ML17298B617
| ML17298B617 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1984 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| ANPP-31405-EEVB, NUDOCS 8412120090 | |
| Download: ML17298B617 (475) | |
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REGULATORY ANPORMATION DISTRIBUTION SSIEM (RIDGY ACCESSION NBR: 8412120090. DOC. DATE: 84/12/10 NOTARIZED: YES DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station~ Uni.t STN"50 529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station~ Unit ii Arizona Publi 2< Arizona Publi 05000529 0'5000528 STN 50 530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station~ Uni.t 3~ Arizona Pub'Ii 05000530 AUTH INANE AUTHOR AFFILIATION VANBRUNT<E~ E ~ Arizona, Public-Service Co ~
RECIP,NAtlE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION KNIGHTONg GN W ~ Licensing Branch 3 SUBJECT! Forwards draft- proposed FSAR changesiincluding revs to steam aupply loafe S recirculation flow path for auxflfary ~~d4 feedwater sys to correct nuclear coo'ling water sys flowrates ~ Changes will be incorporated in FSAR Amend 14 CODE: B001D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE; l,g,g
'ISTRIBUTION TITLE: Licensing Submitta'I: PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8 Related Correspondence NOTES:Standardized plantp 05000528 Standardized plant ~ 05000529.
Standardized plant. 05000530 RECIPIE~ T COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES IO CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCI-NRR/DL/ADL 1 0 NRR LB3 BC lt 0 NRR LB3. LA 0 LICITRA,E, 01 1 1 ~
INTERNAL: ACRS 41 6 6 ADM/LFMO 1 0 ELD/HD$3 0 IE F ILE 1 1 IE/DEPER/EPB 1 1 IE/DEPER/IRB 35 1 1 36'E/DQASIP/QAB21 1 1 NRR- ROEtM ~ L 1 1 ~
NRR/DE/AEAB 1 0 NRR/DE/CEB 11 1 1 NRR/DE/EHEB 1 1 NRR/DE/EQB 13 2 2 NRR/DE/GB 28 2 2 NRR/DE/MEB 18 1 1-NRR/DE/MTEB 17 1- 1 NRR/DE/SAB 24 1 1 NRR/OE/SGEB 25 1 1 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40 1 1.
NRR/DHFS/LQB 32 1 1 NRR/OHFS/PSRB 1 1 NRR/DL/SSPB 1 0 NRR/OS I/AEB 26 1 1 ~
NRR/DS I'/ASB 1 1 NRR/DSI/CPB 10 1 1 NRR/OSI/CSB 09 1 1 NRR/OSI/ICSB 16 1 1 NRR/DSI/METB 12 1 1 NRR/DSI/PSB 19 1 1 B 2$ ) 1 NRR/DSI/RS8 23 1 1-REG F IL 04 1 1 RGN5 3 IB 0 EXTERNALe BNL(AMDTS ONLY) 1 DMB/DSS (AMOTS) 1 FEIYIA REP D IV 39 1 LPDR 03 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC, 05 PNL GRUELgR 0?'TIS 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 54, ENCL 46
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Arizona Public Service Company ANPP-31405-EEVB/WFQ December 10, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530 PVNGS FSAR Update BOP Systems File: 84-056-026 G.1.01.10 84-019-026
Reference:
(1) Letter from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., APS, to T. Bishop, NRC Region V, dated May 7, 1984 (ANPP-29445);
Subject:
Final Report DER 83-76 (Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Logic).
(2) Letter from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., APS, to T. Bishop, NRC Region V, dated July 12, 1984 (ANPP-29951);
Subject:
Final Report DER 84-23 (Auxiliary Feedwater Pump "B" Discharge Valve to the Condensate Storage Tank).
(3) Letter from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., APS, to G. W. Knighton, NRC, dated November 13, 1984 (ANPP-31101);
Subject:
Appendix R Spurious Actuation Analysis.
Dear Mr. Knighton:
Enclosed for your information are draft proposed FSAR changes. These changes
- 1) identify the presence of essential HVAC to cool the essential spray pond pumphouse, 2) revise the steam supply logic and recirculation flow path for the auxiliary feedwater system (Reference 1 and 2), 3) correct nuclear cooling
=water system flowrates, 4) clarifies the closure time of the main steam stop valves, 5) update the listing of safe shutdown equipment in accordance with the spurious actuation analysis submitted in Reference 3, 6) delete the letdown line low flow alarm, and make editorial corrections and clarifications. These changes are considered acceptable as 1) the essential HVAC meets design criteria as described in section 3.2, 2) the auxiliary feedwater system changes are consistent with CESSAR safety analyses, 3) the nuclear cooling water flow-rates meet design requirements, 4) the revised closure time of the stop valves is consistent with the manufacturers criteria, 5) the listing of safe shutdown equipment supports the actions necessary to shutdown after a fire, and 6) the letdown low pressure alarm is sufficient to notify the operator to isolate the letdown lines.
84i 2120090 841210 PDR *DOCK 05000528 A PDR
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,'F~V8GS FSAR Update BOP ANPP-31405 Page 2 Systems t
These changes are expected to be incorporated in FSAR Amendment 14 to the FSAR which is sc'heduled for submittal in February 1985. Please contact William Quinn of my staff if you have any questions.
Very truly ours E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVB/WFQ/mb Enclosure
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ANPP-31405 y p ~
STATE OF ARIZONA )
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COUNTY OF MARICOPA)
I, Edwin E. Van Brunt, Jr., represent that I am Vice President, Nuclear Production of Arizona Public Service Company, that the foregoing document has been signed by me on behalf of Arizona Public Service Company with full authority to do so, that I have read such document and know its contents, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made therein are true.
Edwin E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Sworn to before me tbis~day of 1984.
Notary Publ Hy- Commission Expires:
My GommissIon Expires April 6, 1987 I f (wl s +
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'NGS FSAR Update-BOP Systems ANPP- 31405 Page 3 cc: A. C. Gehr (w/a)
R. P. Zimmerman (w/a)
E. A. Licitra (w/a)
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p IC 12/10/84..8412120090 Table 7.3-7 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SIGNAL ACTUATED DEVICES LIST Figure No. Description Function 10.4-11 Seismic Category I motor-driven Start auxiliary feedwater pump and pump room cooling unit (1)
- 10. 4-11 Non-Seismic Category I motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction from condensate storage tank (2)
- 10. 4-11 Seismic Category I steam turbine Start driven auxiliary feedwater (b) pump and pump room cooling unit (1)
- 10. 4-11 Auxiliary feed regulating (a) valves SGl (4)
- 10. 4-11 Auxiliary feed regulating (a) valves SG2 (4)
- 9. 5-9 Diesel generator system Refer to section 7.4.1.1
- 9. 2-4 Essential cooling water system Refer to section 9.2.2 9.2-11 Essential chilled water system Refer to section 9 '.9
- 10. 4-8 Steam generator blowdown Close isolation valves (4).
- a. Cycles open and close to intact steam generator
- b. Steam admission va'lve opens fr'om intact steam generator 4
S 5GAgk3 f> Ster~ Su~Pt~ Vqhre. Ra~ s/g +l opens on P,FAG-X SCg-gy ISp SAaw S~np~y Va~v<C~ s(g@g~p<<, oAFhS-R 7.3 21 l
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PVNGS PSAR APPENhlX 10B PVNGS AFS RELIABILITYANALYSIS design from the present Case l to design alternative Case 2.
Speci fic recommendations are as follows:
Provide the capability to manually supply Train 3 feedwater pump from the Train A diesel 'uxiliary generator (Case 2).
Provide position indication in the control room on the pump test bypass valves.(cx)
Provide power to the suction valves for Train 3 auxil-iary feedwater pump from the Train A diesel generator.
Perform a total system test once every 1S months.
Perform testing on different shifts.
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PVNGS FSAR APPENDXX 10B PVNGS AFS RELIABILITY'ANALYSIS I
of the main steam isolation valves. The power and con-trois for the valves associated with this pump receive
'power from the Class 1E dc buses A and C.
The:two safety-related auxiliary feedwater pumps are
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3i2 S stem 0 eration For emergency operation, normal flow is from the conden-i I ':.sate storage tank to both the safety-related, motor-driven
'FS pump and to the steam turbine-driven AFS pump. An
'lternative supply of water is provided by local manual cross connections to the reactor makeup water tank.
A minimum flow recirculation system is provided on each il pump discharge with recirculation to the condensate storage tank. Each of these pumps can supply either steam gen-
... erator,.with feedwater. Condensate recirculation lines are provided downstream of the AFM pump to allow for full flow pump'I testing.(m)
Either auxiliary feedwater pump can supply the necessary,
'.'hedwater for reactor .decay heat removal and reactor cool-
" down to 350F."-
For normal AFS operation the non-safety-related pump, located in the turbine building, is employed.
One manually operated auxiliary feedwater path to the
>oleicsteam generators is provided for the non-safety-related motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump through the feed-water heade At a reactor c"olant temperature of 350F, the shutdown cooling sys m is placed in operation. The AFS duty cycle is the.". completed and it is returned to standby status.
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I' PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX 10B PVNGS AFS RELIABILITYANALYSIS l
conservative approach to the consideration of the human factor involved in activating train+3 in Case 2. Under these conditions it is not unreasonable to expect Cases 2 and 2A to be closer in terms of unavailability.
4.2.2 Discussion of Results .-'-
j 4.2.2.1 Dominant Failure Modes
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The analysis indicated that the greatest unavailability was due to human error. The human error was inadvertently leaving the pump recirculation valve open after a test and inadvertently leaving the pump discharge locked-open manual valve closed after maintenance on the pump. These valves ar'e not provided with position indicators in the control room. The locked-open pump discharge maintenance valve J
will not be tested or checked with pump operations after pump maintenance. The estimated human error failure probability for this was assessed at 2.7E-2 per demand.
By tech specs, the pump recirc valve will be opened for 4) pump testing - once a month per train.n All pumps were assumed to be tested monthly. The data source indicates that the failure rate of valves with position, indicators in the 'control room is assessed at about 1/2 order less
- than the valves without position indicators.
The AFS pump discharge valves, both the check and locked open manual valves, V015 6 V016 and V024 S V025, do not indicate to be flow tested in any of the surveillance requirement. A pressure indicator is provided downstream of these valves, but this does not fully assure that these valves are or will fully open.
The two check valves, V079 and V080, which go to the feed-water heade s to the steam generators, again do not indicate to be checked or tested in any of the surveillance require-ments. The technical specification states that pump tests (a) ~i $~$ ,n gg S+7f ting +iA$ ar or.f;c.< J ~:niff~
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g APPENDIX lOB PVNGS AFS RELIABILITYANALYSIS shall be performed monthly and the crossover valves be tested at least once in 18 months, but no explicit t'otal -.
system testing is stated. These check and locked-open manual valves can only be tested during a total system test. Thus, it is recommended that total system test be required at least once every 18 months.
4.2.3 Conclusions The conclusions of the study are as follows:
A. Provide the capability to supply train 3 auxiliary
.feedwater pump from the train A diesel generator (Case 2).
B. Provide position indication in the control room on the pump test by-pass valves.(a.)
h C~ Provide power to the suction valves for train 3
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auxiliary feedwater pump from the train A diesel generator.
Perform a total system test once every 18 months.
E. Perform testing on different shifts ~
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~ ~ r ~ t PVNGS FSAR WATER SYSTEMS Table 9.2-28 ESSENTXAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM Units Number Required of for Component Units Unit Capacity Operation Chillers 2.52 x 10 6 Btu/h, 105 to 120F 210 tons maximum cooling water Chilled 20 hp, 400 gal/ Centrifugal water min type pumps Expansion tanks
~go gal Closed to atmosphere Chemical addi-ll gal Ball feeder tion tanks The essential chilled water system is automatically activated by the actuation sign'als shown on figure 9.2-10. Redundant chilled water units are connected to independent chilled water trains A and B which supply chilled water to the cooling coils of the essential trains A and B air conditioning units serving the control room, ESF switchgear, electrical penetration rooms, ESF equipment rooms and ECW pump rooms in the auxiliary build-ing and the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms in the main steam support structure. Since each train is capable of removing the total emergency heat load (100% redundancy), one of the redundant chilled water systems with its corresponding essential air conditioning units can be manually deactivated once the other train has demonstrated its capability to supply the required essential chilled water. Table 9.2-29 lists Seismic
- 9. 2-118
PVNGS FSAR PROCESS AUXILIARIES high pressure air leakage from the compressed air system. This is accomplished by separation of the compressed air system from the engineered safety features (ESF) systems, or by use of barriers between systems. Safety valves are provided in the system to prevent or mitigate a high-pressure rupture
-ncident.
