ML12269A224

Meeting Summary of with Omaha Public Power District

ML12269A224
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	09/25/2012
From:	Clark J NRC Region 4
To:
Clark J
References
Download: ML12269A224 (43)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I V 1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511 September 25, 2012 LICENSEE: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)

FACILITY: Fort Calhoun Station

SUMMARY

OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 MEETING WITH OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT On September 11, 2012, a Category 1 meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) at The Dana College Gardner-Hawks Center (gymnasium), 2848 College Drive, Blair, Nebraska.

The NRC presented an update of issues and oversight activities at Fort Calhoun Station (Enclosure 1). OPPD presented details of the integrated performance improvement plan, plant status, ongoing work, and corrective action program updates (Enclosure 2).

A video of the public meeting, and responses to the questions directed to the NRC, will be posted on the website devoted to the special oversight at Fort Calhoun Station, available at:

http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/fcs/special-oversight.html.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the Public Electronic Reading Room page of the NRCs public web site at:

http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html.

To receive a summary of future meetings and other plant-specific e-mail distributions, you must subscribe to the Operating Reactor Correspondence electronic distribution for this plant via http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver/plants-by-region.html Once subscribed, if you wish to discontinue receiving electronic distribution, you may unsubscribe at any time by visiting the same web address above.

CONTACT: Jeff Clark, RIV/DRP (817) 200-1147 Docket No. 50-285 : NRC Presentation slides : OPPD Presentation slides

Electronic Distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Art.Howell@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)

DRP Acting Deputy Director (Allen.Howe@nrc.gov)

MC 0350 Panel Chairman (Tony.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Acting Director (Tom.Blount@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (John.Kirkland@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (Jacob.Wingebach@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP (Rick.Deese@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP (Chris.Smith@nrc.gov)

Site Administrative Assistant, DRP (Berni.Madison@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Ray.Keller@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

Deputy Director, DIRS Office of NRR (John.Lubinski@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, PLB IV, DORL Office of NRR (Michael.Markley@nrc.gov)

Project Manager, PLB IV, DORL Office of NRR (Lynnea.Wilkins@nrc.gov)

Reactor Operations Engineer, IPAB, DIRS, Office of NRR (Michael.Balazik@nrc.gov)

OEMail Resource OEDO RIV Coordinator, (Silas.Kennedy@nrc.gov)

ROPreports R:_\REACTORS\FCS\2012\ FCS MS 9-11-12.docx ML12269A224 ADAMS: No Yes SUNSI Review Complete Reviewer Initials: CS Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Category A. Non-publicly Available Sensitive KEYWORD: 0350 RIV:BC:DRP/F PAO SLO D:DRP JClark VDricks WMaier KKennedy

/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/

9/14/12 9/14/12 9/20/12 9/25/12 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

Opening and Introductions Fort Calhoun Station Public Meeting

• Welcome Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• Introduction of NRC personnel September 11, 2012 Blair, Nebraska Purpose

• Convey the overall status of NRC and OPPD actions

- NRC will present status of inspections

- OPPD will present details of plant issue resolution

• Allow for public interaction and questions Enclosure 1

NRC Inspections NRC Inspections

• Continuing or planned inspections

- Flooding Recovery Plan Inspections

• Ongoing inspections

• Intake structure

• Geotechnical

- Permanent local-based resident inspectors - Confirmatory Action Letter Inspections

- Inspections by other NRC Specialists

• Electrical distribution

• Systems readiness for restart

• Safety Culture

• Security inspections

- Baseline Inspections

• Surveillance testing

• Operability evaluations

• Fire Protection Item Number Description Closure Date NRC Inspections Causes of Significant Performance Deficiencies and 1 Assessment of Organizational Effectiveness 1.a Flooding Issue - Yellow finding

• Licensee actions in progress 1.b Reactor Protection System contact failure - White finding 1.c Electrical bus modification and maintenance - Red finding

• All Confirmatory Action Letter items 1.d Security - Greater than green findings remain open 1.e Third-Party Safety Culture Assessment 1.f Integrated Organizational Effectiveness Flood Restoration and Adequacy of Structures, Systems, 2 and Components Flood Recovery Plan actions associated with facility and 2.a system restoration 2.b System readiness from extended shutdown Enclosure 1

