IR 05000458/2020011
| ML20279A509 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/2020 |
| From: | Gaddy A Region 4 Engineering Branch 1 |
| To: | Vercelli S Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2020011 | |
| Download: ML20279A509 (21) | |
Text
October 6, 2020
SUBJECT:
RIVER BEND STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2020011
Dear Mr. Vercelli:
On August 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at River Bend Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Schenk, Manager, Regulatory Assurance, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000458 License No. NPF-47
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000458
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-011-0037
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
River Bend Station
Location:
St. Francisville, LA
Inspection Dates:
July 13, 2020 to July 31, 2020
Inspectors:
R. Kopriva, Senior Reactor Inspector
S. Makor, Reactor Inspector
J. McHugh, Senior Reactor Technology Instructor
G. Nicely, Contractor
C. Smith, Health Physicist
F. Thomas, Reactor Inspector
R. Waters, Contractor
Approved By:
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at River Bend Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to perform airflow testing of the High-Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Unit Cooler HVR-UC5 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2020011-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, when the licensee failed to verify that the HPCS unit cooler HVR-UC5 was supplying adequate airflow.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)
(5 Samples 1 Partial)
- (1) EHS - MCC14A - Division I Motor Control Center, Standby Switchgear
The inspectors reviewed the updated safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with Division I motor control center EHS - MCC14A. The inspectors also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function.
Specifically, the team reviewed:
- System health reports, component maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring and correction of potential degradation.
- Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that electrical equipment capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits.
- The protective device settings and circuit breaker ratings to ensure adequate selective protection coordination of connected equipment during worst-case short circuit conditions.
- Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance.
- Results of completed preventative maintenance on motor control centers and breakers, including breaker tracking.
- (2) NB-ACB561 - Division 1 ENB-SWG01A Supply from ENB-Battery 01A
The inspectors reviewed the updated safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with the ENB-ACB561, ENG-SWG01A. The inspectors also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system and design engineering personnel to ensure the capability of these components to perform their desired design basis function. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed:
- Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradations.
- Procedures for preventative maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry standards and vendor guidance.
- Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short circuit, and electrical protection to verify that bus capacity and voltages remained within the minimum acceptable limits.
- (3) ENB-BAT01A - Standby Bus A 125 V DC System Battery Bank 1A and ENB-CHGR1A
The inspectors reviewed the updated safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with the 125 VDC battery, 1ENB-BAT01A, and battery charger, 1ENB-CHGR1A. The inspectors also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system and design engineering personnel to ensure the capability of these components to perform their desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:
- Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradations by comparing the last 3 years.
- Operations surveillance history to verify monitoring battery room conditions as assumed in battery capacity calculations.
- Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop to verify that battery capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits.
- Sizing calculations to verify input assumptions, design loading, and environmental parameters are appropriate and that the battery cell and battery charger are sized to perform the design basis function.
- Procedure for preventative maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry standards and vendor guidance.
- Operations procedure for station blackout to verify assumptions and loads identified in the battery sizing calculation.
- (4) High-Pressure Core Spray Unit Cooler HVR-UC5
The inspectors reviewed the updated safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with the high-pressure core spray (HPCS) unit cooler HVR-UC5. The inspectors also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed:
- System health reports, component maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring and correction of potential degradation.
- Calculations for room heatup, fan performance, and thermal capacity for the unit cooler to ensure room temperatures remained within acceptable limits.
- Non-destructive examination results from the unit cooler cooling coils.
- Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance.
- Results of completed preventative maintenance.
- (5) High-Pressure Core Spray Pump, Condensate Storage Tank Suction Valve E22-MOV-F001
The inspectors reviewed the updated safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with the HPCS pump, condensate storage tank suction valve E22-MOV-F001. The inspectors also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed:
- Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown).
- Operating procedures.
- Consistency between station documentation and vendor specifications.
- Calculations for motor-operated valve torque and thrust, valve weak-link analysis, and maximum operating differential pressures, line pressures, temperature, and flow.
- Component maintenance history, system health reports, testing results, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation.
- System design criteria documents, updated safety analysis report, technical specifications, and bases to assure licensing bases match component capabilities.
(6)
(Partial)
Simulator scenario:
The scenario was designed to place the crew in a loss of power, that impacted motor control center MCC-14A, and the emergency battery ENB-BAT01A. This was followed by a loss of feedwater, causing a reactor trip. The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system was failed, forcing the crew to use HPCS for level control.