A normally open instrument air line and a normally closed service air line penetrate the containment (two separated penetrations), as shown in figure 9.3-1. The instrument air line penetrating the containment serves the normally operating valves of the pressurizer spray system and the normally operating valve of the nitrogen supply to the safety injection tanks (used to maintain pressure on top of the liquid in the tanks). The penetrating instrument line is provided with a solcwoicf ~
check valve inside the containment and am~pp operated control
~ cl-
'ax valve on the outside of the containment. This ++~adoperated valve closes automatically upon a containment.iso atj.o actuation signal (CIAS) or in case of an otic>ical 'Yp~in ure.
It can also be closed manually from rthe control room. Should the line rupture inside the containment, air flow is limited to a flow of 10 actual.ft /min b~r a restriction orifice upstream of the~wo/emr~d'-
operated control valve.
The service air line penetrating the containment is used for the refueling operations at the time of a programmed shutdown.
This line is provided with a check valve inside the containment and a manual block valve at the point of service connection in the containment. The line is provided with a locked closed manual isolation valve outside the containment.
A compressed air system failure has no effect on the capability, of air operated valves provided in ESF systems to perform a safe reactor shutdown. These valves are designed to fail safe in the absence of air; i.e. they position in a manner that does 9.3-5
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PVNGS FSAR MECHANICAL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS Table 3.9-18 ESS"NTIAL SPRAY POND PUMP SU~IitiARY OF MAXIMUM STRESSES AND ALLONABLES Max Stress (a) Allowable Stress Item (psi) (psi)
Suction bell 12,114 33-, 660 Suction nozzle 3,041 33,660 Discharge column 30,447 31,500 Discharge shell, 4,479 31,500 lower section Discharge shell, 10,532 31,500 upper section Tube. 5,088 31,500 Discharge nozzle 8,515 31,500 Pump shaft 3,613 174,780 Bolts (axial) 8,642 14,220 (shear) 4,561 11,376 Shaft keys 17,461 52,434 Driver stand 2,615 31,500 h
- a. The allowable stresses given above are vbtained by multiplying the values given in ASME III Division 1, Appendix 1, by the specified factor of 1.8 for faulted condition.
tests that veri y that the valve will open and close within <N the specified time limits when subjected to the
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lP~ f +~~, and operability qualification of motor operators =or the environmental conditions over the installed life (i e-, ~
aging, rad'ation, acc'dent, enviro". went s'mu'ation, et".) in
- 3. 9-57
PVNGS FSAR AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTILATION SYSTENS 9.4.7.3 Safet Evaluation Safety evaluations pertinent to the heating and ventilatioa system are numbered to correspond to the safety design bases-and are as follows.
A. Safety Evaluation One The diesel generator building is provided with a HVAC sy'tem designed to distribute air over the- diesel generator, its components and the control equipment to maintain the maximum air temperature at or .below the maximum design temperature specified in table 9.4-2.
A normal unit heating system, des'gned to distr'ibute tempered air in the diesel generator'building, main-tains the minimum temperature at or above the minimum design temperature and the maximum temperature at or below the maximum design temperature specified in table 9.4-2.
Safety Evaluation Two No single failure of any component in the diesel gener-ator'uilding HVAC system can prevent the system from complying with safety design basis one. A single failure analysis is provided in table 9.4-7.
C. Safety Evaluation Three~
The diesel generator HVAC system fans, and dampers a e designed to Seismic Category I criteria.
9.4.7.4 Ins ection and Testin Re irements I
p<RT Preoperational testing is performed as described in section 14. 2.
~9. 4. 8 'ZFiRENCES
- 1. "Particulate Characteristics of Dust Storms at the T
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station," Final Report, Arizona Public Service Company, 1978.
9.4-65
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'I PVNGS FSAR Table 9.4-2 INSIDE DESIGN CONDITIONS Space Temperatures" Maximum Minimum HVAC System (F) (F)
Control room 80(') 70 Compute" area 80(a) 70 ESF switchgear 77 60 ESF equipment rooms 77 60 Battery rooms 85 60 Cable spreading 122 40 Auxiliary bui'dine (exclud- 104(d) 50
'ina ESF equipmeat room h
-nd access cont ol area)
Access control area 80 70 ESF pump room 104/120 ( ) 50 Containment building 120/100( 50/70(
Fuel buildir.g 104 50 Radwaste building 104 50 Turbine building Below operating deck 122 50 Above ope ating deck 122 40 Diesel gene"ator building Diesel generator room 140/ 20( 50 Diesel generator control room 122 50 a ~ Relative humidity 40% to 60%
- b. 104F for normal operation; 120F allowable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> followed by a decay to 104F over a 24-hour period C. 50-120F for normal operation; 70F-100F for refue'inc; 20 to 90% relative humidity
- d. During a normal plant shutdown, the shutdown heat exchanger rooms and adjacent valve galleries shall be maintained at a maximum temperature of 122F
- e. 120F during normal opera ion and testing of the diesel generator; 140F during essential operation of the diesel ger.era"or.
October 1981 9.4-3 Amendment 6
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- h. Circuit protection not required. Local manual may be necessary.
- i. Not r ired for' control room fire.
- n. Circuit separation not required. Train B circuit isolation from the control M 0
- t. For a control room fire, manual tripping of the reactor coolant pump (RCP) breakers (located outside the control room) may be required.
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings
- 4. Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating (Refer to Appendix 9A response to Ques-tion 9A.112).
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Members Building structural columns and beams are protected by coatings with 3-hour fire ratings.
- a. Safe Shutdown Related August 1984 9B.2.1-13 Amendment 13
- 6. Protected Structural Members 0 Building structural columns and beams are protected by coatings with 3-hour ratings.
- 1. Quantity/Type 90 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon) 150 pounds of cable insulation (other)
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 89,100 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 66.8 minutes G. Fire Detection Actuation of the ionization smoke detector system(s) and the thermal detector system(s) activates the automatic C02 gas system. Either detector system alone can provide early warning.
- a. Safe Shutdown Related August 1984 9B.2.1-33 Amendment 13
- 6. Protected Structural Members Building structural columns and beams are protected by coatings with 3-hour ratings.
- 1. Quantity/Type 150 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 102,000 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 76.6 minutes G...- Fire Detection Actuation of the ionization smoke detector system(s) and the thermal detector system(s) activates the auto-matic CO gas system. Either detector system alone can provide early warning.
- a. Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 9B.2.1-36 August 1984
- 6. Protected Structural Members Building structural columns and beams are pro-tected by coatings with 3-hour ratings.
- 6. Protected Structural Members Building structural columns and beams are pro-tected by coatings with 3-hour ratings'.
- 1. Quantity/Type 190 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 73 minutes G. Fire Detection Actuation of the ionization smoke detector system(s) and the thermal detector system(s) activates the auto-matic C02 gas system. Either detector system alone can provide early warning.
- a. Safe Shutdown Related s ~~ ~~ L lllOA 98.2.2-33
- 6. Protected Structural Members Building structural columns and beams are pro-tected by coatings with 3>>hour ratings.
- 1. Quantity/Type
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 105,000 Btu/ft2
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equival'ent Fire Severity 79 minutes G. Fire Detection Actuation of the ionization smoke detectors system(s) and the thermal detector system(s) activates the
- a. Safe Shutdown Related s
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Members None C. Safety Related Equipment and Components
- 1. Quantity/Type
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 38,100 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 29 minutes G. Fire Detection Ionization smok'e detector system(s) is provided for early warning.
- a. Safe Shutdown Related August 1984 9B.2.4-9 Amendment 13
- 2. Zone Access
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings
- 4. Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Members None C. Safety Related Equipment and Components
- a. Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 9B.2.4-18 August 1984
- 4. Fiie Dampers None
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Members None C. Safety Related Equipment and Components
- 1. Quantity/Type 200 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)
- 2. In-situ Combustible Load 38,100 Btu/ft2
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 29 minutes August 1984 9B.2.5-9 Amendment 13
- 2. Zone Access
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Members None C. Safety Related Equipment and Components f ovrA
- a. Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 9B.2.5-18 August 1984
- a. Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 9B.2.11-26 Ai)aust 1984
Conclusion:
The existing design provides equivalent protec-tion to that required by Section III.G.2. The design is standard within the industry.
- 2. A deviation is requested from Section III.G.2 to the extent that it requires a 1-hour fire barrier between redundant safe shutdown equipment in addition to fire detection and automatic fire suppression.
August 1984 9B.2.12-7 Amendment 13
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F1M Yc;mK FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Train A auxiliary feedwater pump room essential
)
, air cooling unit Train A conduit( Train B conduit Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components Conduit E. Radioactive Material None Combustible Loading
- 1. Quantity/Type
~ 60 pounds of oil
~ 20 pounds of grease
~ 120 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)
~ 270 pounds of cable insulation (other)
~ 80 pounds of miscellaneous materials
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load. 14,000 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 10.5 minutes G. Fire Detection Ionization smoke detection system(s) is provided for actuating the deluge valve of the preaction sprinkler system and early warning.
" 'Fire Suppression H.
- 1. Primary Automatic preaction sprinkler system
- a. Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 98.2.12-1$ August 1984
~~~
L PIGS FSM F EC 7~ FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.
- 5. Protected Raceways
.Train A safe shutdown related conduit are covered by 3-hour rated protective wrappings.
- 6. Protected Structural Nembers None C. Sa'fety Related Equipment and Components
~ Train B auxiliary feedwater pump (motor driven) o Train B auxiliary feedwater regulating valve to steam generator No. 2~
~ Train B auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to j steam generator No. 2 Train B auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator No. 2<'>
Train B auxiliary feedwater pump room essential air cooling unit Train B auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator No. 1~'~
~ Train B auxiliary feedwater regulating, valve to steam generator No. 1
~ Train B auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to steam generator No. 1 e F~ai g gee w )~~ ra. Q,o z l'Q~ 4Cp. 2)
R-O~ ~i'A~ ~) 4 Qo Q, (inc. A~. g+<0m 0'bq Q)
- a. Safe Shutdown Related August 1984 9B.2.12-17 Amendment 13
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FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS C. Safety Related Equipment and Components Train A steam generator No. 1, line No. 1, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller Train B steam generator No. 2, line No. 1, atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller Train B steam generator No. 1 blowdown isolation and solenoid valves Train A steam generator No. 1 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves Train B steam generator No. 1 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves 13 Train A steam generator No. 1 economizer feedwater isolation valve Train B steam generator go. 1 economizer feedwater isolation valve Steam generator No. 1, line No. 1, main steam isolation valve Steam generator No. 1, line No. 2, main steam isolation valve Steam generator No. 1 MSIV bypass and solenoid valves~ Train A steam supply to auxiliary feedwater (turbine-driven) pump Train A nitrogen suyj>>ly to atmospheric dump valve J-SGA-HV-184 aa Train B nitrogen supply to atmospheric dump valve J-SGB-HV-178 Safe Shutdown Related Amendment 13 9B.2.12-22 August 1984
n F g.+ PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS C. Safety, Related Equipment and Components Train A steam generator No. 2, line No. 2 atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and-controller Train B steam generator No. 1, line No. 2
.atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller Train A steam generator No; 2 blowdown isolation and solenoid valves Train A steam generator No. 2 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves Train B steam generator No. 2 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves Train A steam generator No. 2 economizer feedwater isolation valve Train B steam generator No. 2 economizer feedwater isolation valve Steam generator No,. 2, line No. 1, main steam isolation valve Steam generator No. 2, line No. 2, main steam isolation valve
~ Steam generator No. 2 MSIV bypass and solenoid valves(
Train A steam supply to auxiliary feedwater (turbine-driven) pump Train A nitrogen supply to atmospheric dump valve@ ~CA=~S J-SGA-HV-179((a)) Train B nitrogen supply to atmospheric dump valve J-SGB-HV-185 -an~MG ee
- a. Safe Shutdown Related August 1984 9B.2.12-27 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR F Pt FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.18
~ ~ FIRE AREA XVIII 9B.2.18.1 Fire Area Description A. Area Boundary Descriptions Fire Area XVIII (figure 9B-3) contains Train A'iesel generator fuel oil storage components found in the outside areas. This fire area includes Zone 78A only (figure 9B-34).
Fire Area XVIII is located to the southwest of the Diesel Generator Building (Fire Area IV). The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train A and Train B (Fire Area XIX) diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks and pumps are buried side by side. The Unit 3 Train B (Fire Area XIX) tank and pump are buried separate from Fire Area XVIII, to the southeast of the Diesel Generator Building. B. Safe Shutdown Equipment Subject to Loss in the Event of a Fire in Fire Area XVIII The following listed equipment is 'all Train A related. In the event of a fire in Fire Area XVIII, Train B components identified in table 9B.1-4 would be used to safely shutdown the plant.
~ M-DFA-T01 Train A diesel fuel oil storage tank
~ M-DFA-P01 Train A diesel fuel oil transfer pump Train A conduit C. Deviations from 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G See the section 9B.2 introduction for generic deviations.
