IR 05000458/2013002

IR 05000458-13-002; Entergy Operations, Inc; 01/01/2013 - 03/30/2013; River Bend Station, NRC Integrated Inspection Report

ML13128A427
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	05/08/2013
From:	Proulx D L NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C
To:	Olson E W Entergy Operations
WALKER W
References
IR-13-002
Download: ML13128A427 (63)

Text

May 8, 2013

SUBJECT:

RIVER BEND STATION NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2013002

Dear Mr. Olson:

On March 30, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 4, 2013, with you and other members of your staff. The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. One NRC-identified finding and three self-revealing findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified during this inspection. Three of these findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest these non-cited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/ David L. Proulx, Acting Branch Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-458 License Nos: NPF-47 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000458/2013002 w/ Attachments: 1. Supplemental Information 2. Information Request for Inspection Activities Documented in 2RS1, 2RS2, and 4OA1 3. Information Request for Inspection Activities Documented in 1R08 cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000458/2013002; 01/01/2013 03/30/2013; RIVER BEND STATION; Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Maintenance Effectiveness; Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls; Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, two announced baseline inspections by region-based inspectors, and one announced baseline inspection by a headquarters-based inspector. Three Green non-cited violations and one Green finding of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, -Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) system against licensee-established goals. The licensee failed to properly classify two maintenance preventable functional failures for this system, and as a result, inappropriately left the system in maintenance rule a(2) status. In response, the licensee properly classified the subject failures and classified the affected system into maintenance rule (a)(1) status. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2013-00295. The failure to adequately monitor the performance of the floor and equipment drains system is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor and was therefore a finding because if left uncorrected, the failure to adequately monitor the performance of the floor and equipment drains system could lead to a more significant safety concern. Using Inspection Manual gnificance Determination Process For Findings At-safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designmaintenance rule program. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned because the finding does not represent current performance (Section 1R12).

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

Green.

The inspectors reviewed two examples of a self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.1 that resulted because individuals failed to request briefings of the dose rates in high-radiation areas before entry. In response, the licensee coached the involved individuals involved about the acceptable radiation work practice. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Reports 2012-07643 and 2013-01275. The failure to request briefings of the dose rates in high-radiation areas before entry was a performance deficiency. The significance of the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure control) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation because the failure exposed workers to higher than anticipated radiation dose rates. The Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone was affected; therefore, the dated August 19, 2008, to determine the significance of the violation. The violation had very low safety significance because: (1) it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This violation had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, associated with the work practices component, because licensee personnel failed to use human error prevention techniques, such as self- and peer-checking, commensurate with the risk of the assigned task such that work activities were performed safely H.4(a) (Section 2RS1).

Green.

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.1 that resulted because a radiation protection technician failed to provide adequate job coverage. In response, the licensee coached the involved individuals involved about the acceptable radiation work practice. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2013-00479. The failure to provide adequate radiation protection job coverage was a performance deficiency. The requirement not met was Technical Specification 5.7.1. The significance of the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure control) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation because the failure exposed workers to higher than anticipated radiation dose rates. The Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone was affected; therefore, the inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609, dated August 19, 2008, to determine the significance of the violation. The violation had very low safety significance because: (1) it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This violation had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, associated with the decision making component, because licensee personnel did not make a risk-significant decision using a systematic process when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions H.1(a) (Section 2RS1).

Green.

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing finding associated with the to provide adequate instructions for installing a new seal into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2011-09015. In that condition report, the licensee developed a corrective action to revise all reactor water cleanup procedures and model work orders to verify proper installation of the pump seal. The failure to provide adequate instructions for properly installing reactor water cleanup pump seal cartridges was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure control) and affected the cornerstone objective in that it caused increased collective radiation dose for occupational workers. Additionally, the finding was similar to example 6(i) in Inspection Reports Using Manual Chapter 0609, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined the finding had very low safety significance because, although the finding involved ALARA planning and work -year rolling average collective dose was less than 240 person-rem. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, associated with the resources component, because the licensee failed to use complete, accurate and up-to-date procedures and work orders to perform the seal installation, which resulted in unnecessary dose H.2(c) (Section 2RS2).

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status River Bend Station began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power. It departed from full power as follows: On January 4, operators reduced reactor power to 75 percent for a control rod adjustment and returned to 100 percent power on the same day.

On January 5, operators reduced reactor power to 87 percent to repack the feedwater regulating valve B after a steam leak developed. Operators returned the plant to 100 percent power on January 6.

On January 23, operators reduced reactor power to 64 percent for a control rod sequence exchange and returned to 100 percent power on January 24.

On February 8, the plant reduced power to 89 percent to perform a control rod adjustment and returned to 100 percent power on February 9.

On February 16, the operators took the plant offline to begin refuel outage 17. The plant started up in power from refuel outage 17 on March 15. On March 26, after arranging two intermediate control rod patterns, operators established their final 100 percent control rod pattern. The plant remained at 100 percent reactor power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

Since thunderstorms with potential tornados and high winds were forecast in the vicinity of the facility for February 25, the inspectors reviewed the overall preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. On that day, the inspectors walked down the primary containment structure equipment hatch, which was open at the time due to refueling outage 17, and the condensate storage tank because their safety-related functions could be affected as a result of high winds or tornado-generated missiles or the loss of offsite power. The inspectors evaluated the plant adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant-specific design conditions. The inspectors also toured the plant grounds to look for any loose debris that could become missiles during a tornado. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report and performance requirements for the systems selected for inspection and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant-specific procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action program items to verify that the licensee identified adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and dispositioned them through the corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of one readiness for impending adverse weather condition sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems: Residual heat removal B in shutdown cooling with suppression pool cooling B in alternate decay heat removal and residual heat removal A out of service, completed on February 19 (during refueling outage 17) Division 1 emergency diesel generator, completed on February 21 Residual heat removal pump A in shutdown cooling with residual heat removal B out of service, completed on March 6 (during refueling outage 17) Spent fuel pool cooling A, completed on March 12 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, Updated Safety Analysis Report, technical specification requirements, administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also inspected accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of four partial system walkdown samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas and on the dates indicated: January 9: fire zone ET-1, B tunnel east smoke detectors deluge initiated January 9: fire zone ET-2, B tunnel west smoke detectors deluge initiated February 7: auxiliary building, 78-foot, 98-foot, 114-foot, and 141-foot elevations February 11: reactor building, 162-foot and 186-foot elevations February 13: control building, 98-foot and 116-foot elevations March 15 (during refueling outage 17): drywell March 19: auxiliary building, 78-foot, 98-foot, and 141-foot elevations The inspectors reviewed these areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features, in accordance with the nt Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that to a security event. Using the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor program. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of seven quarterly fire-protection inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee programs, verified performance against industry standards, and reviewed critical operating parameters and maintenance records for the residual heat removal heat exchangers. The inspectors verified that performance tests were satisfactorily conducted for heat exchangers/heat sinks and reviewed for problems or errors; the licensee utilized the periodic maintenance method outlined in EPRI Report NP 7552, Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guid the licensee adequately assessed the state of cleanliness of their tubes; and the heat exchanger was correctly categorized under 10 CFR ements for Monitoring the during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of one heat sink inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities

Completion of Sections

.1 Inspection Activities Other Than Steam Generator Tube Inspection, Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspections, and Boric Acid Corrosion Control (71111.08-02.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed nine nondestructive examination activity and reviewed 21 nondestructive examination activities that included four types of examinations. The licensee did not identify any relevant indications accepted for continued service during the nondestructive examinations. The inspectors directly observed the following nondestructive examination: SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Water Cleanup WCS-005A-FW007 Ultrasonic Jet Pump Beam BB-1 Ultrasonic (IVVI) Jet Pump Beam BB-2 Ultrasonic(IVVI) Jet Pump Beam BB-3 Ultrasonic(IVVI) Core Spray Sparger A S2a Enhanced VT-1 (IVVI) Core spray Sparger C S2c Enhanced VT-1 (IVVI) Core Spray Piping P3a(L) 59 º Enhanced VT-1 (IVVI) Core Spray Piping P2a(R) 93 º Enhanced VT-1 (IVVI) Core Spray Piping P3b(R) 119 º Enhanced VT-1 (IVVI) The inspectors reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations: SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Recirculation Pump B33-PC001A-WJ-3 Liquid Penetrant Residual Heat Removal RHS-014A-FW010 Magnetic Particle Main Steam MSS-008A-FW029 Magnetic Particle Feedwater FWS-062A-FW012 Magnetic Particle Feedwater FWS-037A-FW012AA/AD Magnetic Particle Feedwater FWS-037A-FW008AA/DD Magnetic Particle SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Water Cleanup WCS-006B2-XI-SW004 Ultrasonic Standby Liquid Control SLS-037D-FW004 Ultrasonic Residual Heat Removal RHS-034B-FW003 Ultrasonic Reactor Coolant RCS-800CX-SW018B Ultrasonic Main Steam MSS-900A3-FWD05 Ultrasonic Reactor Core Isolation Cooling ICS-001B-FW004 Ultrasonic Feedwater FWS-038A-SW012 Ultrasonic Core Spray-Low CSL-043B-FW001 Ultrasonic Core Spray-High CSH-041A-FW005 Ultrasonic Feedwater FWS-037A-SW019 Ultrasonic Main Steam MSS-900A2-FWD04 Ultrasonic Reactor Coolant RCS-800CX-SW018A Ultrasonic Residual Heat Removal RHS-034B-FW002 Ultrasonic Standby Liquid Control SLS-037D-FW003A Ultrasonic Reactor Water Cleanup WCS-006B2-XI-FW011 Ultrasonic During the review and observation of each examination, the inspectors verified that activities were performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements and applicable procedures. The inspectors also verified the qualifications of all nondestructive examination technicians performing the inspections were current. The inspectors reviewed three welds on pressure retaining risk significant systems.

