 (cu. ft/sec) 3 3 5.3 For assumptions used in the selection of vent system size see response to Item 2 above.
bj b/4 10
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