ML13114A881

4/22/2013 - Summary of Closed Meeting with Omaha Public Power District to Discuss Flooding Issues Associated with Fort Calhoun, Unit 1

ML13114A881
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	04/25/2013
From:	Joseph Sebrosky Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:	Cortopassi L Omaha Public Power District
Sebrosky J
References
TAC MF0598
Download: ML13114A881 (5)

Text

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0." NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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"> ~o April 25, 2013

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LICENSEE: Omaha Public Power District FACILITY: Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1

SUMMARY

OF CLOSED MEETING HELD ON APRIL 22,2013, WITH OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT TO DISCUSS MEANS FOR PROTECTING FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT 1, AGAINST FLOODING (TAC NO. MF0598)

On April 22, 2013, a closed meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and representatives of Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) at NRC Headquarters, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss means for protecting Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 (FCS). against flooding. The meeting was closed because the NRC staff determined that the information to be discussed was security-related sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information. A list of attendees is provided in Enclosure 1. A redacted publicly available version of the licensee's presentation slides is available in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at Accession No. ML13114A936.

OPPD provided a new strategy for mitigating the effects of beyond design basis floods up to a certain flood level for FCS. The strategy involved a means for removing decay heat from the fuel in reactor vessel (assuming the reactor coolant system (RCS) is intact) and for providing makeup water to the spent fuel pool that is lost due to boil off of the water. The means for removing decay heat from the fuel in the reactor vessel includes the following attributes:

1) rapidly going to cold shutdown conditions on indications that a beyond design basis flood is forthcoming, 2) providing a means of supplying water to the steam generators in a flooded condition, 3) removing decay heat by steaming through blocked open main steam safety valves,

4) using nitrogen in the pressurizer and safety injection tanks for pressure control of the primary system, and 5) providing makeup water to the RCS as needed to maintain the primary system pressure. A diagram showing this strategy. including the flow paths, is part of the meeting handouts and is provided in the Figure below for ease of reference.

OPPD indicated that it would have portions of the strategy implemented prior to restart of FCS including: 1) purchasing equipment relied on for removing decay heat during the time the unit is in a flooded condition. 2) providing verified and validated procedures to operate the equipment and the plant consistent with the strategy, and 3) training the staff on the use of the equipment and the strategies. OPPD indicated that there are portions of the strategy that would be developed post startup including but not limited to: 1) development of the preventative maintenance and periodic surveillances for the equipment, and 2) providing for a strategy when the RCS is not intact.

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HCV-344 Spent Fuel Pool The following actions were identified during the meeting:

• OPPD will verify the elevation of the alternate emergency operations facility that maybe needed in the event of a beyond design basis flood and ensure that this facility will be available if needed. Alternatively, OPPD will make different arrangements for the alternate emergency operations facility in the event of a beyond design basis flood.

• OPPD will provide feedback to the Regional staff on whether or not nonsafety related switchgear cooling is needed for conditions less than the design basis flood. During the floods of 2011, the staff indicated that this was a concern.

• OPPD will provide a timeline to the Regional staff when portions or all of the strategies discussed during the meeting and intended to be implemented by OPPD prior to restart of FCS will be implemented.

-3 Project Manager Docket No. 50-285

Enclosure:

List of Attendees cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv

LIST OF ATTENDEES U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APRIL 22, 2013, CLOSED MEETING WITH OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT TO DISCUSS MEANS FOR PROTECTING FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT 1, AGAINST FLOODING DOCKET NO. 50-285 Name Organization Bruce Rash OPPD George Wilhelmsen OPPD Matt Anielak OPPD Chris Scofield OPPD Terry Simpkin Exelon/Fort Calhoun Station Joe Gasper OPPD Steve Queen Fort Calhoun Station Anthony Vegel NRC/RIV Mike Hay NRC/RIV Louise Lund NRR/DORL Jacob Wingebach NRC/RIV John Kirkland* NRC/RIV

• Rick Deese* NRC/RIV Christopher Cook NRO/DSEAlRHMB Robert Taylor NRR/JLD George Wilson NRR/JLD Mike Markley NRR/DORL Lynnea Wilkins NRR/DORL Joe Sebrosky NRR/DORL Scott Morris NSIRIDPR Joseph Anderson NSIR/DPR Ron Albert NSIRIDSO Russ Felts NSIRIDSP

• Participated via phone Enclosure

Meeting Notice ML13102A189; Meeting Summary ML13114A881; Slides (OUO-SRI) ML13113A027; Slides(Redacted) ML13114A936 *via email OFFICE NAME NRRlDORLlLPL4/PM JSebrosky I RRiDORULPL4/LA ardt*

NRR/JLD GWilson*

DATE 4/25/13 4/25/13 4/25/13 OFFICE RIV/DRP/RPB-F/BC NRR/DORLlLPL4/BC NRR/DORLlLPL4/PM NAME MHay* MMarkley JSebrosky DATE 4/25/13 4/25/13 4/25/13