Item Number Description Closure Date Item Number Description Closure Date Assessment of NRC Inspection Procedure 95003 Key 3 Adequacy of Significant Programs and Processes 5 Attributes 3.a Corrective Action Program 5.a Design 3.b Equipment design qualifications 5.b Human performance 3.c Design changes and modifications 5.c Procedure quality 3.d Maintenance programs 5.d Equipment performance 3.e Operability process 5.e Configuration control 3.f Quality assurance 5.f Emergency response 5.g Occupational radiation safety 4 Review of Integrated Performance Improvement Plan 5.h Public radiation safety 5.i Security Item Number Description Closure Date Item Number Description Closure Date 6 Licensing Issue Resolution 8 Confirmatory Action Letter Resolution Verification that all restart-related Confirmatory Action Letter 6.a Review of necessary licensing amendments or actions 8.a items are appropriately resolved 6.b Review of licensing commitments necessary for restart 8.b Conduct public meeting regarding plant readiness for restart 7 Readiness for Restart 9 Final Recommendation for Restart Manual Chapter 0350 Panel recommends restart to Region IV 7.a Operations organization ready for restart Administrator. Region IV Administrator obtains concurrence for restart from the Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Systems ready for restart and Mode restraints properly Preparedness Programs and the Director of the Office of 7.b addressed 9.a Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

7.c Final review of corrective actions program for restart items Enclosure 1

OPPD Presentation NRC Remarks Gary Gates President / Chief Executive Officer Closing Remarks Omaha Public Power District Open to the public

• The NRC places a high priority on keeping the public and stakeholders informed of its activities

• At www.nrc.gov, you can:

- Find public meeting dates and transcripts; Open discussion - Read NRC testimony, speeches, press releases, and policy decisions;

- Access the agencys Electronic Reading Room to find NRC publications and documents; and

- Subscribe to automatically receive correspondence from the NRC Enclosure 1

Contacting the NRC

• Report an emergency

- (301) 816-5100 (call collect)

• Report a safety concern

- (800) 695-7403

- Allegation@nrc.gov

• General information or questions

- www.nrc.gov Enclosure 1

9/11/2012 Driving Through Restart Public Meeting with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 11, 2012 1

Topics for Discussion

• Leadership Team

• Vision, Mission and Values

• Plant Status

• Progress on Commitments for Restart

• Closing Remarks 2

Enclosure 2 1

9/11/2012 OPPD Corporate Structure Safety Governance and Oversight Gary Gates Safety Audit &

OPPD President & CEO Review Committee Susan Landahl Exelon Corporate Nuclear Mohamad Doghman Oversight Committee Lou Cortopassi Vice President Energy Site Vice President Delivery & Chief Kerry Ihnen Fort Calhoun Station Compliance Officer Manager, Nuclear Oversight 3

Fort Calhoun Station Operations Organization Lou Cortopassi Site Vice President Mike Prospero Plant Manager Tim Uehling Trevor Orth Bob King Ted Maine Mike Smith Ken Kingston Assistant Plant Site Work Site Radiation Operations Chemistry Manager Management Maintenance Protection Shift Online and Site Radiation Operations Outage Work Maintenance Chemistry Protection Managers Management Organization Organization Organization Organization 4

Enclosure 2 2

9/11/2012 Fort Calhoun Station Support Organizations Lou Cortopassi Site Vice President Brian Victor Terrance Josh Dennis Obermeyer Joe Ruth Naschansky Simpkin Bousum Ron Short Bakalar Corrective Training Site Regulatory Emergency Recovery Security Action Engineering Assurance Planning Program Corrective Engineering Security Regulatory Action Emergency Recovery Training Organization Organization Assurance Program Planning Organization Organization Organization Organization Organization 5

6 Enclosure 2 3

9/11/2012 7

8 Enclosure 2 4

9/11/2012 Plant Status Update 9

Plant Status

• Safety and Human Performance

• Major Accomplishments

• Outage Tasks Remaining 10 Enclosure 2 5

9/11/2012 Industrial Safety 2011 21 1 22 11 2012* 1 Most Recent OSHA Recordable Injury was in February 2012 0 5 10 15 20 25 OSHA Recordable Injury

• 2012 data January 1st to September 7th Lost Time Injury 11 11 Industrial Safety Overview Injury Comparison Summary:

