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                        U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
                                      REGION II
.
              Docket Nos:       50-321, 50-366
.
              License Nos:       DPR-57 and NPF-5
U.S.
              Report No:         50-321/96-11, 50-366/96-11
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
              Licensee:         Georgia Power Company (GPC)
REGION II
              Facility:         E. I. Hatch Units 1 & 2
Docket Nos:
              Location:         P. O. Box 439
50-321, 50-366
                                  Baxley, Georgia       31513
License Nos:
              Dates:             August 4 - September 14, 1996
DPR-57 and NPF-5
              Inspectors:       B. Holbrook, Senior Resident Inspector               '
Report No:
                                  J. Moorman, Senior Resident Inspector               l
50-321/96-11, 50-366/96-11
                                        (Acting)                                       l
Licensee:
                                  E. Christnot, Resident Inspector
Georgia Power Company (GPC)
                                  G. Salyers, Emergency Preparedness
Facility:
                                      Specialist (Sections P2, P3, PS, P6,
E.
                                      P7, P8)
I.
                                  J. Canady, Resident Inspector
Hatch Units 1 & 2
                                                                                      l
Location:
                                                                                      l
P.
              Approved by:       P. Skinner, Chief, Projects Branch 2
O.
                                  Division of Reactor Projects
Box 439
                                                                        Enclosure 2
Baxley, Georgia
    9610220090 961011
31513
    gDR ADOCK 05000321
Dates:
                    PDR
August 4 - September 14, 1996
                              _.
Inspectors:
B.
Holbrook, Senior Resident Inspector
'
J.
Moorman, Senior Resident Inspector
(Acting)
E.
Christnot, Resident Inspector
G.
Salyers, Emergency Preparedness
Specialist (Sections P2, P3, PS, P6,
P7, P8)
J.
Canady, Resident Inspector
Approved by:
P.
Skinner, Chief, Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure 2
9610220090 961011
gDR
ADOCK 05000321
PDR
_.


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i
                                EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
                          Plant Hatch, Units 1 and 2
Plant Hatch, Units 1 and 2
l             NRC Inspection Report 50-321/96-11, 50-366/96-11
l
NRC Inspection Report 50-321/96-11, 50-366/96-11
!
!
l      This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee
        operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support.      The
        report covers a 6-week period of resident inspecticn; in addition,
        it includes the results of an announced inspection ay a regional
        emergency preparedness specialist.                                                      !
                                                                                                l
        Operations                                                                              l
;      e    The inspector concluded that operator response to the
l            Reactor recirculation pump tr p on August 20, was excellent.
l
l
              Actions taken were prompt, deliberate, and in accordance
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee
              with plant procedures. The immediate observations by the
operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support.
              Shift Technical Advisor to assist the operators in use of
The
              the power / flow operating map was excellent (Section 01.2).
report covers a 6-week period of resident inspecticn; in addition,
        *     The inspector reviewed a special report dated July 30, 1996,
it includes the results of an announced inspection ay a regional
              involving an inoperable reactor vessel water level flood-up
emergency preparedness specialist.
              range instrument. The report did not clearly indicate how
Operations
              to compensate for the lack of monitoring capability above
;
              +60 inches should this be required during post accident
e
              conditions.   However, the lack of clarity was not considered
The inspector concluded that operator response to the
              significant. The licensee is considering a TS amendment to
l
              address this issue (Section 02.1).
Reactor recirculation pump tr p on August 20, was excellent.
        *     The license conditions required for the Technical
l
              Specification Improvement Program (TSIP) implementation for
Actions taken were prompt, deliberate, and in accordance
              Unit 1 and Unit 2 are complete with the exception of the
with plant procedures.
              ten-year surveillance requirements for the emergency diesel
The immediate observations by the
              generators (Section 03.1).
Shift Technical Advisor to assist the operators in use of
        *     A Safety Review Board (SRB) meeting was attended on
the power / flow operating map was excellent (Section 01.2).
              September 12. The inspectors concluded that the meeting met
*
              the applicable requirements and that the SRB is providing
The inspector reviewed a special report dated July 30, 1996,
              adequate review and auditing functions (Section 07.1).
involving an inoperable reactor vessel water level flood-up
        *     The licensee activities involving the river conditions
range instrument.
              demonstrated a , pro-active attitude on the part of plant
The report did not clearly indicate how
              management and is considered a strength (Section 01.1).
to compensate for the lack of monitoring capability above
        o     Operation and Maintenance Department personnel routinely use
+60 inches should this be required during post accident
              a risk matrix to perform an assessment of the total plant
conditions.
              equipment out of service to determine the overall effect on
However, the lack of clarity was not considered
              performance of safety functions per' 10 CFR 50.65 (a) (3) ,
significant.
              " Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of
The licensee is considering a TS amendment to
              maintenance at nuclear power plants" (Section 01.1).
address this issue (Section 02.1).
l       Maintenance
*
        e     Maintenance and surveillance activities were performed
The license conditions required for the Technical
              thoroughly and professionally. The inspectors observed that
Specification Improvement Program (TSIP) implementation for
              personnel were knowledgeable in the assigned task;
Unit 1 and Unit 2 are complete with the exception of the
l             procedures were in use; activities were well documented; and
ten-year surveillance requirements for the emergency diesel
j             administrative controls were implemented.
generators (Section 03.1).
                                                                        .
*
A Safety Review Board (SRB) meeting was attended on
September 12.
The inspectors concluded that the meeting met
the applicable requirements and that the SRB is providing
adequate review and auditing functions (Section 07.1).
*
The licensee activities involving the river conditions
demonstrated a , pro-active attitude on the part of plant
management and is considered a strength (Section 01.1).
o
Operation and Maintenance Department personnel routinely use
a risk matrix to perform an assessment of the total plant
equipment out of service to determine the overall effect on
performance of safety functions per' 10 CFR 50.65 (a) (3) ,
" Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of
maintenance at nuclear power plants" (Section 01.1).
l
Maintenance
e
Maintenance and surveillance activities were performed
thoroughly and professionally.
The inspectors observed that
personnel were knowledgeable in the assigned task;
l
procedures were in use; activities were well documented; and
j
administrative controls were implemented.
.


    *
*
                                                                              ,
,
  .                                                                           l
.
                                                                              i
i
      GPC                                 2
GPC
                                                                              l
2
          Encineerino
Encineerino
          e     VIO 50-321/96-11-02:   Failure to Perform an ASME Code-       l
e
                Required VT-3 Inspection on High Pressure Coolant Injection
VIO 50-321/96-11-02:
                (HPCI) Valve 1E41-F006, was identified. The failure to       l
Failure to Perform an ASME Code-
                perform an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)     l
Required VT-3 Inspection on High Pressure Coolant Injection
                Code-required VT-3 inspection on a safety related component   l
(HPCI) Valve 1E41-F006, was identified.
                was considered significant (Section E2.2).
The failure to
          *     The inspectors conducted followup inspections on licensee
perform an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
                activities with respect to the Unit 2 Station Service         l
Code-required VT-3 inspection on a safety related component
                battery. No immediate operability concerns were identified.   I
was considered significant (Section E2.2).
                Onsite engineering was taking appropriate pre-installation
*
                measures to ensure replacement battery cells remained in the
The inspectors conducted followup inspections on licensee
                proper condition (Section E7.1).
activities with respect to the Unit 2 Station Service
          Plant Support
battery.
          *     A Non-Cited Violation (NCV), 50-366/96-11-03, for failure to
No immediate operability concerns were identified.
                follow valve line-up procedures when performing a torus
Onsite engineering was taking appropriate pre-installation
                water sample was identified (Section R1.2).
measures to ensure replacement battery cells remained in the
          *     Poor sampling technique was the most likely cause for the
proper condition (Section E7.1).
                stored fuel oil analysis results that were out of
Plant Support
                specification on August 8. Attention to detail during the
*
                sample analysis collection process may prevent similar
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV), 50-366/96-11-03, for failure to
                problems. This was identified as an area for improvement in
follow valve line-up procedures when performing a torus
                the chemistry sampling process (Section R4.1) .
water sample was identified (Section R1.2).
          *     The Emergency Preparedness (EP) facilities and equipment
*
                were at a satisfactory level for operational readiness;
Poor sampling technique was the most likely cause for the
                Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) ventilation was tested
stored fuel oil analysis results that were out of
                and maintained adequately; and the tone alert radio system
specification on August 8.
                was reliable, tested and maintained (Section P2).
Attention to detail during the
          *     The licensee's review process for EP procedures and
sample analysis collection process may prevent similar
                documents was satisfactory and met the requirements of
problems.
                10 CFR 50.54 (q) . The declaration of the Notification Of
This was identified as an area for improvement in
                Unusual Event (NOUE) on March 20, 1996, was properly
the chemistry sampling process (Section R4.1) .
                classified and the applicable Emergency Implementing
*
                Procedures (EIP) were implemented (Section P3).
The Emergency Preparedness (EP) facilities and equipment
          e     The licensee maintained a satisfactory EP training program
were at a satisfactory level for operational readiness;
                and satisfactorily met their drill requirements
Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) ventilation was tested
                (Section PS).
and maintained adequately; and the tone alert radio system
          *     No significant personnel changes were made since the last
was reliable, tested and maintained (Section P2).
                inspection (April, 1995) that would effect the performance
*
                or maintenance of the EP program (Section P6).
The licensee's review process for EP procedures and
          *     An audit was not conducted in accordance with the Audit
documents was satisfactory and met the requirements of
                Planning Matrix, however, the aggregate of the audit
10 CFR 50.54 (q) .
                elements satisfied 10 CFR 50.54 (t) (Section P7).
The declaration of the Notification Of
Unusual Event (NOUE) on March 20, 1996, was properly
classified and the applicable Emergency Implementing
Procedures (EIP) were implemented (Section P3).
e
The licensee maintained a satisfactory EP training program
and satisfactorily met their drill requirements
(Section PS).
*
No significant personnel changes were made since the last
inspection (April, 1995) that would effect the performance
or maintenance of the EP program (Section P6).
*
An audit was not conducted in accordance with the Audit
Planning Matrix, however, the aggregate of the audit
elements satisfied 10 CFR 50.54 (t) (Section P7).
!
!
l
l
[
[
                                                                  Enclosure 2
Enclosure 2


.
.
  GPC                           3
GPC
      * Quality Assurance (QA) auditors were qualified and EP issues
3
        were satisfactorily trackei. and resolved in a timely manner
*
        (Section P7).
Quality Assurance (QA) auditors were qualified and EP issues
      * Tne inspectors' review of the status of plant security
were satisfactorily trackei. and resolved in a timely manner
        f acilities and equipmer.t did not identify any deficiencies   ,
(Section P7).
        (Section S2).                                                 i
*
                                                                      !
Tne inspectors' review of the status of plant security
                                                                        l
f acilities and equipmer.t did not identify any deficiencies
                                                                        l
,
                                                                        l
(Section S2).
                                                                        l
Enclosure 2
                                                          Enclosure 2


        _- . . _ - _ . ..         . . - - - .       ~ . - - . _ - . - - . - - .               . _ - . . . ._ ~ - ._-
_- . . _ - _ . ..
      '
. . - - - .
                                                                                                                        1
~ . - - . _ - . - - . - - .
  .                                                                                                                     1
. _ - . . . ._ ~ - ._-
                    GPC                                               4
'
                                                    Report Details
1
                          Summary of Plant beatus
.
                                                                                                                        l
GPC
                          Unit 1 began the report period at 100% rated thermal power (RTP).                             '
4
                          On August 20, power was reduced to about 30% RTP due to a trip of                             I
Report Details
                          a reactor recirculation pump motor generator (MG) set and a                                   l
Summary of Plant beatus
                          subsequent runback. The trip occurred when the air high                                       '
Unit 1 began the report period at 100% rated thermal power (RTP).
                          temperature switch was bumped during housekeeping activities and
'
                          the runback was due to the quick opening of a reactor feed pump
On August 20, power was reduced to about 30% RTP due to a trip of
                          minimum flow valve (paragraph 01.2).                   Power was returned to RTP
a reactor recirculation pump motor generator (MG) set and a
                          and the unit operated at 100% RTP for the remainder of the report
subsequent runback.
                          period except for routine testing activities.
The trip occurred when the air high
                          Unit 2 operated at 100% RTP throughout the report period except
'
                          for routine testing activities.
temperature switch was bumped during housekeeping activities and
                                                    I.       Ooerations
the runback was due to the quick opening of a reactor feed pump
minimum flow valve (paragraph 01.2).
Power was returned to RTP
and the unit operated at 100% RTP for the remainder of the report
period except for routine testing activities.
Unit 2 operated at 100% RTP throughout the report period except
for routine testing activities.
I.
Ooerations
l
l
!
!
l                        01    Conduct of Operations
l                        01.1 General Comments
                          a.    Insoection Scoce (71707)
                                Daily reviews of plant operation were conducted using
                                Inspection Procedure 71707, Plant Operations. The conduct
                                of operations was generally professional and safety-
                                conscious. Specific events and noteworthy observations are
                                detailn: in the section below.
                          b.    Observations and Findings
                                The inspectors discussed the electrical harmonics observed
,                              on the Units 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 4160
l
l
                                volt (V) switchgear (Reference paragraph E2.1) with licensee
01
                                personnel. The inspectors reviewed the EDG surveillance
Conduct of Operations
                                procedures. The operators are instructed by the procedures
l
                                to quickly load the EDGs once they are in parallel with the
01.1 General Comments
                                grid. The inspectors observed that there was no discussion
a.
                                in the procedure about the harmonics and the possible effect
Insoection Scoce (71707)
                                on the reverse power trip. The inspectors also observed
Daily reviews of plant operation were conducted using
                                that there was no discussion about the possibility of a
Inspection Procedure 71707, Plant Operations.
                                reverse power trip while unloading the EDGs in preparation
The conduct
!                               for removal from the grid. The inspectors were informed
of operations was generally professional and safety-
conscious.
Specific events and noteworthy observations are
detailn: in the section below.
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspectors discussed the electrical harmonics observed
on the Units 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 4160
,
l
volt (V) switchgear (Reference paragraph E2.1) with licensee
personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the EDG surveillance
procedures.
The operators are instructed by the procedures
to quickly load the EDGs once they are in parallel with the
grid.
The inspectors observed that there was no discussion
in the procedure about the harmonics and the possible effect
on the reverse power trip.
The inspectors also observed
that there was no discussion about the possibility of a
reverse power trip while unloading the EDGs in preparation
!
for removal from the grid.
The inspectors were informed
I
I
                                that the Engineering Department was performing a review of
that the Engineering Department was performing a review of
                                the effects of the electrical harmonics.
the effects of the electrical harmonics.
                                The inspectors monitored the licensee's activities involved
The inspectors monitored the licensee's activities involved
                                with the river water level, temperature, and the debris
with the river water level, temperature, and the debris
                                being pulled into the cooling water systems.                   The licensee
being pulled into the cooling water systems.
                                contracted to have the area in front of the intake structure
The licensee
                                                                                                    Enclosure 2
contracted to have the area in front of the intake structure
    _
Enclosure 2
_


  - . . . . __ _       .._ _ - . _ _ . _ .   _ _._       _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . . .                   _ .-
- . . . . __ _
              *
.._ _ - . _ _ . _ .
_ _._
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . . .
_
.-
i
i
I     .
*
                  GPC                                 5
I
                        dredged. Divers were also contracted to clean sediment                               and       l
.
                        debris from the bottom of the intake water bays. The
GPC
                        inspectors were informed that algae and floating moss were
5
                        clogging various chiller systems and cooling water heat
dredged.
                        exchangers. The inspector attended meetings at which these
Divers were also contracted to clean sediment and
                        problems were discussed. The licensee developed an action
debris from the bottom of the intake water bays.
i                        plan to better cope with the algae and the floating moss.
The
l                       Parts of the plan called for closer monitoring'of chiller
inspectors were informed that algae and floating moss were
l                       systems and cooling water heat exchanger performance.
clogging various chiller systems and cooling water heat
                        One portion of the maintenance rule, 10CFR50. 65 (a) (3 ) ,
exchangers.
l                       states, in part, "an assessment of the total plant equipment
The inspector attended meetings at which these
                        that is out-of-service should be taken into account to
problems were discussed.
                        determine the overall effect on performance of safety
The licensee developed an action
                        functions." On several occasions the inspectors observed
plan to better cope with the algae and the floating moss.
l                       licensed' operators using a matrix governed by Procedure
i
l                       90AC-OAP-002-OS, Scheduling Maintenance. The matrix
l
l                       provides Technical Specification (TS) and risk-informed
Parts of the plan called for closer monitoring'of chiller
l                       guidance to be used when removing combinations of equipment                                   ;
l
l                       from service. The matrix indicated that if a Control Rod                                       )
systems and cooling water heat exchanger performance.
                                                                                                                        '
One portion of the maintenance rule, 10CFR50. 65 (a) (3 ) ,
l                        Drive (CRD) pump was out-of-service it would be a medium
l
l                        risk to take the HPCI out-of-service and it would be a low                                    .
states, in part, "an assessment of the total plant equipment
l                        risk to take out a loop of core spray. The matrix also                                        1
that is out-of-service should be taken into account to
                                                                                                                        '
determine the overall effect on performance of safety
l'                      indicated that if the HPCI was out-of-service, it would be a
functions."
                        high risk to remove a loop of Low Pressure Coolant Injection
On several occasions the inspectors observed
,                        (LPCI) from service and a medium risk to remove a Residual
l
licensed' operators using a matrix governed by Procedure
l
90AC-OAP-002-OS, Scheduling Maintenance.
The matrix
l
provides Technical Specification (TS) and risk-informed
l
guidance to be used when removing combinations of equipment
;
l
from service.
The matrix indicated that if a Control Rod
)
l
Drive (CRD) pump was out-of-service it would be a medium
'
'
                        Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump.                              The instructions
                        on the matrix indicated the.following:
                        -
                                For a high risk removal from service (Required Action
                                Statement (RAS) 12 hours or less, or Risk Achievement
                                !" orth (RAW) equal to or greater than 10), a risk
                                evaluation was required, and approval by the operations
                                manager was required.
                        -
                                For a medium risk (Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
l
l
                                less then 7 days, or RAW more than 5 but less then 10)
risk to take the HPCI out-of-service and it would be a low
                                the approval by the operations manager was required.
.
                        -
l
                                For a low risk (LCO equal to or more then 7 days, or RAW
risk to take out a loop of core spray.
                                1ess then or equal to 5) the approval by the
The matrix also
                                Superintendent On Shift (SOS) was required.
1
                        Two laminated copies of the matrix were available in the
l'
                        Control Room.
high risk to remove a loop of Low Pressure Coolant Injection
                      c. Conclusions on General Comments
'
                        The inspectors considered the EDG harmonic item to be a
indicated that if the HPCI was out-of-service, it would be a
                        potential for possible erroneous reverse power trips, which
(LPCI) from service and a medium risk to remove a Residual
,
'
Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump.
The instructions
on the matrix indicated the.following:
For a high risk removal from service (Required Action
-
Statement (RAS) 12 hours or less, or Risk Achievement
!" orth (RAW) equal to or greater than 10), a risk
evaluation was required, and approval by the operations
manager was required.
-
For a medium risk (Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
l
less then 7 days, or RAW more than 5 but less then 10)
the approval by the operations manager was required.
-
For a low risk (LCO equal to or more then 7 days, or RAW
1ess then or equal to 5) the approval by the
Superintendent On Shift (SOS) was required.
Two laminated copies of the matrix were available in the
Control Room.
c.
Conclusions on General Comments
The inspectors considered the EDG harmonic item to be a
potential for possible erroneous reverse power trips, which
could lead to operator confusion.
i
i
                        could lead to operator confusion.
!s
!s
!
!
}                                                                                                     Enclosure 2
}
Enclosure 2
i
i
    -                                       --                                   -               ,   ,-   .,
-
-
--
-
,
,-
.,


    . -.   , ~ . .       . .     - . - - -       _ - . . - .-. - - - - - - . - - - - .   .. -- - - - - .
.
        .
-.
      .
, ~ . .
. .
- . - - -
_ - . . - .-. - - - - - - . - - - - .
.. -- - - - - .
.
.
1
1
            GPC                                                       6
GPC
6
'
'
                              The licensee activities involving the river conditions                       l
The licensee activities involving the river conditions
                              demonstrated a pro-active attitude on the part of plant
demonstrated a pro-active attitude on the part of plant
                              management and is considered a strength.
management and is considered a strength.
                              Use of the matrix to evaluate risk associated with removing
Use of the matrix to evaluate risk associated with removing
i                             various combinations of equipment from service is consistent
i
i                             with the maintenance rule. This and other aspects of the
various combinations of equipment from service is consistent
l                            licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule will be
i
                              inspected further in the near future.
with the maintenance rule.
                      01.2 Transient Due to Recirculation Pumo Trio and Runback (Unit
This and other aspects of the
                              11
                      a.    InsDection Scoc? (71707)
                              At 9:12 a.m. on August 20, with Unit 1 operating at 100%
                              RTP, the 1A Reactor Recirculation (RR) Pump tripped. An
                              inspector responded to the control room to assess operator
                              actions and unit response. The inspector observed operator
                              monitoring of annunciators and parameter trends.
                              Communications, supervisory control, and the use of
                              procedures were also observed. Among the procedures used by
                              the operators were:
                              -
                                  34AB-C51-001-1S:            Reactor Power Instabilities, Rev. 3
l
l
licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule will be
inspected further in the near future.
01.2 Transient Due to Recirculation Pumo Trio and Runback (Unit
11
a.
InsDection Scoc? (71707)
At 9:12 a.m. on August 20, with Unit 1 operating at 100%
RTP, the 1A Reactor Recirculation (RR) Pump tripped.
An
inspector responded to the control room to assess operator
actions and unit response.
The inspector observed operator
monitoring of annunciators and parameter trends.
Communications, supervisory control, and the use of
procedures were also observed.
Among the procedures used by
the operators were:
-
34AB-C51-001-1S:
Reactor Power Instabilities, Rev. 3
l
-
34SV-SUV-023-1S:
Jet Pump and Recirculation Flow
'
'
                              -
Mismatch Operability, Rev.
                                  34SV-SUV-023-1S:            Jet Pump and Recirculation Flow
6,
                                                              Mismatch Operability, Rev. 6, Edition 1     j
Edition 1
                              -
j
                                  34SO-B21-001-1S:           Reactor Recirculation System, Rev. 4,       1
-
                                                                Attachment 6, Power Versus Flow Map
34SO-B21-001-1S:
                              -
Reactor Recirculation System, Rev.
                                  34GO-OPS-065-1S:           Control Rod Movement, Rev. 14
4,
                              -
Attachment 6,
                                  34GO-OPS-055-OS:           Power Changes, Rev. 18
Power Versus Flow Map
                      b.     Observations and Findinos
-
                              The operators immediately implemented and appropriately used
34GO-OPS-065-1S:
                              applicable procedures in response to the transient. At
Control Rod Movement, Rev. 14
                              about 9:16 a.m. the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) identified
-
                              and reported to the crew that the unit was within the region
34GO-OPS-055-OS:
                              of potential instability. Reactor power had decreased to
Power Changes, Rev. 18
                              69% RTP with 49.8% core flow. At STA and Shift Supervisor
b.
                              (SS) direction, flow was increased slightly on the 1B RR
Observations and Findinos
                              pump. At 9:21 a.m. the STA informed the shift that the
The operators immediately implemented and appropriately used
                              region of potential instability had been exited.
applicable procedures in response to the transient.
                              In preparation to start the tripped pump, control rods were
At
                              inserted to get below the 55% load line, as required by
about 9:16 a.m. the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) identified
                              procedure. As operators prepared to place the 1A Reactor
and reported to the crew that the unit was within the region
                              Feed Pump Turbine (RFPT) in standby, a runback on the 1B RR
of potential instability.
                              pump occurred due to low reactor water level. The operators
Reactor power had decreased to
                              noted that the runback occurred in conjunction with the 1A
69% RTP with 49.8% core flow.
                              Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP) minimum flow valve opening.
At STA and Shift Supervisor
                              The region of potential instability was again entered.
(SS) direction, flow was increased slightly on the 1B RR
pump.
At 9:21 a.m.
the STA informed the shift that the
region of potential instability had been exited.
In preparation to start the tripped pump, control rods were
inserted to get below the 55% load line, as required by
procedure.
As operators prepared to place the 1A Reactor
Feed Pump Turbine (RFPT) in standby, a runback on the 1B RR
pump occurred due to low reactor water level.
The operators
noted that the runback occurred in conjunction with the 1A
Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP) minimum flow valve opening.
The region of potential instability was again entered.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l                                                                                         Enclosure 2
l
                                                                                                          i
Enclosure 2
                                                                                                          I
i
  .                - ,                       _-- -                                       .
.
- ,
_--
-
.