The inspectors reviewed records for the following welding activities: SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION WELD TYPE Leakage Control Penetration Valve LSV-SP1B Gas Tungsten Arc Standby Diesel Generator EGS-EG1A Gas Tungsten Arc Leakage Control Penetration Valve LSV-LS28B Single Metal Arc The inspectors verified that the welding procedure specifications and the welders had been properly qualified in accordance with ASME Code,Section IX, requirements. The inspectors also verified that essential variables were identified, recorded in the procedure qualification record, and formed the bases for qualification of the welding procedure specifications. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These actions constitute completion of the requirements for Section 02.01.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

===.5 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71111.08-02.05)

a. Inspection scope

The inspectors reviewed 13 condition reports associated with inservice inspection activities, and determined that the corrective actions taken were appropriate. The inspectors concluded that the licensee has an appropriate threshold for entering inservice inspection issues into the corrective action program, and has procedures that direct a root cause evaluation when necessary. The licensee also has an effective program for applying inservice inspection industry operating experience. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These actions constitute completion of the requirements of Section 02.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

=

.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope

On January 22, simulator during requalification testing. The inspectors assessed the following areas:

Licensed operator performance The ability of the licensee to administer the evaluations and the quality of the training provided The modeling and performance of the control room simulator The quality of post-scenario critiques These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

===.2 Quarterly Observation of Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

On February 22, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators period of heightened activity due to shutdown for refueling outage 17 and fuel movement. In additincluding EN-OP-Revision 013 and other operations department policies. These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed-operator performance sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

=

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk significant systems: System 512 control room panels System 552 containment atmosphere monitoring The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance has resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following: Implementing appropriate work practices Identifying and addressing common cause failures Scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) Characterizing system reliability issues for performance Charging unavailability for performance Trending key parameters for condition monitoring Ensuring proper classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or -(a)(2) Verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components classified as having an adequate demonstration of performance through preventive maintenance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), or as requiring the establishment of appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as not having adequate performance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) (maintenance rule) associated with the failure to monitor the performance of the floor and equipment drains system against licensee-established goals.

Description.

Inside the drywell, leakage from the reactor coolant system pressure boundary is detected by independently monitored variables, such as sump level changes, drywell gaseous levels, and particulate radioactivity levels. The primary means of quantifying leakage in the drywell involves a leakage process computer, DER-KC174, which monitors the drywell floor and pedestal drain sump. The computer calculates drywell leakage and starts/stops sump pumps in the drywell to control sump level. It also will activate an alarm if it detects an abnormal condition. The inspectors challenged two of the al failure assessments associated with the Leakage Process Computer. Specifically: Condition Report CR-RBS-2010-05306 documented that the reactor floor drain pump would not automatically stop at the required level set point. The maintenance rule function was lost because the process computer could not automatically control pedestal sump pump operation. Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-05361 documented that during a surveillance test, the drywell floor drain, DFR-DNF1101, failed to achieve the specified drain rate due to blockages caused by foreign material in the drain piping. The maintenance rule function was lost because drain flow rate prevented the Leakage Process Computer from determining an accurate and timely reactor coolant unidentified leak rate. After reviewing the inspectors challenges, the licensee initiated CR-RBS-2013-00295, corrected the maintenance rule functional failure classifications for these two condition reports and placed the floor and equipment drains system in maintenance rule (a)(1) status. The licensee identified that the computer had failed to perform its functions twice within an 18-month interval. As a result, the floor and equipment drains system had exceeded its performance criteria of one functional failure in an 18-month period, and should have been in maintenance rule a(1) status from October 12, 2009, to approximately April 12, 2011.

Analysis.

The failure to adequately monitor the performance of the floor and equipment drains system was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor and is therefore a finding because if left uncorrected, the failure to adequately monitor the performance of the floor and equipment drains system would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to adequately monitor the performance of that system could lead to an undetected and therefore unresolved degradation in system availability. Using Inspection Manual -(Green) because the finding:

(1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality;

(2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function;

(3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time; and

(4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety significance in accordance with maintenance rule program. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned because the finding does not represent current performance.

Enforcement.

10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) requires, in part, that holders of an operating license shall monitor the performance or condition of systems, structures, and components within the scope of the rule against licensee-established goals in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such systems, structures, and components are capable of fulfilling their intended safety functions. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) requires, in part, that monitoring specified in paragraph (a)(1) is not required where it has been demonstrated the performance or condition of a system, structure, and component is being effectively controlled through appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the system, structure, and component remains capable of performing its intended function.

Contrary to the above, from October 12, 2009, to April 12, 2011, the licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the floor and equipment drains system had been effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance and did not monitor the system against licensee-established goals. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify two maintenance preventable functional failures of the floor and equipment drains system, which demonstrated that the performance or condition of this system was not was not being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventative maintenance and, as a result, that goal setting and monitoring was required. This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. The violation as Condition Report CR-RBS-2013-00295 (NCV 05000458/2013002-01, Failure to Monitor the Performance of the Floor and Equipment Drains System).

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work: Emergent work in Fancy Point switchyard to investigate opened generator output breaker, January 17 Risk due to fire water out of service in tunnels and radwaste building, January 18 Planned maintenance on the station blackout diesel and surveillance testing on the Division 3 emergency diesel generator, January 28 Planned maintenance on the Division 1 battery charger while moving scaffold material in the main transformer yard, February 6 Emergent work to troubleshoot reactor core isolation cooling minimum flow valve cycling with residual heat removal Division 1 out of service for quarterly surveillance, February 7 Risk due to severe weather and yellow outage risk condition, February 25 The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of six maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following assessments: CR-RBS-2012-07027, pressure control valve, SWP-PVY32A, damaged seat, reviewed on January 23 CR-RBS-2012-04063, residual heat removal pump minimum flow valve tripped when valve opened, reviewed on January 24 CR-RBS-2013-00560, Division 3 emergency diesel generator fuel oil foreign material exclusion, reviewed on February 1 CR-RBS-2013-01661, refuel platform main hoist emergency brake engaged (refueling outage 17), reviewed on February 27 CR-RBS-2013-02182, refuel platform main hoist emergency brake slow to operate (refueling outage 17), reviewed on March 6 CR-RBS-2013-02569, control rod 48-17 failed to settle at target position, reviewed on March 26 The inspectors selected these operability and functionality assessments based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure technical specification operability was properly justified and to verify the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and Updated Safety Analysis Report the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of six operability evaluations inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability: WO-00321421, "HVY-PV32A 20 WO-00313939, "HVK-TV17B March 7 WO-00339910, "SWP-P2D March 13 WO-00323591, "E51-SOV005 Remove and Replace the Solenoid Operated Valve," reviewed on March 25 WO-00343651, "HVK-CHL-1D Control building Ciller Water Chiller 1D Motor Didn't Start," reviewed on March 26 The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable): The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the outage safety plan and contingency plans for refueling outage 17, conducted February 16 to March 21, to confirm that licensee personnel had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense in depth. During the refueling outage, the inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below.

Configuration management, including maintenance of defense in depth, is commensurate with the outage safety plan for key safety functions and compliance with the applicable technical specifications when taking equipment out of service.

Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature instruments to provide accurate indication, accounting for instrument error.

Status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that technical specifications and outage safety-plan requirements were met, and controls over switchyard activities.

Monitoring of decay heat removal processes, systems, and components.

Verification that outage work was not impacting the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system.

Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, and alternative means for inventory addition, and controls to prevent inventory loss.

Controls over activities that could affect reactivity.

Maintenance of primary containment as required by the technical specifications.

Refueling activities, including fuel handling and sipping to detect fuel assembly leakage.

