Text

Summary of Meeting with Omaha Public Power District
	ML13093A473
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	04/03/2013
From:	Hay M; NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
To:	;
References
	Download: ML13093A473 (21)
	v • d • e

April 3, 2013 LICENSEE:

Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)

FACILITY:

Fort Calhoun Station

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF MARCH 27, 2013 MEETING WITH OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT On March 27, 2013, a Category 1 meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) at the Doubletree Hotel at 1616 Dodge St, Omaha, Nebraska.

The NRC presented the status of Inspection Manual Chapter 350 oversight inspections, the revised Confirmatory Action Letter, associated Restart Checklist, and Restart Checklist Basis Document (Enclosure 1) The licensee presented details of their progress for issue resolution and plant restart activities (Enclosure 2).

A video of the public meeting will be posted on the website devoted to the special oversight at Fort Calhoun Station, available at:

http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/fcs/special-oversight.html.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the Public Electronic Reading Room page of the NRCs public web site at:

http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html.

To receive a summary of future meetings and other plant-specific e-mail distributions you may subscribe to the Operating Reactor Correspondence electronic distribution for this plant via:

http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver/plants-by-region.html Once subscribed, if you wish to discontinue receiving electronic distribution, you may unsubscribe at any time by visiting the same web address above.

CONTACT:

Michael Hay, RIV/DRP (817) 200-1147 Docket No.:

50-285

NRC Presentation Slides : OPPD Presentation Slides UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511

OPPD Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (Art.Howell@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Robert.Lewis@nrc.gov)

RIV DRP Director (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)

RIV Acting DRP Deputy Director (Michael.Scott@nrc.gov)

RIV Acting DRS Director (Tom.Blount@nrc.gov)

RIV Acting DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)

RIV Senior Resident Inspector (John.Kirkland@nrc.gov)

RIV Resident Inspector (Jacob.Wingebachl@nrc.gov)

RIV Branch Chief, DRP/F (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)

RIV Senior Project Engineer, DRP/F (Rick.Deese@nrc.gov)

RIV Project Engineer, DRP/F (Chris.Smith@nrc.gov)

RIV Project Engineer, DRP/F (Jesse.Rollins@nrc.gov)

RIV Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

RIV Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)

NRR Project Manager (Lynnea.Wilkins@nrc.gov)

NRR Project Manager (Joseph.Sebrosky@nrc.gov)

RIV Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Ray.Kellar@nrc.gov)

RIV RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

RIV Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

OEWEB Resource (Sue.Bogle@nrc.gov)

RIV/ETA: OEDO (Doug.Huyck@nrc.gov)

RIV RSLO (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov)

MC 0350 Panel Chairman (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

MC 0350 Panel Vice Chairman (Louise.Lund@nrc.gov)

MC 0350 Panel Member (Michael.Balazik@nrc.gov)

MC 0350 Panel Member (Michael.Markley@nrc.gov)

R:\\

ADAMS ML ADAMS: No Yes SUNSI Review Complete Reviewer Initials:

Keyword:

Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Public Release Date:

Non-publicly Available Sensitive RIV/C:DRP/F MHay

/RA/

4/3/13 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax 13093A473 R:\\_REACTORS\\_FCS\\2013 Fort Calhoun Station Public Meeting Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 27, 2013 Omaha, Nebraska Opening and Introductions

Welcome

Introduction of NRC personnel NRC Personnel

Tony Vegel - MC 0350 Panel Chair

Louise Lund - MC 0350 Panel Vice Chair

Mike Hay - Branch Chief Mike Hay Branch Chief

Joe Sebrosky - Project Manager

John Kirkland - Senior Resident Inspector

Rick Deese - Senior Project Engineer Purpose

Status of NRC and OPPD actions

-NRC will present status of inspections and issuance revised CAL and Basis and issuance revised CAL and Basis Documents

-OPPD will present details of plant issue resolution

Allow for public interaction and questions NRC ACTIONS Confirmatory Action Letter Restart Checklist Items (26 Items) 6 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

1 0

1 1

1 2

1 3

1 4

1 5

1 6

1 7

1 8

Restart Checklist Items (26 Items)