      . - _ _ - _ .__ . _ _ -                 . _ . . ~ . _ _ _ _ - . _   __ _ __ _ . _ _ . _         _
. - _ _ - _ .__ . _ _ -
    .
. _ . . ~ . _ _ _ _ - . _
  .
__
      GPC                                                               7
_ __
                              Control rods were inserted and the region was exited in
_ . _ _ . _
                              about eight minutes.
_
                              The licensee determined that the 1A RR pump trip was caused
.
                              by a painter performing work in the recirculation pump Motor
.
                              Generator (MG) set room. A high MG set air temperature
GPC
                              switch was bumped and caused a trip of the MG set.
7
                              Maintenance personnel tested the switch to verify proper
Control rods were inserted and the region was exited in
                              operation and no deficiencies were observed.
about eight minutes.
                              Systems were placed in service and unit RTP was reached at
The licensee determined that the 1A RR pump trip was caused
                              about 7:45 p.m.
by a painter performing work in the recirculation pump Motor
                  c.           Conclusions
Generator (MG) set room.
                              The inspector concluded that operator response to the
A high MG set air temperature
                              transient was excellent. Actions taken were prompt,
switch was bumped and caused a trip of the MG set.
                              deliberate, and in accordance with plant procedures. The
Maintenance personnel tested the switch to verify proper
                              immediate observations by the on-shift STA to recognize the
operation and no deficiencies were observed.
                              reactor was in the area of potential instability was
Systems were placed in service and unit RTP was reached at
                              excellent. The RFP minimum flow valve problem continues to                 l
about 7:45 p.m.
l                              contribute to unplanned plant transients. The inspectors
c.
Conclusions
The inspector concluded that operator response to the
transient was excellent.
Actions taken were prompt,
deliberate, and in accordance with plant procedures.
The
immediate observations by the on-shift STA to recognize the
reactor was in the area of potential instability was
excellent.
The RFP minimum flow valve problem continues to
l
contribute to unplanned plant transients.
The inspectors
will review additional information on the minimum flow
'
'
                              will review additional information on the minimum flow
valves.
                              valves.
02
                02           Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
                02.1 Inocerable Reactor Flood-Un Rance Reactor Water Level                               ,
02.1 Inocerable Reactor Flood-Un Rance Reactor Water Level
                              Instrument Unit i                                                         l
,
                a.           Insoection ScoDe (92901)
Instrument Unit i
                              The inspector reviewed a special report dated July 30, 1996,
l
                              involving the reactor vessel water level flood-up range
a.
                              instrument, 1B21-R605.
Insoection ScoDe (92901)
                b.           Observations and Findinas
The inspector reviewed a special report dated July 30, 1996,
                              On July 21, 30 days had elapsed since flood-up range reactor
involving the reactor vessel water level flood-up range
                              vessel water level instrument 1B21-R605 was declared
instrument, 1B21-R605.
                              inoperable.   The inspectors reviewed the licensee's special
b.
                              report dated July 30, 1996, submitted to meet Technical
Observations and Findinas
                              Specification (TS) requirements. The TS required that a
On July 21, 30 days had elapsed since flood-up range reactor
                              report be submitted within the following 14 days. The
vessel water level instrument 1B21-R605 was declared
                              inspectors found from this review that the report was
inoperable.
                              submitted within the time frame of the specifications. The
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's special
                              TS further states that the report shall outline the
report dated July 30, 1996, submitted to meet Technical
                              preplanned, alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the
Specification (TS) requirements.
                              inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the
The TS required that a
                              instrumentation channels of the function to operable status.
report be submitted within the following 14 days.
                              The inspectors observed that the report stated the cause of
The
                              the inoperability appeared to be the result of a reduction
inspectors found from this review that the report was
                              in the instrument reference leg water level. This was due
submitted within the time frame of the specifications.
                                                                                            Enclosure 2
The
TS further states that the report shall outline the
preplanned, alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the
inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the
instrumentation channels of the function to operable status.
The inspectors observed that the report stated the cause of
the inoperability appeared to be the result of a reduction
in the instrument reference leg water level.
This was due
Enclosure 2


    _                     -                           .--     .-.   .-
_
-
.--
.-.
.-
l
l
l
l
  '
l
l
'
1
1
      GPC                             8
GPC
l           to a packing leak on the equalizing valve   for the
8
I           transmitter of instrument 1B21-R605. The     leak was repaired
l
to a packing leak on the equalizing valve for the
I
transmitter of instrument 1B21-R605.
The leak was repaired
I
I
and the condensation in the reference leg condensing pot was
'
'
            and the condensation in the reference leg    condensing pot was
expected to refill the leg.
            expected to refill the leg. This did not     occur and proper
This did not occur and proper
            instrument function was not restored.
instrument function was not restored.
            The licensee did not determine why the condensing pot failed
The licensee did not determine why the condensing pot failed
            to refill the reference leg. The report further stated that
to refill the reference leg.
            to refill the reference leg by injecting demineralized water
The report further stated that
            would impose a risk to the instrumentation that could cause
to refill the reference leg by injecting demineralized water
            a plant transient.
would impose a risk to the instrumentation that could cause
            The report contained plans and a schedule for restoring the
a plant transient.
            instrument channel to operable status.
The report contained plans and a schedule for restoring the
            The inspectors found that the report did not directly
instrument channel to operable status.
            address the preplanned alternate method of monitoring. The
The inspectors found that the report did not directly
            report stated that the flood-up instrument was indicating 29
address the preplanned alternate method of monitoring.
            to 30 inches higher than actual level as measured by other       I
The
            instruments. The method discussed in the report involved         I
report stated that the flood-up instrument was indicating 29
            other instrumentation that only indicate up to +60 inches.
to 30 inches higher than actual level as measured by other
            This indicated to the inspector that for post accident
instruments.
The method discussed in the report involved
other instrumentation that only indicate up to +60 inches.
This indicated to the inspector that for post accident
monitoring purposes, water level can only be monitored up
,
,
            monitoring purposes, water level can only be monitored up        l
l            +60 inches. The report did not clearly state that between
            +60 inches and +400 inches no alternate method of monitoring
            was available.
            The inspectors discussed the report with licensee personnel.
            The inspector observed that the licensee issued a temporary
            change to the Unit 1 scram procedure, 34AB-C71-001-1S,
            Revision 6, that reduced the required Main Steam Isolation
            Valve (MSIV) closure on high level from +100 inches to +60
            inches.  This would help protect Emergency Core Cooling
            Systems (ECCS) steam-driven turbines.
l
l
            The licensee informed the inspectors that, even though the
+60 inches.
            instrument was listed as a TS post accident monitoring
The report did not clearly state that between
            instrument, the non-redundant instrument was not intended to
+60 inches and +400 inches no alternate method of monitoring
            be used during post accident conditions. The instrument was
was available.
            to be used only during refueling conditions when water level
The inspectors discussed the report with licensee personnel.
            is raised to flood the refueling cavity. The inspectors
The inspector observed that the licensee issued a temporary
            reviewed licensee-supplied documentation that supported the
change to the Unit 1 scram procedure, 34AB-C71-001-1S,
            intended use of the instrument. The licensee was evaluating
Revision 6,
            this problem for a TS amendment.
that reduced the required Main Steam Isolation
          c. Conclusions
Valve (MSIV) closure on high level from +100 inches to +60
inches.
This would help protect Emergency Core Cooling
Systems (ECCS) steam-driven turbines.
l
l
            The inspectors concluded that the report did not clearly
The licensee informed the inspectors that, even though the
            indicate the lack of monitoring capability during post
instrument was listed as a TS post accident monitoring
            accident conditions above +60 inches. However, the lack of
instrument, the non-redundant instrument was not intended to
            clarity was not considered to be significant. The
be used during post accident conditions.
            inspectors viewed a proposed TS amendment as appropriate.
The instrument was
            The revision to the scram procedure was also appropriate.
to be used only during refueling conditions when water level
is raised to flood the refueling cavity.
The inspectors
reviewed licensee-supplied documentation that supported the
intended use of the instrument.
The licensee was evaluating
this problem for a TS amendment.
c.
Conclusions
l
The inspectors concluded that the report did not clearly
indicate the lack of monitoring capability during post
accident conditions above +60 inches.
However, the lack of
clarity was not considered to be significant.
The
inspectors viewed a proposed TS amendment as appropriate.
The revision to the scram procedure was also appropriate.
4
4
                                                                  Enclosure 2
Enclosure 2


          .. -       - -.   . . . - .             _     _.           . . , ~ . .    . . .-.
.. -
    .
-
  .
-.
      GPC                                      9
. . . - .
            03  Operations Procedures and Documentation
_
            03.1 License Conditions for TSIP Imolementation Units 1 and 2
_.
            a.  Inspection ScoDe (92901).
. . , ~ . .
                License condition 2.C. (2) for Units 1 and 2 states, in part:
                The Surveillance Requirements (SRs) listed are not required
                to be performed immediately upon implementation of
                Amendments No. 195 for Unit 1 and No. 135 for Unit 2.              The
                SRs listed shall be successfully demonstrated prior to the
                time and condition specified for each.
            b.  Observations and Findinos
                The inspector observed that license condition 2.C.(2)a)
                stated that the listed SRs shall be successfully
                demonstrated prior to entering MODE 2 on the first plant
                startup following the sixteenth refueling outage for Unit 1
                and the twelfth refueling outage for Unit 2. The license
                condition listed the SRs for both units, Unit 1 only and
                Unit 2 only as follows:
                Listed for both units:
                  - 3.3.2.2.2 Perform channel calibration for the Feedwater
                              and Main Turbine Trip High Level
                              Instrumentation.
.
.
                - 3.3.2.2.3 Perform logic system functional test for the
. .-.
!                             Feedwater and Main Trip High Level
.
                              Instrumentation.
.
                  - 3.3.3.2.2 Verify each required control circuit and
GPC
                              transfer switch is capable of performing the
9
                              intended function for the Remote Shutdown
03
                              System.
Operations Procedures and Documentation
l               - 3.3.8.1.4 Perform logic system functional test for Loss of
03.1 License Conditions for TSIP Imolementation Units 1 and 2
l                             Power Instrumentation.
a.
                - 3.7.7.2   Perform a system functional test for the Main
Inspection ScoDe (92901).
                              Turbine Bypass System.
License condition 2.C. (2) for Units 1 and 2 states, in part:
                - 3.7.7.3   Verify the Main Turbine Bypass System response
The Surveillance Requirements (SRs) listed are not required
                              time is within limits.
to be performed immediately upon implementation of
                Listed for Unit 1 only:
Amendments No. 195 for Unit 1 and No. 135 for Unit 2.
                - 3.3.1.1.15           Perform logic system functional test for
The
                                        Reactor Protective System Instrumentation.
SRs listed shall be successfully demonstrated prior to the
,
time and condition specified for each.
b.
Observations and Findinos
The inspector observed that license condition 2.C.(2)a)
stated that the listed SRs shall be successfully
demonstrated prior to entering MODE 2 on the first plant
startup following the sixteenth refueling outage for Unit 1
and the twelfth refueling outage for Unit 2.
The license
condition listed the SRs for both units, Unit 1 only and
Unit 2 only as follows:
Listed for both units:
- 3.3.2.2.2
Perform channel calibration for the Feedwater
and Main Turbine Trip High Level
Instrumentation.
- 3.3.2.2.3
Perform logic system functional test for the
.
!
Feedwater and Main Trip High Level
Instrumentation.
- 3.3.3.2.2 Verify each required control circuit and
transfer switch is capable of performing the
intended function for the Remote Shutdown
System.
l
- 3.3.8.1.4
Perform logic system functional test for Loss of
l
Power Instrumentation.
- 3.7.7.2
Perform a system functional test for the Main
Turbine Bypass System.
- 3.7.7.3
Verify the Main Turbine Bypass System response
time is within limits.
Listed for Unit 1 only:
- 3.3.1.1.15
Perform logic system functional test for
Reactor Protective System Instrumentation.
,
f
f
                                                                        Enclosure 2
Enclosure 2
{
{
1
1


                .                  . . _ _      _          -        --
  .
.
.
    GPC                         10
. . _
        - 3.3.1.1.16     Verify the RPS response time is within           ,
_
        (Function 9)     limits for the turbine control valve fast       I
_
                          closure, trip oil pressure - low.
-
        - 3.3.6.1.6       Perform logic system functional test for
--
        (Function 1.f)   Turbine Building Area Temperature - High.
.
        Listed for Unit 2 only:
.
        - 3.6.2.4.2 Verify each spray nozzle is unobstructed for the
GPC
                    Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool
10
                    Spray System.
- 3.3.1.1.16
        License condition 2.C.(2)b) stated that the listed SRs shall
Verify the RPS response time is within
        be successfully demonstrated at their next regularly
,
        scheduled performance. The license condition listed the SRs
(Function 9)
        for both units and Unit 2 only as follows:
limits for the turbine control valve fast
        Listed for both units:
closure, trip oil pressure - low.
        - 3.8.1.8   Verify each EDG operating at or less than a
- 3.3.6.1.6
                    specific power factor and does not trip and
Perform logic system functional test for
                    adequate voltage is maintained following a load
(Function 1.f)
                    reject of a specified kilowatt (kw) load.
Turbine Building Area Temperature - High.
        - 3.8.1.10   Verify on an actual or simulated ECCS' initiation
Listed for Unit 2 only:
                    signal that each EDG auto-starts from the
- 3.6.2.4.2
                    standby condition and in a specified time after
Verify each spray nozzle is unobstructed for the
                    auto-start achieves adequate voltage and, after
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool
                    steady state conditions are reached, maintains
Spray System.
                    an acceptable voltage; in the same time after
License condition 2.C.(2)b) stated that the listed SRs shall
                    auto-start achieves adequate frequency and after
be successfully demonstrated at their next regularly
                    steady state conditions are reached, maintains
scheduled performance.
                    an acceptable frequency; and operates for at
The license condition listed the SRs
                    least 5 minutes.
for both units and Unit 2 only as follows:
        - 3.8.1.12   Verify each EDG operating at a specified power
Listed for both units:
                    factor for at least 24 hours; for at least 2
- 3.8.1.8
                    hours loaded at a high kw; for the remaining
Verify each EDG operating at or less than a
                    hours of the test loaded at lower kw.
specific power factor and does not trip and
        - 3.8.1.13   Verify that each EDG starts and achieves, in
adequate voltage is maintained following a load
                    equal to or less than 12 seconds, voltage equal
reject of a specified kilowatt (kw) load.
                    to or greater to 3740 V and frequency equal to
- 3.8.1.10
                    or greater than 58.8 hertz (Hz); and after
Verify on an actual or simulated ECCS' initiation
                    steady state conditions are reached, maintains
signal that each EDG auto-starts from the
                    voltage between 3740 V and 4243 V and frequency
standby condition and in a specified time after
                    between 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz.
auto-start achieves adequate voltage and, after
        - 3.8.1.18   Verify, when started simultaneously from standby
steady state conditions are reached, maintains
                    condition, that all of the Unit 1 and all of the
an acceptable voltage; in the same time after
                    Unit 2 EDGs achieve, in less than or equal to 12
auto-start achieves adequate frequency and after
                    seconds, voltage greater than or equal to 3740 V
steady state conditions are reached, maintains
                    and frequency greater than or equal to 58.8 Hz.
an acceptable frequency; and operates for at
                                                          Enclosure 2
least 5 minutes.
- 3.8.1.12
Verify each EDG operating at a specified power
factor for at least 24 hours; for at least 2
hours loaded at a high kw; for the remaining
hours of the test loaded at lower kw.
- 3.8.1.13
Verify that each EDG starts and achieves, in
equal to or less than 12 seconds, voltage equal
to or greater to 3740 V and frequency equal to
or greater than 58.8 hertz (Hz); and after
steady state conditions are reached, maintains
voltage between 3740 V and 4243 V and frequency
between 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz.
- 3.8.1.18
Verify, when started simultaneously from standby
condition, that all of the Unit 1 and all of the
Unit 2 EDGs achieve, in less than or equal to 12
seconds, voltage greater than or equal to 3740 V
and frequency greater than or equal to 58.8 Hz.
Enclosure 2


        - - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _             _ _ . _       -_-     . - _ _ _ . - . . _ _ _ _ _       ._   ___ -
- - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
_ _ . _
-_-
. - _ _ _ . - .
. _ _ _ _ _
._
___
-
,
,
    '
l
l
'
'
  .
'
      GPC                                                   11
.
                              Listed for Unit 2 only:
GPC
                              - 3.8.1.9         Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite
11
                              (for EDG 2C) power signal: De-energization of emergency
Listed for Unit 2 only:
                                                busses; load shedding from emergency buses; the
- 3.8.1.9
                                                EDG auto-starts from standby condition and;
Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite
                                                energizes permanently connected loads in a
(for EDG 2C) power signal: De-energization of emergency
                                                specified time, energizes auto-connected
busses; load shedding from emergency buses; the
                                                emergency loads through automatic load sequence
EDG auto-starts from standby condition and;
                                                timing devices, achieves adequate steady state                 )
energizes permanently connected loads in a
                                                voltage, achieves adequate steady state                       I
specified time, energizes auto-connected
                                                frequency, and supplies permanently connected
emergency loads through automatic load sequence
                                                and auto-connected emergency loads for at least
timing devices, achieves adequate steady state
                                                5 minutes.
voltage, achieves adequate steady state
                              -
I
                                3.8.1.17       verify that on an actual or simulated loss of                 l
frequency, and supplies permanently connected
                              (for EDG 2C) offsite power signal in conjunction with an
and auto-connected emergency loads for at least
                                                actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal that
5 minutes.
                                                the EDG meets the same requirements as that of
3.8.1.17
                                                the above listed SR 3.8.1.9.
verify that on an actual or simulated loss of
                              License condition 2.C.(2) c) stated that the listed SRs will
-
                              be met at implementation for the secondary containment
(for EDG 2C) offsite power signal in conjunction with an
                              configuration in effect at that time. The SRs shall be
actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal that
                              successfully demonstrated for the other secondary
the EDG meets the same requirements as that of
                              containment configur4tions prior to the plant entering.the
the above listed SR 3.8.1.9.
                              LCO applicability for that configuration. The license
License condition 2.C.(2) c) stated that the listed SRs will
                              condition listed the SRs for both units as follows:
be met at implementation for the secondary containment
                              - 3.6.4.1.3 Verify required Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)
configuration in effect at that time.
                                                subsystem (s) will draw down the secondary
The SRs shall be
                                                containment to greater than or equal to 0.20
successfully demonstrated for the other secondary
                                                inches of vacuum water gauge in less than or
containment configur4tions prior to the plant entering.the
                                                equal to 120 seconds.
LCO applicability for that configuration.
                              - 3.6.4.1.4       Verify required SGT subsystem (s) can maintain a
The license
                                                greater than or equal to 0.20 inches of vacuum
condition listed the SRs for both units as follows:
                                                water gauge in the containment for 1 hour at a
- 3.6.4.1.3
                                                flow rate greater than or equal to 4000 cubic
Verify required Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)
                                                feet per minute (cfm) for each subsystem.
subsystem (s) will draw down the secondary
                              The inspectors observed that the license conditions for both
containment to greater than or equal to 0.20
                              units covered a total of 32 SRs. To determine the
inches of vacuum water gauge in less than or
I                             compliance to the license conditions 2.C.(2) a) and b) the
equal to 120 seconds.
                              inspectors were provided information in the form of two
- 3.6.4.1.4
                              matrices, one for each unit. The matrices listed the TS
Verify required SGT subsystem (s) can maintain a
                              surveillance requirement, commitment number, responsible
greater than or equal to 0.20 inches of vacuum
                              group, procedure (s) performed to meet the requirement (due
water gauge in the containment for 1 hour at a
                              by plant condition, such as prior to Mode 2), date completed
flow rate greater than or equal to 4000 cubic
                              and any comments.         For license condition 2.C.(2) c), which
feet per minute (cfm) for each subsystem.
l                             involved the secondary containment, the inspectors were
The inspectors observed that the license conditions for both
!                            provided with dates on which the applicable surveillances
units covered a total of 32 SRs.
                              were performed.
To determine the
f
I
compliance to the license conditions 2.C.(2) a) and b) the
inspectors were provided information in the form of two
matrices, one for each unit.
The matrices listed the TS
surveillance requirement, commitment number, responsible
group, procedure (s) performed to meet the requirement (due
by plant condition, such as prior to Mode 2), date completed
and any comments.
For license condition 2.C.(2) c), which
l
involved the secondary containment, the inspectors were
!
!
provided with dates on which the applicable surveillances
were performed.
f
!
Enclo.3ure 2
4
4
                                                                                            Enclo.3ure 2
_ _


