ML17298B617

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Forwards Draft Proposed FSAR Changes,Including Revs to Steam Supply Logic & Recirculation Flow Path for Auxiliary Feedwater Sys to Correct Nuclear Cooling Water Sys Flowrates.Changes Will Be Incorporated in FSAR Amend 14
ML17298B617
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 12/10/1984
From: VAN BRUNT E E
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To: KNIGHTON G W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ANPP-31405-EEVB, NUDOCS 8412120090
Download: ML17298B617 (475)


Text

DOCKET 0'5000528 05000529 05000530 i REGULATORY ANPORMATION DISTRIBUTION SSIEM (RIDGY I ACCESSION NBR: 8412120090.

DOC.DATE: 84/12/10 NOTARIZED:

YES FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station~Uni.t ii Arizona Publi STN"50 529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station~Unit 2<Arizona Publi STN 50 530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station~Uni.t 3~Arizona Pub'Ii AUTH INANE AUTHOR AFFILIATION VANBRUNT<E

~E~Arizona, Public-Service Co~RECIP,NAtlE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION KNIGHTONg GN W~Licensing Branch 3 SUBJECT!Forwards draft-proposed FSAR changesiincluding revs to steam aupply loafe S recirculation flow path for auxflfary~~d4 feedwater sys to correct nuclear coo'ling water sys flowrates~Changes will be incorporated in FSAR Amend 14'ISTRIBUTION CODE: B001D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE;, l,g,g TITLE: Licensing Submitta'I:

PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8 Related Correspondence NOTES:Standardized plantp Standardized plant~Standardized plant.05000528 05000529.05000530 RECIPIE~T IO CODE/NAME NRR/DL/ADL NRR LB3.LA INTERNAL: ACRS 41 ELD/HD$3 IE/DEPER/EPB 36'E/DQASIP/QAB21 NRR/DE/AEAB NRR/DE/EHEB NRR/DE/GB 28 NRR/DE/MTEB 17 NRR/OE/SGEB 25 NRR/DHFS/LQB 32 NRR/DL/SSPB NRR/DS I'/ASB NRR/OSI/CSB 09 NRR/DSI/METB 12 B 2$REG F IL 04 IB EXTERNALe BNL(AMDTS ONLY)FEIYIA REP D I V 39 NRC PDR 0?'TIS COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 0 0 6 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 1-1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1)1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NRR LB3 BC LICITRA,E, 01 ADM/LFMO IE F ILE IE/DEPER/IRB 35 NRR-ROEtM~L NRR/DE/CEB 11 NRR/DE/EQB 13 NRR/DE/MEB 18 NRR/DE/SAB 24 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40 NRR/OHFS/PSRB NRR/OS I/AEB 26 NRR/DSI/CPB 10 NRR/OSI/ICSB 16 NRR/DSI/PSB 19 NRR/DSI/RS8 23 RGN5 DMB/DSS (AMOTS)LPDR 03 NSIC, 05 PNL GRUELgR COPIES LTTR ENCI-lt 0 1 1~1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1~1 1 2 2 1 1-1 1 1 1.1 1 1 1~1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1-3 1 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 54, ENCL 46 e e~~~II t N f., W ut Arizona Public Service Company ANPP-31405-EEVB/WFQ December 10, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr.George W.Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No.3 Division of Licensing U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos.STN 50-528/529/530 PVNGS FSAR Update-BOP Systems File: 84-056-026 G.1.01.10 84-019-026

Reference:

(1)Letter from E.E.Van Brunt, Jr., APS, to T.Bishop, NRC Region V, dated May 7, 1984 (ANPP-29445);

Subject:

Final Report DER 83-76 (Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Logic).(2)Letter from E.E.Van Brunt, Jr., APS, to T.Bishop, NRC Region V, dated July 12, 1984 (ANPP-29951);

Subject:

Final Report DER 84-23 (Auxiliary Feedwater Pump"B" Discharge Valve to the Condensate Storage Tank).(3)Letter from E.E.Van Brunt, Jr., APS, to G.W.Knighton, NRC, dated November 13, 1984 (ANPP-31101);

Subject:

Appendix R Spurious Actuation Analysis.

Dear Mr.Knighton:

Enclosed for your information are draft proposed FSAR changes.These changes 1)identify the presence of essential HVAC to cool the essential spray pond pumphouse, 2)revise the steam supply logic and recirculation flow path for the auxiliary feedwater system (Reference 1 and 2), 3)correct nuclear cooling=water system flowrates, 4)clarifies the closure time of the main steam stop valves, 5)update the listing of safe shutdown equipment in accordance with the spurious actuation analysis submitted in Reference 3, 6)delete the letdown line low flow alarm, and make editorial corrections and clarifications.

These changes are considered acceptable as 1)the essential HVAC meets design criteria as described in section 3.2, 2)the auxiliary feedwater system changes are consistent with CESSAR safety analyses, 3)the nuclear cooling water flow-rates meet design requirements, 4)the revised closure time of the stop valves is consistent with the manufacturers criteria, 5)the listing of safe shutdown equipment supports the actions necessary to shutdown after a fire, and 6)the letdown low pressure alarm is sufficient to notify the operator to isolate the letdown lines.84i 2120090 841210 PDR*DOCK 05000528 A PDR

~If~~>>t 4 t hlr.G, M.Knighton ,'F~V8GS FSAR Update-BOP Systems ANPP-31405 Page 2 These changes are expected to be incorporated in FSAR Amendment 14 to the FSAR which is sc'heduled for submittal in February 1985.Please contact William Quinn of my staff if you have any questions.

Very truly ours EEVB/WFQ/mb Enclosure E.E.Van Brunt, Jr.APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director

%Ap I ANPP-31405 y p~STATE OF ARIZONA))ss.COUNTY OF MARICOPA)I, Edwin E.Van Brunt, Jr., represent that I am Vice President, Nuclear Production of Arizona Public Service Company, that the foregoing document has been signed by me on behalf of Arizona Public Service Company with full authority to do so, that I have read such document and know its contents, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made therein are true.Edwin E.Van Brunt, Jr.Sworn to before me tbis~day of 1984.Notary Publ Hy-Commission Expires: My GommissIon Expires April 6, 1987 I f s+(wl I4 mls\I I,4 0 t gE 1A

,Mf.g: M.Knighton'NGS FSAR Update-BOP Systems ANPP-31405 Page 3 cc: A.C.Gehr (w/a)R.P.Zimmerman (w/a)E.A.Licitra (w/a)

~)C I c~.p IC 12/10/84..8412120090 Table 7.3-7 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SIGNAL ACTUATED DEVICES LIST Figure No.10.4-11 10.4-11 10.4-11 10.4-11 10.4-11 9.5-9 9.2-4 Description Seismic Category I motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and pump room cooling unit (1)Non-Seismic Category I motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction from condensate storage tank (2)Seismic Category I steam turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and pump room cooling unit (1)Auxiliary feed regulating valves SGl (4)Auxiliary feed regulating valves SG2 (4)Diesel generator system Essential cooling water system Function Start Start (b)(a)(a)Refer to section 7.4.1.1 Refer to section 9.2.2 9.2-11 10.4-8 Essential chilled water system Steam generator blowdown isolation valves (4).Refer to section 9'.9 Close a.Cycles open and close to intact steam generator b.Steam admission va'lve opens fr'om intact steam generator 4 S 5GAgk3 f>Ster~Su~Pt~Vqhre.Ra~s/g+l opens on P,FAG-X SCg-gy ISp SAaw S~np~y Va~v<C~s(g@g~p<<, oAFhS-R 7.3 21 l I f I 1 PVNGS PSAR APPENhlX 10BPVNGS AFS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS design from the present Case l to design alternative Case 2.Speci f ic recommendations are as follows: Provide the capability to manually supply Train 3'uxiliary feedwater pump from the Train A diesel generator (Case 2).Provide position indication in the control room on (cx)the pump test bypass valves.Provide power to the suction valves for Train 3 auxil-iary feedwater pump from the Train A diesel generator.

Perform a total system test once every 1S months.Perform testing on different shifts.0 (Q)Pu ll Cow t<c.)i'u (w})ow pypafl vo.Ives gav c Lee>, JgfepcJ y c~4c/e fl~+LIL LRI'gV~'H4P pe&C l J~Cl~A.valve pot o$~oo a Ad~(a+i oh ho lohg<r i cpu~i e8~P 2-3 May 1981 10B-15/-16 Blank Amendment 4 I~

PVNGS FSAR APPENDXX 10B PVNGS AFS RELIABILITY

'ANALYSIS',i',;*~;i~~<r~I~i~,i e I i I of the main steam isolation valves.The power and con-trois for the valves associated with this pump receive'power from the Class 1E dc buses A and C.The:two safety-related auxiliary feedwater pumps are separated by a physical barrier.Piping and components

're:located, separated, or protected to preclude damage~C~I": ":.'.',~<.,from missile and environmental effects.~',>>~3i2 S stem 0 eration For emergency operation, normal flow is from the conden-':.sate storage tank to both the safety-related, motor-driven

'FS pump and to the steam turbine-driven AFS pump.An'lternative supply of water is provided by local manual cross connections to the reactor makeup water tank.A minimum flow recirculation system is provided on each pump discharge with recirculation to the condensate storage il tank.Each of these pumps can supply either steam gen-...erator,.with feedwater.

Condensate recirculation lines are provided downstream of the AFM pump to allow for full flow (m)pump testing.'I Either auxiliary feedwater pump can supply the necessary,'.'hedwater for reactor.decay heat removal and reactor cool-" down to 350F."-For normal AFS operation the non-safety-related pump, located in the turbine building, is employed.One manually operated auxiliary feedwater path to the steam generators is provided for the non-safety-related motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump through the feed-water heade At a reactor c"olant temperature of 350F, the shutdown cooling sys m is placed in operation.

The AFS duty cycle is the.".completed and it is returned to standby status.(>oleic is no re~+)r c we~+fear 4~i(flo<$~q$w~is a.cec<rcu.4<:>n woJe'd~s'g~c.L,o~je.4<s 4(c.aged o4 R ex.~g ka'~j f~ll SIW J~c<i~l~d;~n t'ncs.3-2 103-22 Nay 1981 I\I

~I'I PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX 10B PVNGS AFS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS l conservative approach to the consideration of the human factor involved in activating train+3 in Case 2.Under these conditions it is not unreasonable to expect Cases 2 and 2A to be closer in terms of unavailability.

4.2.2 Discussion

of Results.-'-j 4.2.2.1 Dominant Failure Modes~1~i~The analysis indicated that the greatest unavailability was due to human error.The human error was inadvertently leaving the pump recirculation valve open after a test and inadvertently leaving the pump discharge locked-open manual valve closed after maintenance on the pump.These valves ar'e not provided with position indicators in the control room.The locked-open pump discharge maintenance valve J will not be tested or checked with pump operations after pump maintenance.

The estimated human error failure probability for this was assessed at 2.7E-2 per demand.By tech specs, the pump recirc valve will be opened for pump testing-once a month per train.All pumps were.4)n assumed to be tested monthly.The data source indicates that the failure rate of valves with position, indicators in the'control room is assessed at about 1/2 order less;than the valves without position indicators.

The AFS pump discharge valves, both the check and locked open manual valves, V015 6 V016 and V024 S V025, do not indicate to be flow tested in any of the surveillance requirement.

A pressure indicator is provided downstream of these valves, but this does not fully assure that these valves are or will fully open.The two check valves, V079 and V080, which go to the feed-water heade s to the steam generators, again do not indicate to be checked or tested in any of the surveillance require-ments.The technical specification states that pump tests (a)~i$~$,n gg S+7f ting+iA$ar or.f;c.<J~:niff~~an i pu.les.k:on o4 an~va.lveS te tlat-re,c,'<re Ja+',~);~, (4-20 Amendment 4 10B-48 May 19S1.

I 0 t~,~~/~g PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX lOB PVNGS AFS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS shall be performed monthly and the crossover valves be tested at least once in 18 months, but no explicit t'otal-.system testing is stated.These check and locked-open manual valves can only be tested during a total system test.Thus, it is recommended that total system test be required at least once every 18 months.4.2.3 Conclusions The conclusions of the study are as follows: '0 A.B.C~D.E.Provide the capability to supply train 3 auxiliary.feedwater pump from the train A diesel generator (Case 2).Provide position indication in the control room on (a.)the pump test by-pass valves.h Provide power to the suction valves for train 3 auxiliary feedwater pump from the train A diesel generator.

Perform a total system test once every 18 months.Perform testing on different shifts~)veS h~" n yt'~"~p~+~4c+4 a+c.1oc c.d~i+4~W Q C~$, 5~A~l~g&f 4 Q)4I.I t'C 4-21 flay 1981].OB-49/-50 Blank Amendment 4 I 1 l

~~r~t PVNGS FSARTable 9.2-28 ESSENTXAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM WATER SYSTEMS Component Chillers Number of Units Unit Capacity 2.52 x 10 Btu/h, 6 210 tons Units Required for Operation 105 to 120F maximum cooling water Chilled water pumps Expansion tanks Chemical addi-tion tanks 20 hp, 400 gal/min go~gal ll gal Centrifugal type Closed to atmosphere Ball feeder The essential chilled water system is automatically activated by the actuation sign'als shown on figure 9.2-10.Redundant chilled water units are connected to independent chilled water trains A and B which supply chilled water to the cooling coils of the essential trains A and B air conditioning units serving the control room, ESF switchgear, electrical penetration rooms, ESF equipment rooms and ECW pump rooms in the auxiliary build-ing and the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms in the main steam support structure.

Since each train is capable of removing the total emergency heat load (100%redundancy), one of the redundant chilled water systems with its corresponding essential air conditioning units can be manually deactivated once the other train has demonstrated its capability to supply the required essential chilled water.Table 9.2-29 lists Seismic 9.2-118

PVNGS FSAR PROCESS AUXILIARIES high pressure air leakage from the compressed air system.This is accomplished by separation of the compressed air system from the engineered safety features (ESF)systems, or by use of barriers between systems.Safety valves are provided in the system to prevent or mitigate a high-pressure rupture-ncident.A normally open instrument air line and a normally closed service air line penetrate the containment (two separated penetrations), as shown in figure 9.3-1.The instrument air line penetrating the containment serves the normally operating valves of the pressurizer spray system and the normally operating valve of the nitrogen supply to the safety injection tanks (used to maintain pressure on top of the liquid in the tanks).The penetrating instrument line is provided with a a solcwoicf~check valve inside the containment and m~pp operated control++~ad cl-valve on the outside of the containment.

This~operated valve closes automatically upon a containment.iso atj.o otic>ical'Yp~in actuation signal (CIAS)or in case of an'ax ure.r It can also be closed manually from the control room.Should the line rupture inside the containment, air flow is limited to a flow of 10 actual.ft/min b~r a restriction orifice wo/emr~d'-

upstream of the~operated control valve.The service air line penetrating the containment is used for the refueling operations at the time of a programmed shutdown.This line is provided with a check valve inside the containment and a manual block valve at the point of service connection in the containment.

The line is provided with a locked closed manual isolation valve outside the containment.

A compressed air system failure has no effect on the capability, of air operated valves provided in ESF systems to perform a safe reactor shutdown.These valves are designed to fail safe in the absence of air;i.e.they position in a manner that does 9.3-5 1 1 0 t PVNGS FSARMECHANICAL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS Table 3.9-18 ESS"NTIAL SPRAY POND PUMP-SU~IitiARY OF MAXIMUM STRESSES AND ALLONABLES Item Suction bell Suction nozzle Discharge column Discharge shell, lower section Max Stress (a)(psi)12,114 3,041 30,447 4,479 Allowable Stress (psi)33-, 660 33,660 31,500 31,500 Discharge shell, upper section Tube.Discharge nozzle Pump shaft Bolts (axial)(shear)Shaft keys Driver stand 10,532 5,088 8,515 3,613 8,642 4,561 17,461 2,615 31,500 31,500 31,500 174,780 14,220 11,376 52,434 31,500 a.h The allowable stresses given above are vbtained by multiplying the values given in ASME III Division 1, Appendix 1, by the specified factor of 1.8 for faulted condition.

tests that veri y that the valve will open and close within a.pf~pgtH~M Ap6c<EO<N~the specified time limits when subjected to the lP~f+~~, and operability qualification of motor operators=or the environmental conditions over the installed life (i~e-, aging, rad'ation, acc'dent, enviro".went s'mu'ation, et".)in 3.9-57

PVNGS FSAR AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTILATION SYSTENS 9.4.7.3 Safet Evaluation Safety evaluations pertinent to the heating and ventilatioa system are numbered to correspond to the safety design bases-and are as follows.A.Safety Evaluation One The diesel generator building is provided with a HVAC sy'tem designed to distribute air over the-diesel generator, its components and the control equipment to maintain the maximum air temperature at or.below the maximum design temperature specified in table 9.4-2.A normal unit heating system, des'gned to distr'ibute tempered air in the diesel generator'building, main-tains the minimum temperature at or above the minimum design temperature and the maximum temperature at or below the maximum design temperature specified in table 9.4-2.C.Safety Evaluation Two No single failure of any component in the diesel gener-ator'uilding HVAC system can prevent the system from complying with safety design basis one.A single failure analysis is provided in table 9.4-7.Safety Evaluation Three~The diesel generator HVAC system fans, and dampers a e designed to Seismic Category I criteria.9.4.7.4 Ins ection and Testin Re irements p<RT Preoperational testing is performed as described in section 14.2.I~9.4.8'ZFiRENCES 1."Particulate Characteristics of Dust Storms at the T Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station," Final Report, Arizona Public Service Company, 1978.9.4-65 I

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'I PVNGS FSAR Table 9.4-2 INSIDE DESIGN CONDITIONS Space Temperatures" HVAC System Control room Compute" area ESF switchgear ESF equipment rooms Battery rooms Cable spreading Auxiliary bui'dine (exclud-'ina ESF equipmeat room-nd access cont ol area)h Access control area ESF pump room Containment building Fuel buildir.g Radwaste building Turbine building Below operating deck Above ope ating deck Diesel gene"ator building Diesel generator room Diesel generator control room Maximum (F)80(')80(a)77 77 85 122 104(d)80 104/120 ()120/100(104 104 122 122 140/20(122 Minimum (F)70 70 60 60 60 40 50 70 50 50/70(50 50 50 40 50 50 a~b.C.d.e.Relative humidity 40%to 60%104F for normal operation; 120F allowable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> followed by a decay to 104F over a 24-hour period 50-120F for normal operation; 70F-100F for refue'inc; 20 to 90%relative humidity During a normal plant shutdown, the shutdown heat exchanger rooms and adjacent valve galleries shall be maintained at a maximum temperature of 122F 120F during normal opera ion and testing of the diesel generator; 140F during essential operation of the diesel ger.era"or.

October 1981 9.4-3 Amendment 6

I I 4)4 7~@8~id Q&6Mw~~c~~>~k4o Vise f 2-0 I'I 1 Tt~blQ 9 4 3))VAC SYSTEMS--

SUMMARY

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~III,'I.>~~~11 Ilail Inil I N l I I i>ii I rill't i Oil I'<nl>en,lieI.>>>>1.1 r it s Si.i snii~I ail>'I<~I$I'VN>e!>(i>I I I i I y A" 1>>i~ii>>ie I'.>.;I)I><Ill ill.ill'y I;i)lite~I.7C>Qei<nil iien AtN>t N)8.2<>alt i'I.y (I<1!IS>Table 3.2-1 QUALITY CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS (Sheet 23 of 39)f P)~)V (>at hP I hP Ul f St sw i (>>I>et<elr ri>om nurml I All(i I'ln Vl)ki r I~io I i net I!>>I I Il<<lt.I liat I'>ii)II>>>I w<ei I: I)~>lilt>>al S Silt<)>ol'I

