IR 05000458/2013004
| ML13317C059 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/2013 |
| From: | Allen D NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C |
| To: | Olson E Entergy Operations |
| Allen D | |
| References | |
| IR-13-004 | |
| Download: ML13317C059 (29) | |
Text
U N IT E D S TA TE S N U C LE AR R E GU LA TOR Y C OM MI S S I ON ber 13, 2013
SUBJECT:
RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2013004
Dear Mr. Olson:
On September 28, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the River Bend Station, Unit 1. On October 9, 2013, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Donald B. Allen, Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-458 License Nos: NPF-47 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000458/2013004 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000458/2013004; 06/30/2013 - 09/28/2013; RIVER BEND STATION; Integrated Resident and Regional Report The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors. No findings were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings
None
Licensee-Identified Violations
None
PLANT STATUS
River Bend Station began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power. It departed from full power as follows:
On August 9, the licensee reduced reactor power to 71 percent to perform a rod sequence exchange and a partially withdrawn rod operability test. The licensee returned the plant to full power on August 10.
On September 7, the licensee reduced reactor power to 96 percent to perform a partially withdrawn rod operability test. The test found three control rods at position 10 that were difficult to move. The control rods were inserted to the full in
- (00) position. The licensee returned the plant to 100 percent power on the same day.
On September 23, after performing corrective maintenance, the licensee reduced reactor power to 93 percent to recover three control rods that were left fully inserted in the core after control rod insertion testing on September 7. The licensee returned the plant to 100 percent power on the same day.
The plant remained at 100 percent reactor power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Readiness to Cope with External Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the design, material condition, and procedures for coping with the design basis probable maximum flood. The evaluation included a review to check for deviations from the descriptions provided in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) for features intended to mitigate the potential for flooding from external factors.
As part of this evaluation, the inspectors checked the sealing of equipment below the flood line, checked for obstructions that could prevent draining, checked that the roofs did not contain obvious loose items that could clog drains in the event of heavy precipitation, and determined that barriers required to mitigate the flood such as water tight doors and sump pumps were in place and operable. Additionally, the inspectors performed an inspection of the protected area to identify any modification to the site that would inhibit site drainage during a probable maximum precipitation event or allow water ingress past a barrier. The inspectors also reviewed the abnormal operating procedure
for mitigating the design basis flood to ensure it could be implemented as written.
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one external flooding sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems:
Division 1 emergency diesel generator, completed on August 19 Division 1 control building chilled water, completed on August 23 Division 1 standby gas treatment system, completed on September 16 Division 1 residual heat removal, completed on September 17 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected, while considering out of service time, inoperable or degraded conditions, recent system outages, and maintenance, modification, and testing. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, USAR, technical specification requirements, administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also inspected accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of four partial system walkdown samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Complete Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
On August 9, 2013, the inspectors performed a complete system alignment inspection of the standby diesel generator fuel oil system to verify the functional capability of the system. The inspectors selected this system based on risk-informed insights from site-specific risk studies together with other factors, such as engineering analysis and judgment, operating experience, performance history, current plant mode, and/or previous walkdowns. The inspectors reviewed plant procedures, including abnormal and emergency, drawings, USAR and vendor manuals to determine the correct lineup and visually inspected the system to review mechanical and electrical equipment line ups, electrical power availability, system pressure and temperature indications, as appropriate, component labeling, component lubrication, component and equipment cooling, hangers and supports, operability of support systems, and to ensure that ancillary equipment or debris did not interfere with equipment operation. The inspectors reviewed a sample of past and outstanding work orders to determine whether any deficiencies significantly affected the system function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the corrective action program database to ensure that system equipment-alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one complete system walkdown sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas:
July 9: normal switchgear building, 98-foot and 123-foot elevations September 9: control building, 98-foot and 116-foot elevations September 16: standby gas treatment system filter room A September 17: residual heat removal pump A room September 23: diesel generator 1 control room and diesel generator 1
September 24: turbine building, 95-foot elevation The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features, in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition and verified that adequate compensatory measures were put in place by the licensee for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment systems or features. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action program.
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of six quarterly fire-protection inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Fire Protection Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
On September 10, 2013, the inspectors observed a fire brigade activation for a mock fire in the control building heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system, 98-foot elevation.
