ML12102A043

04/4/2012 Omaha Public Power District Public Meeting (0350)

ML12102A043
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	04/04/2012
From:	Omaha Public Power District
To:	NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
References
Download: ML12102A043 (70)

Text

Fort Calhoun Station Public Meeting with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 4, 2012 4/6/2012

Fort Calhoun Station Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer DAVID BANNISTER OPENING REMARKS 4/6/2012

Performance Initiatives

• Integrated Performance Improvement Plan

• Plant Status

• Indepth Reviews

• LookAhead 4/6/2012

Fort Calhoun Station Recovery Manager RON SHORT INTEGRATED PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN STATUS 4/6/2012

Integrated Performance Improvement Plan 4/6/2012

4/6/2012 4/6/2012 Implement corrective Systematic approach action to performance Identify improvement - four fundamental phases performance deficiencies Evaluate significance and trends Analysis 4/6/2012

Flood damage repair complete Flooding lessons learned included in plant procedures Remaining issues added to IPIP 4/6/2012

• 4160/480 volt AC

• 125 volt DC/Emergency Batteries

• High Pressure Safety Injection 4/6/2012

• Selection based on nuclear safety significance

• Six key attributes addressed

- Design

- Equipment Performance

- Configuration Control

- Procedure Quality

- Human Performance

- Emergency Response Organization Readiness 4/6/2012

• Review of processes for finding and fixing problems

• Ten assessment areas

- Audits and oversight

- Historical Data Review and trending 4/6/2012

• Areas of focus:

- Survey

- Interviews: Oneonone and focus groups

- Observations and document reviews

• Conducted by recognized experts

• Results discussed with NRC and at a future public meeting 4/6/2012

• Scope Resolution of design and program issues:

- Vendor manuals

- Equipment service life

- Degraded/nonconforming conditions

- Vendor design changes 4/6/2012

Summary

• Integrated Improvement plan established

• Staffing and resources in place

• Work has begun

• Progress is being made 4/6/2012

Fort Calhoun Station Division Manager WOODY GOODELL CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM 4/6/2012

• Improved CAP culture Key to Station improvement Comprehensive program improvement Training being completed 4/6/2012

• Enhanced management involvement

• Reinforcing behaviors

• Multidisciplinary screening team

• Established new positions 4/6/2012

• Safety Culture Assessment will refine actions

• Behavioral changes take time

• Seeing improvements

• Future state 4/6/2012

Fort Calhoun Station Plant Manager MIKE PROSPERO PLANT STATUS 4/6/2012

June 2011 August 2011 August 2011 March 2012 4/6/2012 21

Plant Status June 2011 March 2012 Looking Down the Access Road towards the Plant 4/6/2012

Plant Status June 2011 March 2012 View of Plant from Access Bridge 4/6/2012

Plant Status June 2011 March 2012 Walkway Exiting the Plant 4/6/2012

Plant Status June 2011 March 2012 View of River from Plant 4/6/2012

Plant Status Flood Cleanup Activities 4/6/2012

Plant Status

• Plant in cold shutdown

• Safe condition

• Maintenance and testing activities in progress 4/6/2012

Plant Status

• Meteorological Tower

- Out of service due to flooding

- Received weather information from other sources Operational 4/6/2012

Plant Status

• Electrical equipment restoration Fire damaged electrical equipment repaired Tested Re-energized Returned to normal electrical alignment Restored Switchgear 1B4A 4/6/2012

Lessons Learned Procedural Guidance Upgraded FORT CALHOUN STATION FCSG63, Establishing Incident Command implemented FCSG64, External Flooding of Site implemented OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT Business Continuity Plan updated to incorporate lessons learned

Lessons Learned Abnormal Operating Procedure Enhanced AOP01, Acts of Nature updated with enhanced flooding actions.

Lessons Learned EPIPTSC2, Catastrophic Flooding Preparations updated

Lessons Learned AC Power Reliability ReEvaluated based on Flooding Event Length New method to transfer diesel fuel during flooding

Lessons Learned Building and Floor Penetrations Sealed and Certified Approximately 375 penetrations (electrical conduit, piping runs, etc.)

were sealed and certified

Lessons Learned BelowGround Surveys Conducted No significant impacts identified to date

Flood Readiness Intake structure

• Evaluating equipment classification

• Changed operating procedures

• Actions needed to protect the sluice gates and motor operated valves from river debris during a flood

• Interim compensatory measures 4/6/2012

Plant Status Public Warning Sirens

• 101 Sirens

• Several lost power during flood Sirens operable

• Recent Siren Outage

NRC Inspection Readiness

• Actions to improve inspection readiness

- Detailed selfassessments 4/6/2012

NRC Inspection Readiness

• Actions to improve inspection readiness

- Senior management led challenge boards 4/6/2012

NRC Inspection Readiness

• Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Conducted Last Week

• First of two weeks of inspection (will be back April 9th)