1 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.19 FIRE AREA XIX 9B.2.19.1 Fire Area Descri tion A. Area Boundary Descriptions Fire Area XIX (figure 9B-3) contains Train B diesel generator fuel oil storage components found in the outside areas. This fire area includes Zone 78B only (figure 9B-33). Fire Area XIX of Units 1 and 2 is located to the south-west of the Diesel Generator Building (Fire Area IV). The Train A (Fire Area XVIII) and Train B diesel genera-tor fuel oil storage tanks and pumps are buried side by side. The Unit 3 Train B tank and pump are buried separate from Train A (Fire Area XVIII), to the southeast of the Diesel Generator Building (Fire Area V). B. Safe Shutdown Equipment Subject to Loss in the Event of a Fire in Fire Area XIX The following listed equipment=is all Train B related. In the event of a fire in 'Fire Area XIX, Train A components identified in table 9B.1-4 would be used to safely shutdown the plant.
~ M-DFB<<T01 Train B diesel fuel oil storage tank
~ M-DFB-POl Train B diesel fuel oil transfer
~B~ pump
~ Train B conduit C. Deviations From 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G See the section 9B.2 introduction for generic deviations.
i-August 1984 9B.2.19-1 Amendment 13
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~ . FSAR SAFE SHUTDOhN FLOh'ATHS AUXILIARY FEEDhATER AND CONDENSATE STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM Figure 9B-44 August 1984 Amendment 13
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'TGV 11 ~ I tcs J Cvt LT tc' Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station FSAR SAFE SHUTDOWN FLOW PATHS CLASS IE POWER SYSTEM TRAZN "B" Figure 9B-53 August 1984 Amendment 13
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APPEiuDiZ 3A o "essu "e-,temple-atu-~ e-"~ec":s resulting from cracks 3.n I I
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ge; erator blowdown, and steam g nerator downcoz r feed lines are bounded by the results from the ma'n steam l'ne break analysis. Pressure-temperature analyses of the Auxiliary Building were perform d as d'scussed in am nded section 3.6.2.1.2.2. The worst case pressure loading resulting from an AS line break was 1.5 psig and from the CVCS letdown was 0.8 psig. The temperature profiles resulting from the worst case postulated ruptures in the AS and CVCS lines indicated a thermal spike of 317.8F and 213.4F, respectively. However, t1 e subcompartments experiencing the thermal spikes contain no sa e-shutdown eauipment.
'Blowdown from the AS line is automatically terminated several seconds after the postulated break by isolation valves closed by high differential pressure withi~ the affected subcompartments. Blowdown of the CVCS letdown l'ne is terminated by operator action within ten minutes of the initiation of one. of three alarms in the control
'oom:
e R generative heat exchanger high exit. temperature o Letdown line -.. 9 low pressure e Low flow in the process radiation monitor and boronometer. Also see QtJESTEON 3A.19 (NRC Question 410.4). Amen, .~en~ 8 3A-34 March 1982
h PIGS FSAR . 841213P379 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS OA number of fluorescent fixtures which are fed from~ uninter-ruptible power supply (UPS) and some self-contained battery powered-emergency light'ng units. The emergency lighting system fixtures in the control room horseshoe suspended ceil-ing are normally fed from the essential lighting system con-nected from the redundant Class 1E buses through isolation source, the fixtures are energized through ~ ~ transformers. In the event of loss of Class 1E ac power each UPS~consisting oi an inverter, a charger, and ea 8-hour rated batterg (See section 9.5.3.2.2.2 Essential Lighting.) The batteries are designed to provide rated lighting for a minimum continuous period of 8 hours. Spare self-contained battery pack units will readily be available to areas as required should there be a need for dc lighting in excess of 8 hours.
- 9. 5.3. 3 Sa fet Evaluation The safety evaluations are numbered to correspond to the safety design bases and are as follows:
A. Safety Evaluation One Emergency lighting, systems that serve the control room and the remote shutdown room and all supports of other lighting systems installed in Category I structures are designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements as specified in section 3.2 and are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Position C.l.n. of Regulatory Guide 1.29. The components and supporting structures of any system, equipment, or structure that are not Seismic Category I and whose collapse could result in the loss of a required lighting system function through either impact or flooding are checked to determine that the lighting system integrity is maintained. Amendment 12 9.5-50 February 1984
The batteries, UPS unit, and lighting fixtures of the control ro'om horseshoe suspended ceiling in the control building cLrR capable of vithstanding the safe shutdown earthqu'ake'SSE), and a,re. seismically qualified by analysis and/or testing in accordance with 7EEE Standard 344-1975. ~~ a,cc ~ ~~ '~ pope f ic w s c:
+~ self-contained units above safety-related equipment Qr g. installed in such a manner that during and after an SSE, their failure Vbll not incapacitate the operator nor cause crippling damage to needed safety-related equipment~~W in the control room and other areas are not required to fuaction during or after a seismic event.
0 PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS B. Safety Evaluation Two Reliable lighting is provided to permit the operators to shut down the unit safely and to maintain it in a safe shutdown condition at any time. The lighting system is designed to provide lighting in those areas used during a reactor shutdown or emergency. Lighting in the control room, remote shutdown panel room, and associated local control stations are fed from Class IE buses. The lighting is arranged so that alternate fixtures are fed by redundant buses to maximize the coverage of remaining fixtures in the event of a loss of one Class IE bus. Physical separation is provided to maintain independence of the redundant essential lighting systems. If the normal (preferred) source to a Class IE bus . fails, the associated diesel generator is started auto-matically. During the diesel starting period, the emergency lighting system provides illumination. Lighting in the control room and remote shutdown area is automatically restored during diesel generator sequencing. In the event that ac power is lost, illumination in the control room (except for the control room horseshoe suspended ceiling) and remote shutdown area is provided by the dc emergency lighting system consisting of self-contained emergency lighting fixtures. In the control room panel area, upon loss of ac power, the dc emergency lighting system is energized automatically. Additionally, the UPS will supply power to selected fluorescent fixture each . In the cony ski~~ control room suspended ceiling area, ~ UPS an inverter, charger, and separately installed 8-hour rated battery suppl~ power to fixtures upon loss of ac power. A single failure analysis is provided in table 9.5-5. February 1984 5 <1 ver.~-...e-..~ '
0 PVNGS FSAR CONFORMANCE WITH NRC GENERAI DESIGN CRITERIA exceeded. One of these circuits shall be designed to be available within a few seconds following a loss-of-coolant accident to assure that core cooling, containment integrity, and other vital safety functions are maintained. Provisions shall be included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining sources as a result of, or coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power sources.
RESPONSE
For each nuclear power unit of PVNGS an onsite electric"power system and an offsite electric. power system provide -power for electric loads important, to safety. Two completely independent and redundant electric load groups important to safety are provided for each unit. Each load group has sufficient capa-. bility, independent of the'other load group for the same unit, to ensure that: A. Specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the RCPB are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences. B. The core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postu-lated accidents. Each redundant load group is provided with two offsite pre-ferred electric power sources, a diesel generator onsite electric power source, and two sets of batteries These pro-= vide suf redun estability to erform their safety functions, assuming a single failure. ko 4e ti~i4%cns aFycvler s~s~ d'evelcp~e~+ sec+i~ 8.2.},2.1) ( 3.1-10
PVNGS FSAR
- 2. Any circuit breaker can be isolated for maintenance without interrupting the power or protection to any circuit (subject to 1imitations of po~er system development section 8.2.1.2.1).
- 3. Short circuits on a section of bus can be isolated without interrupting service to any circuit other than that connected to the faulty bus section.
G. The offsite sources from the 525 kV switchyards to the startup transformers are separate and independent. The failure or structural collapse of one system or structure does not affect other offsite sources. H. The offsite sources from the startup transformers to the 13.8 kV switchgear located at the units are inde-pendently and separately routed. Two physically independent circuits are provided for . offsite power to the onsite distribution system for each unit. The offsite source normally connected to each ESF bus is immediately available to supply com-ponents important to safety following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident. Either of the two offsite sources to each ESF bus, if available, can be connected by control switch operation in the control roo 8.2 ing of Electric Power Systems The 13.8 kV and 4.16 kV circuit breakers can be inspected, maintained, and tested on a routine basis.. This can be accomplished without removing the generators, transformers, or transmission lines from service (subject to limitations of power system development section 8.2.1.2.1). August 1982 8. 2-5 Amendment 9
PIGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS shutdown, and maintenance under normal and emergency conditions.
~
The design bases of these systems are:
~ - A. An electronic private automatic branch exchange (EPABX) teleph'one system a sound powers41ephone sys'em, ag f'co+re cOl'<'c.k <'~ a Pcq't 0$ Wag goto Qcwhro( Ron olds>
intercompsy~em;yUHF radiot, and a public address system are provided toTfvg-eau . Zgghm> accomplish-onsxte communication between the control room and various plant locations. B. Public fpy and private telephone systems and a VHF radio L LC A. system tw-the:.Qaricopa County sheriffs arepaarprovided to permit plant-to-offsite communication on a continuous 3
~p,ps Ric.rcu33ve sf M C. The plant has1"telephone communication link+to the Arizona Public Service had-San%-River~~~dispatch-h, nt pAe)c ing center pand'-Alternate links~via the m~<rwwave system~ ~p proV<~t& bg dt'4 T~lep4~~~
D. An emergency evacuation alarm system is designed to warn personnel to evacuate the exclusion area in the event of a DBA. F. Communication systems are provided with power supplies gJps) for each subsystem as noted tl 9.3-3. *3 supp3we~r ~ocatedm~epara<e-area~ The communication systems zen 9 ~ t~ remi'wee.
~~rrc+i&~
IH cmI with applicable local in codes, standards, ordinances, and Federal Communications Commission regulations. Th~mmuni~Waa-systems~~~pab~
~
G. ender-condi-tian~~maximum-pl~n~oi se&wvel s-baiZtQ
~
~3 genera%ed-during-th~ariaus~perwting-Geadi aacXuding-acciden~ondi4ioaes-H.
Mat I 9 ~ I t
'@per -Communiw~ae~ransm I
<6 0 bt.
n I48h 13fo<se boreas (gveaLer %khan 95 el&) Ek skgol Blue fi'bahts prowled fr dletttntj personnel (n <dse g d plartt- AHotden't . 9.5-39
PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS Table 9.5-3 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS POWER SUPPLIES System Power Supply EPABX telephone system UPS (Battery a 6 charger) PA system ZpS~Iaattery~al a ctargerg Microwave equipment (APSg Communication battery (a) in SRP) microwave building (APQQRO) SouD Second-powered telephone None required Two-way radio (base station) UPS (Battery( ~ a charger) Two-way radio (mobile units) Self-contained battery packs RddCO Reg~fa, Canbol Cc gaLa S, D't'lsd Ac~era fov 5~ked. up intercom< Sith-radio Emergency evacuation alarm UPS (Battery(P~ & charger) system (unit) (c3 Sotdr panama u3i& Qtp+ g cg~ Emergency evacuation 'alarm AC-powerMrom-480V-hyao system (vite) non-Class-IE-MCC~
- a. 8 hour operation W~ouroperation~ 4. o5>>J--
9.5-40
tr Table 9.5-3A
SUMMARY
OF ONSITE COMMUN CATIO S SYSTEM CAPABILITIES AND NOISE CONSIDERATIONS DURING TRANSIENTS AND/OR ACCIDENTS Communication Systems Available -and Haximum Background Noise for Ff fective Communication (b) Haximum nticipated- EPABX EPABX Pub)ic Address Soun ower Portable Sound bevels (a) Telephone Telephone Jack Public Address P es (dse) UHF Radio Station (dBA (dBA) (dBA) (dBA) (dBA) (dBA) Control room 70 92 118 95 Remote shutdown panel 75 102 118 95 Sa fety in jection pump rooms 92 102 95 Shutdown heat exchanger rooms 90 118 102 95 ESF switchgear rooms 75 118 102 95 0 Piping penetration rooms 100 92 118 )02 95 Radwaste building 102 118 102 95 t Auxiliary feedwater p 95 M rooms 110 92 118 102
- a. Subj to verification during startup d. Telephone headset
- b. deference 1 e. Telephone headset K Based on data supplied by vendors
PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS I. f 8e ix-ed~eat.e~~re-uC
't;~n~
ective=rel'ayi'ngwndHi rewyaf ems-are 9.5.2.2 S stem Descri tion The plant communications systems are illustrated schematically in figures 9.5-2 through 9.5-5. Locations of telephones and public address speakers are shown on the station lighting and communication plan drawings. Connections to offsite communi-cations are shown in figure 9.5-6. 9.5.2.2.1 Intra-Plant Communication Systems 9.5.2.2.1.1 EPABX Tele hone S stem. The primary means of communications within the plant is the EPABX system (refer to figure 9.5-2. The EPABX system provides station-to-station private line communications with any EPABX telephone on site, including the main control room, and between the plant and the external public system. Interconnection to the PA system is also provided. Cables between the EPABX exchange, located in the service building, and each unit communication room area distribution frames are routed underground in concrete-encased duct banks to protect the cable from being severed accidentally. Communication cables within the plant have fire resistant insulation and are routed in conduit or non-safety-related cable trays. The EPABX exchange is powered by a 48-volt battery located in the battery room of the service building. The main control rooms are provided with alarms to indicate failure of the battery or its charger. 9.5-41
PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTENS f<t)Ijc. iQJYcss 9.5.2.2.1.2
~ ~ ~ ~ Public Address S stem. The ~giap~ystem (refer
~
~
~
to figure 9.5-3)consists of sevementsalwach5-volt<'d
~
~
Ba.he~~s amplifiers powered by i~ivy.dual-UPS~with an 8-hour capacity.