The HPCS unit cooler, HVR-UC5, was failed requiring the crew to recognize the failure and respond by restoring the cooler.
- The loss of switch gear EJS-SWG 1A, removing main control room cooling supplied by MCC 14A (inspection component), and the battery charger supporting the ENB-BAT01A (inspection component). This required the crew to place the battery on the backup charger and track battery depletion until the backup charger was in service.
- The loss of feedwater and RCIC forced the crew to use the HPCS for level control. When the HPCS system had injected enough water to reach the reactor water Level 8 set point, it closed the injection valve which causes the HPCS minimum flow valve to open, transferring water directly from the CST to the suppression chamber. This raised suppression pool level to the Emergency Operating Procedure EOP-02 entry condition. The operators attempted to transfer the HPCS suction valve E22-F001 (inspection component) to the suppression pool to stop increasing suppression pool level prior to depleting the condensate storage tank. Condensate storage tank suction valve E22-F001 would not close manually or automatically from the control room. This required the operators to either reset the breaker (two crews) or manually close the condensate storage tank suction valve to align to the suppression pool.
- The HPCS unit cooler HVR-UC5 (inspection component) was tripped electrically when the HPCS pump was started. This required the operators to recognize the trip during their panel walkdowns. As the station has no alarms associated with the HPCS room cooler or any HPCS room temperature indication, and there is no specific alarm to support identification of the cooler failure, the crew was required to recognize that the cooler running light was out and take action to restore the cooler.
In plant job performance measure:
The in-plant job performance measure was used to evaluate the operator performing stripping control room battery supplied loads to minimize control room heatup. This action is a 30-minute time required action in the plants station blackout abnormal operating procedures (AOPs).
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02)===
- (1) Condensate Storage Tank CNS-TK1
The inspectors reviewed the updated safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with the condensate storage tank CNS-TK1. The inspectors also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed:
- Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown).
- Operating procedures.
- Condensate system health report.
- Consistency between station documentation and vendor specifications.
- Component maintenance history, inspection results, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation.
- System design criteria documents, updated safety analysis report, technical specifications and bases to assure licensing bases match component capabilities.
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (6 Samples)
- (1) Engineering Change EC-67609: Masterpact Breaker Outage Permanent Modification.
Licensee Condition Report CR-RBS-2016-03637 documents the testing performed by AZZ/NLI on Masterpact circuit breakers that determined breakers receiving an open signal within 75 milliseconds following the receipt of a close signal may not close on the next closure attempt due to anti-pump latch binding. Licensee Condition Report CR-RBS-2016-06564 revised this evaluation to include breakers having a close command maintained for greater than 200 milliseconds while the closing springs are being charged. Temporary modifications were implemented to alleviate this problem in 12 Masterpact breakers at River Bend Station. The 12 temporary modifications were installed and tested with no issues. Engineering Change EC-67609 was implemented to convert the temporary modification changes into permanent plant configuration and update all required documentation. The inspectors did not identify any concerns with the design package.
- (2) Engineering Change EC-55130: Replace Obsolete Pneumatic Logic Boards Div 1 and Div 2 Diesel Generator Control Systems.
The inspectors reviewed Engineering Change EC-55130, implemented to replace obsolete pneumatic logic boards. The standby diesel generator shutdown pneumatic logic board assembly failed bench testing and the supplier of the logic board notified River Bend Station that they no longer repair the board because some of the parts on the board were obsolete. The primary reason for the changes involved the timing elements and the sequence at which they fire. The change eliminates the potential problem of unwarranted shutdown due to uncontrollable timing issues. The new assembly is a drop-in, functionally equivalent, replacement. The inspectors did not identify any concerns with the design change package.
- (3) Engineering Change EC-32109: Div II Standby Diesel Generator Replace the East Side Intercooler Support Bracket with a New Support Bracket.
The inspectors reviewed Engineering Change EC-32109, which replaced the intercooler support brackets on the Division II standby diesel generator. The original intercoolers for the standby diesel generator were cracking inservice due to vibration loads. The new support brackets were designed with a higher tolerance and stiffer connection than the previous brackets. This added rigidity and reduced gaps between the intercoolers and the engine which should reduce stresses on the intercoolers. The inspectors did not identify any concerns with the design package.
- (4) Engineering Change EC-72603: Standby Diesel Generator Exhaust Pipe Modification.