2011 2012 Untreated Injuries: 23 10 First Aid Injuries: 22 4 OSHA Recordable: 21 1 Lost Time/Restricted: 1 0 2012 data January 1st to September 7th 12 Enclosure 2 6

9/11/2012 Human Performance Results Station Level Performance Issues 2011 9 2012 0

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 321 days since Most Recent Station Level Performance Issue

• 2012 data January 1st to September 7th 13 Human Performance Results Department Level Performance Issues 2011 134 2012* 35 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

• 2012 data January 1st to September 7th 14 Enclosure 2 7

9/11/2012 Major Accomplishments

• Dedicated work management control center established 15 Major Accomplishments

• Fuel is being removed from reactor and safely stored 16 Enclosure 2 8

9/11/2012 Major Accomplishments

• Manhole 31 B train complete and raw water pump reliability improved 17 Major Accomplishments

• Safety feedwater pump motor being refurbished 18 Enclosure 2 9

9/11/2012 Major Accomplishments

• Protected area vehicle access Insert photo facility refurbished 19 Outage Tasks Remaining

• Manhole 31 Train A restoration

• Backup diesel generator reliability enhancements

• Finalize geotechnical report

• Address preventative maintenance tasks

• Repair chemical and volume control piping welds

• Resolution of containment internal structure issue

• Resolution of electrical equipment qualification issues including containment electrical penetrations

• Core reload and reactor reassembly

• Reactor coolant system fill and plant heatup

• Plant start up / Turbine testing / Breakers closed 20 Enclosure 2 10

9/11/2012 Outage Tasks Remaining

• Manhole Restoration - Train A 21 Outage Tasks Remaining

• Backup Diesel Generator Reliability Enhancements 22 Enclosure 2 11

9/11/2012 Continued Progress

• Station Priorities Safety Insert Picture Human Performance Fix the Plant Corrective Action Program

• Human behavior is changing

• Physical work on plant is being completed 23 OPPD Commitments to NRC for Restart of Fort Calhoun Station 24 Enclosure 2 12

9/11/2012 OPPD Commitments to NRC

• OPPD has made commitments to the NRC for successful recovery and restart

• Commitments documented in Confirmatory Action Letter and summary Restart Checklist

• OPPD Integrated Performance Improvement Plan provides extensive detail on recovery and Restart Checklist Implementation 25 OPPD Commitments for Restart

1. Identify causes and implement corrective actions for safety significant findings (Checklist 1.a through 1.d)

2. Assess safety culture and organizational effectiveness and implement improvement actions (Checklist 1.e and 1.f)

3. Assess and resolve flooding impact, evaluate systems, and ensure plant is ready for restart (Checklist 2.a and 2.b)

4. Assess and improve programs and processes that caused significant performance decline (Checklist 3.a through 3.f)

5. Implement the Integrated Performance Improvement Plan (Checklist 4)

6. Submit Recovery and Restart Report 26 Enclosure 2 13

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 1 Commitment 1 Progress on addressing safety findings 1.a Flooding Issue 1.b Reactor Protection System Contactor Failure 1.c Electrical Bus Modification and Maintenance 1.d Security Information Control 27 CAL Commitment No. 1 Flooding Issue Scoping 100%

Discovery 100%

Analysis 100%

Implementation 78%

• Root cause analysis complete

• Key corrective actions complete

- Includes external flood procedures

• Driving to inspection close-out 28 Enclosure 2 14

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 1 Reactor Protection System Contactor Scoping 100%

Discovery 100%

Analysis 90%

Implementation 75%

• Completed initial root cause analysis

• Replaced all RPS M2 contactors

• Trained staff on operability evaluation process

• Root cause analysis is being revised to address higher root cause analysis standards 29 CAL Commitment No. 1 Electrical Bus Modification and Maintenance Scoping 100%

Discovery 100%

Analysis 100%

Implementation 85%

• Completed root cause analyses for electrical bus failure and electrical train separation issue

• Completed third-party evaluation of root cause analyses

• Completed electrical bus repairs and inspections

• Completed modification and maintenance process improvements

• Developing detailed inspection procedures to prevent recurrence 30 Enclosure 2 15

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 1 Security Information Control Scoping 100%

Discovery 100%

Analysis 100%

Implementation 50%

• Root cause analyses completed

• Independent evaluation of root cause analyses identified need for collective evaluation and improved corrective actions