~
P A . -paging-speakers utilize self-contained matching transformers-and are distributed between amplifiers for increased reliability in the event a given amplifier or speaker fails. Access to the
'V~
PA system may be obtained from any plant PABX telephone using p dedicated numbexS rW a- r-~orit The seven amplifier racks are C. vade from the
~tUl& ly CLVCLi f3. C located in the areas they serve operators'elephone.
as follows: Conkro t Soil J'ng, < ~~<A ~I 'ops I
<o0~( f20 F~ev .
Unit 1 .microwave-and-tel.emetering-room~-
~
~ Unit 2 telemetering room e li
~ Unit 3 telemetering room
~ Administration building communications room (Serves Cruand o Water reclamation facility (WRF) communications room
~ EOr COWW5. ROOyrl (SQYWg PM a>CL Mal<y) &~M)C ) ~ ~
~ S<$ 0L cE Bo lcL'~q cfyw~ s, /f3>~
L 9.5.2.2.1e3 Emer 6'nc Evacuation Alarm S stem. site-ar'ea
~
evacua~~larm~ys. m "eXe~~oigure- . - consisting-central~1 located roof-.mounted-electrically-driven-siren i~rovided-to-aler<Me.entire-site .The-sirenmsmniti~te t-A f ~ht manuaKyMromm- pushbutton-Xocated inthe-of fice-~ f-the-shi f unit evacuation alarm system for each unit is provided. Each unit. system. consists of an electronic siren with amplifier/ projectors (speakers) located throughout the unit area. Actuation of the system h'd is initiated manually from the unit A) )he ('.Orfftnl. ROOm ~ . communications console~ A mz.crophone is provided to permit p.A the system to be used as a back-up pagan@ system. Qa Bach unzt t 41t ~$ emergency evacuation alarm system is provided with g-UPS-with a 2-hour capacity. In high noise work areas (greater than 95dB) flashing blue strobe lights are furnished to provide visual alarms in conjunction with the audible evacuation and accountability alarms of the unit evacuation system. Amendment 13 9.5-42 August 1984
L PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5.2.2.1.4 Sound Powered Tele hone S stem. A private direct-line sound powered telephone system is provided between the C4>qJ I dmf PP.~C,[ )W ~ CC7r)frO{ WOO~ fuel building and theKperatzon-Console for each unit. Co&hOl 4;-> second independent system is provided between the eperato~ Rrnxra console and maintenance control points throughout the unit.. Qc, s)'o~he.d. The system~ can be connected together by a,s8ztch en~mi .~peraVo&s~onsoIVg' g~~C R~IQ
'g'D CD) ) >f)l CdIMGc:.c5
)
9.5.2.2.1.5 Intercom. ).Intercom service-is providedlhetween themainmontrol-rooms,-<he-security-consol~~ndMh~F communications-room -as.wn-ad j unct touche-cont ro3.uni tsm&the-radio system Refev h - . gg. 9-5-5
- 9. ~ . .2.. ~d*'
throughout the site is provided by two-'dual-6')'apl)
.tiffI hblefrequency base
~
stations (refer to figure 9.5-5), 4uaXP-fre(uency mobile transceivers, and single-and-Qual frequenc~portable
~)t).L HP4. gg e.fL~c~c.g transceivers.
~
Se) ZAs~4 Qne&requency~ assigned Ao-a wecurxt~unct ion-whi3.e th f I 'I B.d pl H b NaU+n-and-associate~reguencies serve-as-a-bac~p~or&he other. Radi~ommunicatio~nto the~ntainmen&is~rovided-h~ng 3~-frequency-base-stations-at-each-uni~ontw inmen& building~as~ations-ara-prov &ed-wit~~i~~~our. cspain<~. The portable units are provided with rechargeable batteries. Portable radios stored in recharger units in selected locations throughout the plant provide additional emergency radio communications. 9:5.2.2.2 Plant-to-Offsite Communication Systems 9.5.2.2.2.1 Public Offsite Communications S stem. The EPABX interconnects with the Mountain Bell Telephone System to provide communications with the local Buckeye area,pnd Phoenix from L;~d field 9.5-43
PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS aad-the-eont~h thol .dt xoomso This provides direct dialing to I'A'M'i:"1 pro, Ilail kvi'(rIinss (riel/;o~ sop s~". locations outside the plant. =
~sard SAQ Wve.
The ~~entrol-rooms-aa&-security centersfare-al~r~videC h lines directly connected to the public telephone system as a backup to the EPABX connected trunks. Refer to figure= 9.5-6. 9.5.2.2.2.2 Private Offsite Communications S stem. The private offsite communications system provides communications via APS and-SRP'-owned microwave systems. Private VHF radio facilities also provide (LLE'A~ communications with the office of the M Iggb~c vg Pr';.>~gricdt) Maricopa County Sherif+ Direct dedicated&elephone lines=.'~ provide communications with APS -and-SR'.dispatch offices. 9.5.2.2.2.3 Securit Force Communications. The security force communications are UHF radio described as part of the two-way radio system and VHF radio described in sections 9. 5.2. 2. 1. 6 and 9.5.2.2.2.2, respectively. S~e, ~~gqH C 9.y.2.g..2.4. Erneqeri Conoiirivoi'ca i'mio Q
.2.2.3 System Operation Diverse systems are provided to ensure means of intra-plant-to-offsite communications under operating conditions. Intra-plant communication systems have adequate flexibility to keep plant personnel informed of plant operational status. Cg~< +o Q J dvrii (iii~ medi ibi'Li'Q o$ v0v i'ou o QgPc~5 i~ M" goat( blocAN Amendment 13 9.5-44 August 1984
i i
e ZWSt-RT A.
'9 5. 2 2 ~
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KVAcUATIQH hLARM
~vacuakiow SY&71 M hqsMm (refer 4o PipcJre 9 v-4) cons(sh'niI of. six pole.-ynouyiged. Eieckronic.
outdoor ldBrnincI sirens, Powered g solar poli>erect Bci tteyie s, Loc ateo oilers ingle 8aoh QiveH blccfs i'o p rolA'cIed aleyL ali personnel k3(%i'n %a Zecuyikj heundciri'es pV !~K gsoyn Pushguttons (boy,. un~'t- leliti'ciced og PVQCl> . QLl. SLreyis s cote pYoUz'd+ on '%e RY'PA t ~Ai+ c,~~6'on commcuod uai 6 cm 4~ cd'&) Room [+0 ek.v .
~
INSERT. e
~ 5. 2 ~ 2 I.C TAO-A)AY %ADIT Oge fyeyuercq is assigyied to o eeausitg fumck.orl ~M each u nil is cissi'cIned a. uzniiI ue pla+ encxintw~ance ~ucenccI.gge ylang ynaimtcnance..
Ense, S&bi'ons eSuse a s sccuyit'] base S&kiori . P Loni syne'ycjencii bask.-
~3 nance
+ M 4m.
Coynynunica.kans Lnside %e, coniuii ~celt A4yuckcre. sexch unit ls jsyo~i'ded Q ci 5i'nile $ mquezcg 6cxse. sklhcn on M reSIeckvy'Ani& pLIA+ ynalvkcncivlce Qgucncg. Seve, >%hone Sass PovMd ice~ ape Q>Prl ayi k-+uy cqyacihg ERIC,KT. C
'9.5 2 P 2 ~ 4 EM<~<N<Y ccMMQNtcA mg agz~
~ewe@ Co~un>'cakon g.iI sperm Csp~ioIs DP Qcxck- ~ ~
Qcvi~oocv& Locn(ed. ~ ~p Inkyconnec6 Mlephone dr>Skscysemlg cu Varcou& einerge~y foc(iikes sinai 'coins( Roeyyo ( See Eyocygcncit plam,
~ohon 7) as "ius<rab'-d. ' $ cN 9 <-roA i.sheep's land 2)
~
PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX 14B 14B.35 IN PLANT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 1.0 OBJECTIVE To demonstrate the adequacy of the Inplant Communica-tions System to provide communications between vital plant areas and to test the operability of the emer-gency evacuation alarms. 2.1 All construction activities on the Inplant .Com-munications System are complete. 2.2 Support systems required for operation of the Inplant Communications System are available. 2.3 ah W' ' 1 1 h l~p AH-possible-plant-equipment-that-contributes to-c. 3.0 TEST METHOD
'~',p/gy~ pvn~4)n 3.1 Verify the Federal-Siratrol-alarm-system func-tions properly.
3.2 Verify that the HEAX-Bi~telephone system functions properly, that each station is assigned to the current restriction class. 3.3 Verify the sound powered phone system functions
'properly.
3.4 Verify the radio= communication system functions properly. ggy'f ~ 9704~/ Lg ' Pauli'c. address gs$ e~ +n*io 4.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The Inplant Communications System operates as described in section 9.5.2 when using above test methods. Amendment 9 14B-50 August 1982
PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX 14B LL.C.A 14B.36 PRIVATE:-OFFSITE COI~1ICJNICATION SYSTEMS 1.0 OBJECTIVE
'ELBA To demonstrate the proper operation of the Private Offsite Communication System~
2.1 All construction activities have been completed on the Private- Offsite Communication Systems LLt"4, 2.2 Support systems required for operation of the LPGA
+ra.vate-Offsite Communication System are available.