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  • >n>nvlm.il e<Xh<II!nt. talon Smoki!>>x)1>nt sys(om I'el II I)~imtei In ll!!rl w>>>k tl>.I'iril)i!i>in>(ion nys("m Well>e I'y!I~ill\'ill>at>>>I>~ail I i ()><>s (I'IIg i>i<)Ilail>>>>)Ill))e~y!II I'm>)i>et~>alii~I>I<O Silt>)s>1 I 111>l)I<In<!>el 11 I'I 1 I'll I'I l I'l l I'l I;I I I'I I I'l I l'll I'tl I AI I AII.I'tl AI I 11.1 Ii I II tl.)11 1.'<HA('Nh!<HA(:tth e i>1 I>el SHA<'NA~SHArtlh tll'I'h/AN((()NIA/AN I 11<1 11,1 Ii I 11 1 I>~1 ii, 1 Ii~I (til nl nl n'1 Ii I 11,1 Ii~I I>,i I'1.1 11.1 Il 1 ie 1 (I~)(y)(y)I>ii il I Ii 1 Ii 1 Ii I>><1>>I I i<i I i>.1 NNS ii~11<1 11<I Nt!S nel nel nl Ii I NNS NN!e~Nt!S)e M O p ~<~Mm porJaJm~~/pdmP JN~<c p~~v'Syp~gg~sJ$~r lEKC-3l 0f'Fvvfaag iS+(lg QAQ t~~l~le.~W iWg J PVNGS FSARMISSILE PROTECTION genera or fuel storage tanks, the condensate storage tank, or cause loss of integrity to the spent fuel pool.The missiles shall not cause loss of func-tion to any system described in section 3.5.B as required for safe shutdown.3.5.1 MISSILE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION The sources of missiles which, if generated, could affect the safety of the plant are considered in this section.These are rotating component failure missiles, pressurized component failure missiles, and tornado generated missiles.3.5.1.1 Internall Generated Missiles Outside Containment There are two general sources of postulated missiles outside containment: .o Rotating component failures o Pressurized component failure'tabulation of safety-related structures, systems, and components outside the containment, their locations, seismic categories, quality group classifications, and the applicable FSAR sections, which include system piping and instrumentation drawings describing safety design features, is given in'table 3.2-1.General arrangement and section detail drawings are located in section 1.2.3.5.1.1.1 Rotating Component Failure Missiles A tabulation of missiles generated by postulated failures of rotating components, their sources and characteristics, and provided missile protection is given in table 3.5-1.Amendment 2 3.5-6 September 198o 0 0 rt 0 0 Table 3.5-9 MISSILE BARRIERS FOR TORNADO AND ACCIDENT MISSILES (Sheet 3 of 4)Protected Systems and Components Missile Barrier Walls Roof Floor Concrete Thickness (in.)Design Concrete Strength (ps')4J Ul I 4J Diesel generator fuel storage tank Diesel fuel transfer pumps and pump motors Main steam line isolation valves Underground (10 feet below grade with DG fuel oil storage tank valve box located above it)Underground in DG fuel oil storage tank valve box Containment, structure wall Main steam support structure NA 16 44 39 NA 16'" 20 NA 5000 4000 6000 5000 4000 ,D 3J'D IW Condensate storage tank Condensate transfer pumps Condensate piping ssential spray pond pumps and pump motors Cylindrical walls Underground Underground 21 NA NA Pond discharge structure 24 None NA NA 24 NA NA NA 24 5CKC)4000 3: M k~0 td O H 0 ReFve4n)g~~$~<P4~~(,~~gad~,M u~/lOoAINUK klieg.NA, VA gA gA Table 9.2-0 HFAT LOADS AND WATER REQUIREMENTS NUCLEAR.COOLING WATER SYSTEM (Sheet 1 of 3)Component Boric acid concentrator package Radwaste evaporator package Waste gas compressor (2 ea)in series with Waste gas compressor aftercooler (2 ea)Reactor coolant sample cooler Safety injection system sample coolers (2 ea)Pressurizer vapor space sample cooler Pressurizer surge sample cooler Gas stripper Related System Chemical and volume control system (CUCS)Radwaste Radwaste Radwaste Sampling Sampling Sampling Sampling CVCS FSAR Section Reference 9.3 ll.2 ll.3 ll.3 9.3.2 9.3.2 9.3.2 9.3.2 9.3 Heat Load (ea)(106 Btu/h)14.00 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.26 7.6 (max)Cooling Water Requirement (ea)(gal/min)700 962 10 10 16 PCo~i~"<700 I' ,TURBINE GENERATOR actuator so that the stop valve is either fully open or fully closed.The function of the stop valves is to shut off the r flow of steam to the n maives lrs Er EII PREEEJR IOPREEEIII AIIQARE OEEO III O.&Eccllns're closed within 0.2 secon s or essay ac uat1on o e STEAH PP.P~RE.emergency trip system devices.These devices are independent+I-I keSslJT of the electronic flow control unit (see section 10.2.2.3.1.5). The turbine control valves are positioned by electrohydraulic servo-actuators in response, to signals from their respective flow control unit.The flow control unit signal positions the control valves for long range speed control through the normal turbine operating range and for load control after the turbine-generator unit is synchronized. The combined reheat valves located in the hot reheat lines are stop and intercept valves in one casing and control steam flow to the low-pressure turbines.During normal operation of the turbine, the stop and intercept valves are wide open.The intercept valve flow control unit positions the valve during startup and normal operations and closes the valve rapidly on loss of turbine load.The reheat stop valves close completely on turbine overspeed and trip.I0.2.2.3.1.4 Power Load Unbalance. Associated with the load control unit is a rate sensitive power/load unbalance circuit whose purpose is to initiate control valve fast closing action under load rejection conditions that might lead to rapid rotor acceleration and consequent overspeed. Valve action will occur when the power exceeds the load by at-least 40/and generator current is lost in a time span of 35 ms or less.Cold reheat pressure is used as a measure of power, and generator current is used as a measure of load to provide discrimination between loss of load incidents and occurrences of electric system faults.May 1981 10.2-7 Amendment 4 3S TURBINE GENERATOR Mhen the detection circuitry provides a signal indicating a ower/a u 0 con 3~ives.,are c>sed..--WAE.nl 0 6.AH PR R&w RE.IW l Avo A~e.~o~6 i~o.z s~c:~vs, eR LEeS in 0.2 s con o e s a as acting s enon'.or eac con-awe.H Ho SYKAM proem<trol valve.Simultaneously, the load reference signal is gxaunded and the load reference motor begins to run back toward the no load flow point.Should the condition disappear~ckly, the power/load unbalance circuit will reset automat-ically, and the load reference signal will be re-established near its value prior to the loss of load.Should the con-dition persist, and the load does not return within approxi-mately 45 seconds, the load reference runback will be completed. The power/load unbalance circuit will clear automatically when the cold reheat pressure drops below 40%.10.2.2.3.1.5 Overs eed Protection. Two means of overspeed trip protection are provided;a mechanical overspeed trip (OST)and a backup overspeed trip (BOST).The OST is a conventional eccentric ring that actuates a trip latch to operate a pilot valve that operates the mechanical trip valve.The mechanical trip valve releases the hydraulic fluid.pressure in the steam valve.actuator, allowing the springs to close the steam valves.The OST trip is set at 110%of rated turbine speed.(Refer to Protection System Block Diagram, figure 10.2-4.)The BOST is an electric trip normally set to operate at a slightly higher speed than the OST.Three independent BOSTs are provided by magnetic pickups from toothed wheels on the turbine shaft.The signals are amplified through electronic circuitry and are compared to trip speed reference voltage signals.Exceeding the trip speed will cause each BOST voltage to energize its master trip relay.The master trip relays, through a two-out-of-three logic, de-energize both pilot solenoids of the master (electric) trip solenoid valve.This releases the hydraulic fluid pressure in the steam valve actuators, causing the turbine main valves to close.The overspeed trip logic is shown in figure 10.2-3.Amendment 4 10.2-8 Nay 1981 PVNGS FSAR PROCESS AUXILIARIES not negate the safety-related functional performance of the system.A list of these valves is given in table 9.3M.-.9.3.1.2.2 System Operation Two compressors are normally in operation with the third on standby.Normally, one of the two compressors has adequate capacity for base load operation. The other compressor cycles on and off as required to meet increased plant demands as evidenced by a pressure drop in the compressed air system distribution piping.In order to equalize wear on all compressors, the compressors are interchanged for base load operation. In the event that the two.operating compressors fail to supply 4 Lcc+Ylcag+rip oPcxn epernti'ng cod&~>>>~o~w~s the full air demand><the resulting continuou'5 low pressure in the supply line initiates an automatic start of the standby compressor. Compressed air supplied by the compressors for instrument air use is filtered and dehumidified prior to its introduction into the instrument. air distribution piping.This instrument air subsystem includes prefilters, filters, and regenerative 'uplex air driers and filters.If plugging of a filter occurs, a high differential pressure alarm is provided to warn the operator who may then divert the air stream to the other filter through manually operated valves.Normally, filters are replaced on a regular basis to prevent plugging during operation. The duplex driers are utilized in such a manner that one regenerates while the other is in service.The units inter-change automatically on a time basis.9.3-6 Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet'1 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)+~c~HFÃ3 Train uA Train"B" AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM C Function: Maintain water inventory in the steam generators during hot standby and effect a reactor cooldown M-AFA-P01 and M-AFA-K01 and J-AFA-E01 J-AFA-HV-54 Ca)J-AFA-FT-40A A J-AFA-HV-32 J-AFC-UV-36 Auxiliary feedwater pump, turbine and control panel and 3-A~a-~<-52.Auxiliary feedwater turbine trip and'hrottle valve Auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator No.1 Auxiliary feedwater regulating valve to steam generator No.1 Auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to steam generator No.1 M-AFB-POl(J-AFB-FT-41A J-AFB-HV-3 0 ((s)J-AFB-Uv-34 Auxiliary feedwater pump (motor driven)Auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator No.1 Auxiliary feedwater regulating valve to steam generator No.1 Auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to steam generator No.1 13 M H 0 H 0 Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 2 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train"A" Train ftBn A.)J-AFA-FT-40B 0 J-AFC-HV-33 tff J-AFA<<UV-37 I Ql Auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator No.2 Auxiliary feedwater regulating valve to steam generator No.2 Auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to steam generator No.2 J-AFB-FT-41B(J-AFB-HV-31()J-AFB-UV>>3S(Auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator No.2 Auxiliary feedwater regulating valve to steam generator No.2 Auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to steam generator No.2 3 hrJ 0 a C O 0 R 0 a 0 0 Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF'ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT((Sheet 3 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train A Train"B" CONDENSATE STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM/Function: Provide condensate to the auxiliary feedwater pumps for steam generator makeup and provide makeup to the diesel generator cooling, essential cooling and essential chilled water systems.M-CTA-P01 Condensate transfer pump No.1 J-CTA-LT-35('ondensate storage (n)(tank level O)(x)M-CTB-P01 A 4 J-CTB-LT-36 Condensate transfer pump No.2 Condensate storage-tank level 0 a A 0'z O<<r Fl 0 a 0 C Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 4 of 37).(footnotes at end of table)'I Train"A" Train"B" MAIN STEAM SYSTEM J-SGA-PT-1013A J-SGA-LT-1113A Steam generator No.1 pressure Steam generator No.1 level (wide range)J-SGB-PT-1013B Steam generator No.1 (s)pressure J-SGB-LT-1113B Steam generator No.1 (s)level (wide range)J-SGA-PT-1023A Steam generator No.2 pressure J-SGB-PT-1023B }(s}Steam generator No.2 pressure J-SGA-LT-1123A Steam generator No.2'-SGB-LT-1123B (s)level (wide range)Steam generator No.2 level (wide range)J-SGA-HV-179((k)and J-SGA-HY>>179A and J-SGC-HY-179B and J-SGA-HY-179C and Steam generator No.2, line No.2, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller J-SGB-HV-178 and (~)J-SGB-HY-178A and~(,)J-SGD-HY-178B nc~).J-SGB-HY-178C and Steam generator No.1, line No.2, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller'unction: Dissipate heat generated by NSSS through atmospheric dump valves, provide steam to the Train A auxiliary feedwater pump and provide effective control of reactor coolant temperature during cooldown.I i'3 CA M t3 XI 0 U C o 0 z U z 0 U 0 C' 'I Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT((Sheet 5 of 37)(footnotes 'at end of table)J-SGA-HY-179R and J-SGC-HY-179S Train"A" I PI5EP7.c~)J-SGB-HY-178R and g5)J-SGD-HY-178S Train"B" W I Steam generator No.1, line No.1, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller e J-SGA>>PSL-313 g J-SGA-UV-500P and T-5C A-Ug-50oV Steam generator No.1 blowdown isolation and solenoid valves J-SGA-HV-184 and J-SGA-HY-184A and J-SGC-HY-184B and J-SGA-HY-184C and J-SGA-HY-184R and/ASEE7~8 J-SGC-HY-184S J-SGA-PV-313A Nitrogen supply to and atmospheric dump J-SGA-PV-313B valves J-SGA-HV-184 and and J-SGA-HV-179 J-SGA-PT-313 and Steam generator No.2, line No.1, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller I Steam generator No.1 blowdown isolation'nd solenoid valves J-SGB-HV-185 and J-SGB-HY-185A and J-SGD-HY-185B .and pg)J-SGB<<HY-185C (~)J-SGB-HY-185R ann (,)wr~sarJ-SGD-HY-185S (()(')J-SGB-PV-306Ag Nitrogen supply to and~((i)atmospheric dump J-SGB-PV-306B~ valves J-SGB-HV-185 and , and J-SGB-HV-178 J-SGB-PT-306 'and J-SGB-PSL-306 J-SGB-UV-500Q.Png.')p-gyp-gg-5008 13 0 D C O K 0 U z 0 0 t" O A f p)HH.RR 5 To PRIE 1 t4S E.R~~R t'E r-<cA-Hwc-<zgh CM ck I 0-MA-Hzc.-<v9B n.vd~-ggQ-WK,-l TQ a.eQ lQSCR.T Q~>r-gc A-H>c.-l SHR mme v-mR-H~c.-~BRB aw J.----V-SAR-WC--~8+'-5&9-WW-lB+/hlSELT(s3 Z-~e-~~-i~5 ($-,5C P-,.R 7-...l 7S c~l gs.)---------S64-HZC=(789.av g--"---(g)sc e,-H~->7SB AnZ (.(s)z-sos-H>C-~B~R ,Z-ma,-lgzc-)S5L anX~>.~S"KK=-~~and w-sc'e;=-~a=-)B5 -.-----.---- t 0 9 I 0 ft C 4P Table 9B.1-4 Train irAi)Train"B" LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 6 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)I O J-SGA-UV-500S and~gyp-u.'/-5005 J-SGA-UV-211 J-SGA-UV-204 J-SGA-UV-225 J-SGA-UV-223 J-SGA-UV-220 Steam generator No.2 blowdown isolation and'solenoid valves Steam generator No..1 hot-leg blowdown sample isolation valve Steam generator No.1 cold-leg blowdown sample isolation valve Steam generator No;2 hot-leg blowdown sample isolation valve Steam generator No.2 cold-leg blowdown sample isolation valve Steam generator No.1 downcomer blowdown sample isolation valve Pa.n.')J-SGB-UV-500R an/Z-sC b-u'l-Sook gn.o.)J-SGB-UV-228 Pc<e)J-SGB-UV-219 Pea.)J-SGB-UV-224 Pa~)J-SGB-UV-222 pcza.)J-SGB-UV-221 Steam generator No.2 blowdown isolation and solenoid valves Steam generator No.1 hot-leg blowdown sample isolation valve Steam generator No.1 cold-leg blowdown sample isolation valve Steam generator No.2 hot-leg blowdown sample isolation valve Steam generator No.2 cold-leg blowdown sample isolation valve Steam generator No'.1 downcomer blowdown sample isolation valve Table 9B.1-4 ZISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 7 of 37)*(footnotes at end of table)J-SGA-UV-227 Train"A Steam generator No.2 downcomer blowdown sample isolation valve (Cia)J-SGB-UV-226 Train"B" Steam generator No.2 downcomer blowdown sample isolation valve lO N I h)J-SGA-UV-172((c)and r-sc~~->'I->>~~Or g-sC'R-li.'t-l7~~J-SGA-UV-174((c)Steam generator No.1 downcomer feedwater isolation and sole-noid valves Steam generator No.1 economizer feedwater isolation valve J-SGB-UV-130 C)D.nd 3-MR-8-'/-150R ov'-sc a-<<9-l~J-SGB-UV-132 Steam-generator No.1 downcomer feedwater isolation and sole-noid valves Steam generator No.1 economizer feedwater isolation valve 13 J-SGA-UV-175((c)Dnd t,1.$-175&or 3-5,C,q-U.'t-l75B J-SGA-UV-177 (c)(d)J-SGE-UV-170 I Steam generator No.2 downcomer feedwater isolation and sole-noid valves Steam generator No.2 economizer feedwater isolation valve Steam generator No.1, line No.1, main'team isolation valve J-SGB-UV-135 and T-.5(~g.-I E.~t-(35R Or r-sc a-u-'t-(,)C~))p>B J-SGB-UV-137 J-SGE-UV-170 Steam generator No.2 downcomer feedwater isolation and sole-noid valves Steam generator No.2 economizer feedwater isolation valve Steam generator No., 1, line No.1, main steam isolation valve 0 C 0 M 0 2l'z 0 a 0 0 Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 8 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)J-SGE-UV-180 Train"A" Steam generator No.1, line,No.2, main steam isolation valve Train"B" J-SGE-UV-180 ~Steam generator No.1, (d)Pea.h line No.2, main steam isolation valve J-SGE-UV-171 (d)J-SGE-UV-181 (d)J-SGE-UV-183 (d)ca~i a-sc h-u'f-l'RA J-SGE-UV-169((d)T~A-L<Y-169R J<<SGA-UV-134 and J-SGA-UV-134A Steam generator No.2, line No.1, main steam isolation valve Steam generator No.2, line No.2, main~steam'solation valve Steam generator No.2 MSIV bypass and solenoid valves Steam generator No.1 MSIV bypass and solenoid valves Steam supply valve to auxiliary feedwater (turbine-driven) pump or J-SGE-UV-183 aM w sc s-u Y-1~>>J-SGE-UV-169 a J 3-568,-ug-)698 Steam generator No.2 MSIV bypass and solenoid valves Steam generator No.1 MSIV bypass and solenoid valves J-SGE-UV-171 "~Steam generator No.2, line No.1, main steam isolation valve J-SGE-UV-181 Steam generator No.2, (d)Paa)line No.2, main steam isolation valve 13 H z A 0 U C O M 0 z 0 U O 0 A 1 Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet-9 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train"A" Train"B" J-SGA-UV-138 and J-SGA-UV-138A Steam supply valve to auxiliary feedwater (turbine-driven) pump P A 13 C 0 M 0 R 0 a 0 0 1 K Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 10 of 37)(footnotes at end of.table)Train uA nB REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Function: Provide cooling during shutdown operations to preclude significant fuel damage<t)<>>J<<RCA-PT-102A J-RCA-LT-110X J-RCA-TE-112HA and J-RCA-TT-112HA J-RCA-TE-122HA-and J-RCA-TT-122HA J-RCA-TE-112CA and J-RCA-TT-112CA Pressurizer pressure Pressurizer level Hot-leg loop 1 temperature for control room display\Hot-leg loop 2 temperature for control room display'Cold-leg loop 1A temperature for control room display J-RCB>>PT-102B J-RCB-LT-110Y I J-RCB-TE-112HB and y~)J-RCB-TT-112HB J>>RCB-TE-122HB(and g)J-RCB-TT-122HB J-RCB-TE-112CB and Qg)J-RCB-TT-112CB Pressurizer pressure Pressurizer level Hot-leg loop 1.temperature for control room display Hot-leg loop 2 temperature for control room display Cold-leg loop 1B temperature for control room display 13 M 0 5 0 t" 0 4 Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet:11 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train"A" Train"B" J-RCA-TE-122CA and j-RCA-TT-122CA Cold-leg loop 2A temperature for control room display J-RCB-TE-122CB (i)and J-RCB-TT-122CB J-RCB-TE-122H2 (s)and ('~)J-RCB-TT-122H2 J-RCB-TE-122C2 and J-RCB-TT-122C2~ Cold-leg loop 2B temperature for control room display Hot-leg loop 2 temperature for remote shutdown panel display Cold-leg loop 2B temperature for remote shutdown panel display M C 0 0'I 5 0 a 0 C'0 A Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 12 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train"A" Train"B" SAFETY INJECTION AND SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Function: Provide the'capability to remo M-SIA-P01 J-SIA-FT-306 J-SIA-UV-651 IPSI pump No.1 LPSI pump No.1 flow Shutdown cooling suction isolation valve ve.decay heat.M-SIB-P01(J-SIB-FT-307(') J-SIB-UV-652~ LPSI pump No.2 LPSI pump No.2 flow Shutdown cooling suction isolation valve i CO J-SIA-HV-683 J-SIC-UV-653 Cg')and E-PKC<<N43 and E-PKC-B43 J SIA-UV-655 LPSI pump suction isolation valve (Refueling Water Tank)Shutdown cooling containment isolation valve 480V inverter Local starter Shutdown cooling containment isolation valve J-SIB-HV-692 (g')J-SID-UV-654 and E-PKD-N44 and~<y E-PKD-B44 J-SIB-UV-656()~~LPSI pump suction isolation valve (Refueling Water Tank)Shutdown cooling containment isolation valve 480V inverter Local starter Shutdown cooling containment isolation valve I Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 15 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train"A" CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Train"B" Function: Maintain Reactor Coolant System (RCS)inventory and boron concentration and provide auxiliary spray to the pressurizer for RCS pressure control.M-CHA-POl and J-CHA-PSL-216 J-CHA-HV-205 J-CHA-UV-516(f) aqg 3-cHA-u'I-514 J-CHA-LT-a4()40ZA Charging pump No.1 Pressurizer auxiliary spray valve Letdown to regenera-, tive heat-exchanger isolation valmaP and<olene iQ~ah<es Refueling water tank level M-CHB-POl d (S)J-CHB-PSL-217 J-CHB-HV-203's) J-CHB-UV-515 esS 3-cHS-u.g-815 J-CHB-LT-201 Charging pump No.2 Pressurizer auxiliary spray valve Letdown to regenera-tive heat-exchanger isolation va+ve sole,nc>>d gaXges Refueling water tank level V V.M 0 U O 0 e v~Non-Train Related J-CHN-UV-501 Volume control tank outlet valve U z 0 0 Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 16 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train nAir Train"B" J-CHN-UV-527 olume control tank bypass valve J-CHE-HV-536 Refueling water tank gravity feed valve J-CHE-PDV-240(Charging system pressure control valve 13 0 a O H 0 0 8 C aQ C Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Shee't i7 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train nAn Train nBn ESSENTIAL SPRAY POND SYSTEM Function: Remove heat from the Essential Cooling Water System and diesel generator cooling water heat exchangers and dissipate this heat into the atmosphere. M-SPA-Pol-W J-SPA-HV-49A I Essential spray pond pump Essential spray pond spray header inlet valve M-SPB-P01 J-SPB-HV-50A Q~)Essential spray pond pump Essential spray pond spray header inlet valve 13 J-SPA-HV-49B c.g)Essential spray pond'-SPB-HV-50B spray header bypass rf valve Essential spray pond spray header bypass valve 0 f Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF.ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 18 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train"A" rain ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM Function: Supply chilled water to HVAC Systems for the Control Building, Auxiliary Building and Main Steam Support Structure. M-ECA-E01 M>>ECA-P01 J-ECA-FT-533 cEnd'3-ace-wsc-533 J-ECA-LV-15 J-ECA-LT-15 and J<<ECA-LC-15 and J-ECA-LSLL-15 J<<ECA-TV-29 and J-HJA-TE-123 and J-HJA-TIC-123 Essential chiller A Essential chilled water circulation pump Main chilled water supply flow Chilled water expan-sidn tank level control valve Chilled water expan-sion tank level control Control room.essen-tial air handling unit chilled water control valve M-ECB-E01(,M-ECB-P01(J-ECB-FT-534 /r)nnQ p-Ccb-F5L-5 3 f~J-ECB-LV-16(i)~~ J-ECB-LT-16 and J-ECB-LC-lf&~ and J-ECB-LSLL-18 J-ECB-TV>>30(and J-HJB-TE-124 and J-HJB-.TIC 124-"i Essential chiller B Essential chilled water circulation pump Main chilled water supply flow Chilled water expan-sion tank level control valve Chilled water expan-sion tank level control Control room essen-tial air handling unit chilled water control valve 0 H 0 U z 0 O 0 K~-BC'-aoE E.~<<~h~l cw(4 aq poioor t~z-~~a-~c 4'~Esse~Hol c4'Ll.r B av>>'iaq po~r pa~I Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 19 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train iiA~r Train nBn M-EWA-P01 Essential Cooling Water System (ECWS)pump ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM Function: Remove heat, from all essential shutdown, and reject this heat components required for emergency to the essential spray ponds.M-EWB-P01 Essential Cooling Water System (ECWS)pump J-EWA-FT-151 and J-EWA-FSI-151 J-EWA-LV-91 J-EWA-LT-91 and J-EWA-LC-91 and J-EWA-LSLL-91 Cooling water flow to essential chiller ECWS surge tank level control valve ECWS surge tank level control C~)J-EWB-FT-152 and J-EWB-FSL-152 J-EWB-LV-92('>> J-EWB-LT-92 and (g)J-EWB-LC-92 and (j~)J-EWB-LSLL-92 Cooling water flow to essential chiller ECWS surge tank level*control valve ECWS surge tank level control 13 M 0 R Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 20 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train"A" Train Auxiliary feedwater pump room B essential air cooling unit Auxiliary feedwater pump room A essential air cooling unit M-HAA-Z04 HVAC-AUXILIARY BUILDING Function: Provide required environment in ESF equipment rooms in the Auxiliary Building and the Main Steam Support Structure.(s)M-HAB-Z04 M-HAA-Z02 M-HAA-Z05 M-HAA-Z06 IPSI pump room essen-tial air cooling unit Essential cooling water system pump room essential air cooling unit Electrical penetration room essential air cooling unit Cs)M-HAB-Z02 Cs)M-HAB-Z05 Cs)M-HAB-Z06 LPSI pump room essen-tial air cooling unit Essential cooling water system pump room essential air cooling unit Electrical penetration room essential air cooling unit'z 0 U A M 0 PQ 0 U 0 0 A)I( C Vl Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 21 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train iiA Train irB HVAC-CONTROL BUILDING Function: Provide required environment in ESF equipment and battery rooms and for operator comfort in the main control room and remote shutdown panel area.M-HJA-Z03 M-HJA-J01A r-gA-p psh'-8/M-HJA-J01B c~d.Z-H JA-0~+2 M-HJA-M25 g 6HCL e g-/gp-uv-$fg g'SF switchgear room essential air handling unit Control Building battery room"A" essential exhaust fan oQ di'R~g~d>a(prate m ycsrN>>Control Building battery room"C" essential exhaust~fan c e<cf~A~<~>'~'r c6"crrc ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve M-HJB-Z03 M-HJB-J01A(f'-08-PLOY-O'I M-HJB-JOlB Q3 Z-era-<ah'-g cz)M-HJB-M34 2g)7-WB~)'-4>~ESF switchgear room essential air handling unit Control Building battery room"D" essential exhaust fan o~d'agley e~f'uf prcsSu~i<<14'<.Control Building battery room"8" essential exhaust j fan u>d 8"j e~e~rfar pyg gywYc/e.4f&b ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 22 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)"Au Train~rBn M-HJA-M28 3-AU 5-0't-Llh M-HJA-M36 ow0 s-H3A-ug-5%V cu M-HJA-M34 Ql noh Z-H~~-u.S-'tl M-HJA-MSS g Qg4-L I-PvA M-HJA-F04 M-HJA-M01".a.v g 3-A5A-Lg-'t R ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve'SF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve ESF switchgear room'entilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Control room essen-tial air handling unit Control room ventila-tion isolation damper and solenoid valve (K3 M-HJB-M38 a~0 (~)3-Q3Q-0't-42A M-HJB-MS2(3 4>B-R5-ldll@H)M-HJB-M31 aW C~)S-H3'6,"4 I-QgQ N-HJB-N2!P ash C~)~-+we,-uV-t09'b M-HJB-F04(M-HJB"M01 o 4.~)r-Ha s-LR-CA ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve ESP switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Control room essen-tial air handling unit Control room ventila-tion isolation damper and solenoid valve 13 Q H 0 0 C 0 M 0 R I Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet.23 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Train)rAu Train"B" M-HJA-M52 z-Hah-lA'I-'18 M-HJA-M58 a.n4 z-HzR-u.g-MR I M-HJA-M59 u,m4 M-HJA-M03 M-HJA-M02 8~~Control room normal air handling unit return isolation damper and solenoid valve Communications/ inverter room air supply isolation damper and solenoid valve Communications/ inverter room air return isolation-damper and solenoid valve Fan HJB-F04 outside air supply isolation damper.Fan HJA-F04 outside air supply isolation damper M-HJB-M55 (~x~)Z-H~e-u.g-gB M-HJB-M10(ca~gi)r-Hve-u.g-<XA M-HJB-M13((i)O,nd C<)O'-H~e,-u.'I-i>A>>Train>>B>>DIESEL GENERATING SYSTEM Function: Provide onsite electrical power when offsite (normal)power is interrupted. M-DGA-H01 M-DFA-P01 Diesel engine Diesel fuel oil transfer pump M-DGB-H01(M-DFB-P01(~4~Diesel engine Diesel fuel oil transfer pump J-DGA-UV<<1 J-DGA-UV-3 J-DGA-UV-5 J-DGA-UV-7 J-DGA-UV-9 J-DGA-UV-11 J-DGA-UV-15 J-DGA-SSH-3 Cooling water makeup valve Starting air solenoid Starting air solenoid Starting air solenoid Fuel oil control Fuel oil control Starting air solenoid Overspeed trip J-DGB-UV-2 (s)J-DGB-UV-4 (s)J<<DGB-UV-6 C~>J-DGB-UV-8 (a)J-DGB-UV-10 ca J-DGB-UV-12 C~~J-DGB-UV-16 C>)J-DGB-SSH-4 Cooling water makeup valve Starting air solenoid Starting air solenoid Starting air solenoid Fuel oil control I Fuel oil control Starting axr solenoid Overspeed trip K I C rt Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE.SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet'27 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)V$I J-DGA-SSH-5 J-DGA-PSL-3 J-DGA-PSL-5 J-DGA-PSL-7 Train it A Overspeed trip Low lube oil pressure trip Low lube oil pressure trip Low lube oil pressure trip go J-DGB-SSH-6 (s,>J-DGB-PSL-4 (0 J-DGB-PSL-6 (s)J-DGB-PSL-8 Train"B" Overspeed trip Low lube oil pressure trip Low lube oil pressure trip Low lube oil pressure trip 13 J-DGA-PSL-9 J-DGA-LSLL-11 J-DGA-LC-1 J-DGA-LC-7 I E-PEA-G01 1 Low lube oil pressure trip Cooling water makeup control Cooling water makeup control Day tank level control Diesel generator (s)J-DGB-PSL-10 Ii1 (~)J-DGB-LSLL-12 (s?J-DGB-LC-2 (~)J-DGB-LC-8 E-PEB-GO[s)Low lube oil pressure trip Cooling water makeup control Cooling water makeup control Day tank level control Diesel generator 0 a C O 0 a r 0 a 0 C" 0 K Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 28 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)J-DGA-B02 J-DGA-BOl Train uA Diesel generator control and~excitation Diesel generator control eies~k g~~v 4r 4 y4 voyage i ne$PA J-DGB-902 cs>J-DGB-B01 (s0 g-5c~K-%foal Train'"B" Diesel generator control and excitation Diesel generator control Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT)(Sheet 32 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)E-ZAA-C01 E-ZAA-C03 E-ZAA-C04 E-ZAA-C05 E-ZAA-C06 E-ZJA-C01 E-ZJA-C03 z-SGA-C01 Train"A" 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution , auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet MSIV logic cabinet E-ZAB-C01((s)E-ZAB-C03 E-ZAB-C04(E-ZAB"C05 E-ZAB-C06 E-ZJB-C01)E-ZJB-C03 gSGB-Col Train"B" 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet MSIV logic cabinet 13 M C 0 M 0 R K E Table 9B.1-4-LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet 35 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)Only the Train"A" or Train"B" redundant identified equipment or specified alternate is required to be available to satisfy the safety function (i.e., no fire can disable both[redundant] trains).Train B equipment is used for the control room fire.Qp~~~~~g g<rcui+Circuit protection not required.Valve fails closed.'power supply at auxiliary relay cabinet may be required to ensure the capability for pressurizer auxiliary spray.For an MSSS fire, tripping of the non-essential auxiliary feedwater pump or the main feedwater pump may be required to prevent overfilling of the steam generator(s). For an MSSS fire, manual tripping of the main turbine and isolation of the steam bypass control valves may be required.Redundant vent valves are provided to allow depressurization of the Safety Injection Tanks (SIT s).In addition, each SIT is provided with an outlet isolation valve.For a containment fire, one of the SIT outlet isolation valves may have to be local manually closed to allow Reactor Coolant System depressurization to establish conditions for cold shutdown.JA For a containment fire,[CHH-HV-523 (located outside.containment) may be used to isolate letdown..ciosin)I Circuit protection not required.Local manual)'ay be necessary Redundant means of isolation of the inadvertent boron dilution path is provided by local manual closing of CHV-771 (Reactor Makeup Water Tank outlet).13 H 0 a C 0 M 0 0 U 0 0 A Table 9B.1-4 LISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPNENT (Sheet 36 of 37)(footnotes at end of table)h.op@.n.np Circuit protection not required.Local manual may be necessary. Redundant boration flow path provided by local manual alignment via CHV-327~and CHV-756 or CHV-755.i.Not r ired for'control room fire.WSC47O INSET (P mQ l.Local control from diesel generator control panel required for control room fire.n.0~Circuit separation not required.Train B circuit isolation from the control room not required.Local indicator J--LI-22 provides backup level indication. Refueling water tank level indication cannot be assured for a Fuel Building or control room fire.Backup tank level indication can be made available by attachment of a local indicator at one of the tank level transmitter connections. j.QLee~isaua~ontre1-uaing~ole or s u own from outside the control--I'oom. Local verzffcat'.ion of-expansion/surge. <an~vel ls ut rom side-the control room.13 W 0 U C O M~0 z 0 0 0 A C gt Table 9B.1-4 IISTING OF ACTIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Sheet'37 of 37).(footnotes at end of table)po Reactor Makeup Water Tank (RMWT)provides additional steam generator makeup capacity.BMWT level indication can be made available by attachment of a local indicator at the tank level transmitter connections. y,eh W<S'5 Fi're5'or the control room~4~steam generator level indication is an alternate for this function.lO N W I Vl S~Motor operated valve J-CHA-HV-524 is normally open, p Circuits for the identified device are provided with disconnect capability or are otherwise independent of the control room..ve For a control room fire, Train B pressurizer backup heater operation will be available from outside the control room.We Circuit protection. for valves J-CHB-UV-505 and J-CHA-UV-506 is not required since the valves fail to the"closed" position.Local manual alignment via handwheel is provided to.realign, if desired.t.For a control room fire, manual tripping of the reactor coolant pump (RCP)breakers (located outside the control room)may be required.D ele4d-u$I 0 U C O W 0 R z 0 O 0 C'Gl K ZH 5'To PHg~O'Z.g-ya S'ymm<H p C dV~i'rneAoa'pv p~W cdd 4~~~use re('uii cg@PC.va 7'd>>07 d~8 8'PU&-5T~~d~PPP fJ~5 P C.A~flag>>ga is uzof aud i'ade.!oy,~r'r>>d 5 f,&a 4o>>vs F/)'c'q vC C,bv 8 ij, o~n.Ssy~ed.h codlgoin>>r fdw/4 4c pc~MSZdi-T~m T~PAaW/82-SC>pose" king dsr 7 vdoJcpp 7 o~rw$74~>>7 urv PMev u i'/I 5'y)O'eC~>>6'C eye gp'o v c7joCv&H/u>>c7/4 gPP 5'ci eve v pf a.co>>7vdy r am prva.e(>~ed'd f f jA-A/IY--SvL ct rq 4(TQ)I'sld vdSodvI'my ~g-gu-~o~g<~/gpss./&pg g>>7 07 7'4 Cd+Pvd/Idd&the c+X'Pe Pd~cv 5~S S.b'c I 0 ~ov~.Co~for Woo~~7'o~A/du~~4~s c.jr'vc, ddsc/~~drPrv Qv 7 U sf caccia'~o ji'rrc cc/drA~p P bu-g j)s'age.r C W~~cr 4 SyS 4~>r'Z<~~r/~dr'~P~m Fsv~.Pv W~-'~5'ps'.~-~J cpgprpf id'ir@>po d J(c.Pct"c/y'crcf dos.gh e/e~~s.r'r~5'~rye-brrW/crJ ls'rfcc85>i.p Y.jo pr cc-/cd74.r oe7~dr/d oow fir d: 5yuvrodr5 ore/kp fr drd f'I 8rrr-e j r r g gal r x(u7 dwury ya Ivc/'5-d'c=ed@eve'&c('gscur'ug drov..ue j rs/d/an 8 optic r',b~, J g/o~n~/recur cud~g c~a*v sddrrrrr~c I/drc s cdc rr'sord~I y opd~r'e~G/<crrr'7 Sp ccPcr s 7r urn>L>.d d'ivy-r'/ur'r'-~ p ecdr'r'sooee~d S u~4s 4 yZ yg/VCX OVC.Z>H VCg~r'd-CZ Damp,<<sa.I'(~Z~gr'r ca pa5, pro'~/ops dd/docc'~.Op~r'dd~d rvcdrr'7 p~cv puyp ly n~auxiYi'a y pcS'oy ccr..(r'~f'ey $C'ecur~pO Ar'ydd.p4 JCHQ~C'av EDCrdfr'rc/&Cdrrdry 5'&.Fov f4.'ord'fad'/ rod'm jv.c gL"r'err<<--5/<om/r'drr S Cr'ec/ua i'~y ky~d ssc S3~~We~c-/secs Ccc ec~ra-oZArv<cdru Cu)'~57CAddr l PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS B.barrier common to Fire Area II (Zone 19).The floor of Zone 20 is 3-hour rated and common to Fire Area III.-The ceiling, which is also the roof of the Control Building, is non-rated. Safe Shutdown Equipment Subject to Loss in the Event of a Fire in Fire Area I 13 The following listed equipment is all Train A related with the exception of a Train B outside air supply isolation damper and solenoid valve, and its associated Train B conduit,'located in Zone 1.The isolation damper will fail to its desired position upon loss of air and/or electrical power.Although'the Train A and Train B redundant dampers are located in the same fire zone, the damper failure mode will assure that the dampers will be property positioned. In the event of a fire in Fire Area I, Train B components identified in table 9B.1-4 would be used to safely shut down the plant.~M-ECA-E01 o-7-E'c0-Eck ~J-ECA-LT-15 Train A essential chiller urn nP'es~nHal e4 lier av'xilieeq p>er@reel Train A chilled water expansion tank level control~J-ECA-LV-15 Train A chilled water expansion tank level control valve~M-ECA-P01~J-ECA-FT-533 ~J-ERA-FT-151 Train A essential chilled water circulation pump Train A main chilled water supply flow Train A cooling water flow to essential chiller~M-HJA-Z03 M-HJA-F04 Train A ESF switchgear room essential air handling unit Train A control room essential air handling unit 13'mendment 13 9B.2.1-4 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR~M-'ECA-T01 ~M-HJA-M02 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Train A essential chilled water expansion tank Train A fan HJA-F04 outside air supply isolation damper~M-HJB-M02 Train B fan HJA-F04 outside air supply isolation damper~'<<ECA-TV-29 ~M-HJA-M36 and S-HzR-uY-see ~M-HJA-M34 and 3-HzA-U.'f-9g 0 M-HJA-M55 aM S-HzR-uY-Hq~E-PBA-S03~E-PHA-M31 Train A ontrol room essential air handling unit chilled water control valve Train A ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Train A ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Train A ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Train A 4.16 kV Class IE switchgear Train A 480V Class IE motor control center~E<<PGA-L31~E-PGA-L33~E-PGA-L35~E-ZJA-C01~E-ZJA-C03 Train A 480V Class IE load center Train A 480V Class IE load center Train A 480V Class IE load center Train A 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet Train A 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet August 1984 9B.2.1-5 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR lg'f>(e~~E-PKC-H13~E-PKC-M43~E-PKC-N43~E-PKC-B43~E-PKC-D23~M-HJA-M25 aM Z-Hzp-u.g-hl5~M-HJA-M28 O.n 4 g-Hze-R'I-fly~E-PKA-D21- ~E-PNA-N11 E-PNA-D25' E-PKA-H11~E-PKA-M41~M-HJA-J01B a.n J V-HZA-T DSH-'K3 4 E-PKC-F13 0 M-HJA-J01A g,nd.a-era-posH-8 I~E-PKA-Fll FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Train A battery charger"C" Train A 125V dc control center"C" Train A 480V inverter Train A 480V local starter for valve SIC-UV-653 Train A 125V dc distribution panel"C" (in E-PKC-M43) Train A ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Train A ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Train A 125V dc distribution panel"A" (in E-PKA-M41) Train A 120V ac inverter"A" I Train A 120V ac vital instrument distribution panel"A" Train A battery charger"A" Train A 125V dc control center"A" Train A Control Building battery roupy."C" essential exhaust fan~gl di~4e~5a.l~sg a-e g~~r Train A 125V dc battery"C" Train A Control Building battery roo~"A" essential exhaust fan a<~6 t fk~+d.l p~ss UP<s~n5e c Train A 125V dc battery"A"~Train A cable trays and conduit~Train B conduit Amendment 13 9B.2.1-6 August 1984 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS~One Class A door in the 3-hour rated east wall to Zone 2 One Class A sliding door in the 3-hour rated east wall to Zone 2~One Class A door in the 3-hour rated north wall to Zone 3A 3.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings 4.Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating (Refer to Appendix 9A response to Ques-tion 9A.112).5.Protected Raceways None 6.Protected Structural Members C.Building structural columns and beams are protected by coatings with 3-hour fire ratings.0 0 Train A control room essential air handling unit~Safety Related Equipment and Components ~Train A cable trays and conduit~Train A essential, chil)er ,.<C<)7r~in A ess~As.l ch I/er'~uxilip~pouev pcfnef Train A Control Building ESF switCL)ear robm'h essential air handling unit Train A main chilled water supply flow instrumentation a.Safe Shutdown Related August 1984 9B.2.1-13 Amendment 13 6.Protected Structural Members FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 0 Building structural columns and beams are protected by coatings with 3-hour ratings.C.Safety Related Equipment and Components Train A Control Building battery room"C" essential exhaust fan and chhA~~+d s~Se.naos Train A 125V dc battery"C" Train A conduit D.Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components E.F.Conduit~Normal exhaust fan Radioactive Material None Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type 90 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)150 pounds of cable insulation (other)~2,500 pounds of plastic battery cases 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 89,100 Btu/ft G.3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity Fire Detection 66.8 minutes Actuation of the ionization smoke detector system(s)and the thermal detector system(s)activates the automatic C02 gas system.Either detector system alone can provide early warning.a.Safe Shutdown Related'August 1984 9B.2.1-33 Amendment 13 plgE.~~sR PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 6.Protected Structural Members Building structural columns and beams are protected by coatings with 3-hour ratings.C.Safety Related Equipment and Components Train A Control Building battery room"A" essential exhaust fan+pAJ J.ice.<eAVte.(pcs Train A 125V dc battery"A" Train A conduit D.Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components Conduit o Normal exhaust fan E.Radioactive Material None F.Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type 150 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)~340 pounds of cable insulation (other)~2,500 pounds of plastic battery cases 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 102,000 Btu/ft 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity G...-Fire Detection 76.6 minutes Actuation of the ionization smoke detector system(s)and the thermal detector system(s)activates the auto-matic CO gas system.Either detector system alone can provide early warning.a.Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 9B.2.1-36 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS includes Zone 19 and is bounded to the north and west by 2-hour rated barriers common to Fire Area I, to the south by a 3-hour rated barrier common to Fire Area V and a non-rated exterior wall, and to the east by a 3-hour rated barrier common to the Corridor Building and a non-rated exterior wall.The floor to Zone 19 is a 3-hour rated barrier partially common to Fire A'rea III.The ceiling to Zones 18B and 19, which is also the roof of the Control Building, is non-rated. B.Safe Shutdown Equipment Subject to Loss in the Event of a Fire in Fire Area II 6 Train B essential chj.lier 7fA n 8 essenRa~c/t l(er 6'ux</la~/ pc~~<<Train B chilled water expansion tank level control The following listed equipment is all Train B related except: (1)some Train A conduit located in Zone 10B and, (2)some HVAC isolation dampers and solenoid valves and their associated Train B conduit, located in Zones 2, 12 and 13.The Train A conduit in Zone 10B which is safe shutdown related is protected with a 3-hour rated envelope.The HVAC isolation dampers fail to the desired position upon loss of air and electrical power.Although the Train A and B redundant dampers are located in the same fire z'ones, the damper failure mode will assure that the dampers will be properly positioned. In the event of a fire in Fire Area II, Train A components identified in table 9B.1-4 would be used to safely shutdown the plant.~M-ECB-EOl Z-Ecb-row~J-ECB-LT-16 ~J-ECB-LV-16 Train B chilled water expansion tank level control valve~M-ECB-P01 Train B essential chilled water circulation pump'ugust 1984 9B.2.2-3 Amendment 13 lt PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS~J-ECB-FT-534
    • and 3-ECB-FSL-53+~J-EWB-FT-152 wed~-C~B-FSL-15 Q.N-HJB-Z03 N-HJB-F04 4 M-ECB-TOl~M-HJA-N03 Train B main chilled water supply flow Train B cooling water flow to essential chiller Train B ESF switchgear room essential air handling unit Train B control room essential air handling unit Train B essential chilled water expansion tank Train A fan HJB-F04 outside air supply isolation damper 4 M-HJB-M03 Train B fan HJB-F04 outside air supply isolation damper o J-ECB-TV-30 Train B control room essential air handli'ng unit chilled water control valve~M-HJA-M01 and 3-RrR-u.'I-'7A Train A control room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve M-HJA-M52 y.nh g-HTR-l<'I-/5 Train A control room normal air handling unit return isolation damper and solenoid valve Train B control room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve 0 M-HJB-M55 Z-HzS-N I-R,B Train B control room normal air handling unit return isolation damper and solenoid valve Amendment 13 9B.2.2-4 August 1984