The inspectors reviewed Engineering Change EC-72603, which modified the exhaust pipe by adding gussets between the exhaust pipe and cylinder flange, increased the weld size of the exhaust pipe flange connection, and added conical washers to the flange bolts on the Division II standby diesel generator. The original exhaust pipe and manifold was prone to high cycle fatigue failures, which resulted in exhaust pipe flange bolts breaking and subsequent exhaust manifold leakage. The modified exhaust pipe and flange design should mitigate the cyclic fatigue and any effects of thermal cycling. The inspectors reviewed the modification design package and verified the design met code stress limits. The inspectors did not identify any concerns with the design package.
The inspectors reviewed Engineering Change EC-70846, which modified the lube oil header seal assembly (where the lube oil header enters engine block) by replacing the existing flange, cap screws, lip seal, and gasket by a flange, cap screws, gasket/boot, and hose clamps. The original lube oil header seal assembly was prone to persistent leakage on both EDGs. The inspectors reviewed the modification design package and verified the equivalency of the existing and alternate assemblies and that the alternate seal assembly design should mitigate the persistent leakage. The inspectors did not identify any concerns with the design package.
- (6) Engineering Change EC-57096: Evaluate Replacement for Ronan Topaz Inverters Due to Obsolescence with Majorsine Replacement Inverter.
The inspectors reviewed Engineering Change EC-57096, which evaluated the use of the Major Power Majorsine 2000-125-2U inverter as an equivalent replacement for the Topaz 5352-40 inverter due to obsolescence. The scope of this engineering change included the replacement of
- (9) Topaz 5352-40 inverters. The inspectors did not identify any concerns with this engineering change package.
Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (3 Samples)
- (1) Inspection of NRC Event 54350, 10 CFR 50 Part 21, Engine Systems Electro-Motive Division (EMD) Fuel Injectors Seized Plunger and Bushing.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of NRC Event 54350, 10 CFR 50, Part 21, Engine Systems Electro-Motive Division (EMD) Fuel Injectors Seized Plunger and Bushing. River Bend Station was notified that EMD fuel injectors supplies to another plant had seized after a short amount of engine run time. Examination of the plunger and bushing from each injector identified particles consistent with the base material of the plunger and bushing embedded in the scar marks associated with the seizures. The root cause of the seizures was attributed to residual machining debris from the manufacturing process. The licensee investigated all fuel injectors installed in the plant and in the warehouse as spare parts. No concerns or problems were identified with the fuel injectors at the River Bend Station.
The inspectors did not identify any concerns with how the licensee addressed this operating experience.
- (2) NOE-2017-0402, IPEC FLEX Equipment Diesel Fuel Oil Cloud Point Discrepancy.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of NOE-2017-0402, IPEC FLEX Equipment Diesel Fuel Oil Cloud Point Discrepancy to verify that the licensee has taken actions to mitigate the risk of FLEX diesel operability problems at low temperatures. The inspectors did not identify any concerns with how the licensee addressed this operating experience.
- (3) Inspection of NRC Information Notice 2017-05 - Rev 1 Masterpact Breakers Potential Binding of Schneider Electric Square-D Masterpact NT and NW 480-VAC Circuit Breaker Anti-Pump Feature.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of NRC Information Notice 2017-05, Masterpact Breakers Potential Binding of Schneider Electric Square-D Masterpact NT and NW 480-VAC Circuit Breaker Anti-Pump Feature, to verify that the licensee has taken actions to eliminate the anti-pump mechanical binding failure mode on affected breakers. The inspectors did not identify any concerns with how the licensee addressed this operating experience.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to perform airflow testing of the High-Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Unit Cooler HVR-UC5 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000458/2020011-01 Open/Closed
None (NPP)71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, when the licensee failed to verify that the HPCS unit cooler HVR-UC5 was supplying adequate airflow.
Description:
The HPCS unit cooler, HVR-UC5, is a safety-related cooler that is required to keep the HPCS system within its design temperature limit of 127 degrees Fahrenheit. Unit cooler HVR-UC5 is comprised of finned cooling coils, where service water flows on the tube side, and an adjustable-blade fan assembly that directs airflow across the finned coils. The cooled air is then routed to the HPCS room via ductwork.