The observation evaluated the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The inspectors verified that the licensee staff identified deficiencies, openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and took appropriate corrective actions.
Specific attributes evaluated were
- (1) proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus;
- (2) proper use and layout of fire hoses;
- (3) employment of appropriate fire fighting techniques;
- (4) sufficient firefighting equipment brought to the scene;
- (5) effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control;
- (6) search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas;
- (7) smoke removal operations;
- (8) utilization of preplanned strategies;
- (9) adherence to the preplanned drill scenario; and
- (10) drill objectives.
These activities constitute completion of one annual fire-protection inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Program
a. Inspection Scope
On September 17, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plants simulator during requalification training. The inspectors assessed the following areas:
Licensed operator performance The quality of the training provided The modeling and performance of the control room simulator The quality of post-scenario critiques Follow-up actions taken by the licensee for identified discrepancies These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Quarterly Observation of Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
On September 24, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened risk due to the Division 3 diesel generator being out of service for troubleshooting and emergent maintenance.
In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations, Revision 14, and other operations department policies.
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed-operator performance sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:
Emergent maintenance of Division 3 diesel generator with high pressure core spray minimum flow valve testing, September 25 The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following condition reports (CR):
CR-RBS-2012-04063, residual heat removal minimum flow valve breaker trip due to valve plugging, reviewed on July 11 CR-RBS-2013-04732, Division 2 emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump high differential pressure, reviewed on July 15
Condition Report CR-RBS-2013-05772, emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump testing aborted, reviewed on September 4 The inspectors selected these operability and functionality assessments based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems along with other factors, such as engineering analysis and judgement, operating experience, and performance history. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure technical specification operability was properly justified and to verify the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and USAR to the licensees evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of three operability evaluations inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
To verify that the safety functions of important safety systems were not degraded, the inspectors reviewed the following engineering changes (EC) that described temporary modifications:
EC-36852, Install Reactor Protection System Division 1 Scram Contacts Bypass Test Points in H13-P691, Revision 0 EC-46007, Provide Temporary Side Stream Filtration and Dehydration for Bypass EHC System Sump Tank C85-D002 Contents and Maintain EHC System Operation During Installation, Operations, and Removal, Revision 0 EC-45911, Provide Temporary Side Stream Filtration and Dehydration for Main Turbine EHC System Sump Tank, TMB-D002 Contents and Maintain EHC System Operation During Installation, Operations, and Removal, Revision 0
The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications and the associated safety-evaluation screening against the system design bases documentation, including the USAR and the technical specifications, and verified that the modification did not adversely affect the system operability/availability. The inspectors also verified that the installation and restoration were consistent with the modification documents and that configuration control was adequate. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the temporary modification was identified on control room drawings, appropriate tags were placed on the affected equipment, and licensee personnel evaluated the combined effects on mitigating systems and the integrity of radiological barriers.
These activities constitute completion of three samples for temporary plant modifications as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following work orders (WO) that described post-maintenance activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:
WO-00338646, EGF-STR2A is Partially Clogged, reviewed on April 11 WO-00357169, SWP-AOV599 - Perform Functional Test of Standby Cooling Tower Return Valve, reviewed on July 21 WO-00357550, DFR-LT105, Drywell Floor Drain is Reading Erratic, reviewed on July 22 WO-00357510, EGS-EG1B - Jacket Water Leak from Top of Exhaust Shroud, reviewed on July 24 WO-00308112, RHR B Relay Replacement, reviewed on September 19 The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate
The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the USAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected risk-significant surveillance activities based on risk information and reviewed the USAR, procedure requirements, and technical specifications to ensure that the surveillance activities listed below demonstrated that the systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of performing their intended safety functions.
The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to verify that the significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to address the following:
Evaluation of testing impact on the plant Acceptance criteria Test equipment Procedures Jumper/lifted lead controls Test data Test equipment removal Restoration of plant systems Fulfillment of ASME Code requirements
Updating of performance indicator data Engineering evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested systems, structures, and components not meeting the test acceptance criteria were correct Reference setting data Annunciators and alarms setpoints The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.