• Collective evaluation of all root cause analyses will integrate and focus corrective actions 31 CAL Commitment No. 2 Commitment 2 Progress on Safety Culture and Organizational Effectiveness 1.e ThirdParty Safety Culture Assessment 1.f Integrated Organizational Effectiveness Assessment Comprehensive organizational performance assessment 32 Enclosure 2 16

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 2 Safety Culture Scoping 100%

Discovery 100%

Analysis 100%

Implementation 74%

• Third-party safety culture assessment completed

- Resulted in four areas for improvement

• Root cause assessments completed on areas for improvement

• Implementing corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence 33 CAL Commitment No. 2 Safety Culture Areas for Improvement

1. Develop and communicate a strategic vision, make decisions based on the vision and engage the workforce

2. Improve implementation of Corrective Action Program

3. Encourage beneficial challenging of management decisions and a healthy questioning attitude

4. Improve accountability at all levels 34 Enclosure 2 17

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 2 Safety Culture Corrective Actions

• Develop strategic plan and define the vision, mission and values that clearly establish safety and behavioral expectations

• Establish corporate nuclear oversight committee

• Assess leaders to ensure skills and abilities meet our standards, and identify training and development needs

• Change Employee Concerns Coordinator reporting relationship to an independent corporate executive enhancing credibility and anonymity 35 CAL Commitment No. 2 Safety Culture Corrective Actions

• Provide positionspecific safety conscious work environment training on expectations

• Establish effectiveness metrics, conduct pulse surveys, Site VP hold 2Cs (Compliments and Concerns) meetings with staff

• Develop a Differing Professional Opinion process

• Describe the right picture mental model for beliefs, values and behavior expectations, train the staff, develop scorecards and observe and provide feedback at key meetings and activities

• Develop communication and alignment plans 36 Enclosure 2 18

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 2 Organizational Effectiveness Scoping 100%

Discovery 100%

Analysis 100%

Implementation 64%

• Organizational effectiveness assessment by industry experts addressed strategic, policy and structural aspects that enable a successful, safetyfocused operation

• Comprehensive organizational performance assessment (NRC IP95003 RSSPA and IACPD) OPPD and industry experts drill down into multiple organizations identifying with granularity how the organization is performing 37 CAL Commitment No. 2 Organizational Effectiveness Organizational effectiveness root cause analysis by industry experts completed

• Root causes identified

- Governance and oversight

- Station leader behaviors

- Implementation of policies

• Contributing causes identified

- Strong nuclear safety culture principles

- Change management processes

- Communication policy implementation 38 Enclosure 2 19

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 2 Organizational Effectiveness Corrective Actions

• Develop OPPD Governance and Oversight Policy

• Establish Corporate Nuclear Oversight Committee

• Revise Strategic Plan and Vision, Mission, and Values

• Assess leadership team

• Enhance communications plan 39 CAL Commitment No. 2 Comprehensive Organizational Performance Assessment

• Comprehensive evaluation of organizational performance

- Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Assessment Operations Security and safeguards Engineering Procedures Maintenance Human performance Emergency Equipment Preparedness performance Environmental and Radiological protection

- Identification, Analysis and Correction of Performance Deficiencies Assessment

• Utilized NRC Inspection Procedure 95003 methodology 40 Enclosure 2 20

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 2 Comprehensive Organizational Performance Assessment

• Organizational performance and cause assessments to date has involved 240,000 person hours of effort by over 200 OPPD staff and outside experts

• Identified organizational performance issues across the station providing opportunity for additional granularity of corrective actions 41 CAL Commitment No. 2 Comprehensive Organizational Performance Assessment

• 15 focus areas identified and cause assessments being conducted

• Any additional common factors will be identified and addressed

• Will continue to report out on corrective actions and outcomes 42 Enclosure 2 21

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 2 Organizational Effectiveness Results to date

• Senior leaders with strong managerial and technical skills in place

• Station leaders aligning to the Integrated Performance Improvement Plan and vision, mission, and values

• Potential training and development needs being identified

• Improvement in behaviors and performance being observed 43 CAL Commitment No. 3 Commitment 3 Progress on systems ready for restart 2.a Flood Recovery Plan actions facility and systems restoration 2.b Systems ready for restart 2.b.1 System Readiness Reviews