    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS~M-HJB-M52 and~g>8-cry'-1oVR~M-HJB-M31 nn J~M-HJB-M28 artJ~gyp,-g/-J0'/p~E-PBB-S04~E-PHB-M32~E-PGB-L32~E-PGB-L34 4 E-PGB-L36 0 E-ZJB-C01~E-ZJB-C03~E-PKD-H14 E-PKD-M44~E-PKD-N44~E-PKD-B44 Train B ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Train B ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation.damper and solenoid valve Train B ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Train B 4.16 kV ac Class IE switchgear Train B 480V ac Class IE motor control center Train B 480V ac Class IE load center Train B 480V ac Class IE load center Train B 480V ac Class IE load center Train B 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet Train B 125V dc distribution auxiliary relay cabinet Train B battery charger"D" Train B 125V dc control center"D" Train B 480V inverter Train B 480V local starter for valve J-SID-UV-654 August 1984 9B.2.2-5 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR E-PKD-D24~M-HJB-M34 3-H3'8-U'l-0 BS~M-H JB-M38 ar J~-HQe-V'f-GWH~E-PKB-D22~E-PNB-N12~E-PNB-D26~E-PKB-H12~E-PKB-M42~M-HJB-j01A and z-H~s-msA-'l0~E-PKD-F14~M-HJB-j01B V-H.UE,-PbSH-83~E-PKB-F12 0 J-ZJB-E02 4 J-RCB-TT-122C2 ~J-RCB-TT-122H2 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Train B 125V dc distribution panel"D" (in E-PKD-M44) Train B ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Train B ESF switchgear room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve Train B 125V dc distribution panel"B" (in E-PKB-M42) Train B 120V ac inverter"B" Train B 120V ac vital instrument distribution panel"B" Train B battery charger"B" Train B 125V dc control center~iiBir Train B Control Building battery roo~"D" essential exhaust fan~4 dK 4 gcfeebQA pre sc~~(e.5cgsN Train B 125V dc battery"D" Train B Control Building battery room"B" essential exhaust fan c4 d i4gg~Q~(p<g~Q~~Sc,i~scc Train B 125V dc battery"B" Train B remote shutdown isola-tion disconnect cabinet Train B cold-leg loop 2B temp-erature for remote shutdown panel display Train B hot-leg loop.2 tempera-ture for remote shutdown panel display Amendment 13 9B.2.2-6 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS~M-HJA-M59 a.n J 3-HgA-U-'f-loS Train A communications/inverter room air return isolation damper and solenoid valve~M-HJB-M13 a~/Z-QZP,-g'I-tl~Train B communications/inverter room air return isolation damper and solenoid valve~M-HJA-M58 zv J Train A communications/inverter room air supply isolation damper and solenoid valve~M-HJB-M10 Train B communications/inverter room air supply isolation damper~~R and solenoid valve C.~Train B cable trays and conduit~Train A conduit (protected with a 3-hour rated envelope in Zone 10B).Deviations from 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G A deviation is requested from section III.G.2 to the extent that it requires three-hour rated barriers to separate circuits of redundant trains.Discussion: The west and north walls of the southeast outside air and HVAC chases (adjacent to Fire Area II, Zones 2, 5B, 12, 13, 14, and 19)are common boundaries with Fire Area III, Zones 16 and 17, at elevation 140'0".The outside air and HVAC chases have walls of reinforced concrete construction rated for 2 or 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.For a fire to propagate between redundant trains, the fire must burn through at least two 2-hour rated fire barriers.The outside air and HVAC chases are virtually devoid of combustibles. Fire dampers used in the two hour rated wall portions are identical inmaterial and construction to three-hour labeled August 1984 9B.2.2-7 Amendment.13 PVNGS FSAR PIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 6.Protected Structural Members C.Building structural columns and beams are pro-tected by coatings with 3-hour ratings.Safety Related Equipment and Components ~Train B cable trays and conduit~Train B essential chiller Cu)s 7rain Q c'ssenHQ@lait ao>ci(hq pciWr panel Train B main chilled water supply flow instrumentation Train B essential chilled water expansion tank Train B cooling water flow to'ssential chil'ler instrumentation Train A conduit Train B chilled water expansion tank level control instrumentation Train B fan HJB-F04 outsije air supply isolation damper Train A fan HJB-F04 outside air supply isolation damper Train B control room essential air handling unit chilled water control valve (a)Train A control room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve (a)Train B control room ventilation isolation damper and solenoid valve (a)Train A control room normal return isolation damper and air handling unit solenoid valve Train B control room normal air handling unit return isolation damper and solenoid valve V a-Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 9B.2.2-12 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR 6.Protected Structural Members FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Building structural columns and beams are pro-tected by coatings with 3-hour ratings'.C.Safety Rela'ted Equipment and Components Train B Control Building battery room"D" essential exhaust fan~~/Q i Q~~QQ~~~~<SeA5t C c~)Train B 125V dc battery"D" Train B conduit D.E.F.Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components ~Conduit Normal exhaust fan Radioactive Material None Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type 190 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)~320 pounds of cable insulation (other)~2,500 pounds of plastic battery cases'2.In-Situ Combustible Load 97,000 Btu/ft 3.Transient Combustible Load G.4.Equivalent Fire Severity Fire Detection 73 minutes Actuation of the ionization smoke detector system(s)and the thermal detector system(s)activates the auto-matic C02 gas system.Either detector system alone can provide early warning.a.Safe Shutdown Related s~~~~L lllOA 98.2.2-33 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS.- 6.Protected Structural Members C.Building structural columns and beams are pro-tected by coatings with 3>>hour ratings.Safety Related Equipment and Components Train B Control Building battery room"B" essential exhaust fan~~anJ Ji Fgren+g pessaeC~men<'Train B conduit D.E.F.~Train B 125V dc battery"B" Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components Conduit Normal exhaust fan Radioactive Material None Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type ~200 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)~390 pounds of cable.insulation (other)2,500 pounds of plastic battery cases 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 105,000 Btu/ft 2 G.3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equival'ent Fire Severity Fire Detection 79 minutes Actuation of the ionization smoke detectors system(s)and the thermal detector system(s)activates the a.Safe Shutdown Related s~3l Amendment 13 9B.2.2-36 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR~E-PEA-G01~J-DGA-B01 J-DGA-B02 J-DGA-LC-7 M-DFA-T02 M-HDA-A01~M-HDA-J01 Train A diesel room essential Train A diesel exhaust fan generator control air handling unit (cm~generator essential FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Train A diesel generator Train A diesel generator control Train A diesel generator control and excitation Train A day tank level control Train A fuel oil day tank I C.~Train A cable trays and conduit Deviations from 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G See the section 9B.2 introduction for generic deviations. Q(gg~'I eenerc h~volkap c<<'+~August 1984 9B.2.4-3 Amendment 13 F~p.E YcQK aQQ PVNGS FSAR5.Protected Raceways None FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 6.Protected Structural Members None C.Safety Related Equipment and Components ~Train A diesel generator controls and excitation Train A generator-low voltage control panel d'~cc.e Qenerah f c'Train A)high voltage w~De cmb<~e+Train A cable trays and conduit D.Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components ~.Neutral grounding transformer ~Cable trays and conduit E.Radioactive Material None F.Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type ~200 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)2.3.~1,000 pounds of cable insulation (other)In-Situ Combustible Load 38,100 Btu/ft Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity G.Fire Detection 29 minutes Ionization smok'e detector system(s)is provided for early warning.a.Safe Shutdown Related August 1984 9B.2.4-9 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 2.Zone Access~One Class A door in the 3-hour rated east wall to the central staircase. ~Two Class A doors in the 3-hour rated east walls to Zone 23A.'One 7-x 16-foot room air intake opening in the non-rated south wall.~One non-rated equipment removal hatch in the non-rated ceiling.~Non-rated grating in the non-rated floor to Zone 21A Open to the Train A exhaust stack.3.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings 4.Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.5.Protected Raceways None 6.Protected Structural Members None C.Safety Related Equipment and Components ~AY)Train A diesel generator essential exhaust fan~~Train A starting air-package (air receivers and compressors) Train A conduit~Train A exhaust silencer a.Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 9B.2.4-18 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS B.Safe Shutdown Equipment Subject to Loss in the Event of a Fire in Fire Area V The following listed equipment is all Train B related.In the event of a fire in Fire Area V, Train A components identified in table 9B.1-4 would be used to safely shut-down the plant.~M-DGB-H01~J-DGB-UV-2 J-DGB-UV-4 J-DGB-UV-6 J-DGB-UV-8 J-DGB-UV-10 J-DGB-UV-12 J-DGB-UV-16 J-DGB-SSH-4 J-DGB-SSH-6 J-DGB-PSL-4 J<<DGB-PSL-6 J-DGB-PSL-8 J-DGB-PSL-10 J-DGB-LSLL-12 J-DGB-LC-2 E-PEB"G/0 h J-DGB-B01 J>>DGB-B02, Train B diesel engine Train B cooling water'makeup valve Train B starting air solenoid Train B starting air solenoid Train B starting air solenoid Train B fuel oil control Train B fuel oil control Train B starting air solenoid Train B overspeed trip Train B overspeed trip Train B low lube oil pressure trip Train B low lube oil pressure trip Train B low lube oil pressure trip Train B low lube oil pressure trip Train B cooling water makeup control Train B cooling water makeup control Train B diesel generator Train B diesel generator control Train B diesel generator control and excitation Amendment 13 Au<ust lri;4 Fl lZ E.WOkOE os@8 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 4.Fiie Dampers None 5.Protected Raceways None 6.Protected Structural Members None C.D.F.Safety Related Equipment and Components ~Train B diesel generator controls and excitation Train B generator-low voltage control panel 4 i em<g ene~o+(Train B),hxgh voltage~~Lcm ca4ine+Train B cable trays and conduit Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components ~Neutral grounding transformer ~Cable trays and conduit Radioactive Material None Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type 200 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)2.~1,000 pounds of cable insulation (other)2 In-situ Combustible Load 38,100 Btu/ft 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity 29 minutes August 1984 9B.2.5-9 Amendment 13 ~F'~p~~WE.QS 6 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 2.Zone Access~One Class A door in the 3-hour rated west wall to the central staircase Two Class A doors in the 3-hour rated west walls to Zone 23B.~One non-rated equipment removal hatch in the non-rated ceiling.Open to the Train B exhaust stack.One 7-x 16-foot room air intake opening in'the non-rated south wall.~Non-rated grating in the non-rated floor to Zone 21B.3.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the.rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.5.Protected Raceways None 6.Protected Structural Members None C.Safety Related Equipment and Components f ovrA~Train B diesel generator essential exhaust fan~Train B starting air package (air receivers and compressors) a.Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 9B.2.5-18 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR~J-CHE-PDV-240 ~J-SGA-PT-1023A ~J-SIC-UV-653 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Charging system pressure control valve Train A steam generator No.2 pressure Train A shutdown cooling contain-ment isolation valve~J-'CHA-UV-516 and a-c Hg-u1-GAL~J-CHB-UV-515 a,n3 3-c HG-ug-Sl<~J-SIA-HV-606 Train A letdown to regenerative heat exchanger isolation~~and<oleic d va.hveS Train B letdown to regenerative he~t exchanger isolation vat~a~h so>each aa1Ueg Train A safety injection tank No.2B vent valve~J-SIB-HV-623 ~J-SIB-UV-624 Train B safety injection tank No.2B vent valve Train B safety injection tank No.2B isolation valve 0 J-SGA-LT-1123A J-SGB<<UV-500R an3 z-u..s-ug-sex R Train A steam generator No.2 level (wide*x'ange) Train B steam generator No.2 blowdown isolation and solenoid valves J-SIB-UV-652 Train B shutdown cooling=.suction isolation valve J-SID-UV-654 Train B shutdown cooling contain-ment isolation valve~J-SIA-HV-605 Train A safety injection tank No.2A vent valve~J-SIB-HV-613 Train B safety injection tank No.2A vent valve'0 August 1984 9B.2.11-5 Amendmegt 13 I PVNGS FSAR~J-SIB-UV-614 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Train B safety injection tank No.2A isolation valve J-RCA-LT>>110X J-RCB-LT-110Y J-RCA-PT-102A J-RCB-PT-102B J-SIA-UV-651 Train A pressurizer level Train B pressurizer level Train A pressurizer pressure Train B pressurizer pressure Train A shutdown cooling suction isolation valve~J-SIA-HV-607 Train A safety injection tank No.1A vent valve~J-SIB-HV-633 Train B safety injection tank No.1A vent valve J-S IA-UV-634 Train A safety injection tank No.1A isolation valve 0 J-SGA-LT-1113B 0 J-SGA-PT-1013A J-SGA-LT-1113A Train A steam generator No.1 level (wide range)Train A steam generator No.1 pressure Train A steam generator No.1 level (wide range)~J-SGB-PT-1013B ~J-SGA-UV-500P a.~Z-SCA-ul-mcus Train B steam generator No.1 pressure Train A steam generator No.1 blowdown isolation and solenoid valves~J-SIA-HV-608 Train A safety injection tank No.1B vent valve~J-SIA-HV-643 Train B safety injection tank No.1B vent valve Amendment 13 9B.2.11-6 August 1984 F')P-E Rc~~R PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS C.Safety Related Equipment and Components ~Train B steam generator No.2 pressure instrumentation ~Train B steam generator No.2 level (wide range)instrumentation Train A safety injection tank No.2B vent valve Train B safety injection tank No.2B vent valve Train A letdown to regenerative heat exchanger isolation a.n3 5o4-no d~Train B letdown to regenerative heat exchanger isolation valve~n 0<o'La~a', 1 Vahl8%Train A steam generator No.1 hot-leg blowdown sample isolation valve~Train A steam generator No.1 cold-leg blowdown sample isolation valve~Train B steam generator No.2 hot-leg blowdown sample isolation valve Train B steam generator No.2 cold-leg blowdown sample isolation valve~Train A steam generator No.1 downcomer blowdown sample isolation valve~Train B steam generator No.2 downcomer blowdown sample isolation valve~~Charging system pressure control valve~Train A steam generator No.2 pressure instrumentation Train A shutdown cooling containment isolation valve~a.Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 9B.2.11-26 Ai)aust 1984 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS to 10CFR50 Appendix R is detailed in section 9B.2.12.1.C. ~'M-AFA-P01 and M-AFA-K01 and J-AFA-E01 Train A auxiliary feedwater pump, turbine, and control panel~J-AFA-HV-54 Cln-R~e-5 T-52~J-AFA-FT-40A ~J-AFA-HV-32 Train A auxiliary feedwater turbine trip and throttle valve Train A auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator No.1 Train A auxiliary feedwater regulating valve to steam generator No.1 J-AFC-UV-36 ~J-AFA-FT-40B Train A auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to steam generator No.1 Train A auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator No.2~,J-AFC-HV-33 .~J-AFA-UV-37 ~M-HAA-Z04 Train A auxiliary feedwater regulating valve to steam generator No.2 Train A auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to steam generator No.2 Train A auxiliary feedwater pump room essential air cooling unit Amendment 13 9B.2.12-2 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR C~J-SGB-HV-185 and J-SGB-HY-185A and J-SGD-HY-185B and J-SGB-HY-185C and J<<SGB-HY-185R and J-SGD-HY>>185S ~,J-SGA-HV-184 and J-SGA-HY-184A and J-SGC-HY-184B and J-SGA-HY-184C and J-SGA-HY-184R and J-SGC-HY-184S FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Train B steam generator No.2, line No.1, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller a~8 z-sc 8-a E-18<n~5(8-'Q T-185 Train A steam generator No.1, line No.1, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller g see-~z-see-aa-<B~~J-SGB-UV>>500Q end 3=sc~Q,-Q.I-sQQQ~J-SGA-UV-172 Q-S,QA-U.f-1+2.$~Oq Z-<C A--u.g-lpga J-SGB-UV-130 Q-5(i Q-Q.'f-t3QQ~or 3-SC 8-Lag-tBqg Train B steam generator No.1 blowdown isolation and"solenoid valves Train A steam generator No.1 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves Train B steam generator No.1 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves Amendment 13 9B.2.12-4 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR~..4 a FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS~J-SGA-UV-174 Train A steam generator No.1 economizer feedwater isolation valve~J-SGB-UV-132 Train B steam generator No.1 economizer feedwater isolation valve~J-SGE-UV-170 Steam generator No,.1, line No.1, main steam isolation valve J-SGE-UV-180 Steam generator No.1, line No.2, main steam isolation valve J-SGE--169 J-<Ci g-g 9-l49R~-'~'t-hP-'F~and J<<SGA-UV-134A ~J-SGB-HV-178 and J-SGB-HY-178A and J-SGD-HY-178B and J-SGB-HY-178C and J-SGB-HY-178R and J-SGD-HY-178S an/ggg-q 6-17/a~4 SC 8-8 Steam generator No.1 NSIV bypass and solenoid valves Train A steam supply valve to auxiliary feedwater (turbine-driven)pump I Train B steam generator No.1, line No.2, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller August 19B4 9B.2.12-5 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS~J-SGA-HV-179 and J-SGA>>HY-179A and J-SGC-HY-179B and J-SGA-HY-179C and J-SGA-HY-179R and J-SGC-HY-179S Train A steam generator No.2, line No.2, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller a~3~-~~-~<-579~-S&R-P.W-1'79~J-SGA-UV-500S Train A steam generator No.2 blowdown isolation and solenoid S-GCA-Lg-SOOS v,lJ-SGA-UV-175 oeJ+-gap,-a~9->38 A~ar 3=BC A-uf-i~sB.~J-SGB-UV-135 a~J Q-5QG-U.'I-t 3K'Woc x-~c~s-u.g-(ss3,~J-SGA>>UV-177 Train A steam generator No.2 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves Train B steam generator No.2 downcomer'feedwater isolation and solenoid valves Train A steam generator No'.2 economizer feedwater isolation valve~J-SGB-UV-'37 Train B steam generator No.2 economizer feedwater isolation valve~J-SGE-UV-171 Steam generator No.2, line No.1, main steam isolation valve~J-SGE-UV-181 Steam generator No.2, line No.2, main steam isolation valve Amendment 13 9B 2.12-6 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS J-SGE-UV-183 a.ad wwc~A-u./-)8bA&-S,c g.-u.P-iQae J-SGA-UV-138 and J-SGA<<UV<<138A Steam generator No.2 MSIV bypass and solenoid valves Train A steam supply valve to auxiliary feedwater (turbine-driven)pump C.~Train A conduit~Train B conduit Deviations from 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G A deviation is requested from Section III.G.2 to the extent that it requires a three-hour rated barrier between adjacent fire areas separating circuits of redundant trains..Discussion: The mechanical penetrations in the containment boundary are not rated.Mechanical containment penetrations are fitted with flued heads constructed of steel with a minimum thickness of 1/8-inch.The special construction of the flued heads was designed to maintain the integrity of the Containment Building.Conclusion: 2.The existing design provides equivalent protec-tion to that required by Section III.G.2.The design is standard within the industry.A deviation is requested from Section III.G.2 to the extent that it requires a 1-hour fire barrier between redundant safe shutdown equipment in addition to fire detection and automatic fire suppression. August 1984 9B.2.12-7 Amendment 13 7'(~8 sjggm gggp~~hr bio.2~i~Ao.X, c~)~g bV~gs~)cr'q Tra n'B s*citn g ell eraser pci),pDV pos'h'og ,)F1M Yc;mK FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Train A auxiliary feedwater pump room essential air cooling unit Train A conduit(E.Train B conduit Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components Conduit Radioactive Material None Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type ~60 pounds of oil~20 pounds of grease~120 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)~270 pounds of cable insulation (other)~80 pounds of miscellaneous materials 2.In-Situ Combustible Load.14,000 Btu/ft 3.Transient Combustible Load G.4.Equivalent Fire Severity Fire Detection 10.5 minutes H." Ionization smoke detection system(s)is provided for actuating the deluge valve of the preaction sprinkler system and early warning.'Fire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic preaction sprinkler system a.Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 98.2.12-1$ August 1984 L F EC~~~7~PIGS FSM FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.5.Protected Raceways.Train A safe shutdown related conduit are covered by 3-hour rated protective wrappings. 6.Protected Structural Nembers None j o Train B auxiliary feedwater steam generator No.2~~Train B auxiliary feedwater steam generator No.2 regulating valve to isolation valve to Train B auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator No.2<'>C.Sa'fety Related Equipment and Components ~Train B auxiliary feedwater pump (motor driven)Train B auxiliary feedwater pump room essential air cooling unit Train B auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator No.1~'~~Train steam~Train steam e F~ai g R-O~4 0'bq a.Safe Shutdown B auxiliary feedwater generator No.1 gee w)~~ra.~i'A~g+<0m Q)Related isolation valve to Q,o z l'Q~4Cp.2)Qo Q, (inc.A~.~)B auxiliary feedwater regulating, valve to generator No.1 August 1984 9B.2.12-17 Amendment 13 +F)Pg EO<C 7+/PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS C.Safety Related Equipment and Components Train A steam generator No.1, line No.1, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller Train B steam generator No.2, line No.1, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller Train B steam generator No.1 blowdown isolation and solenoid valves Train A steam generator No.1 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves Train B steam generator No.1 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves 13 Train A steam generator No.1 economizer feedwater isolation valve Train B steam generator go.1 economizer feedwater isolation valve Steam generator No.1, line No.1, main steam isolation valve Steam generator No.1, line No.2, main steam isolation valve Steam generator No.1 MSIV bypass and solenoid valves~Train A steam supply to auxiliary feedwater (turbine-driven) pump Train A nitrogen suyj>>ly to atmospheric dump valve J-SGA-HV-184 aa Train B nitrogen supply to atmospheric dump valve J-SGB-HV-178 Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 9B.2.12-22 August 1984 F g.+PVNGS FSAR n C.FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Safety, Related Equipment and Components Train A steam generator No.2, line No.2 atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and-controller Train B steam generator No.1, line No.2.atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller Train A steam generator No;2 blowdown isolation and solenoid valves Train A steam generator No.2 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves Train B steam generator No.2 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves Train A steam generator No.2 economizer feedwater isolation valve Train B steam generator No.2 economizer feedwater isolation valve Steam generator No,.2, line No.1, main steam isolation valve Steam generator No.2, line No.2, main steam isolation valve~Steam generator No.2 MSIV bypass and solenoid valves(Train A steam supply to auxiliary feedwater (turbine-driven) pump Train A nitrogen supply to atmospheric dump valve@~CA=~S J-SGA-HV-179()(a)Train B nitrogen supply to atmospheric dump valve ee J-SGB-HV-185-an~MG a.Safe Shutdown Related August 1984 9B.2.12-27 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR F Pt~~9B.2.18 FIRE AREA XVIII 9B.2.18.1 Fire Area Description A.Area Boundary Descriptions FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSISB.Fire Area XVIII (figure 9B-3)contains Train A'iesel generator fuel oil storage components found in the outside areas.This fire area includes Zone 78A only (figure 9B-34).Fire Area XVIII is located to the southwest of the Diesel Generator Building (Fire Area IV).The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train A and Train B (Fire Area XIX)diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks and pumps are buried side by side.The Unit 3 Train B (Fire Area XIX)tank and pump are buried separate from Fire Area XVIII, to the southeast of the Diesel Generator Building.Safe Shutdown Equipment Subject to Loss in the Event of a Fire in Fire Area XVIII The following listed equipment is'all Train A related.In the event of a fire in Fire Area XVIII, Train B components identified in table 9B.1-4 would be used to safely shutdown the plant.~M-DFA-T01 Train A diesel fuel oil storage tank~M-DFA-P01 Train A diesel fuel oil transfer pump Train A conduit C.Deviations from 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G See the section 9B.2 introduction for generic deviations. 1 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.19 FIRE AREA XIX 9B.2.19.1 Fire Area Descri tion A.Area Boundary Descriptions Fire Area XIX (figure 9B-3)contains Train B diesel generator fuel oil storage components found in the outside areas.This fire area includes Zone 78B only (figure 9B-33).Fire Area XIX of Units 1 and 2 is located to the south-west of the Diesel Generator Building (Fire Area IV).The Train A (Fire Area XVIII)and Train B diesel genera-tor fuel oil storage tanks and pumps are buried side by side.The Unit 3 Train B tank and pump are buried separate from Train A (Fire Area XVIII), to the southeast of the Diesel Generator Building (Fire Area V).B.Safe Shutdown Equipment Subject to Loss in the Event of a Fire in Fire Area XIX The following listed equipment=is all Train B related.In the event of a fire in'Fire Area XIX, Train A components identified in table 9B.1-4 would be used to safely shutdown the plant.~M-DFB<<T01~M-DFB-POl~B~Train B diesel fuel oil storage tank Train B diesel fuel oil transfer pump~Train B conduit C.Deviations From 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G See the section 9B.2 introduction for generic deviations. i-August 1984 9B.2.19-1 Amendment 13 Cl %5 CI~a I atVLOC>>~CS I~C l g IC~al I I C Ca vl vvOC a Qrr.I I ,Ci~e IC Cv~Ov IC aalllvaI la alI~Islaal Satv~~IIVV~: C V~)'l v~Ca~OOS.O al CD C<<vaOIal Lla(IO a ICOv?a i ISIS~C'vaSS j..:.v I l Cv'005'OCaa 2'0 C VISI C~Ca 5 5~~~~ve I Cv~l~%I C~va5 I I Co tg.~hl 5 I IC IC N Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station FSAR SAFE SHUTDOWN FLOW PATHS CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Figure 9B-41 August 19B4.Amenciment 13 >>ieP>>~>>'I~~~>>~.>>a>>>>'>>a>>~>>>>>>~>>aK'EVC>>>>t l'>>a>>4g~EcNTEL tot tool auclol I toeco towage tilt Italo oaclclo Ital~Inao~Illioa Cata Oa>>IIOO>>>>boa talk ck>>lcaa alaa voalk4 ccNIaol, Calle>>~>>a>>>>a~Iaaa w>>~I., r~~~ 13 Pa1o Va de Nuckar Generating, Station FSAR SAFE SHUTDOWN FLOW PATHS SAFETY INJECTION 6 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEH Figure 9B-42 August 1984-Amencment 13 , ~~(.I~~1 I I J I 1 I)I 4 4 (I I I 4 I I I 1 I ria t'I i 4 4 f)I I'I)I l l I M e Qt=l N Ni~(=5<a'(Q'6?\~e H ta N~kdiJII~at gQLI))t diPP~lt V~Wt~I--'=-,"I N N~H~'(y>>M QI>>vae'"0~N NQI~(>l" (tl)~I W~~I M~I~Hl NN~>>Ne M Li)>>I I I (")~e Ill NN N Hill te iil NNI>>N~a NH~\I I NNI>>Ie Ne N te>>H>>>>H N~~~N I N~e H N~He INC)(TEL ICIIICI CICLIIIIITIC IILNIT IIL~'Il~It avRIII uar~IItaa II oa~aec lie>>>>Dole>> eaoe e>>IIII I>>ICII Itlltt~ID>>l a Ita>>IDO>>N COOL INO at I I tv HN~M~~la>>a&.>>I~I 1 I 13 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station FSAR SAFE SHUTDOWN FLOW PATHS MAIN STEAM SYSTEM Figure 9B-43 (Sheet 1 of 2)August 1984 Amendment 13 (g~<<~~a-~v P..A:.~~~(g Io!~~~>\wo I a (=)pig~~}<<IO rs~IUm L."4)I--~~~~-r lge I I'~4~~~<4 (;l(Q.<<I~I IO~qwr Pw~>>~o U H$Q egrd)(r~~(>>)'(V IP'Ae~r ($~<<~I~1<<<<~m 4 w>I'4 sro s~~~~.~~(" I,(ug~!de!".:).:.Pf...,~s~~""e~Wl<CC}N i=.)er aa Q')'<<P'!(")~I=!(.),~~~IO (rd)'r.~~grl)L.-.!gth}'s~~o3'4 9}4-IECllffL Cdddddd~VCldld tCCCC tdMCT tsld'Idldd 44CCCCC CIII~I Isd ISIIS04 44CC 4>4SIOOW t404 tris>4~s>IN clcs>e crdscos oe<<>>>><<>>W4~I I>>44 os@le 9s-H5 (~gy(46 4) 5C ol ICISL$0 IS 1CsSS ggPLrlCK RwTRc.t4c.V Ply~PE-R5 gkcLF Dla Ll~11$$~S 5 SC CS pg I I I I I I I I I l I I I I I I I I I I SC~CS SCHUSS~I I~I 101 5~~LI 1~SS~~S~S I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I SC%1~I 1C$5 1$$1 11$$$~S SC~C+I~l,va,vl~il 5 5 05$'SL CY kI 5 i5'i'$1 O+CSI 0'0-Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station FSAR SAFE SHUTDOWN FLOW PATHS MAIN STEAM SYSTEM Figure 9B-43 (Sheet 2 of 2)August 1984 Amencment 13 ~5 M M<<oo'7b~~e+I"".(Lef.....Qe~V~-.:..-"----..Fib ~~J I I I'I I I t I I l I I I I I I I o I 3 I I I'I I I 1 I I!~I~o--U~O~f~~<<eo~()e (I--~()-.4 Q)'-)v eP~~I~I~~~~i~R q<"-.rA cob)")we>>ep (:l'-.vef~I~~V V W~e e~e~~~<<el Q 4.(8)~t~M<<I<<Ve~eel e Yo e e l e I e%~~..'r~$'"-4.e3~"7I.f ee v 4~4g~ECHHL aSuIII IuaI I I Iaau IlaaII IIII IIIII IWEIII Ilol~IleoI Itlle<<<<I<<eoeeoo Oleo M<<Meo~elm Ieeea e<<e F<c 9eH3 (skL 2./>) 13 Palo Verde nuclear Generating Station~.FSAR SAFE SHUTDOhN FLOh'ATHS AUXILIARY FEEDhATER AND CONDENSATE STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM Figure 9B-44 August 1984 Amendment 13 u.u.%7=i f.'): I='>Ci+re eee P(gr r>>~~~(t-Ifa)y<"(rsf JP'e'rt.l~~acro o Ir~I oe ooeoeoL~Ir~U<-4.-((l bf-.k-.bT N=--"O.t;f=.'g~-.Q"-i~\~Ui~j I pie~r~~~Qas~I (as)8Jlec'iC Qg aegir.--'i7=Q~(9'.V>>Q~g-V-4+II o+ye Hro~r e~~or sr p EK"IQCE r~eee oo I~UIrr (:t&-U Q~-0-"-"Q@~-Q'o rr~eee or~e~~~~~~~rw~ro,~Oru~>>~~~r~~I~N~e~r~err o~L~e lECIICEL mfasc svcf II s ta of I t caffe f till la III slfffl~Cf If I l flea flfMI avc ceeefooeee flor telo~~eeell leae fccorello CaeOfrlklf alae~CC I 1 I~~I oe~eol flov ee'ee~sa rrr4 I~-~:-I' 13 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station FSAR/SAFE SHUTDOWN FLOW PATHS ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM Figure 9B-46 August 1984 Amendment 13 'I N\~J~P~~N~4 Uh 8 W lal~8 EN'L&CC'w I~t f-I)'a wt C~Qse'3-).~ej-lf CITAL CCICCII~QCICII CIOIC I CIRCA'II~Illll OOCICII IIII~It'll~IIIIII CVC VOIIDOw OLO+O+I>C CIICII~IIC COO.ISO ellCO~I~I I II$4~E 0~SO~IMMI II&~~.-'. 13 I o--~W IC~ON Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station FSAR SAFE SHUTDOWN FLOW PATHS ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEH Figure 9B-47 August 1984 Amendment 13 (' Wi~YiPi w ee hLIIY M eb&JIRV'4~4 Red~ie~V NO'eN, W'e v INgeii M~ie Oe 01 V~M~4 IH~%\NO~~iee iii~e~V H~ii~'e~i'P~4T~Aakg~ee eei~~~~~~~~~~~~~g'A~Lg'I%It'5.Q.eM~~EECNTEL CCI?CCL COCLCLI OCOIS OIOJCCI tll~ICIOC OOCCCI~CI III~IIIIO~IIINie OLIO\wiOOeee OLON eeIeeS CLCIeeiliL CeilLLCO OLIO%~IIIIII~ag we two ee ie~~~ Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station FSAR SAFE SHUTDOWN FLOW PATHS DIESEL SYSTEM Figure 9B-48 August 1984 Amendment 13 E ~e~I~~'e~~r~r er~(i%3 Qia f e~~~JLr re cree e~~rid gee~ee re re reer err er~~~r er err\~rle~4 re rr i-'D>>ere;~r'CL~r Seer'r e e e v r er~r~~reer re Lee EECNTEL~LFg twlDooa Floe FJfeet OLCLLL~I~Itee ee r Lll?Ltt lVCllit FLWlt FLMCT FLL~tiitl FFCLILL~f IIL L~Iat I~L IOO~rr4 Le~IOFL E ee~ 13 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station FSAR SAFE SHUTDOWN FLOW PATHS SWITCHGEAR ROON ESSENTIAL COOLING Figure 9B-49 August 1984 Amendment 13 .,y)l~~~I I I 4~~r IE~~t v w I J~>>w~~(l I w~\~~~~~<<~I4<<v>>v~~~\~\>>V~~<<<<<<I~V>>'""" Y lew~<<>>W~e W W W~ECNTEL 44IIOII 4444444 tIYII tl44444~Ill I444l IOCIIII clel~I le4 Ii 4444 iveloow eeoc eels~~el IC<<OCee eOOV 4444<<lice CCOLI>>4<<a w<<e~I MAoee 4~ 4' 13 I~)~~I I~Dl'VIII'hill gLtg g~L CHAOS&Cuss, Palo Verde Nuclear Generatin~ Station FSAR SAFE SHUTDOWN FLOW PATHS CLASS lE POWER SYSTEM TRAIN"A" Figure 9B-52 August 1984 Amendment 13' ~I III f!f..IM I M I<<I<.>>rl!f ti!}I!I:i I I)" rr!: ifil Il li t!i<<}'I'fl 1'-I r<j i);I$i'j~I N I I I I I I)I I I I I f.li)IS 515 I I I L,--~I MNW~N N~I I I I I I I t I I I I I I~~~~~V I Ilf Ilf<I.<\~)',;<);I',!}::,<!!I i..<551.<III.51 f I}<<:I fl.!)i I)Il~----I~MIMI~N N I I I I I J~I))!l.P)I;f>>:!.I f)jl rj'f!!ijr I~<I.!Ir, fr+I II)if ti'r.I!!I fl I'I}!I jf<)'if'l I!:'<I'I'. I,"Il i)ii r I I I N INN~~I I I~~II~~I IN N I I~NIM I I ww~<<~)I~M NWN~~M~~'N tN~N N~w MNt Nwt I I I I I N N MI M~~M~tt~I~I<,~i<tf)I N~M N q!I tt~IN~~I r it f,tf)<:)!'.V I lil)Ii I I I I I I M~'" I I I I I I M N~MW~M~'1 WN WMW~N~N 04 I I I 1 I I l<'f<f<f Ri!iii!fi>>>>.-)I I I~~~~M I tw I NN~\M LN P tww t,t tMNt~~N~~~~IN w~.\~~N~~~~IN~N tw~~N M~'M~~~N~~4p~EC<<TEL ill<Ill IWIIII tran!~tNAC<tl l~IIIII IW)Ill~rrl~)5)II Ill)ll atr)Nraa aa ttta i)IN~ANI~I~Il~INN N N tNNN~Ita\I\5~l4tt a~I TT21224 I ov 1 I)at tvta)Save CVJ)coca SOLOS Svovv.2 covlao rover SIÃr 1 eca~v.aes.eol v 5et eol V CCC CCI Let rol 2.COe)r Su CLV C.tat COI 1 I)I I 5 0 L e 1 Ul'5 f'la C 0 1'10 11 12 I~J TCS Lv 14~oera sueeLY 5 tac cot J~Cfotot 4 SCC W lts J Ces LV$2 roe)a SVCLV C'tat$44'vv~Tea~~1st J 5cc ev 204a avo 2044 SCC W ISC~5C4 Ilv OOOO J 551 uv 1st SCL W 14'roe)a Sur>v C taS CDG 4~SCC VI~~~La aao ltsa 5GC uv Gooa J 504 W tlt J 5CS W ttl J 5C4 uv 4 554 uv tta J'I Gt W 225 4'554 W ttl COe)a SWCLY 2 taS COG J$)~vv tat J.S)t-vv.stt J$1~<<v 455 J SI~vv 442~DVT~5ueelv c 2 Jt col J'DCC W 2 V VvS V)a~evt v)C I'v45 v)t I~VJ~~Vtl v vas v)C V AJC v I I vvt VS V vvt vlo V VJ~V V'vv~vo2~Oe!a Suaeav 5)44'CCS 4 C~uv$1$~CVT~su eav 4 oct CGI J~OCS'L'v~4 J DCC Uv l.J OG5 uv OCC uv 10 Or~uv 12 4~DGC.JV.14 4'DGC$$'4 J DG4 J~Dot CSL 10 04 4L It DGC LC roe)a suer Y 4 sct~cc'I 4'CCI~I>I'TC 4'SCL W IT~J 5CI UV 1st J~5CI~uv~~'~Sct uv 1st J~$CC uv IST roeca Sueaav 4'24$cote 4~ae~~Il~'a J~avs el~'0 J CCC I l 14 a 4'S~~a@I LC 14 J CGA vl ste cec'll St aIC LS\St avo LC St J~C~5~V ISC avo~5 1st 4'5ct~~505 av r5 Ns v Clt Ll OC roeTL 5uee I 4.24~~Cot J LCS"~TCC J 555 v la J~5Ct\I~1st 4 5CI Lv 1122C LCS e'01st, J 51 4~lONI'act.~I~IOCS 4~LT~I~01 aC~)5~tt 2 ale 1'12)CC~oe)a CJer I J 505 cote~CI TC~lt 4 avt I~I)td 5 4 IT Ittes aac 11)24<acs TC I)2~aL 11 II)4 4 ecs'Tc ltt)I aec 11~I tcs J~5)4 11'TGV J Cvt LT tc'Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station FSAR SAFE SHUTDOWN FLOW PATHS CLASS IE POWER SYSTEM TRAZN"B" Figure 9B-53 August 1984 Amendment 13 II Il I I~~P W~>>V V OP r~.J~NOW P V W~Ii I ll'I!II.!Il I--------"-- I~N I I I-"'fr----y I'l'll w H H HOW e<<<<O'I I PP l.<<v p wv~r<<op,<>~I\~~H>>I~~~~W>>~I\N W~IH~H~~~V H W MVW H>>l II I II I I~~1 I I I I I I I~~H<<e P~ll~'I!~I:i t.!III I It,!I I!!I!II I I I~I I~~I~I:.1 I I I I I~P I I P I I 9't!t jlif.flit r---I s~~WV;I i~ll w!Oli ti Ifccl iIIL~WH~~MO>><<~W~W W<<I~W H~~~IH N~Pt OP N W P~~~P<<I!C!!TEL SIIIOII Reilifll tIYIS tNACl tll~lilli lllllll~Slilliltllililll ~lls c<<rteW I\c<<tll~COHO H PNO~Itic~IOON~PP WPP~~OO WH t>>N Net I~Ir~~'I I APPEiuDiZ 3A I~I o"essu"e-,temple-atu-~ e-"~ec":s resulting from cracks 3.n ge;erator blowdown, and steam g nerator downcoz r feed lines are bounded by the results from the ma'n steam l'ne break analysis.Pressure-temperature analyses of the Auxiliary Building were perform d as d'scussed in am nded section 3.6.2.1.2.2. The worst case pressure loading resulting from an AS line break was 1.5 psig and from the CVCS letdown was 0.8 psig.The temperature profiles resulting from the worst case postulated ruptures in the AS and CVCS lines indicated a thermal spike of 317.8F and 213.4F, respectively. However, t1 e subcompartments experiencing the thermal spikes contain no sa e-shutdown eauipment. 'Blowdown from the AS line is automatically terminated several seconds after the postulated break by isolation valves closed by high differential pressure withi~the affected subcompartments. Blowdown of the CVCS letdown l'ne is terminated by operator action within ten minutes of the initiation of one.of three alarms in the control'oom: e R generative heat exchanger high exit.temperature 9 o Letdown line-..low pressure e Low flow in the process radiation monitor and boronometer. Also see QtJESTEON 3A.19 (NRC Question 410.4).Amen,.~en~8 3A-34 March 1982 h PIGS FSAR.841213P379 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS OA number of fluorescent fixtures which are fed from~uninter-ruptible power supply (UPS)and some self-contained battery powered-emergency light'ng units.The emergency lighting system fixtures in the control room horseshoe suspended ceil-ing are normally fed from the essential lighting system con-nected from the redundant Class 1E buses through isolation transformers. In the event of loss of Class 1E ac power~each source, the fixtures are energized through~UPS~consisting oi an inverter, a charger, and ea 8-hour rated batterg (See section 9.5.3.2.2.2 Essential Lighting.) The batteries are designed to provide rated lighting for a minimum continuous period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.Spare self-contained battery pack units will readily be available to areas as required should there be a need for dc lighting in excess of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.9.5.3.3 Sa fet Evaluation The safety evaluations are numbered to correspond to the safety design bases and are as follows: A.Safety Evaluation One Emergency lighting, systems that serve the control room and the remote shutdown room and all supports of other lighting systems installed in Category I structures are designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements as specified in section 3.2 and are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Position C.l.n.of Regulatory Guide 1.29.The components and supporting structures of any system, equipment, or structure that are not Seismic Category I and whose collapse could result in the loss of a required lighting system function through either impact or flooding are checked to determine that the lighting system integrity is maintained. Amendment 12 9.5-50 February 1984 The batteries, UPS unit, and lighting fixtures of the control ro'om horseshoe suspended ceiling in the control building cLrR capable of vithstanding the safe shutdown earthqu'ake'SSE), and a,re.seismically qualified by analysis and/or testing in accordance with 7EEE Standard 344-1975.~~a,cc~~~'~pope f ic w s c:+~self-contained units above safety-related equipment Qr g.installed in such a manner that during and after an SSE, their failure Vbll not incapacitate the operator nor cause crippling damage to needed safety-related equipment~~W in the control room and other areas are not required to fuaction during or after a seismic event. 0 PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS B.Safety Evaluation Two Reliable lighting is provided to permit the operators to shut down the unit safely and to maintain it in a safe shutdown condition at any time.The lighting system is designed to provide lighting in those areas used during a reactor shutdown or emergency. Lighting in the control room, remote shutdown panel room, and associated local control stations are fed from Class IE buses.The lighting is arranged so that alternate fixtures are fed by redundant buses to maximize the coverage of remaining fixtures in the event of a loss of one Class IE bus.Physical separation is provided to maintain independence of the redundant essential lighting systems.If the normal (preferred) source to a Class IE bus.fails, the associated diesel generator is started auto-matically. During the diesel starting period, the emergency lighting system provides illumination. Lighting in the control room and remote shutdown area is automatically restored during diesel generator sequencing. In the event that ac power is lost, illumination in the control room (except for the control room horseshoe suspended ceiling)and remote shutdown area is provided by the dc emergency lighting system consisting of self-contained emergency lighting fixtures.In the control room panel area, upon loss of ac power, the dc emergency lighting system is energized automatically. Additionally, the UPS will supply power to selected fluorescent fixture.In the each cony ski~~control room suspended ceiling area,~UPS an inverter, charger, and separately installed 8-hour rated battery suppl~power to fixtures upon loss of ac power.A single failure analysis is provided in table 9.5-5.February 1984 5<1 ver.~-...e-..~ ' 0 PVNGS FSAR CONFORMANCE WITH NRC GENERAI DESIGN CRITERIA exceeded.One of these circuits shall be designed to be available within a few seconds following a loss-of-coolant accident to assure that core cooling, containment integrity, and other vital safety functions are maintained. Provisions shall be included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining sources as a result of, or coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power sources.RESPONSE: For each nuclear power unit of PVNGS an onsite electric"power system and an offsite electric.power system provide-power for electric loads important, to safety.Two completely independent and redundant electric load groups important to safety are provided for each unit.Each load group has sufficient capa-.bility, independent of the'other load group for the same unit, to ensure that: A.Specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the RCPB are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences. B.The core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postu-lated accidents. Each redundant load group is provided with two offsite pre-ferred electric power sources, a diesel generator onsite electric power source, and two sets of batteries These pro-=vide suf redun estability to erform their safety functions, assuming a single failure.ko 4e ti~i4%cns aFycvler s~s~d'evelcp~e~+ sec+i~8.2.},2.1) (3.1-10 PVNGS FSAR 2.Any circuit breaker can be isolated for maintenance without interrupting the power or protection to any circuit (subject to 1imitations of po~er system development section 8.2.1.2.1). G.3.Short circuits on a section of bus can be isolated without interrupting service to any circuit other than that connected to the faulty bus section.The offsite sources from the 525 kV switchyards to the startup transformers are separate and independent. The failure or structural collapse of one system or structure does not affect other offsite sources.H.The offsite sources from the startup transformers to the 13.8 kV switchgear located at the units are inde-pendently and separately routed.Two physically independent circuits are provided for.offsite power to the onsite distribution system for each unit.The offsite source normally connected to each ESF bus is immediately available to supply com-ponents important to safety following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.Either of the two offsite sources to each ESF bus, if available, can be connected by control switch operation in the control roo 8.2 Power Systems ing of Electric The 13.8 kV and 4.16 kV circuit breakers can be inspected, maintained, and tested on a routine basis..This can be accomplished without removing the generators, transformers, or transmission lines from service (subject to limitations of power system development section 8.2.1.2.1). August 1982 8.2-5 Amendment 9 PIGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS~~shutdown, and maintenance under normal and emergency conditions. The design bases of these systems are:-A.An electronic private automatic branch exchange (EPABX)teleph'one system a sound powers41ephone sys'em, ag f'co+re cOl'<'c.k<'~a Pcq't 0$Wag goto Qcwhro(Ron olds>intercompsy~em;yUHF radiot, and a public address system Tfvg-eau.Zgghm>are provided to accomplish-onsxte communication between the control room and various plant locations. B.Public and private telephone systems and a VHF radio fpy L LC A..system tw-the:.Qaricopa County sheriffs are provided to permit plant-to-offsite communication on a continuous ~p,ps Ric.rcu33ve sf M 3 C.The plant has1"telephone communication link+to the Arizona Public Service had-San%-River~~~dispatch-h, paar nt pAe)c ing center pand'-Alternate links~via the m~<rwwave system~~p proV<~t&bg dt'4 T~lep4~~~D.F.G.An emergency evacuation alarm system is designed to warn personnel to evacuate the exclusion area in the event of a DBA.remi'wee.Communication systems are provided with~~rrc+i&~power supplies gJps)for each subsystem as noted in tl 9.3-3.*3 9~t~IH supp3we~r~ocatedm~epara<e-area~ cmI The communication systems zen with applicable local codes, standards, ordinances, and Federal Communications Commission regulations. Th~mmuni~Waa-systems~~~pab~ ender-condi-tian~~maximum-pl~n~oi se&wvel s-baiZtQ genera%ed-during-th~ariaus~perwting-Geadi ~aacXuding-acciden~ondi4ioaes-H.~I 9~I t I~3 Mat'@per-Communiw~ae~ransm '<6 0 bt.n I48h 13fo<se boreas (gveaLer%khan 95 el&)Ek skgol Blue fi'bahts prowled fr dletttntj personnel (n<dse g d plartt-AHotden't.9.5-39 PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS Table 9.5-3 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS POWER SUPPLIES System EPABX telephone system PA system Microwave equipment (APSg SRP)SouD Second-powered telephone Power Supply UPS (Battery a 6 charger)ZpS~Iaattery~al a ctargerg Communication battery (a)in microwave building (APQQRO)None required Two-way radio (base station)Two-way radio (mobile units)RddCO Reg~fa, Canbol Cc gaLa S, intercom<UPS (Battery(~a charger)Self-contained battery packs D't'lsd Ac~era fov 5~ked.up Sith-radio Emergency evacuation alarm system (unit)Emergency evacuation 'alarm hyao system (vite)UPS (Battery(P~ &charger)(c3 Sotdr panama u3i&Qtp+g cg~AC-powerMrom-480V-non-Class-IE-MCC~ a.8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> operation W~our-operation~ 4.o5>>J--9.5-40 tr Table 9.5-3A