3.0 TEST NETHOD 3.1 Verify proper operation of the Local Law Enforce-ment Agency VHF Radio. 3.2 Verify proper operation of the Local Law Enforce-ment Agency Land Line~ 3.3 Verify proper operation of 115V ac power sources for the Local Law Enforcement Agency Land Line. 4.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA LLeP 5 The private-of'fsite Communications Systeml-operate as described in section 9.5.2 when using above test methods. September 1980 14B-51 Amendment 2
NOTES'F-AREA DSTRIBUTION FRAME 2 BATTERY CHGRS ELECTRONIC TC- TELEPHONE TERMINAL CABI~ AC- ATTENDANTS CONSOLE (OUTPUT OBV, AUTOMATIC TEL 208V, IE) AC I. THE NUMBER OF EXTENSIONS AT EACH 200A EACH) SWITCHBOARD- AREA OF THE SITE ARE AS NOTED AS (EPABX) (.&L"I WELL AS THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE c ge I FROM THE MAIN DISTRIBUTION FRAME. Ep 48 VOLT BATTERY I WITH 8 HOUR
~c EMERGENCY I
e Te CAPACITY I e c e MAIN DISTRIBUTION I c 0 I SERVICE BUILDING FROM-(MDI ) I L
~
e rr FOREIGN EXCHANGE l300 FEET F TRUNKS INTERFACE WITH II PUBLIC TELEPHONE CO e e UNIT I OF II TC GUARD HOUSE c~ I900 FEET 650 FEET II c UNIT 2 DF II 850 FEET TC WATER RECLAMATION e e II 4600 FEET PLANT e E UNIT 3 OF TC MAKE-UP WATER AREA I I50 FEET 4600 FEET
'e e c ADMIN BI.OG AC OF II TC START-UP TRANSFORMER 700 FEET 2050 FEET x'0 I YARD CP II hl e
(FUT) Jl I950 FEET TC MICROWAVE LINK-IN UNIT I Ir e. e v ( FUT) DF SERVICE BU(LDING ~ 'g 20 FEET -e e e 0 e7 TECHNICAL PF ADMINISTRATION 53 SUPPORT CENTER 300 FEET 600 FEET ANNEX BLDG f 'ee r1 e c VVm~g p FpP P
&Id(m L)))C >'~~'~~ SKCNTKL SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM ~ re C rr g I,~g PAtCiH e ~
LOS ANGELE5~ TK)EPHONE SYSTEM ftp. ) $ -2. I ARIZONA NUCLEAR ROWER RROJKT I'AEO VERDE NOI:LEAR DECy 8$ ~~ ploUkE co. wr GENERATING STATION I ~ 1IT QF 3 I
)'.F'PA < 57lr)i+ \ Iota tailh I ~ YTquJ ~g~
4 j P. A. SYSTEM ih INPUTS TELEPHONE IMPEDANCE PUBUC Dg T EPABX COMPRESSOR MATCHING ADDRESS PLANT DIAL ACCESS AMPLIFIERS TRANSFORMERS AMPLIFIERS CABLES SPEAKERS ANTI-FEEDBACK EQUIPMENT C MAGNETIC TAPE RECORDERS 24 VDC 24 VDC UNIT"I K~ 2REQ C 600n coon I2on IJ 24 VDC 2REQ 24 VDC AMPLIFIERS Ir 3 5 7 '9 II 0 UNIT-2 2,4,6,8, 40 00C UNITS I<2a3 OPERAT6RS 2REQ K~D (MRR &VS UNI soon coon I2on 2 UNIT l,2 a3 gx MANUAL 24 VDC 24 VDC AMPUFIERS I I, 3, 5, 7, 9, II 0 0 ACCESS 2REQ UNIT-3 0 'll 2REQ L7 0E C UNIT 600n 600n l20n 3 0 0 2REQ AMPLIFIERS 1,3,5,7,9,I I 2,4,6,8,IO 24 VOC 24VDC 1 == E ADMINISTRATION 600n l50n AND SERVICE 0 C BUILDINGS ADJACENT 24VDC 24VDC AMPUFIERS I 3lr33e33A AREAS, AND i 32,34,34A GUARD HOUSE I 47 D ~0~ 600 n 600 n 300n WATER li RECLAMATION 24VDC 24VDC AMPLIFIERS) 35,36 K 600 n. 600n 300n ADMIN. ANNEX AND TSC, AMPLIFIERS ) 39,4I,43,45 Ii MAIN DISTR FRAME I 40.42 44,46 C 0 (MDF I '4 'f IECHTKL SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM PUBLIC ADDRESS EQUIPMENT LOS ANGELES"- Cg ARIZONA NUCLEAR I'OWER FROJECI PALO VERDE NUCLEAR
~'5$ vo ~ rro. rtouec ao. atv à ag ~CENERATING STAEION I0407 Q f.02 pep.<y.c. Ay~r~livLcg Iggp~l Qilh t'harp %CAN o'..~
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PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS C. Power Generation Design Basis Three Lighting fixtures containing aluminum or aluminum alloys are not used inside the containment building. 9.5.3.1.3 Codes and Standards Design and installation of the plant lighting systems uses the guidance provided by the National Electrical Code (NFPA No. 70-1975/ANSI Cl-75) and the Handbook of the Illuminating Engineering Society. fe<vlrirla ape.~a4r act es~ 9.5.3.2 S stem Descri tion acQieve. w~K sh~Q~n CVm+ of fif'C.
- 9. 5.3.2. 1 General Description Unit lighting is divided into three subsystems: normal; essential; and emergency. The normal system is supplied from non-Class IE ac buses. The essential system is connected to Class IE ac buses. The emergency lighting system, consisting of batteries, battery chargers, and lamps, are fed from the same supply as the essential lighting and function upon loss of ac power. Refer to 'table 9.5-4 for a list of areas+served by both the essential and emergency lighting systems.
9.5.3.2.2 Component Description The three lighting categories are described briefly in the following sections. 9.5.3.2.2.1 Normal Li htin . The normal lighting system is that system which provides illumination for the entire station. In each unit, the lighting load is distributed equally between two non-Class IE lighting load centers, each consisting of 1000 KVA 13,800 - 480/277-volt dry type transformers with 208/120 and 480/277-volt distribution subsystems. Areas remote March 1982 9.5-47 Amendment 8
PVNGS FSAR jhlG Table 9.5-4 AREAS REQUIRED BOTH EMERGENCY AND ESSENTIAL LIGHTING JL FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN FORK Area uxxlxar Buxldzn Sa ty injection pump rooms Shut wn heat exchanger rooms Piping enetration room . Boric ac makeup pump room CVCS charge. g pump room (Train B only) Essential coo ing water surge tanks Essential cooli g water pump rooms Access corridors above rooms Control Buildin Main control room Remote shutdown room ESF switchgear room Access corridors to above roo s Main Steam Su ort St-ucture Turbine driven auxiliary feedwate pump room Motor driven auxiliary feedwater p room Atmospheric dump valves operating dec (el 140') Access to above rooms Diesel Generator Buildin Diesel generator control rooms Access corridors to above rooms gggZR.7 IIt Amendment 13 9. 5-48 August 1984
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PVNGS PSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTENS from the lighting load center are fed from local power sources. Lighting transformers for the system are solidly grounded" at neutrals. 9.5.3.2.2.2 Essential Li htin . The essential lighting system supplements the normal lighting and provides a minimum level of illumination throughout each unit in the event of a failure of the normal lighting system. The essential lighting system supplies the lighting in the main control room and the remote shutdown room. Redundancy is provided in the essential lighting system in the control room and remote shutdown panel room, to shut down and maintain the unit in a hot shutdown condition. The essential lighting system serving the control room and remote shutdown panel area is fed from Class IE MCCs, via Class IE isolation transformers, and is not tripped on SIAS. The remainder of the essential lighting feeders for the plant area are tripped on SIAS and can be manually reconnected after diesel generator sequencing.. The essential lighting system is normally energized.and is supplied from two redundant Class IE load centers. 9.5.3.2.2.3 Emer enc Li htin . The dc-powered emergency lighting system is provided in the main control room (except the control room horseshoe suspended ceiling), at the remote shutdown panel room, associated local control stations, and along emergency exit routes where emergency maintenance is expected to be required. In the event of the loss of essential lighting sources, the dc emergency lighting system is energized automatically. The dc emergency lighting units>except in the control room consist of fixtures that have self-contained batteries, battery chargers, and switches that automatically energize the fixtures from their batteries in the event of the loss of the ac source for their battery chargers. In the control room panel area,+the emergency lighting system consists of a
/ALSERT i~Sr~~ 6 February 1984 9.5-49 Amendment 12
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PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS ( number of fluorescent fixtures which are fed from the uninter-ruptible power supply (UPS) and some self-contained battery powered-emergency lighting units. The emergency lighting < 4 Iuo~esc~<+ P fixtures are normally fed from the essential lighting system con-nected from the redundant Class lE buses through isolation transformers. In the event of loss of Class lE ac power source, the fixtures -are energized through the UPS consisting of an inverter, a charger, and an 8-hour rated battery. (See .section 9.5.3.2.2.2 Essential Lighting.) The batteries are designed to provide rated lighting for a minimum continuous period of 8 hours. Spare self-contained battery pack units will readily be available to areas as required should there be a need for dc lighting in excess of 8 hours. 9.5.3.3 Safet Evaluation The safety evaluations are numbered to correspond to the safety design bases and are as follows: A. Safety Evaluation One Emergency lighting. systems that serve the control room and the remote shutdown room and all supports of other lighting systems installed in Category I structures are designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements as specified in section 3.2 and are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Position C.l.n. of Regulatory Guide 1.29. The components and supporting structures of any system, equipment, or structure that are not Seismic Category I and whose collapse could result in the loss of a required lighting system function through either impact or flooding are checked to determine that the lighting system integrity is maintained. Amendment 12 9.5-50 February 1984
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 35,500 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 26.6 minutes G. Fire Detection Ionization smoke detector systems are provided for early warning, and in a cross-zoned mode will actuate an automatic C02 gas system.
H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Automatic CO2 total flooding
- 2. Secondary One manual hose reel Two portable CO2 fire extinguishers I. Ventilation Manually controlled smoke exhaust venting to outside.
J. Drainage Two 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with B-hour 'battery unit(s) is provided
~ ~
Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. the. o~+c'" gQ~+0 ou a August 1984 9B.2.1-25 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 55,700 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 41.8 minutes G. Fire Detection Ionization smoke detector system(s) is provided for early warning.
H. Fire Suppression L
- 1. Primary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 5A.
- 2. Secondary Two portable CO 2
fire extinguishers are located in Zone 5A. I. Ventilation Refer to Appendix 9A response to Question 9A.70. Portable fans exhaust the smoke to adjacent rooms where smoke exhaust fans exhaust to outside air. J. Drainage None K. Emergency Lighting A L. Emergency Communication Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided.
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quip~~+ Amendment 13 9B.2.1-28 August 1984
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G. Fire Detection Ionization smoke detectors system(s) is provided for early warning. H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 5A.
- 2. Secondary Two portable CO2 fire extinguishers are located in adjacent Zone SA.
Ventilation Refer to Appendix 9A response to Question 9A.70. Portable fans exhaust the smoke to adjacent rooms where smoke exhaust fans exhaust to outside air.
'J. Drainage None K. Emergency Lighting L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided.
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PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary One manual hose reel
- 2. Secondary Two portable CO2 fire extinguishers I. Ventilation Smoke venting to outside. {Manual smoke exhaust fan)
J. Drainage Seven 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided. L. Emergency Communications '\ Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. 6 ~. +he. apernhon sQuWlou n 9B.2.2-14 August 1984 Amendment 13
~ I ) PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 28.3 minutes G. Fire Detection Ionization smoke detector systems are provided for early warning, and in a cross-zoned mode will actuate an automatic C02 gas system.
H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Automatic CO2 total flooding
- 2. Secondary 13 One manual hose reel and one portable CO2 fire extinguisher. One portable CO2 fire extinguisher and one manual hose reel are located in the adjacent Corridor Building.
I. Ventilation Smoke venting to outside. (Manual Smoke Exhaust Fan) J. Drainage Two 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)+is provided. L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. Q>> +g 0 Pcro+b 0 gQ~+doun cap i'P~ Amendment 13 9B.2.2-24 August 19~4
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 35,600 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 26.6 minutes G. Fire Detection Ionization smoke detector system(s) is provided for early warning.
H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 5B.
- 2. Secondary One portable C02 fire extinguisher is located in adjacent zone 5B. One portable CO fire extin-guisher and one manual hose reel are located in adjacent Corridor Building near Zone 5B.
Ventilation (Refer to Appendix 9A response to Question 9A.70). Portable fans exhaust the smoke to adjacent rooms where smoke exhaust fans exhaust to outside air. J. Drainage None K. Emergency 'Lighting
~ond'.
Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. August 1984 9B.2.2-27 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS K. Emergency Lighting L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. posi+c net 4r 4k< c>yer0,~<< so@ 54~& s~n e)oip~~ < hs ;a~d. o P August 1984 9B. 2 . 2-31 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G. Fire Detection Actuation of the ultra-violet or thermal detector systems activates the automatic preaction water sprinkler system. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Automatic pre-action water sprinkler system
- 2. Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher. Additionally, one manual hose reel is located in adjacent Control Building at elevation 100'0".
I. Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside by way of silencer room (engine operating). J. Drainage Seven 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided. L. Emergency Communications None
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August 1984 9B.2.5-7 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZAIG)S ANALYSIS G. Fire Detection Ionization smoke detector system(s) is provided for early warning. H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary One portable C02 fire extinguisher
- 2. Secondary One manual hose reel is located in the Control Building at elevation 100'0".
I. Ventilation Flow through diesel generator room and silencer room to the outside (generator running). (Refer to Appendix 9A
,response to Question 9A.86).
J. Drainage Two 4-inch drains Po ~>C Z2- 6 K. Emergency Lighting
~lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) "is provided.
L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided.
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Amendment 13 9B.2.5-10 August 1984
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS F. Combustible Loading
- 1. Quantity/Type 20 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)
~ 120 pounds of cable insulation (other)
~ 20 pounds of oil and grease
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 3,500 Btu/ft2
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 2. 6 minutes G. Fire Detection Smoke detectors are located in the pump house.
H. Fire Suppression Manual hose streams from hydrants on the fire yard main. Ventilation Natural convection J. Drainage None
.K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided.
L. Emergency Communications None owiHowe.d 4c- Ale. d p.<~ <~ gag c4ukdo~n Amendment C; 9B.2.9-6 August 1984
0 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS
- 2. Secondary.
One portable CO2 fire extinguisher I. Ventilation Flow to outside. J. Drainage One 4-inch drain K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)~is provided. L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided.
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s4~><~~ August 1984 9B.2.12-15 Amendment 13
0 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS
- 2. Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher is located .in adjacent Zone 72.
I; Ventilation Flow to outside J. Drainage One 4-inch drain Bone. +~ K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)+is provided. L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. August 1984 9B.2.12-19 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Ventilation Flow to outside Drainage One 4-inch drain is provided at elevation 100'0" K. Emergency Lighting QC)AE. 7 + lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)<is provided. L.. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided.
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s-C Amendment 13 9B.2.12-24 August 1984
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS I. Ventilation Flow to outside J. Drainage One 4-inch drain Pone. 7'f 6 K. Emergency Lighting
~lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)<is provided.