Calculation G13.18.2.1*061, Auxiliary building design basis heat loads and unit cooler sizing verification, analyzed that unit cooler HVR-UC5 must provide service water flows from 185 gallons per minute (gpm) to 222 gpm, and the fan must supply an air flow of at least 24,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm). The inspectors noted that the service water flows, on the tube side, are periodically measured to ensure adequate water flow. However, the inspectors noted that the fan output and airflow to the HPCS room is not currently being measured. To meet design basis conditions, the heat input to the service water and heat input through the airflow must be within their minimum specifications for unit cooler HVR-UC5 to function properly. Additionally, because of improvements with the service water system, unit cooler HVR-UC5 is no longer performance tested per the Generic Letter 89-13 program. This performance testing, discontinued in 1995, would verify the unit cooler could supply the required cooling capacity and maintain the HPCS room within design limits. In lieu of performance testing, the licensee periodically cleans and inspects the unit cooler.
The inspectors noted that the fan performance curve was based on the fan blade pitch being set at 19 degrees, and that the allowable range for the blade pitch varied from 19 to 21 degrees. At a fan blade pitch above 21 degrees, the airflow degrades and will not supply the designed cooling airflow. On December 7, 2000, the fan hub assembly was replaced, and the blade pitch angle was set at 20 degrees. After this maintenance, the airflow was measured to be 25,803 cfm. In year 2010, the fan bearings and motor were replaced, and the blade pitch angle was measured at 20.8 degrees, although there had been no adjustment of the fan blade pitch. The licensee was unable to determine why the fan blade pitch apparently changed since the December 7, 2000, maintenance. Also, the inspectors did not find any information for any post maintenance testing of air flow after the bearing and motor maintenance had been completed. The licensee had also completed a root cause evaluation pertaining to the bearing failure and the licensee's evaluation team recommended that the bearings be lubricated at a frequency of nine months. The licensee is currently performing bearing lubrication activities on a twelve month frequency without any engineering justification for varying from the evaluation team's recommendation. Because the design basis requirement for the fan requires a minimum flow of 24,000 cfm and since 2000, the licensee had not measured the airflow into the HPCS room, even after major maintenance activities, there exists a concern that HPCS unit cooler HVR-UC5 may not be able to supply adequate cooling to the HPCS room.
Corrective Actions: In response to this issue, the licensee generated a condition report. Additionally, this issue does not represent an immediate safety concern because the licensee confirmed that operator rounds verify the temperature in the HPCS room, and that airflow is present from the cooler duct work during each shift.
Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2020-03204
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The team determined that the failure to perform air flow testing of the HPCS unit cooler HVR-UC5 to confirm the air flow requirements identified in Calculation G13.18.2.1*061, Auxiliary Building Design Basis Heat Loads and Unit Cooler Sizing Verification, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to measure airflow of unit cooler HVR-UC5 could lead to a more significant safety concern because degrading fan performance or ductwork leakage may challenge the unit cooler's ability to perform the design basis function of maintaining the temperature of the HPCS room within limits.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it
- (1) was not a design deficiency or qualification impacting operability or probabilistic risk assessment functionality,
- (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function,
- (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time,
- (4) did not represent a loss of the probability risk analysis function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,
- (5) did not represent a loss of probability risk analysis system and/or function for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and
- (6) did not result in the loss of a high safety-significant, nontechnical specification train.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.
Contrary to this requirement, from December 7, 2000, to present, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify that the HPCS unit cooler HVR-UC5 provided the correct airflow.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On August 31, 2020, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Mr. T. Schenk, Manager, Regulatory Assurance, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 31, 2020, the inspectors presented the initial debrief inspection results to Mr. S. Vercelli, Vice President of Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Calculations
E-143
Standby Battery ENB-BAT01A Duty Cycle, Current Profile
and Size Verification
71111.21M Calculations
E-144
ENB-BAT01B Duty Cycle, Current Profile and
Size Verification
008
71111.21M Calculations
E-176
Standby Load Center, MCC [Motor Control Center], and 120
Volt Panel Short Circuit Calculation
71111.21M Calculations
G13.18.12.4*027
Control Room Temperature During Station Blackout
004
71111.21M Calculations
G13.18.12.4-004
Level Instrument Effect on Station Blackout CST Depletion
Time
11/13/1998
71111.21M Calculations
G13.18.2.1*061
Auxiliary Building Design Basis Heat Loads and Unit Cooler
Sizing Verification
71111.21M Calculations
G13.18.2.3*325
River Bend Station NRC Generic Letter 96-05, AC Motor
Operated Valve Actuator Output Capacity Verification.