    SUMMARY

    OF ONSITE COMMUN CATIO S SYSTEM CAPABILITIES AND NOISE CONSIDERATIONS DURING TRANSIENTS AND/OR ACCIDENTS Communication Systems Available-and Haximum Background Noise for Ff fective Communication (b)Station Control room Haximum nticipated-Sound bevels (a)(dBA 70 EPABX Telephone (dBA)92 EPABX Telephone Jack (dBA)Pub)ic Address Public Address (dBA)Soun ower P es (dse)(dBA)118 Portable UHF Radio (dBA)95 Remote shutdown panel 75 102 118 95 Sa f ety in jection pump rooms 92 102 95 Shutdown heat exchanger rooms 90 118 102 95 ESF switchgear rooms 75 118 102 95 Piping penetration rooms 100 Radwaste building 102 Auxiliary feedwater p rooms 110 a.Subj to verification during startup b.deference 1 Based on data supplied by vendors 92 92 118)02 118 102 118 102 d.Telephone headset e.Telephone headset 95 95 95 0 t M K

    PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS I.8e-f ix-ed~eat.e~~re-uC

    't;~n~ective=rel'ayi'ngwndHi rewyaf ems-are 9.5.2.2 S stem Descri tion The plant communications systems are illustrated schematically in figures 9.5-2 through 9.5-5.Locations of telephones and public address speakers are shown on the station lighting and communication plan drawings.Connections to offsite communi-cations are shown in figure 9.5-6.9.5.2.2.1 Intra-Plant Communication Systems 9.5.2.2.1.1 EPABX Tele hone S stem.The primary means of communications within the plant is the EPABX system (refer to figure 9.5-2.The EPABX system provides station-to-station private line communications with any EPABX telephone on site, including the main control room, and between the plant and the external public system.Interconnection to the PA system is also provided.Cables between the EPABX exchange, located in the service building, and each unit communication room area distribution frames are routed underground in concrete-encased duct banks to protect the cable from being severed accidentally.

    Communication cables within the plant have fire resistant insulation and are routed in conduit or non-safety-related cable trays.The EPABX exchange is powered by a 48-volt battery located in the battery room of the service building.The main control rooms are provided with alarms to indicate failure of the battery or its charger.9.5-41

    PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTENS~~~~~~~~~f<t)Ijc.iQJYcss 9.5.2.2.1.2 Public Address S stem.The~giap~ystem (refer to figure 9.5-3)consists of sevementsalwach5-volt<'d

    ~Ba.he~~s amplifiers powered by i~ivy.dual-UPS~with an 8-hour capacity.P A.-paging-speakers utilize self-contained matching transformers-and are distributed between amplifiers for increased reliability in the event a given amplifier or speaker fails.Access to the PA system may be obtained from any plant PABX telephone using p dedicated numbexS rW a-r-~orit vade from the operators'elephone.

    'V~C.~tUl&ly CLVCLi f3.C The seven amplifier racks are located in the areas they serve as follows: I Conkro t Soil J'ng,<~~<A~I'ops<o0~(f20 F~ev.~Unit 1.microwave-and-tel.emetering-room~-

    ~Unit 2 telemetering

    -room e-li~Unit 3 telemetering

    -room~Administration building communications room (Serves Cruand o Water reclamation facility (WRF)communications room~EOr COWW5.ROOyrl (SQYWg PM a>CL Mal<y)~&~M)C~)~S<$0L cE Bo L lcL'~q cfyw~s,/f3>~9.5.2.2.1e3 Emer 6'nc Evacuation Alarm S stem.site-ar'ea evacua~~larm~ys.

    m"eXe~~oigure-

    .-consisting-

    ~central~1 located roof-.mounted-electrically-driven-siren i~rovided-to-aler<Me.entire-site

    -.The-sirenmsmniti~te manuaKyMromm-pushbutton-Xocated

    -in-the-of f ice-~f-the-shi f t-f~ht A unit evacuation alarm system for each unit is provided.Each unit.system.consists of an electronic siren with amplifier/

    projectors (speakers) located throughout the unit area.Actuation of the system is initiated manually from the unit h'd A))he ('.Orfftnl.