L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. pne'lbo~e<k 4< +~e- oP. 0-(- q~P z4~+clo~n eg~~1s'ea-~ August 1984 9B.2.12-29 hsendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Two manual hose reels
- 2. .Secondary Two portable ABC powder fire extinguishers I. Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and then to the outside J:. Drainage Five 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) Ais provided.
L. Emergency Communications None August 1984 9B.2.15-49 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 37A.
- 2. Secondary Two portable ABC powder fire extinguishers are located in adjacent Zone 37A.
I. Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J. Drainage One 4-inch drain K. Emergency Lighting A L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. Amendment 13 9B.2.15-64 August 1984
f 0
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS E. Radioactive Material In process piping F. Combustible Loading '90
- 1. Quantity/Type pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon) 3,700 pounds of cable insulation (other) 60 pounds of oil and grease
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 21,000 Btu/ft2
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 15.7 minutes G. Fire Detection Ionization smoke .detector system(s) is provided for early warning.
H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Two manual hose reels
- 2. Secondary Two portable ABC powder fire extinguishers.
I. Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and then to outside J. Drainage Seven 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)~is provided. L. Emergency Communications None Posifio~J, Par ctccess h>
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Amendment 13 9B.2.15-68 August 1984
0 e ~ f PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H. . Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Three manual hose reels
- 2. Secondary Three portable ABC powder fire extinguishers.
I. Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and then to the outside J. Drainage
~
Ten 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)<is provided. L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. p.,-,ho ad P ~ ~doe ~ Sa.Fe. Shotdo~ <g~ 7~~+ August 1984 9B.2.15-73 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS F. Combustible Loading
- 1. Quantity/Type
~ 390 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalafi)
~ 1,600 pounds of cable. insulation (other)
~ 50 pounds of oil and grease
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 21,600 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. 'Equivalent Fire Severity 16.2 minutes G. Fire Detection Ionization smoke detector system(s} is provided for early warning.
H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 37A.
- 2. Secondary One portable ABC powder fire extinguisher is located in adjacent Zone 37A.
I. Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J. Drainage
~
One 4-inch drain K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. poei%oned4w .~ opsr~~o~
'"~
S 4 ~~o< ~<<q" V August 1984 9B.2.15-77 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary One manual hose reel is located: in adjacent--
Zone 37B.
- 2. Secondary One portable ABC powder fire extinguisher is located in adjacent Zone 37B.
I. Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside Drainage One 4-inch drain K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)'s provided. L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. op~i~+<<
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August 1984 9B.2.15-81 Amendment 13
0 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Automatic preaction water sprinkler system, covering cable trays only.
- 2. Secondary Two manual hose reels and two portable CO2 fire extinguishers.
I. Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and then through air filtration unit to outside J. Drainage Eight 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8'hour battery unit(s)>is provided. L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. QCC8'5S c 0,@ SQNP J.o~~ gq~'pMCK% Amendment 13 9B.2.15-96 August 1984
~ t PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G. Fire Detection Actuation of ionization smoke detector system(s) activates the automatic preaction water sprinkler system. The detector system(s) provide early warning capability. (Refer to Appendix 9A reponse to Question 9A.116). H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Automatic preaction water sprinkler system
- 2. Secondary One manual hose reel and one portable CO2 fire extinguisher are located in adjacent Zone 42C.
Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to.outside Drainage Three 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided. 4 L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. August l984 9B.2.1S-117 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS F. 'ombustible Loading
- 1. Quantity/Type
~ 290 pounds of cable insula<ion (Hypalorr)-..
~ 980 pounds of cable insulation (other)
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 10,100 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 7.6 minutes G. Fire Detection Ionization smoke detector system(s) is provided for early warning.
H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary
\
One manual hose reel NOTE The passage to Fire Area X through the 3-hour rated south wall is protected by a fixed sprinkler system water curtain.
- 2. Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher.
Ventilation Flow from corridors to rooms and then through air filtration unit to outside Drainage Four 4-inch drains
~Emergency Lighting lighting with 8 p~gHonek hour -battery unit(s) is provided.
c'h~~ sqo i p~e~ August 1984 9B.2.15-123 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS I. Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J. Drainage Two 4-inch drains 2Q AG K; Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided. L. Emergency Communications None
~ pE> 0:h 6 ~
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C gybe s4ohdown'(<<g August 1984 9B.2.15-155 Amendment 1 3
0 PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary
,One manual hose reel is located in adjacent Zone 53.
- 2. Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher is located in adjacent Zone 53.
I. Ventilation Flow to outside J. Drainage
~
None K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8 hou-r battery unit(s)<is provided. L. Emergency Communications None
~Cdogs<
gg Q eh&++~ August 1984 9B.2e15-161 Amendment 13
Il PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G. Fire Detection Actuation of either ionization smoke detector system(s) or line-type thermal detector system(s) activates the automatic preaction 'water sprinkler system and will pressurize the piping with water. Either detector system alone can provide early warning. H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Automatic preaction water sprinkler system covering the cable trays only (excluding corridor adjacent to the west elevator and stairwell).
- 2. Secondary One manual hose reel and two portable CO2 fire extinguishers.
I. Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and through air filtration unit to outside J. Drainage Four 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided. L. Emergency Communications None August 1984 9B.2.15-165 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS H. 'ire Suppression
- 1. Primary Automatic preaction water sprinkler system --.
covering cable trays only except in northeast corner (north of column line A3) which has area coverage.
- 2. Secondary Two manual hose reels and two portable CO2 fire extinguishers.
I. Ventilation Flow from the corridors to the rooms and through the air filtration unit to outside Drainage Eight 4-inch drains Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided. L. Emergency Communications None
~pecck5 6 po~~ A~~~
sho04>~" August 1984 9B.2.15-169 Amendment 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSES
- 2. Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside Drainage Four 4-inch drains gene K. Emergency Lighting Zgzak lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)>is provided.
L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. Amendment 3.3 9B.2.15-172 August 1984
v PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside Drainage None Bene 5S< K. Emergency Lighting L. Emergency Communications None u <+ g-ho~~ ga+q or'A(s) posh~on~ ghee+ 26M'A'po <'pi>>>>+>>i~ (Q 'I>>Yc>>ll>> cl8 ~. 9B.2.15-181 Amendment 13 August 1984
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS
~ 100 pounds of rubber
~ 2,900 pounds of Mipolam flooring
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load - 26,400 Btu/<t-.2
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 20 minutes G. Fire Detection Ionization smoke detector system(s) is provided for early warning.
H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Two ABC powder and one CO2 fire extinguishers.
- 2. Secondary One manual hose reel is located in adjacent 57N.
I. - Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J. Drainage Three 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided. L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provide
~p bb '9 gg~+daw~ <p 'p Amendment 13 9B.2.15-196 August 1984
4 I PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS F. Combustible Loading
- 1. Quantity/Type
~ 400 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)
~ 1,400 pounds of cable insulation (other)
~ 200 pounds of papers and fabrics
~ 400 pounds of rubber 4,400 pounds of Mipolam flooring
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 21,700 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 16 minutes G. Pire Detection Ionization smoke detector system(s) is provided for early warning.
H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Five manual hose reels
- 2. Secondary One pressurized water fire extinguisher.
Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside Drainage None 5vw
"'. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)<is provided.
L. Emergency Communications None August 1984 9B.2.15-237 Amendment 13
I 'I
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS F. Combustible Loading Quantity/Type
~ 1,500 pounds of cable insulation (Hypalon)
~ 6,600 pounds of cable insulation (other)
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 55,300 Btu/ft2
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 41.5 minutes G. Fire Detection Actuation of either the ionization smoke detector or the line-type thermal detector systems activates an early warning alarm and the automatic preaction system.
H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Automatic preaction sprinkler system
- 2. Secondary One manual hose reel and one portable C02 fire extinguisher are located in adjacent Zone 42D.
Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside Drainage
~
Two 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided. L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provide
+<boned.
I" v +S< oP- ~ t Siva~ Amendment K 9B.2.16-6 August 1984
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS J. Drainage Three 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s)<is provided.
~ ~ ~
L. Emergency Communications'ound powered phone jack(s) is provided. iDna +,e. ~pr~fa~ < p<>gh
~g~p Jomw epeip Amendment 13 9B.2.16-10 August 1984
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS I. Ventilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J. Drainage Two 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided.
~ ~
L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. po~ i QaneJ Qv- 61K oP<~0. '~
~g~+lo~~ eg iq~~
9B.2.17-7 Amendment 13 August 1984
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G. Fire Detection Actuation of either ionization smoke detector, or the line-type thermal detector system(s) activates
'the automatic preaction water sprinkler system and will pressurize the piping with. water. Either detector system can provide early warning capability.
H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Automatic preaction water sprinkler system covering cable trays and structural members only.
- 2. Secondary One portable CO2 fire extinguisher and one manual hose reel are located in adjacent Zone 52D.
I. Uentilation Flow through air filtration unit to outside J. Drainage Three 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided.
~ ~ ~
L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone j ack(s ) is provided.
~ )e ro'.H ~ ~
~g~do~n ego ('iii~
0 Amendment 13 9B.2.17-10 August 1984
o h) Table 9B.3-1 CD COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF 13 CO NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet 3 of 68) DO A. OVERALL RE UIRENENTS OF NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM (CONTINUED) APPLICATION DOCKETED BUT CONSTRUCTION PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND PO PERNIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF I/I/76 OPERATING PLANTS PVNGS POSITION AND BASIS FOR NON-CONPLIANCE ITENS C)
- 4. Sin le Failure Criterion 4. Sin le Failure Criterion 4.'Sin le Failure Criterion Vl A single failure in the fire cuppres- h single failure in the fire PVNGS complics with the "single failure criterion" based oa the sioa system should aot impair both the suppressioa system should aot dcfinitioa of "backup" fire suppression bciag interpreted as follows primary and backup fire suppression impair both the primary aad for each specific hazard:
capability. For example, redundant backup fire suppression fire water pumps vith iadepcadeat power capability. For example, NOTE: Postulated fires or fire protcctioa system failures are aot supplies aad controls cbould be pro- redundant fire vater pumps considered coacurrcnt with other plaat accidents or thc most vided. Postulated fires or fiie vith independent pover sup- severe aatural phenomena. protection system failurec seed not be plies and controlc should bc considered concurrent vith other plaat sccideats or the most severe natural phenomena. Novcver, in thc event of provided. Postulated fires or fire protection system failures need not be consid-
~ For hazards which depend upon vater as both primary aad backup supprcssioa, PVNGS has reduadaat fire vater pumps vith iadepeadent pover supplies. Piping betvecn fire pu~s and aay of fn S the most severe earthquake, i.e., thc Safe Shutdovn Earthquake (SSE), the ered concurreat with other plant accidents or the most the several buildings vithin thc plant is routed such that tvo separate flov paths exist, vith sectioaal valves located such gRAM fire suppression system should be ceverc aatural phenomena. that a failure in either flov path can be isolated.
capable of deliveriog vater to manual bose statioas located vithin hose reach ~ For any building which loses iateraal fire vater proiectfoa due of areas containing equipment required to a single failure of the fire vater piping vithin the building, for safe plant shutdovn. The fire backup cuppressioa capability is available from outside hydraats protectioa systems chould, hovever, and/or inside portable extiaguishers. M M retain their origiaal desiga capabfI- gtvic.i'll,'r ~O nMO WAR ity for (I) aatural severity imately aad oace phcaomena of less greater frequcacy (approx-ia 10 years) such as
~ Specifically for the/(Control Building a single failure of the internal fire vater piping does not impair both automatic sprinkler/spray systems aad all of the iaternal fir<< vater hose 13 r>HO tornadoes, hurricanes, floods'cc stations for aay fire zone; i.e., if the failure for aay OO storms, or srall intensity earthquakes specific hazard impairs the automatic sprinkler systems, at least MgW vhich are characteristic of the site oae Class II hose station is still available in the fire zone.
geographic regioa aad (2) for poten-tial maa-created site related events ~ Specifically for the Auxiliary Building, a single failure of the such ac oil barge collisions, aircraft internal fire vater pipiag does rfot impair the suppression crashes vhich have a reasonable proba- capability (either automatic or manual) of both Train h and bility of occurriag at a specific plant Traia B; i.e. after any cingle failure has occurred vithin the site. building, all areas of oac safety related train vill retain their total fire suppression capability. CPa5 A Ir)
~ Specifically for the Turbine Building> a single failure of say g fire vater pipiag still allovs full coverage of any location by either automatic sprinkler systems or by internal fire vater hose stations.
The effects of lightning strikes should The effects of lightning PVNGS minimizes the effects of lightning strikes by providiag be included in the overall plant fire strikes should be iacluded in lightning protection for the structure in accordance vith the protection program. the overall plant fire pro- Uadervriters'aboratory Naster Labeled Lightaiag Protection Program, tection program. hll startup transformers, main traasformerc, and 13.g kV svitchgear are protected with appropriate lightaing arrestors. (See Appendix 9h rcspoase to fiuestioa 9A.66.)