Startup and ascension to full power operation, tracking of startup prerequisites, walkdown of the drywell (primary containment) to verify that debris had not been left which could block emergency core cooling system suction strainers, and reactor physics testing.

Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to refueling outage activities. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of one refueling outage and other outage inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report, procedure requirements, and technical specifications to ensure that the surveillance activities listed below demonstrated that the systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to verify that the significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to address the following: Preconditioning Evaluation of testing impact on the plant Acceptance criteria Test equipment Procedures Jumper/lifted lead controls Test data Testing frequency and method demonstrated technical specification operability Test equipment removal Restoration of plant systems Fulfillment of ASME Code requirements Updating of performance indicator data Engineering evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested systems, structures, and components not meeting the test acceptance criteria were correct Reference setting data Annunciators and alarms setpoints The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.

STP-209-performed on January 18 (inservice test) STP-053-January 18 (routine) STP-403-0603, Revision 7, STP-256-inservice test) STP-309-0601, Revision 27 (routine) TSP-on March 6 (routine)

Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of six surveillance testing inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

===Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness 1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (IP 71114.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The NSIR headquarters staff performed an in-office review of the latest revisions of various Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) and the Emergency Plan located under ADAMS accession numbers ML12354A521 and ML13014A041 as listed in the attachment. The licensee determined that in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the changes made in the revisions resulted in no reduction in the effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, this revision is subject to future inspection. The specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.===

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

Training Observations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on January 22, 2013, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the postevolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and other documents listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

===Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

a. Inspection Scope

This area was inspected to:

(1) the radiological hazards in the workplace associated with licensed activities and the implementation of appropriate radiation monitoring and exposure control measures for both individual and collective exposures,

(2) verify the licensee is properly identifying and reporting Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone performance indicators, and

(3) identify those performance deficiencies that were reportable as a performance indicator and which may have represented a substantial potential for overexposure of the worker. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, the technical specifications, criteria for determining compliance. During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed the radiation protection manager, radiation protection supervisors, and radiation workers. The inspectors performed walkdowns of various portions of the plant, performed independent radiation dose rate measurements and reviewed the following items: Performance indicator events and associated documentation reported by the licensee in the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone The hazard assessment program, including of changes in plant operations and radiological surveys to detect dose rates, airborne radioactivity, and surface contamination levels Instructions and notices to workers, including labeling or marking containers of radioactive material, radiation work permits, actions for electronic dosimeter alarms, and changes to radiological conditions Programs and processes for control of sealed sources and release of potentially contaminated material from the radiologically controlled area, including survey===

performance, instrument sensitivity, release criteria, procedural guidance, and sealed source accountability Radiological hazards control and work coverage, including the adequacy of surveys, radiation protection job coverage, and contamination controls; the use of electronic dosimeters in high noise areas; dosimetry placement; airborne radioactivity monitoring; controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within spent fuel and other storage pools; and posting and physical controls for high-radiation areas and very high-radiation areas Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance with respect to radiation protection work requirements Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to radiological hazard assessment and exposure controls since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.01-05.

b. Findings

===.1 Failure to Request Briefings of the Dose Rates in High-Radiation Areas Before Entry

=

The inspectors reviewed two examples a self-revealing green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.1 that resulted because individuals failed to request briefings of the dose rates in high-radiation areas before entry. The violation had very low safety significance.

Description.

On December 12, 2012, one of three instruments and controls technicians received an unanticipated electronic dosimeter dose rate alarm when he/she entered a high-radiation area on the 114-foot elevation of the reactor building while performing a scram discharge volume water level channel functional test. The individual entered a dose rate of 211 millirems per hour, but had not been briefed on the dose rates in the area. The individual worked in accordance with Radiation Work Permit 20121004, Task 1, which did not allow work in high-radiation areas. A high-radiation area is an area with dose rates greater than 100 millirems per hour at 30 centimeters from the source of the radiation. The occurrence was documented in Condition Report 2012-07643. Licensee personnel reviewed the occurrence and determined job site reviews and peer checking of the work area failed to note the high-radiation area enclosing the work area. Neither the workers or the radiation protection personnel questioned the use of Task 1. As corrective action, licensee personnel enhanced the training for new nuclear workers and revised the surveillance procedure used by the instruments and controls technicians for this particular functional test to add a precaution that this level switch was in a high-radiation area.

On February 21, a worker received an unanticipated electronic dosimeter dose rate alarm on the 141-foot elevation of the drywell. The individual entered a dose rate of 453 millirems per hour, but had only been briefed for a dose rate of 40 millirems per hour on the 95-foot elevation of the drywell, according to licensee personnel. The individual worked in accordance with Radiation Work Permit 20131932, Task 1. The dose rate setpoint was 300 millirems per hour. The occurrence was documented in Condition Report 2013-cess to the radiological controlled area was restricted and the worker was coached on the proper practice. Licensee personnel investigated the occurrence and found that the worker was redirected by his/her supervisor to another location and the worker did not self-check and request another briefing. The worker and supervisor were coached on acceptable radiation work practices.

Analysis.

The failure to request briefings of the dose rates in high-radiation areas before entry is a performance deficiency. The requirement not met was Technical Specification 5.7.1. The significance of the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure control) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation because the failure exposed workers to higher than anticipated radiation dose rates. The Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone was affected; dated August 19, 2008, to determine the significance of the violation. The violation had very low safety significance because:

(1) it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding,

(2) there was no overexposure,

(3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and

(4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This violation had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, associated with the work practices component, because licensee personnel failed to use human error prevention techniques, such as self- and peer-checking, commensurate with the risk of the assigned task such that work activities were performed safely H.4(a).

Enforcement.

Technical Specification 5.7.1 requires individuals entering an area with radiation dose rates greater than 100 millirems per hour be aware of the dose rates prior to entry. Contrary to the above, licensee personnel entered areas with radiation dose rates greater than 100 millirems per hour without being aware of the dose rates. Specifically, on December 12, 2012, an individual entered an area with a dose rate of 211 millirems per hour on the 114-foot elevation of the reactor building without being briefed on dose rates in the area. On February 21, an individual entered an area on the 141-foot elevation of the drywell with a dose rate of 453 millirems per hour, but had only been briefed for a dose rate of 40 millirems per hour on the 95-foot elevation of the drywell. The workers were coached on the acceptable radiation protection practice and training content was enhanced as determined appropriate by the licensee. This violation was being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. as Condition Reports CR-RBS-2012-07643 and CR-RBS-2013-01275. (NCV 05000458/2013002-02, Failure to Request Briefings of the Dose Rates in High-Radiation Areas Before Entry)

===.2 Failure of a Radiation Protection Technician to Provide Adequate Job Coverage

=

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited green, violation of Technical Specification 5.7.1 that resulted because a radiation protection technician failed to provide adequate job coverage. The violation had very low safety significance.

Description.

On January 25, an operator and a radiation protection technician entered the offgas recombiner room on the 123-foot elevation of the turbine building. The area was controlled as a locked high-radiation area, an area with dose rates greater than 1000 millirems per hour at 30 centimeters from the source of the radiation. The radiation rates in the area, and inform the operator before the operator entered the area, as required by Technical Specification 5.7.1.b and to provide positive control over activities within the area, as required by Technical Specification 5.7.1.c. However, the radiation protection technician did not provide positive control until he/she determined the dose rates in the area, and both the individuals entered the offgas combiner room and received unanticipated electronic dosimeter alarms. The radiation protection ems per hour. Licensee personnel documented the occurrence in Condition Report 2013-00479 and performed an investigation. They determined the radiation protection technician did not extend the extendable radiation survey instrument because he/she did not expect to see dose rates as high as were encountered. The radiation protection technician did not instruct the operator to stay at the entryway until dose rates were determined. Licensee representatives concluded the radiation protection technician was overconfident regarding the coverage and did not expect to see dose rates higher than 500 millirems per hour. Also, the radiation protection technician did not communicate to the operator to ensure the operator waited until the dose rates were determined before entering.

Analysis.

The failure to provide adequate radiation protection job coverage was a performance deficiency. The requirement not met was Technical Specification 5.7.1. The significance of the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure control) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation because the failure exposed workers to higher than anticipated radiation dose rates. The Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone was affected; therefore, the inspectors used ce e significance of the violation. The violation had very low safety significance because:

(1) it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding,

(2) there was no overexposure,

(3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and

(4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This violation had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, associated with the decision making component, because licensee personnel did not make a risk-significant decision using a systematic process when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions H.1(a).

Enforcement.

Technical Specification 5.7.1 requires individuals entering an area with radiation dose rates greater than 100 millirems per hour enter into such areas after the personnel are aware of the dose rates. Contrary to the above, licensee personnel entered an area with radiation dose rates greater than 100 millirems per hour without being aware of the dose rates. Specifically, on January 25, an operator and a radiation protection technician entered the offgas recombiner room on the 123-foot elevation of the turbine building, an area with dose rates of 1190 to 1350 millirems per hour, without being aware of the dose rates in the area. This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy, because it was of program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2013-00479 to address recurrence (NCV 05000458/2013002-03, Failure of a Radiation Protection Technician to Provide Adequate Job Coverage).

