IR 05000458/2020012

NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2020012, Investigation Report 4-2019-013 and Notice of Violation

ML20273A235
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	09/29/2020
From:	Hay M NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
To:	Vercelli S Entergy Operations
Clark D
References
4-2019-013, EA-20-058 IR 2020012
Preceding documents:	ML20343A182 (17 December 2020)
Download: ML20273A235 (12)

Text

ber 29, 2020

SUBJECT:

RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2020012, INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2019-013 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Dear Mr. Vercelli:

This letter refers to the investigation completed on April 19, 2020, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) at the River Bend Station. The purpose of the investigation was to determine if non-licensed operators willfully failed to appropriately supervise qualifying trainees; if qualification cards for qualifying operator trainees were willfully falsified by non-licensed operators; and if non-licensed operators willfully failed to ensure that operator rounds for their watchstations were completed. In a telephonic exit briefing on September 1, 2020, inspectors discussed the results of the investigation and inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in Enclosure 3.

Based on the results of this investigation, the NRC has determined that a Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred, which involved a failure to maintain training program records that were complete and accurate in all material respects. The violation is cited in the Notice of Violation (Enclosure 1), and the circumstances surrounding it are described in the Factual Summary (Enclosure 2) and Inspection Report (Enclosure 3). This violation was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. We determined that this violation did not meet the non-cited violation (NCV) criteria specified in Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Specifically, this violation is being cited because it involved willfulness and was not identified by the licensee.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice of Violation when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response. The NRC review of your response will also determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program, Section 13.02.b, the NRC will follow-up the violation using Inspection Procedure 92702, Follow-up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, Confirmatory Orders, and Alternative Dispute Resolution Confirmatory Orders, during the next follow-up inspection to review actions required by a Confirmatory Order issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. on March 12, 2018 (EA-17-132 and EA-17-153), which will be scheduled in 2021.

Additionally, based on information developed during the investigation, the NRC has identified an additional example of a previous Severity Level III problem documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2019014 (EA-18-174) (ADAMS Accession No. ML19112A197). This additional example involved willful failure of three non-licensed operators to ensure that operator rounds for their watchstations were completed as required. The circumstances surrounding this violation are described in the Factual Summary (Enclosure 2) and Inspection Report (Enclosure 3). Because the additional example occurred during the same time period as those cited in NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2019014, was similar in nature, and because no broad additional corrective actions are warranted, the NRC is not issuing a new enforcement action consistent with the NRC Enforcement Manual, Section 1.3.6, Documenting Examples of Violations Previously Cited.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, any response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, you may contact John Kramer, Senior Enforcement Specialist, at 817-200-1121.

Sincerely, Michael C. Digitally signed by Michael C. Hay Hay Date: 2020.09.29 16:00:19 -05'00'

Michael C. Hay, Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-458 License No. NPF-47

Enclosures:

1. Notice of Violation 2. Factual Summary 3. Inspection Report 05000458/2020012

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000458 License Numbers: NPF-47 Report Numbers: 05000458/2020012 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-012-0024 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: River Bend Station Location: St Francisville, Louisiana Inspection Dates: June 26, 2020, to September 1, 2020 Inspector: C. Young, Senior Project Engineer Approved By: David L. Proulx Acting Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure 3

SUMMARY The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an inspection at River Bend Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations Falsification of Operator Qualification Cards Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Not Severity Level IV Not Not Applicable NOV 05000458/2020012-01 Applicable Applicable Open EA-20-058 Based on the information developed in Investigation 4-2019-013, the NRC identified that the licensee failed to maintain information required by the Commissions regulations that was complete and accurate in all material respects, in violation of 10 CFR 50.9. Specifically, two non-licensed operators falsified completion of on-the-job training on training records (qualification cards) for an operator trainee. The non-licensed operators signed qualification cards for completion of on-the-job training for trainee tours of plant areas which the trainee had not entered.

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MISCELLANEOUS - TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT In April 2019, based on the information developed in the NRC Office of Investigations (OI)

case 4-2017-025, the NRC issued Severity Level III violations to River Bend Station in NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2019014 (EA-18-174). These violations involved non-licensed operators that willfully failed to ensure that operator rounds were appropriately completed in accordance with station procedures and the falsification of associated operator rounds records.

During the review of OI case 4-2019-013, the NRC identified additional concerns involving non-licensed operators failure to ensure that operator rounds for their watchstations were completed as well as the falsification of operator trainee qualification cards.