    ROOm~.-communications console~A mz.crophone is provided to permit p.A the system to be used as a back-up pagan@system.Bach unzt Qa t 41t~$emergency evacuation alarm system is provided with g-UPS-with a 2-hour capacity.In high noise work areas (greater than 95dB)flashing blue strobe lights are furnished to provide visual alarms in conjunction with the audible evacuation and accountability alarms of the unit evacuation system.Amendment 13 9.5-42 August 1984 L

    PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5.2.2.1.4 Sound Powered Tele hone S stem.A private direct-line sound powered telephone system is provided between the C4>qJ I dmf PP.~C,[)W~CC7r)frO{WOO~fuel building and theKperatzon-Console for each unit.4;->Co&hOl second independent system is provided between the eperato~Rrnxra console and maintenance control points throughout the unit..Qc, s)'o~he.d.

    The system~can be connected together by a,s8ztch en~mi.~peraVo&s~onsoIVg'

    'g'D g~~C R~IQ CD))>f)l CdIMGc:.c5

    )9.5.2.2.1.5 Intercom.).Intercom service-is providedlhetween themainmontrol-rooms,-<he-security-consol~~ndMh~F-communications-room-as.wn-ad j unct-touche-cont ro3.-uni tsm&the-radio system Refev h..:-.gg.9-5-5 9.~..2..~d*'6')'apl)throughout the site is provided by two-'dual-frequency base.tiff I hble stations (refer to figure 9.5-5), 4uaXP-fre(uency mobile transceivers, and single-and-Qual

    -frequenc~portable

    ~~)t).L HP4.gg e.fL~c~c.g transceivers.

    Se)ZAs~4 Qne&requency~

    assigned Ao-a wecurxt~unct ion-whi3.e th f I'I B.d-pl~H b NaU+n-and-associate~reguencies serve-as-a-bac~p~or&he other.Radi~ommunicatio~nto the~ntainmen&is~rovided-h~ng 3~-frequency-base-stations-at-each-uni~ontw inmen&building~as~ations-ara-prov

    &ed-wit~~i~~~our.

    cspain<~.The portable units are provided with rechargeable batteries.

    Portable radios stored in recharger units in selected locations throughout the plant provide additional emergency radio communications.

    9:5.2.2.2 Plant-to-Offsite Communication Systems 9.5.2.2.2.1 Public Offsite Communications S stem.The EPABX interconnects with the Mountain Bell Telephone System to provide communications with the local Buckeye area,pnd Phoenix from L;~d field 9.5-43

    PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS pro, Ilail kvi'(rIinss (riel/;o~sop s~".thol.dt I'A'M'i:"1 aad-the-eont~h

    -xoomso This provides direct dialing to locations outside the plant.=~sard SAQ Wve.The~~entrol-rooms-aa&-security centersfare-al~r~videC h lines directly connected to the public telephone system as a backup to the EPABX connected trunks.Refer to figure=9.5-6.9.5.2.2.2.2 Private Offsite Communications S stem.The private offsite communications system provides communications via APS and-SRP'-owned microwave systems.Private VHF radio facilities also provide communications with the office of the (LLE'A~M Iggb~c vg Pr';.>~gricdt)

    Maricopa County Sherif+Direct-dedicated&elephone lines=.'~provide communications with APS-and-SR'.dispatch offices.9.5.2.2.2.3 Securit Force Communications.

    The security force communications are UHF radio described as part of the two-way radio system and VHF radio described in sections 9.5.2.2.1.6 and 9.5.2.2.2.2, respectively.

    S~e,~~gqH C 9.y.2.g..2.4.

    Erneqeri Conoiirivoi'ca i'mio Q.2.2.3 System Operation Diverse systems are provided to ensure means of intra-plant-to-offsite communications under operating conditions.

    Intra-plant communication systems have adequate flexibility to keep plant personnel informed of plant operational status.Cg~<+o Q J dvrii (iii~medi ibi'L i'Q o$v0v i'ou o QgPc~5 i~M" goat(blocAN Amendment 13 9.5-44 August 1984 i i e ZWSt-RT A.'9 5.2 2~I~3 EMKRQPqc KVAcUATIQH hLARM SY&71 M&L'te~~~vacuakiow hqsMm (refer 4o PipcJre 9 v-4)cons(sh'niI of.six pole.-ynouyiged.

    Eieckronic.

    outdoor ldBrnincI sirens, Powered g solar poli>erect Bci tteyi e s, Loc ateo oilers ingle 8aoh QiveH blccfs i'o p rolA'cI ed aleyL ali personnel k3(%i'n%a Zecuyikj heundciri'es og PVQCl>.QLl.SLreyis s cote leliti'ciced gsoyn Pushguttons (boy,.un~'t-pV!~K pYoUz'd+on'%e RY'PA t~Ai+c,~~6'on commcuod uai 6 cm 4~cd'&)Room~[+0 ek.v.INSERT.e~5.2~2 I.C TAO-A)AY%ADIT Oge fyeyuercq is assigyied to o eeausitg fumck.orl~M each u nil is cissi'cIned a.uzniiI ue pla+encxintw~ance

    ~ucenccI.gge ylang ynaimtcnance..

    Ense, S&bi'ons e Su se a s syne'ycjencii bask.-+M 4m.sccuyit']base S&kiori.P Loni~3 nance Coynynunica.kans Lnside%e, coniuii~celt A4yuckcre.

    sexch unit ls jsyo~i'ded Q ci 5i'nile$mquezcg 6cxse.sklhcn on M reSIeckvy'Ani&

    pLIA+ynalvkcncivlce Qgucncg.Seve,>%hone Sass PovMd ice~ape Q>Prl ayi k-+uy cqyacihg ERIC,KT.C'9.5 2 P~2 4 EM<~<N<Y ccMMQNtcA mg agz~~ewe@Co~un>'cakon g.iI sperm Csp~ioIs DP Qcxck-~~Qcvi~oocv&

    Locn(ed.~~p Inkyconnec6 Mlephone dr>Skscysemlg cu Varcou&einerge~y foc(iik es sinai'coins(Roeyyo (See Eyocygcncit plam,~ohon 7)as"ius<rab'-d.

    Ž$cN~9<-roA i.sheep's land 2)

    PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX 14B 14B.35 IN PLANT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 1.0 OBJECTIVE To demonstrate the adequacy of the Inplant Communica-tions System to provide communications between vital plant areas and to test the operability of the emer-gency evacuation alarms.2.1 All construction activities on the Inplant.Com-munications System are complete.2.2 Support systems required for operation of the Inplant Communications System are available.

    2.3 AH-possible-plant-equipment-that-contributes to-c.ah W1 1 h l~p 3.0 TEST METHOD'~',p/gy~pvn~4)n 3.1 Verify the Federal-Siratrol-alarm-system func-tions properly.3.2 Verify that the HEAX-Bi~telephone system functions properly, that each station is assigned to the current restriction class.3.3 Verify the sound powered phone system functions'properly.

    3.4 Verify the radio=communication system functions properly.ggy'f~Pauli'c.address gs$e~+n*io 9704~/Lg'4.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The Inplant Communications System operates as described in section 9.5.2 when using above test methods.Amendment 9 14B-50 August 1982

    PVNGS FSAR LL.C.A 14B.36 PRIVATE:-OFFSITE COI~1ICJNICATION SYSTEMS APPENDIX 14B 1.0 OBJECTIVE'ELBA To demonstrate the proper operation of the Private Offsite Communication System~2.1 All construction activities have been completed on the Private-Offsite Communication Systems LLt" 4, 2.2 Support systems required for operation of the LPGA+ra.vate-Offsite Communication System are available.

    3.0 TEST NETHOD 3.1 Verify proper operation of the Local Law Enforce-ment Agency VHF Radio.3.2 Verify proper operation of the Local Law Enforce-ment Agency Land Line~3.3 Verify proper operation of 115V ac power sources for the Local Law Enforcement Agency Land Line.4.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA LLeP 5 The private-of'fsite Communications Systeml-operate as described in section 9.5.2 when using above test methods.September 1980 14B-51 Amendment 2 e c g Ep~c e Te e c e c 0 e rr e e c~c e e e E'e e c I x'0 CP hl e Ir e.e v~'g-e e e 0 e7 53 f e r1'e e p c~re C rr 208V, IE)AC UNIT I OF UNIT 2 DF UNIT 3 OF (FUT)(FUT)TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ADMIN BI.OG AC OF 2 BATTERY CHGRS (OUTPUT OBV, 200A EACH)ELECTRONIC AUTOMATIC TEL SWITCHBOARD-(EPABX)(.&L" I 48 VOLT BATTERY WITH 8 HOUR EMERGENCY CAPACITY I SERVICE BUILDING L I I I I MAIN DISTRIBUTION I FROM-(MDI~)I I900 FEET 850 FEET II II II II II I I50 FEET 700 FEET II II Jl 300 FEET VVm~g FpP P&Id(m L)))C>'~~'~~g e~I,~g PAtCiH ftp.)$-2.I NOTES'F-AREA DSTRIBUTION FRAME TC-TELEPHONE TERMINAL CABI~AC-ATTENDANTS CONSOLE I.THE NUMBER OF EXTENSIONS AT EACH AREA OF THE SITE ARE AS NOTED AS WELL AS THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE FROM THE MAIN DISTRIBUTION FRAME.l300 FEET 650 FEET FOREIGN EXCHANGE F TRUNKS INTERFACE WITH PUBLIC TELEPHONE CO TC GUARD HOUSE 4600 FEET TC WATER RECLAMATION PLANT 4600 FEET TC MAKE-UP WATER AREA 2050 FEET TC START-UP TRANSFORMER YARD I950 FEET TC MICROWAVE LINK-IN UNIT I 20 FEET DF SERVICE BU(LDING 600 FEET PF ADMINISTRATION ANNEX BLDG ARIZONA NUCLEAR ROWER RROJKT I'AEO VERDE NOI:LEAR GENERATING STATION DECy 8$~~ploUkE co.wr SKCNTKL SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM LOS ANGELE5~TK)EPHONE SYSTEM)'.F'PA<57lr)i+\Iota tailh I~YTquJ~g~I~1IT QF 3 I

    4 j ih T Dg C K~C IJ 0 0 4 C 0 0 K~D g x 0 0 0'll L7 C 0E 0 0 E 0 C I 47 D~0~li K"-" Ii C 0'4'f CgÃag ANTI-FEEDBACK MAGNETIC TAPE RECORDERS UNITS I<2a3 OPERAT6RS (MRR&VS MANUAL ACCESS UNI 2 UNIT 3 TELEPHONE EPABX DIAL ACCESS EQUIPMENT 600n soon 600n 600 n 600 n.MAIN DISTR FRAME (MDF I PLANT CABLES SPEAKERS 24 VDC 2REQ coon I2on 24 VDC UNIT" I 24 VDC 2REQ 24 VDC 2REQ coon I2on 24 VDC 2REQ 24 VDC 2REQ 600n l20n AMPLIFIERS Ir 3 5 7'9 II UNIT-2 2,4,6,8, AMPUFIERS I, 3, 5, 7, 9, II I UNIT-3 UNIT l,2 a3 24 VOC 2REQ 24VDC AMPLIFIERS 1,3,5,7,9,I I 2,4,6,8,IO 1==24VDC 600n l50n 24VDC AMPUFIERS I 3lr33e33A i 32,34,34A ADMINISTRATION AND SERVICE BUILDINGS ADJACENT AREAS, AND GUARD HOUSE 24VDC 600 n 300n 600n 300n 24VDC AMPLIFIERS) 35,36 AMPLIFIERS

    )39,4I,43,45 I 40.42 44,46 WATER RECLAMATION ADMIN.ANNEX AND TSC, IECHTKL LOS ANGELES"-ARIZONA NUCLEAR I'OWER FROJECI PALO VERDE NUCLEAR~CENERATING STAEION SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM PUBLIC ADDRESS EQUIPMENT~'5$vo~rro.rtouec ao.atv I0407 Q f.02 P.A.SYSTEM INPUTS IMPEDANCE PUBUC COMPRESSOR MATCHING ADDRESS AMPLIFIERS TRANSFORMERS AMPLIFIERS pep.<y.c.Ay~r~livLcg Iggp~l Qilh t'harp%CAN o'..~

    Saf+~Y CA@1M'f 5'.m fPahtgL.Q (g p)BQC)V&C U UM1MCR.O~dI.)I->R.LSE KITH HJEHIvllnl STC-6 MIMED~SLAVE AMPLIFIER LOUDSPEAKERS III.t4V~c FED.SI G.CORP.500SA Sc@JAN~Wr&I.K F".~MT.C+0 (elean FED.SIG.CORP, M50 (TYt)h,M.FLY>&p.SEE~~0-SIQ.I 0-2%V~c FED.SIG.CORP.'+500 GC 8 500 SK PURCHASERS 120V oc.I d POWER SUPPLY MICROPHONE UNIT EVACUATION ALARM COMMAND MODULE Ik IBAD~CONTR OL R 00 M+V~~""~'~'ED.SIG.CORP 4 50DVk BATTERY CHARGER INPUT I20Voc IIII OUTPUT 2%V dc 0 FQ>c 0 l20V oc 2@V dc IIONAL BATTERY I2 CELL 2+V dc (2 HRS)FUSED SAFETY SWlTCH~VqpeoR.M~I4i~GLASS.pVMc<'7 p~J~Aq 54~~~~~~"~AkIZONA NU Ek PkOJECT tALO VEkDE NUCI.EA SENECA ATf DlAG JOI IIO.IO407 FI tUltE IIO;MV BLOCK TION SYSTEM Wu i W atrhd ImYhUr'

    5 P R Y 7](b 5/~@5 IW rucL nUILDttto Rckph'cw4S, P A woomp Pomuego-P m~es C0<<, TO~g I(-gnr&(pg)(JPt f-2~U~coN IIHENT lu I LD lho8-p<<oweSi.PA/<A"IT t A'foal 5409.h~~AV L Coat t~q PvH~~-p&P 8 n7-vb,ghQU$coMphp.6+~~&ou)cR.'Lo~.FI~U~.Q-~-0>.Tuhhtht JUILDIgO<<GEpaomr c.5 P lj 4 0 tl b Qo~IiAD VAOZE lulLDIXO CohZhoL SU I!.0150 g jgmruoW~S, f8.i3P.OOKED M4 4$$tike>l A1 IO(l LAUliDhZ LUILLI HO ntr.tirL tiut I.ti'I hQ/Itic I t.gVaii~pre~<o AUXlLlAhZ SUILDINO pQiWELK.Plj'CrVQ5>P.R e P8NT'o~~iDE+.PEAS QFJQs@@9 Qgp7+Ddod+gooe Qee~liZooLC 5)eoofjcdo.p+eAoi~)y.+..saE~IA.

    9-5-5 peR.,FR~omcy Am!GNA&vT.~8'3l-46ol e<<>>E.+Migoe+f+iirS Radio fbi gooo6oeoejeoe

    .vTr-.~: f-'Q)-i'Lour QAwTauaucE

    ~weeedd-y/+8<WAS)RS-QCI'v&lv c<+ed~~dv I

    $a'.gS~RC~<<4 C 0 C~~C V e l e'0 C 0 V m-s 0 C o W s e O a lh r E<O e c 0 I E CP 4l O aI~e 4 0 0 S.e e J g C 0 g 8 a W 0 g%P~~A NPP SITE VHF GUARD HOUSE SERVICE BLDG//()SWYD i R//MSTI MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE+e.I L,\C',.Lgl<~J L:Bigs.iW u)ilEi-PqI~+ro)~AC I WHITE'TANK I MOUNTAIN REPEATER T R T R VHF LITCHFIELD EXCHANGE COLDWATER EXCHANGE BUCKEYE M ST EXCHANGE I I I I Pj~bP p Lofti QIAc<>4 g fgtAM.VQL4hg'Oh 7~i('..q)->OFF SITE APS CENTREX SYSTEM PHOENIX MST EXCHANGE VHF SHERIFF OF MARI COPA COUNTY WHITE TANK MOUNTAIN REPEATER NKCHTKL LOS ANGELES--...AklZONA NUCLEAk POWEk tkOJECT ITALO VERDE NUCLEAk GENEkATING STATION T R APS DISPATCH CENTER SALT RIVER DISPATCH CENTER R OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS JUNE 64 4~I Ieuak sO.T~CST OK-I

    ~~IH C I~~~@WE

    ~EAR 12A YOX Ol LID E OOITCII WOIO tDII 2$LIOTS ENEOOtOCY OttOATIOOS IACILITY ILJIJJ I SLIDE TCSN J T t ECIE L O L TS DO 700 O.TS.C.I 2O 2 DIOI 0 12O2 10 SL-I SWlTCH'HIO 2 ICS.U J ALTEIWATE IOS.C J R C A L L TSC fTTC I 2 O 2 C~I 2~2 t 0 S ISLIOE (OS.V J Tl CIIO ICAL SOttOOT CLOll O TISS J T RENt LAAC L L L l 52 LOS ANCELE~OLOCK OIAORlA ESEROENCY ColaUNICATION SYSTEM (ESS J ttOIoI 2 ot 2)P&~ZLoc.v c i~~M~m~~i~goN SYS~i'~.gg gP, QLTT.2oq2)

    AR!ZONA NUCLEAR tOOER t%0%CT tALO VEROE NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION DEC.85 IOO OO.ATTAC~OT+E.W P&VRGg WMC2 PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS C.Power Generation Design Basis Three Lighting fixtures containing aluminum or aluminum alloys are not used inside the containment building.9.5.3.1.3 Codes and Standards Design and installation of the plant lighting systems uses the guidance provided by the National Electrical Code (NFPA No.70-1975/ANSI Cl-75)and the Handbook of the Illuminating Engineering Society.fe<vlrirla ape.~a4r act es~acQieve.w~K sh~Q~n 9.5.3.2 S stem Descri tion CVm+of fif'C.9.5.3.2.1 General Description Unit lighting is divided into three subsystems:

    normal;essential; and emergency.

    The normal system is supplied from non-Class IE ac buses.The essential system is connected to Class IE ac buses.The emergency lighting system, consisting of batteries, battery chargers, and lamps, are fed from the same supply as the essential lighting and function upon loss of ac power.Refer to'table 9.5-4 for a list of areas+served by both the essential and emergency lighting systems.9.5.3.2.2 Component Description The three lighting categories are described briefly in the following sections.9.5.3.2.2.1 Normal Li htin.The normal lighting system is that system which provides illumination for the entire station.In each unit, the lighting load is distributed equally between two non-Class IE lighting load centers, each consisting of 1000 KVA 13,800-480/277-volt dry type transformers with 208/120 and 480/277-volt distribution subsystems.

    Areas remote March 1982 9.5-47 Amendment 8

    PVNGS FSAR jhlG Table 9.5-4 AREAS REQUIRED BOTH EMERGENCY AND ESSENTIAL LIGHTING JL FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN FORK Area uxxlxar Buxldzn Sa ty injection pump rooms Shut wn heat exchanger rooms Piping enetration room.Boric ac makeup pump room CVCS charge.g pump room (Train B only)Essential coo ing water surge tanks Essential cooli g water pump rooms Access corridors above rooms Control Buildin Main control room Remote shutdown room ESF switchgear room Access corridors to above roo s Main Steam Su ort St-ucture Turbine driven auxiliary feedwate pump room Motor driven auxiliary feedwater p room Atmospheric dump valves operating dec (el 140')Access to above rooms Diesel Generator Buildin Diesel generator control rooms Access corridors to above rooms gggZR.7 IIt Amendment 13 9.5-48 August 1984

    gcac&r makeup qua*rarr2 d'or c'ac'd nrem'eu/r/ar p rcrrrn 7 ra in 4 pip mr//a eneHrah'rrn ream Tram 8 piping penchaPrrn

    /corri 7rarn P7 (c(n.Bnnd (/)e(ec(i (ca I/rene(ra(ran 7rcrr'n Ci (c(r'anne(c)e(ec*r'ca(gene(ra+an ro ion Trra'rn 8 (Channel g)elec(r(ca((acne&'a+an rcorn 7rgtn 8 (C(ranne('D)e(ec(n'ce(pei7ekaRen roam 7rp, in g c (r Bgr ng'p urnFr va(ve cI a((e (g room ees<<'Ha(coo(r'ng iria4r surge pan g an J.5ouj(i corridor rarecL>o(urne.con(rrr/&an(: va(vega.(4'dcrn C'orr'4ors

    ~k e/evan'on/70 C l+sf corr c/ors crf e.(evattcrr

    ,5-I (."/a k orak,r Access*a gve/ocaAon 5 S p~rr~':d+r'Diesse'l Gene'rabr So'>llrr I 7rcriri Q>c(jese($ene ia(or ARYrl 7rar'n B dr'ese(c3enera4r cori&I room Access*z bove/o cab'orig

    o~r Qr gpss.7 contin u<~anno/Bu'J'n)Tra n'Pi g ssenA'czl c hiller room 7fa(p7 A 8'5F SooHcA]EBI

    Ž7rct i'n 8 E$F, S~iVchgcar r aorn/ya in 4 (nh anne')'DC e~o i'pmerit I oorri 7rcii n g (/)anne~(C)70C e~o,'~nion 6 voo rn Tvri n'P>(Channi'-I

    &)/>C q o,'pnion 6 room 8 CC h~nne f D)QC~go, pyy'lent room 7ruin A ygIriok VukJolAn f oorrl 7iain 8 ronlok qhufdou'n vcxni 5'on gaol r ooiri AccesS h>a 6ove.cocci-'ttori5 Ma'n/hearn$ore Sic'4re.+~7cir kine 8 ri ve n au xi Ilay geo(&a&r p ump roem1/r'hk"Qo&r griveA a+xi fiQry~ucL&r p>omp roorYl:<~":Wnzrn 4)rein S~iSo lakori end d'amp ya l ves Ci,reci Train 8 pnu>n Si earn i solo%'on ein 4 Jump Valves+rt w 4ccess fv above.loca+an~.'

    Con J~sa+Sk>rage.he k p~~p&~use.Hcce ss*a bove..l occcA'op

    PVNGS PSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTENS from the lighting load center are fed from local power sources.Lighting transformers for the system are solidly grounded" at neutrals.9.5.3.2.2.2 Essential Li htin.The essential lighting system supplements the normal lighting and provides a minimum level of illumination throughout each unit in the event of a failure of the normal lighting system.The essential lighting system supplies the lighting in the main control room and the remote shutdown room.Redundancy is provided in the essential lighting system in the control room and remote shutdown panel room, to shut down and maintain the unit in a hot shutdown condition.

    The essential lighting system serving the control room and remote shutdown panel area is fed from Class IE MCCs, via Class IE isolation transformers, and is not tripped on SIAS.The remainder of the essential lighting feeders for the plant area are tripped on SIAS and can be manually reconnected after diesel generator sequencing..

    The essential lighting system is normally energized.and is supplied from two redundant Class IE load centers./ALSERT 9.5.3.2.2.3 Emer enc Li htin.The dc-powered emergency lighting system is provided in the main control room (except the control room horseshoe suspended ceiling), at the remote shutdown panel room, associated local control stations, and along emergency exit routes where emergency maintenance is expected to be required.In the event of the loss of essential lighting sources, the dc emergency lighting system is energized automatically.

    The dc emergency lighting units>except in the control room consist of fixtures that have self-contained batteries, battery chargers, and switches that automatically energize the fixtures from their batteries in the event of the loss of the ac source for their battery chargers.In the control room panel area,+the emergency lighting system consists of a i~Sr~~6 February 1984 9.5-49 Amendment 12

    p g,5-pg p~g~~PW(CC)~gee.~~//Ru'J<np~~,~prr nod DC.ep'pmcn7 arced~and+he Awol)a~y 8~:~J'ng Channels.A ca~J, 8 c/ech(ca I pen~dP7 I'Ozrttl 5

    PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS (number of fluorescent fixtures which are fed from the uninter-ruptible power supply (UPS)and some self-contained battery powered-emergency lighting units.The emergency lighting<4 Iuo~esc~<+

    P fixtures are normally fed from the essential lighting system con-nected from the redundant Class lE buses through isolation transformers.

    In the event of loss of Class lE ac power source, the fixtures-are energized through the UPS consisting of an inverter, a charger, and an 8-hour rated battery.(See.section 9.5.3.2.2.2 Essential Lighting.)

    The batteries are designed to provide rated lighting for a minimum continuous period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.Spare self-contained battery pack units will readily be available to areas as required should there be a need for dc lighting in excess of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.9.5.3.3 Safet Evaluation The safety evaluations are numbered to correspond to the safety design bases and are as follows: A.Safety Evaluation One Emergency lighting.systems that serve the control room and the remote shutdown room and all supports of other lighting systems installed in Category I structures are designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements as specified in section 3.2 and are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Position C.l.n.of Regulatory Guide 1.29.The components and supporting structures of any system, equipment, or structure that are not Seismic Category I and whose collapse could result in the loss of a required lighting system function through either impact or flooding are checked to determine that the lighting system integrity is maintained.

    Amendment 12 9.5-50 February 1984

    PVNGS FSAR 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity G.Fire Detection FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 35,500 Btu/ft 26.6 minutes Ionization smoke detector systems are provided for early warning, and in a cross-zoned mode will actuate an automatic C02 gas system.H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic CO2 total flooding 2.Secondary One manual hose reel Two portable CO2 fire extinguishers I.Ventilation Manually controlled smoke exhaust venting to outside.J.Drainage Two 4-inch drains K.Emergency Lighting~~~lighting with B-hour'battery unit(s)is provided Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.the.o~+c'" gQ~+0 ou a August 1984 9B.2.1-25 Amendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 3.Transient Combustible Load FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 55,700 Btu/ft 4.Equivalent Fire Severity G.Fire Detection 41.8 minutes Ionization smoke detector system(s)is provided for early warning.H.Fire Suppression L 1.Primary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 5A.2.Secondary Two portable CO fire extinguishers are located 2 in Zone 5A.I.Ventilation Refer to Appendix 9A response to Question 9A.70.Portable fans exhaust the smoke to adjacent rooms where smoke exhaust fans exhaust to outside air.J.Drainage None K.L.Emergency Lighting A Emergency Communication Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.oq~)p.siHoned~AH 8-~~ng w'I g~Q 54a+~~0~~~<a+aa 0.quip~~+15 pfc v>~c~Amendment 13 9B.2.1-28 August 1984

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G.Fire Detection H.Ionization smoke detectors system(s)is provided for early warning.Fire Suppression 1.Primary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 5A.2.Secondary Two portable CO2 fire extinguishers are located in adjacent Zone SA.Ventilation Refer to Appendix 9A response to Question 9A.70.Portable fans exhaust the smoke to adjacent rooms where smoke exhaust fans exhaust to outside air.'J.Drainage None K.Emergency Lighting L.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.~+e~~i4 (~)go~'+~~'les~p~~4Ofl ,~~<Lo~n pgU'ip~enQ is d~d August 1984 9B.2.1-31 Amendment 1~~~

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary One manual hose reel 2.Secondary Two portable CO2 fire extinguishers I.Ventilation Smoke venting to outside.{Manual smoke exhaust fan)J.Drainage Seven 4-inch drains K.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided.L.Emergency Communications

    '\Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.6~.+he.apernhon sQuWlou n Amendment 13 9B.2.2-14 August 1984

    ~I)PVNGS FSAR 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity G.Fire Detection FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 28.3 minutes 13 Ionization smoke detector systems are provided for early warning, and in a cross-zoned mode will actuate an automatic C02 gas system.H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic CO2 total flooding 2.Secondary One manual hose reel and one portable CO2 fire extinguisher.

    One portable CO2 fire extinguisher and one manual hose reel are located in the adjacent Corridor Building.I.Ventilation Smoke venting to outside.(Manual Smoke Exhaust Fan)J.Drainage Two 4-inch drains K.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)+is provided.L.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.Q>>+g 0 Pcro+b 0 gQ~+doun cap i'P~Amendment 13 9B.2.2-24 August 19~4

    PVNGS FSAR 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 3.Transient Combustible Load FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 35,600 Btu/ft 4.Equivalent Fire Severity G.Fire Detection 26.6 minutes Ionization smoke detector system(s)is provided for early warning.H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 5B.2.Secondary One portable C02 fire extinguisher is located in adjacent zone 5B.One portable CO fire extin-guisher and one manual hose reel are located in adjacent Corridor Building near Zone 5B.Ventilation (Refer to Appendix 9A response to Question 9A.70).Portable fans exhaust the smoke to adjacent rooms where smoke exhaust fans exhaust to outside air.J.Drainage None K.Emergency'Lighting~ond'.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.August 1984 9B.2.2-27 Amendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR K.Emergency Lighting FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS L.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.posi+c net 4r 4k<c>yer0,~<<;a~d.so@54~&s~n e)oip~~<hs P o August 1984 9B.2.2-31 Amendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR G.Fire Detection FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Actuation of the ultra-violet or thermal detector systems activates the automatic preaction water sprinkler system.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic pre-action water sprinkler system 2.Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher.

    Additionally, one manual hose reel is located in adjacent Control Building at elevation 100'0".I.Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside by way of silencer room (engine operating).