  -   - . - .   -.         .  .  ~  -. .    -- . - - . - . .. -          ..- .- - .
-
                                                                                          1
-
                                                                                          1
. - .
                                                                                          l
-.
    *
.
                                                                                          i
.
.
        GPC                                  12
~
-. .
-- . - - . - . .. -
..-
.- - .
1
1
1
                    The inspectors reviewed the matrices and observed that the
l
i                   surveillance requirements for license conditions 2.C.(2) a)
i
j                   and b) corresponded to the applicable plant procedures. The           l
*
.
GPC
12
1
The inspectors reviewed the matrices and observed that the
i
surveillance requirements for license conditions 2.C.(2) a)
j
and b) corresponded to the applicable plant procedures.
The
requirements for Unit 1 were performed during spring 1996
'
,
,
                    requirements for Unit 1 were performed during spring 1996            '
i
i                  refueling outage and for Unit 2 during the fall 1995                 i
refueling outage and for Unit 2 during the fall 1995
i                   refueling outage. The inspectors observed that the                   ;
i
i
refueling outage.
The inspectors observed that the
;
completed procedures were_the applicable procedures for the
4
4
                    completed procedures were_the applicable procedures for the            l
license conditions.
                    license conditions. However, SR 3.d.1.18, a simultaneous
However, SR 3.d.1.18, a simultaneous
l                   start of all the respective EDGs for both units was not
l
;                   performed. This SR has a frequency of 10 years.     The due
start of all the respective EDGs for both units was not
l                   date for Unit 1 is March 1, 2003 and for Unit 2 is                   i
;
a                  February 1, 1997. The inspectors observed that the required
performed.
:                   surveillance for the license condition 2.C. (2) c) were also
This SR has a frequency of 10 years.
                    performed as required for both units.
The due
!                   The inspectors documented SR activities associated with the
l
date for Unit 1 is March 1,
2003 and for Unit 2 is
i
February 1,
1997.
The inspectors observed that the required
a
:
surveillance for the license condition 2.C. (2) c) were also
performed as required for both units.
!
The inspectors documented SR activities associated with the
.
.
                    TSIP and sections of the license conditions in irs 50-321,
TSIP and sections of the license conditions in irs 50-321,
!                  366/95-08, 95-22, and 95-23.
!
!
,             c.   Conclusions
366/95-08, 95-22, and 95-23.
!
c.
Conclusions
,
i
i
i                   The inspectors concluded that license conditions 2.C.(2).a)
i
                    and c) are fully closed for both units. License condition
The inspectors concluded that license conditions 2.C.(2).a)
                    2.C. (2) b) will be fully closed when SR 3.8.1.18 is
and c) are fully closed for both units.
                    performed for the respective units.
License condition
              07   Quality Assurance in Operations
2.C. (2) b) will be fully closed when SR 3.8.1.18 is
              07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (40500)
performed for the respective units.
                    On September 12, the Hatch SRB convened meeting H96-03 at             '
07
                    Plant Hatch. The meeting was conducted in accordance with
Quality Assurance in Operations
                    the requirements of the Hatch Final Safety Analysis Report
07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (40500)
                    (FSAR) and QA Manual. The board discussed the status of
On September 12, the Hatch SRB convened meeting H96-03 at
                    previously-opened items and determined which items should be
'
                    closed. Much of the discussion centered on the past                   l
Plant Hatch.
                    problems experienced by the Operations and Engineering
The meeting was conducted in accordance with
                    Departments and their solutions. New issues were identified
the requirements of the Hatch Final Safety Analysis Report
                    and assigned to the copropriate manager for resolution.
(FSAR) and QA Manual.
                    There was some discussion involving the quality of
The board discussed the status of
                    contractor work, particrictly that of the plant's Nuclear
previously-opened items and determined which items should be
                    Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor. Various problems were
closed.
                    discussed, along with solutions and ways of avoiding future
Much of the discussion centered on the past
                    problems. The inspectors concluded that licensee efforts in
problems experienced by the Operations and Engineering
                    this area for self-assessment were effective.
Departments and their solutions.
              08   Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
New issues were identified
              08.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-321.366/96-07-01:
and assigned to the copropriate manager for resolution.
                    Determine Safety Significance and Testing Requirements for
There was some discussion involving the quality of
                    Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment Isolation Status Panel.
contractor work, particrictly that of the plant's Nuclear
                    The inspector reviewed Abnormal Operating Procedure,
Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor.
                    34AB-C71-001-1S and 2S, Scram Procedure, Revision 6, for
Various problems were
                                                                      Enclosure 2
discussed, along with solutions and ways of avoiding future
problems.
The inspectors concluded that licensee efforts in
this area for self-assessment were effective.
08
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1
(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-321.366/96-07-01:
Determine Safety Significance and Testing Requirements for
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment Isolation Status Panel.
The inspector reviewed Abnormal Operating Procedure,
34AB-C71-001-1S and 2S, Scram Procedure, Revision 6,
for
Enclosure 2


      _ - .                                 _                   .   _ .   _ . _ _ _ __     - _~__ _ _. _ _ .                 - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . .
_ - .
_
.
_
.
_ . _ _
_ __
- _~__ _ _. _ _ .
- _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . .
1
1
a                                         *
a
;               -
*
;
-
'
'
                                                                GPC                                           13
GPC
13
i
i
                                                                          both units.   The procedures made a general reference that
both units.
                                                                          isolation status could be found on Panel 1/2-H11-P601
The procedures made a general reference that
i                                                                         vertical display. The procedures also listed other
isolation status could be found on Panel 1/2-H11-P601
i
vertical display.
The procedures also listed other
+
+
                                                                          locations, such as the Safety Parameter Display System
locations, such as the Safety Parameter Display System
                                                                            (SPDS) where system isolation indications could be located.
(SPDS) where system isolation indications could be located.
.
.
.
.
                                                                          The inspectors reviewed both the Unit 1 and 2 UFSARs to
The inspectors reviewed both the Unit 1 and 2 UFSARs to
i                                                                         determine the isolation panels description and use. Unit 1
i
i                                                                         FSAR Section 5.2.3.5.2 states in part, "A mimic display
determine the isolation panels description and use.
Unit 1
i
FSAR Section 5.2.3.5.2 states in part,
"A mimic display
J
J
                                                                          board for only isolation valves provides indication of
board for only isolation valves provides indication of
l                                                                         isolation valve position.                 When isolation has occurred, all
l
,                                                                          energized lights of the display are green".
isolation valve position.
i                                                                                                                                                                       I
When isolation has occurred, all
]                                                                         The UFSAR for Unit 2, Section 7.3.2.2, System Description -                                 1
energized lights of the display are green".
i                                                                         Primary Containment and Reactor Pressure Vessel Isolation                                   l
,
}                                                                         Control System; Subsection 7.3.2.2.7, Testability, states,                                   l
i
                                                                                                                                                                        '
I
                                                                          in part, " Isolation valves can be tested to ensure that they
]
l                                                                         are capable of closing by operating manual switches in the
The UFSAR for Unit 2,
j                                                                         Main Control Room (MCR) and observing the position lights
Section 7.3.2.2,
System Description -
1
i
Primary Containment and Reactor Pressure Vessel Isolation
}
Control System;
Subsection 7.3.2.2.7,
Testability, states,
in part, " Isolation valves can be tested to ensure that they
'
l
are capable of closing by operating manual switches in the
j
Main Control Room (MCR) and observing the position lights
i-
i-
and any associated process effects".
The subsection directs
'
'
                                                                          and any associated process effects". The subsection directs
the reader to "See also figure 7.3-2 (Nuclear Boiler System
                                                                          the reader to "See also figure 7.3-2 (Nuclear Boiler System
- Functional Control Diagrams)."
                                                                          - Functional Control Diagrams)." The inspector reviewed the
The inspector reviewed the
                                                                          figure and observed that it contained 12 sheets of logic
figure and observed that it contained 12 sheets of logic
                                                                          diagrams with control switch and indicating light MCR panel
diagrams with control switch and indicating light MCR panel
                                                                          locations. The diagrams for the isolation valves clearly
locations.
                                                                          showed indication lights for both the opened and closed
The diagrams for the isolation valves clearly
                                                                          positions on the graphic display located on MCR panel                                       i
showed indication lights for both the opened and closed
                                                                          2H11-P601.                                                                                   I
positions on the graphic display located on MCR panel
                                                                          From reviews, observations, and discussions with licensee
i
                                                                          personnel, the inspectors found that the isolation status
2H11-P601.
                                                                          panels were used by the operators to verify isolation
From reviews, observations, and discussions with licensee
                                                                          status; are being maintained current with plant design
personnel, the inspectors found that the isolation status
                                                                          changes; and are referenced in plant procedures and the
panels were used by the operators to verify isolation
                                                                          UFSARs for both units.
status; are being maintained current with plant design
                                                                          The inspectors did not locate any procedure that required
changes; and are referenced in plant procedures and the
                                                                          testing or verification that the isolation panel indications
UFSARs for both units.
                                                                          correctly reflected system status or isolation condition.
The inspectors did not locate any procedure that required
                                                                          The inspectors frequently observed operators monitoring the
testing or verification that the isolation panel indications
                                                                          isolation panel during normal panel observations. The
correctly reflected system status or isolation condition.
                                                                          inspectors also observed that Design Changes (DCs) were
The inspectors frequently observed operators monitoring the
                                                                          initiated when required to properly maintain the panels.                                     ,
isolation panel during normal panel observations.
                                                                                                                                                                        '
The
                                                                          The inspectors were not aware of any discrepancy between the
inspectors also observed that Design Changes (DCs) were
                                                                          isolation panel indications and plant systems.
initiated when required to properly maintain the panels.
                                                                          The inspectors observed that Operations management issued an
,
                                                                          operating order instructing control room operators to
'
                                                                          observe and record light indications that could be monitored
The inspectors were not aware of any discrepancy between the
                                                                          from the isolation status panel for all valves that were
isolation panel indications and plant systems.
                                                                          cycled. Also, plant procedures were to be revised to
The inspectors observed that Operations management issued an
                                                                          include verification of indication response for valves
operating order instructing control room operators to
                                                                                                                                                            Enclosure 2
observe and record light indications that could be monitored
  _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ .                     _
from the isolation status panel for all valves that were
                                                                                                                  -- -_
cycled.
Also, plant procedures were to be revised to
include verification of indication response for valves
Enclosure 2
-
.
-
.
.
.
-- -
_


  - . _ .. _ _ _ _ _.- _.__ _ - _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _                                                 . _ . . _ . _ _ _     . - .__.. _ _ -
- . _ .. _ _ _ _ _.- _.__ _ - _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _
                      *
. _ . . _ . _ _ _
. -
.__..
_ _ -
*
1
1
;         -
;
                            ' GPC                                                         14
-
,                                                        located on the isolation status panel. Most of the checks
' GPC
14
located on the isolation status panel.
Most of the checks
,
will be conducted during unit cold shutdown conditions.
<
<
                                                        will be conducted during unit cold shutdown conditions.
The inspectors determined that although the failure to test
*
*
                                                        The inspectors determined that although the failure to test
or verify the isolation valve indications on the isolation
                                                        or verify the isolation valve indications on the isolation
status panels was an oversight, no regulatory violation had
                                                        status panels was an oversight, no regulatory violation had
occurred.
                                                        occurred. Based upon this review URI 50-321, 366/96-07-01
Based upon this review URI 50-321, 366/96-07-01
                                                        is closed.
is closed.
                                          b.             Conclusions
b.
                                                        Systems that are used by the operators to verify the status
Conclusions
                                                        of safety-related systems and are discussed in the UFSAR
Systems that are used by the operators to verify the status
                                                        should be tested or verified periodically.
of safety-related systems and are discussed in the UFSAR
should be tested or verified periodically.
'
'
                                        08.2           (Closed) Licensee Event ReDort (LER) 50-321/96-011:
08.2
                                                        Inadequate Procedure Results in Missed Technical
(Closed) Licensee Event ReDort (LER) 50-321/96-011:
,                                                        Specifications Surveillances. This problem was discussed in
Inadequate Procedure Results in Missed Technical
j                                                       Inspection Report (IR) 50-321, 366/96-10. No new issues
Specifications Surveillances.
                                                        were revealed by the LER.
This problem was discussed in
,
j
Inspection Report (IR) 50-321, 366/96-10.
No new issues
were revealed by the LER.
i
i
*
*
                                          08.3           (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-321/95-23-01: Operators'
08.3
                                                        Failure to Follow Procedure While Transferring Diesel Fuel
(Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-321/95-23-01:
                                                        011. This violation was identified when operators were
Operators'
                                                        receiving new fuel oil from a tanker truck. Due to a valve
Failure to Follow Procedure While Transferring Diesel Fuel
                                                        lineup, not in accordance with procedure, 300 gallons of
011.
This violation was identified when operators were
receiving new fuel oil from a tanker truck.
Due to a valve
lineup, not in accordance with procedure, 300 gallons of
fuel overflowed a day tank.
The inspector reviewed the
>
>
                                                        fuel overflowed a day tank. The inspector reviewed the
)
)                                                        licensee's response, dated January 2, 1996. The response
licensee's response, dated January 2,
                                                        indicated that administrative personnel action was taken and
1996.
                                                        that procedure changes were being considered. The
The response
                                                      - inspectors reviewed the EDG procedure 34SO-R43-001-1S,
indicated that administrative personnel action was taken and
                                                        Revision 18, and observed procedure changes. These changes
that procedure changes were being considered.
                                                        included a simplified drawing of the fuel oil system piping
The
                                                        and valves. This drawing was to aid personnel in
- inspectors reviewed the EDG procedure 34SO-R43-001-1S,
                                                        determining the correct valve line up for the activity to be
Revision 18, and observed procedure changes.
                                                        performed.
These changes
                                          08.4           (Closed) VIO 50-366/95-26-01: Inability to Safely Shutdown
included a simplified drawing of the fuel oil system piping
and valves.
This drawing was to aid personnel in
determining the correct valve line up for the activity to be
performed.
08.4
(Closed) VIO 50-366/95-26-01:
Inability to Safely Shutdown
,
Unit 2 from the Remote Shutdown' Panel in the Event of a Fire
'
'
,
in the Main Control Room.
                                                        Unit 2 from the Remote Shutdown' Panel in the Event of a Fire
This violation was identified
                                                        in the Main Control Room. This violation was identified
when operators attempced to perform a surveillance on the
                                                        when operators attempced to perform a surveillance on the
Unit 2 Remote Shutdcwn Panel (RSDP).
                                                        Unit 2 Remote Shutdcwn Panel (RSDP). The surveillance was
The surveillance was
                                                        being performed for the first time because of the TSIP.
being performed for the first time because of the TSIP.
                                                        Prior to the implementation of the TSIP, testing of the RSDP
'.
'.
                                                        was not required. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
Prior to the implementation of the TSIP, testing of the RSDP
                                                        response, dated February 12, 1996. The response indicated
was not required.
                                                        that failure to perform periodic testing, as well as
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
                                                        inadequate design and design change functional testing,
response, dated February 12, 1996.
                                                        contributed to the violation. This item was initially
The response indicated
                                                        documented in IR 321,366/95-23. Subsequent licensee and
that failure to perform periodic testing, as well as
                                                        inspector activities were documented in irs 321,366/95-26
inadequate design and design change functional testing,
                                                        and 95-27. These activities included observed licensee
contributed to the violation.
                                                        corrective actions involving system testing, maintenance and
This item was initially
                                                                                                                          Enclosure 2
documented in IR 321,366/95-23.
Subsequent licensee and
inspector activities were documented in irs 321,366/95-26
and 95-27.
These activities included observed licensee
corrective actions involving system testing, maintenance and
Enclosure 2
,
,
R
R
                                                                                                    .+-
-
      -
- - , -
              - - , -     ,                   n           ,       - - - . , --,--e . , - -   -,e-.           ..,-.4               - - -
,
n
,
- - - . ,
--,--e
. , - -
-,e-.
.+-
..,-.4
- - -


                                                                            1
1
                                                                              l
                                                                            l
  .                                                                          :
.
.
    GPC                               15
.
                                                                            l
GPC
              modification work. The inspectors concluded that the
15
              licensee's corrective actions had been appropriate.
modification work.
                                                                              1
The inspectors concluded that the
                                                                            l
licensee's corrective actions had been appropriate.
        08.5 (Closed) VIO 50-321.366/95-18-02:     Failure to Follow
08.5 (Closed) VIO 50-321.366/95-18-02:
              Procedure, Second Example. This example was identified when   1
Failure to Follow
              operators failed to follow a procedure while performing.       l
Procedure, Second Example.
              hydrogen water chemistry flow changes.   This resulted in
This example was identified when
                                                                            '
1
              unnecessary exposure to personnel performing maintenance in
operators failed to follow a procedure while performing.
              the condenser bay. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
hydrogen water chemistry flow changes.
              response dated October 26, 1995. The response indicated
This resulted in
              that a less-than-adequate operating procedure and less-than-   l
'
              adequate training contributed'to the violation. The
unnecessary exposure to personnel performing maintenance in
              response stated that personnel were counseled regarding
the condenser bay.
              their actions, training material would be revised, and
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
              procedure changes would be made. The inspectors reviewed
response dated October 26, 1995.
              the revised material and procedure changes and concluded
The response indicated
              that the licensee's corrective actions had been appropriate.
that a less-than-adequate operating procedure and less-than-
                                II. Maintenance
adequate training contributed'to the violation.
        M1   Conduct of Maintenance
The
        M1.1 General Comments
response stated that personnel were counseled regarding
        a.   Inspection Scoce (62703) (62707)
their actions, training material would be revised, and
              The inspectors observed all or portions of the following
procedure changes would be made.
              work activities:
The inspectors reviewed
              -
the revised material and procedure changes and concluded
                  MWO 2-96-2492: . Replace seal on 2B Plant Service Water
that the licensee's corrective actions had been appropriate.
                                  (PSW) Pump
II. Maintenance
              -
M1
                  MWO 2-96-2586:   Insulation inspection of Reactor
Conduct of Maintenance
                                  Protection System (RPS) MG Set 2A
M1.1 General Comments
              -
a.
                  MWO 2-96-2131:   RPS MG Set Minor Design Change (MDC)
Inspection Scoce (62703) (62707)
                                  95-5037 Implementation
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following
        b.   Observations and Findinas
work activities:
              The inspectors found that the work was performed with the
-
              work packages present and being actively used. The
MWO 2-96-2492: . Replace seal on 2B Plant Service Water
              inspectors observed that during the implementation of the
(PSW) Pump
              MDC the system engineer was present at the job site.
-
              Appropriate post-modification and maintenance tests were
MWO 2-96-2586:
              performed. These tests consisted of operating the equipment
Insulation inspection of Reactor
              following the completion of work activities.
Protection System (RPS) MG Set 2A
        c.   Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance
-
              Maintenance activities were generally completed in a
MWO 2-96-2131:
              thorough and professional manner. No deficiencies were
RPS MG Set Minor Design Change (MDC)
              identified.
95-5037 Implementation
                                                                Enclosure 2
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found that the work was performed with the
work packages present and being actively used.
The
inspectors observed that during the implementation of the
MDC the system engineer was present at the job site.
Appropriate post-modification and maintenance tests were
performed.
These tests consisted of operating the equipment
following the completion of work activities.
c.
Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance
Maintenance activities were generally completed in a
thorough and professional manner.
No deficiencies were
identified.
Enclosure 2