Table 9B.3-1 COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF 13 NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet: 16 of 68) D. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PLANT PROTECTION APPLICATION DOCKETED BUT CONSTRUCTION PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND PERMIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/I/76 OPERATING PLAHTS PVNGS POSITION AND BASIS FOR HON-COMPLIANCE ITEMS I. ~Bi ldi 3 I 1. ~di 1dl D I 1. 3~lid' I (a) Plaat Layouts should be arranged (a) Plant Layouts: to: (1) Isolate safety related (I) (I) related systems are isolated from uaacceptable fire systems Erom unacceptable SAME SaEety hazards. For detailed dcscriptioas of the protection and A fire hazards, and isolation of safety related systems, sce sectioa 9B.2, "Fire Hazards Analysis". (2) Separate redundant safety (2) Alternatives: (2) VNGS separates re un sat safety related systems rom eac related systems from each (a) Redundant other so that both are not subject to damage froa a single other so that both are not subject to damage from a safety related that are Eire hazard. Redundant safety related systems are geaerally 95OM systems located in separate fire areas and/or have sufficient spatial single fire hazard. subject to damage .eparation which meet the requirements oE Section III.G of from a single fire OCFR50, Appendix R, as explained ia sectioa 9B.2 of this 13 hazard should bc cport. IB DI protected by a gg combination of For an area-by-area description of thc separation of 5 Qi-I fire retardant redundant safety related'qufpmentd refer to OMO coatings and fire section 9B.2. (See Appendix 9A responses t'o WHC suppression systems, or (b) I)uestions 9A.73, 9A 743 9h 77 9A.121 and 9A.130.)
'A 'h 'A 95 101 1023 RO a separate system to perform the OO safety function 'PF~eggyy To Suvr gceou T//d
+gyp gE'LATc'0 Qoi pmFhrr gF3pcAEFD tran 7FZT7/E'~S/Q BASK OF MgQ should be provided.
SmCTln3/ A,B/ APF'6'PAOdsftD PEDA 72/8 Hbif/I///2'/Fiuf$ Oin (b) In order to accomplish 1.(a) (b) SAME - Additional (b) PVNGS complies aad the detailed "Fire Hazards Analysis" ioClgf'0> above, safety related systems Eire hazards analysis and fire hazards should be should be done after is provided by sectioa 9B.2. The upire Hazards identifies safety related systems and fire hazards. Analysis"~>~ identified throughout the any plant modificatioa. plant. Therefore, a detailed fire hazard analysis should bc The fire hazards analysis is reviewed modifications as necessary. and updated after plant gag AgX cade. The fire hazards analysis 3 should be reviewed and updated as necessary. Vl
Table 9B.3-1 COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF 13 NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet: 38 of 68) E. FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION (CONTINUED) APPLICATION DOCKETED BUI'ONSTRUCTION PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND PEIQIIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/I/76 OPERATINC PLANTS PVNGS POSITION AND BASIS FOR NON-CONPLIANCE ITENS
- 2. Fire Protection Water Su I S stems 2. Fire Protection Water 2. Fire Protection Water Cont Su 1 S stems (Continued)
(4) This d~sign feature vill ensure immediate operator attention in isolating and valuing off the tank oi the pipe section from where leak is occurring. The main plant fire vater supply capacity is capable of refilling either tank in eight hours. (e) Tbe fire vater supply (total (e) SANE (e) Tvo fire vater supply tanks, each vith dedicated 300,000 gallons capacity and flov rate) should fire vater capacity, have been provided (see Section E.2.(d) of be calculated on the basis of this table). the largest. expected flow rate for a period of tvo hours, but The flow rate is based on 500 gal/min for manual hose stream 95nm not less than 300,000 gallons. plus the hydraulically calculated demand for the largest fire This flow rate should be based sprinkler or deluge system. (conservatively) on 1,000 gpm for manual hose streams plus the greater of: (I) all sprinkler heads opened I VNQ &mr//as .13 Of/10 and flowing in the largest WHQ designed fire area; or HO (2) the largest open head OO deluge system(s) operating. (f) Lakes or fresh vater ponds of (f) SANE (f) Not applicable to PVNCS sufficient size may qualify as sole source of vater for fire protection, but require at least two intakes to the pump supply. When ~ cor on vater supply is permitted for fixe gQg
'O protection and the ultimate (z) heat sink, the folloving g conditions should also be satisfied:
(1) The additional fire protection vater require ments are designed into the total storage capacity; and
Table 9B.3-1 COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF '3 NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL 4 POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet: 40 of 68) E. FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION (CONTINUED) APPLICATION DOCKETED BUT CONSTRUCTION PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND PERHIT NOT RECEIVED. AS OF 7/I/76 OPERATING PLANTS PVNGS POSITION AND BASIS FOR NON-COHPLIANCE ITEHS
- 3. Water S rinklers and Hose Stand i e 3. Water S rinklerc and Hose 3. Water S rinklers and Hose Stand I e S stems Systems Stand i e S stems (a) Each automatic sprinkler system (a) SANE (a) PVNGS complies by providing headers that are fed from each and manual hose station stand- end for the Control, Auxiliary and Turbin'c Buildings. These pipe should have an independent headers cerve multiple sprinkler systems and also thc hose connection to the plant under- rack/reel stations for each respective building, and no ground vater main. Headers fed single Eailure vill result in any of the folloving from each end are permitted situations:
inside buildings to supply multiple sprinkler and stand- ~ for the Auxiliary Building, the suppression capability pipe systems. When provided, Eor both Train A and rain i aired at once. 3R such headers are considered an extension of the yard main system. The header arrangemcnt
~
AfuxlEJACV ~ B For theocontrol BufldfngG primary vater spray systems CRAM and all hose stations for any specific fire xone should be such that no single impaired at once. failure can impair both the fire pro-primary and backup tection systems.
~ For thc Turbine Building, primary sprinkler system and backup hose stations impaired at once. Im55 M M
~ For the Diesel G~nerator Building, no single failure AM0 can impair both trains or both primary and'ackup fire prot~ction system. Separate headers from the o' Control Building Eeed the automatic preaction sprin'kler RO systems. Each diesel generator train is fed separately.
The hose stations, connected to each header, are located OO in the Control Building. MgW
~ For the Hain Steam Support Structure, no single failure can impair both the primary and backup supprcccion capability. The backup hose streams arc available from hydrant on the yard main and hose station No. 63 in the Turbine Building adjacent to the Hain Steam'Support Structure. (see Appendix 9h response to Question CPa5 9A.100). O td g
In the Fuel Building, sprfnkler system and manual hose stationc are fed from a sfngle header connected to the plant underground yard main. In the'advaste Building, the sprinkler system and hose stations are fed from a single header connected to the I 05 plant underground yard main. In the Containment Building, all of the hose stations and the sprinklers for the charcoal filters sre fed from a single header from the Auxiliary Building. The supply header piping ic Seismic Category I. (cee Appendix 9A responce to Quest,ion 9A.97).
'a ~/
-I (iP7 PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS {..l placed in a configuration to isolate the hazard area from any flow of outside air. The closing of dampers will be timed relative to the CO2 @s-charge such that overpressurization of the hazard area will not occur. The alarm condition is maintained until the system is reset manually. The control pilot .valve also 'elay may be operated manually to activate the system. A supervised 1/4-inch ball valve is provided to deacti-vate the system when personnel occupy the .room. The storage capacity of the system is adequate to permit two separate discharges within the largest single pro-tected area immediately after, complete purging of the ma'n generator with carbon dioxide. Operation of CO2 hose reels for local application is initiated by manually removing the playpipe from its support bracket, thereby causing the master valve at the storage tank to open and charge the piping up to I the nozzle. ~~ 5'tG~B. -BV ond1-t RGB 3.~e-eon Discharge of CO2 is controlled by the hose operation by utilizing the squeeze-type valve at the nozzle. Replacement of the playpipe on its support
' 9 5'&
shuts the master valve+ea~eturn wi-t Halon 1301 Systems Halon 1301 system operation is initiated by the product of combustion detectors (operation type) which are cross-zoned. Actuation of the first circuit {or loop), 9.5-24
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NOII9) I/ t. Altfnfoflnnnfs9s.l Innoonl(98 I IOA I IAf /v/'f Ice/hr C/ c/ootr/o AnfA Iu)n)A)RAY III/Jl' ~ / n <<an aoorl t(I//Ce/ru/ I 'nf rrrrr/r/rr/nr Cr/vl lnun ANI I ~ I A<> cr>>rSP (, St hr/Ct Cthe>>it ). AI f fn IOIIAVAI9I(.$ 9 AUXILIARYICUILDING I I/nun + It/oh/>> he/fee>> ~ I I t( If/'0 I /rr/'C'lttlr ICI/t(lr. e 'the teen cYcdeecn nftlr of/f(tfof/ ld>>K fo Poln Vn(I/ Pin/I/or I:tnrloling Xfoticln I'!Ihli HS <I4 CC)NTAIN)N NT'INII))INC PIAN AT I:I f.VATION lfl()'-0 PLAII AT'L. 140';0" P I ~ IIIIC nfl )2 hlaea,. uwwnn ~ "IT~~nv>> r . A(IIIn nl. I'Ilc I Afu>>I)nr nl I I LEGEND FIRE HOSE CABIIIETS WITH HOSE ALARH CHECK VALVE FOR IIET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEH ~ FULLY RECESSED C RACK FOR 75 FT OF 1-1/2" 8 FIRE HOSE CABINET LINED POLYESTER HOSE WITH DELUGE VALVE FOR WATER SPRAY OR PRE-ACTIOtl SYSTEH CLASS NOZZLE A-B-C (UNLESS SEHI-RECESSED IttDICATED THUS: (C) (WITH "C" LABEL DOORS)+ FOR llllllllll Ot(E HOUR BARRIER FIRE HOSE CABINET CLASS NOZZLE C ONLY) AND A TMO HOUR BARRIER (WITH "B". LABEL DOORS)+ 2-1/2 GAL. PRESSURIZED WATFR SURFACE IMUNTED (2-A) PORTABLE FIRE FIRE HOSE CABINET THREE HOUR BARRIER ('ITH "A" LABEL DOORS)* EXTINGUISHER. HOSE REEL WITH 75 FT LOttG, l-l/2" 8 LlttED nUTOIIATIC PRE-ACTIOtt SPRINKLER SYSTEH POLYESTER HOSE ltlTH CLASS NOZZLE A-B-C. DELUGE WATER SPRAY SYSTDI HOSE REEL MITH 75 FT LONG, l-l/2" 8 LltIED POLYESTER HOSE MITH CLASS NOZZLE C. IIET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEH IIOSE STATION WITH 100 FT HOSE HALON 1301 = / '/////// COZ FLOODING O4 HOSE STATIOtt WITH 125 FT HOSE I SELECTOR VALVE FOR FIXED C02 SYSTEH k = HOSE STATION WITH 150 FT HOSE C02 HOSE REEL HS HOSE STATION (REEL OR CABINET) 1/2 2-A Q PORTABLE FIRE EXT. GAL. PRESSURIZED MATER, PORTABLE FIRE EXT. - C02 - 20 LB; 10-B:C PORTABLE FIRE EXT. - "ABC" POWDER, 20 LB. 10A-40-B:C HINIHUH I MHEELED TYPE. FIRE EXTltIGUISHER, 350 LB, 4A-240 B:C HlttIHUH 'OTE: DOOR nA" I.ABEL n 3 HRS pain Vn<lr llnrlrsr l<rnrratinr. DOOR nB" LABEL 1 1/2 HRS ~>>tnn':SAR DOOR "C" LABEI. n 3/4 HR rl ter. FROTNTICtt 1 r/rnn nttn svttnnre Fiqurr 2n-39 J4tnnnt inn 1 pnrn<lnrnt 1'1 1 PVNGS F SAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.15.53 pire Area XV, Fire Zone 57A, Hot Laborator A. Location Fire Zone 57A (figure 9B-23) is located in the at elevation 140'0!!.. AuxiliarY'uilding B. Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Non-rated wall of metal lath and plaster common to Zone 57B. 1-hour rated wall common to Zone S7N. 'outh: 1-hour wall common to Zone.57N at column A8 East: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete con-struction common to Zone 57K at column AE. Non-rated wall of metal lath and plaster common to Zone .57B at column line AD. 2 -hour rated-wall common to Zone 57P at h column line AD. West: Non-rated walls of heavy concrete con-struction common to Zones 57C and S7D. Floor: Non-rated barrier of heavy concrete con-struction common to Zones 49H and 52A. Ceiling: Non-rated area boundary roof of heavy concrete construction.