71111.21M Calculations
G13.18.3.6*009
Division III 125 VDC Battery Sizing, Load Flow, Circuit
Voltage Drop, Short Circuit, Charger Verification and Cable
Verification
71111.21M Calculations
G13.2.3*181
Generic Letter 89-10, Design Basis Review for E22-
MOVF001
71111.21M Calculations
G13.2.4*017
Effects of Flow on Setpoints of 1E22*ESN654C and
1E22*ESN654D
71111.21M Calculations
Document Level Instrument Effect on Condensate Storage
Tank Reserve Volume of High Pressure Core Spray/Reactor
Core Isolation Cooling.
71111.21M Calculations
Condensate Storage Tank Capacity Verification
71111.21M Calculations
Condensate Storage Tank Capacity Verification
71111.21M Calculations
Stone and
Webster IA-13
Analysis to Verify Orifice Size and Capacity of Safety and
Relief Valves.
09/30/1996
71111.21M Calculations
VA-7215.253-
809-009A
Heat Transfer Performance of Replacement Coils for
Auxiliary Building Unit Coolers at 95F Service Water
Temperature
71111.21M Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
CR-RBS
2009-00132, 2010-00931, 2010-00932, 2010-06683, 2010-
06684, 2010-06694, 2011-00835, 2011-01140, 2011-07193,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2011-07213, 2011-07282, 2012-00061, 2012-00513, 2012-
01908, 2012-02660, 2012-02707, 2012-02711, 2012-03704,
2012-04840, 2012-04872, 2012-04878, 2012-04883, 2012-
04885, 2012-04886, 2012-04939, 2012-05012, 2012-05016,
2012-05044, 2012-06137, 2012-06466, 2013-01222, 2013-
06510, 2014-01768, 2014-04604, 2014-05392, 2014-06284,
2015-00142, 2015-00848, 2015-01512, 2015-01669, 2015-
03951, 2015-06267, 2015-06303, 2015-08897, 2016-00727,
2016-01702, 2016-01712, 2016-01777, 2016-02983, 2016-
03637, 2016-03893, 2016-04271, 2016-06564, 2016-06656,
2016-07002, 2016-07052, 2016-07902, 2016-08073, 2017-
00687, 2017-00938, 2017-00958, 2017-00969, 2017-01195,
2017-01439, 2017-05144, 2017-05349, 2017-07450, 2017-
07825, 2017-08540, 2018-00207, 2018-00263, 2018-00269,
2018-03658, 2018-05150, 2019-00998, 2019-01070, 2019-
2442, 2019-02936, 2019-03014, 2019-03018, 2019-03313,
2019-04222, 2019-04250, 2019-04991, 2019-05667, 2019-
07010, 2019-07894, 2019-07954, 2020-00319, 2020-00347,
20-00348, 2020-01384, 2020-02858, 2020-07085
71111.21M Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
CR-RBS
20-02919, 2020-02922, 2020-02943, 2020-02944, 2020-
2964, 2020-03055, 2020-03065, 2020-03079, 2020-03092,
20-03110, 2020-03182, 2020-03192, 2020-03193, 2020-
0194, 2020-03196, 2020-03199, 2020-03204, 2020-03576
71111.21M Drawings
215.253-809-
001
Auxiliary Building Unit Cooler Replacement Cooling Coil
C
71111.21M Drawings
237.300-116-
003
Condensate Storage Tank
71111.21M Drawings
237.300-116-
003
Condensate Storage Tank
71111.21M Drawings
2515.252-057-
037
NF Support for cooling
E
71111.21M Drawings
215.252-057-
009A
Fan Performance Curve
08/29/1980
71111.21M Drawings
851E892AA
Functional Control Diagram High Pressure Core Spray
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
System
71111.21M Drawings
EE-001A
Main One Line Diagram, Key Drawing, Power Distribution
71111.21M Drawings
EE-001AA
480V One Line Diagram Standby Bus, EJS-LDC1A 8 & 2A
71111.21M Drawings
EE-001VA
480 V One Line Diagram, Standby Switchgear, EHS-
MCC8A
71111.21M Drawings
EE-001WA
480 V One Line Diagram, EHS-MCC14A & 14B, Standby
SWGR [Switchgear] Room 1A
71111.21M Drawings
EE-001ZG
25 VDC One Line Diagram, Standby Bus A, ENB-
SWG01A, ENB-PNL02A, 03A
71111.21M Drawings
EE-001ZG