- Containment Internal Structure

- Steam Generators 2.b.2 Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Review 2.b.3 Impact of subsurface water on structures

- Geotechnical 44 Enclosure 2 22

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 3 Containment Internal Structure Scoping 65%

Discovery 50%

Analysis 50%

Implementation 5%

• OPPD identified deficient original design drawings and calculations for certain structural elements inside containment

• Certain structural elements are functional but may not be within design requirements

• Interim actions taken

- Work involving containment beams and internal structure suspended pending review

- Containment function not affected 45 CAL Commitment No. 3 Containment Internal Structure

• Discovery Status

- Developed scope and strategy for discovery utilizing outside experts Complete

- Performed asbuilt verifications Complete

- Performed root cause assessment with thirdparty review Complete

- Developed engineering models for analysis Complete

- Performing analysis of internal structure using current licensing basis methods

• Recovery Status

- Evaluate integrated solutions for modifications

- Rerun design model with revised load inputs

- Complete implementation of modifications 46 Enclosure 2 23

9/11/2012 Steam Generators Add RCS/steam cycle graphic

• Fort Calhoun Station steam generators replaced in 2006

• 100 percent of steam generator tubes inspected prior to service and in 2008 following first cycle of operation

• No flaws identified in either exam 47 Steam Generators

• Unusual tube wear identified on newer steam generator at another plant

• Same manufacturer and similar design to Fort Calhoun Stations steam generators

• Fort Calhoun Station not affected by same degradation mechanism as other plant

- Tube wear would be expected during first operating cycle

- Size and flow rates at affected plant far exceed that at Fort Calhoun Station

- Rereviewed 2008 nondestructive test data no anomalies identified 48 Enclosure 2 24

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 3 Geotechnical Scoping 100%

Discovery 100%

Analysis 95%

Implementation 80%

• Fort Calhoun Station was subjected to flood waters for several months

• Determined that testing and analysis of soil beneath structures was prudent

• Testing and analysis was performed to evaluate impact of flood waters on structural integrity 49 CAL Commitment No. 3 Geotechnical

• Local expert geotechnical firm performed extensive testing of soil condition

- Geotechnical testing was conducted utilizing Standard Penetration Test Cone Penetration Test Static Cone Penetrometer Dynamic Cone Penetrometer

- Geophysical testing was conducted utilizing Ground Penetrating Radar Refraction Survey Refraction Microtremor Survey 50 Enclosure 2 25

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 3 Geotechnical Results for NonSafety Related Structures

• Three issues identified

- Maintenance Shop column settled due to soil wetting Installed new screw pile foundation to bedrock under column

- Turbine building drain piping degradation Final engineering inprogress for piping repairs

- Pavement between Intake Structure and Service Building was worn due to freeze/thaw, expansion/contraction, and traffic wear Repaired pavement 51 CAL Commitment No. 3 Geotechnical Results for SafetyRelated Structures

• Testing demonstrated that there was no negatively affected soil beneath the Auxiliary Building and Containment Building

• Local geotechnical firm does not perform safetyrelated structural analyses

• Separate expert firm (10 CFR 50, Appendix B qualified) was contracted to perform safetyrelated structural analysis

• Separate firm completed bounding parametric analysis concluding that up to 10 feet of negatively affected soil under the Auxiliary Building and Containment Building could exist with no impact on the structures 52 Enclosure 2 26

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 3 Geotechnical Auxiliary Building Dynamic Cone Penetrometer Testing 53 CAL Commitment No. 3 Geotechnical Final Actions

• Local expert geotechnical firms analysis

- Incorporating the independent thirdparty review comments

- Final report scheduled to be issued on 09182012

• Separate safety qualified expert firms analysis

- Incorporating independent thirdparty review comments

- Final report scheduled to be issued on 09282012 54 Enclosure 2 27

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 4 Commitment 4 Progress programs and processes ready for restart 3.a Corrective Action Program (CAP) 3.b Equipment design qualifications 3.b.1 Safetyrelated parts program 3.b.2 Equipment qualification program Containment penetrations 3.c Design changes and modifications 3.c.1 Vendor modification control 3.c.2 10 CFR 50.59 screening and safety evaluation program 55 CAL Commitment No. 4 Commitment 4 3.d Maintenance programs 3.c.1 Vendor manuals and vendor information control program 3.c.2 Equipment service life program 3.e Operability process 3.e.1 Operability determination program 3.e.2 Degraded and nonconforming condition program 3.f Quality Assurance 56 Enclosure 2 28