Basis Document Items (450+)

Revised Confirmatory Action Letter

Issued February 26, 2013 http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/fcs/special-oversight.html Added 3 items to the Restart Checklist

Added 3 items to the Restart Checklist

- Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs)

- Qualification of Containment Electrical Penetrations

- Containment Internal Structures Revised Basis Document

Issued March 7, 2013 http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/fcs/special-oversight.html

SSFFs consisted of 9 Licensee Event R

t (LER )

Reports (LERs)

Containment Penetrations and Internal Structures

- Root Cause

- Extent of Condition and Cause Evaluation

- Corrective Actions Status of Inspections and Reviews

CAL Inspection Team - On Site Inspection Complete

Security - On Site Inspection Complete

Safety Culture - On Site Inspection Complete y

p p

Operational Assessment - April 2013

Containment Structure - Ongoing

Containment Penetration - Ongoing

Flooding - Review in Progress

Special Inspection - On Site Inspection Complete 9

Status of Items Completed

All Restart Checklist Items Remain Open

Approximately 150 of 460 Restart Ch kli t B i D t It Cl d

Checklist Basis Document Items Closed

Majority of Flood Recovery Items Near Completion Flood Recovery Items

Original CAL had 231 individual items

Restart Checklist Basis Document split t it t di tl l t d t fl d

out items not directly related to flood

- 162 directly related to flood, including 22 specifically related to geotechnical inspection

- 102 have been inspected and closed Current Assessment

Improvements:

- Overall Site Safety Culture

- Nuclear Oversight Assessments

- Plant Equipment

Challenges:

- Inconsistent quality of Fort Calhoun Stations reviews and actions to address CAL and Basis Document items

Station actions were not always complete

Lack of consistent thoroughness of station evaluations Path Forward

Fort Calhoun Station

- Complete Identification and Implementation of Corrective Actions for Restart Checklist Items in a High Quality Manner

- Determine Readiness for Inspection Activities

- Provide NRC in Writing Results and Readiness for Inspection of CAL Items Path Forward

NRC

- Operational Assessment Team Inspection

- Security Follow Up Inspection

- MC 0350 and CAL Follow Up Inspections p

p PERFORM THOROUGH and INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION of PLANT SAFETY OPPD Presentation Lou Cortopassi Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Omaha Public Power District NRC Remarks Closing Remarks Open Discussion Open to the Public

The NRC places a high priority on keeping the public and stakeholders informed of its activities

At www.nrc.gov, you can:

- Find public meeting dates and transcripts; p

g p

- Read NRC testimony, speeches, press releases, and policy decisions;

- Access the agencys Electronic Reading Room to find NRC publications and documents; and

- Subscribe to automatically receive correspondence from the NRC Contacting the NRC

Report an emergency

- (301) 816-5100 (call collect)

Report a safety concern (800) 695 7403

- (800) 695-7403

- Allegation@nrc.gov

General information or questions

- www.nrc.gov Fort Calhoun Station Driving Through Restart Public Meeting with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1

March 27, 2013 Topics for Discussion

Plant Status - Readiness for Restart

Progress on Commitments for Restart 2

Plan for Sustained Improvement

Independent Assessment

Closing Remarks Plant Status 3

Safety Performance

Human Performance

Fixing the Plant

Readiness for Restart FCS March 2013 Industrial Safety Overview ant Ranking 52nd 1st 1st quartile 2nd quartile 26th EMENT EMENT 4

104th FCS January 2012 Industrial Accident Rating U.S. Pla 78th 3rd quartile 4th quartile IMPROVE MPROVE FCS March 2013 Human Performance Overview t Ranking 52nd 1st 1st quartile 2nd quartile 26th NT NT 5

104th FCS January 2012 Human Performance Errors U.S. Plant 52nd 78th 3rd quartile 4th quartile IMPROVEMEN MPROVEMEN Fixing the Plant

Approximately 20,000 tasks completed (November 2012 through February 2013)

Approximately 5,000 tasks remaining to be ready for restart 6

ready for restart

- Approximately 3,900 tasks to complete reloading fuel into the reactor

- Approximately 1,000 additional tasks to heat up the plant Major Tasks to Complete Loading Fuel into the Reactor