2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

This area was inspected to assess performance with respect to maintaining occupational individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, the technical criteria for determining compliance. During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed the following items: Site-specific ALARA procedures and collective exposure history, including the current 3-year rolling average, site-specific trends in collective exposures, and source-term measurements ALARA work activity evaluations/postjob reviews, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation requirements The methodology for estimating work activity exposures, the intended dose outcome, the accuracy of dose rate and man-hour estimates, and intended versus actual work activity doses and the reasons for any inconsistencies Records detailing the historical trends and current status of tracked plant source terms and contingency plans for expected changes in the source term due to changes in plant fuel performance issues or changes in plant primary chemistry Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during work activities in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high-radiation areas Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to ALARA planning and controls since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.02-05.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, Green finding associated with the licensee provide adequate procedures for installing a seal on reactor pump. The finding had very low safety significance.

Description.

On December 4, 2011, while adding oil to the RWCU -PC001A), licensee personnel identified seal leakage at a rate of approximately one quart per minute. Several days later, the licensee identified a rise in the leak rate to about 0.5 gallons per minute. On January 3, 2012, the licensee initiated another work order request and properly replaced the pump seal with vendor oversight. To install the new seal, mechanics followed the installation procedure provided to them in work order 180842. That work order directed the workers to install the seal into a blind gland after the impeller nut was installed and fully torqued. However, it did not require the workers to ensure that the seal was fully inserted prior to torquing the impeller nut, and installing the impeller and impeller nut prior to ensuring that the seal was fully inserted allowed the seal cartridge to rotate during the torquing steps which mispositioned the anti-rotation pin in relation to the pin guide. This rotation ultimately bent the anti-rotation pin and dislodged the pin from the machined guide. Once the pin was deformed, it caused the mating surfaces of the sealing faces to shift, resulting in a gap that allowed the seal to leak. That leak prompted licensee personnel to rework the seal replacement on January 3, 2012 with vendor oversight. The licensee used Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 2011-1096 and RWP 2012-1096 to perform this work. The original dose estimate was 3.871 person-rem. However, because of the re-work, a total of 6.343 person-rem was accrued for both seal installations in December 2011 and January 2012. -cause evaluation of this incident is documented in condition report CR-RBS-2011-09015, which determined that the work instructions had inappropriately delayed verification of the seal installation until after the impeller and impeller nut was installed and fully torque. In that condition report, the licensee developed corrective acRevise all RWCU procedures and model work orders to verify seal engagement prior to torquing the impeller nut The inspector therefore determined that the increased collective dose was due to the provide adequate work instructions for installing RWCU pump seals. That failure was inconsistent with licensee expectations described in maintenance Procedure EN-MA-, which states, in part, that maintenance personnel are expected to accomplish assigned work with the highest quality, striving to do it right the first time.

Analysis.

The failure to provide adequate work instructions for installing RWCU pump seals is a performance deficiency with respect to described in Procedure EN-MA-101. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure control) and affected the cornerstone objective, in that it caused increased collective radiation dose for occupational workers. Additionally, the finding was similar to example 6(i) in Inspection Reports This example states that an issue is more-than-minor if it results in a collective dose greater than 5 person-rem, and the actual dose exceeds the estimated dose by greater than 50 percent. Using Manual Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process,dated August 19, 2008, the inspectors determined the finding had very low safety significance because, although the finding involved ALARA planning and work controls, -year rolling average collective dose was less than 240 person-rem. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, associated with the resources component, because the licensee failed to use complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures and work orders to perform the seal installation, which resulted in unnecessary dose H.2(c).

Enforcement.

This finding does not involve enforcement action because no violation of a regulatory requirement was identified. Because this finding does not involve a violation and is of very low safety significance, it is identified as a finding (FIN 05000458/2013002-04, Failure to Provide Adequate Work Instructions for Installing Reactor Water Cleanup Pump Seals).

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Data Submission Issue

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the performance indicator data submitted by the licensee for the fourth quarter 2012 performance indicators for any obvious inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 060 as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for the period from the first quarter 2012 through the fourth quarter 2012. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensereports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2012 through December 2012 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. These activities constitute completion of one unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for the period from the first quarter 2012 through the fourth quarter 2012. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-reports, maintenance rule records, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2012 through December 2012 to validate the accuracy of the determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. These activities constitute completion of one unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator for the period from the first quarter 2012 through the fourth quarter 2012. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2012 through December 2012 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. These activities constitute completion of one unplanned scrams with complications sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (OR01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed performance indicator data for the second quarter of 2012 through the fourth quarter of 2012. The objective of the inspection was to determine the accuracy and completeness of the performance indicator data reported during these periods. The inspectors used the definitions and clarifying notes contained in NEI Document 99-as criteria for determining whether the licensee was in compliance. The inspectors reviewed corrective action program records associated with high-radiation area (greater than 1 rem/hr) and very high-radiation area non-conformances. The inspectors reviewed radiological, controlled area exit transactions greater than 100 mrem. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of high-radiation areas (greater than 1 rem/hr) and very high-radiation area entrances to determine the adequacy of the controls of these areas. These activities constitute completion of the occupational exposure control effectiveness sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

===.6 Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (PR01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed performance indicator data for the second quarter of 2012 through the fourth quarter of 2012. The objective of the inspection was to determine the accuracy and completeness of the performance indicator data reported during these periods. The inspectors used the definitions and clarifying notes contained in NEI Document 99-Revision 6, as criteria for determining whether the licensee was in compliance. individual annual or special reports to identify potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose. These activities constitute completion of the radiological effluent technical specifications/offsite dose calculation manual radiological effluent occurrences sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

=

.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entercorrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included the complete and accurate identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions.

These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of e inspectors The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 (Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that -g -elements as specified in NEI 12-07 Walkdown Guidance document. The inspectors accompanied the licensee on October 23, 2012 on their walkdown of the Auxiliary Building, 70 foot elevation, south wall and verified that the licensee confirmed the following flood protection features: Visual inspection of the flood protection feature was performed if the flood protection feature was relevant. External visual inspection for indications of degradation that would prevent its credited function from being performed was performed. Critical structures, systems, and components dimensions were measured Available physical margin, where applicable, was determined Flood protection feature functionality was determined using either visual observation or by review of other documents The inspectors independently performed their walkdown of the Control Building south wall below elevation 96 foot elevation and verified that the following flood protection features were in place: Visual inspection of the flood protection feature was performed if the flood protection feature was relevant. External visual inspection for indications of degradation that would prevent its credited function from being performed was performed. Critical structures, systems, and components dimensions were measured Available physical margin, where applicable, was determined Flood protection feature functionality was determined using either visual observation or by review of other documents The inspectors verified that noncompliances with current licensing requirements, and issues identified in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter, Item 2.g of Enclosure 4, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program. In addition, issues identified in response to Item ability to mitigate the consequences will be subject to additional NRC evaluation.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 (Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors accompanied the licensee on their seismic and area walkdowns of the standby switchgear room motor control center EHS-MCC8B in the control building elevation on October 10th and 11th, 2012. The inspectors verified that the licensee confirmed that the following seismic features associated with motor control center EHS-MCC8B were free of potential adverse seismic conditions: Anchorage was free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware. Anchorage was free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation. Anchorage was free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors. Anchorage configuration was consistent with plant documentation.

SSCs will not be damaged from impact by nearby equipment or structures. Overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls are secure and not likely to collapse onto the equipment. Attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage. The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area. The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area. The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding). On November 30, 2012, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns and verified all of seismic features as specified in the EPinspection of the following equipment: ENB- SWP- ENB-MCC1, Motor Control Center, Aux Buildin ENB- Observations made during the walkdown that could not be determined to be acceptable inspectors verified that items that could allow the spent fuel pool to drain down rapidly were added to the SWEL and these items were walked down by the licensee.

b. Findings

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified.