    J.Drainage Seven 4-inch drains K.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided.L.Emergency Communications None~~rg b 09 ih~VJ.o~n e)~'p~~~August 1984 9B.2.5-7 Amendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZAIG)S ANALYSIS G.Fire Detection Ionization smoke detector system(s)is provided for early warning.H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary One portable C02 fire extinguisher 2.Secondary One manual hose reel is located in the Control Building at elevation 100'0".I.Ventilation Flow through diesel generator room and silencer room to the outside (generator running).(Refer to Appendix 9A ,response to Question 9A.86).J.Drainage Two 4-inch drains Po~>C Z2-6 K.Emergency Lighting~lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)"is provided.L.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.~aJ g<~a oP 8goi pAe"+Amendment 13 9B.2.5-10 August 1984

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS F.Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type 20 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)~120 pounds of cable insulation (other)~20 pounds of oil and grease 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 3,500 Btu/ft 2 G.3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity Fire Detection 2.6 minutes H.Smoke detectors are located in the pump house.Fire Suppression Manual hose streams from hydrants on the fire yard main.Ventilation Natural convection J.Drainage None.K.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided.L.Emergency Communications None owiHowe.d 4c-Ale.d p.<~<~gag c4ukdo~n Amendment C;9B.2.9-6 August 1984 0

    PVNGS FSAR 2.Secondary.

    FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS One portable CO2 fire extinguisher I.Ventilation Flow to outside.J.Drainage One 4-inch drain K.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)~is provided.L.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.~pq((x'ha~

    s4~><~~August 1984 9B.2.12-15 Amendment 13 0

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 2.Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher is located.in adjacent Zone 72.I;Ventilation Flow to outside J.Drainage One 4-inch drain Bone.+~K.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)+is provided.L.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.August 1984 9B.2.12-19 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR Ventilation Flow to outside FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS K.Drainage One 4-inch drain is provided at elevation 100'0" Emergency Lighting QC)AE.7+lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)<is provided.L..Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.@os>+on c<s-C Amendment 13 9B.2.12-24 August 1984

    PVNGS FSAR I.Ventilation Flow to outside J.Drainage One 4-inch drain FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Pone.7'f 6 K.Emergency Lighting~lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)<is provided.L.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.pne'lbo~e<k 4<+~e-oP.0-(-q~P z4~+clo~n eg~~1s'ea-~

    August 1984 9B.2.12-29 hsendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Two manual hose reels 2..Secondary Two portable ABC powder fire extinguishers I.Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and then to the outside J:.Drainage Five 4-inch drains K.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided.A L.Emergency Communications None August 1984 9B.2.15-49 Amendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 37A.2.Secondary Two portable ABC powder fire extinguishers are located in adjacent Zone 37A.I.Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J.Drainage One 4-inch drain K.Emergency Lighting A L.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.Amendment 13 9B.2.15-64 August 1984 f 0 PVNGS FSAR E.Radioactive Material In process piping F.Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS'90 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)3,700 pounds of cable insulation (other)60 pounds of oil and grease 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 21,000 Btu/ft 2 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity G.Fire Detection 15.7 minutes Ionization smoke.detector system(s)is provided for early warning.H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Two manual hose reels 2.Secondary Two portable ABC powder fire extinguishers.

    I.Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and then to outside J.Drainage Seven 4-inch drains K.L.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)~is provided.Emergency Communications None Amendment 13 Posifio~J, Par ctccess h>@%4-$4MV~~RAID'p~~~9B.2.15-68 August 1984 0

    e~f PVNGS FSAR H..Fire Suppression 1.Primary Three manual hose reels 2.Secondary FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Three portable ABC powder fire extinguishers.

    I.Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and then to the outside J.Drainage Ten 4-inch drains K.Emergency Lighting~lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)<is provided.L.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.p.,-,ho ad P~~doe~Sa.Fe.Shotdo~<g~7~~+August 1984 9B.2.15-73 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR F.Combustible Loading FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 1.Quantity/Type

    ~390 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalafi)

    ~1,600 pounds of cable.insulation (other)~50 pounds of oil and grease 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 21,600 Btu/ft 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.'Equivalent Fire Severity G.Fire Detection 16.2 minutes Ionization smoke detector system(s}is provided for early warning.H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 37A.2.Secondary One portable ABC powder fire extinguisher is located in adjacent Zone 37A.I.Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J.Drainage One 4-inch drain K.L.Emergency Lighting~lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.August 1984 Amendment 13 poei%oned4w

    .~opsr~~o~S 4~~o<~<<q" V'"~9B.2.15-77

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary One manual hose reel is located: in adjacent--

    Zone 37B.2.Secondary One portable ABC powder fire extinguisher is located in adjacent Zone 37B.I.Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside Drainage One 4-inch drain K.L.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)'s provided.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.op~i~+<<>g~+g~~n cpu'i~+.August 1984 9B.2.15-81 Amendment 13 0

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic preaction water sprinkler system, covering cable trays only.2.Secondary Two manual hose reels and two portable CO2 fire extinguishers.

    I.Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and then through air filtration unit to outside J.Drainage Eight 4-inch drains K.L.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8Žhour battery unit(s)>is provided.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.QCC8'5S c 0,@SQNP J.o~~gq~'pMCK%Amendment 13 9B.2.15-96 August 1984

    ~t PVNGS FSAR G.Fire Detection FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Actuation of ionization smoke detector system(s)activates the automatic preaction water sprinkler system.The detector system(s)provide early warning capability.(Refer to Appendix 9A reponse to Question 9A.116).H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic preaction water sprinkler system 2.Secondary One manual hose reel and one portable CO2 fire extinguisher are located in adjacent Zone 42C.Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to.outside Drainage Three 4-inch drains K.L.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour Emergency Communications battery unit(s)is provided.4 Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.August l984 9B.2.1S-117 Amendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR F.'ombustible Loading FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 1.Quantity/Type

    ~290 pounds of cable insula<ion (Hypalorr)-..

    ~980 pounds of cable insulation (other)2.In-Situ Combustible Load 10,100 Btu/ft G.3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity Fire Detection 7.6 minutes H.Ionization smoke detector system(s)is provided for early warning.Fire Suppression 1.Primary\One manual hose reel NOTE The passage to Fire Area X through the 3-hour rated south wall is protected by a fixed sprinkler system water curtain.2.Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher.

    Ventilation Flow from corridors to rooms and then through air filtration unit to outside Drainage Four 4-inch drains Emergency Lighting~lighting with 8 hour-battery unit(s)is provided.p~gHonek c'h~~sqo i p~e~August 1984 9B.2.15-123 Amendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR I.Ventilation FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Flow through air filtration unit to outside J.Drainage K;L.Two 4-inch drains 2Q AG Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided.Emergency Communications None~pE>C 0:h 6~gybe s4ohdown'(<<g

    ~August 1984 9B.2.15-155 Amendment 1 3 0

    PVNGS FSAR H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS ,One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 53.2.Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher is located in adjacent Zone 53.I.Ventilation Flow to outside J.Drainage None K.L.Emergency Lighting~lighting with 8 hou-r battery unit(s)<is provided.Emergency Communications None~Cdogs<gg Q eh&++~August 1984 9B.2e15-161 Amendment 13 Il PVNGS FSAR G.Fire Detection FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Actuation of either ionization smoke detector system(s)or line-type thermal detector system(s)activates the automatic preaction'water sprinkler system and will pressurize the piping with water.Either detector system alone can provide early warning.H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic preaction water sprinkler system covering the cable trays only (excluding corridor adjacent to the west elevator and stairwell).

    2.Secondary One manual hose reel and two portable CO2 fire extinguishers.

    I.Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and through air filtration unit to outside J.Drainage Four 4-inch drains K.L.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided.Emergency Communications None August 1984 9B.2.15-165 Amendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H.'ire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic preaction water sprinkler system--.covering cable trays only except in northeast corner (north of column line A3)which has area coverage.2.Secondary Two manual hose reels and two portable CO2 fire extinguishers.

    I.Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and through the air filtration unit to outside'.L.Drainage Eight 4-inch drains Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided.Emergency Communications None~pecck5 6 po~~A~~~sho04>~" August 1984 9B.2.15-169 Amendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSES 2.Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside Drainage Four 4-inch drains gene K.L.Emergency Lighting Zgzak lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)>is provided.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.Amendment 3.3 9B.2.15-172 August 1984

    v PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside Drainage K.L.None Emergency Lighting Emergency Communications None Bene 5S<u<+g-ho~~ga+q or'A(s)posh~on~ghee+26M'A'po<'pi>>>>+>>i~(Q'I>>Yc>>ll>>cl8~.August 1984 9B.2.15-181 Amendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 2.~100 pounds of rubber~2,900 pounds of Mipolam flooring In-Situ Combustible Load-26,400 Btu/<t-.2 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity G.Fire Detection 20 minutes Ionization smoke detector system(s)is provided for early warning.H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Two ABC powder and one CO2 fire extinguishers.

    2.Secondary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent 57N.I.-Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J.Drainage Three 4-inch drains K.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided.L.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provide~p bb'9 gg~+daw~<p'p Amendment 13 9B.2.15-196 August 1984 4 I PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS F.Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type

    ~400 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)~1,400 pounds of cable insulation (other)~200 pounds of papers and fabrics~400 pounds of rubber 4,400 pounds of Mipolam flooring 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 21,700 Btu/ft G.3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity Pire Detection 16 minutes H.Ionization smoke detector system(s)is provided for early warning.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Five manual hose reels 2.Secondary One pressurized water fire extinguisher.

    Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside Drainage None 5vw"'.L.Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)<is provided.Emergency Communications None August 1984 9B.2.15-237 Amendment 13 I'I PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS F.Combustible Loading 2.Quantity/Type

    ~1,500 pounds of~6,600 pounds of In-Situ Combustible cable insulation (Hypalon)cable insulation (other)Load 55,300 Btu/ft 2 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity 41.5 minutes G.Fire Detection H.Actuation of either the ionization smoke detector or the line-type thermal detector systems activates an early warning alarm and the automatic preaction system.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic preaction sprinkler system 2.Secondary One manual hose reel and one portable C02 fire extinguisher are located in adjacent Zone 42D.Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside Drainage Two 4-inch drains K.L.Emergency Lighting~lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provide t+<boned.I" v+S<oP-~Siva~Amendment K 9B.2.16-6 August 1984

    PVNGS FSAR J.Drainage Three 4-inch drains FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS K.L.Emergency Lighting~~~lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)<is provided.Emergency Communications'ound powered phone jack(s)is provided.+,e.~pr~fa~<p<>gh iDna~g~p Jomw epeip Amendment 13 9B.2.16-10 August 1984

    PVNGS FSAR I.Ventilation FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Flow through air filtration unit to outside J.Drainage Two 4-inch drains K.L.Emergency Lighting~~lighting with 8-hour Emergency Communications battery unit(s)is provided.Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.po~i QaneJ Qv-61K oP<~0.'~~g~+lo~~eg iq~~August 1984 9B.2.17-7 Amendment 13

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G.Fire Detection Actuation of either ionization smoke detector, or the line-type thermal detector system(s)activates'the automatic preaction water sprinkler system and will pressurize the piping with.water.Either detector system can provide early warning capability.

    H.Fire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic preaction water sprinkler system covering cable trays and structural members only.2.Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher and one manual hose reel are located in adjacent Zone 52D.I.Uentilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J.Drainage Three 4-inch drains K.L.Emergency Lighting~~~~~lighting with 8-hour Emergency Communications battery unit(s)is provided.Sound powered phone j ack(s)is provided.~)e ro'.H~~~g~do~n ego ('iii~0 Amendment 13 9B.2.17-10 August 1984 o

    Table 9B.3-1 NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet 3 of 68)A.OVERALL RE UIRENENTS OF NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM (CONTINUED)

    APPLICATION DOCKETED BUT CONSTRUCTION PERNIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF I/I/76 PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATING PLANTS PVNGS POSITION AND BASIS FOR NON-CONPLIANCE ITENS 4.Sin le Failure Criterion 4.Sin le Failure Criterion 4.'Sin le Failure Criterion COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF 13 h)CD CO DO PO C)Vl A single failure in the fire cuppres-sioa system should aot impair both the primary and backup fire suppression capability.

    For example, redundant fire water pumps vith iadepcadeat power supplies aad controls cbould be pro-vided.Postulated fires or fiie protection system failurec seed not be considered concurrent vith other plaat sccideats or the most severe natural phenomena.

    Novcver, in thc event of the most severe earthquake, i.e., thc Safe Shutdovn Earthquake (SSE), the fire suppression system should be capable of deliveriog vater to manual bose statioas located vithin hose reach of areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdovn.The fire protectioa systems chould, hovever, retain their origiaal desiga capabfI-ity for (I)aatural phcaomena of less severity aad greater frequcacy (approx-imately oace ia 10 years)such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods'cc storms, or srall intensity earthquakes vhich are characteristic of the site geographic regioa aad (2)for poten-tial maa-created site related events such ac oil barge collisions, aircraft crashes vhich have a reasonable proba-bility of occurriag at a specific plant site.The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the overall plant fire protection program.h single failure in the fire suppressioa system should aot impair both the primary aad backup fire suppression capability.

    For example, redundant fire vater pumps vith independent pover sup-plies and controlc should bc provided.Postulated fires or fire protection system failures need not be consid-ered concurreat with other plant accidents or the most ceverc aatural phenomena.

    The effects of lightning strikes should be iacluded in the overall plant fire pro-tection program.PVNGS complics with the"single failure criterion" based oa the dcfinitioa of"backup" fire suppression bciag interpreted as follows for each specific hazard: NOTE: Postulated fires or fire protcctioa system failures are aot considered coacurrcnt with other plaat accidents or thc most severe aatural phenomena.

    ~For hazards which depend upon vater as both primary aad backup supprcssioa, PVNGS has reduadaat fire vater pumps vith iadepeadent pover supplies.Piping betvecn fire pu~s and aay of the several buildings vithin thc plant is routed such that tvo separate flov paths exist, vith sectioaal valves located such that a failure in either flov path can be isolated.~For any building which loses iateraal fire vater proiectfoa due to a single failure of the fire vater piping vithin the building, backup cuppressioa capability is available from outside hydraats and/or inside portable extiaguishers.

    gtvic.i'll,'r

    ~O~Specifically for the/(Control Building a single failure of the internal fire vater piping does not impair both automatic sprinkler/spray systems aad all of the iaternal fir<<vater hose stations for aay fire zone;i.e., if the failure for aay specific hazard impairs the automatic sprinkler systems, at least oae Class II hose station is still available in the fire zone.~Specifically for the Auxiliary Building, a single failure of the internal fire vater pipiag does rfot impair the suppression capability (either automatic or manual)of both Train h and Traia B;i.e.after any cingle failure has occurred vithin the building, all areas of oac safety related train vill retain their total fire suppression capability.

    ~Specifically for the Turbine Building>a single failure of say fire vater pipiag still allovs full coverage of any location by either automatic sprinkler systems or by internal fire vater hose stations.PVNGS minimizes the effects of lightning strikes by providiag lightning protection for the structure in accordance vith the Uadervriters'aboratory Naster Labeled Lightaiag Protection Program, hll startup transformers, main traasformerc, and 13.g kV svitchgear are protected with appropriate lightaing arrestors.(See Appendix 9h rcspoase to fiuestioa 9A.66.)13 fn S gRAM M M nMO r>WAR HO OO MgW CPa5 A g Ir)

    Table 9B.3-1 COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet: 16 of 68)13 D.GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PLANT PROTECTION APPLICATION DOCKETED BUT CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/I/76 PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATING PLAHTS PVNGS POSITION AND BASIS FOR HON-COMPLIANCE ITEMS I.~Bi ldi 3 I (a)Plaat Layouts should be arranged to: (1)Isolate safety related systems Erom unacceptable fire hazards, and (2)Separate redundant safety related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire hazard.(b)In order to accomplish 1.(a)above, safety related systems and fire hazards should be identified throughout the plant.Therefore, a detailed fire hazard analysis should bc cade.The fire hazards analysis should be reviewed and updated as necessary.

    1.~di 1dl D I (I)SAME (2)Alternatives: (a)Redundant safety related systems that are subject to damage from a single fire hazard should bc protected by a combination of fire retardant coatings and fire suppression systems, or (b)a separate system to perform the safety function should be provided.(b)SAME-Additional Eire hazards analysis should be done after any plant modificatioa.

    1.3~lid'I (a)Plant Layouts: (I)SaEety related systems are isolated from uaacceptable fire hazards.For detailed dcscriptioas of the protection and isolation of safety related systems, sce sectioa 9B.2,"Fire Hazards Analysis".

    (2)VNGS separates re un sat safety related systems rom eac other so that both are not subject to damage froa a single Eire hazard.Redundant safety related systems are geaerally located in separate fire areas and/or have sufficient spatial.eparation which meet the requirements oE Section III.G of OCFR50, Appendix R, as explained ia sectioa 9B.2 of this cport.For an area-by-area description of thc separation of redundant safety related'qufpmentd refer to section 9B.2.(See Appendix 9A responses t'o I)uestions 9A.73, 9A 743 9h 77'A 95'h 101'A 1023 9A.121 and 9A.130.)'PF~eggyy+gyp gE'LATc'0 Qoi pmFhrr gF3pcAEFD To Suvr gceou T//d tran 7FZT7/E'~S/Q BASK OF SmCTln3/A,B/APF'6'PAOdsftD PEDA 72/8 Hbif/I///2'/Fiuf$

    Oin (b)PVNGS complies aad the detailed"Fire Hazards Analysis" ioClgf'0>is provided by sectioa 9B.2.The upire Hazards Analysis"~>~

    identifies safety related systems and fire hazards.The fire hazards analysis is reviewed and updated after plant modifications as necessary.

    3 A 95OM 13 IB DI g g 5 Qi-I OMO WHC RO OO MgQ gag AgX Vl Table 9B.3-1 COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet: 38 of 68)13 E.FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION (CONTINUED)

    APPLICATION DOCKETED BUI'ONSTRUCTION PEIQIIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/I/76 PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATINC PLANTS PVNGS POSITION AND BASIS FOR NON-CONPLIANCE ITENS 2.Fire Protection Water Su I S stems Cont 2.Fire Protection Water 2.Fire Protection Water Su 1 S stems (Continued)(e)Tbe fire vater supply (total capacity and flov rate)should be calculated on the basis of the largest.expected flow rate for a period of tvo hours, but not less than 300,000 gallons.This flow rate should be based (conservatively) on 1,000 gpm for manual hose streams plus the greater of: (I)all sprinkler heads opened and flowing in the largest designed fire area;or (2)the largest open head deluge system(s)operating.(f)Lakes or fresh vater ponds of sufficient size may qualify as sole source of vater for fire protection, but require at least two intakes to the pump supply.When~cor on vater supply is permitted for fixe protection and the ultimate heat sink, the folloving conditions should also be satisfied:

    (1)The additional fire protection vater require ments are designed into the total storage capacity;and (e)SANE (f)SANE (4)This d~sign feature vill ensure immediate operator attention in isolating and valuing off the tank oi the pipe section from where leak is occurring.

    The main plant fire vater supply capacity is capable of refilling either tank in eight hours.(e)Tvo fire vater supply tanks, each vith dedicated 300,000 gallons fire vater capacity, have been provided (see Section E.2.(d)of this table).The flow rate is based on 500 gal/min for manual hose stream plus the hydraulically calculated demand for the largest fire sprinkler or deluge system.I VNQ&mr//as (f)Not applicable to PVNCS 95nm.13 Of/10 WHQ HO OO gQg'O g (z)

    Table 9B.3-1 COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF'3 NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet: 40 of 68)4 E.FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION (CONTINUED)

    APPLICATION DOCKETED BUT CONSTRUCTION PERHIT NOT RECEIVED.AS OF 7/I/76 PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATING PLANTS PVNGS POSITION AND BASIS FOR NON-COHPLIANCE ITEHS 3.Water S rinklers and Hose Stand i e Systems (a)Each automatic sprinkler system and manual hose station stand-pipe should have an independent connection to the plant under-ground vater main.Headers fed from each end are permitted inside buildings to supply multiple sprinkler and stand-pipe systems.When provided, such headers are considered an extension of the yard main system.The header arrangemcnt should be such that no single failure can impair both the primary and backup fire pro-tection systems.3.Water S rinklerc and Hose Stand i e S stems (a)SANE 3.Water S rinklers and Hose Stand I e S stems (a)PVNGS complies by providing headers that are fed from each end for the Control, Auxiliary and Turbin'c Buildings.

    These headers cerve multiple sprinkler systems and also thc hose rack/reel stations for each respective building, and no single Eailure vill result in any of the folloving situations:

    ~for the Auxiliary Building, the suppression capability Eor both Train A and rain B i aired at once.AfuxlEJACV

    ~~For theocontrol BufldfngG primary vater spray systems and all hose stations for any specific fire xone impaired at once.~For thc Turbine Building, primary sprinkler system and backup hose stations impaired at once.~For the Diesel G~nerator Building, no single failure can impair both trains or both primary and'ackup fire prot~ction system.Separate headers from the Control Building Eeed the automatic preaction sprin'kler systems.Each diesel generator train is fed separately.

    The hose stations, connected to each header, are located in the Control Building.~For the Hain Steam Support Structure, no single failure can impair both the primary and backup supprcccion capability.

    The backup hose streams arc available from hydrant on the yard main and hose station No.63 in the Turbine Building adjacent to the Hain Steam'Support Structure.(see Appendix 9h response to Question 9A.100).In the Fuel Building, sprfnkler system and manual hose stationc are fed from a sfngle header connected to the plant underground yard main.In the'advaste Building, the sprinkler system and hose stations are fed from a single header connected to the plant underground yard main.In the Containment Building, all of the hose stations and the sprinklers for the charcoal filters sre fed from a single header from the Auxiliary Building.The supply header piping ic Seismic Category I.(cee Appendix 9A responce to Quest,ion 9A.97).'a~/3R CRAM Im55 M M A M 0 o'RO OO MgW CPa5.O g td I 05

    -I PVNGS FSAR (iP7 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS placed in a configuration to isolate the hazard area from any flow of outside air.The closing of dampers will be timed relative to the CO2@s-charge such that overpressurization of the hazard area will not occur.{..l The alarm condition is maintained until the system'elay is reset manually.The control pilot.valve also may be operated manually to activate the system.A supervised 1/4-inch ball valve is provided to deacti-vate the system when personnel occupy the.room.The storage capacity of the system is adequate to permit two separate discharges within the largest single pro-tected area immediately after, complete purging of the ma'n generator with carbon dioxide.Operation of CO2 hose reels for local application is initiated by manually removing the playpipe from its support bracket, thereby causing the master valve at the storage tank to open and charge the piping up to I the nozzle.~~-BV 5'tG~B.9 5'&ond1-t RGB-3.~e-eon Discharge of CO2 is controlled by the hose operation by utilizing the squeeze-type valve at the nozzle.Replacement of the playpipe on its support shuts the master valve+ea~eturn

    'wi-t Halon 1301 Systems Halon 1301 system operation is initiated by the product of combustion detectors (operation type)which are cross-zoned.