Complete maintenance work on electrical distribution system 7

Complete major safety system testing

Load fuel into the reactor Major Tasks to Complete Plant Heat-Up

Complete high-energy line break and electrical equipment qualification modifications 8

Complete maintenance work to resolve equipment service life issues

Complete installation of new containment penetrations

Heat up the plant Major Tasks Remaining to Ready the Plant for Start-Up

Complete Systems, Programs and Departments Readiness Reviews

Complete Operational Readiness Assessment

Verify Confirmatory Action Letter commitments and 9

y y

Restart Checklist items are resolved

Chief Nuclear Officer submits Restart Report to NRC (Confirmatory Action Letter Commitment 6)

Operators confirm plant ready for start-up and Plant Review Committee recommends restart

Plant ready for start-up Current Schedule Load fuel into the reactor

Mid-April 2013 Heat up the plant with l

h t

10 non-nuclear heat

Mid-May 2013 Plant ready for start-up

Late May 2013 Driving to Restart Station Priorities

Safety

Human Performance

Fix the Plant

Corrective Action P

11 Program Training Program Human Performance Continues to Improve Remaining Work is Known and Scheduled We are Driving to Restart Our Supervisors are Driving our Improved Performance OPPD Commitments for Restart 1.

Identify causes and implement corrective actions for safety significant findings (Checklist 1.a through 1.d and 1.g) 2.

Assess safety culture and organizational effectiveness and implement improvement actions (Checklist 1.e and 1.f) 3 A

d l

fl di i

t l

t t

12 3.

Assess and resolve flooding impact, evaluate systems, and ensure plant is ready for restart (Checklist 2.a through 2.d) 4.

Assess and improve programs and processes that caused significant performance decline (Checklist 3.a through 3.f) 5.

Implement the Integrated Performance Improvement Plan (Checklist 4) 6.

Submit Fort Calhoun Station Restart Report CAL Commitment No. 1 Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement Commitment 1 Progress on Addressing Safety Findings 100%

100%

75%

100%

5%

1.a. Flooding 1.b. Reactor Prot.

Sys. Contactor Failure November 13 100%

100%

75%

5%

100% 100% 100% 75%

1.c. Electrical Bus Modification &

Maintenance 1.d. Safeguards Information Control 1.a. Flooding CAL Commitment No. 1 Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement 1.b. Reactor Prot.

Sys. Contactor Failure Commitment 1 Progress on Addressing Safety Findings 100%

100%

89%

100%

98%

Current 14 1.c. Electrical Bus Modification &

Maintenance 100%

100%

100% 100% 100% 99%

1.d. Safeguards Information Control 1.g. Safety System Performance Indicator 89%

1.a. Flooding Yellow Finding

Completed scoping, discovery and analysis

Completed root cause analyses

Completed key corrective actions

- Replaced certain flood barriers CAL Commitment No. 1 15

- Inspected conduit/piping seals

- Successfully completed penetration seal testing

- Improved flood procedures

Restart Checklist item closure package approved and ready - One action remains for restart readiness 1.a. Flooding Yellow Finding Intake Cell Level Control

Modification for level control - complete Cell level controlled through four 10-inch manual throttle valves off 18-inch pipes O

t ill it l

l d i

t fl d

CAL Commitment No. 1 16 Operators will monitor level during extreme flood and adjust valves to control flow Significant improvement - ease of operation and system function

Remaining action for restart readiness

- Piping classification being updated Protecting Fort Calhoun Station from Flooding Topics Display the Missouri River dam and reservoir system 17 Explain the NRC approved Design Basis Flood in the Fort Calhoun license Describe Fort Calhoun protection for the Design Basis Flood Describe mitigation strategies OPPD put in place for much more severe floods 18 18 Fort Calhoun Station License Requirements

NRC established license requirements for safe plant operation

Design Basis Flood in Fort Calhoun license -

19 extreme precipitation and failure of the Oahe or Fort Randall Dam

Fort Calhoun Station has physical protection from that flood Fort Calhoun Station is safe from Design Basis Flood Protection from Design Basis Flood