.3 Temporary

a. Inspection Scope

in accordance with paragraphs 03.01.a through 03.01.c of the TI and was found to meet all applicable aspects of NEI 09-14, Revision 1, as set forth in Table 1 of the TI.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit Exit Meeting Summary On March 1, the inspectors presented the results of the radiation safety inspections to Mr. Eric Olson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. The inspectors conducted subsequent discussions with licensee personnel concerning changes in the characterization of a finding, concluding with a telephone conversation with Ms. K. Huffstatler, Senior Licensing Specialist, on April 3. On March 19, the inspector presented the inspection results of the review of inservice inspection activities to Mr. J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. On April 4, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Eric Olson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

A1-

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

S. Barkowski, Quality Assurance

J. Boulanger, Manager, Maintenance

M. Briley, Engineering

D. Burnett, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

G. Bush, Manager, Material, Procurement, and Contracts

M. Chase, Manager, Training

J. Clark, Manager, Licensing

C. Coleman, Manager, Engineering Programs & Components

F. Corley, Manager, Design Engineering

R. Creel, Superintendent, Plant Security

T. Evans, Manager, Operations

M. Feltner, Manager, Production

A. Fredieu, Manager, Outage

R. Gadbois, General Manager, Plant Operations

T. Gates, Assistant Operations Manager - Shift

K. Hallaran, Manager, Chemistry

D. Hebert, Engineering

K. Huffstatler, Senior Licensing Specialist

B. Kienlen, Engineering

G. Krause, Assistant Operations Manager Training

P. Lucky, Manager, Corrective Actions and Assessments

J. Maher, Manager, System Engineering

W. Mashburn, Director, Engineering

D. Moore, Corporate Manager, Radiation Protection

E. Neal, Superintendent, Radiation Protection

E. Olson, Site Vice President

J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance

T. Santy, Manager, Security

T. Shenk, Assistant Operations Manager Support

J. Vukovics, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering

J. Wieging, Manager, Planning and Scheduling, Outages

L. Woods, Manager, Quality Assurance

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened 2515/182 TI Review of the Implementation of the Industry Initiative to Control Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks

Opened and Closed

05000458/2013002-01 NCV Failure to Monitor the Performance of the Floor and Equipment Drains System (Section 1R12)

05000458/2013002-02 NCV Failure to Request Briefings of the Dose Rates in High-Radiation Areas Before Entry (Section 2RS1)

05000458/2013002-03 NCV Failure of a Radiation Protection Technician to Provide Adequate Job Coverage

05000458/2013002-04 FIN Failure to Properly Perform a Maintenance Activity (2RS2) Closed 2515/187 TI Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns 2515/188 TI Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2012-03852

CR-RBS-2013-01570

CR-RBS-2013-01581

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

AOP-0029 Severe Weather Operation 028

AOP-0029 Severe Weather Operation 029

AOP-0029 Severe Weather Operation 030

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2013-02072

CR-RBS-2013-02089

CR-RBS-2013-02186

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

SOP-0031 Residual Heat Removal (SYS #204) 316

SOP-0091 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (SYS #602) 046

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

CALCULATION NUMBER TITLE REVISION G13.18.12.2-022 River Bend Station

Combustible Loading 4

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2013-00165

CR-RBS-2013-00167

CR-RBS-2013-00169

CR-RBS-2013-00190

CR-RBS-2013-00192

CR-RBS-2013-00193

CR-RBS-2013-00198

CR-RBS-2013-00203

CR-RBS-2013-00204

CR-RBS-2013-00205

CR-RBS-2013-00323

CR-RBS-2013-00407

CR-RBS-2013-00819

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

FPP-0020 Guidelines for Preparation of Pre-Fire Strategies and Pre-Fire Plans 10

RB-095-001 Recirculation Pump Area Fire Area

RDW-1 3

STP-000-3601 Inaccessible Fire Barrier Outage Inspection 2

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

CONDITION REPORT

CR-RBS-2012-07040

MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE Holtec Report No.

HI-931083 Validation Manual for Computer Code ST_XPERT 3 Reference Manual 00809-0100-4101 Rosemount 2051 Pressure Transmitter with 4-20 mA HART and 1-5 Vdc Low Power Protocol AA / July 2008 Product Date Sheet 00813-0100-4360 Rosemount 1151 Pressure Transmitter JB / March 2010 TIN No. 2000-1145 Test Protocol Entergy River Bend Station Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers Prepared by Power Generation Technologies 0

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE

OSP-0068 Critical Decision Process 001

OSP-0068, Attachment 1 Division II Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchangers (Hxs):

Inspection, Cleaning, and Testing-Critical Decision Screening Document December 20, 2012

SEP-HX-RBS-001 Service Water Heat Exchanger Inspections 1

SEP-HX-RBS-002 Performance Monitoring Program for the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers E12-EB001B and E12-EB001D (DIV II) 5

SOP-0031 Residual Heat Removal (SYS #204) 316

Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection Activities

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

CEP-COS-0110 Control and Use of the ScheduleWorks Module of IDDEAL Software 308

CEP-ISI-100 ASME Section XI, Division 1, Fleet Administrative Controls for Inservice Inspection Program 0

CEP-NDE-0400 Ultrasonic Examination 3

CEP-NDE-0423 Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds

5

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION (ASME XI)

CEP-NDE-0641 Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) for ASME Section XI 7

CEP-NDE-0731 Magnetic Particle Examination (MT) for ASME Section XI 3

CEP-NDE-0901

VT-1 Examination 4

CEP-NDE-0903

VT-3 Examination 5

EN-DC-120 Engineering Code Programs 1

EN-FAP-OU-100 Refueling Outage Preparation and Milestones 4

SEP-ISI-103 Program Section for ASME Code,Section XI, Division 1 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program 0

CEP-WP-003 Qualification and Control of Welders 2

CEP-WP-004 Control and Documentation of Welding Activities 2

CEP-WP-GWS-1 General Welding Standard ASME/ANSI 2

CEP-WP-GWS-2 General Welding Standard Structural Steel AWS D1.1 2

CEP-WP-PHT-1 Preheat and Postweld Heat Treatment Requirements 2

CEP-WP-WIIR-1 Weld Inprocess Inspection Requirements 2

CEP-WP-002 Qualification, Development, and Control of Welding Procedure Specifications 1

CEP-WP-005 Control and Issuance of Welding Material 1

CEP-WP-006 Review and Approval of Vendor Welding Programs 1

CEP-WP-IGP-1 Internal Gas Purging 1

MISCELLANOUS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE

RBG-46922 Request for Alternative

Implementation of a Risk-June 16, 2009

MISCELLANOUS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE Informed Inservice Inspection Program Based on ASME Code Case N-716

RGB-46977 Request for Alternative

RBS-ISI-015 Proposed Alternative to 10CFR50.55a Examination Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Weld Inspections November 30, 2009

LO-RLO-2011-00108 Focused Self-Assessment Report - ASME Code,Section XI Containment Inservice Inspection (CISI) and Inservice Inspection (ISI) Programs July 12, 2012 +LO-RLO-2010-00087 Welding Program Focused Self Assessment November 22, 2011 INR RBS R17

IVVI-13-01 Steam Dryer Support Ring Indication Notification Report February 19, 2013 INR RBS R17

IVVI-13-02 Feedwater Sparger End Pins Indication Notification Report February 25, 2013 G13.18.10.2-261 Determination of Acceptable Minimum Wall Thickness of Piping Components for RF15 (Calculation) 0 CONDITION REPORTS

2009-5253 2011-0441 2011-0443 2011-0729 2011-0885 2011-1105 2011-1193 2011-1344 2011-1518 2011-1660 2011-0052 2009-04488 2011-00491

WORK ORDERS

WO 213800

WO 213802

WO 218494

WO-289615

WO-272621 WO-287361

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

OSP-0001 Control of Operator Aids 013

OSP-0027 Log Report

Main Control Room 029

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

OSP-0046 Operations Notifications 010

TPP-7-008 SRO/RO Simulator Certification Program 5

TRAINING PROGRAM DOCUMENT NUMBER TITLE REVISION

RSMS-OPS-0657.00 Simulator Scenario

Plant SU / MSR Failure / ATWS 0

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-1994-00897

CR-RBS-1994-01291

CR-RBS-2009-00807

CR-RBS-2009-00937

CR-RBS-2009-01062

CR-RBS-2009-01751

CR-RBS-2009-04386

CR-RBS-2009-04728

CR-RBS-2009-05361

CR-RBS-2009-06512

CR-RBS-2010-00665

CR-RBS-2010-00849

CR-RBS-2010-00989

CR-RBS-2010-01076

CR-RBS-2010-01100

CR-RBS-2010-01119

CR-RBS-2010-01647

CR-RBS-2010-02054

CR-RBS-2010-02110

CR-RBS-2010-02112

CR-RBS-2010-02496

CR-RBS-2010-02560

CR-RBS-2010-02851

CR-RBS-2010-03119

CR-RBS-2010-03351

CR-RBS-2010-03879

CR-RBS-2010-04852

CR-RBS-2010-05304

CR-RBS-2010-05306

CR-RBS-2011-00315

CR-RBS-2011-02411

CR-RBS-2011-03701

CR-RBS-2011-03853

CR-RBS-2011-04011

CR-RBS-2011-04081

CR-RBS-2011-04383

CR-RBS-2011-04401

CR-RBS-2011-04480

CR-RBS-2011-04685

CR-RBS-2011-04798

CR-RBS-2011-05938

CR-RBS-2011-06021

CR-RBS-2011-06163

CR-RBS-2011-07927

CR-RBS-2011-08394

CR-RBS-2011-08454

CR-RBS-2011-08464

CR-RBS-2012-00997

CR-RBS-2012-01490

CR-RBS-2012-01587

CR-RBS-2012-01967

CR-RBS-2012-03199

CR-RBS-2012-03277

CR-RBS-2012-03854

CR-RBS-2012-04349

CR-RBS-2012-04436

CR-RBS-2012-04463

CR-RBS-2012-04717

CR-RBS-2012-04988

CR-RBS-2012-05084

CR-RBS-2012-05329

CR-RBS-2012-05581

CR-RBS-2012-05704

CR-RBS-2012-06982

CR-RBS-2012-07096

CR-RBS-2012-07100

CR-RBS-2012-07776

CR-RBS-2013-00295

ENGINEERING REPORT NUMBER TITLE REVISION

RBS-SE-11-00001 Maintenance Rule Program 2009-10 (a) (3)