,-- , . -     - - . - - ~ - - .                       _.   - - . -..- - .       .     . . ~ -     - . . - --.
, . -
- - . - - ~ - - .
_.
- - . -..- - .
.
. . ~ -
- . . -
--.
,--
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    *
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                                                                                                                l
*
l        GPC                                                 16
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GPC
16
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M3
Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
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M3.1 Surveillance Observations
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                  M3            Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
a.
Inspection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following
Unit 1 and Unit 2 surveillance activities:
- 34SV-R43-004-1S:
Diesel Generator 1A semi-annual test
- 34SV-E41-002-2S:
HPCI Pump operability
b.
Observations and Findings
The HPCI surveillance observed was the three-month
operability test to meet TS and AMSE Code In-Service Testing
requirements.
Data was collected on system valve stroke
i
times and pump operating characteristics.
A pre-evolution
briefing was conducted by the licensed operator performing
!
,
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l                M3.1 Surveillance Observations
the surveillance.
All personnel involved were in
attendance.
The diesel surveillance was performed without problem and
all parameters were within specification.
c.
Conclusions
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l                a.            Inspection Scoce (61726)
For both surveillances, all data was within the required
                                The inspectors observed all or portions of the following
,
                                Unit 1 and Unit 2 surveillance activities:
!
                                - 34SV-R43-004-1S:      Diesel Generator 1A semi-annual test
range and the equipment was determined to pass the
                                - 34SV-E41-002-2S:      HPCI Pump operability                                  l
surveillance.
                  b.            Observations and Findings
The performance of the operators and crews
                                The HPCI surveillance observed was the three-month
conducting the surveillances was generally professional and
                                operability test to meet TS and AMSE Code In-Service Testing                    l
competent.
                                requirements. Data was collected on system valve stroke                        i
No deficiencies were identified.
                                times and pump operating characteristics. A pre-evolution                        I
M8
!                              briefing was conducted by the licensed operator performing                      ,
Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92700) (92902)
l                              the surveillance.    All personnel involved were in                            I
M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-366/96-03:
                                attendance.
High Pressure Coolant Injection
                                The diesel surveillance was performed without problem and
i
                                all parameters were within specification.
System Temporarily Inoperable Following Engineering Safety
                  c.            Conclusions                                                                      l
l                              For both surveillances, all data was within the required                       ,
                                                                                                                !
                                range and the equipment was determined to pass the
                                surveillance. The performance of the operators and crews
                                conducting the surveillances was generally professional and
                                competent. No deficiencies were identified.
                M8             Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92700) (92902)
                  M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-366/96-03: High Pressure Coolant Injection
i                               System Temporarily Inoperable Following Engineering Safety
I
I
                                Feature Actuation. The cause of this problem was a physical
Feature Actuation.
                                " slip" that occurred when a technician was manipulating a
The cause of this problem was a physical
                                piece of test equipment during surveillance testing
" slip" that occurred when a technician was manipulating a
piece of test equipment during surveillance testing
activities.
The system responded as expected.
As part of
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'
'
                                activities. The system responded as expected.            As part of
the corrective actions, management discussed the problem
                                the corrective actions, management discussed the problem
with the technician and suressed the importance of caution
                                with the technician and suressed the importance of caution
when performing test act.vities.
                                when performing test act.vities. The system was realigned
The system was realigned
                                to the operable (standby' condition.
to the operable (standby' condition.
                M8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-321,366/95-18-02:                   Failure to Follow
M8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-321,366/95-18-02:
                                Procedure, First Example. This example was identified when
Failure to Follow
                                divers entered the intake structure pump pit area to perform
Procedure, First Example.
                                inspection activities without the use of a procedure. A
This example was identified when
                                service water pump was declared inoperable when a section of
divers entered the intake structure pump pit area to perform
                                the diver's life, air and communication line entered the
inspection activities without the use of a procedure.
                                suction of the pump. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
A
                                response dated October 26, 1995. The response indicated
service water pump was declared inoperable when a section of
                                                                                            Enclosure 2
the diver's life, air and communication line entered the
suction of the pump. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
response dated October 26, 1995.
The response indicated
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Enclosure 2
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      ..     ._     __ _.               _ _ _ _ . . ._.         _ __ .   _ _ . _ _ _ _ _     .
..
        .
._
'
__ _.
    .
_ _ _ _ . . ._.
_ __
.
_ _ . _ _ _ _ _
.
.
'
.
4
4
          GPC                                           17
GPC
:                         that miscommunications among personnel regarding the use and
17
i                         applicability of a procedure contributed to the violation.
:
                          The response stated that administrative personnel action was
that miscommunications among personnel regarding the use and
                          taken, procedure changes would be made and signs would be
i
;                        posted. The inspectors reviewed the procedure changes and
applicability of a procedure contributed to the violation.
                          observed the posted signs. The inspectors concluded that
The response stated that administrative personnel action was
                          the licensee's corrective actions had been appropriate.
taken, procedure changes would be made and signs would be
;
;
                                                  III. Encineerina
posted.
                E2       Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
The inspectors reviewed the procedure changes and
observed the posted signs.
The inspectors concluded that
the licensee's corrective actions had been appropriate.
III. Encineerina
;
E2
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1 Harmonics on Safety Related EDG 4160 V Switchaear
,
,
                E2.1 Harmonics on Safety Related EDG 4160 V Switchaear
a.
Insoection Scope (92903)
,
,
                a.        Insoection Scope (92903)
i
i                        The inspectors performed followup activities involved with
The inspectors performed followup activities involved with
,
,
electrical harmonics discussed in IR 50-321, 366/96-06.
4
4
                          electrical harmonics discussed in IR 50-321, 366/96-06.
i
i
b.
Observations and Findinas
:
:
                b.        Observations and Findinas
}
}                        The inspectors observed electrical data supplied by licensee
The inspectors observed electrical data supplied by licensee
                          personnel. The data clearly indicated the presence of
personnel.
                                                                                                ]
The data clearly indicated the presence of
                          harmonics on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDG 4160V switchgear.             ;
]
,                        The harmonics appeared to be identical on all safety-related
harmonics on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDG 4160V switchgear.
j                         4160V switchgear on both units.
;
                          The inspectors discussed the harmonics with licensee
The harmonics appeared to be identical on all safety-related
                          personnel. The inspectors were informed that the harmonics
,
j
4160V switchgear on both units.
The inspectors discussed the harmonics with licensee
personnel.
The inspectors were informed that the harmonics
could possibly cause reverse power trips of the EDGs when
=
=
                          could possibly cause reverse power trips of the EDGs when
they were in parallel with the grid and operating at low
                          they were in parallel with the grid and operating at low
power.
                          power.   The inspectors were also informed that the manner in
The inspectors were also informed that the manner in
which the switchgear was instrumented, on what phases the
e
e
                          which the switchgear was instrumented, on what phases the
i                        voltage and current were sensed, could be changed to help
                          prevent unnecessary reverse power trips. Under current
j                        conditions the CR operators could possibly have erroneous
,                        indication on an EDG and due to the harmonics get a reverse
j                        power trip.
i
i
voltage and current were sensed, could be changed to help
prevent unnecessary reverse power trips.
Under current
j
conditions the CR operators could possibly have erroneous
indication on an EDG and due to the harmonics get a reverse
,
j
power trip.
i
c.
Conclusions
'
'
                c.        Conclusions
The engineering group was actively pursuing a solution to
,                        The engineering group was actively pursuing a solution to
,
j ~
j
                          the effects of the harmonics on EDG operation and testing.
the effects of the harmonics on EDG operation and testing.
                          At the end of this report period, the inspectors concluded
~
At the end of this report period, the inspectors concluded
i
i
                          that the information about the effects of the harmonics had
that the information about the effects of the harmonics had
not been forwarded to the Operations Department.
*
*
                          not been forwarded to the Operations Department.
Recommendations to assist the operators in mitigating the
                          Recommendations to assist the operators in mitigating the
harmonic effects on EDG operation had also not been
                          harmonic effects on EDG operation had also not been
i
i                         forwarded. EDG reverse power trips during surveillance
forwarded.
EDG reverse power trips during surveillance
1
1
                          testing has been a problem at the site. Some of the reverse
testing has been a problem at the site.
,                        power trips were due to personnel error and inattention to
Some of the reverse
                          detail while the root cause of others was inconclusive. The
power trips were due to personnel error and inattention to
                          inspectors were informed that the potential harmonic effects
,
                          on EDG operations was being reviewed by the Engineering
detail while the root cause of others was inconclusive.
  .
The
                                                                                  Enclosure 2
inspectors were informed that the potential harmonic effects
on EDG operations was being reviewed by the Engineering
.
Enclosure 2


    .
.
  .
.
      GPC                               18
GPC
              Department. The results of the review will be   forwarded to
18
              the Operations Department. This is identified   as Inspector
Department.
The results of the review will be forwarded to
the Operations Department.
This is identified as Inspector
Followup Item (IFI) 321, 366/96-11-01:
Review of
-
-
              Followup Item (IFI) 321, 366/96-11-01: Review    of
Engineering Report on the Effects of Harmonics on EDG
              Engineering Report on the Effects of Harmonics   on EDG
Operation.
              Operation.
E2.2 ASME Code Insoection Not Performed
          E2.2 ASME Code Insoection Not Performed
a.
          a.   Inspection Scope (92903)
Inspection Scope (92903)
              The inspectors followed up the licensee activities involving
The inspectors followed up the licensee activities involving
              a missed ASME code-required inspection of Unit 1 HPCI
a missed ASME code-required inspection of Unit 1 HPCI
              injection valve, 1E41-F006.
injection valve, 1E41-F006.
          b.   Observations and Findinas
b.
,              The inspectors identified a violation in IR 50-321,
Observations and Findinas
              366/96-06 involving activities associated with missed VT-3
The inspectors identified a violation in IR 50-321,
              inspections for three valves. The VT-3 inspections were
,
              required by procedure but only the HPCI valve required a
366/96-06 involving activities associated with missed VT-3
              VT-3 inspection in accordance with the ASME code.
inspections for three valves.
              During the inspectors' initial review of the problem, the
The VT-3 inspections were
              inspectors were informed that a VT-3 inspection was
required by procedure but only the HPCI valve required a
              performed on HPCI valve 1E41-F006, in conjunction with a
VT-3 inspection in accordance with the ASME code.
              cleanliness inspection conducted by contract personnel. The
During the inspectors' initial review of the problem, the
              inspectors reviewed licensee-supplied documents and agreed
inspectors were informed that a VT-3 inspection was
              with the licensee's assessment that an adequate VT-3
performed on HPCI valve 1E41-F006, in conjunction with a
              inspection had been performed.
cleanliness inspection conducted by contract personnel.
              On August 12, the licensee informed the inspectors that new
The
              information had been received from the contract personnel
inspectors reviewed licensee-supplied documents and agreed
              who performed the cleanliness inspection. This led site
with the licensee's assessment that an adequate VT-3
              personnel to conclude that an adequate VT-3 inspection had
inspection had been performed.
              not been completed. As a result, an ASME code-required post
On August 12, the licensee informed the inspectors that new
              maintenance VT-3 inspection was not performed.
information had been received from the contract personnel
              The inspectors reviewed the licensee's testing of the valve
who performed the cleanliness inspection.
              and the valve's performance since the completion of the
This led site
              maintenance activities and the missed VT-3 inspection. No
personnel to conclude that an adequate VT-3 inspection had
              deficiencies were identified. Cognizant licensee personnel
not been completed.
              stated that they planned to disassemble and complete a VT-3
As a result, an ASME code-required post
              inspection of the valve during the next scheduled refueling
maintenance VT-3 inspection was not performed.
              outage.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's testing of the valve
              The licensee provided the inspectors with information which
and the valve's performance since the completion of the
              indicated that the root cause of the missed VT-3 inspection
maintenance activities and the missed VT-3 inspection.
              was an inadequate resolution to the Quality Control
No
              Inspection Report (QCIR) that identified the original
deficiencies were identified.
              problem. The QCIR did not specify that a VT-3 inspection
Cognizant licensee personnel
              should be performed after completion of maintenance.
stated that they planned to disassemble and complete a VT-3
              As a result of this problem, the inspectors conducted i
inspection of the valve during the next scheduled refueling
              review of maintenance and engineering activities that
outage.
                                                                  Enclosure 2
The licensee provided the inspectors with information which
indicated that the root cause of the missed VT-3 inspection
was an inadequate resolution to the Quality Control
Inspection Report (QCIR) that identified the original
problem.
The QCIR did not specify that a VT-3 inspection
should be performed after completion of maintenance.
As a result of this problem, the inspectors conducted i
review of maintenance and engineering activities that
Enclosure 2


  _ . _ . _ -       _     _ _ . . _ .     . . . _ _ _ _ .   _ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
_ . _ . _ -
              .
_
          .
_ _ . . _ .
                GPC                                         19
.
                              occurred during the last two refueling outages to determine
. . _ _ _ _ .
l                             if other code-required VT-3 inspections were missed. The
_ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
.
.
GPC
19
occurred during the last two refueling outages to determine
l
if other code-required VT-3 inspections were missed.
The
inspectors review included Safety Audit and Engineering
!
!
                                inspectors review included Safety Audit and Engineering
l
l                            Review (SAER) audits, Design Change Requests (DCRs), DCs,                               ,
Review (SAER) audits, Design Change Requests (DCRs), DCs,
i                            Maintenance Work Orders (MWOs), SORc, work records, Quality                              l
'                            Control (QC) documents, and discussions with licensee                                    ,
                              management personnel. The inspectors did not identify other                              j
                              examples of missed code-required VT-3 inspections. The
                              inspectors also reviewed the licensee evaluation, dated
                              August 12, 1996, which concluded that there was no valve
                              operability concern.
                              The failure to perform an ASME code-required VT-3 inspection
                              on a safety related component was considered significant.
,
,
i
Maintenance Work Orders (MWOs), SORc, work records, Quality
l
Control (QC) documents, and discussions with licensee
'
'
                              Lack of thoroughness in determining post-maintenance testing
                              requirements centributed to this problem. The failure to
                              complete a code-required VT-3 inspection was identified as
                              VIO 50-321/96-11-02, Failure to Perform an ASME Code-
                              Required VT-3 Inspection on HPCI Valve 1E41-F006.
                      c.      Conclusions                                                                              j
                                                                                                                        l
                              The inspectors concluded that an operability concern did not                            i
                              exist for the HPCI injection valve. The inspectors did not                              i
                              identify other examples of missed code-required VT-3
                              inspections and concluded this was not a recurring problem.
                      E7      Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities
                      E7.1 Unit 2 Station Service Batteries
                      a.      Insoection ScoDe (92903)
                              The inspectors continued to monitor the licensee activities
                              involved with the sediment in the Unit 2 Station Service
                                  (SS) Battery cells. Previous inspector observations are
                              documented in IR 50-321,366/96-07. The inspectors were
                              informed that 52 of 120 cells had sediment in the bottom of
                              their jars.                                                                          -
                      b.      Observations and Findinos
                              The inspectors observed the preparation of a new battery
                              receiving and storage area in an onsite warehouse. This
                              area was constructed so that replacement batteries received
                              on site could be stored in an area that has battery charging
                              capability as well as temperature and cleanliness controls.
                              The new cells can be maintained fully charged for
                              replacement when required.
l                    c.      Conclusions
                              At the end of this report period, the inservice SS battery
,
,
                              capacity exceeded TS requirements. Increased battery
management personnel.
                                                                                                        Enclosure 2
The inspectors did not identify other
                              __
j
examples of missed code-required VT-3 inspections.
The
inspectors also reviewed the licensee evaluation, dated
August 12, 1996, which concluded that there was no valve
operability concern.
The failure to perform an ASME code-required VT-3 inspection
on a safety related component was considered significant.
Lack of thoroughness in determining post-maintenance testing
,
'
requirements centributed to this problem.
The failure to
complete a code-required VT-3 inspection was identified as
VIO 50-321/96-11-02,
Failure to Perform an ASME Code-
Required VT-3 Inspection on HPCI Valve 1E41-F006.
c.
Conclusions
j
The inspectors concluded that an operability concern did not
i
exist for the HPCI injection valve.
The inspectors did not
i
identify other examples of missed code-required VT-3
inspections and concluded this was not a recurring problem.
E7
Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities
E7.1 Unit 2 Station Service Batteries
a.
Insoection ScoDe (92903)
The inspectors continued to monitor the licensee activities
involved with the sediment in the Unit 2 Station Service
(SS) Battery cells. Previous inspector observations are
documented in IR 50-321,366/96-07.
The inspectors were
informed that 52 of 120 cells had sediment in the bottom of
their jars.
-
b.
Observations and Findinos
The inspectors observed the preparation of a new battery
receiving and storage area in an onsite warehouse.
This
area was constructed so that replacement batteries received
on site could be stored in an area that has battery charging
capability as well as temperature and cleanliness controls.
The new cells can be maintained fully charged for
replacement when required.
l
c.
Conclusions
At the end of this report period, the inservice SS battery
capacity exceeded TS requirements.
Increased battery
,
Enclosure 2
__


                                                                                i
i
                                                                                l
l
                                                                                l
e
    e
1
                                                                                1
'
  '
l
                                                                                l
GPC
                                                                                l
20
      GPC                                20
monitoring and testing continued and no immediate
                monitoring and testing continued and no immediate
operability concerns were identified.
                operability concerns were identified. Onsite engineering         I
Onsite engineering
                was taking appropriate pre-installation measures to ensure     !
was taking appropriate pre-installation measures to ensure
                adequate replacement battery cell condition.
adequate replacement battery cell condition.
          E8     Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92700) (92903)
E8
          E8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-321/95-16-01: Contract Personnel Failure to       l
Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92700) (92903)
                Follow Procedure While Performing Maintenance on Valve           1
E8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-321/95-16-01:
                1E41-F003. This violation was identified after contract         '
Contract Personnel Failure to
                personnel performed GL 89-10 activities on valve 1E41-F003,     ,
Follow Procedure While Performing Maintenance on Valve
                HPCI Steam Isolation Valve. The contractors were under the
1E41-F003.
                control of site engineering personnel. The inspector             ,
This violation was identified after contract
                                                                              "
'
                reviewed the response from the licensee dated September 28,
personnel performed GL 89-10 activities on valve 1E41-F003,
                1995.   The valve was repaired. The licensee counseled site     '
,
                contractor representatives on the importance of following       l
HPCI Steam Isolation Valve.
                procedures. The inspectors reviewed records which indicated     '
The contractors were under the
                that all contractor valve technicians received procedure       ;
control of site engineering personnel.
                training. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's           1
The inspector
                corrective actions were appropriate.                             I
,
                                  JV. Plant Suonort
reviewed the response from the licensee dated September 28,
          R1   Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
"
          R1.1 Observation of Routine Radiolocical Controls
1995.
                                                                              ;
The valve was repaired.
          a.   Insoection Scoce (71750)                                       j
The licensee counseled site
                General Health Physics (HP) activities were observed during
'
                the report period. This included locked high radiation area     i
contractor representatives on the importance of following
                doors, proper radiological postings, and personnel frisking     l
procedures.
                upon exiting the Radiologically-Controlled Area (RCA). The
The inspectors reviewed records which indicated
                inspectors made frequent tours of the RCA and discussed
'
                radiological controls with HP technicians and HP management.
that all contractor valve technicians received procedure
                No deficiencies were identified.
training.
                                                                                1
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's
          R1.2 Misalioned Sucoression Pool Sample Valve
corrective actions were appropriate.
                                                                                )
JV. Plant Suonort
          a.   Insoection Scoce (71750)
R1
                The inspectors discovered Suppression Pool Sample Valve
Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
                2P33-F364 to be open on August 14. The valve is located on       l
R1.1 Observation of Routine Radiolocical Controls
                Sample Panel 2P33-P101 in the Reactor Building.                 I
;
          b.   Observations and Findinas
a.
                                                                                l
Insoection Scoce (71750)
                During a routine tour of the Reactor Building, the               '
j
                inspectors observed a steady stream of water flowing from
General Health Physics (HP) activities were observed during
                the Suppression Pool Sample Valve, 2P33-F364.
the report period.
                The inspectors reviewed the applicable plant procedure,         l
This included locked high radiation area
                64CH-SAM-004-OS, " General Chemistry Sampling," Rev.5, Ed. 1,   '
i
                dated November 7, 1995, and Piping and Instrumentation
doors, proper radiological postings, and personnel frisking
}                                                                 Enclosure 2
upon exiting the Radiologically-Controlled Area (RCA).
The
inspectors made frequent tours of the RCA and discussed
radiological controls with HP technicians and HP management.
No deficiencies were identified.
R1.2 Misalioned Sucoression Pool Sample Valve
a.
Insoection Scoce (71750)
The inspectors discovered Suppression Pool Sample Valve
2P33-F364 to be open on August 14.
The valve is located on
Sample Panel 2P33-P101 in the Reactor Building.
b.
Observations and Findinas
During a routine tour of the Reactor Building, the
'
inspectors observed a steady stream of water flowing from
the Suppression Pool Sample Valve, 2P33-F364.
The inspectors reviewed the applicable plant procedure,
64CH-SAM-004-OS, " General Chemistry Sampling," Rev.5, Ed.
1,
'
dated November 7,
1995, and Piping and Instrumentation
}
Enclosure 2


  *
*
                                                                            4
4
.
.
    GPC                               21
GPC
              Diagram (P&ID) which indicated that the normal position of
21
              the valve was closed. FSAR section 9.3.2, Process Sampling     ,
Diagram (P&ID) which indicated that the normal position of
              System, did not specifically indicate the normal position of   '
the valve was closed.
              the valve but stated that the sampling valve is for drawing
FSAR section 9.3.2,
              process fluid into a closed sample container.                 l
Process Sampling
                                                                            l
System, did not specifically indicate the normal position of
              The inspectors discussed the problem with chemistry           g
,
              personnel. The inspectors were informed that sampling flow     J
'
              through this sample valve and the corresponding valve on
the valve but stated that the sampling valve is for drawing
              Unit 1 was, as a matter of routine, left running because of
process fluid into a closed sample container.
              problems encountered with sample line blockage due to         i
l
              sediment buildup. The inspectors were not able to find any     I
l
              procedural guidance that allowed the continuous flow of       I
The inspectors discussed the problem with chemistry
              sampling streams to prevent line blockage for these valves.
g
                                                                            l
personnel.
                                                                            1
The inspectors were informed that sampling flow
              The licensee took immediate corrective action by returning     j
J
              the valve to its normal position as specified by procedure.   1
through this sample valve and the corresponding valve on
              The licensee stated they would monitor the buildup of
Unit 1 was, as a matter of routine, left running because of
              sediment in the sample lines.   In the future, if conditions j
problems encountered with sample line blockage due to
              warrant, a procedural change will be initiated prior to
i
              leaving any sample valves open to prevent line. blockage.
sediment buildup.
              The inspectors verified that the corresponding suppression
The inspectors were not able to find any
              pool sample valve on Unit 1 was in the closed position,
I
        c.   Conclusions
procedural guidance that allowed the continuous flow of
              This NRC-identified failure to follow procedure is being
I
              treated as an NCV consistent with Section IV of the NRC
sampling streams to prevent line blockage for these valves.
              Enforcement Policy. NCV 50-366/96-11-03, Failure to Follow
l
              Procedure for Sample Valve Lineup, was identified.
1
        R4   Staff Knowledge and Performance                               j
The licensee took immediate corrective action by returning
                                                                            1
j
        R4.1 Samolino Analysis Collection Technicues (71750)
the valve to its normal position as specified by procedure.
                                                                            1
1
              On August 8, Chemistry Department personnel informed the       d
The licensee stated they would monitor the buildup of
              operations Department that fuel oil samples collected on EDG
j
              1A and 1B fuel oil tanks and the diesel-driven fire pump
sediment in the sample lines.
              fuel oil tank were not within specifications. Analysis
In the future, if conditions
              indicated particulate at 16 milligrams per liter (mg/1) and
warrant, a procedural change will be initiated prior to
              11 mg/l for the 1A and 1B EDG, respectfully. The fire pump
leaving any sample valves open to prevent line. blockage.
              fuel oil analysis indicated particulate at 55 mg/1. TS
The inspectors verified that the corresponding suppression
              3.8.3.D for stored fuel oil requires total particulate to be
pool sample valve on Unit 1 was in the closed position,
              less that or equal to 10 mg/1. The Operations Department
c.
              immediately entered the appropriate TS LCO for the systems.
Conclusions
              The out-of-specification tanks were immediately re-sampled
This NRC-identified failure to follow procedure is being
              and the samples sent offsite for analysis. On August 9, the
treated as an NCV consistent with Section IV of the NRC
              re-analysis indicated satisfactory results. Chemistry
Enforcement Policy.
              personnel investigated the problem to determine the root
NCV 50-366/96-11-03, Failure to Follow
              cause for the discrepancy and identified areas for
Procedure for Sample Valve Lineup, was identified.
              improvement in the collection techniques. Licensee               l
R4
                                                                              l
Staff Knowledge and Performance
                                                                              i
j
                                                                Enclosure 2   l
1
                                                                              l
R4.1 Samolino Analysis Collection Technicues (71750)
                                                                              !
1
                                                                                l
On August 8,
                                                                              !
Chemistry Department personnel informed the
d
operations Department that fuel oil samples collected on EDG
1A and 1B fuel oil tanks and the diesel-driven fire pump
fuel oil tank were not within specifications.
Analysis
indicated particulate at 16 milligrams per liter (mg/1) and
11 mg/l for the 1A and 1B EDG, respectfully.
The fire pump
fuel oil analysis indicated particulate at 55 mg/1.
TS
3.8.3.D for stored fuel oil requires total particulate to be
less that or equal to 10 mg/1.
The Operations Department
immediately entered the appropriate TS LCO for the systems.
The out-of-specification tanks were immediately re-sampled
and the samples sent offsite for analysis.
On August 9,
the
re-analysis indicated satisfactory results.
Chemistry
personnel investigated the problem to determine the root
cause for the discrepancy and identified areas for
improvement in the collection techniques.
Licensee
l
i
Enclosure 2
l
l
!
!


