ML14065A253
| ML14065A253 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/2014 |
| From: | NRC Region 4 |
| To: | |
| Hay M | |
| References | |
| Download: ML14065A253 (11) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E. LAMAR BLVD. ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511 March 5, 2014 LICENSEE: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) FACILITY: Fort Calhoun Station
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY OF FEBRUARY 27, 2014 MEETING WITH OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT On February 27, 2014 a Category 1 meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) in Blair, Nebraska. The NRC presented the status of oversight activities at Fort Calhoun Station (Enclosure 1). OPPD presented their actions for continued performance improvement following the plant restart in December 2013 (Enclosure 2). The slides from the presentations are available electronically from the Ns Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) and are enclosed in this notice. A video of the public meeting will be posted on the website devoted to the special oversight at Fort Calhoun Station, available at: http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/fcs/special-oversight.html. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the s Rules of Practice,py of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the s Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the Public Electronic Reading Room page of the s public web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To receive a summary of future meetings and other plant-specific e-mail distributions, you must subscribe to the Operating Reactor Correspondence electronic distribution for this plant via: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver/plants-by-region.html Once subscribed, if you wish to discontinue receiving electronic distribution, you may unsubscribe at any time by visiting the same web address above. CONTACT: Michael Hay, RIV/DRP (817) 200-1147 Docket No.: 50-285 Enclosure 1: NRC Presentation Slides Enclosure 2: OPPD Presentation Slides Introductions Fort Calhoun Station Public Meeting Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 27, 2014 Blair, Nebraska Welcome Introduction of NRC personnel 1 2 Purpose of Meeting NRC will present status of regulatory activities associated with the Fort Calhoun Station OPPD will present details of Fort Calhoun Station performance improvement initiatives Public comments and questions Opening Remarks Marc Dapas Regional Administrator 4 1 Enclosure 1 2 NRC Actions Completed NRC completed inspection, assessment, and licensing activities associated with the Confirmatory Action Letter Restart Checklist NRC Actions Completed NRC determined plant safe for restart and closed Confirmatory Action Letter December 17, 2013 NRC issued PosRestart Confirmatory Action Letter December 17, 2013 5 6 PosRestart CAL OPPD committed to the NRC to continue implementing improvement initiatives in key areas and address specific technical items 7 PosRestart CAL PosRestart commitments consist of: Key areas for sustained performance improvement Long term flood recovery items High energy line break corrective actions associated with the Auxiliary Steam System Containment internal structure corrective actions to restore design margins 8 3 NRC Assessment Activities Routine inspections Resident Inspectors Regional inspections Team inspection (Summer 2014) Assess Corrective Action Process effectiveness Assess PosRestart Confirmatory Action Letter items In Summary Increased NRC oversight activities remain NRC continues to implement independent and thorough inspection activities to assess station performance improvement progress 9 10 OPPD Presentation Contacting the NRC Report an emergency (301) 8165100 (call collect) Report a safety concern (800) 6957403 Allegation@nrc.gov General information or questions www.nrc.gov 11 12 OPPDs Fort Calhoun Station Driving To Excellence Public meeting with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 27, 2014 1 Topics for Discussion Safety Culture Problem Identification and Resolution Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use Site Operational Focus Programs Engineering Focus Areas Flooding Recovery Action Plans Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation Fukushima Response Project Tornado-Borne Missiles High-Energy Line Break 10 CFR 50.59 Containment Internal Structures Nuclear Oversight Integration into the Exelon Nuclear Fleet 2 Safety Culture Safety Culture Monitoring and Improvements Continue Initial and continuing Safety Culture/SCWE training for leaders and site personnel What People Are Saying hinking back over the past six months, Better Better Same 70% 28% Continue to utilize the 2Cs meetings (compliments and concerns) Implemented a Site Employee Issues Advisory Committee Continue our monthly Safety Culture Pulse Survey Weekly leadership and station alignment meetings to discuss survey results OPPD can determine both station safety culture trends and department level trends for departments of ten people or larger 3 is Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) at hinking back over the past six months, is nuclear safety culture at 4 Same Same Worse Better Worse Worse Better Same Worse 2% 77% 23% 1% 1 Enclosure 2 2 Problem Identification and Resolution Corrective Action Program (CAP) changes implemented to improve OPPDs detection and correction of plant issues Streamlined CAP procedures