Periodic Assessment 000

MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE DATE

RBS Maintenance Rule Reliability and Availability December 31, 2012

MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE DATE Sheet

WORK ORDERS

WO 00102849

WO 00209749

WO 00210003

WO 00211412

WO 00281423

WO 00295552

WO 00311183

WO 00312410

WO 00315902

WO 00317915 WO 00330014

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2012-02479

CR-RBS-2013-00282

CR-RBS-2013-00745

CR-RBS-2013-00824

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

OSP-0048 Switchyard, Transformer Yard and Sensitive Equipment Controls 018

RBNP-061 Vehicular Traffic Control Plan 0B

SOP-0055 Main and Station Transformers (SYS #311) 028

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations and Functionality Assessments

CALCULATION NUMBER TITLE REVISION G13.18.2.1 Control Building Minimum Zone Temperatures Normal Operation 1

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2001-01510

CR-RBS-2007-03766

CR-RBS-2007-03791

CR-RBS-2008-02410

CR-RBS-2008-03083

CR-RBS-2011-01171

CR-RBS-2012-07027

CR-RBS-2012-07135

CR-RBS-2012-07395

CR-RBS-2012-07400

CR-RBS-2012-07401

CR-RBS-2012-07402

CR-RBS-2012-07411

CR-RBS-2012-07412

CR-RBS-2012-07414

CR-RBS-2012-07422

CR-RBS-2012-07428

CR-RBS-2012-07429

CR-RBS-2012-07430

CR-RBS-2012-07439

CR-RBS-2012-07451

CR-RBS-2012-07480

CR-RBS-2012-07484

CR-RBS-2012-07499

CR-RBS-2012-07551

CR-RBS-2012-07567

CR-RBS-2012-07585

CR-RBS-2012-07586

CR-RBS-2012-07588

CR-RBS-2012-07594

CR-RBS-2012-07595

CR-RBS-2012-07621

CR-RBS-2013-00560

CR-RBS-2013-02332

NRC DOCUMENTS NUMBER TITLE DATE

IV-12-053 NRC Begins Special Inspection at River Bend Nuclear Plant December 14, 2012

Memorandum Management Directive 8.3 Evaluation of a Piping Failure Associated with an Emergency Diesel Generator at the River Bend Station December 14, 2012

Memorandum Special Inspection Charter

Review of a Piping Failure Associated with an Emergency Diesel Generator at the River Bend Station December 14, 2012

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

ARP-877-32 P877-32 Alarm Response 021

OSP-0049 CRD Exercising in Mode 3, 4, or 5 5

OSP-0065 CRD Performance Testing 9

STP-052-0101 Fully Withdrawn Control Rod Insertion Operability Check 16

STP-052-0102 Partially Withdrawn Control Rod Insertion Operability Check 07

STP-052-3701 Control Rod Scram Testing 28

STP-055-0702 Refuel Platform Hoist Operability 020

STP-309-0206 Division I Diesel Generator 184 Day Operability Test 021

SPECIFICATIONS NUMBER TITLE DATE 221.720 Fuel Building Bridge Crane July 20, 1973 251.120 Miscellaneous Lifting Equipment March 21, 1981

SYSTEM DESIGN CRITERIA DOCUMENT NUMBER TITLE REVISION 309 (DIV I & II) Standby Diesel Generator Division I & II Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System - System Design Criteria System Numbers 309 & 405 3

WORK ORDERS

WO 00144886 WO 00262997

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2013-00436

CR-RBS-2013-00458

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NUMBER TITLE DATE 2012-005-00 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1

Average Power Range Monitors Inoperable in Excess of Technical Specification Allowances in Mode 2 August 13, 2012

MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE REVISION Metrex Manual D214A -150 lb. Flow Regulating Valves for Entergy Operations, Inc. River Bend Station

Unit 1 A

Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2012-00598

CR-RBS-2013-00225

CR-RBS-2013-00301

CR-RBS-2013-00745

CR-RBS-2013-00869

CR-RBS-2013-00946

CR-RBS-2013-01007

CR-RBS-2013-01058

CR-RBS-2013-01063

CR-RBS-2013-01105

CR-RBS-2013-01123

CR-RBS-2013-01249

CR-RBS-2013-01268

CR-RBS-2013-01274

CR-RBS-2013-01307

CR-RBS-2013-01317

CR-RBS-2013-01330

CR-RBS-2013-01357

CR-RBS-2013-01364

CR-RBS-2013-01365

CR-RBS-2013-01380

CR-RBS-2013-01387

CR-RBS-2013-01405

CR-RBS-2013-01495

CR-RBS-2013-01497

CR-RBS-2013-01512

CR-RBS-2013-01581

CR-RBS-2013-01621

CR-RBS-2013-01631

CR-RBS-2013-01635

CR-RBS-2013-01638

CR-RBS-2013-01653

CR-RBS-2013-01661

CR-RBS-2013-01662

CR-RBS-2013-01675

CR-RBS-2013-01682

CR-RBS-2013-01685

CR-RBS-2013-01686

CR-RBS-2013-01692

CR-RBS-2013-01701

CR-RBS-2013-01702

CR-RBS-2013-01716

CR-RBS-2013-01719

CR-RBS-2013-01731

CR-RBS-2013-01739

CR-RBS-2013-01742

CR-RBS-2013-01745

CR-RBS-2013-01751

CR-RBS-2013-01757

CR-RBS-2013-01759

CR-RBS-2013-01770

CR-RBS-2013-01771

CR-RBS-2013-01800

CR-RBS-2013-01804

CR-RBS-2013-01815

CR-RBS-2013-01816

CR-RBS-2013-01825

CR-RBS-2013-01826

CR-RBS-2013-01827

CR-RBS-2013-01836

CR-RBS-2013-01838

CR-RBS-2013-01841

CR-RBS-2013-01855

CR-RBS-2013-01862

CR-RBS-2013-01871

CR-RBS-2013-01881

CR-RBS-2013-01882

CR-RBS-2013-01891

CR-RBS-2013-01893

CR-RBS-2013-01901

CR-RBS-2013-01904

CR-RBS-2013-01913

CR-RBS-2013-01919

CR-RBS-2013-01921

CR-RBS-2013-01968

CR-RBS-2013-02025

CR-RBS-2013-02035

CR-RBS-2013-02041

CR-RBS-2013-02066

CR-RBS-2013-02069

CR-RBS-2013-02102

CR-RBS-2013-02105

CR-RBS-2013-02182

CR-RBS-2013-02192

CR-RBS-2013-02218

CR-RBS-2013-02237

CR-RBS-2013-02266

CR-RBS-2013-02332

MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE DATE --- Outage Risk Assessment Team

RF-17 Outage Report January 6, 2013

EN 48785 Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet February 26, 2013

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EN-IS-111 General Industrial Safety Requirements 12

GOP-0002 Power Decrease/Plant Shutdown 064

GOP-0003 Scram Recovery 022

OSP-0033 Operations with a Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel/Cavity 009

OSP-0037 Shutdown Operations Protection Plan (SOPP) 030

OSP-0041 Alternate Decay Heat Removal 304

STP-055-0702 Refuel Platform Hoist Operability 019

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2011-00359

CR-RBS-2011-00557

CR-RBS-2011-02067

CR-RBS-2011-05735

CR-RBS-2011-07572

CR-RBS-2011-07905

CR-RBS-2012-06694

CR-RBS-2013-01010

CR-RBS-2013-01048

CR-RBS-2013-01052

CR-RBS-2013-01053

CR-RBS-2013-01058

CR-RBS-2013-01105

CR-RBS-2013-01557

CR-RBS-2013-01923

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

ADM-0015 Station Surveillance Test Program 037

OSP-0047 Local Leak Rate Testing Implementation 007

STP-053-3001 Jet Pump Operability Test 020

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

STP-209-0201 RCIC Discharge Piping Fill and Valve Lineup Verification 012

STP-209-6310 RCIC Quarterly Pump and Valve Operability Test 038

STP-256-6305 Div I Standby Service Water Quarterly Valve Operability Test 010

STP-309-0601 Division I ECCS Test 043

STP-403-0603 Division I Standby Gas Treatment System Functional Test 007

TSP-0021 Containment Atmosphere Monitoring System Leak Test 6

Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION --- Emergency Plan 38 and 39