STP-309-6301, Revision 17, Division 1 EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump and Valve Operability Test, performed on April 15 (inservice test)
STP-309-0202, Revision 322, Division 2 Diesel Generator Operability Test, performed on August 19 (routine)
STP-204-1302, Revision 18, LPCI Pump C Start Time Delay Channel Calibration and Channel Functional Test, performed on August 20 (routine)
EN-MA-125, Revision 2, SDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump A Discharge Strainer 2A, performed on September 5 (routine)
STP-052-0102, Revision 7, Partially Withdrawn Control Rod Insertion Operability Check, performed on September 9 (routine)
COP-0719, Revision 4, Test Method for Particulate Contaminant in Diesel Fuel, performed on September 20, 2013, (routine)
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of six surveillance testing inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on July 23, 2013, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulator and in the emergency operating center to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff in order to evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Training Observations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on September 17, 2013, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the postevolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crews performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and other documents listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one training observation sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Data Submission Issue
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the performance indicator data submitted by the licensee for the second quarter 2013, performance indicators for any obvious inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0608, Performance Indicator Program.
This review was performed as part of the inspectors normal plant status activities and, as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Safety System Functional Failures (MS05)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the safety system functional failures performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2012 through the second quarter 2013. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6, and NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73."
The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, operability assessments, maintenance rule records, maintenance work orders, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of July 2012 through June 2013, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constitute completion of one safety system functional failures sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Emergency ac Power System (MS06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the mitigating systems performance index - emergency ac power system performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2012 through the second quarter 2013. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of July 2012 through June 2013, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the mitigating systems performance index component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constitute completion of one mitigating systems performance index -
emergency ac power system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - High Pressure Injection Systems (MS07)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the mitigating systems performance index - high pressure injection systems performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2012 through the second quarter 2013. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of July 2012 through June 2013, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the mitigating systems performance index component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator
and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constitute completion of one mitigating systems performance index -
high pressure injection system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Heat Removal System (MS08)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the mitigating systems performance index - heat removal system performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2012 through the second quarter 2013. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of July 2012 through June 2013, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the mitigating systems performance index component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constitute completion of one mitigating systems performance index -
heat removal system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.6 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Residual Heat Removal System (MS09)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the mitigating systems performance index - residual heat removal system performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2012 through the second quarter 2013. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensees
operator narrative logs, issue reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of July 2012 through June 2013, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the mitigating systems performance index component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constitute completion of one mitigating systems performance index -
residual heat removal system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.7 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Cooling Water Systems (MS10)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the mitigating systems performance index - cooling water systems performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2012 thorugh the second quarter 2013. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of July 2012 through June 2013, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the mitigating systems performance index component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constitute completion of one mitigating systems performance index -
cooling water system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included the complete and accurate identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions. Minor issues entered into the licensees corrective action program because of the inspectors observations are included in the attached list of documents reviewed.
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews
a. Inspection Scope
In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. The inspectors accomplished this through review of the stations daily corrective action documents.
The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On October 9, 2013, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Eric Olson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- J. Boulanger, Assistant Manager, Maintenance
- D. Burnett, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- G. Bush, Manager, Material, Procurement, and Contracts
- M. Chase, Manager, Training
- J. Clark, Manager, Licensing
- C. Coleman, Manager, Engineering Programs & Components
- F. Corley, Manager, Design Engineering
- R. Creel, Superintendent, Plant Security
- T. Evans, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
- M. Feltner, Manager, Production
- A. Fredieu, Manager, Outage
- R. Gadbois, General Manager, Plant Operations
- T. Gates, Assistant Operations Manager - Shift
- K. Hallaran, Manager, Chemistry
- K. Huffstatler, Senior Licensing Specialist
- G. Krause, Assistant Operations Manager - Training
- P. Lucky, Manager, Corrective Actions and Assessments
- J. Maher, Manager, System Engineering
- W. Mashburn, Director, Engineering
- E. Neal, Acting Manager, Radiation Protection
- E. Olson, Site Vice President
- J. Reynolds, Assistant Operations Manager - Support
- T. Santy, Manager, Security
- T. Shenk, Manager, Operations
- J. Vukovics, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering
- J. Wieging, Manager, Planning and Scheduling, Outages
- L. Woods, Manager, Quality Assurance