        _ . _ _ .       _                 _ _ _ .     . _ . _ _ _ _       _ _ _     . _ _     _   __ _
_ . _ _ .
      *
_
_ _ _ .
. _ . _ _ _ _
_ _ _
. _
_
_
__ _
*
,
,
    .
.
o
o
;                 CPC                                 22
;
l                           representatives stated that they believed personnel
CPC
                            collecting the samples stirred up the bottom of the tanks
22
                            resulting in non- representative samples.             Poor collection
l
representatives stated that they believed personnel
collecting the samples stirred up the bottom of the tanks
resulting in non- representative samples.
Poor collection
-
techniques were also suspected as a problem during
,
,
-
subsequent backup sample collections.
                            techniques were also suspected as a problem during
Personnel who collected the samples were qualified in
                            subsequent backup sample collections.
collection techniques but had not recently performed the
                            Personnel who collected the samples were qualified in
task.
                            collection techniques but had not recently performed the
As part of the corrective actions, management
                            task.   As part of the corrective actions, management
cautioned personnel of the importance of obtaining
                            cautioned personnel of the importance of obtaining
representative samples and the impact and consequences of
:                            representative samples and the impact and consequences of
:
poor sampling techniques.
.
.
                            poor sampling techniques.
The inspectors reviewed and discussed the problem with
                            The inspectors reviewed and discussed the problem with
licensee management, reviewed applicable sampling procedures
l
4
4
                            licensee management, reviewed applicable sampling procedures                  i
                                                                                                            l
.
.
'                            and the licensees corrective actions.             The inspectors
and the licensees corrective actions.
                            concluded that poor sampling techniques were probably the
The inspectors
                            root cause of the problem.           More attention to detail during
'
                            the sample collection process may prevent similar problems.
concluded that poor sampling techniques were probably the
                            This was identified as an area for improvement in the
root cause of the problem.
                            chemistry sampling process.
More attention to detail during
                      P2     Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources
the sample collection process may prevent similar problems.
This was identified as an area for improvement in the
chemistry sampling process.
P2
Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources
'
'
                      P2.1 Facility Insoection
P2.1 Facility Insoection
a.
Inspection Scoce (82701)
'
'
                      a.    Inspection Scoce (82701)
;
;
                            The inspectors toured the facilities to determine whether
The inspectors toured the facilities to determine whether
!                           key facilities and equipment were adequately maintained in
!
                            accordance with the site Emergency Plan.
key facilities and equipment were adequately maintained in
accordance with the site Emergency Plan.
i
i
;                    b.     Observations and Findinas
b.
                            The inspectors toured the Technical Support Center (TSC)
Observations and Findinas
                            Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) , and Operational Support
;
                            Center (OSC). The inspectors witnessed the testing of
The inspectors toured the Technical Support Center (TSC)
                            selected telephones, fax machines, Safety Parameter Display
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) , and Operational Support
                            System (SPDS), Non-Regulated Emergency Response Data System
Center (OSC).
                              (ERDS), Dose Assessment Computer, and the Emergency
The inspectors witnessed the testing of
                            Notification Network (ENN) phone. The equipment operated
selected telephones, fax machines, Safety Parameter Display
                            properly. No significant changes had been made to the
System (SPDS), Non-Regulated Emergency Response Data System
.                           facilities.
(ERDS), Dose Assessment Computer, and the Emergency
i                           The inspectors reviewed documentation that indicated
Notification Network (ENN) phone.
The equipment operated
properly.
No significant changes had been made to the
facilities.
.
i
The inspectors reviewed documentation that indicated
surveillance of emergency equipment and verification of
'
'
                            surveillance of emergency equipment and verification of
communications capability were performed at the frequencies
                            communications capability were performed at the frequencies
specified in 73EP-TET-001-OS, Control And Testing Of
                            specified in 73EP-TET-001-OS, Control And Testing Of
Emergency Communication Equipment, Revision 4 Ed.
                            Emergency Communication Equipment, Revision 4 Ed.             1,
1,
                            Effective Date June 9, 1994. The inspectors noted that
Effective Date June 9,
                            deficiencies were resolved in a timely manner.
1994.
  ;                         The inspectors reviewed documentation that indicated
The inspectors noted that
]                           facility supplies were being inventoried and maintained in
deficiencies were resolved in a timely manner.
4
;
i
The inspectors reviewed documentation that indicated
                                                                                          Enclosure 2
]
facility supplies were being inventoried and maintained in
4
i
Enclosure 2
i
i
                      -
-
                          .
.


    . . .   .   - - . -     . - - - -   .. - . _ - . . - - -         ,       ..
. . .
.
- - . -
. - -
-
-
..
- . _ - . . - - -
,
..
l
l
l
l
        -
l
l
  .
-
          GPC                                               23
.
                        accordance with the requirement in 73EP-INS-001-OS,
GPC
                        Emergency Equipment Inventory, Revision 1, Effective Date
23
                        April 27, 1996. The inspectors randomly selected facility
accordance with the requirement in 73EP-INS-001-OS,
                        cabinets and audited emergency supplies and tested
Emergency Equipment Inventory, Revision 1,
                        equipment.   No discrepancies were identified by the
Effective Date
                        inspectors.
April 27, 1996.
              c.         Conclusion
The inspectors randomly selected facility
                        The inspectors concluded that the licensee maintained the
cabinets and audited emergency supplies and tested
                        facilities and equipment at a satisfactory level of
equipment.
I                       operational readiness.
No discrepancies were identified by the
              P2.2 Emercency Response Dose Assessment Cacabilities
inspectors.
              a.         Inspection Scoce (82701)
c.
                        Dose assessment capabilities were inspected to verify that
Conclusion
                        the licensee maintained continuous dose assessment
The inspectors concluded that the licensee maintained the
                        capabilities which used real time meteorological and
facilities and equipment at a satisfactory level of
                        radiological data. Also, the inspectors reviewed the
I
                        licensee's computerized dose assessment system to evaluate
operational readiness.
                        the training required to operate the system, the capability
P2.2 Emercency Response Dose Assessment Cacabilities
                        of the system, and verify that the licensee's system had
a.
                        been compared to Radiological Assessment System for
Inspection Scoce (82701)
                        Consequence Analysis (RASCAL).
Dose assessment capabilities were inspected to verify that
              b.         Observations and Findinos
the licensee maintained continuous dose assessment
capabilities which used real time meteorological and
radiological data.
Also, the inspectors reviewed the
licensee's computerized dose assessment system to evaluate
the training required to operate the system, the capability
of the system, and verify that the licensee's system had
been compared to Radiological Assessment System for
Consequence Analysis (RASCAL).
b.
Observations and Findinos
l
l
The licensee's Meteorological Information and Dose
'
'
                        The licensee's Meteorological Information and Dose
Assessment System (MIDAS) program was installed on
                        Assessment System (MIDAS) program was installed on
designated personal computers in the TSC and EOF and if
                        designated personal computers in the TSC and EOF and if
needed, the program could be loaded on other personal
                        needed, the program could be loaded on other personal
computers.
                        computers. Real time radiological and meteorological data
Real time radiological and meteorological data
                        was input to the computer. The program used default values
was input to the computer.
The program used default values
from WASH 1400 for the source terms and did not have the
,
,
'
'
                        from WASH 1400 for the source terms and did not have the
capability of using actual isotopic analysis data from a
                        capability of using actual isotopic analysis data from a
Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) sample.
                        Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) sample. MIDAS had the
MIDAS had the
                        capability to use field team radiological data to back
capability to use field team radiological data to back
l                       calculate a source term.
l
                        The inspectors observed the licensee perform several dose
calculate a source term.
                        assessment calculations using MIDAS. The inspectors
The inspectors observed the licensee perform several dose
                        observed that the computer dose assessment system was user
assessment calculations using MIDAS.
                        friendly and did not require extensive training to obtain a
The inspectors
                        dose assessment.
observed that the computer dose assessment system was user
                        The Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) and Reactor Operators
friendly and did not require extensive training to obtain a
                        (ROs) were trained to do on-shift dose assessment using the
dose assessment.
                        " Prompt offsite dose assessment" version of MIDAS. This was
The Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) and Reactor Operators
(ROs) were trained to do on-shift dose assessment using the
" Prompt offsite dose assessment" version of MIDAS.
This was
a simplified version of MIDAS which used some default
i
i
                        a simplified version of MIDAS which used some default
l
l                        values.   The operators received MIDAS training as part of
values.
l                       licensed operator training.
The operators received MIDAS training as part of
                                                                            Enclosure 2
l
licensed operator training.
Enclosure 2


  - _ .     - - . - . - . -             . .   - - .       - . -             _ - - ~ . ~ - - - . -     . . .-..-_   .- .
- _ .
          .
- - . - . - . -
      A
. .
                  GPC                                         24
- - .
                                  The inspectors verified that the licensee had compared dose
- . -
_ - - ~ . ~ - - - . -
. . .-..-_
.- .
.
A
GPC
24
The inspectors verified that the licensee had compared dose
j
j
                                  assessment calculations from MIDAS to calculations from
assessment calculations from MIDAS to calculations from
;                                 NRC's RASCAL and that the results were comparable,
;
NRC's RASCAL and that the results were comparable,
i
i
                            c.   Conclusion
c.
Conclusion
l
l
                                  The inspectors concluded that licensee personnel were
The inspectors concluded that licensee personnel were
                                  capable of performing on-shift dose assessments using real
capable of performing on-shift dose assessments using real
l                                time meteorology. The licensee's MIDAS dose assessment
l                                calculation program was user friendly and results were
l
l
time meteorology.
The licensee's MIDAS dose assessment
l
calculation program was user friendly and results were
l
comparable to those from RASCAL.
,
,
                                  comparable to those from RASCAL.
P2.3 Emeroency Operations Facility - Emeroency Ventilation System
                            P2.3 Emeroency Operations Facility - Emeroency Ventilation System
I
I                           a.   Insoection Scoce (82701)
a.
                                  The inspectors reviewed the EOF Emergency Ventilation System
Insoection Scoce (82701)
L                                 and its testing to determine if the licensee was maintair.ing
The inspectors reviewed the EOF Emergency Ventilation System
                                  the system in accordance with Emergency Plan requirenents.
L
                              b. Observations and Findinas
and its testing to determine if the licensee was maintair.ing
the system in accordance with Emergency Plan requirenents.
b.
Observations and Findinas
'
'
                                  The EOF was not designed as a hardened facility and the
The EOF was not designed as a hardened facility and the
l                                 licensee maintained a fully equipped backup EOF. The EOF's
l
l                                 Emergency Ventilation System was a zero pressure system with
licensee maintained a fully equipped backup EOF.
j                                 High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) Filters and no carbon
The EOF's
l
Emergency Ventilation System was a zero pressure system with
j
High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) Filters and no carbon
.
.
                                  filter.   In the emergency mode of operation, the Emergency
filter.
                                  ventilation System isolated outside air and recirculated air
In the emergency mode of operation, the Emergency
                                  in the EOF through HEPA filters. The inspectors interviewed
ventilation System isolated outside air and recirculated air
                                  the system engineer responsible for the system, performed a
in the EOF through HEPA filters.
                                  walkdown of the system, and observed an operational
The inspectors interviewed
                                  demonstration of the system. All components (dampers) and
the system engineer responsible for the system, performed a
                                  instrumentation worked properly.
walkdown of the system, and observed an operational
!                           c.   Conclusion
demonstration of the system.
All components (dampers) and
instrumentation worked properly.
!
c.
Conclusion
l
l
                                  The inspectors concluded that the licensee was testing and
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was testing and
                                  maintaining the EOF Emergency Ventilation System adequately.
maintaining the EOF Emergency Ventilation System adequately.
!
P2.4 Tone Alert Radios. Public Alert And Notification
Caoabilities
a.
Insoection Scone (82701)
This area was inspected to determine if the licensee's
method of notifying the public in the event of an emergency
was in accordance with the site Emergency Plan.
In
;
addition, the inspectors reviewed the system's procedures,
l
configuration, and reliability.
j
l
\\
!
!
                            P2.4 Tone Alert Radios. Public Alert And Notification
                                  Caoabilities
                            a.    Insoection Scone (82701)
                                  This area was inspected to determine if the licensee's
                                  method of notifying the public in the event of an emergency
                                  was in accordance with the site Emergency Plan. In
;                                addition, the inspectors reviewed the system's procedures,
l                                configuration, and reliability.                                                        j
                                                                                                                          l
\                                                                                                                        l
!                                                                                                                        !
!
!
l
l
                                                                                                  Enclosure 2
Enclosure 2
l
l
;                                                                                                                         I
;
l
l
l
l
i   -   _                               _     .     _ .         - - - - .                                   . . . . .
i
-
_
_
.
.
- - - - .
.
.
. . .


      . __   _   . . .   .-     _ _ . . _ . _   _           _ .__ _ _ __   -     _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _
. __
_
. . .
.-
_ _ .
. _ . _
_
_ .__ _ _ __
-
_
_ _ _ . . . _ .
_
!
.
!
!
    .
.
!  .
]
]
            GPC                                      25
]
]
!                b.      Observations and Findinos
GPC
25
!
!
                          The inspectors reviewed licensee's documentation and
b.
Observations and Findinos
!
The inspectors reviewed licensee's documentation and
discussed with the licensee, their public alert and
<
<
                          discussed with the licensee, their public alert and
notification process.
                          notification process. The licensee's system for alerting
The licensee's system for alerting
                          and notifying the public used approximately 2900 Tone Alert
and notifying the public used approximately 2900 Tone Alert
                          Radios located within about a ten mile radius of the plant.
Radios located within about a ten mile radius of the plant.
i                         The licensee maintained accountability of local business and
i
The licensee maintained accountability of local business and
4
4
                          residence within the ten-mile Emergency Preparedness Zone
residence within the ten-mile Emergency Preparedness Zone
i                          (EPZ) that needed Tone Alert Radios with the aid of the
i                        local electrical power companies. When a local business or
                          resident changed their electrical power services, the
;                        utility notified the licensee.
i
i
(EPZ) that needed Tone Alert Radios with the aid of the
i
i
                          In September 1995, Plant Hatch's National Oceanographic &
local electrical power companies.
;                         Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) service was discontinued
When a local business or
;                         from the Savannah, Georgia weather station and service was
resident changed their electrical power services, the
                          updated and switched to the National Weather Service (NWS)
;
.
utility notified the licensee.
                          in Jacksonville, Florida. The primary communication was
i
i
In September 1995, Plant Hatch's National Oceanographic &
;
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) service was discontinued
;
from the Savannah, Georgia weather station and service was
updated and switched to the National Weather Service (NWS)
.
in Jacksonville, Florida.
The primary communication was
'
'
                          from Jacksonville and utilized a leased line from
from Jacksonville and utilized a leased line from
                          Jacksonville to the Brunswick micro-wave tower, then the
Jacksonville to the Brunswick micro-wave tower, then the
                          Georgia Power Company (GPC) micro-wave system to the site.
Georgia Power Company (GPC) micro-wave system to the site.
A secondary line was a leased land line from Jacksonville to
'
'
                          A secondary line was a leased land line from Jacksonville to
1
1                        Plant Hatch.     The radios were operationally tested each
Plant Hatch.
The radios were operationally tested each
;
;
Wednesday when the NWS station generated a tone which was
'
'
                          Wednesday when the NWS station generated a tone which was
transmitted from the Plant Hatch NWS transmitter to activate
                          transmitted from the Plant Hatch NWS transmitter to activate
the tone alert radios.
In addition to the testing, there
-
-
                          the tone alert radios.    In addition to the testing, there
were numerous instances in 1995 and 1996 in which the system
                          were numerous instances in 1995 and 1996 in which the system
was activated for severe weather conditions.
                          was activated for severe weather conditions.     The inspectors
The inspectors
                          reviewed the 1995 annual report for the Tone Alert Radios.
reviewed the 1995 annual report for the Tone Alert Radios.
                          The report and supporting data indicated a 99 percent
The report and supporting data indicated a 99 percent
i                         ava: lability factor for 1995. There were two instances of
i
:                         minor losses of services during the year, one for 50 minutes
ava: lability factor for 1995.
!                         and another for 22 minutes.
There were two instances of
                c.       Conclusion
:
                          The inspectors concluded that the Tone Alert Radio system
minor losses of services during the year, one for 50 minutes
                          had been demonstrated to be reliable through testing and
!
                          actual actuation, and the system was being adequately
and another for 22 minutes.
                          maintained.
c.
                P3       EP Procedures and Documentation
Conclusion
                P3.1 Maintenance of th3 Emeroency Plan and Procedures
The inspectors concluded that the Tone Alert Radio system
                a.       Insoection Scone (8?701)
had been demonstrated to be reliable through testing and
                          The inspectors reviewed the licensee's process for making
actual actuation, and the system was being adequately
                          changes to the Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing
maintained.
                          Procedures (EIPs). The inspectors reviewed changes to the
P3
                          EIPs and verified that changes to the EIPs were in agreement
EP Procedures and Documentation
                          with and implemented the Emergency Plan.
P3.1 Maintenance of th3 Emeroency Plan and Procedures
                                                                                Enclosure 2
a.
Insoection Scone (8?701)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's process for making
changes to the Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing
Procedures (EIPs).
The inspectors reviewed changes to the
EIPs and verified that changes to the EIPs were in agreement
with and implemented the Emergency Plan.
Enclosure 2
i
i
j
j
.
.
J
J
j
j


    _ .   .     .
_ .
                                                                    __             _
.
;                                                                                       l
.
__
_
;
e
e
                                                                                        l
.
            .
-
-
        .                                                                             :
.
                                                                                        1
GPC
26
'
'
              GPC                                  26                                  I
:
:                                                                                       i
b.
                  b.   Observations and Findinos                                     1
Observations and Findinos
.                        Procedures were revised in accordance with administrative
1
Procedures were revised in accordance with administrative
.
procedure 10AC-MGR-003-OS, Preparation and Control of
,
4
'
'
,
Procedures.
                        procedure 10AC-MGR-003-OS, Preparation and Control of          4
Proposed changes to the Emergency Plan and EIPs
                        Procedures.   Proposed changes to the Emergency Plan and EIPs I
received a 50.59 evaluation and a review by the Plant Review
                        received a 50.59 evaluation and a review by the Plant Review
Board. The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation
t
t
                        Board. The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation
for four EIP changes.
4                        for four EIP changes. The inspectors reviewed the changes
The inspectors reviewed the changes
                        to evaluate the licensee's evaluation of the changes, and to
4
i                       independently evaluate the changes for the intent of the
to evaluate the licensee's evaluation of the changes, and to
.
i
                        change and to verify that the change continued to
independently evaluate the changes for the intent of the
I                       implemented the plan. A review of licensee records
.
;                       indicated that the revisions to the EIPs were satisfactory
change and to verify that the change continued to
                        and were submitted to the NRC within 30 days of the
I
                        implementation date, as required.                             l
implemented the plan.
l                        Controlled copies of the EIPs in the EOF and TSC were
A review of licensee records
l                       reviewed and determined to be maintained up to date.
;
indicated that the revisions to the EIPs were satisfactory
and were submitted to the NRC within 30 days of the
implementation date, as required.
l
Controlled copies of the EIPs in the EOF and TSC were
l
reviewed and determined to be maintained up to date.
1
1
;                 c.   Conclusion
;
c.
Conclusion
i
i
;                        The inspectors concluded that the licensee's review process
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's review process
;                       was satisfactory and met the requirements of
;
                        10 CFR 50.54(q).
was satisfactory and met the requirements of
j                 P3.2 Use Of The Emeroency Implementino Procedures
;
                  a.   Insoection Scoce (82701)
10 CFR 50.54(q).
                        The inspectors reviewed the licensee's event declaration to
j
                        verify that the event was properly classified and the
P3.2 Use Of The Emeroency Implementino Procedures
                        Emergency Implementing Procedures were properly implemented.
a.
;                 b.   Observations and Findinos
Insoection Scoce (82701)
!                       The inspectors reviewed the licensee's one event declaration
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's event declaration to
;                       since the last inspection conducted in April 1995.
verify that the event was properly classified and the
:                       On March 20, 1996, a NOUE was declared due to a
Emergency Implementing Procedures were properly implemented.
                        contaminated, injured individual being transferred off-site
;
,                        to a local hospital.
b.
I                  c.    Conclusion
Observations and Findinos
!
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's one event declaration
;
since the last inspection conducted in April 1995.
:
On March 20, 1996, a NOUE was declared due to a
contaminated, injured individual being transferred off-site
to a local hospital.
,
,
                        The inspectors concluded that the event was properly
I
;                       classified, the notification was made in a timely manner,
c.
!                       and the applicable EIP was implemented.
Conclusion
,
The inspectors concluded that the event was properly
;
classified, the notification was made in a timely manner,
!
and the applicable EIP was implemented.
i
i
a
a
  I
I
1
1
  i
i
l                                                                           Enclosure 2
l
Enclosure 2
J
J
:
:
!
!
l
l
. .
- _


.
.
  GPC                                 27
GPC
      P5   Staff Training and Qualification in EP
27
      PS.1 Trainino of Emercency Response Personnel
P5
      a.   Inspection Scoce (82701)
Staff Training and Qualification in EP
            The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Response Training
PS.1 Trainino of Emercency Response Personnel
            Program and verified that emergency response personnel were
a.
            initially trained and retrained annually to maintain their
Inspection Scoce (82701)
            training current.
The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Response Training
      b.   Observations and Findinos
Program and verified that emergency response personnel were
            The inspectors reviewed Plant E.I. Hatch System Master Plan
initially trained and retrained annually to maintain their
            for Emergency Preparedness Training. The Master Plan
training current.
            described the program, position, qualification requirements,
b.
            required job performance task, and initial and continuing
Observations and Findinos
            training requirements. Emergency Response Organization
The inspectors reviewed Plant E.I.
            (ERO) training consisted of completing job task, classroom
Hatch System Master Plan
            training, and self study. The inspectors selected two
for Emergency Preparedness Training. The Master Plan
            lesson plans and their associated exams from the Master Plan
described the program, position, qualification requirements,
            for review. The inspectors concluded from the review that
required job performance task, and initial and continuing
            the lesson plans satisfactorily covered the information
training requirements.
            necessary for the position; the lesson plans were organized
Emergency Response Organization
            and contained the appropriate depth of material; and the
(ERO) training consisted of completing job task, classroom
            exams were challenging.
training, and self study.
            The inspector selected six individuals within the ERO from
The inspectors selected two
            the current revision of the Emergency Response Position
lesson plans and their associated exams from the Master Plan
            Matrix and reviewed their training records against their
for review.
            required training. All of the individual qualifications
The inspectors concluded from the review that
            reviewed by the inspectors were up-to-date,
the lesson plans satisfactorily covered the information
      c.   Conclusion
necessary for the position; the lesson plans were organized
            The inspectors concluded that the licensee maintained a
and contained the appropriate depth of material; and the
            satisfactory Emergency Preparedness training program.
exams were challenging.
      P5.2 Emeroency Plannino Drills
The inspector selected six individuals within the ERO from
      a.   Insoection Scope (82701)
the current revision of the Emergency Response Position
            The inspectors compared the licensee drill commitments to
Matrix and reviewed their training records against their
            the actual drills performed, and evaluated the quality of
required training.
            those drills.
All of the individual qualifications
      b.   Observations and Findinos
reviewed by the inspectors were up-to-date,
            The inspectors reviewed and compared the licensee's drill
c.
            documentation to Section N, Exercises and Drills of their
Conclusion
            Emergency Plan, and the requirement in 73EP-ADM-001-OS,
The inspectors concluded that the licensee maintained a
            Maintaining Emergency Preparedness, Revision 3, Effective
satisfactory Emergency Preparedness training program.
            Date April 9, 1996. The inspectors found the licensee's
P5.2 Emeroency Plannino Drills
            documentation to be well-organized. The licensee's drill
a.
                                                              Enclosure 2
Insoection Scope (82701)
The inspectors compared the licensee drill commitments to
the actual drills performed, and evaluated the quality of
those drills.
b.
Observations and Findinos
The inspectors reviewed and compared the licensee's drill
documentation to Section N,
Exercises and Drills of their
Emergency Plan, and the requirement in 73EP-ADM-001-OS,
Maintaining Emergency Preparedness, Revision 3, Effective
Date April 9,
1996.
The inspectors found the licensee's
documentation to be well-organized.
The licensee's drill
Enclosure 2