EIP-2-001 Classification of Emergencies 24

Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EIP-2-001 Classification of Emergencies 024

EIP-2-002 Classification Actions 30

EIP-2-006 Notifications 40

EIP-2-102 Training, Drills, and Exercises 25

Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EN-RP-121 Radioactive Material Control 7

EN-RP-122 Alpha Monitoring 7

EN-RP-141 Job Coverage 5

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EN-RP-143 Source Control 9

RP-100 Radiation

Worker Expectations 7

RP-101 Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas 7

RP-102 Radiological Control 3

RP-105 Radiological Work Permits 12

RP-108 Radiation Protection Posting 12

AUDITS,

SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES

NUMBER TITLE DATE

LO-RLO-2012-79 Self-Assessment:

Radiation Protection Program Review December 27, 2012

CONDITION REPORTS

2012-07652 2012-04566 2012-07144 2012-07643 2012-07824 2012-07835 2013-05844 2013-00479

RADIATION WORK PERMITS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

20121004 General Maintenance Activities 01

20131212 Ops & RP LHRA

Inspections and Tours 00

20131932

RF-17 Drywell Snubber Activities 00

RADIATION SURVEY RECORDS

NUMBER TITLE DATE

RBS-1212-0119 Reactor Building

December 13, 2012

RBS-1302-0701 Drywell

E22 AOVF005 February 21, 2013

RBS-1301-0430 Offgas - Recombiner Room January 25, 2012

Section 2RS2: Occupational

ALARA Planning and Controls

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

ADM-0046 Temporary Shielding Control Program 10

EN-OE-100 Operating Experience Program 18

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EN-RP-100 Radiation Worker Expectations 7

EN-RP-101 Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas 7

EN-RP-102 Radiological Control 3

EN-RP-105 Radiological Work Permits 12

EN-RP-110 ALARA Program 10

EN-RP-110-03 Collective Radiation Exposure (CRE) Reduction Guidelines 2

EN-RP-110-05 ALARA Planning and Controls 1

EN-RP-110-06 Outage Dose Estimating and Tracking 1

EN-RP-121 Radioactive Material Program 7

EN-WM-105 Planning 10

EN-MA-101 Fundamentals of Maintenance 13

AUDITS,

SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES

NUMBER TITLE DATE

QS-2012-RBS-012 Second QA Follow-Up Surveillance of Two Quality Assurance Findings from the 2011 Radiation Protection (RP) / Radwaste Audit

April 19, 2012

LO-RLO-2011-00162 Snapshot Assessment/Benchmarking: Emergent Dose Reduction

August 29, 2012

LO-RLO-2012-00079 Focused Self Assessment: Radiation Protection at

River Bend Station December 27, 2012

CONDITION REPORTS

2011-08632 2011-08802 2011-08937 2011-08941 2012-00022 2012-01039 2012-01946 2012-02339 2012-03510 2012-03926 2012-04036 2012-04095 2012-04106 2012-06198 2012-06584 2012-06673 2012-07162 2013-00150 2013-00811 2011-09015

RADIATION WORK PERMIT PACKAGES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

20111096 Replace RWCU Pump Seal on G33-PC001A 0

20121056 Steam Affected Areas, Investigation and Repairs in LHRAs

3

20121096 Replace RWCU Pump Seal on G33-PC001A 3

20121107 IFTS Underwater Work

3

20121304 Forced Outage Minor Maintenance in the Drywell 3

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE

2012 RBS Exposure Recovery Plan October 16, 2012

River Bend Station 5-Year Exposure Reduction Plan 2012-2016

0

DW-6 Temporary Shielding Request for LPRM/IRM/CRDM EL

May 15, 2012

DW-1 Suction and Discharge Horizontal Piping

May 15, 2012

RB-1 Temporary Shielding Request on RWCU Horizontal Piping May 15, 2012

January 24, 2012

March 8, 2013

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EN-LI-114 Performance Indicator Process 6

Section 4OA5: Other Activities

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2011-06331

CR-RBS-2012-00877

CR-RBS-2012-06236

CR-RBS-2012-06237

CR-RBS-2012-06238

CR-RBS-2012-06241

CR-RBS-2012-06242

CR-RBS-2012-06311

CR-RBS-2012-06312

CR-RBS-2012-06313

CR-RBS-2012-06323

CR-RBS-2012-06352

CR-RBS-2012-06387

CR-RBS-2012-06391

CR-RBS-2012-06399

CR-RBS-2012-06400

CR-RBS-2012-06426

CR-RBS-2012-06444

CR-RBS-2012-06446

CR-RBS-2012-06483

CR-RBS-2012-06485

CR-RBS-2012-06525

CR-RBS-2012-06526

CR-RBS-2012-06664

CR-RBS-2012-06703

CR-RBS-2012-06704

CR-RBS-2012-06706

CR-RBS-2012-06760

CR-RBS-2012-06764

CR-RBS-2012-06847

CR-RBS-2012-06866

CR-RBS-2012-06869

CR-RBS-2012-06876

CR-RBS-2012-06877

CR-RBS-2012-06878

CR-RBS-2012-06879

CR-RBS-2012-06880

CR-RBS-2012-06957

CR-RBS-2012-07090

CR-RBS-2012-07175

CR-RBS-2012-07178

CR-RBS-2012-07582

CR-RBS-2013-00721

CR-RBS-2013-00868

CR-RBS-2013-00946

CR-RBS-2013-01010

CR-RBS-2013-01048

CR-RBS-2013-01052

CR-RBS-2013-01053

CR-RBS-2013-01056

CR-RBS-2013-01058

CR-RBS-2013-01105

CR-RBS-2013-01123

CR-RBS-2013-01148

CR-RBS-2013-01149

CR-RBS-2013-01150

CR-RBS-2013-01151

CR-RBS-2013-01154

CR-RBS-2013-01167

CR-RBS-2013-01179

CR-RBS-2013-02310

DRAWINGS NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EC-058A 0 FND PLAN

EL 70'-0"

OUTLINE CTRL BLDG 010

EC-058P 0 NORTH & SOUTH WALL ELS

CTRL BLDG 009

EC-066A FDN PLAN

EL 70'-0"

OUTLINE AUX BLDG 007

EE-037C 0 ARRGT INSERTS SLVS & OPENINGS CTRL BLDG 008

EE-037S ARRGT SLVS, INSERTS&OPNGAUX BLDG

EL 70 013

EP-117A SLV LOCN PLAN&DTLSELECTRICAL TUNNEL 008

EP-119 AB SLV

LOCN-PLAN

AUX BLDG 005

EP-145A SLV LOC PLAN

EL 70' & 98' CONT BLDG 009

MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE --- The National Diet of Japan

The Official Report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission --- Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute 12-07,

May 31, 2012

MISCELLANEOUS NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE --- Fukushima Related Inspection Activities Presentation by Robert Taylor and Tim Kobetz June 26, 2012 --- Seismic Walkdown Planning Schedule

Week 1 10/1/2012 to 10/5/2012 and Week 2 10/8/2012 to 10/12/2012

EPRI Report

1021561 Inspection Methodologies for Buried Piping and Tanks August 2010 EPRI Report

1025286 Seismic Walkdown guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3:

Seismic June 2012 LOCTR #1-TS-12-FB & RW FWS

INOP-282 Fuel Building and Radwaste Fire Protection Impairment to Support CST Excavation Work November 9, 2012

RBG-47304 Flooding Walkdown Report

NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10

CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3: of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident 0

RBG-47307 Seismic Walkdown Report

NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10

CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

River Bend Station

Unit 1, Docket No. 50-458, License No.

NPF-47 November 27, 2012 Specification 229.180 Floor and Wall Sleeve Seals March 30, 1985

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

CEP-UPT-0100 Underground Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring 2

EN-DC-168 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walk-down Procedure 0

EN-DC-170 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdown Procedure 0

PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EN-DC-343 Underground Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program 7

SEP-UIP-RBS Underground Components Inspection Plan 3

Attachment 2 The following items are requested for the Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection at River Bend Station (February 25

March 1, 2013) Integrated Report

2013002

Inspection areas are listed in the attachments below.

Please provide the requested information on or before February 8, 2013.

Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below.