and guidance Established expectations managers, supervisors and staff trained Accountability reinforced Added staff CAP Coordinators (CAPCOs) Implemented detailed Exelon Nuclear performance monitoring tools Conducted oral board interviews to assess & reinforce understanding Results Station has seen a reduction in the number of open Corrective Actions and Causal Analyses over the last quarter CAP performance indicators are showing improvements due to better alignment of the Senior Leadership Team (SLT) Through performance data trending, the station has identified needed improvements in Causal Analysis quality 5 Problem Identification and Resolution Observations Areas that have shown improvement in last quarter Open corrective actions (Oct: 3,229 / Current: 2,124) Open report evaluations (Oct: 617 / Current: 410) Open correction action prevent recurrences (CAPRs) (Oct: 33 / Current: 25) RCA/ACA Rejection Rates (1st Two Quarters: 47% / Last Two Quarter: 24%) Areas where we are still being challenged Number of overdue CAP items RCA / ACA timeliness Actions addressing challenges Common Factors Analysis required for department with five or more overdue CAP items Increased Management Oversight of open Causal Analysis. Developed Engineering recovery plan to reduce analysis volume and increase qualified analysts Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection scheduled for the weeks of June 23 and July 14, 2014 6 Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use OPPDs post restart commitment states that: After restart, OPPD will complete a significant effort to perform a risk- focused reconstitution of the: Design basis, Licensing basis, and Updated Safety Analysis Report As part of this project, OPPD will: Ensure proper classification of equipment, Convert to a safety-related approach for equipment classification, and Complete a key calculation review A pilot program will be completed during 2014 on a selected system to and the process, scheduling and resource allocation Complete the reconstitution project before the end of 4th quarter 2018 7 Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use January 2014: Commenced review of key calculation Pre-restart 93 calculations were reviewed with 45 revisions for administrative corrections 78 of 351 key calculations were reviewed with 33 revisions required for administrative corrections February 7, 2014 Issue project request for proposal to vendors (COMPLETE) March 28, 2014 Vendor proposals due April 30, 2014 Award project contract May 5, 2014 Commence pilot project August 1, 2014 Complete project status assessment December 31, 2014 Complete pilot project (NRC commitment) February 1, 2015 Complete project status assessment February 28, 2015 Implement lessons learned from pilot project March 1, 2015 Commence remainder of project December 31, 2018 Complete reconstitution project (NRC commitment) Approximately every six months between March 1, 2015 and December 31, 2018 Complete project status assessments 7 8 8 3 Site Operational Focus Site Operational Focus combines the awareness of plant and equipment performance, knowledge of the plant design and licensing basis, with qualified personnel and procedures supporting sustained operations Elements of Operational Focus include: Shift Managers leads the station's of the Day providing oversight and setting the priorities for the station Daily activities are assessed for impact to the station based on risk Risk assessment includes ensuring activities are resource-loaded (compatible work bundled, parts procured and personnel support) Site Operational Focus Elements of Operational Focus include: (continued) Actual and potential issues screened using formal systematic decision-making process CAP used to support trending, investigations and causal analysis Operator rounds and monitoring plans to trend performance Plant Health Committee reviews equipment status against expected performance Exelon Fleet provides a suite of Performance Indicators Fleet resources available for support needed 9 10 Site Operational Focus Fort Calhoun has resumed safe operations Site Operational Focus Traveling screen sluice gate shaft was found damaged by Operations personnel. Commenced Heatup Nov. 24, 2013 @1432 Reactor Critical Dec. 18, 2013 @1848 Breakers Closed Dec. 21, 2013 @2100 Reactor Shutdown (CW-14C) Jan. 9, 2014 @0900 Reactor Critical Jan. 12, 2014 @0308 Manual Reactor Shutdown (CEA-41) Jan. 12, 2014 @0323 Reactor Critical Jan. 13, 2014 @0136 Breakers Closed Jan. 13, 2014 @1411 The shaft was bent by moving the gate with heavy ice buildup, caused by a leak above from a backwash pipe Root Cause from CAP analysis Motor torque settings allowed the stem to be bent Corrective Actions The stem has been replaced 1. Heat-up performed to support testing and equipment verifications 2. Reactor startup only after conditions confirmed and commitments met 3. Unit returned to service 4. Forced outage to repair river sluice gate 5. Control rod issue identified during unit startup; unit shut down to support repairs 6. Reactor restarted after repairs made and returned to service Motor torque settings were verified and reset The pipe leak is being repaired 11 12 4 Site Operational Focus Organizational Changes: Enhanced operator rounds to monitor for ice on gates beneath catwalk over the river Inspect other motor actuator torque settings GATES at INTAKE STRUCTURE Flooding Recovery Action Plans Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action Plan status There are five Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments outlined in section 2 of the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) Three Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments have been submitted to the NRC resident inspectors Two Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments are on-going File photo of Gates 13 14 Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation Interim action currently in place New portable system Fukushima Response Project Project scope Flooding reevaluation and seismic evaluation Mitigates effects of floods above elevation Designed and tested for beyond design basis conditions NRC approved license amendment for minimum river level Portable Submersible Pumps Flooding and seismic walkdowns Results submitted to the NRC Actions ongoing Mitigating strategies for beyond design basis external events Portable Skids for Water and Power Distribution Portable Diesel Generators Strategy developed and submitted to NRC Portable equipment pre-staged at FCS Procedures (Admin/Operations/PM/Testing) Staffing Communications (internal and external) Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (SFPI) SFPI modifications submitted to the NRC 15 16 5 Tornado-Borne Missiles High-Energy Line Break Protection of key equipment from potential tornado-borne missiles Used 250 tons of steel Completed 37 modifications High-Energy Line Break (HELB) Established a clear licensing basis Reassessed all high-energy systems Revised over 30 design documents Completed over 30 hardware changes Post-Restart Action commitments outlined in section 3 of the CAL Piping Changes Redundancy to Mitigate HELBs Improved Piping Supports HELB Flood Barriers 17 18 10 CFR 50.59 of actions taken regarding 10 CFR 50.59: Reduced population of individuals qualified to perform Section 50.59 Screens and Evaluations Provided vendor training for the reduced population of qualified individuals. This training was specifically developed for FCS by utilizing examples of station products. A custom exam was also created. The training has two purposes: 1. Develop subject matter experts and alternates for Section 50.59, which will be able to give the initial and requalification training. 2. Increase the level of knowledge of individuals that will be mentoring our less-experienced engineers in Section 50.59 screens and evaluations Implemented the Engineering Assurance Group (EAG). All Screens and Evaluations are required to be reviewed by EAG prior to issuance Completed focused briefings on specific deficiencies seen through EAG reviews Implementing Exelons Quality Review Team, which will review Section 50.59 products as part of the review scope Containment Internal Structures OPPD committed to: Evaluate the structural design margin for the containment internal structure, and reactor cavity and compartments, and resolve any deficiencies in accordance with FCSs CAP Regarding Beams 22A and Beam 22B under Safety Injection Tanks 6B/D, resolve any deficiencies in accordance with the CAP Significant effort and resources utilized to analyze the containment internal structure and develop resolution strategies. Resolution Strategy Reactor Vessel Head stand Replace current existing pedestal supports with deep beams that span the floor to take the load to adjacent walls and columns 19 20 6 Nuclear Oversight Independent Assessment Plant Startup Post-Restart The Exelon Nuclear Management Model Transition in five phases Framework development Organization, Procedures, Performance Indicators, Information Technology Analysis Gap analysis of 27 functional areas Design Recommendations to address key gaps Implementation planning Schedule development to include change management Implementation Majority of activities due for completion in 2015 completed over 2000 activities as of today Approved by OPPD and Exelon executives 21 22 The Exelon Nuclear Management Model Check and adjust approach using weekly status meetings and workload look-aheads to maintain schedule adherence Review progress Defined process for any schedule changes Monthly Executive Status Meetings Fleet Corporate Functional Area Manager Peer Support oversight NSRB Station visits with report outs to the OPPD board What it Took So Far person-hours 69,000 task completions -year operating agreement with Exelon More than 450 restart checklist items closed Industry-leading measurement of safety culture 23 24 7 What it Took The Details Tasks complete: 69,032 Person-hours worked: 8,027,621 Work orders planned: 26,956 Work order tasks completed: 50,197 Engineering changes completed: 187 NRC yellow sheets addressed: 1,885 Modifications installed: 90 Modification tasks: 11,614 Parts issued: 50,317 Radiography exams (RT shots): 474 Clearances used: 7,906 Clearance tags hung and removed: 34,547 Dose to complete the work:180.113 REM What it Took The Details CAP items assigned: 51,726 Cause Analyses (RCAs) assigned: 77 Cause Analyses (ACAs) assigned: 287 Simple Causes assigned: 16,742 -level Condition Reports (CRs) assigned: 34,384 25 26 Closing Remarks Tonight, we updated you on Safety Culture Problem Identification and Resolution Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use Site Operational Focus Programs Engineering Focus Areas Flooding Recovery Action Plans Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation Fukushima Response Project Tornadne Missiles Highrgy Line Break 10 CFR 50.59 Containment Internal Structures Nuclear Oversight Integration into the Exelon Nuclear Fleet 27