  .  --                                  .  - .-      - . - _ - _ - _ _ _ - - . .        .~ - .
.
.
          .
--
    '
.
- .-
- . - _ - _ - _ _ _ - - . .
.~ -
.
.
.
'
i-
i-
            GPC                                   28
GPC
                      scenarios were satisfactory, the critiques were objective,
28
                      and the drill comments or action items were well-documentad
scenarios were satisfactory, the critiques were objective,
                      and tracked.
and the drill comments or action items were well-documentad
I               c.   Conclusion
and tracked.
I
c.
Conclusion
l
l
l                     The licensee satisfactorily met their its drill commitments.
l
                P6   EP Organization and Administration
The licensee satisfactorily met their its drill commitments.
                a.   Insoection Scoce (82701)
P6
                      The inspectors reviewed this area to determine if any
EP Organization and Administration
                      changes in management or personnel had occurred which would
a.
                      affect the efficiency or performance of the ERO.
Insoection Scoce (82701)
                b.   Observations and Findinos
The inspectors reviewed this area to determine if any
                      The inspectors reviewed the licensee ERO structure and
changes in management or personnel had occurred which would
                      discussed the current ERO with the Emergency Preparedness
affect the efficiency or performance of the ERO.
                      Coordinator.
b.
                c.   Conclusion
Observations and Findinos
                      The inspectors concluded that since the last inspection in
The inspectors reviewed the licensee ERO structure and
                      April 1995, no onsite management or significant personnel
discussed the current ERO with the Emergency Preparedness
                      changes had occurred which would affect the performance or
Coordinator.
                      maintenance of the Emergency Preparedness Program.
c.
                P7   Quality Assurance in EP Activities
Conclusion
                P7.1 Recuired 10 CFR 50. 54 (t) Audit Of Emeroency Preparedness
The inspectors concluded that since the last inspection in
                      Procram
April 1995, no onsite management or significant personnel
                a.   Inspection Scoce (82701)
changes had occurred which would affect the performance or
                      The inspectors reviewed this area to assess the quality of
maintenance of the Emergency Preparedness Program.
                      the required audit, the qualifications of the auditors, and
P7
                      verify that the audit met the requirements of
Quality Assurance in EP Activities
                      10 CFR 50.54(t).
P7.1 Recuired 10 CFR 50. 54 (t) Audit Of Emeroency Preparedness
                b.   Observations and Findinos
Procram
                      The inspector reviewed SAER-07, " Hatch Project Safety Audit
a.
                      And Engineering Review Procedure For SAER Audits", Revision
Inspection Scoce (82701)
                      8, dated December 12, 1995.   The procedure required an
The inspectors reviewed this area to assess the quality of
                      " Audit Planning Matrix" to be prepared once per year for the
the required audit, the qualifications of the auditors, and
                      upcoming year and the final revision to be distributed to
verify that the audit met the requirements of
                      the SRB. The Audit Planning Matrix was to list the Audit
10 CFR 50.54(t).
                      Area Titles and a breakdown of the Audit Elements.               Lead
b.
                      Auditors were to use the Audit Planning Matrix to prepare an
Observations and Findinos
                      audit plan and checklist.
The inspector reviewed SAER-07, " Hatch Project Safety Audit
                                                                                    Enclosure 2
And Engineering Review Procedure For SAER Audits", Revision
8,
dated December 12, 1995.
The procedure required an
" Audit Planning Matrix" to be prepared once per year for the
upcoming year and the final revision to be distributed to
the SRB.
The Audit Planning Matrix was to list the Audit
Area Titles and a breakdown of the Audit Elements.
Lead
Auditors were to use the Audit Planning Matrix to prepare an
audit plan and checklist.
Enclosure 2


    __.       _ _ _ _ .   _ __ _ _. __             . . . . _ . - __ _ _ _ _ . _
__.
        .
_
  .
_
                                                                                            1
_ _ .
_ __ _ _. __
. . . . _ . -
__ _ _ _ _ . _
.
.
1
'
'
          GPC                               29
GPC
29
'
'
                  The inspectors reviewed the Audit Planning Matrix for the
The inspectors reviewed the Audit Planning Matrix for the
                  Emergency Plan. The matrix listed fifteen areas which                     '
Emergency Plan.
The matrix listed fifteen areas which
'
corresponded to the titles of each chapter in the Emergency
)
I
I
                  corresponded to the titles of each chapter in the Emergency                )
Plan.
                  Plan.                                                                     l
l
                  The inspector reviewed Audit 95-EP-2, which was a three-
The inspector reviewed Audit 95-EP-2, which was a three-
                  person audit conducted between November 13, and December 13,
person audit conducted between November 13, and December 13,
                  1595.
,
                                                                                            ,
1595.
The audit was considered by the licensee to be the
-
-
                          The audit was considered by the licensee to be the                I
annual Emergency Preparedness. Audit required by
                  annual Emergency Preparedness. Audit required by                           l
l
                  10 CFR 50.54(t). The cover letter stated that the audit was
10 CFR 50.54(t).
                  based upon completing the fifteen elements specified in the
The cover letter stated that the audit was
                  Audit Planning Matrix. The inspectors reviewed each
based upon completing the fifteen elements specified in the
                  auditor's checklists and noted that the audit was not based
Audit Planning Matrix.
                  upon or conducted in accordance with the Planning Matrix or
The inspectors reviewed each
                  as specified in the report cover letter. The actual audit
auditor's checklists and noted that the audit was not based
                  was performed using the guidance in an Institute of Nuclear               l
upon or conducted in accordance with the Planning Matrix or
                  Power Operations (INPO) document, 85-014, " Generic Guidanco               I
as specified in the report cover letter.
                  For Emergency Preparedness Review." The auditors' checklist
The actual audit
                  and notes mirrored the elements, A through G, and the
was performed using the guidance in an Institute of Nuclear
                  elements breakdown in the INPO document. The audit
Power Operations (INPO) document, 85-014, " Generic Guidanco
                  contained 118 element breakdowns. In reviewing the
For Emergency Preparedness Review."
                  auditors' notes, the inspectors noted that, for some issues,
The auditors' checklist
                  the auditors relied on discussions with EP staff but did not
and notes mirrored the elements, A through G,
                  independently verify their results.
and the
                  One element breakdown questioned whether the EIPs provided a
elements breakdown in the INPO document.
                  space for a check mark or initial to indicate that the step
The audit
                  had been complete. The audit result indicated that the
contained 118 element breakdowns.
                  procedures did provide a space. The inspectors independently
In reviewing the
                  reviewed approximately five different EIP's and did not
auditors' notes, the inspectors noted that, for some issues,
                  observe any such provision in the EIPs.
the auditors relied on discussions with EP staff but did not
                  There were no issues identified by the licensee in the Audit
independently verify their results.
                  report.
One element breakdown questioned whether the EIPs provided a
                  The inspector reviewed the audit to verify that the elements
space for a check mark or initial to indicate that the step
                  identified in 10 CFR 50.54(t) were addressed. The
had been complete.
                  inspectors noted that Audit 95-EP-2 did not address the
The audit result indicated that the
                  requirement in 10 CFR 50.54 (t) for " Adequacy of interface
procedures did provide a space. The inspectors independently
                  with State and local governments." After discussions with
reviewed approximately five different EIP's and did not
                  the licensee, it was determined that the element was covered
observe any such provision in the EIPs.
                  in an independent Corporate audit, Audit Report No. 96-3.
There were no issues identified by the licensee in the Audit
                  The inspectors reviewed the qualification requirements for
report.
                  an auditor and lead auditor and concluded that the program
The inspector reviewed the audit to verify that the elements
                  qualification requirements were in accordance with American
identified in 10 CFR 50.54(t) were addressed.
                  National Standards Institute, Inc. (ANSI)-N45.2.23. The
The
                  inspectors reviewed each auditor's qualification card and
inspectors noted that Audit 95-EP-2 did not address the
                  noted that their qualifications were satisfactorily
requirement in 10 CFR 50.54 (t) for " Adequacy of interface
                  completed and up-to-date.
with State and local governments."
                                                                                Enclosure 2
After discussions with
the licensee, it was determined that the element was covered
in an independent Corporate audit, Audit Report No. 96-3.
The inspectors reviewed the qualification requirements for
an auditor and lead auditor and concluded that the program
qualification requirements were in accordance with American
National Standards Institute, Inc. (ANSI)-N45.2.23.
The
inspectors reviewed each auditor's qualification card and
noted that their qualifications were satisfactorily
completed and up-to-date.
Enclosure 2


    .     ~ . . .   . --.   - - . . ~ ---- . . -           . ~ . - -     .- -.     -.- - . -
.
        .
~ . . .
      .
.
            GPC                                     30
--.
                  c.   Conclusion
- - . . ~
                      The inspectors concluded that the audit performed did not
---- . . -
                        independently verify some conclusions and at least one audit
. ~
                        finding was incorrect. Although the audit was not conducted
. - -
.- -.
-.- -
.
-
.
.
GPC
30
c.
Conclusion
The inspectors concluded that the audit performed did not
independently verify some conclusions and at least one audit
finding was incorrect.
Although the audit was not conducted
in accordance with the Audit Planning Matrix, the aggregate
,
,
                      in accordance with the Audit Planning Matrix, the aggregate
j
j
                      of the audit elements satisfied the 10 CFR 50.54 (t)
of the audit elements satisfied the 10 CFR 50.54 (t)
                      requirement for an annual independent. audit of the~EP
requirement for an annual independent. audit of the~EP
                      program. The inspectors concluded that the auditors                         l
program.
The inspectors concluded that the auditors
,
,
qualification program was satisfactory and the auditors were
qualified.
'
'
                      qualification program was satisfactory and the auditors were
                      qualified.
I
I
                  P7.2 Licensee's Corrective Action Procram For Drill Comments and
P7.2 Licensee's Corrective Action Procram For Drill Comments and
                        Issues
Issues
                  a.   Insoection Scoce (82701)                                                   l
a.
                      The area was inspected to evaluate the licensee's corrective
Insoection Scoce (82701)
.                     actions to comments and issues identified in their drills.
The area was inspected to evaluate the licensee's corrective
.
actions to comments and issues identified in their drills.
J
J
                  b.   Observations and Findinas
b.
                      The inspectors reviewed the licensee's drill documentation
Observations and Findinas
                      and verified that significant critique comments were being
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's drill documentation
                      tracked and resolved.       Emergency Preparedness issues were
and verified that significant critique comments were being
tracked and resolved.
Emergency Preparedness issues were
tracked on-the licensee's Action Item Tracking (AIT) system.
.
.
For each issue, the AIT gave a description of the issue,
*
*
                        tracked on-the licensee's Action Item Tracking (AIT) system.
J.
                      For each issue, the AIT gave a description of the issue,
identified the responsible group and person, and indicated
                      identified the responsible group and person, and indicated
its status and estimated completion date.
J.                      its status and estimated completion date.       Individuals
Individuals
,                      maintained a file on the issues assigned to them, and when
maintained a file on the issues assigned to them, and when
{                     the AIT was updated, the individual was responsible to
,
                      review the status of their issues. The inspectors noted
{
the AIT was updated, the individual was responsible to
review the status of their issues.
The inspectors noted
from the review of the AIT that there were few issues older
-
-
                        from the review of the AIT that there were few issues older
than one year old,
                      than one year old,
c.
                  c.   Conclusion
Conclusion
                      The inspectors' review concluded that the emergency
The inspectors' review concluded that the emergency
                      preparedness issues were satisfactorily tracked and resolved
preparedness issues were satisfactorily tracked and resolved
                        in a timely manner. The licensee's resolution of items
in a timely manner.
                        tracked was adequate.
The licensee's resolution of items
tracked was adequate.
P8
Miscellaneous EP Issues
,
,
                  P8  Miscellaneous EP Issues
P8.1 (Closed) Follow-uo Item 50-321.366/95-09-01:
                  P8.1 (Closed) Follow-uo Item 50-321.366/95-09-01: Correction of
Correction of
                      discrepancies between the Plan and EIPs regarding follow-up
discrepancies between the Plan and EIPs regarding follow-up
  i
i
                      notifications to the State and counties at the Alert level
notifications to the State and counties at the Alert level
                      and above. The inspector reviewed and verified that
and above.
                      procedures 73EP-EIP-004-OS, Duties Of Emergency Director,
The inspector reviewed and verified that
                      Revision 5, Effective Date July 26, 1995 and
procedures 73EP-EIP-004-OS, Duties Of Emergency Director,
Revision 5,
Effective Date July 26, 1995 and
73EP-EIP-073-OS, Offsite Emergency Notifications,
^
^
                      73EP-EIP-073-OS, Offsite Emergency Notifications,
Revision 11, Effective Date July 19, 1995, had been revised
  +
+
                      Revision 11, Effective Date July 19, 1995, had been revised
i
  i                   to correct discrepancies regarding follow-up notifications
to correct discrepancies regarding follow-up notifications
                      to State and local officials during declared emergencies.
to State and local officials during declared emergencies.
  i
i
  !
!
                                                                                  Enclosure 2
Enclosure 2
  a
a
  f
f
  .
.
--


                                                                                l
.
                                                                                l
i
                                                                                l
GPC
  .                                                                             I
31
                                                                                i
The applicable emergency preparedness training material was
                                                                                l
revised to reflect the changes to the procedures.
    GPC                                    31
Both
                                                                                l
              The applicable emergency preparedness training material was       l
'
'
              revised to reflect the changes to the procedures.        Both      !
procedures had been changed to require follow-up
              procedures had been changed to require follow-up
notifications to be performed " periodically."
              notifications to be performed " periodically."
P8.2 Conclusion / Assessment
        P8.2 Conclusion / Assessment
i
                                                                                i
The licensee Emergency Preparedness Program plan and
              The licensee Emergency Preparedness Program plan and               l
procedures, training equipment, and response facilities were
              procedures, training equipment, and response facilities were       l
being satisfactorily maintained.
              being satisfactorily maintained. The licensee properly
The licensee properly
              classified an event and made the necessary notifications in
classified an event and made the necessary notifications in
              a timely manner. Licensee personnel were capable of
a timely manner.
              performing on-shift dose assessments. The tone alert radio
Licensee personnel were capable of
              system was reliable and adequately maintained. Licensee
performing on-shift dose assessments.
              drill comments were satisfactorily resolved in a timely
The tone alert radio
              manner.                                                           1
system was reliable and adequately maintained.
        S2   Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
Licensee
              The inspectors toured the protected area and coserved that
drill comments were satisfactorily resolved in a timely
              the perimeter fence was intact and not compromised by
manner.
              erosion nor disrepair. The fence fabric was secured and
S2
              barbed wire was angled as required by the licensee's Plant
Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
              Security Plan (PSP).       Isolation zones were maintained on
The inspectors toured the protected area and coserved that
              both sides of the barrier and were free of objects which
the perimeter fence was intact and not compromised by
              could shield or conceal an individual. The inspectors
erosion nor disrepair.
              observed that personnel and packages entering the protected
The fence fabric was secured and
              area were searched either by special purpose detectors or by
barbed wire was angled as required by the licensee's Plant
              a physical search for firearms, explosives and contraband.
Security Plan (PSP).
              Badge issuance was observed, as was the processing and
Isolation zones were maintained on
              escorting of visitors. Vehicles were searched, escorted,
both sides of the barrier and were free of objects which
              and secured as described in the PSP. The inspectors
could shield or conceal an individual.
              verified that the security procedures addressed suspension
The inspectors
              of safeguards during emergencies in accordance with 10 CFR
observed that personnel and packages entering the protected
              50. 54 (x) and 50. 54 (y) .
area were searched either by special purpose detectors or by
              The inspectors concluded that the areas of the PSP inspected
a physical search for firearms, explosives and contraband.
              met the PSP requirements.
Badge issuance was observed, as was the processing and
                              V. Manacement Meetinas
escorting of visitors.
        X.   Review of UFSAR Commitments
Vehicles were searched, escorted,
              A recent discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a
and secured as described in the PSP.
              manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
The inspectors
              (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a special
verified that the security procedures addressed suspension
              focused review that compares plant practices, procedures
of safeguards during emergencies in accordance with 10 CFR
              and/or parameters to the UFSAR description. While
50. 54 (x) and 50. 54 (y) .
              performing the inspections discussed in this report, the
The inspectors concluded that the areas of the PSP inspected
              inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR
met the PSP requirements.
l             that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors
V.
              verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the
Manacement Meetinas
l             observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters.
X.
Review of UFSAR Commitments
A recent discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a
manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a special
focused review that compares plant practices, procedures
and/or parameters to the UFSAR description.
While
performing the inspections discussed in this report, the
inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR
l
that related to the areas inspected.
The inspectors
verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the
l
observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters.
!
!
i                                                                   Enclosure 2
i
Enclosure 2


  .
.
.
    *GPC                               32
.
        X.1 Exit Meeting Summary
*GPC
            The inspectors presented the inspection results to members     )
32
            of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection
X.1
            on September 20, 1996. The license acknowledged the
Exit Meeting Summary
            findings presented. An interim exit was conducted on
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members
            August 30, 1996.
of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection
            The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials         ;
on September 20, 1996.
            examined during the inspection should be considered
The license acknowledged the
            proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
findings presented.
        X.2 Other NRC Personnel On Site
An interim exit was conducted on
            On August 19-20, 1996, Mr. P.H. Skinner, Chief Reactor         i
August 30, 1996.
            Projects Branch 2, visited the site. He met with the           l
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials
            resident inspector staff and discussed plant issues,
examined during the inspection should be considered
            licensee performance, and generic issues. He also attended     l
proprietary.
            licensee management meetings and met with licensee             !
No proprietary information was identified.
            management to discuss licensee performance and regulatory       l
X.2
            issues.                                                         l
Other NRC Personnel On Site
                                                                            l
On August 19-20, 1996, Mr.
                      PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED                     l
P.H. Skinner, Chief Reactor
            Licensee
i
            Anderson, J., Unit Superintendent                               i
Projects Branch 2, visited the site.
            Betsill, J., Operations Manager                                 l
He met with the
            Coggin, C., Engineering Support Manager                         l
l
            Curtis, S., Operations Support Superintendent                   I
resident inspector staff and discussed plant issues,
            Davis, D., Plant Administration Manager                         l
licensee performance, and generic issues.
            Fornel, P., Performance Team Manager
He also attended
            Fraser, O., Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor
licensee management meetings and met with licensee
            Hammonds, J., Regulatory Compliance Supervisor                 l
management to discuss licensee performance and regulatory
            Kirkley, W., Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
issues.
            Lewis, J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
l
            Moore, C., Assistant General Manager - Plant Support           l
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
            Reddick, R., Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
Licensee
            Roberts, P., Outages and Planning Manager
Anderson,
            Sumner, H., General Manager - Nuclear Plant
J.,
            Thompson, J., Nuclear Security Manager
Unit Superintendent
            Tipps, S., Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
Betsill,
            Wells, P., Assistant General Manager - Operations
J.,
                          INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
Operations Manager
            IP 37551:   Onsite Engineering
Coggin,
            IP 40500:   Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in
C.,
                          Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems   l
Engineering Support Manager
            IP 61726: Surveillance Observations                           l
Curtis,
            IP 62703: Maintenance Observation                             l
S.,
            IP 62707: Maintenance Observation                             l
Operations Support Superintendent
            IP 71707: Plant Operations                                   l
Davis,
            IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
D.,
                                                                Enclosure 2 :
Plant Administration Manager
                                                                            1
Fornel,
                                                                            !
P., Performance Team Manager
                                                                            1
Fraser,
                                                          _
O.,
Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor
Hammonds,
J.,
Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
Kirkley,
W.,
Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
Lewis,
J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
Moore,
C.,
Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
Reddick,
R.,
Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
Roberts,
P.,
Outages and Planning Manager
Sumner,
H.,
General Manager - Nuclear Plant
Thompson,
J.,
Nuclear Security Manager
Tipps,
S.,
Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
Wells,
P.,
Assistant General Manager - Operations
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in
Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems
IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations
IP 62703:
Maintenance Observation
IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation
IP 71707:
Plant Operations
IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities
Enclosure 2