Site grade was established at the level of the estimated 1000 year flood with no dam failures (1960s USACE Analysis)

Site grade was established at the level of the estimated 1000 year flood with no dam failures (1960s USACE Analysis)

Critical structures permanently sealed an additional three feet higher for safety margin and wave action

Critical structures permanently sealed an additional three feet higher for safety margin and wave action

Estimated three foot higher probable maximum flood (PMF) -

t i it ti ith d

f il (1960 USACE

Estimated three foot higher probable maximum flood (PMF) -

t i it ti ith d

f il (1960 USACE 20 extreme precipitation with no dam failure (1960s USACE Analysis)

Permanently sealed structures protected an additional six feet higher with removable engineered barriers extreme precipitation with no dam failure (1960s USACE Analysis)

Permanently sealed structures protected an additional six feet higher with removable engineered barriers

Estimated PMF with failure of Oahe or Ft. Randall Dam (1960s USACE Analysis) - Design Basis Flood (DBF) in License

Removable engineered barriers with one foot of temporary barriers (sandbags) in limited areas protect against DBF

Estimated PMF with failure of Oahe or Ft. Randall Dam (1960s USACE Analysis) - Design Basis Flood (DBF) in License

Removable engineered barriers with one foot of temporary barriers (sandbags) in limited areas protect against DBF 20 Voluntary Mitigation Strategies for More Severe Flooding

- OPPD Initiated Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) in 1990s following NRC Generic Letter

- Fort Calhoun IPEEE included evaluation of external flooding far beyond the original licensing basis 21

Procedures in place to mitigate a flood 21 feet higher than DBF - will keep the plant safe from a PMF plus failure of the Oahe Dam with cascading failures of Big Bend, Fort Randall and Gavins Point downstream dams (1990s USACE Analysis)

Procedures involve temporary gasoline-powered pumps and hoses to cool the reactor

Procedures in place to mitigate a flood 21 feet higher than DBF - will keep the plant safe from a PMF plus failure of the Oahe Dam with cascading failures of Big Bend, Fort Randall and Gavins Point downstream dams (1990s USACE Analysis)

Procedures involve temporary gasoline-powered pumps and hoses to cool the reactor 21 Risk from Floods at Fort Calhoun Station

IPEEE estimated plant risk from floods

- All analyzed floods, including IPEEE flood from significant precipitation and four dam failures 22

- Included plant protection features and use of mitigating strategies

- Resulting plant accident risk is 4 in 1,000,000 for all external flooding scenarios - similar to other plant risks Fort Calhoun is safe from flooding 22 Commitment 2 Progress on Safety Culture and Organizational Effectiveness CAL Commitment No. 2 Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement 1.e. Safety Culture 100%

100%

93%

100%

November 23 1.f. Organizational Effectiveness 89%

100%

Commitment 2 Progress on Safety Culture and Organizational Effectiveness CAL Commitment No. 2 Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement 1.e. Safety Culture 100%

100%

Current 24 1.f. Organizational Effectiveness 100%

100%

1.e. Safety Culture What is Safety Culture An organizations values and behaviors modeled CAL Commitment No. 2 25 and behaviors, modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members that serve to make nuclear safety the overriding priority.

Actions Taken

Root Cause Analyzed

- Management changed

- Governance and Oversight Policy implemented

- Leaders and staff trained CAL Commitment No. 2 26

- Dozens of staff 2Cs (Compliments and Concerns) meetings held with Chief Nuclear Officer

- Corrective Action Program improved

- Employee Concerns Program enhanced

- Survey our staff monthly to monitor effectiveness and adjust actions Industry-Leading Safety Culture Monthly Survey Results CAL Commitment No. 2 2.83 2.90 2.95 2.9 2.95 3

Safety Culture Index 27 2.81 2.83 2.83 2.7 2.75 2.8 2.85 October 2012 November 2012 December 2012 January 2013 February 2013 Three-Month Average, Month Ending CAL Commitment No. 3 Commitment 3 Progress on Systems Ready for Restart 2.a. Flood Recovery Restoration Actions Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement 100%