For example, all contacts and phone numbers for Inspection Procedure 71124.01 should be in a file/folder titled - -

If information is placed on ims.certrec.com, please ensure the inspection exit date entered is at least 30 days later than the onsite inspection dates, so the inspectors will have access to the information while writing the report.

In addition to the corrective action document lists provided for each inspection procedure listed below, please provide updated lists of corrective action documents at the entrance meeting.

The dates for these lists should range from the end dates of the original lists to the day of the entrance meeting.

If more than one inspection procedure is to be conducted and the information requests appear to be redundant, there is no need to provide duplicate copies.

Enter a note explaining in which file the information can be found.

If you have any questions or comments, please contact Natasha Greene at (817) 200-1154 or Natasha.Greene@nrc.gov.

Currently, the other inspector will be Larry Ricketson.

He may be contacted at (817) 200-1165 or Larry.Ricketson@nrc.gov.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number 3150-0011.

1. Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)

Date of Last Inspection: June 08, 2012

A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the Radiation Protection Organization Staff and Technicians B. Applicable organization charts C. Audits, self assessments, and LERs written since date of last inspection, related to this inspection area D. Procedure indexes for the radiation protection procedures E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.

Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes

1. Radiation Protection Program Description 2. Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations 3. Personnel Dosimetry Program 4. Posting of Radiological Areas 5. High Radiation Area Controls 6. RCA Access Controls and Radworker Instructions 7. Conduct of Radiological Surveys 8. Radioactive Source Inventory and Control 9. Declared Pregnant Worker Program F. List of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) since date of last inspection: a. Initiated by the radiation protection organization b. Assigned to the radiation protection organization c. Identify any CRs that are potentially related to a performance indicator event

NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria can perform word searches. If not covered above, a summary of corrective action documents since date of last inspection involving unmonitored releases, unplanned releases, or releases in which any dose limit or administrative dose limit was exceeded (for Public Radiation Safety Performance Indicator verification in accordance with

IP 71151) G. List of radiologically significant work activities scheduled to be conducted during the inspection period (If the inspection is scheduled during an outage, please also include a list of work activities greater than 1 rem, scheduled during the outage with the dose estimate for the work activity.) H. List of active radiation work permits I. Radioactive source inventory list

2.

Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls (71124.02)

Date of Last Inspection: March 01, 2012

A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for ALARA program personnel B. Applicable organization charts C. Copies of audits, self-assessments, and LERs, written since date of last inspection, focusing on ALARA D. Procedure index for ALARA Program E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.

Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes:

1. ALARA Program 2. ALARA Committee 3. Radiation Work Permit Preparation F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since date of last inspection, related to the ALARA program.

In addition to ALARA, the summary should also address Radiation Work Permit violations, Electronic Dosimeter Alarms, and RWP Dose Estimates

NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria

G.

List of work activities greater than 1 rem, since date of last inspection.

Include original dose estimate and actual dose.

H. Site dose totals and 3-year rolling averages for the past 3 years (based on dose of record) I. Outline of source term reduction strategy Attachment 3 PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number 3150-0011.

Information Request January 7, 2013 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information River Bend Station NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2013002 (NRC) Region IV office will perform the baseline inservice inspection at River Bend Station, using NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.08, "Insthis inspection is a resource intensive inspection both for the NRC inspectors and your staff.

In order to minimize the impact to your onsite resources and to ensure a productive inspection, we have enclosed a request for documents needed for this inspection.

These documents have been divided into two groups.

The first group (Section A of the enclosure) identified information to be provided prior to the inspection to ensure that the inspectors are adequately prepared.

The second group (Section B of the enclosure) identifies the information the inspectors will need upon arrival at the site.

It is important that all of these documents are up to date and complete in order to minimize the number of additional documents requested during the preparation and/or the onsite portions of the inspection.

We have discussed the schedule for these inspection activities with your staff and understand that our regulatory contact for this inspection will be Ms. Kristi Huffstatler of your licensing organization.

The tentative inspection schedule is as follows:

Preparation week: February 18, 2013

Onsite week: February 25 through March 1, 2013

Our inspection dates are subject to change based on your updated schedule of outage activities.

If there are any questions about this inspection or the material requested, please contact the lead inspector Wayne Sifre at (817) 200-1193 (wayne.sifre@nrc.gov).

A.1 ISI/Welding Programs and Schedule Information a) A detailed schedule (including preliminary dates) of: i. Nondestructive examinations planned for ASME Code Class Components performed as part of your ASME Section XI, risk informed (if applicable), and augmented inservice inspection programs during the upcoming outage. ii. Examinations associated with the BWRVIP program, i.e. In-Vessel Visual Inspections (IVVI).

iii. Welding activities that are scheduled to be completed during the upcoming outage (ASME Class 1, 2, or 3 structures, systems, or components) b) A copy of ASME Section XI Code Relief Requests and associated NRC safety evaluations applicable to the examinations identified above. i.

A list of ASME Code Cases currently being used to include the system and/or component the Code Case is being applied to. c) A list of nondestructive examination reports which have identified recordable or rejectable indications on any ASME Code Class components since the beginning of the last refueling outage. This should include the previousSection XI pressure test(s) conducted during start up and any evaluations associated with the results of the pressure tests. d) A list including a brief description (e.g., system, code class, weld category, nondestructive examination performed) associated with the repair/replacement activities of any ASME Code Class component since the beginning of the last outage and/or planned this refueling outage. e) Copy of any 10 CFR Part 21 reports applicable to structures, systems, or components within the scope of Section XI of the ASME Code that have been identified since the beginning of the last refueling outage. f) A list of any temporary noncode repairs in service (e.g., pinhole leaks). g) Please provide copies of the most recent self-assessments for the inservice inspection and welding programs

A.2 Additional Information Related to all Inservice Inspection Activities a) A list with a brief description of inservice inspection, and boric acid corrosion control program related issues entered into your corrective action program since the beginning of the last refueling outage.

For example, a list based upon data base searches using key words related to piping such as: inservice inspection, ASME Code,Section XI, NDE, cracks, wear, thinning, leakage, rust, corrosion, or errors in piping examinations. b) Provide training (e.g. Scaffolding, Fall Protection, FME, Confined Space) if they are required for the activities described in A.1. c) Please provide names and phone numbers for the following program leads:

Inservice inspection (examination, planning, BWRVIP) Snubbers and supports Repair and replacement program

Licensing

Site welding engineer

B. Information to be Provided Onsite to the Inspector(s) at the Entrance Meeting (February 25, 2013):

B.1 Inservice Inspection / Welding Programs and Schedule Information a) Updated schedules for inservice inspection/nondestructive examination activities, including planned welding activities, and schedule showing contingency repair plans, if available. b) For ASME Code Class welds selected by the inspector from the lists provided from section A of this enclosure, please provide copies of the following documentation for each subject weld: i. Weld data sheet (traveler). ii. Weld configuration and system location. iii. Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for weldment. iv. Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for welding procedures. v. Applicable welding procedures used to fabricate the welds. vi. Copies of procedure qualification records (PQRs) supporting the weld procedures from B.1.b.v. vii. s performance qualification records (WPQ). viii. Copies of the nonconformance reports for the selected welds (If applicable). ix. Radiographs of the selected welds and access to equipment to allow viewing radiographs (if radiographic testing was performed). x. Copies of the preservice examination records for the selected welds. xi. Readily accessible copies of nondestructive examination personnel qualifications records for reviewing. c) For the inservice inspection related corrective action issues selected by the inspectors from section A of this enclosure, provide a copy of the corrective actions and supporting documentation. d) For the nondestructive examination reports with relevant conditions on ASME Code Class components selected by the inspectors from Section A above, provide a copy of the examination records, examiner qualification records, and associated corrective action documents.

e) A copy of (or ready access to) most current revision of the inservice inspection program manual and plan for the current interval. f) For the nondestructive examinations selected by the inspectors from section A of this enclosure, provide a copy of the nondestructive examination procedures used to perform the examinations (including calibration and flaw characterization/sizing procedures).

For ultrasonic examination procedures qualified in accordance with ASME Code,Section XI, Appendix VIII, provide documentation supporting the procedure qualification (e.g. the EPRI performance demonstration qualification summary sheets).

Also, include qualification documentation of the specific equipment to be used (e.g., ultrasonic unit, cables, and transducers including serial numbers) and nondestructive examination personnel qualification records.

B.2 Codes and Standards a) Ready access to (i.e., copies provided to the inspector(s) for use during the inspection at the onsite inspection location, or room number and location where available): i. Applicable Editions of the ASME Code (Sections V, IX, and XI) for the inservice inspection program and the repair/replacement program. b) Copy of the performance demonstration initiative (PDI) generic procedures with the latest applicable revisions that support site qualified ultrasonic examinations of piping welds and components (e.g.,

PDI-UT-1,

PDI-UT-2,

PDI-UT-3,

PDI-UT-10, etc.).