    .-.-.-.-. _ -. . - - _ ..-.- .-_ - -. - . .- _ ..- .-.- _ .-....~. _ ._ .. - . - ._. .
.-.-.-.-. _ -. . - - _ ..-.- .-_ - -. - . .- _ ..- .-.- _ .-....~. _ ._ .. - . - ._. .
                      -
-
                                                                                                                                                                1
'
          '
:
                                                                                                                                                                :
i
                                                                                                                                                                i
GPC
                                GPC                                                                       33                                                   !
33
                                                                IP 82701:                   Operational Status Of The Emergency Preparedness
IP 82701:
                                                                                              Program
Operational Status Of The Emergency Preparedness
                                                                IP 92700:                   Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine
Program
            *
IP 92700:
Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine
*
Events at Power Reactor Facilities
r
r
'
'
                                                                                              Events at Power Reactor Facilities
IP 92901:
                                                                IP 92901:                   Followup - Operations
Followup - Operations
                                                        p IP 92902:                         Followup - Maintenance / Surveillance
p IP 92902:
                                                            NIP 92903:                       Followup - Followup Engineering
Followup - Maintenance / Surveillance
                                                                                      ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
NIP 92903:
Followup - Followup Engineering
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
!
!
!
!                                                              Opened
Opened
I
I
!                                                               50-321,366/96-11-01                     IFI     Review of Engineering Report
!
l                                                                                                                on the Effects of Harmonics on
50-321,366/96-11-01
                                                                                                                EDG Operation (Section E2.1).
IFI
                                                                50-321/96-11-02                        VIO      Failure to Perform an ASME
Review of Engineering Report
                                                                                                                Code Required VT-3 Inspection
                                                                                                                on HPCI Valve 1E41-F006, was
                                                                                                                  identified (Section E2.2).
    $                                                        Closed
l
l
                                                                50-321,366/95-09-01                     IFI     Correction of discrepancies
on the Effects of Harmonics on
l                                                                                                               between the Plan and EIPs
EDG Operation (Section E2.1).
;                                                                                                                 regarding follow-up
50-321/96-11-02
                                                                                                                notifications to the State and
VIO
                                                                                                                counties at the Alert level
Failure to Perform an ASME
;                                                                                                               and above (Section P8.1).
Code Required VT-3 Inspection
                                                                50-321/95-16-01                         VIO     Contract personnel failure to                 ]
on HPCI Valve 1E41-F006, was
                                                                                                                  follow procedure while                       !
identified (Section E2.2).
                                                                                                                performing maintenance on                     !
$
Closed
l
50-321,366/95-09-01
IFI
Correction of discrepancies
l
between the Plan and EIPs
;
regarding follow-up
notifications to the State and
counties at the Alert level
;
and above (Section P8.1).
50-321/95-16-01
VIO
Contract personnel failure to
]
follow procedure while
performing maintenance on
valve 1E41-F003
i
i
                                                                                                                valve 1E41-F003
!                                                                                                                  (Section E8.1).
                                                                50-321,366/95-18-02                    VIO      Failure to follow Procedure.                  I
                                                                                                                                                                !
                                                                                                                  First example (Section M8.2).
                                                                                                                Second example (Section 08.5).
                                                                50-366/95-26-01                        VIO      Inability to safely shutdown
                                                                                                                Unit 2 from Remote Shutdown
                                                                                                                  Panel in the event of a fire
                                                                                                                  in the Main Control Room
                                                                                                                  (Section 08.4).
                                                                50-321/95-23-01                        VIO      Operators' failure to follow
                                                                                                                procedure while transferring
                                                                                                                diesel fuel oil
                                                                                                                  (Section 08.3).
  .
!
!
i                                                                                                                                       Enclosure 2
(Section E8.1).
50-321,366/95-18-02
VIO
Failure to follow Procedure.
First example (Section M8.2).
Second example (Section 08.5).
50-366/95-26-01
VIO
Inability to safely shutdown
Unit 2 from Remote Shutdown
Panel in the event of a fire
in the Main Control Room
(Section 08.4).
50-321/95-23-01
VIO
Operators' failure to follow
procedure while transferring
diesel fuel oil
(Section 08.3).
.
!
i
Enclosure 2
l
l
l
l
.
.
            wwa -                                                         r- , ,w       4   e-           +         - -r iw-- e-wi   ,- >w-w, e- -
wwa -
                                                                                                                                                        -g,+y9
r-
,
,w
4
e-
+
-
-r
iw--
ni
e-wi
,-
>w-w,
e-
-
-g,+y9


  .   _ .. ~ .   - - - - - - - - . _ _ _ - - -                               ..- - . - .- ._ - . .. -.. _ ..- -.             ..-. - . .
.
                                                                                                                                        1
_ .. ~ .
        -                                                                                                                               j
- - - - - - - - . _ _ _ - - -
    -
..- - . - .- ._ - . .. -.. _ ..- -.
                                                                                                                                        l
..-. - .
              GPC                                                  34
.
                                        50-366/96-03             LER     High Pressure Coolant
j
                                                                          Injection System Temporarily
-
                                                                          Inoperable Following
-
                                                                          Engineering Safety Feature
GPC
l                                                                         Actuation (Section M8.1) .
34
                                        50-321,366/96-07-01       URI     Determine Safety Significance
50-366/96-03
                                                                          and Testing Requirements for
LER
                                                                          Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment
High Pressure Coolant
                                                                          Isolation Status Panel
Injection System Temporarily
                                                                          (Section                     08.1).
Inoperable Following
                                        50-321/96-11             LER   . Inadequate Procedure Results
Engineering Safety Feature
                                                                          in Missed Technical
l
!                                                                         Specifications Surveillances
Actuation (Section M8.1) .
                                                                          (Section 08.2).
50-321,366/96-07-01
                                        50-321,366/96-11-01       NCV     Failure to Test or Verify the
URI
                                                                          Function as Described in USFAR
Determine Safety Significance
                                                                          of the Isolation valve
and Testing Requirements for
                                                                          Indication on the Containment
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment
Isolation Status Panel
(Section
08.1).
50-321/96-11
LER
. Inadequate Procedure Results
in Missed Technical
!
Specifications Surveillances
(Section 08.2).
50-321,366/96-11-01
NCV
Failure to Test or Verify the
Function as Described in USFAR
of the Isolation valve
Indication on the Containment
Isolation Status Panels
,
,
'
'
                                                                          Isolation Status Panels
(Section 08.1).
                                                                          (Section 08.1).
50-366/96-11-03
                                        50-366/96-11-03         NCV     Failure to Follow Procedure
NCV
                                                                          for Sample Valve Lineup
Failure to Follow Procedure
                                                                          (Section R1.2).
for Sample Valve Lineup
                                                          LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
(Section R1.2).
                                        AIT     -
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
                                                  Action Item Tracking
AIT
                                        ASME -     American Society of Mechanical Engineers
-
I                                       cfm     -
Action Item Tracking
                                                  cubic feet per minute
ASME -
                                        CFR     -
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
                                                  Code of Federal Regulations
I
                                        CR       -
cfm
                                                  Control Room
-
l                                       CRD     -
cubic feet per minute
                                                  Control Rod Drive
CFR
!                                       DC       -
-
                                                  Design Change
Code of Federal Regulations
                                        DCR     -
CR
                                                  Design Change Request
-
                                        ECCS -     Emergency Core Cooling Systems
Control Room
                                        EDG     -
l
                                                  Emergency Diesel Generator
CRD
                                        EHC     -
-
                                                  Electro Hydraulic Control
Control Rod Drive
l                                       EIP     -
!
                                                  Emergency Implementing Procedures
DC
                                        ENN     -
-
                                                  Emergency Notification Network
Design Change
                                        EOF     -
DCR
                                                  Emergency Operating Facility
-
                                        EP       -
Design Change Request
                                                  Emergency Preparedness
ECCS -
                                        EPZ     -
Emergency Core Cooling Systems
                                                  Emergency Preparedness Zone
EDG
                                        ERDS -     Emergency Response Data System
-
l                                       ERO     -
Emergency Diesel Generator
                                                  Emergency Response Organization
EHC
i                                       FSAR -     Final Safety Analysis Report
-
Electro Hydraulic Control
l
EIP
-
Emergency Implementing Procedures
ENN
-
Emergency Notification Network
EOF
-
Emergency Operating Facility
EP
-
Emergency Preparedness
EPZ
-
Emergency Preparedness Zone
ERDS -
Emergency Response Data System
l
ERO
-
Emergency Response Organization
i
FSAR -
Final Safety Analysis Report
(
(
GPC
-
Georgia Power Company
HEPA -
High-Efficiency Particulate Air Filters
'
'
                                        GPC      -
HP
                                                  Georgia Power Company
-
                                        HEPA -    High-Efficiency Particulate Air Filters
Health Physics
,                                      HP      -
,
                                                  Health Physics
HPCI -
                                        HPCI -     High Pressure Coolant Injection
High Pressure Coolant Injection
I
I
j                                                                                                                 Enclosure 2
j
              -                         . . . .                   - .     .                       --
Enclosure 2
-
. . . .
-
.
.
--


  _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ - - _ _ - . - _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ - . - . . . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _                             -
_ _ _ . _ . _ . _ - - _ _ - . - _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ - . - . . . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _
                =
-
                                                                                                                                                  ,\<: .
=
    *
,\\<:
                                                                                                                                                    i j Ii
.
                                                                                                                                            J     11 5illl
i j Ii
                          GPC                                                                               35                                           ig;
*
                                                                                                                                                  f ('  It'
J
,                                                        Hz               -
1 illl
                                                                                  hertz                                                             i
GPC
l
35
                                                          IFI              -
ig;
                                                                                  Inspector Followup Item
1 5 It'
                                                          INPO -                  Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
f ('
                                                          IR              -
Hz
                                                                                  Inspection Report
-
                                                          kw              -
hertz
                                                                                  kilowatt
i
                                                          1                -
,
                                                                                  liter
                                                          LCO              -
                                                                                  Limiting Condition of Operation
                                                          LER              -
                                                                                  Licensee Event Report
                                                          LPCI -                  Low Pressure Coolant Injection
                                                          MCR              -
                                                                                  Main Control Room
                                                          MDC              -
                                                                                  Minor Design Change
                                                          mg              -
                                                                                  milligram
l
l
                                                          MG               -
IFI
                                                                                  Motor-Generator
-
j                                                        MIDAS-                 Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment
Inspector Followup Item
l                                                                                 System
INPO -
                                                          MSIV               - Main Steam Isolation Valve
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
                                                          MWO             -
Inspection Report
                                                                                  Maintenance Work Order
IR
                                                          NCV             -
-
                                                                                  Non-Cited Violation
kw
                                                          NOAA -                 National Oceanographic & Atmospheric Administration
-
                                                          NOUE -                 Notice of Unusual Event
kilowatt
l                                                         NRC             -
1
                                                                                  Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-
liter
LCO
-
Limiting Condition of Operation
Licensee Event Report
LER
-
LPCI -
Low Pressure Coolant Injection
Main Control Room
MCR
-
MDC
-
Minor Design Change
mg
-
milligram
MG
-
Motor-Generator
l
MIDAS-
Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment
j
l
System
MSIV
- Main Steam Isolation Valve
MWO
-
Maintenance Work Order
NCV
-
Non-Cited Violation
NOAA -
National Oceanographic & Atmospheric Administration
NOUE -
Notice of Unusual Event
l
NRC
-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR
-
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
'
'
                                                          NRR              -
I
                                                                                  Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NSSS -
I                                                        NSSS -                 Nuclear Steam Supply System
Nuclear Steam Supply System
                                                          NWS             -
NWS
                                                                                  National Weather Service
-
                                                          OSC             -
National Weather Service
                                                                                  Operations Support Center
OSC
                                                          P&ID -                 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
-
                                                          PASS -                 Post Accident Sample System
Operations Support Center
                                                          PDR             -
P&ID -
                                                                                  Public Document Room
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
                                                          PSP             -
PASS -
                                                                                  Plant Security Plan
Post Accident Sample System
                                                          PSW             -
PDR
                                                                                  Plant Service Water System
-
                                                          QA               -
Public Document Room
                                                                                  Quality Assurance
PSP
                                                          QC               -
-
                                                                                  Quality control
Plant Security Plan
                                                          QCIR -                 Quality Control Inspection Report
PSW
                                                          RAS             -
-
                                                                                  Required Action Statement
Plant Service Water System
                                                          RASCAL- Radiological Assessment System for Consequence
QA
                                                                                  Analysis
-
                                                          RAW             -
Quality Assurance
                                                                                  Risk Achievement Worth
QC
                                                          RCA             -
-
                                                                                  Radiological Controlled Area
Quality control
                                                          RFP             -
QCIR -
                                                                                  Reactor Feedwater Pump
Quality Control Inspection Report
                                                          RFPT -                 Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine
RAS
                                                          RHR             -
-
                                                                                  Residual Heat Removal
Required Action Statement
                                                          RPS             -
RASCAL- Radiological Assessment System for Consequence
                                                                                  Reactor Protection System
Analysis
                                                          RR               -
RAW
                                                                                  Reactor Recirculation
-
                                                          RTP             -
Risk Achievement Worth
                                                                                  Rated Thermal Power
RCA
                                                          SAE             -
-
                                                                                  Site Area Emergency
Radiological Controlled Area
                                                          SAER -                 Safety Audit and Engineering Review
RFP
                                                          SGT              -
-
                                                                                  Standby Gas Treatment
Reactor Feedwater Pump
                                                          SOS             -
RFPT -
                                                                                  Superintendent On Shift
Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine
                                                          SPDS -                 Safety Parameter Display System
RHR
                                                          SR               -
-
                                                                                  Surveillance Requirement
Residual Heat Removal
                                                          SRO              -
RPS
                                                                                  Senior Reactor Operator
-
                                                          SS               -
Reactor Protection System
                                                                                  Station Service                                                           7
RR
                                                        TS               -
-
                                                                                  Technical Specifications
Reactor Recirculation
                                                        TSC               -
RTP
                                                                                  Technical Support Center
-
                                                                                                                                Enclosure 2
Rated Thermal Power
                                                  ._-                 . -
SAE
                                                                                        _.         , _ . _ .             . _ _ _               ._.
-
Site Area Emergency
SAER -
Safety Audit and Engineering Review
Standby Gas Treatment
SGT
-
SOS
-
Superintendent On Shift
SPDS -
Safety Parameter Display System
Surveillance Requirement
SR
-
SRO
-
Senior Reactor Operator
SS
-
Station Service
7
TS
-
Technical Specifications
TSC
-
Technical Support Center
Enclosure 2
. -
. -
.
, _ . _
.
. _ _ _
._.


f         i     .
f
    .
i
1 .
.
      GPC                             36
.
            TSIP - Technical Specification Improvement Program
1
            UFSAR- Updated Fina) Safety Analysis Report
.
            URI   -
GPC
                    Unresolved item
36
            VIO   -
TSIP -
                    Violation
Technical Specification Improvement Program
                                                                          l
UFSAR-
                                                                          1
Updated Fina) Safety Analysis Report
URI
-
Unresolved item
VIO
-
Violation
1
l
l
I
I
1
1
l                                                             Enclosure 2
l
Enclosure 2
'
'
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 05:29, 12 December 2024

Insp Repts 50-321/96-11 & 50-366/96-11 on 960804-0914. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Engineering & Plant Support
ML20134D377
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 10/11/1996
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134D372 List:
References
50-321-96-11, 50-366-96-11, NUDOCS 9610220090
Download: ML20134D377 (38)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000321/1996011

Text

.. ._.

. _ _ _

.

.

.

.

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos:

50-321, 50-366

License Nos:

DPR-57 and NPF-5

Report No:

50-321/96-11, 50-366/96-11

Licensee:

Georgia Power Company (GPC)

Facility:

E.

I.

Hatch Units 1 & 2

Location:

P.

O.

Box 439

Baxley, Georgia

31513

Dates:

August 4 - September 14, 1996

Inspectors:

B.

Holbrook, Senior Resident Inspector

'

J.

Moorman, Senior Resident Inspector

(Acting)

E.

Christnot, Resident Inspector

G.

Salyers, Emergency Preparedness

Specialist (Sections P2, P3, PS, P6,

P7, P8)

J.

Canady, Resident Inspector

Approved by:

P.

Skinner, Chief, Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure 2

9610220090 961011

gDR

ADOCK 05000321

PDR

_.

.

..

.

--

_ _ -

_

- - .

_ -

-

- .

. - - . . - . .

_. - .

.

.

i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Plant Hatch, Units 1 and 2

l

NRC Inspection Report 50-321/96-11, 50-366/96-11

!

l

This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee

operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support.

The

report covers a 6-week period of resident inspecticn; in addition,

it includes the results of an announced inspection ay a regional

emergency preparedness specialist.

Operations

e

The inspector concluded that operator response to the

l

Reactor recirculation pump tr p on August 20, was excellent.

l

Actions taken were prompt, deliberate, and in accordance

with plant procedures.

The immediate observations by the

Shift Technical Advisor to assist the operators in use of

the power / flow operating map was excellent (Section 01.2).

The inspector reviewed a special report dated July 30, 1996,

involving an inoperable reactor vessel water level flood-up

range instrument.

The report did not clearly indicate how

to compensate for the lack of monitoring capability above

+60 inches should this be required during post accident

conditions.

However, the lack of clarity was not considered

significant.

The licensee is considering a TS amendment to

address this issue (Section 02.1).

The license conditions required for the Technical

Specification Improvement Program (TSIP) implementation for

Unit 1 and Unit 2 are complete with the exception of the

ten-year surveillance requirements for the emergency diesel

generators (Section 03.1).

A Safety Review Board (SRB) meeting was attended on

September 12.

The inspectors concluded that the meeting met

the applicable requirements and that the SRB is providing

adequate review and auditing functions (Section 07.1).

The licensee activities involving the river conditions

demonstrated a , pro-active attitude on the part of plant

management and is considered a strength (Section 01.1).

o

Operation and Maintenance Department personnel routinely use

a risk matrix to perform an assessment of the total plant

equipment out of service to determine the overall effect on

performance of safety functions per' 10 CFR 50.65 (a) (3) ,

" Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of

maintenance at nuclear power plants" (Section 01.1).

l

Maintenance

e

Maintenance and surveillance activities were performed

thoroughly and professionally.

The inspectors observed that

personnel were knowledgeable in the assigned task;

l

procedures were in use; activities were well documented; and

j

administrative controls were implemented.

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GPC

2

Encineerino

e

VIO 50-321/96-11-02:

Failure to Perform an ASME Code-

Required VT-3 Inspection on High Pressure Coolant Injection

(HPCI) Valve 1E41-F006, was identified.

The failure to

perform an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

Code-required VT-3 inspection on a safety related component

was considered significant (Section E2.2).

The inspectors conducted followup inspections on licensee

activities with respect to the Unit 2 Station Service

battery.

No immediate operability concerns were identified.

Onsite engineering was taking appropriate pre-installation

measures to ensure replacement battery cells remained in the

proper condition (Section E7.1).

Plant Support

A Non-Cited Violation (NCV), 50-366/96-11-03, for failure to

follow valve line-up procedures when performing a torus

water sample was identified (Section R1.2).

Poor sampling technique was the most likely cause for the

stored fuel oil analysis results that were out of

specification on August 8.

Attention to detail during the

sample analysis collection process may prevent similar

problems.

This was identified as an area for improvement in

the chemistry sampling process (Section R4.1) .

The Emergency Preparedness (EP) facilities and equipment

were at a satisfactory level for operational readiness;

Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) ventilation was tested

and maintained adequately; and the tone alert radio system

was reliable, tested and maintained (Section P2).

The licensee's review process for EP procedures and

documents was satisfactory and met the requirements of

10 CFR 50.54 (q) .

The declaration of the Notification Of

Unusual Event (NOUE) on March 20, 1996, was properly

classified and the applicable Emergency Implementing

Procedures (EIP) were implemented (Section P3).

e

The licensee maintained a satisfactory EP training program

and satisfactorily met their drill requirements

(Section PS).

No significant personnel changes were made since the last

inspection (April, 1995) that would effect the performance

or maintenance of the EP program (Section P6).

An audit was not conducted in accordance with the Audit

Planning Matrix, however, the aggregate of the audit

elements satisfied 10 CFR 50.54 (t) (Section P7).

!

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Enclosure 2

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GPC

3

Quality Assurance (QA) auditors were qualified and EP issues

were satisfactorily trackei. and resolved in a timely manner

(Section P7).

Tne inspectors' review of the status of plant security

f acilities and equipmer.t did not identify any deficiencies

,

(Section S2).

Enclosure 2

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Report Details

Summary of Plant beatus

Unit 1 began the report period at 100% rated thermal power (RTP).

'

On August 20, power was reduced to about 30% RTP due to a trip of

a reactor recirculation pump motor generator (MG) set and a

subsequent runback.

The trip occurred when the air high

'

temperature switch was bumped during housekeeping activities and

the runback was due to the quick opening of a reactor feed pump

minimum flow valve (paragraph 01.2).

Power was returned to RTP

and the unit operated at 100% RTP for the remainder of the report

period except for routine testing activities.

Unit 2 operated at 100% RTP throughout the report period except

for routine testing activities.

I.

Ooerations

l

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01

Conduct of Operations

l

01.1 General Comments

a.

Insoection Scoce (71707)

Daily reviews of plant operation were conducted using

Inspection Procedure 71707, Plant Operations.

The conduct

of operations was generally professional and safety-

conscious.

Specific events and noteworthy observations are

detailn: in the section below.

b.

Observations and Findings

The inspectors discussed the electrical harmonics observed

on the Units 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 4160

,

l

volt (V) switchgear (Reference paragraph E2.1) with licensee

personnel.

The inspectors reviewed the EDG surveillance

procedures.

The operators are instructed by the procedures

to quickly load the EDGs once they are in parallel with the

grid.

The inspectors observed that there was no discussion

in the procedure about the harmonics and the possible effect

on the reverse power trip.

The inspectors also observed

that there was no discussion about the possibility of a

reverse power trip while unloading the EDGs in preparation

!

for removal from the grid.

The inspectors were informed

I

that the Engineering Department was performing a review of

the effects of the electrical harmonics.

The inspectors monitored the licensee's activities involved

with the river water level, temperature, and the debris

being pulled into the cooling water systems.

The licensee

contracted to have the area in front of the intake structure

Enclosure 2

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5

dredged.

Divers were also contracted to clean sediment and

debris from the bottom of the intake water bays.

The

inspectors were informed that algae and floating moss were

clogging various chiller systems and cooling water heat

exchangers.

The inspector attended meetings at which these

problems were discussed.

The licensee developed an action

plan to better cope with the algae and the floating moss.

i

l

Parts of the plan called for closer monitoring'of chiller

l

systems and cooling water heat exchanger performance.

One portion of the maintenance rule, 10CFR50. 65 (a) (3 ) ,

l

states, in part, "an assessment of the total plant equipment

that is out-of-service should be taken into account to

determine the overall effect on performance of safety

functions."

On several occasions the inspectors observed

l

licensed' operators using a matrix governed by Procedure

l

90AC-OAP-002-OS, Scheduling Maintenance.

The matrix

l

provides Technical Specification (TS) and risk-informed

l

guidance to be used when removing combinations of equipment

l

from service.

The matrix indicated that if a Control Rod

)

l

Drive (CRD) pump was out-of-service it would be a medium

'

l

risk to take the HPCI out-of-service and it would be a low

.

l

risk to take out a loop of core spray.

The matrix also

1

l'

high risk to remove a loop of Low Pressure Coolant Injection

'

indicated that if the HPCI was out-of-service, it would be a

(LPCI) from service and a medium risk to remove a Residual

,

'

Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump.

The instructions

on the matrix indicated the.following:

For a high risk removal from service (Required Action

-

Statement (RAS) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or less, or Risk Achievement

!" orth (RAW) equal to or greater than 10), a risk

evaluation was required, and approval by the operations

manager was required.

-

For a medium risk (Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)

l

less then 7 days, or RAW more than 5 but less then 10)

the approval by the operations manager was required.

-

For a low risk (LCO equal to or more then 7 days, or RAW

1ess then or equal to 5) the approval by the

Superintendent On Shift (SOS) was required.

Two laminated copies of the matrix were available in the

Control Room.

c.

Conclusions on General Comments

The inspectors considered the EDG harmonic item to be a

potential for possible erroneous reverse power trips, which

could lead to operator confusion.

i

!s

!