25VDC One Line Diagram Standby Bus A ENB-SWG01A,
ENB-PNL02A,03A
71111.21M Drawings
PID-04-03A
System 106 Condensate Makeup, Storage and Transfer
71111.21M Drawings
PID-09-10C
Service Water Normal System 118
71111.21M Drawings
PID-22-01E
HVAC-Auxiliary Building System 409
71111.21M Drawings
PID-27-04A
System 203 High Pressure Core Spray System
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
55130
Replace Obsolete Pneumatic Logic Boards Div 1 and 2
Diesel Generator Control Systems
000
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
56037
Replace Obsolete Pneumatic Logic Board in Division 1
Diesel Generator Control System
000
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
57096
Evaluate Replacement for Ronan Topaz Inverters Due to
Obsolescence with Majorsine Replacement Inverter
001
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
57155
Child to EC57096 for H13-P630 INV1
001
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
57156
Child EC to EC57096 for H13-P630 INV2
001
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
67609
Masterpact Breaker Outage Permanent Mods
000
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
84094
Replace E22-S001 Battery Charger
000
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
River Bend Station Generic Letter 96-05 MOV Actuator
Output Calculation
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
Update Various MOV Calculations
71111.21M Engineering
EDG Lube Oil Header Alternate Seal Assembly, Base EC
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Changes
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
Chile EC to Base EC-70846
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
ER-0580
Revise Documentation to Reflect Effective Reduction in
HPCS/RCIC CST Reserve Volume due to Flow Induced
Instrument Error
71111.21M Engineering
Evaluations
28.212-047-
006B
Actuator Documentation
B
71111.21M Engineering
Evaluations
21.412-000-
006B
Maximum Thrust Weak Link Analysis/Seismic (1E22*F001)
71111.21M Engineering
Evaluations
22.250-000-
2C
105% Power Uprate Evaluation Report GE Task No. 16.0,
RCIC System
300
71111.21M Engineering
Evaluations
28.201-007-
001B
Selection Procedures and Switch Setting Charts
300
71111.21M Engineering
Evaluations
222.250-000-
014A
HPCS System 105% Power Uprate Evaluation Report
300
71111.21M Miscellaneous
River Bend Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapters 9 and
15, associated with the Condensate Storage Tank and
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
71111.21M Miscellaneous
River Bend Station Technical Specifications and Associated
Bases, 3.3.6.1 - RCIC Isolations, 3.5.1 - ECCS Operating,
3.5.2 - Water Management.
71111.21M Miscellaneous
244.700-041-
074E
Preventative Maintenance Program for Nuclear Standby
Applications
005
71111.21M Miscellaneous
C634-0112
Transamerica Delaval Instruction Manual for Model DSR-48
Diesel Engine/Generator
2
71111.21M Miscellaneous
C634-0291
Cooper Group Parts List for Control Panel Assembly
2
71111.21M Miscellaneous
EA-RA-024
River Bend Station Blackout Submittal
71111.21M Miscellaneous
G185-0100
GNB Industrial Power Installation & Operating Instructions
for Classic Flooded Lead Acid Batteries
001
71111.21M Miscellaneous
OE-NOE-2017-
00321
NRC IN 2017-05 Potential Binding of Schneider
Electric/Square-D Masterpact NT and NW 480 -VAC Circuit
Breaker Anti-Pump Feature
71111.21M Miscellaneous
PSA-RBS-06-TSA River Bend Station Time Sensitive Actions.