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5lEAM 5UPPORI 5IRUCEURE AUXILIARY ICUILDING NOII 9)t.Altfnfoflnnnfs9s.l Innoonl(98 I IOA I IAf Anf A Iu)n)A)RAY III/Jl'l nun AN I I~I A<>r.A(III n nl.I'Ilc I Afu>>I)nr nl I I LEGEND ALARH CHECK VALVE FOR IIET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEH DELUGE VALVE FOR WATER SPRAY OR PRE-ACTIOtl SYSTEH llllllllll Ot(E HOUR BARRIER (WITH"C" LABEL DOORS)+TMO HOUR BARRIER (WITH"B".LABEL DOORS)+THREE HOUR BARRIER ('ITH"A" LABEL DOORS)*C~FULLY RECESSED FIRE HOSE CABINET SEHI-RECESSED FIRE HOSE CABINET SURFACE IMUNTED FIRE HOSE CABINET FIRE HOSE CABIIIETS WITH HOSE RACK FOR 75 FT OF 1-1/2" 8 LINED POLYESTER HOSE WITH CLASS NOZZLE A-B-C (UNLESS IttDICATED THUS: (C)FOR CLASS NOZZLE C ONLY)AND A 2-1/2 GAL.PRESSURIZED WATFR (2-A)PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHER. /'///////I nUTOIIATIC PRE-ACTIOtt SPRINKLER SYSTEH DELUGE WATER SPRAY SYSTDI IIET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEH HALON 1301 COZ FLOODING SELECTOR VALVE FOR FIXED C02 SYSTEH'OTE: DOOR nA" I.ABEL n 3 HRS DOOR nB" LABEL 1 1/2 HRS DOOR"C" LABEI.n 3/4 HR HS HOSE STATION (REEL OR CABINET)HOSE REEL WITH 75 FT LOttG, l-l/2" 8 LlttED POLYESTER HOSE ltlTH CLASS NOZZLE A-B-C.HOSE REEL MITH 75 FT LONG, l-l/2" 8 LltIED POLYESTER HOSE MITH CLASS NOZZLE C.IIOSE STATION WITH 100 FT HOSE O4=HOSE STATIOtt WITH 125 FT HOSE k=HOSE STATION WITH 150 FT HOSE C02 HOSE REEL Q PORTABLE FIRE EXT.-2-1/2 GAL.PRESSURIZED MATER, 2-A PORTABLE FIRE EXT.-C02-20 LB;10-B:C PORTABLE FIRE EXT.-"ABC" POWDER, 20 LB.10A-40-B:C HINIHUH I MHEELED TYPE.FIRE EXTltIGUISHER, 350 LB, 4A-240 B:C HlttIHUH pain Vn<lr llnrlrsr l<rnrratinr. ~>>tnn':SAR rl ter.FROTNTICtt 1 r/rnn nttn svttnnre Fiqurr 2n-39 J4tnnnt inn 1 pnrn<lnrnt 1'1 PVNGS F SAR 1 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.53 pire Area XV, Fire Zone 57A, Hot Laborator A.B.Location Fire Zone 57A (figure 9B-23)is located in the AuxiliarY'uilding at elevation 140'0!!..Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Non-rated wall of metal lath and plaster common to Zone 57B.1-hour rated wall common to Zone S7N.'outh: 1-hour wall common to Zone.57N at column A8 East: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete con-struction common to Zone 57K at column AE.West: Floor: Non-rated wall of metal lath and plaster common to Zone.57B at column line AD.2-hour rated-wall common to Zone 57P at h column line AD.Non-rated walls of heavy concrete con-struction common to Zones 57C and S7D.Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete con-struction common to Zones 49H and 52A.Ceiling: Non-rated area boundary roof of heavy concrete construction. 2.Zone Access One Class C door in the 1-hour rated north wall to Zone 57N One non-rated door in the non-rated east wall to Zone 57B One non-rated door in the non-rated west.wall to Zone 57C Amendment 13 9B.2.15-194 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.54 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 57B, C 1'inder Stora e Area A.Location B.Fire Zone 57B (figure 9B-23)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 140'0".Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: g-hour rated wall common to Zone 57P.Z~South: Non-rated wall of metal lath and plaster construction common to Zone 57A.East: 1-hour rated wall common to Zone 57N.Nest: Non-rated wall of metal lath and plaster construction common to Zone 57A at column line AD.~~Floor: ".24efn-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction Common to Zone 52A.II Ceiling': Roti-rated area boundary roof of heavy concrete construction. 2.Zone Access 3.Non-rated door in the non-rated west wall to Zone 57A.Sealed Penetrations 4.Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.5.Protected Raceways None August 1984 9B.2.15-197 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR g.l FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.66 Fire Area KV, Fire Zone 57N, Corridor Area A.B.Location Fire Zone 57N (figure 9B-23)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 140'0".Fire Pievention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: North Corridor-1-hour rated walls common to Zones 55C, 55E, 56A and 56B at column line A6.2-hour rated area boundary'wall common to the east stairwell at column line A6.Open to Zone 56C at column line A6.Non-rated area boundary walls of heavy concrete construction common.to the south access shaft.'outh-1-hour rated wall common to~Corridor Zones 57A, 57D, 57I and 57K at column line A8.South: North Corridor-1-hour rated walls common to Zones 57A, 57B, 57C, 57H, and 57I and 57K.2-hour rated walls common to Zone 57P.South-1-hour rated wall common to P Corridor Zones 57E, 57F, 57G, 57J and 57L.West-3-hour rated area boundary Corridor wall common to Fire Area X at column line A10;August 1984 9B.2.15-233 Amendment 13 PANGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS~One Class C door in the 1-hour rated wall to Zone 57K Two Class C doors in the 1-hour rated wall to Zone 57L One Class C door (pair}in the 1-hour rated.wall to Zone 57M 2 One Class a door (pair)in rheP-hour rated.P wall to Zone 57P~One Class A door (pair)in the 3-hour rated wall to Fire Area X~One Class A door (pair)in the 3-hour rated wall to the Corridor Building 3.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.4.Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in%he rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.5.Protected Raceways None 6.Protected Structural Members None C.Safety Related Equipment and Components Train A conduit'D.E.Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components Cable trays and conduit Radioactive Material None a.Safe Shutdown Related Amendment l3 9B.2s15-236 August 1984 Cl -PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2e15.67 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 57P,'Flammable Stora e Area A.Location.B.Fire Zone 57P (figure 9B-23)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 140'0".Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: p-hour rated wall common to Zone 57N.South: g-hour rated wall common to Zone 57B.East:~g-hour rated wall common to Zone 57N.West: p-hour rated wall common to Zone 57A.9 Floor: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 52A.Ceiling: Non-rated area boundary roof of heavy concrete construction. 2.Zone Access 9 One Class A door (pair)in the p-hour rated north wall to Zone 57N 3.Sealed Penetrations Seal.s equal or exceed fire barrier ratings 5.Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.Protected Raceways 6.None Protected Structural Members None Amendment 13 9B.2.15-238 August, 1984 0~~Cl'.I 63 i3,')I 4<e r<<A~'r>rt~'(N I, 5A.:.01 35,1~r-y nr>S t'y (re(>Ay>>(r er>re>rr(IO'4~(>~~r.'..-5tlS:.-.=;.:t. Ig;~--'-"::-""'~56 C W-::i:-:'::.:-I Pili(.!f:I: rr 5OI-I P~+EL S 5I P6>(~/rr HS HS s'r>(SS>C rrrtt Ae<(C e(A(t>C Sr(C<ta~Wli~t 17a s see is iljl II ol i I'>i i s i I ii s i el i i I I',$%'No 7P f 57S 5<N>(E cr r<<>u>r(A t r(rerraLg Sr(><ref 57N~o<<oow~N.O nsssees~sits ISA</fy=-57H:-=.~~IP<illll II~~"cs(>r(YA store<(meaeowlseeee ~I~IIII<TW 57N-ee>err~i<I(esse(a ~~esse<<see<<<oesessssa<oeoneenu(2 rs~<<5 lfo llllllllllli f I-..-(NACA ,'I (o, S'4$$~(ee~st:d(T)~ri39--~HS a4l 40I<<g(<Y(rt Jr><err(.5TA 57 g T~O(ef cr mcanmact c" I=-P NOTE 5<I.SIES C<1 TOSIOVAESTC I Ti>AOVCNSC I foist<At Ant*cov<<OA<IY CocA Iiohs A>ro r(ANf Oiii f N l A I ION.7.<if lan<0 Si>'>VSIE$84$son sYNaot ato(NO I.s>olni SI A T E 0 C oh A i OOA.I<A(as AAE nA<to ton ass(5ASC TY ACA5045 ON(Y}I<<QHS~&S Ct>toit t rrr~er, HS~l I I ll'-0" w-'0'4"-~70'4"~-70'4"~lo'0~-1l'4/CIA)id/)~lc ld~~>>~Ytr<J f<4>)>~I"~I ll4 FAIO Vndc ttuclror Cn>no flog Slllihn FEAR I svn'~-.--.'-"--'.--.5:-:.~I,V V~wt~~',~Tollllletteotttelllltntt(tits(esses>'ll ~I~II~I>>II~Ill<>>I~I~Iles>>I>>1ef ~II~I~>>~~III>>ls~I>Alt~eeffentll ~Iffeeeeoioo'A<leee<ei 57NI co<A>0(>A 57 N~lcfsfslifl ~Ige~I~Iet~ll Qe>>n~n>>I~I~Illfl elltlflsteli>>et os~esses(~JPTIT ~Ill((+IIII(CTJ~CII rt T(n'n(So7P((~~o I w<<cc I pe'4AAgs+cf L-~-=-'-=Q+c(co<Ah(ret7I ot((er AA(A Q I Q'ol jg I>$(<<T.1 I s~~Es~~-.-<<r->,t O JTJ<r(/5 I(7:.T'"~<5 AVXILIART BVELOIJ(C PLAT(AT CLfVATTO(t Ir I'I9ucc 98-2)Ahrtu<hc n T 5'isl PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Ceiling:-Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete g-hoor ga4c', b~c<~et c~w~fa 3o~g~P.2.Zone Access Two non-rated missile proof doors in the non-rated west wall to Zone 27~Open corridor to Zone 27 One Class B door in the 2-hour rated south-east stairwell south wall~One Class A door in the 3-hour rated east wall to Fire Area XV~One non-rated door in the non-rated south exterior wall 3.Sealed Penetrations'eals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.Fire Dampers None Protected Raceways None 6.Protected Structural Members None C.Safety Related Equipment and Components Train A spent fuel pool heat exchanger Train B spent fuel pool heat exchanger Train A spent fuel cooling system pump Train B spent fuel cooling system pump Train A conduit Train B conduit August l984 9B.2.6-7 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR E FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS East: Non-rated area boundary exterior walls of heavy concrete construction at column line FF.3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Areas XV and XVI at eleva-tion 140'0" at the southeast corner.2-hour rated walls about the southeast stairwell at elevation 140'0".West: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 27 and about the cask loading pit at eleva-tions 100'0" and 120'0".Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construction at column line FA and elevation 140'0".Floor: Non-rated area boundary basemat of heavy concrete construction for the spent fuel pool.Non-rated barriers of heavy concrete construction for the new fuel inspection pit.Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common and partially open to Zone 27.Ceiling: 2-hour rated new fuel storage rack cover at elevation 140'0".Non-rated area boundary barrier of heavy concrete construction common to the roof.g.sneak'n k'Ar.necv gae1 s~s~P~gpss p~~/~won 47 g~)Amendment 13 9B.2.6-14 August 1984 t ~~~.l~~,.PVNGS F SAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15 FIRE AREA XV 9B.2.15.1 Fire Area Descri tion A.Area Boundary Descriptions Fire Area XV (figures 9B-1, 9B-2, 9B-3, 9B-4, and 9B-5)contains Train A and Train B components found in the Auxiliary Building.This fire area includes Zones 33A, 33Bt 87A~87B 89 90 SSA SSB 34Ap 34B 35A 35B 36'7Ai 37B, 37C, 37D, 37E, 39A, 39B, 42C, 42D, 43, 44, 45, 46A, 46B, 46E, 48, 49A, 49B, 49C, 49D, 49E, 49G i 49H, 50A, 50B, 51A, 51B, 52A, 52D, 53, 54, 55CI, 55E, 56A, 56B, 56C, 57A, 57B, 57C, 57D, 57E, 57G, 57H, 57I, 57J, 57K, 57L, 57M, 57N and 57P (figures 9B-17, 9B-18, 9B-19, 9B-20, 9B-21, 9B-22, and 9B-23).At elevations 40'0" and 51'6", Fire Area XV is below grade and annular in shape, enclosing Fire Areas XIII">>d XIV by 3-hour rated barriers.Fire Area XV is bounded to the north, south, east and west by non-rated exterior walls.The basemat is non-rated. At elevation 70'0", Fire Area XV is below grade, bounded to the north by both non-rated and 3-hour rated barriers common to the south access shaft, a non-rated exterior wall, and 3-hour rated barriers common to Fire Areas XI and XII, to the south by 3-hour rated barriers common to Fire Areas I, II and X, and a non-rated exterior wall, to the east by 2-hour rated barriers common to the east stairwell and non-rated exterior and to the west by a 2-hour rated barrier common to the west elevator, stairwell and HVAC chase, and non-rated exter'or walls.Portions of the floor are 3-hour rated barriers common to Fire Areas XIII and XIV.Cy" no fj'(g-you 4 PCCg$$S August 1984 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR West: FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construction at column line AC.Floor: Non-rated barrier of heavy.concrete construction common to Zone 87A.Ceiling: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zones 35A+ad 37A~aw3 5'7g,<nor t~rridor-)Wet~een -eMum~~i ne~E~d-AP.3-hour rated area boundary barrier common to the south access shaft.2.Zone Access~One Class B door in the 2-hour rated east wall of the northwest stairwell. ~One Class A door in the 3-hour rated north corridor east wall to'one SSB One Class A doo in the 3-hour rated central corridor e st wall to Zone 30A One Class A door in the 3-hour rated north corridor south wall to Zone 31A One Class A door in the 3-hour rated south corridor north wall to Zone 32A Open doorway in the non-rated south corridor east wall to Zone 90 Stairwell through the non-rated north corridor floor to Zone 87A Stairwell through the non-rated south corridor floor to Zone 87A August 1984 9B.2.15-43 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Ceiling: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zones 48, 49A, 49Br 49Dr 49Ei 49GI 49Hi SOAI a~'52A av)o.5~2.Zone Access~One Class B door (pair)in the 2-hour rated north corridor east wall to Zone 42A~One Class B door (pair)in the 2-hour rated north corridor north wall to Zone 42A One non-rated door (pair)in the non-rated north corridor north wall to the access shaft One Class A door (pair)in the one-hour rated north corridor east wall to Zone 42C~One non-rated door in the non-rated north corridor south wall to Zone 43 One open doorway in the non-rated north corridor south wall to Zone 44 One open doorway in the non-rated north corridor south wall to Zone 45/Two non-rated doors in the non-rated central corridor west wall to Zone 43 One non-rated door in the non-rated south corridor north wall to Zone 43 One 3-hour rated door (pair)in the 3-hour rated south corridor south wall to Fire Area X One Class A door (pair)in the one-hour rated south corridor east wall to Zone 42C August 1984 9B.2.15-99 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR I c FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.26 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 45, Crud Pum and Crud Tank Rooms A.Location B.Fire Zone 45 (figure 9B-21)is located'n the Auxiliary Building at elevation 100'0".Fire Prevention Features l.Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 42D at column line A7.:.;.~South: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 42D at column line A9.C Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to a pipe chase.East: West: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete con-struction common to Zone 46E at column line AG.;Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to a pipe chase.Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 44 at-column line AF.'.Floor: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zones 39B and 37E..-, Ceiling: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete S construction common to Zone~SOAP 2.Zone Access Open doorway in the non-rated north wall to Zone 42D August 1984 9'.15-109 Amendment 13 6/30/84 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.40 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 50B, Valve Galler A.Location B.Fire Zone 50B (figure 9B-22')is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 120'0".Fire Prevention Features 1..-'Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construc-tion common to Zone 52D at column line A7.South: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construc-tion common to Zone 51B at column line A8.East: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construc-tion common to Zone 53 at column line AH.West: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construc-tion common to Zone 51A at column line AG.Floor: Ceiling: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 46E.Lhgn~'r.gory canc.re..~ d-hoariiated barrier(common to Zone 57I.2.Zone Access One non-rated gate in the non-rated south wall to Zone 51B.3.4~Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.Fire Dampers None 5.Protected Raceways None 6.Protected Structural Members None August 1984 93.2.15-153 Amendment 13 II II (l l r jl 1 I t 6/30/84 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.3.5.41 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 51A, Volume Control Tank Room A.Location Fire Zone 51A (figure 9B-22)i: s located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 120'0".B.Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construc-tion common to Zone 52D at column line A7.South: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete con-u~CC~~aa~i 1 1~~~line AS.East: West: Floor: Ceiling: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construc-tion common to Zone 50B at column line AG.3-hour rated wall common to the central stairwell at column line AF.e.(I'>i~oF l.cap c~~c.re,'w ce~s~c.i4~ ~zeus'>rated barrier)common to Zone 45.i~>i:on-e(hecxvq c'.etc.re& consbu<~w 9-hour;<rated barrier~common to Zone 57K.2.3.4~5.Zone Access None Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.Fire Dampers None Protected Raceways None 6.Protected Structural Members None Amendment 13 9B 2.15-156 August 1984 Cl 07/06/84 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.42 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 51B, Sora Chemical Stora e Tank Room A.Location Fire Zone 51B (figure 9B-22)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 120'0".B.Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construc-tion common to Zone SOB at column line A8.South: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area I at column line A10.East: West: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construc-tion common to Zone 53 at column line AH.3-hour rated wall common to Zones 49G and 50A at colur.~line AG.3 Floor: Ceiling: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zones 42C and 46E.o&'ncaa/conc.cc.w cces~~c-.9Mourirated barriers'ommon to Zones 57J and 57N.2.Zone Access One non-rated gate in the non-rated north.wall to Zone 50B~One open doorway in the non-rated west wall-to Zone 53 3.Sealed Penetrations 4~Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.Fire Dampers None August 1984 9B.2.15-159 Amendment 13 f13 6/30/84 PVNGS FSAR\~I\FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 2-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area XVII, Zone 47B.Floor: H-hour-rated..-barrie~ommon-to-ZoneM2D.~'Ceiling: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zonep42C,g oW hea u~i cove.~e~cps~<<~~8-hour)rated barriericommon to Zones 56C, 57I, 57K, and 57N.Zone Access One Class B door (pair)in the 2-hour rated west waix to Zone 47B C~One Class A door (pair)in tne 1-hour rated west wall to Zone 52A One Class B door in the 2-hour rated east wall to the east sta'ell~One Class B door ig the 2-hour rated north wall to Zone 47B~Open stairwell in'the non-rated south wall leading up to Zone 50A~Open to Zone 53~One Class B door (pair)in the non-rated south wall to Zone 54 3.4 Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.5.Protected Raceways Some Train A conduit is protected by wrappings with 1-hour ratings.August 1984 9B.2.15-167 Amendment 13 i 6/30/84 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.45 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 53, Process Radiation Monitor and Boronometer Room A.Location B.Fire Zone 53 (figure 9B-22)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 120'0".Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Open to Zone 52D at column line A7.South: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area II at column line A10.East: West: Non-rated walls of metal lath and plaster construction common to Zone 54.J Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construc-tion common to Zones 50B and 51B at column line AH.Floor: Ceiling: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zones 42C and 46B.W nr-r eawM conc.re~c.cnz~c-;~r 8-hour prated barrier(common to Zones 571, 57J and 57N.2.Zone Access~Open to Zone 52D~Two non-rated doors (pairs)in the non-rated east wall to Zone 54.~Open doorway in the non-rated west wall to Zone 51B 3.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.Fire Dampers None Amendment 13 9B.2.15-170 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR 6/30/84 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B;2.15.46 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 54, Reactor Tri.Switch-ear Room and CEDN Control S stem A.Location B.Fire Zone 54 (figure 9B-22)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 120'0".Fire Prevention Features ,~tl 1.Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Non-rated walls of metal lath and plaster construction common to Zone 52D.Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construc-tion coliuiion to Zone 52D aL column line Ai.South: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area II at column line A10.East: 3-hour rated area boundary exterior wall at column line AL 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to the Corridor Building at column line AL.West: Non-rated walls of metal lath and plaster construction common to Zone 53 Floor: Ceiling: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zones 42C and 46B.Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 46A.++avq conc.5~~~+-3-hour>x'ated barrier>common to Zones 57I, 57J and 57N.2.Zone Access One Class A door (pair)in the 3-hour rated east, wall to the Corridor Building Two Class B doors (pairs)in the non-rated west wall to Mone 53 August 1984 9B.2.15-173 Amendment 13 07/06/84 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS e 9B.2.15.52 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 56C, Northeast Corridor A.Location Fire Zone 56C (figure 9B-23}is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 140'0".B.Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: 3-hour rated area boundary common to Fire Area XII.South: Open to Zone 57N at column line A6.East: 3-hour rated area boundary exterior wall at column line AL.West: Floor 2-hour rated area boundary walls common to the east stairwell. l-hour rated wall common to Zone 56B.Non-rated wall.-of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 56B.~skag COn C~Y4'-CoNQ~C=.LE H-hour~ated barrier>common to Zone 52D.13 Ceiling: Non-rated area boundary roof of heavy concrete construction. 2.Zone Access One Class C door in the 2-hour rated west wall of the east stairwell. ~One Class C door (pair}in the 1-hour rated west wall to Zone 56B.0 3.~Open to Zone 57N.~One non-rated steel hatch in the 3<<hour rated floor over Zone 52D.Sealed Penetrations Will equal or exceed fire barrier ratings August 1984 9B.2.15-191 >monument 13 l1~r 6/30/84 PVNGS F SAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.61 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 57I, Clothin Issue and Men's Locker Rooms A.Location B.Fire Zone 571 (figure 9B-23)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 140'0".Fire Prevention Features 1.Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: South: I-hour rated walls common to Zone 57N.1-hour rated wall common to Zone 57N at column line AS.East,: 3-hour rated area boundary exterior wall at column line AL.West: Floor: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 57K at'L I column line AG.>~<'neo,c-~c<c,-e. c-.a.s~c>m hour'IGated barrier~~common to Zones 50B, 52D and 54,.Ceiling: Non-rated area boundary roof of heavy concrete construction. NOTE The HVAC chase near column lines A7 and AH is surrounded by 2-hour rated walls.2.Zone Access~Two Class C doors in the 1-hour rated north wall to Zone 57N Three Class C doors.(1 pair)in the 1-hour rated south wall to Zone 57N 3.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier rating Amendment 13 9B.2.15-218 August 1984 ~~I~r 6/30/84 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSES 9B.2.15.62 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 57J, Women's Locker, Clean Stora e and Lunch Rooms A.Location B.Fire Zone 57J (figure 9B-23)is located in the Auxiliary Building at Elevation 140'0".Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North;1-hour rated wall common to Zone 57N.South: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Areas I and II at column line A10.East: 1-hour rated wall common to Zone 57N at column line AK.West: Floor: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zones 57L and 57M at column line AG.l COQUE+~Co>A OC-~-3-hour'Crated barrier(common to Zones 51B, 53 and 54.Ceiling: Non-rated area boundary roof of heavy concrete construction. 2.Zone Access~Four Class C doors (one pair)in the 1-hour rated north wall to Zone 57N~One Class C door in the 1-hour rated east wall to Zone 57N 3.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.August 1984 9B.2.15-221 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.17 FIRE AREA XVII 9B.2.17.1 Fire Area Descri tion A.Area Boundary Descriptions Fire Area XVII (figures 9B-3 and 9B-4)contains the Train B electrical penetration rooms of the Auxiliary Building at elevations 100'0" and 120'0".This fire area includes Zones 42B and 47B (,figures 9B-21 and 9B-22).Fire Area XVII is bounded to the north by 3-hour rated barriers common to Fire Areas XI and XII, and to the west by a 2-hour rated barrier common to'he south access shaft.Fire Area XVII is bounded to the south and east by 2-hour rated barriers common to the north corridors of Fire Area XV.The floor and ceiling are 1-hour and~-hour rated barriers respectively, common to Fire Area XV.B.Safe Shutdown Equipment Subject to Loss in the Event of a Fire in Fire Area XVII The following listed equipment is all Train B related with the exception of some Train A conduit.The Train A conduit has been covered by protective wrappings of 1-hour rating, and full area fire detec-tion and suppression is present.In the event of a fire in Fire Area XVII, Train A components identified in Table 9B.1-4 would be used to safely shutdown the plant.~M-HAB-Z06 Train B electrical penetration room essential air cooling unit, E-PPA-M34 o E-PHB-M36 Train B 480V ac Class IE motor control center Train B-480V ac Class IE motor control center August 1984 9B.2.17-1 Amendment'3 II PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 5.Protected Raceways None 6.Protected Structural Members...None C.Safety Related Equipment and Components D.E.F.None Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components ~Laboratory equipment~Conduit Radioactive Material Area containing radioactive materials. Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type 2.~190 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)~110 pounds of cable insulation (other)In-Situ Combustible Load 8,900 Btu/ft G.H.3.Transient Combustible Load 4.'quivalent Fire Severity Fi e Detection None Fire Suppression 7 minutes 2.Primary'jABC powder fire extinguisher',. and e~e-ps~@(e Cc~A,re-~~>guls4~Secondary One manual hose reel is located in Zone 57N.Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside Amendment 13 9B~2'5-204 August 1984 Vl hI I'J Sr w rl n Ul;.g: 1.g P (4i H U L LQtfrruvf~I'ILII': 0'i 0 url~cirro CP~IIVC;XH AUIILIANY IUILOINI SL.II I'.p.CINI AVNLNT II II.//L~AYTNVIY VII CDNTAINVTNT IUIlOLNC It.TI I'.VAIN ITSAII 5uttOAT 5TAUCTVAT Tl,ll ST AVXILIANY~UIIDINC IL.I~I I.CON INOL~UILOINC LL.IL ST.r('.~LSX D l (Rl AUIILIANY IVII DINI Il.Sl ST.I INCNTI Ll~INO~VTIIIICAl IOUNDAAY bX%W'DVNDAAY CSILINO~/lllXlr IDUNDAAY fl000",':.:IOUNDAIIY CflllNG AND SLDDII f lRE APEAS PLANS BELO(OAADC figure 90-5:urondncnt I)'efo Yrr Je Sfucl rr GmcrclinE Sl~lion PSA ll cornet I JOA I A A4/dl LI/f~.<i)~i'I')Ctl.II)(II)(I~'s.-~rb JP!37C CV a.q Islv I'..r r,~>IO'rq.>C r'~~rr r r 37/,, I~/A~~I~I'~ra~37D l rl ra>le rrv raan>rrv/I!~~'l~I I lrv><<>VC ms v<vsv~a\I</ss v>J<J s P~I I C~anr'>C Qr.r.fl'>ra sr'.l'n pc\ass~45~1$~I~rl I.,"-=, Ili/'a ,:l~car~cpa>pe r vlf~rC>ss~la>pirlI rr~r~Vr<C I:L....4 i~.'I'~'>l~IIS 10 37A~!~.Cf 37'>I a'll rrl r J v~C~rv~I Ca>sr a r'll I>>ala Y P>VV>lf P>C>I~I~~r.~~~~,'/J<s'ss IIIVC3 aa%%'.,<<'Ys I/,~45~11 CI"-)(ldll I~nv P-)l I)'I I-j-.37AŽ~'Cvaslrl>f PJ vl I~rr~~a~a~~/>IV Vrn I rrrnr~'I I:1'-,-"=<-34a.,--=:.:: ':.-.'lfp Cr~rv vrrr rl II.v r f p rvv r I Ir/f~ll'I P~\j'$46<<sa.I JS<a~lv~I\a I P~~~37B r-'-oM-,-I---378!r.P~.C'r ALIIS iH HO'I!5.I nf St<<SOS&as>ntf f5.l I ss visa>Is f 5~n I sas I>H!k!CU!0 nv UC<<!ISS'rf A 0 r!>'I INIH'J<IO's f nfl!Is~'!<snop<!1 lf S<rn!V usa!!!C,!"0~'Cra'~\saran I I I'4 10'vi~20'"'~!0'0~-11'"~I!'0-~v.I, (Ic)(!b (<<!.(4f)Pals>Vs<dc IfIlls tr'mscsfissg Sll!inn FRAR AUX I I.IAAY 6UILDlhfr'LAII AT 6lSVAYIOI! ~'sn I'"".'7E-O'""-': I 34B'=I I I I~~.s"lrv<<~vsl>P fk~~I P f~I pls.~I'SSI I I'Ispsre 96-19;!~~c sr!I I J t~"Pc~:~g.t 0 S a"r.l~p~gg pl I I*il)A I I I I!M.SAJ M~~A MA%tlAh~I'~'I U ll~~K~8 Wf C A 1 I l9~I I I LEGEttD FQ<>>I X!1=CO.C>Mi.f ALARM CIIECK VALVE FOR ltET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEtt DELUGE VALVE FOR MATER SPRAY OR PRE-ACTION SYSTEtt UNNNN ONE HOUR BARRIER (MITH C" LABEL DOORS)+TMO HOUR BARRIER (XITH"B" LABEL DOORS)+aua" THREE HOUR BARRIER (XITH"A LABEL DOORS)*FULLY RECESSED I'IRE HOSE CABlttET SNI-RECESSED FIRE HOSE CAUIIIET SURFACE tIOUtlTFD flltE HOSE CABlttl;T FIRE HOSE CABlttCTS WITH HUSt RACK FOR 75 FT OF 1-1/2" 8 LIIIED POLYESTER HOSE WITH CLASS NOZZLE A-B-C (UNLESS INDICAIED IIIUS: (C)FOR CLASS NOZZLE C ONLY)AND A 2-1/2 GAL.PRESSURIZED MATER (2-A)PORIABLE FIRE EXTINGUISIIER. P)hC'PP////////AUTONAT IC PRE-ACTION SPRINKLER SYSTEtt DELUGE MATER SPRAY SYSTEtt.MET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEN HALON 1301 C02 FLOODING SELECTOR VALVE FOR FIXED C02 SYSTEtt g+HOSE REEL WITH 75 FT LOttG, l-l/2" 8 Llt(ED POLYESTER IIOSE WITH CPS NOZZLE A-B-C.HOSE REEL KITH 75 FT LONG, 1-1/2 8 LINED POLYESTER HOSE KITH CLASS NOZZLE C.HOSC STATION WITH 100 FT HOSE 04 n HOSE STATIOtt MITH 125 FT HOSE IIOSE STATIOtt WITH 150 FT IIOSE C 2 HOSE REEL HS" HOSE STATION (REEL OR CABINL'T)PORTABLE FIRE EXT.-2-1/2 GAL.PRESSURIZED MATER, 2-A PORTABLE FIRE EXT'OZ 20 I'B 10 B'C'OTE: DOOR"A" LABEL 3 llRS DOOR"B" LABEL n 1 1/2 MRS DOOR"C" (ABEL n 3/4 NR=Ie 8 PORTABLE FIRE EXT.-"ABC" POWDER, 20 LB, 10A-40-B:C tIINIIIUtt I WHEELED TYPE, FIRE EXTINGUISHER, 350 LB, 4A-240 B:C IIINIIIUtt f jg ytt*ttwlesr GmaaOag Slal~PiAR naz rsmcertrw LKCL'nO ANO SYIISOLS>Flqute 9$-t9 I An.pie I Inllt I Aeendernt'tt PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS common to Fire Area V, the central staircase. 2.Zone Access~-A~One Class B>~roll-up fire door in the 2-hour rated north wall to Zone 22A~One non-rated missile proof door in the non-rated west exterior wall.~Non-rated removable missile proof panels in the non-rated south exterior wall.~Non-rated grating in the non-rated ceiling to Zone 25A.3.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.4.Fire Dampers None 5.Protected Raceways None 6.Protected Structural Nembers None C.Safety Related Eguipment and Components ~Train A diesel engine Train A cooling water makeup valve~Train A starting air solenoids~Train A fuel oil controls~Train A overspeed trips~Train A low lube oil pressure trips a Sa e Shutdown Related August 1984 9B.2.4-5 Amendment 13 1 I PVNGS FSAR'FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.4.3 Fire Area IV, Fire Zone 22A, Train A Diesel Generator Control Room A.B.Location Fire Zone 22A (figure 9B-13)is located in the Diesel Generator Building at elevation 100'0".Fire Prevention Features Zone.Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Areas I and II at column line Gl.South: 2-hour rated wall common to Zone 21A at column line G2.East: Nest: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area V, the central stai case.5 Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construction at column line.GA.Floor: Non-rated area boundary basemat of heavy concrete construction. Ceiling: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 24A.2;.Zone Access One Class A door in the 3-hour rated east wall to the central staircase..pt One Class p'.;roll-up fire door in the 2-hour rated south wall to Zone 21A 3.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire, barrier ratings.Fire Dampers None Amendment 13 9B.2.4-8 August 1984 ii PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 3-hour rated barrier common to Zone 23B-3-hour rated barrier common to the central staircase. 2.Zone Access One Class+)roll-up fire door in the 2-hour rated north wall to Zone 22B~One non-rated missile proof door in the non-rated east exterior wall Non-rated removable missile proof panels in the non-rated south wall Non-rated grating in the non-rated ceiling to Zone 25B 3.5.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.Fire Dampers None Protected Raceways None 6.Protected Structural Members None C.Safety Related Equipment and Components ~Train B diesel engine Train B cooling water makeup valve~Train B starting air solenoids~Train B fuel oil controls~Train B overspeed trips~a.Safe Shutdown Related August 1984 9B.2.5-5 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.5.3 Fire Area V, Fire Zone 22B,: Tr'ain B Diesel Generator Control Room 9~A.Location B.Fire Zone 22B (figure 9B-13)is located in the Control Building at elevation 100'0".Fire Prevention Features Fire Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area II at column line Gl.South-2-hour rated wall common to Zone 21B at column line G2.East: Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construction at column line GC.West: 3-hour rated wall common to the centr'al staircase. Floor: Ceiling: Non-rated area boundary basemat of-heavy concrete construction including pipe trench to elevation 94'0".Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 24B.2.Zone Access One Class A door in the 3-hour rated west wall to the central staircase r~g~One Class p;roll-up fire door in the 2-hour rated south wall to Zone 21B 3.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.Amendment 13 9B.2.5-8 August 1984 RER~T%/'%lt&%MVf>>ll>>"WVg~:0 ag&%A&i)~LA\WIN%>>KREIS I (~I"->>\FI IF~Wlftltf'PWAFII\+ PWIAWWF~'fJF I pN I ,*C56%i 5F I PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS cuxd I='leo(rtcoI Chase 9B.2.15.15 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 37A, West Corridors A A..Location a.nd 9S-RG Fire Zone 37A (figure>9B-19>)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 70'0"~r'Lad EBO..B.Fire Prevention Features 1.Zone Boundaries and North: North Corridor Rated Fire Barriers Non-rated walls of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 37C at column line A6.2-hour rated walls common to the north stairwell. South: South Corridor North Corri'dor Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zones 35A and 36 at column line A9.Non-rated wall of heavy con-crete construction common to'one 35A at column line A7.13 Non-rated wall of heavy con-crete construction common to Zone 34A.South Corridor Non-rated walls of heavy con-;-crete construction common to a pipe chase.Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construction at column line A10.3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area X at column line A10.August 1984" 9B.2.15-65 Amendment 13 I f~Asar-'w A T>Fs.s e.v.>S=(5 P~<e.M~e.'5'.<<4es e.Mc wee+eA~~4 c (~'no.~as)o~+~3 ah 8&+%he Se-C.49~ea-ave.Q.AClOq&4 q~-'no r r I~(s-~~4 c~4n~+igloo~+o~H+Re.7 carr Nor~~4 e.Le~ck~z o'o".~ne, 5<9~e,~$'err>a~s 4 il.o~',n J.esc.~i (4m o (gee~6 gee.)'a~(~~t'L J t~l)L~r<<.wv S o PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANAKYSIS 6'Pd E)ec'-9r uU C4u~'5 9B.2.15.16 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 37B, East Corridors h.A.Eocation 9S-aa I Fire Zone 37B (figure~>9B-19.:)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation70'0"~Q'6 J 89 C:,, c>+J B.Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: North-Non-rated area boundary walls Corridor of heavy concrete construction common to the south access shaft.2-hour rated walls common to the north stairwell. Non-rated walls of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 37D at column line A6~2-hour rated area boundary wall common to the east stairwell. at column line A6.South-Non-rated wall of heavy Corridor concrete construction common to Zones 34B and 35B at column line A9~South:-North.-.-Non-rated wall of heavy con-Corridor crete construction common to: Zone 37E.Non-rated"~alls of heavy con-crete construction common to a pipe chase.'Non-rated wall of heavy con-crete construction common to Zones 34B and 3SB at column line A7.August 1984 9B.2.15-69 Amendment 13 ~Co~C>.9B~2>S-k9 p KCE ZO~K M Q l Yl c(QQeK WK'tQO CL+Kle~W<c~i c&d.%eh LQ~MA ckh 8.4v<A<'c) &8'o".We~cbees--'a.~e.ercJos~db h-bo~r ra.4.J~a-6~cate g<ed'6ngs, mike 0la~vs open 4 We ea.s corri J.are e (e.i<vo+<rl 7Q o 40o~i~g de~c~~<H~n nygli'e~4,+e.pQ 8~/A)~s~Qp<>ace I 1 rr/', N'V xi'!~ PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.17.Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 37C, Train A Pi in Penetration Room A.Location B.Fire Zone 37C (f igures 9B-19 and 9B-20)is located'n the Auxiliary Building at elevations 70'0" and 88'0".Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area XI.Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construction at column line A1.South: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction at column line A6 common to: Zone 37A at elevation 70'0"~Zone 39A at elevation 88'0".East: 2-hour rated wall common to the north corridor north stairwell at column line A6 and elevation 70'0".p Q1i"I Q 3-hour rated wall common to the electrics(chase at elevation 88'0".Non-rated area boundary wall of heavy concrete construction common to the south access shaft.West: Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construction at column line AA4.2-hour rated area boundary wall common to the west elevator and stairwell at column line AA.Amendment'13 9B.2.15-74 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.18 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 37D, Train B Pi in Penetration Room A.Location Fire Zone 37D (figures 9B-.19 and 9B-20)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevations 70'0" and 88'0".B.Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North 3-hour rated area boundary wall common~to Fire Area.XI.3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area XII.South: 2-hour rated wall common to the north stairwell at elevation 70'0" and at column line A6.Non-rated walls of heavy concrete con-struction common'o Zone 37B at eleva-tion 70'0" and at column line A6.Zc"A<3-hour rated wall common to wrr<electri-cal chase at elevation 88'0" and at column line A6.Non-rated wall of heavy concrete con-....struction common to Zone 39B at eleva-tion 88'0" and at column line A6.2-hour rated area boundary wall common to the east stairwell. East: Non-'rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construction at column line AL.2-hour rated area boundary wall common to.the east.stairwell..;... Amendment 13 9B.2.15-78 August.1984 0 i PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.20 Fire Area XV, Fire Zone 39A, Train A Pi ewa A.Location Fire Zone 39A (figure 9B-20)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation.88'0". B..Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 37C at column line A6.~c~~57R 3-hour rated walls common to the.electric chase.3-hour rated area boundary wall common to the south access shaft.South: Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construction at column line A10.3-hour rated area.boundary wall common to Fire Area X at column line A10.East: Open to Zone 39B at.column line AE.Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 39B at column line AE'between column lines A7 and AS.West: Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construction at column line AA.2-hour rated area boundary wall common to the west stairwell and HVAC chase.Zane%7R 3-hour rated walls common to the@est electrical chase.August 1984 9B.2.15-85 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR ,'(<(<~FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.21 Fire Area.XV, Fire Zone 39B, Train B Pi ewa A.Location Fire Zone 39B (figure 9B-20)is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 88'0".B.Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete con-struction common to Zone 37D at column line A6.Ai e~~p)(r Q l~3-hour rated walls common to~twe elec-trical chases.2-hour rated area boundary wall common to the east stairwell at column line A6.South.3-hour rated area boundary wall common to the south access shaft.3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Areas I and II at column line A10.East: Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construction at column line AL.West".Ogen;to Zone 39A at column line AE.Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 39A at column line AE, between column lines A7 and A8.Floor: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zones 34B, 3SB, 37B and 37E.Amendment 13 9B.2.1S-88 August 1984' PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANAEYSIS 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to the Corridor Building at column line AZ.2-hour rated area boundary walls common to the east stairwell. Nest: North-1-hour rated wall common to Corridor Zone 42D at column line AG.3-hour rated area'oundary wall common to the south access shaft at column line AG.South-1-hour rated wall common to Corridor Zone 42D at column line AG.East,-2-hour rated wall common to Corridor Zone 42B.Non-rated wall of heavy con-crete construction common to'one 46A.Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction. common to Zones 37D and 39B.2.Ceiling: on-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zones 51B, 52D, 53 and 54.Zone Access One Class B door (pair)in the 2-hour rated east corridor west wall to Zone 42B One Class B door in the 2-hour rated north corridor north wall to Zone 42B One Class A door (pair)in the 1-hour rated north corridor west wall to Zone 42D One Class C door (pair)in the 1-hour rated south corridor west wall to Zone 42D August 1984 9B.2.15-93 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR East: PIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS North'1-hour rated wall common to Corridor Zone 42C at column line AG.2-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area 3plI, Zone 42A, at column line AB.South-1-hour rated wall common to Corridor Zone 42C at column line AG.Central-Non-rated wall of heavy concrete Corridor construction common to Zone 44 at column line AE.West,: North-2-hour rated area boundary wall Corridor common to the west'stairwell, HVAC chase and elevator at column line AA.3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area VI at.column line AA.Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construc-tion at column line AA.South Corridor-Non-rated area boundary exterior wall of heavy concrete construc-tion at column line AA.Central-Non-rated wall of heavy concrete Corridor construction common to Zone 43.Floor-: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 39A.Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 39B.Amendment 13 9B.2.15-98 August 1984 ,lP~~As}A3 l Q~Ai A!I 5849" T i'~i t , AC, 1 0 0 0 v4 I QAvf OA>$Q/J~4 A3 C I I N pwa (rrl OP(CNS5 Ir'Pll P.CI 370"-<<444 re p (Affv(3 SM I~p HS 030 lrrlSS Crrelm (P 9$1l'v'w avl 4vb 0 rv I'v(OIV Bl}'T.I;"I!.I I~I I i~/PE H/A Cv TB Naat Lpf I~Iva CO+(K'I PWh./,II~I>a$4(tl Cl(C CIPSI.tl)I.f'!C.CC-CICI 7i/All!A Pllf Crl 5((a(IJl', 39B CD(1(4((vtv osawf g~r.7 (ll 1HMI 54.I 1 I%5 f~aIII 4W, r I Cv4 I(CIAN(~O./PC CP45(1 Ca(4 ow 1 I.(1 (CC Cv4$(A4$p Iwllr4vw rl(P Ar(28+Jursr f(II($$HS o3l'I/~-~~i'KOC~K OPI 44140S-/-TC raS f.I i I 9 Avll I avv COC I Olr'ill I Irk 40(l(r((ta AIITIIV pvr cp4$((O'4(API Crllf (Parr(5//PFI//y (gAN B 19-0 QA(t Ic/(4444(4 oa4$w DMe HS f29 tt'M i Ia'4 AA'...At, (Ovlr olev Ivy 22'4 (44OWI 4(45(oo prie'isl ll 20'4~20M'l 444 IITIIC II, Orrwlvlf 5 TPJCISCS Covjr tvc Tlar Oewvf 20'4 22'~8~g'II~HS f28 tt'4" I (44(IC Plrff(cf law(Hvca I~J Carly coral I NOTCSI I~Rtf f 4 TO f IGVRCS 99 I THROVGH99 1 IOR FIRC ART A BOVNO*RT LOCA.TIONS AND FLANT ORIENTATION. 2.RCI SR TO FIGVRI 99.99 FOR SYMBOL LEGTNO.~AIJXILIA15Y BUILDING PLAN AT ELEYATION 88'" I'alo Verde huelear Generating Station FSAR/YAI/G F(es:0'LEvSL a)August 1984 FI9uee 98-20 AuenCIaent 13~14v I 1 Iv<<4~A fp TI~pwwvprrl<< I' 1~~IP~\ge A I PVNGS FSAR H.PLANT PROCEDUPKS Station Security Procedures e Station security procedures provide for the implementa-tion of the Security Plan (refer to section 13.6).Fire Protection Procedures'ppLIcn8L Fire protection procedures are provided to instruct~. station personnel in methods of fire prevention, fire fighting, and maintenance of fire protection eouipment.. Procedures provide specific instructions to members of the fire team in fire fighting techniques. April 1983 13.5-'3 Amenc..en@ll ~~~~PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX 9A (4)Fireproofing 13 X701 for columns N706 for beams (5)Doors and frames will bear the appropriate UL or FM fire rating label (6)Floors and roof slabs exceed minimum requixed thicknesses for structural reasons.No UL'esign is applicable. (7)Gypsum board partitions U-411 (UBC Table 43B 471)-two hours (Refer to the response to Question 9A.109).b.Fire dampers and fire doors ,Test method and acceptance criteria for dampers are in accordance with ASTM Standard E-152.Typically-the devices carry the UL label and are installed in sleeves which are attached to the duct work and supported by the walls.The devices are positioned between the two wall surfaces.A failure of the duct on either side will not violate the fire barrier.There are a few cases where the damper is not installed in the tested configuration. The'ampers are mounted off the centerline of the wall-or on the surface of the wall and are supported in part or totally by structural steel attached to the/45K<~Q+Auaust, 1984 Amendment. 1 a fire wall.a In all cases the structural steel will be protected from an exposure fire by designs using thermolag. In addition, the first.HVAC duct support on the side of the wall of the fire damper will be coated with fire retardant material of a rating equal to that of the wall, prior to the fuel load of each unit.Although UL labels are not attached to these dampers, they provide an equivalent level of fire protection. Typically 3-hour dampers are't cij 9A-54 PIGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G.Fire Detection None H.Fire Suppression ~Manual hose stream from a'ydrant on the yard fire mai$is available. I.Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J.Drainage None K., Emergency Lighting None L.Emergency Communications None Amendment 13 9B.2.20-30 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR a J FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS~100 pounds of paper and fabric~1,200 pounds of rubber 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity G.Fire Detection 16,600 Btu/ft 12.4 minutes None H.Fire Suppression Manu l hose stream from a hydrant on the yard fire main is a ailable.I.Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside K.L.Drainage Five 4-inch drains Emergency Lighting None Emergency Communications None PE II~0/Q pr7 g>f.'Ci/<<.na p:esse glypt<</a" a August 1984 9B.2.20-33 Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 5.Protected Raceways None 6.-Protected Structural Members'one C.Safety Related Equipment and Components None D.Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components ~Tools and Supplies Conduit E.Radioactive Material None F.Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type ~20 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)~50 pounds of cable insulation (other)2.In-Situ Combustible Load 4,700 Btu/ft 2 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity G.Fire Detection 3.6 minutes None H.Fire Suppression <Manual hose stream from a hydrant on the yard fire main is.available. .~c.'>~'lY.'!I A!~r!re, 7)~~5'I L), August 1984 ,:n.4 9B.2.20-35 '~/p 5/c,l<W c/c~chic/ic;~!"c/~~.;i:ic'ii~. Amendment 13 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS~Steamerette ~Pressure washer~2-ton monorail Sump and pump~Conduit E.Radioactive Material Area designed to.clean contaminated parts and equipment. F.Combustible Loading 1.Quantity/Type ~30 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)~50 pounds of cable insulation (other)2.In-Situ Combustible Load 940 Btu/ft 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity G.Fire Detection 1 minute None H.Fire Suppression Jf~Man al hose stream from a hydrant on the yard fire main vailable.3.S I.Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J.Drainage Nine 4-inch drains August 1984 Pi i'r~ay (Ql G4.Il J (~Q P+c f;r<ex.Hn,u-~<<'~5 g o/I Je(P 9B.2.20-39.rg S><(i/" Amendment 13 Table 9.5-1 FIRE PROTECTION FOR AREAS AND EQUIPMENT (Sheet 3 of 9)Areas or Equipment Primary Fire Protection Backup Fire Protection Detection Device for Primary Fire Protection Safety-Related Area Heat Radiation Toxic Combustion Products Accessibility Restrictions E ev.100 Ft~ESF Switchgear Rm., Train A68 5~Remote Shutdown+~Battery Rm.CH C~DC Equip.Rm...CH C~Battery Rm., CH D I~DC Equip.Rm., CH D~Battery Rm., CH A~DC Equip.Rm., CH A~Battery Rm., CH B~DC Equip.Rm., CH B~Cable Shaft, Train A~Cable Shaft, Train B Control Buildin E ev.)20 Ft~Lower Cable Spreading Rm.~Cable Shaft, Train A~Communications Rm.~Cable Shaft, Train B~Inverter Rm.CD CD CD I WHS CD CD WHS PA H WHS H WHS,PX m)}S,V>c-PX~WHS, PX PX WHSrPX PX WHS,PX PX WHS, PX PX PX PX-.jr!WHS.PX'X PX, WHS PX PX, WHS~i~}-}AD I, HAD r I~I, HAD I, HAD I, HAD I,L,S I'r Yes I Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes.P~P P t p I P 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P P~p P~~)ia i 4:))S)is*)4.l>>0)>>)4 C'S M 4)>>)cn Z PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS placed in a configuration to isolate the hazard.area from-any flow of outside air.-The closing of--dampers:.will-be timed relative to the CO>dis-charge such that overpressurization of the hazard-.-.area will not occur.The alarm condition is maintained until the system'elay is reset manually.The control pilot valve alsomay be operated manually to activate the system.A unsupervised 1/4-inch ball valve is provided to deacti-vate the system when personnel occupy the room.The storage capacity of the system is adequate to permit two separate discharges within the largest single pro--tected area immediately after complete purging of the main generator with carbon dioxide.Operation of CO2 hose reels for local application is initiated by manually removing the playpipe from its support bracket,.thereby causing the master valve at the storage.tank to open and charge the.piping up to the nozzle.Removal of the playpipe also trips a limit.switch which registers an alarm condition in the con-trol room.Discharge of CO2 is controlled by the hose operation by utilizing the squeeze-type valve at the nozzle.Replacement of the playpipe on its support shuts the master valves and returns the limit switch to normal.~~gprcD B'f Halon 1301 Systems Plh 8'mznE'D Halon 1301 system operation is"~~Md by the product Ahlb THPRcAhw~-<<.cWcd'-> f&'~f((('*t t(('),'8 Tee~oK<~vc~N~W~>, 4atb L9~ahu<.t'F~~4%~<ne Qp7+7ggg,~~~RkF~WA4~A)Fb 1hl fg M~H7~~~Appgf+Tgg A~b C 9.5-24 i PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS on the cross-zones system, accomplishes the following function: Energizes an audible and visual alarm The actuation of'econd c'ircuit (or'oop), on the cross-zoned system shall accomplish the following functions: ~'udible and visual alarm energized. HVAC dampers closed.Magnetic door holders released i4~pp~'~~~+4'+)+he.dooss esse.no~gos'rnssllg closed)Halon discharged. A 20-second delay is provided before release of-Halon 1301 The detection system trips the release valve assembly in the control head of the pilot storage cylinder to discharge the total capacity of the agent storage cylinders. In this manner a minimum (maximum)Halon 1301 concentration of 5%(7%)is achieved in the area to be pretected. Alarms are also provided in the control room for.Halon discharge and Halon system malfunctions. A concentration level of up to 7%Halon 1301 in the computer room may be inhaled by personnel for 4 or 5 minutes without risk of serious effects.The control room will remain habitable at all times.Standpipes and Hoses Inside hose stations are intended to be operated by plant personnel for the manual control of small fires.Adjustable spray'ozzles are used for areas where non-electrical fires might occur, and approved fog nozzles (Class C)are used in areas where electrical fires might occur.August 1984 9.5-25 Amendment 13 (q gJ Jeviakan is request J 4am Sech'an K 6 2.<<i, 4k 4i)i g~ii p-l t'cx4 j Jsarriers*separate ci rc'ul 6 re J n Jane+ra'n5.D i s cu ss)on+I'l The'east oia.ll of i ire Zone lOA i's'.~-A our~n/ed barr)er ornrnon Fire AredZ.Fire 2sone loe.The wa.ll+4 ch seegar ks the.~o remo0e sAok Juion jane I rooNsi i'ireful latA and p(asker danshuc4dn anJ conkuns a~hour relied tire aloof.77li s I I~r p~repbou.n ,cfar~)6 no j va1e J ak 3 Lou-l 5 Jue 5 she lech'oF a'.Qes4d'<Agura+on feakrlny cu 3 ho rakJ cloor frame)ns4lle j iw p Z-ho'~teJ me%l la&anJ p4s-4r gall..8n ty 7ra'n, ci'rrul ha)5-roo&J%rou 4 Pone)P A,, Zone l05 conklns both 7raln Q C.inc l+)Dnd sonieTr ln.0 Con Juilk.>at 7raln A racemate require J grSafe,,~C~In)~MR)05 SIlukJoion gi sp'~~<c+ci $y is.3 bouc-radeiJ&Co anhA P TAP e$uivolen4'Are seUe6'4s 1'n Zones fQk (Qe care.o+v i~c4L~%cnl 28 Ye spec:4V cA)Eclc lll o 0 s.RYE.o~s'4r&I P<~8D Y gc 4n lan'l s,pprpss>~ Pamper 8y'Yn&4e-CLAd g~gP rfAO l cLe:%ac+t.S insM<~4 in eoc4 G<e~pe..Fi~e.b~)ode.Y eS'ponse.(lh>AnwYl SQ Yr6nlOSs)3 S~pecbacj 4e4re, SigniPcon< degrW~S~oV the m~shn)pre 40rrie s lQou(J, occ.'c.Kcc ss+each 2ones lQPc oncl lQ<)s'assive+4wu'4 44<Delj o~4 E.SF s~ikckgeor rcromsO'At" G St&p~~i~yng d')~t.a-id"@~imp&+l~bc~~6 o4 rendu~re.J bq Section TlT.&Z uqgqa,ling, Ae.~ishng obes'icy 4 o 3-So c.y'c.9n)>o~<4 noh z'igm'0 co~k<g eb4gnce&e.pr le~+~~rr~elg prow'4e.4. PVNGS FSAR