• Working on items identified 4/6/2012

NRC Inspection Readiness

• Emergency Planning Inspection The Nuclear Regulatory Commission concluded that the overall Emergency Planning Conducted Last Organization performance continued to Week provide confidence in Fort Calhouns ability to implement the major elements of the Evaluated Exercise emergency plan and protect the health and safety of the public.

with States and Senior Inspector, NRC Region IV Counties 4/6/2012

Fort Calhoun Station Division Manager Engineering JOHN HERMAN ELECTRICAL FIRE 4/6/2012

480Volt Load Center 4/6/2012

480Volt Load Center 4/6/2012

Load Center with Breaker 4/6/2012

Event

• June 7, 2011 - Electrical fault caused a fire in 480 volt load center 1B4A

- Fire damage required complete replacement of load center 1B4A

- No other load centers were damaged by the fire 4/6/2012

Event

• Soot from the fire caused supply breaker 1B3A to trip on overcurrent

- Breaker was reset and power restored to 1B3A

- There was no damage to load center 1B3A 4/6/2012

Priorities

• Safety

• Quality

• Timeliness 4/6/2012

Elevated Walkways to get around plant Looking Down the Access Road towards the Plant 4/6/2012

Response Activities

• Fire occurred on Tuesday, June 7, 2011

• A forensic engineering company was onsite to begin fire investigation by Friday

• Demolition work could not begin until fire investigation was complete 4/6/2012

Response Activities

• Replacement electrical equipment had to be custom built to fit the existing equipment

• Two options considered:

- Build the entire load center offsite Due to flooding, materials to rebuild onsite had to be brought in via barge - Rebuild in place onesite 4/6/2012

Response Activities

• Work had to be performed in series to ensure no more than one additional load center was removed at a time

• Engineering design package

• 1B3A root cause analysis 4/6/2012

Response Timeline

• 6/7/11 Fire event

• 6/10/11 Engineering work started

• 7/23/11 Demolition and reconstruction work started

• 8/29/11 Flood level below 1004msl - site recovery started

• 9/12/11 Root cause analysis for fire completed

• 10/27/11 Reconstruction work finished

• 12/9/11 Extent of condition work completed

• 2/17/12 Engineering work completed

• 3/5/12 1B4A load center energized for testing 4/6/2012

Lessons Learned

• Following the fire, the Fort Calhoun Station:

- Acted promptly to investigate the fire

- Determined the cause

- Began the engineering work

- Procure new electrical equipment 4/6/2012

Lessons Learned

• Timely completion of EOC work

• Timely completion of design package

• Appropriate resources allocated 4/6/2012

Root Cause Analysis Terminology

• Direct Cause - the physical condition that created the failure

• Root Cause the situation that allowed the physical condition to exist, if corrected would have prevented the event from occurring 4/6/2012

Root Cause Analysis Terminology

• Contributing Cause - increases the likeliness or severity of an occurrence

• Extent of Condition - describes other equipment that could have the same physical condition that led to the failure

• Extent of Cause - describes how the root cause could impact other equipment and processes 4/6/2012

Current Root Cause Analysis

• Direct cause of the fire in load center 1B4A

- High resistance electrical connection failed

• Direct cause of the 1B3A breaker trip

- Overcurrent condition Circuit Breaker Finger & Stab 4/6/2012

Bustie breaker and 1B3A supply breaker both tripped 4/6/2012

480Volt Load Center 4/6/2012

1B3A Breaker

• The two breakers were removed from the plant and tested together at the testing facility 4/6/2012

1B3A Breaker Jumper 4/6/2012

1B3A Breaker

• Design change procedures do not provide guidance to evaluate the impact of unused design features

• Training not provided on unique features of new equipment 4/6/2012

Corrective Actions

• Demolition and cleanup after the fire

• Fabrication and reconstruction of 1B4A

• Extent of condition investigations and repairs on other 480 VAC circuit breakers

• Remove hardened grease 4/6/2012

Corrective Actions 4/6/2012

Corrective Actions Procedures were changed to include specific guidance on identifying critical characteristics Expanded the requirements for researching operating experience during design process More detailed instructions for cleaning breaker stabs 4/6/2012

Corrective Actions Review of inprogress modifications Review of previously completed modifications (inprogress)

New thermography procedure for investigating unusual odors Quality audit of equipment supplier 4/6/2012

Corrective Actions Verified other jumpers installed correctly Identified other equipment supplied by same vendor 4/6/2012

4/6/2012 Fort Calhoun Station Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer DAVID BANNISTER LOOK AHEAD AND CLOSING REMARKS 4/6/2012