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Q2 2019
System Health Report - 203 high Pressure Core Spray
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Q2.2019
System Health Report - 104 and 106 Condensate and
Condensate Makeup
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Q4 2019
System Health Report - 104 and 106 Condensate and
Condensate Makeup
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Q4 2019
System Health Report - 203 High Pressure Core Spray
71111.21M Miscellaneous
R-STM-203
High Pressure Core Spray System Training Manual
71111.21M Miscellaneous
VTD-P319-0100
Instruction Manual for Three Phase Thyristor Controlled
Model 3SD-130-300
71111.21M Miscellaneous
VTF-A391-0100
Vendor Manual - Anchor/Darling Maintenance Manual for
Flexible Wedge Type Gate Valves
71111.21M Procedures
Automatic Isolations
71111.21M Procedures
71111.21M Procedures
Loss of 125VDC
28
71111.21M Procedures
Loss of 125 VDC
71111.21M Procedures
Severe Weather Operation
2
71111.21M Procedures
- Shutdown from Outside the Main Control Room
336
71111.21M Procedures
Shutdown from Outside the Control Room
336
71111.21M Procedures
- Station Blackout
2
71111.21M Procedures
006
71111.21M Procedures
APO-014
Loss of 125 VDC
71111.21M Procedures
CMP-1026
MCC [Motor Control Center] Circuit Breakers, Starters and
Thermal Overloads
21
71111.21M Procedures
CMP-EM-000-
20
Clean and Inspect MCC [Motor Control Center]
000
71111.21M Procedures
Engineering Change Process
71111.21M Procedures
71111.21M Procedures
Preventive Maintenance Component Classification
71111.21M Procedures
Preventive Maintenance Program
24
71111.21M Procedures
PM [Preventive Maintenance] Basis Template
71111.21M Procedures
Process Applicability Determination
71111.21M Procedures
CFR 50.59 Evaluations
71111.21M Procedures
Time Critical Action /Time Sensitive Action Program
003
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Standard
71111.21M Procedures
EN-SA-G-001
Identification and Documentation of Time Critical Actions
71111.21M Procedures
On Line Risk Assessment
2
71111.21M Procedures
Emergency Operating Procedure - RPV Control
29
71111.21M Procedures
Emergency Operating Procedure - Primary Containment
Control
017
71111.21M Procedures
Emergency Operating Procedure - Secondary Containment
and Radioactive Release Control
018
71111.21M Procedures
Emergency Operating Procedure - Contingencies
017
71111.21M Procedures
Emergency Operating and Severe Accident Procedures
Enclosures
24
71111.21M Procedures
Extensive Damage Mitigation Procedure
031
71111.21M Procedures
P877-031
Alarm Response
71111.21M Procedures
P877-032
Alarm Response
71111.21M Procedures
RBS-FSG-0004
ELAP DC Bus Load Shed and Management
003
71111.21M Procedures
RBS-FSG-0012
Alternate Containment Cooling and Hydrogen Control
004
71111.21M Procedures
SDC-104
Condensate System
71111.21M Procedures
SDC-203
71111.21M Procedures
SDC-305
Safety Related 125 VDC System Design Criteria
71111.21M Procedures
SDC-309
Standby Diesel Generator Division I & II Diesel Generator
Building Ventilation System
71111.21M Procedures
SDC-309
Standby Diesel Generator Div. I and II
71111.21M Procedures
SEC-303 (EJS)
Safety Related 480 V Electrical Distribution System, Design
Criteria, System Number 303
71111.21M Procedures
SOP-0008
Condensate Storage, Makeup and Transfer (System # 106)
24
71111.21M Procedures
SOP-0030
High Pressure Core Spray (Sys. # 203)
71111.21M Procedures
SOP-0031
Residual Heat Removal (Sys # 204)
2
71111.21M Procedures
SOP-0046
4.16 KV System (Sys. # 302)
057
71111.21M Procedures
SOP-0047
480 VAC System
067
71111.21M Procedures
SOP-0091
Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Sys (# 602)
71111.21M Procedures
STP-203-6501
HPCS Quarterly Pump and Valve Operability Test
71111.21M Procedures
STP-256-6311
Div III Standby Service Water Quarterly Valve Operability
Test
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Procedures
STP-305-1100
- ENB-BAT01A Weekly Surveillance
031
71111.21M Procedures
STP-305-1300
- ENB-BAT01A Quarterly Surveillance
031
71111.21M Procedures
STP-305-1600
- ENB-BAT01A Inspection
304
71111.21M Procedures
STP-305-1603
- ENB-CHGR1A Load Test
20
71111.21M Procedures
STP-305-1606
- ENB-BAT01A Service Discharge Test
21
71111.21M Procedures
STP-305-1700
- ENB-BAT01A Performance Discharge Test
28
71111.21M Work Orders
WO - 00019182, 00045164, 00050193, 00078422, 00106495,
00116705, 00128477, 00175790, 00236138, 00323927,
00335870, 00397884, 00408859, 00410508, 00411587,
00411588, 00437814, 00451604, 00466946, 00480646,
00480647, 00508661, 04662213, 51640836, 52330685,
2405881, 52426841, 52457396, 52462311, 52562429,
2565990, 52653788, 52702684, 52766954, 52784695,
2816444