    Conclusion:

    FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS The existing design provides equivalent protection to that required by Section III.G.2, and upgrading the existing design to a 1-hour rating plus suppression would not.significantly enhance protection currently provided.See section 9B.2.2 for a deviation common to Fire Area II and the section 9B.2 introduction for generic deviations.

    gpss)lgjg~g 7 g (pg~~: g~py77On!5'g~~<E2?8/'giCGAI/22K~+'g/@pe--VS Xr/7~<)'~~g g~8~//pl PP-3~~0 y~ggus7 2/,~~~~August 1984 9B.2.1-11 Amendment 13 t

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSES 9B.2.1.10 Fire Area I, Fire Zone 10A, Train A Remote Shutdown Room A.Location B.Fire Zone 10A (figure 9B-9).is, located in the Control Building at elevation 100'0".Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: 3-hour rated wall common to Zone 7A.'-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area II, Zone 7B.South: East: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area IV at column line J4 2-hour rated area boundary wall common P to Fire Area II, Zone 10B.West: Floor: 1-hour rated wall common to Zone SA.3-hour rated barrier common to Zone l.3-hour rated area boundary barrier common to Fire Area II, Zone 2.Ceiling: 3-hour rated area boundary barrier common to Fire Area II, Zone 14.2.Zone Access'h~One Classy'oor in the+-hour rated east wall/i P to Zone 10B 3.o One Class C door in the 1-hour rated west wall to Zone 5A.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.Amendment 13 9B.2.1-38 August 1984

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G.H.F ire Detection~~Ionization smoke detector system(s)is provided, for earl a~a>><Pa oar ac.'o.+e%ho.Holoa l">ol gas spain.w, Fire Suppression 1.Primary F,)~6yy~tV4AMb Ha)c a l BGl~g sqsfegq 14 1-'.Secondary~AA~l AOSQ.f'~>e.(~~J go portable CO2 fire extinguishers are located in adjacent Zone 5A.Ventilation Refer to Appendix 9A response to Question 9A.70.Portable fans exhaust.smoke to adjacent rooms where smoke exhaust fans exhaust.to outside air.K.L.Drainage None Emergency Lighting Lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)positioned for the operation of safe shutdown equipment is provided.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.C.: Amendment 13 9B.2.1-40 August 1984 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.2.10 Fire Area II, Fire Zone 10B, Train B Remote Shutdown Room A.Location B.Fire Zone 10B (figure 9B-9)is'ocated in the Control Building at elevation 100'0".Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: 3-hour rated wall common to Zone 7B.South: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area IV at column line J4.East: West: 1-hour rated wall common to Zone 5B.,3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area I, Zone 10A.Floor: 3-hour rated barrier common to Zone 2.2.Ceiling: 3-hour rated barrier common to Zone 14.Zone Access 2w One Class P, door in the+-hour rated west p h wall to Zone 10A~One Class A door in the 1-hour rated east wall to Zone 5B 3.4.Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.5.Protected Raceways Train A conduit are covered by 3-hour rated pro-tective wrappings.

    Amendment 13 9B.2.2-38 August 1984

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G.Fire Detection~+iy Cug~im A~O k d ())df~A~@4~~!<<acQaQ+4e g<'tomo4c H~h~L3c'L Fire Suppression

    +1.'rimary p~~~lw6cu&Hr~G Ha.(c<l>Q(l~gs4~s--'-ad jeaent-Zoa~DB-.~

    2.Secondary rnAYL~)Lese.Ice~Pne portable CO2 fire extinguisher.

    'ocated in adjacent Zone 5B.One portable CO fire extin-guisher and one manual hose reel are located in adjacent Corridor Building near Zone 5B.I..Ventilation Refer to Appendix 9A response to Question 9A.70.Portable fans exhaust smoke to adjacent rooms where smoke exhaust fans exhaust to outside air.K.L.Drainage None Emergency Lighting Lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)positioned for the operation of safe shutdown equipment is provided.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.Amendment 13 9B.2.2-40 August.1984

    CI II~()JC JD Je JF C PNA H)9 Ci CI AVX 4104~HYAC CH~If PL%LE IVu'.O'Ãfil/'G CAAANI I'I I I I~I I)CII f cI~I+C It CcIN~I<gl I tg 86A pit RADNA)ft~LOB~~~\CSI SN44 RN I TRAIN A tlrtds SHONCR(~fl'trA)H I I v:rw~...NNIJA JOIA (OIN)II HDRNAL IYN IAN N H JH~*t)I IN)~40 V tOAD CI IER z/;,.t P4A L))(OICJIRONT

    ~lc CHAHHEL A DC-COUIP.ROON 4)4 KV Srsd t-PSA-SO)(ott)IrdN)

    ~~BATTERY Crleltd~C PKA HIS (OIE)SA11ERY CNAalld<<~t-PKA-Hlt(atc) l+~~C C I I j/g,'j/~/~LIB 88-.cHPM)E 3.-F1(M sA'LL 7(>d-h'cÃR&>>As TRAIN A tXH IAN lt HJA JCIS (OIN)I?0 V Irt(CP E fH SAT MAY CHAR4EA E/KC Hl).OIE)DGHCC f PAC H)(Otf)4.'+ccgatt%6 c NORMAL EXH IAM H Jtt-JOID(DIM)TRAIN 0'XH.IAH M HJS Jotd (atM)I)0 V INYCRTER PHD HI4 SAX CHAREER Ega HI4.C, HCC E PKD HM (OIE)E PHD Nf (OIE)PANEL

    '&68'AHVEI.

    0 SATIERY ROON CHANHCC D O.G EOCHR ROOI PS@SPAT, HVAC CHASE'C f-PHd It)1 (or f)HCC E PHS N)sl (OII).~v 484c'8, cdATTEIIY 4 ctgPI I I I/9 j/I I jy 10 I u k FlRE BAR.)IG)ROTE)MTOOW~EL IOO II)4 Ft)R.Dlt)tL 6ENCRATOR SLDCL IOR ELEC1RICAL PEHCTRATIOH OPEHIHBS DOOR(NISSKt PROOF)W5 (QB IEO V DISTR PAHEL f&HA-029(alf)

    AUX.SLDS.9R~'~D'y'+8DL~QEs (C p+IOB Cttffd PIRE HOSE 0ASIHET (C)CL t VA 10R Ho.I CSI Srs RH RKCN'S A6: i=IG 9B-B9)Ic DC.LOAD CENMP'C PKS H)t(OIE)HYAC CNASC OUTSIDE EHOTE SHUTDOHH ROON AIR CHAM fNOTE SHVTDONN PAHEL t CJH EOI(DIE)l'alu Vcltlc Nuclear (Ieneralinr Slalion P~~VSA!I COIITICOL BUILDIIIG PL)L)I AT BLBVILnOII 100'-0" Ptgurc 9B-9 EIHOI 0 HIH CACLC RISER SHAFT IL El, IOCT.O 440 V LOAD CE TEA E P64 LM (alt IROHT VAC COUIP.HAfCN ELNO 6TIIISSILE TRODI E JHA'SCII)I EIA'E RATED)CltAHHEL'8'Af 1 ERY ROOM 9 EX)0 NVAC fXHAVST LOUVER HOILNAL txN IAH N<<JINJIKSQPI()

    IRoN SATTERY<<ooN EL.Italo'AT, CHARCitR t PKS ltl4 (Olf)4/6 KV SII4R CWSS-$04(att)IRONI I.RfFE R TOFIGVRf$94 I~Af CHARBER'PKS Hlf (OIC)THAOVGH 98.1 FOA I IAE 440 V LOAD CCHICR t Pad La~(OIE)IROVT AH f A SOUND*AY LOCA.TIONS Attn PLANT CHANNEL 4 CLG EOVIP.ROON OH ILN TAT ION~IZO V DISTR PAHEL E PHS D?4 (OIE)2.1 llEFCA TOFICURE 9S)9 FOA SYMBOL Lf Gf ND.August 1904)Cucnatlcnt 13

    PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 2.In-Situ Combustible Load 3.Transient Combustible Load 35,500 Btu/ft G.H.4.Equivalent Fire Severity 26.6 minutes Fige Detection P I-o~t4en-smok~etectcn-~stem~~rov&9ed

    -$~~~y-warn'-n~nd-ad~~ress-zoned-mode-w&3.-l

    -ac~M~rr ctMNma.C~s-sp&t&~Fire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic CO2 total flooding 2.Secondary One manual hose reel Two portable CO2 fire extinguishers Ventilation Manually controlled smoke exhaust venting to outside.K.Drainage.Two 4-inch drains Emergency Lighting Egress lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided.Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.t~ggPuanon o~ke.(On (Ba-Aar7~~)p~J+p~p i(18l N~a cri ia.ri~~+'~((El/'ger aBrrc<>~5f si~><ear(~r~8rntng, Je7.eC ec+vcr'Tr s)'S('<(<('>>)gas sp re<.P)Qv(5 Je.August 1984 9B.2.1-25 Amendment 13 4 I I r, II I t, f, I I I I t h 1 l I PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 3.Transient Combustible Load 4.Equivalent Fire Severity 28.3 minutes G.Fire Detection 4oawzat'i'-smoke-deteato~ys'tem~r~ovided

    -fear early-warning~nd~n

    -~zos~oned-mode-wi 1~ac~e-an-'automatic-CG

    -'gas-systeM 2 Fire Suppression 1.Primary Automatic CO2 total flooding 2.Secondary One manual hose reel and one portable CO2 fire extinguisher.

    One portable CO2 fire extinguisher and one manual hose reel are located in the adjacent Corridor Building...

    Ventilation Smoke venting to outside."(Manual Smoke Exhaust Fan)Drainage Two 4-inch drains K.L.Emergency Lighting Egress lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)is provided.Emergency"Communications Sound powered phone jack(s)is provided.I j r,.'>n i gg4m>anode pet 77~I~~s)p~rfll g/!Jg~cA>r ap 5 re!r!~.gy5 j~!~!5)JH s+ll8~r ga s st-,'en!.ave~1~~+!'ar sp 5re!rl~g f+8t P8rA PZI<<<f.Amendment 13 9B.2.2-24 August 1984

    PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2 , 5P 72 g)8 g 4l~U~z placed in a configuration'to isolate the hazard area from any flow of outside air.The closing of dampers will be timed relative to the CO dis-2 charge such that overpressurization of the hazard area will not occur.The alarm condition is maintained until the system relay is reset, manually..The control pilot valve also may be operated manually to activate the system.A supervised 1/4-inch ball valve is provided to deacti-vate the system when personnel occupy the room.The storage capacity of the system is adequate to perm%hgg'th'h 1~ll p tected area immediately after complete purging of the main generator with carbon dioxide.'peration of CO2 hose reels-for local application is initiated by manually removing the playpipe from its support bracket, thereby causing the master valve at the storage tank to open and charge the piping up to the nozzle.Removal of the playpipe also trips a limit switch which registers an alarm condition in the con-trol room.Discharge of CO2 is controlled by the hose operation by utilizing the squeeze-type valve at the nozzle.Replacement of the playpipe on its support shuts the master valves and returns the limit switch to normal.Halon 1301 Systems Halon 1301 system operation is initiated by the product of combustion detectors (operation type)which are cross-zoned.

    Actuation of the first circuit (or loop), 9.5-24