INSPECTION RESULTS Falsification of Operator Qualification Cards Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Not Applicable Severity Level IV Not Applicable Not Applicable NOV 05000458/2020012-01 Open EA-20-058 Based on the information developed in Investigation 4-2019-013, the NRC identified that the licensee failed to maintain information required by the Commissions regulations that was complete and accurate in all material respects, in violation of 10 CFR 50.9. Specifically, two non-licensed operators signed completion of on-the-job training on training records (qualification cards) for an operator trainee, indicating that the trainee had toured plant areas that the trainee had not entered.

Description:

In April 2019, OI investigation 4-2019-013 was initiated to explore possible willful aspects of concerns identified by the NRC involving potential falsification of operator trainee qualification cards by non-licensed operators. This investigation was completed in April 2020. Based on the evidence developed during this investigation, the NRC concluded that two instances occurred in December 2015 and March 2016 in which two non-licensed operators documented completion of on-the-job training on an operator trainee qualification card that included trainee tours of plant areas which the trainee had not actually performed. These instances were determined to be a violation of 10 CFR 50.9 as documented below and in the Notice of Violation (Enclosure 1). The NRC determined that these violations involved willfulness on the part of the non-licensed operators.

Corrective Actions: Corrective actions will be developed by the licensee in conjunction with the condition report referenced below, which has been entered in the licensees corrective action program.

Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2020-03599 Performance Assessment:

The NRC determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.

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Enforcement:

The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider willfulness in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation, which involves willfulness, using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.

Severity: Including consideration of the willful aspects of this violation, it was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with Section 2.2.1.d of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

This determination included consideration that actions taken in violation of NRC requirements were deliberate, and that all individuals were experienced Senior Nuclear Equipment Operators, which are non-licensed, non-supervisory operations positions.

Violation:

10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information required by statute or the Commissions regulations to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.

10 CFR 50.120 requires, in part, that each holder of an operating license shall establish, implement, and maintain a training program that meets the requirements of paragraph (b)(3) of 10 CFR 50.120.

10 CFR 50.120(b)(3) requires, in part, that sufficient records must be maintained by the licensee to maintain training program integrity and kept available for NRC inspection to verify the adequacy of the program.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to maintain information required by the Commissions regulations that was complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, on December 13, 2015, and March 25, 2016, respectively, two non-licensed operators signed a qualification card, which indicated that the non-licensed operators had properly documented a trainees completion of training and that they had maintained control over the actions of the trainee. The signed qualification card was not complete and accurate in all material respects because, by allowing the trainee to perform portions of the required tour alone, the non-licensed operators did not maintain control over the actions of the trainee and thus did not properly document the trainees completion of training. The information was material to the NRC because the NRC uses the information to ensure that licensee personnel are qualified to perform safety-related activities.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being cited because the violation was willful and not identified by the licensee.

Observation: Additional example of a previously cited violation Report Section:

N/A In April 2019, OI investigation 4-2019-013 was initiated to explore possible willful aspects of concerns identified by the NRC involving failures of non-licensed operators to ensure that operator rounds were appropriately completed in accordance with station procedures. This investigation was completed in April 2020. Based on the evidence developed during this investigation, the NRC concluded that from December 2015 to November 2016 three non-licensed operators deliberately failed to ensure that operator rounds were completed in accordance with Procedure EN-OP-115-01, Operator Rounds. These instances were determined to be a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as described below.

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10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with documented instructions or procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Entergy Procedure EN-OP-115-01, Operator Rounds, Revision 1, a quality-related procedure intended to meet this requirement for non-licensed operators performing watchstanding rounds, Step 5.1.7, requires, in part, that watchstanders tour all required areas of their watchstation.

Contrary to the above, from December 2015 to November 2016, watchstanders failed to tour all required areas of their watchstation. Specifically, three non-licensed operators allowed trainees to perform portions of their assigned rounds and did not verify appropriate completion of the control building rounds for which they were responsible. As a result, areas required to be toured were missed.

The NRC determined that this violation constitutes an additional example of the previously cited Severity Level III violation NOV 05000458/2019014-01 (EA-18-174) and is not being cited individually. Because the additional example occurred during the same time period as the example cited in the previous violation and were similar in nature, and because no broad additional corrective actions are warranted, no new enforcement action is being issued consistent with NRC Enforcement Manual, Section 1.3.6, Documenting Examples of Violations Previously Cited. No additional response to violation NOV 05000458/2019014-01 (EA-18-174) is required.

Further corrective actions for this additional example are expected to be taken in conjunction with corrective actions for the previously cited violation.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS On September 1, 2020, the NRC staff presented the inspection results to Mr. S. Vercelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff in a telephonic exit meeting. The NRC staff verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

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