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 4 Corrective Action Program Scoping 100%

Discovery 100%

Analysis 100%

Implementation 70%

• Root cause analyses completed

• Ineffective alignment, beliefs, and values resulted in untimely problem identification and resolution

• Organizational values precluded a selfimproving culture and learning environment 57 CAL Commitment No. 4 Corrective Action Program

• Contributing Causes Inconsistent reinforcement of expectations and holding personnel accountable Process changes not wellcoordinated Challenges prioritizing corrective action scope and significance Insufficient skills and knowledge for personnel performing and approving cause analyses Weaknesses in causal analysis and timely and effective problem resolution Corrective actions not developed using a systematic change management process Inadequate corrective action effectiveness reviews 58 Enclosure 2 29

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 4 Corrective Action Program

• Actions Taken:

- Benchmarked industry best

- Developed streamlined procedures

- Trained site personnel (process and behaviors)

- Enhanced process:

Standards and expectations set by senior management Corrective Action Program is core business and station priority Senior managers chair and attend Station Corrective Action Review Board Corrective Action Coordinator positions created and staffed - New CAPCOs mentored by industry experts Program Health and Trending Reports published monthly 59 CAL Commitment No. 4 Corrective Action Program

• Results to date

- Department Corrective Action Review Board reflecting improved leadership standards

- Quality of products being delivered to Station Corrective Action Review Board is improving

• Next Steps

- Monitor and reinforce expected behaviors 60 Enclosure 2 30

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 4 Condition Reports Initiated 61 CAL Commitment No. 4 Condition Reports Initiated 62 Enclosure 2 31

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 4 Root Cause Analyses Initiated 63 CAL Commitment No. 4 Closed Condition Reports 64 Enclosure 2 32

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 4 Containment Penetrations Scoping 100%

Discovery 100%

Analysis 50%

Implementation 0%

Problem Statement Fort Calhoun staff identified that 614 containment penetration feedthroughs contain Teflon materials that could degrade under certain accident conditions 65 CAL Commitment No. 4 Containment Penetrations

• Three corrective actions identified

- Approximately 170 unused penetrations will be capped

- Approximately 10 coaxial and triaxial penetrations for nuclear instrumentation will be replaced with qualified penetrations

- A modification approach developed for the remainder of the penetrations involving a field splice with a sleeve using environmentally qualified materials

• Perform qualification testing of new configuration 66 Enclosure 2 33

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 4 Vendor Manuals Scoping 100%

Discovery 100%

Analysis 90%

Implementation 50%

Problem Statement

• Vendor manuals have not been updated to assure technical instructions are being properly referenced, followed in the field and incorporated into associated plant documents Discovery Plan

• Developed list of all vendor manuals for safety equipment and important non safety equipment

• Perform technical reviews of station documents regarding installation, operation and maintenance activities in vendor manuals

• Initiate CRs to document and track correction of noted deficiencies 67 CAL Commitment No. 4 Vendor Manuals

• Status Update

- 899 vendor manuals reviewed Complete

- 57 Condition Reports issued for technical and seven Condition Reports issued for administrative updates

- Vendor manual updated Complete

- Station document updates in progress

• A causal analysis will identify actions to prevent recurrence.

68 Enclosure 2 34

9/11/2012 CAL Commitment No. 4 Commitment 4 Integrated Performance Improvement Plan (IPIP)

• Current IPIP (Rev 3) describes in detail the process for recovery and return to service

- Governance and management oversight

- Restart Checklist implementation strategy

- Flood recovery actions

- Schedule

- Performance indicators

- Communications strategy

• IPIP is being updated to address

- Organizational changes

- Detailed postrestart Plan for Sustained Improvement 69 OPPDs Commitment Tonight we discussed

• Our Team at Fort Calhoun Station

• Our renewed Vision, Mission and Values

• The status of plant activities

• Our progress on completing our commitments for recovery and the safe restart of the plant 70 Enclosure 2 35

9/11/2012 Driving Through Restart Were On Our Way!

71 Enclosure 2 36