- 2. Zone Access One Class C door in the 1-hour rated north wall to Zone 57N One non-rated door in the non-rated east wall to Zone 57B One non-rated door in the non-rated west. wall to Zone 57C Amendment 13 9B.2.15-194 August 1984
- 2. Zone Access Non-rated door in the non-rated west wall to Zone 57A.
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 4. Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.
- 5. Protected Raceways None August 1984 9B.2.15-197 Amendment 13
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 4. Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in %he rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Members None C. Safety Related Equipment and Components Train A conduit
- a. Safe Shutdown Related Amendment l3 9B.2s15-236 August 1984
- 2. Zone Access 9
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seal.s equal or exceed fire barrier ratings Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Members None Amendment 13 9B.2.15-238 August, 1984
- d(T) ~ ', ~
- 7. <if lan <0 Si>'>VSIE $ 84$
- 2. Zone Access Two non-rated missile proof doors in the non-rated west wall to Zone 27
- 3. Sealed Penetrations'eals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 6. Protected Structural Members None C. Safety Related Equipment and Components Train A spent fuel pool heat exchanger Train B spent fuel pool heat exchanger Train A spent fuel cooling system pump Train B spent fuel cooling system pump Train A conduit Train B conduit August l984 9B.2.6-7 Amendment 13
- 2. Zone Access
- 2. Zone Access
- l. Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Non-rated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 42D at column line A7.:.;. ~
- 2. Zone Access Open doorway in the non-rated north wall to Zone 42D August 1984 9'.15-109 Amendment 13
- 2. Zone Access One non-rated gate in the non-rated south wall to Zone 51B.
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Members None August 1984 93.2.15-153 Amendment 13
- e. ( I'>i ~ oF l.cap c~~c.re,'w ce~s~c.i4~
- 2. Zone Access None
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Members None Amendment 13 9B 2.15-156 August 1984
- 2. Zone Access One non-rated gate in the non-rated north. wall to Zone 50B
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 5. Protected Raceways Some Train A conduit is protected by wrappings with 1-hour ratings.
- 2. Zone Access
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 1. Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: Non-rated walls of metal lath and plaster construction common to Zone 52D.
- 2. Zone Access One Class A door (pair) in the 3-hour rated east, wall to the Corridor Building Two Class B doors (pairs) in the non-rated west wall to Mone 53 August 1984 9B.2.15-173 Amendment 13
- 2. Zone Access One Class C door in the 2-hour rated west wall of the east stairwell.
- 3. Sealed Penetrations 0 Will equal or exceed fire barrier ratings August 1984 9B.2.15-191 >monument 13
- 1. Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: I-hour rated walls common to Zone 57N.
- 2. Zone Access
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier rating Amendment 13 9B.2.15-218 August 1984
- 2. Zone Access
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Members
- 1. Quantity/Type
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 8,900 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. 'quivalent Fire Severity 7 minutes G. Fi e Detection None H. Fire Suppression Primary
- 2. Secondary One manual hose reel is located in Zone 57N.
- 2. Zone Access -A
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 4. Fire Dampers None
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Nembers None C. Safety Related Eguipment and Components
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire, barrier ratings.
- 2. Zone Access One Class+)roll-up fire door in the 2-hour rated north wall to Zone 22B
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. Protected Structural Members None C. Safety Related Equipment and Components
- a. Safe Shutdown Related 9B.2.5-5 Amendment 13 August 1984
- 2. Zone Access One Class A door in the 3-hour rated west wall to the central staircase r~g Class p; roll-up fire door
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
- 1. Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: North Non-rated walls of heavy Corridor concrete construction common to Zone 37C at column line A6.
- 2. Zone Access One Class B door (pair) in the 2-hour rated east corridor west wall to Zone 42B One Class B door in the 2-hour rated north corridor north wall to Zone 42B One Class A door (pair) in the 1-hour rated north corridor west wall to Zone 42D One Class C door (pair) in the 1-hour rated south corridor west wall to Zone 42D August 1984 9B.2.15-93 Amendment 13
- b. Fire dampers and fire doors
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 16,600 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 12.4 minutes G. Fire Detection None H. Fire Suppression Manu l hose stream from a hydrant on the yard fire main is a ailable.
- 5. Protected Raceways None
- 6. - Protected Structural Members'one C. Safety Related Equipment and Components None D. Non-Safety Related Equipment and Components
- 1. Quantity/Type
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 4,700 Btu/ft2
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 3.6 minutes G. Fire Detection None H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Quantity/Type
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 940 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 1 minute G. Fire Detection None H. Fire Suppression Jf
Conclusion:
The existing design provides equivalent protection to that required by Section III.G.2, and upgrading the existing design to a 1-hour rating plus suppression would not. significantly enhance protection currently provided. See section 9B.2.2 for a deviation common to Fire Area II and the section 9B.2 introduction for generic deviations. gpss) lgjg ~g 7 g 5' g~~<E2? (pg~~: g~py77On! 8/'giCGAI /22K~ +' /
--VS Xr g/7~<)'~ @pe 0 ~g g~ 8~/ /pl PP- 3~~
y~ggus7 2/, ~~~~ August 1984 9B.2.1-11 Amendment 13
t PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSES 9B.2.1.10 Fire Area I, Fire Zone 10A, Train A Remote Shutdown Room A. Location Fire Zone 10A (figure 9B-9) .is, located in the Control Building at elevation 100'0". B. Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: 3-hour rated wall common to Zone 7A.'-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area II, Zone 7B. South: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area IV at column line J4 East: 2 -hour rated area boundary wall common P to Fire Area II, Zone 10B. West: 1-hour rated wall common to Zone SA. Floor: 3-hour rated barrier common to Zone l. 3-hour rated area boundary barrier common to Fire Area II, Zone 2. Ceiling: 3-hour rated area boundary barrier common to Fire Area II, Zone 14.
- 2. Zone Access
'h
~ One Classy'oor
/i in the+-hour P
rated east wall to Zone 10B o One Class C door in the 1-hour rated west wall to Zone 5A.
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings.
Amendment 13 9B.2.1-38 August 1984
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G. F ire Detection Ionization smoke detector system(s) is provided, for earl
~ ~
a~a>> <Pa oar
%ho. Holoa l ">ol gas ac. 'o. +e H. Fire Suppression spain.w,
- 1. Primary F,)~ 6yy~tV4AMb 14 Ha)c a 1
l BGl
~g sqsfegq
. Secondary
~ AA~l AOSQ. f'~>e.( ~~ J go portable CO2 fire extinguishers are located in adjacent Zone 5A.
Ventilation Refer to Appendix 9A response to Question 9A.70. Portable fans exhaust. smoke to adjacent rooms where smoke exhaust fans exhaust.to outside air. Drainage None C.: K. Emergency Lighting Lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) positioned for the operation of safe shutdown equipment is provided. L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. Amendment 13 9B.2.1-40 August 1984
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 9B.2.2.10 Fire Area II, Fire Zone 10B, Train B Remote Shutdown Room A. Location Fire Zone 10B (figure 9B-9) is'ocated in the Control Building at elevation 100'0". B. Fire Prevention Features Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North: 3-hour rated wall common to Zone 7B. South: 3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area IV at column line J4. East: 1-hour rated wall common to Zone 5B. West: ,3-hour rated area boundary wall common to Fire Area I, Zone 10A. Floor: 3-hour rated barrier common to Zone 2. Ceiling: 3-hour rated barrier common to Zone 14.
- 2. Zone Access 2w One Class P,p door in the+-hour h
rated west wall to Zone 10A
~ One Class A door in the 1-hour rated east wall to Zone 5B
- 3. Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier ratings
- 4. Fire Dampers Duct penetrations in the rated fire barriers are provided with fire dampers of equal or greater rating.
- 5. Protected Raceways Train A conduit are covered by 3-hour rated pro-tective wrappings.
Amendment 13 9B.2.2-38 August 1984
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS G. Fire Detection k d
~@4~ ( )
~!<<acQaQ +4e g<'tomo4c H~h~
')df ~
~A L3c'L
+iy Cug~im A~O Fire Suppression +
- 1. 'rimary p~~ ~lw6cu&Hr~G
~s l>Q(
Ha.(c<
' l~gs4 ad jeaent
-Zoa~DB-.~
- 2. Secondary rnAYL~) Lese. Ice ~
Pne portable CO2 fire extinguisher. 'ocated in adjacent Zone 5B. One portable CO fire extin-guisher and one manual hose reel are located in adjacent Corridor Building near Zone 5B. I.. Ventilation Refer to Appendix 9A response to Question 9A.70. Portable fans exhaust smoke to adjacent rooms where smoke exhaust fans exhaust to outside air. Drainage None K. Emergency Lighting Lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) positioned for the operation of safe shutdown equipment is provided. L. Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. Amendment 13 9B.2.2-40 August. 1984
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DC. LOAD CENMP'C PKS H)t(OIE) OH ILNTATION 2.1 llEFCA TOFICURE 9S )9 FOA SYMBOL LfGf ND. Dlt)tL 6ENCRATOR SLDCL HYAC CNASC l'alu Vcltlc Nuclear (Ieneralinr Slalion
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IOR ELEC1RICAL PEHCTRATIOH OUTSIDE OPEHIHBS EHOTE SHUTDOHH ROON AIR CHAM VSA!I
. cHPM)E 3.-F1(M sA'LL DOOR(NISSKt PROOF) W5 (QB fNOTE SHVTDONN PAHEL P
t CJH EOI(DIE) COIITICOL BUILDIIIG 7(> d-h'cà R&>> IEO V DISTR PAHEL f&HA-029(alf) PL)L)I AT BLBVILnOII 100'-0" Ptgurc 9B-9 As ~EL IOO August 1904 )Cucnatlcnt 13
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Load 35,500 Btu/ft
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 26.6 minutes G. Fige Detection P I-o~t4en-smok~etectcn-~stem~~rov&9ed $ ~~
~y-warn'-n~nd-ad~~ress-zoned-mode-w&3.-l ac~M~rr ctMNma.C ~
s sp&t&~ H. Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Automatic CO2 total flooding
- 2. Secondary One manual hose reel Two portable CO2 fire extinguishers Ventilation Manually controlled smoke exhaust venting to outside.
Drainage
. Two 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting Egress lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided.
Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. ke. t ~ (On ( Ba-Aar7 Je7.eC ec ggPuanon o~ i(18l N ~ +vcr'Tr s)'S('<(< ('>>
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a cri ia.ri~~+ ' gas sp
( ( Qv( Je. 5 El/'ger aBrrc <>~ 5f si~><
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P) ear(~ r~8rntng, August 1984 9B.2.1-25 Amendment 13
4 I I r, II I t, f, I I I I t h 1 l I
PVNGS FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS
- 3. Transient Combustible Load
- 4. Equivalent Fire Severity 28.3 minutes G. Fire Detection 4oawzat'i'-smoke-deteato~ys'tem~r~ovided fear early-warning~nd~n -~zos~oned-mode-wi 1~ac~e-an-'automatic-CG 2
'gas-systeM Fire Suppression
- 1. Primary Automatic CO2 total flooding
- 2. Secondary One manual hose reel and one portable CO2 fire extinguisher. One portable CO2 fire extinguisher and one manual hose reel are located in the adjacent Corridor Building...
Ventilation Smoke venting to outside. "(Manual Smoke Exhaust Fan) Drainage Two 4-inch drains K. Emergency Lighting Egress lighting with 8-hour battery unit(s) is provided. L. Emergency "Communications Sound powered phone jack(s) is provided. I pet 77~ r,. '> n i gg4m >anode I j
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P8rA PZI<<<f . Amendment 13 9B.2.2-24 August 1984
PVNGS FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS placed in a configuration'to isolate the hazard area from any flow of outside air. The closing of dampers will be timed relative to the CO dis-2 2 charge such that overpressurization of the hazard , 5P area will not occur. 72 The alarm condition is maintained until the system 8 g) relay is reset, manually. .The control pilot valve also 4l g may be operated manually to activate the system. A
~U supervised 1/4-inch ball valve is provided to deacti-vate the system when personnel occupy the room. The storage capacity of the system is adequate to perm% ~z hgg'th'h 1 ~ ll p tected area immediately after complete purging of the main generator with carbon dioxide.
of CO2 hose reels- for local application is
'peration initiated by manually removing the playpipe from its support bracket, thereby causing the master valve at the storage tank to open and charge the piping up to the nozzle. Removal of the playpipe also trips a limit switch which registers an alarm condition in the con-trol room. Discharge of CO2 is controlled by the hose operation by utilizing the squeeze-type valve at the nozzle. Replacement of the playpipe on its support shuts the master valves and returns the limit switch to normal.
Halon 1301 Systems Halon 1301 system operation is initiated by the product of combustion detectors (operation type) which are cross-zoned. Actuation of the first circuit (or loop), 9.5-24}}