100%

91%

November 28 2.b.1. System Health Reviews 2.b.2. Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area Review 50%

100%

70%

10%

100%

50%

CAL Commitment No. 3 Commitment 3 Progress on Systems Ready for Restart 2.a. Flood Recovery Restoration Actions Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement 100%

100%

94%

Current 29 2.b.1. System Health Reviews 2.b.2. Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area Review 50%

100%

96%

100%

Commitment 3 Progress on Systems Ready for Restart - Contd CAL Commitment No. 3 2.b.3. Flood Impact on Soils & Structures Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement 100%

100%

95%

80%

November 30 2.c. Containment Penetration Design 2.d. Containment Internal Structure Design 10%

5%

100%

75%

100%

75%

Commitment 3 Progress on Systems Ready for Restart - Contd CAL Commitment No. 3 2.b.3. Flood Impact on Soils & Structures Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement 100%

100%

100% 93%

Current 31 2.c. Containment Penetration Design 2.d. Containment Internal Structure Design 50%

100%

90%

77%

2.b.1 System Health Reviews 27 Risk-significant systems reviewed

Detailed review and evaluation of the most important components in each system.

>> Selected based on historical performance and risk th CAL Commitment No. 3 32 worth

Historical review of open and closed Condition Reports and Work Orders

Comprehensive system walkdowns were performed to evaluate the physical condition of the equipment 2.b.1 System Health Reviews (Continued)

Each System Health Review was performed by the system engineer, an operator and a member of the maintenance staff

Comprehensive reports prepared documenting CAL Commitment No. 3 33

Comprehensive reports prepared documenting the health of the systems

Reviewed by senior reactor operator and senior maintenance staff prior to approval

Reviewed and Approved by Plant Health Committee 2.b.1 System Health Reviews (Continued)

Many System Health Improvement Items were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program including:

- A wire jumper was found in poor condition during a diesel generator starting air system walkdown. It has been repaired CAL Commitment No. 3 34 been repaired.

- Turbine Generator review revealed several work orders that should be worked prior to start up. Work orders added to the outage schedule.

- Minor seal leakage on Component Cooling Water pump 3C, and minor surface corrosion on piping that is cosmetic in nature. Not required to be fixed prior to start up.

Continuing reviews performed quarterly by Plant Health Committee 2.c. Containment Penetrations

Fort Calhoun staff identified Teflon in some containment electrical penetration feed-throughs that could degrade under accident conditions

Recent testing demonstrated that the outboard seal on the feed-throughs did not leak when CAL Commitment No. 3 35 seal on the feed-throughs did not leak when exposed to the Fort Calhoun post-accident conditions

Safety-focused decision made to:

- Upgrade penetration feed-throughs with fully qualified design that does not include Teflon

- Remove feed-throughs and cap unused penetrations 2.c. Containment Penetrations -

Contd CAL Commitment No. 3 36 2.d Containment Internal Structure

Self-identified issue involves concrete beams, and columns inside containment that support plant components and systems CAL Commitment No. 3 37 p

p y

Containment Internal Structure (CIS) does NOT include the containment boundary or the containment liner Containment Shell and Structures CAL Commitment No. 3 38 VIEW FROM ABOVE History and Identification of Issue

Original design calculations were performed during the 1960s

Discrepancy self-identified by Fort Calhoun staff during extended power uprate analysis CAL Commitment No. 3 39 staff during extended power uprate analysis for pipe supports

Multiple deficiencies identified in original calculations Containment Internal Structure Reanalysis

Confirmed as-built configuration through extensive walkdowns

Developed three-dimensional computer-based model CAL Commitment No. 3 40 based model

Validated assumptions and input parameters

Conducted challenge boards and independent third-party reviews

New analyses rigorously documented Reanalysis Results

Containment internal structures are capable of meeting their required safety function and safe for restart

Modifications to restore design margins CAL Commitment No. 3 41 g

g will be completed during future outages

Significant planning, design work and preparation completed during this outage

Fort Calhoun Station containment is safe for restart CAL Commitment No. 4 Commitment 4 Progress on Programs and Processes Ready for Restart 3.a. Corrective Action Program f

Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement 100%

100%

70%

November 42 3.a.1. Identify, Analyze

& Correct Performance Deficiencies 3.b.1. Safety Related Parts 3.b.2. Equipment Qualification 50%

100%

5%

100%

75%

20%

90%

100%

60%

CAL Commitment No. 4 Commitment 4 Progress on Programs and Processes Ready for Restart 3.a. Corrective Action Program f

Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement 100%

100%

Current 43 3.a.1. Identify, Analyze

& Correct Performance Deficiencies 3.b.1. Safety Related Parts 3.b.2. Equipment Qualification 100%

100%

87%

68%

90%

72%

CAL Commitment No. 4 Commitment 4 Progress on Programs and Processes Ready for Restart (Continued) 3.c.1. Vendor Modifications 3 c 2 10CFR50 59 10%

100%

95%

Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement November 44 3.c.2. 10CFR50.59 Screening & Safety Evaluations 3.d.1. Vendor Manuals 3.d.2. Equipment Service Life 20%

98%

100%

75%

55%

100%

95%

5%

100%

95%

CAL Commitment No. 4 Commitment 4 Progress on Programs and Processes Ready for Restart (Continued) 3.c.1. Vendor Modifications 3 c 2 10CFR50 59 100%

100%

Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement 87%

Current 45 3.c.2. 10CFR50.59 Screening & Safety Evaluations 3.d.1. Vendor Manuals 3.d.2. Equipment Service Life 100%

100%

29%

100%

71%

87%

CAL Commitment No. 4 Commitment 4 Progress on Programs and Processes Ready for Restart (Continued) 3.e.1. Operability Determinations 15%

100%

80%

Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement November 46 3.e.2. Degraded /

Non-Conforming Equipment 3.f. Quality Assurance 15%

100%

80%

83%

100%

CAL Commitment No. 4 Commitment 4 Progress on Programs and Processes Ready for Restart (Continued) 3.e.1. Operability Determinations 47%

100%

Scoping Discovery Analysis Implement Current 47 3.e.2. Degraded /

Non-Conforming Equipment 3.f. Quality Assurance 100%

100%

47%

3.a Corrective Action Program

Program improvements implemented 11 months ago

- New Corrective Action Program procedures and guidance CAL Commitment No. 4 48 g

- Additional staff - CAPCOs

- Training

- Accountability

Performance is improving 3.a. Corrective Action Program Station Engagement Ratio CAL Commitment No. 4 50 60 70 80 49 0

10 20 30 40 Station Engagement Ratio 3.a. Corrective Action Program Condition Report Generation Rate CAL Commitment No. 4 1500 2000 2500 50 0

500 1000 Non Start-up CR Generation Start-up CR Generation Corrective Action Program (Continued)

Capturing issues in the Corrective Action Program has improved

Resolving issues through the Corrective Action Program is improving CAL Commitment No. 4 51 Action Program is improving

- Safety Culture improvement

- Containment penetration and structural design issue resolution

- Flood preparedness and mitigation

Continued improvement in the Corrective Action Program is under way

IPIP Revision 5 will be docketed in April 2013

Will address the three Commitment 5 Integrated Performance Improvement Plan (IPIP)

CAL Commitment No. 5 52

Will address the three additional Restart Checklist items

Will expand detail in post-restart Plan for Sustained Improvement Plan for Sustained Improvement Actions to continue performance improvement after restart

Continued emphasis on Corrective Action Program and Training Program effectiveness Safety culture and human performance Engineering effectiveness Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence CAL Commitment No. 5 53 Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence

Continue assessing FCS programs against the Exelon Nuclear Management Model (ENMM)

Implement action plans to close gaps to ENMM

Fully integrate Fort Calhoun into the Exelon fleet

Perform periodic self assessments of Corrective Action Program effectiveness, safety culture, and engineering effectiveness Independent Assessments 54 OPPDs Commitment Tonight We Updated You on Plant Status and Readiness

- Driving to Restart Progress on Commitments 55 Progress on Commitments for Restart Plan for Sustained Improvement after Restart Independent Assessments

ML13093A473

Text

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

Navigation menu

Search