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Enclosure 2

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The licensee activities involving the river conditions

demonstrated a pro-active attitude on the part of plant

management and is considered a strength.

Use of the matrix to evaluate risk associated with removing

i

various combinations of equipment from service is consistent

i

with the maintenance rule.

This and other aspects of the

l

licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule will be

inspected further in the near future.

01.2 Transient Due to Recirculation Pumo Trio and Runback (Unit

11

a.

InsDection Scoc? (71707)

At 9:12 a.m. on August 20, with Unit 1 operating at 100%

RTP, the 1A Reactor Recirculation (RR) Pump tripped.

An

inspector responded to the control room to assess operator

actions and unit response.

The inspector observed operator

monitoring of annunciators and parameter trends.

Communications, supervisory control, and the use of

procedures were also observed.

Among the procedures used by

the operators were:

-

34AB-C51-001-1S:

Reactor Power Instabilities, Rev. 3

l

-

34SV-SUV-023-1S:

Jet Pump and Recirculation Flow

'

Mismatch Operability, Rev.

6,

Edition 1

j

-

34SO-B21-001-1S:

Reactor Recirculation System, Rev.

4,

Attachment 6,

Power Versus Flow Map

-

34GO-OPS-065-1S:

Control Rod Movement, Rev. 14

-

34GO-OPS-055-OS:

Power Changes, Rev. 18

b.

Observations and Findinos

The operators immediately implemented and appropriately used

applicable procedures in response to the transient.

At

about 9:16 a.m. the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) identified

and reported to the crew that the unit was within the region

of potential instability.

Reactor power had decreased to

69% RTP with 49.8% core flow.

At STA and Shift Supervisor

(SS) direction, flow was increased slightly on the 1B RR

pump.

At 9:21 a.m.

the STA informed the shift that the

region of potential instability had been exited.

In preparation to start the tripped pump, control rods were

inserted to get below the 55% load line, as required by

procedure.

As operators prepared to place the 1A Reactor

Feed Pump Turbine (RFPT) in standby, a runback on the 1B RR

pump occurred due to low reactor water level.

The operators

noted that the runback occurred in conjunction with the 1A

Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP) minimum flow valve opening.

The region of potential instability was again entered.

l

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Enclosure 2

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GPC

7

Control rods were inserted and the region was exited in

about eight minutes.

The licensee determined that the 1A RR pump trip was caused

by a painter performing work in the recirculation pump Motor

Generator (MG) set room.

A high MG set air temperature

switch was bumped and caused a trip of the MG set.

Maintenance personnel tested the switch to verify proper

operation and no deficiencies were observed.

Systems were placed in service and unit RTP was reached at

about 7:45 p.m.

c.

Conclusions

The inspector concluded that operator response to the

transient was excellent.

Actions taken were prompt,

deliberate, and in accordance with plant procedures.

The

immediate observations by the on-shift STA to recognize the

reactor was in the area of potential instability was

excellent.

The RFP minimum flow valve problem continues to

l

contribute to unplanned plant transients.

The inspectors

will review additional information on the minimum flow

'

valves.

02

Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

02.1 Inocerable Reactor Flood-Un Rance Reactor Water Level

,

Instrument Unit i

l

a.

Insoection ScoDe (92901)

The inspector reviewed a special report dated July 30, 1996,

involving the reactor vessel water level flood-up range

instrument, 1B21-R605.

b.

Observations and Findinas

On July 21, 30 days had elapsed since flood-up range reactor

vessel water level instrument 1B21-R605 was declared

inoperable.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's special

report dated July 30, 1996, submitted to meet Technical

Specification (TS) requirements.

The TS required that a

report be submitted within the following 14 days.

The

inspectors found from this review that the report was

submitted within the time frame of the specifications.

The

TS further states that the report shall outline the

preplanned, alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the

inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the

instrumentation channels of the function to operable status.

The inspectors observed that the report stated the cause of

the inoperability appeared to be the result of a reduction

in the instrument reference leg water level.

This was due

Enclosure 2

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GPC

8

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to a packing leak on the equalizing valve for the

I

transmitter of instrument 1B21-R605.

The leak was repaired

I

and the condensation in the reference leg condensing pot was

'

expected to refill the leg.

This did not occur and proper

instrument function was not restored.

The licensee did not determine why the condensing pot failed

to refill the reference leg.

The report further stated that

to refill the reference leg by injecting demineralized water

would impose a risk to the instrumentation that could cause

a plant transient.

The report contained plans and a schedule for restoring the

instrument channel to operable status.

The inspectors found that the report did not directly

address the preplanned alternate method of monitoring.

The

report stated that the flood-up instrument was indicating 29

to 30 inches higher than actual level as measured by other

instruments.

The method discussed in the report involved

other instrumentation that only indicate up to +60 inches.

This indicated to the inspector that for post accident

monitoring purposes, water level can only be monitored up

,

l

+60 inches.

The report did not clearly state that between

+60 inches and +400 inches no alternate method of monitoring

was available.

The inspectors discussed the report with licensee personnel.

The inspector observed that the licensee issued a temporary

change to the Unit 1 scram procedure, 34AB-C71-001-1S,

Revision 6,

that reduced the required Main Steam Isolation

Valve (MSIV) closure on high level from +100 inches to +60

inches.

This would help protect Emergency Core Cooling

Systems (ECCS) steam-driven turbines.

l

The licensee informed the inspectors that, even though the

instrument was listed as a TS post accident monitoring

instrument, the non-redundant instrument was not intended to

be used during post accident conditions.

The instrument was

to be used only during refueling conditions when water level

is raised to flood the refueling cavity.

The inspectors

reviewed licensee-supplied documentation that supported the

intended use of the instrument.

The licensee was evaluating

this problem for a TS amendment.

c.

Conclusions

l

The inspectors concluded that the report did not clearly

indicate the lack of monitoring capability during post

accident conditions above +60 inches.

However, the lack of

clarity was not considered to be significant.

The

inspectors viewed a proposed TS amendment as appropriate.

The revision to the scram procedure was also appropriate.

4

Enclosure 2

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03

Operations Procedures and Documentation

03.1 License Conditions for TSIP Imolementation Units 1 and 2

a.

Inspection ScoDe (92901).

License condition 2.C. (2) for Units 1 and 2 states, in part:

The Surveillance Requirements (SRs) listed are not required

to be performed immediately upon implementation of

Amendments No. 195 for Unit 1 and No. 135 for Unit 2.

The

SRs listed shall be successfully demonstrated prior to the

time and condition specified for each.

b.

Observations and Findinos

The inspector observed that license condition 2.C.(2)a)

stated that the listed SRs shall be successfully

demonstrated prior to entering MODE 2 on the first plant

startup following the sixteenth refueling outage for Unit 1

and the twelfth refueling outage for Unit 2.

The license

condition listed the SRs for both units, Unit 1 only and

Unit 2 only as follows:

Listed for both units:

- 3.3.2.2.2

Perform channel calibration for the Feedwater

and Main Turbine Trip High Level

Instrumentation.

- 3.3.2.2.3

Perform logic system functional test for the

.

!

Feedwater and Main Trip High Level

Instrumentation.

- 3.3.3.2.2 Verify each required control circuit and

transfer switch is capable of performing the

intended function for the Remote Shutdown

System.

l

- 3.3.8.1.4

Perform logic system functional test for Loss of

l

Power Instrumentation.

- 3.7.7.2

Perform a system functional test for the Main

Turbine Bypass System.

- 3.7.7.3

Verify the Main Turbine Bypass System response

time is within limits.

Listed for Unit 1 only:

- 3.3.1.1.15

Perform logic system functional test for

Reactor Protective System Instrumentation.

,

f

Enclosure 2

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GPC

10

- 3.3.1.1.16

Verify the RPS response time is within

,

(Function 9)

limits for the turbine control valve fast

closure, trip oil pressure - low.

- 3.3.6.1.6

Perform logic system functional test for

(Function 1.f)

Turbine Building Area Temperature - High.

Listed for Unit 2 only:

- 3.6.2.4.2

Verify each spray nozzle is unobstructed for the

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool

Spray System.

License condition 2.C.(2)b) stated that the listed SRs shall

be successfully demonstrated at their next regularly

scheduled performance.

The license condition listed the SRs

for both units and Unit 2 only as follows:

Listed for both units:

- 3.8.1.8

Verify each EDG operating at or less than a

specific power factor and does not trip and

adequate voltage is maintained following a load

reject of a specified kilowatt (kw) load.

- 3.8.1.10

Verify on an actual or simulated ECCS' initiation

signal that each EDG auto-starts from the

standby condition and in a specified time after

auto-start achieves adequate voltage and, after

steady state conditions are reached, maintains

an acceptable voltage; in the same time after

auto-start achieves adequate frequency and after

steady state conditions are reached, maintains

an acceptable frequency; and operates for at

least 5 minutes.

- 3.8.1.12

Verify each EDG operating at a specified power

factor for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; for at least 2

hours loaded at a high kw; for the remaining

hours of the test loaded at lower kw.

- 3.8.1.13

Verify that each EDG starts and achieves, in

equal to or less than 12 seconds, voltage equal

to or greater to 3740 V and frequency equal to

or greater than 58.8 hertz (Hz); and after

steady state conditions are reached, maintains

voltage between 3740 V and 4243 V and frequency

between 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz.

- 3.8.1.18

Verify, when started simultaneously from standby

condition, that all of the Unit 1 and all of the

Unit 2 EDGs achieve, in less than or equal to 12

seconds, voltage greater than or equal to 3740 V

and frequency greater than or equal to 58.8 Hz.

Enclosure 2

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11

Listed for Unit 2 only:

- 3.8.1.9

Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite

(for EDG 2C) power signal: De-energization of emergency

busses; load shedding from emergency buses; the

EDG auto-starts from standby condition and;

energizes permanently connected loads in a

specified time, energizes auto-connected

emergency loads through automatic load sequence

timing devices, achieves adequate steady state

voltage, achieves adequate steady state

I

frequency, and supplies permanently connected

and auto-connected emergency loads for at least

5 minutes.

3.8.1.17

verify that on an actual or simulated loss of

-

(for EDG 2C) offsite power signal in conjunction with an

actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal that

the EDG meets the same requirements as that of

the above listed SR 3.8.1.9.

License condition 2.C.(2) c) stated that the listed SRs will

be met at implementation for the secondary containment

configuration in effect at that time.

The SRs shall be

successfully demonstrated for the other secondary

containment configur4tions prior to the plant entering.the

LCO applicability for that configuration.

The license

condition listed the SRs for both units as follows:

- 3.6.4.1.3

Verify required Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

subsystem (s) will draw down the secondary

containment to greater than or equal to 0.20

inches of vacuum water gauge in less than or

equal to 120 seconds.

- 3.6.4.1.4

Verify required SGT subsystem (s) can maintain a

greater than or equal to 0.20 inches of vacuum

water gauge in the containment for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at a

flow rate greater than or equal to 4000 cubic

feet per minute (cfm) for each subsystem.

The inspectors observed that the license conditions for both

units covered a total of 32 SRs.

To determine the

I

compliance to the license conditions 2.C.(2) a) and b) the

inspectors were provided information in the form of two

matrices, one for each unit.

The matrices listed the TS

surveillance requirement, commitment number, responsible

group, procedure (s) performed to meet the requirement (due

by plant condition, such as prior to Mode 2), date completed

and any comments.

For license condition 2.C.(2) c), which

l

involved the secondary containment, the inspectors were

!

provided with dates on which the applicable surveillances

were performed.

f

!

Enclo.3ure 2

4

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12

1

The inspectors reviewed the matrices and observed that the

i

surveillance requirements for license conditions 2.C.(2) a)

j

and b) corresponded to the applicable plant procedures.

The

requirements for Unit 1 were performed during spring 1996

'

,

i

refueling outage and for Unit 2 during the fall 1995

i

i

refueling outage.

The inspectors observed that the

completed procedures were_the applicable procedures for the

4

license conditions.

However, SR 3.d.1.18, a simultaneous

l

start of all the respective EDGs for both units was not

performed.

This SR has a frequency of 10 years.

The due

l

date for Unit 1 is March 1,

2003 and for Unit 2 is

i

February 1,

1997.

The inspectors observed that the required

a

surveillance for the license condition 2.C. (2) c) were also

performed as required for both units.

!

The inspectors documented SR activities associated with the

.

TSIP and sections of the license conditions in irs 50-321,

!

366/95-08, 95-22, and 95-23.

!

c.

Conclusions

,

i

i

The inspectors concluded that license conditions 2.C.(2).a)

and c) are fully closed for both units.

License condition

2.C. (2) b) will be fully closed when SR 3.8.1.18 is

performed for the respective units.

07

Quality Assurance in Operations

07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (40500)

On September 12, the Hatch SRB convened meeting H96-03 at

'

Plant Hatch.

The meeting was conducted in accordance with

the requirements of the Hatch Final Safety Analysis Report

(FSAR) and QA Manual.

The board discussed the status of

previously-opened items and determined which items should be

closed.

Much of the discussion centered on the past

problems experienced by the Operations and Engineering

Departments and their solutions.

New issues were identified

and assigned to the copropriate manager for resolution.

There was some discussion involving the quality of

contractor work, particrictly that of the plant's Nuclear

Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor.

Various problems were

discussed, along with solutions and ways of avoiding future

problems.

The inspectors concluded that licensee efforts in

this area for self-assessment were effective.

08

Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)

08.1

(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-321.366/96-07-01:

Determine Safety Significance and Testing Requirements for

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment Isolation Status Panel.

The inspector reviewed Abnormal Operating Procedure,

34AB-C71-001-1S and 2S, Scram Procedure, Revision 6,

for

Enclosure 2

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13

i

both units.

The procedures made a general reference that

isolation status could be found on Panel 1/2-H11-P601

i

vertical display.

The procedures also listed other

+

locations, such as the Safety Parameter Display System

(SPDS) where system isolation indications could be located.

.

.

The inspectors reviewed both the Unit 1 and 2 UFSARs to

i

determine the isolation panels description and use.

Unit 1

i

FSAR Section 5.2.3.5.2 states in part,

"A mimic display

J

board for only isolation valves provides indication of

l

isolation valve position.

When isolation has occurred, all

energized lights of the display are green".

,

i

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]

The UFSAR for Unit 2,

Section 7.3.2.2,

System Description -

1

i

Primary Containment and Reactor Pressure Vessel Isolation

}

Control System;

Subsection 7.3.2.2.7,

Testability, states,

in part, " Isolation valves can be tested to ensure that they

'

l

are capable of closing by operating manual switches in the

j

Main Control Room (MCR) and observing the position lights

i-

and any associated process effects".

The subsection directs

'

the reader to "See also figure 7.3-2 (Nuclear Boiler System

- Functional Control Diagrams)."

The inspector reviewed the

figure and observed that it contained 12 sheets of logic

diagrams with control switch and indicating light MCR panel

locations.

The diagrams for the isolation valves clearly

showed indication lights for both the opened and closed

positions on the graphic display located on MCR panel

i

2H11-P601.

From reviews, observations, and discussions with licensee

personnel, the inspectors found that the isolation status

panels were used by the operators to verify isolation

status; are being maintained current with plant design

changes; and are referenced in plant procedures and the

UFSARs for both units.

The inspectors did not locate any procedure that required

testing or verification that the isolation panel indications

correctly reflected system status or isolation condition.

The inspectors frequently observed operators monitoring the

isolation panel during normal panel observations.

The

inspectors also observed that Design Changes (DCs) were

initiated when required to properly maintain the panels.

,

'

The inspectors were not aware of any discrepancy between the

isolation panel indications and plant systems.

The inspectors observed that Operations management issued an

operating order instructing control room operators to

observe and record light indications that could be monitored

from the isolation status panel for all valves that were

cycled.

Also, plant procedures were to be revised to

include verification of indication response for valves

Enclosure 2

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. _ . . _ . _ _ _

. -

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14

located on the isolation status panel.

Most of the checks

,

will be conducted during unit cold shutdown conditions.

<

The inspectors determined that although the failure to test

or verify the isolation valve indications on the isolation

status panels was an oversight, no regulatory violation had

occurred.

Based upon this review URI 50-321, 366/96-07-01

is closed.

b.

Conclusions

Systems that are used by the operators to verify the status

of safety-related systems and are discussed in the UFSAR

should be tested or verified periodically.

'

08.2

(Closed) Licensee Event ReDort (LER) 50-321/96-011:

Inadequate Procedure Results in Missed Technical

Specifications Surveillances.

This problem was discussed in

,

j

Inspection Report (IR) 50-321, 366/96-10.

No new issues

were revealed by the LER.

i

08.3

(Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-321/95-23-01:

Operators'

Failure to Follow Procedure While Transferring Diesel Fuel

011.

This violation was identified when operators were

receiving new fuel oil from a tanker truck.

Due to a valve

lineup, not in accordance with procedure, 300 gallons of

fuel overflowed a day tank.

The inspector reviewed the

>

)

licensee's response, dated January 2,

1996.

The response

indicated that administrative personnel action was taken and

that procedure changes were being considered.

The

- inspectors reviewed the EDG procedure 34SO-R43-001-1S,

Revision 18, and observed procedure changes.

These changes

included a simplified drawing of the fuel oil system piping

and valves.

This drawing was to aid personnel in

determining the correct valve line up for the activity to be

performed.

08.4

(Closed) VIO 50-366/95-26-01:

Inability to Safely Shutdown

,

Unit 2 from the Remote Shutdown' Panel in the Event of a Fire

'

in the Main Control Room.

This violation was identified

when operators attempced to perform a surveillance on the

Unit 2 Remote Shutdcwn Panel (RSDP).

The surveillance was

being performed for the first time because of the TSIP.

'.

Prior to the implementation of the TSIP, testing of the RSDP

was not required.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's

response, dated February 12, 1996.

The response indicated

that failure to perform periodic testing, as well as

inadequate design and design change functional testing,

contributed to the violation.

This item was initially

documented in IR 321,366/95-23.

Subsequent licensee and

inspector activities were documented in irs 321,366/95-26

and 95-27.

These activities included observed licensee

corrective actions involving system testing, maintenance and

Enclosure 2

,

R

-

- - , -

,

n

,

- - - . ,

--,--e

. , - -

-,e-.

.+-

..,-.4

- - -

1

.

.

GPC

15

modification work.

The inspectors concluded that the

licensee's corrective actions had been appropriate.

08.5 (Closed) VIO 50-321.366/95-18-02:

Failure to Follow

Procedure, Second Example.

This example was identified when

1

operators failed to follow a procedure while performing.

hydrogen water chemistry flow changes.

This resulted in

'

unnecessary exposure to personnel performing maintenance in

the condenser bay.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's

response dated October 26, 1995.

The response indicated

that a less-than-adequate operating procedure and less-than-

adequate training contributed'to the violation.

The

response stated that personnel were counseled regarding

their actions, training material would be revised, and

procedure changes would be made.

The inspectors reviewed

the revised material and procedure changes and concluded

that the licensee's corrective actions had been appropriate.

II. Maintenance

M1

Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 General Comments

a.

Inspection Scoce (62703) (62707)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following

work activities:

-

MWO 2-96-2492: . Replace seal on 2B Plant Service Water

(PSW) Pump

-

MWO 2-96-2586:

Insulation inspection of Reactor

Protection System (RPS) MG Set 2A

-

MWO 2-96-2131:

RPS MG Set Minor Design Change (MDC)

95-5037 Implementation

b.

Observations and Findinas

The inspectors found that the work was performed with the

work packages present and being actively used.

The

inspectors observed that during the implementation of the

MDC the system engineer was present at the job site.

Appropriate post-modification and maintenance tests were

performed.

These tests consisted of operating the equipment

following the completion of work activities.

c.

Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance

Maintenance activities were generally completed in a

thorough and professional manner.

No deficiencies were

identified.

Enclosure 2

, . -

- - . - - ~ - - .

_.

- - . -..- - .

.

. . ~ -

- . . -

--.

,--

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GPC

16

l

l

M3

Maintenance Procedures and Documentation

l

l

M3.1 Surveillance Observations

l

l

a.

Inspection Scoce (61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following

Unit 1 and Unit 2 surveillance activities:

- 34SV-R43-004-1S:

Diesel Generator 1A semi-annual test

- 34SV-E41-002-2S:

HPCI Pump operability

b.

Observations and Findings

The HPCI surveillance observed was the three-month

operability test to meet TS and AMSE Code In-Service Testing

requirements.

Data was collected on system valve stroke

i

times and pump operating characteristics.

A pre-evolution

briefing was conducted by the licensed operator performing

!

,

l

the surveillance.

All personnel involved were in

attendance.

The diesel surveillance was performed without problem and

all parameters were within specification.

c.

Conclusions

l

For both surveillances, all data was within the required

,

!

range and the equipment was determined to pass the

surveillance.

The performance of the operators and crews

conducting the surveillances was generally professional and

competent.

No deficiencies were identified.

M8

Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92700) (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-366/96-03:

High Pressure Coolant Injection

i

System Temporarily Inoperable Following Engineering Safety

I

Feature Actuation.

The cause of this problem was a physical

" slip" that occurred when a technician was manipulating a

piece of test equipment during surveillance testing

activities.

The system responded as expected.

As part of

l

'

the corrective actions, management discussed the problem

with the technician and suressed the importance of caution

when performing test act.vities.

The system was realigned

to the operable (standby' condition.

M8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-321,366/95-18-02:

Failure to Follow

Procedure, First Example.

This example was identified when

divers entered the intake structure pump pit area to perform

inspection activities without the use of a procedure.

A

service water pump was declared inoperable when a section of

the diver's life, air and communication line entered the

suction of the pump. The inspector reviewed the licensee's

response dated October 26, 1995.

The response indicated

l

Enclosure 2

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_ _ _ _ . . ._.

_ __

.

_ _ . _ _ _ _ _

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.

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4

GPC

17

that miscommunications among personnel regarding the use and

i

applicability of a procedure contributed to the violation.

The response stated that administrative personnel action was

taken, procedure changes would be made and signs would be

posted.

The inspectors reviewed the procedure changes and

observed the posted signs.

The inspectors concluded that

the licensee's corrective actions had been appropriate.

III. Encineerina

E2

Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment

E2.1 Harmonics on Safety Related EDG 4160 V Switchaear

,

a.

Insoection Scope (92903)

,

i

The inspectors performed followup activities involved with

,

electrical harmonics discussed in IR 50-321, 366/96-06.

4

i

b.

Observations and Findinas

}

The inspectors observed electrical data supplied by licensee

personnel.

The data clearly indicated the presence of

]

harmonics on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDG 4160V switchgear.

The harmonics appeared to be identical on all safety-related

,

j

4160V switchgear on both units.

The inspectors discussed the harmonics with licensee

personnel.

The inspectors were informed that the harmonics

could possibly cause reverse power trips of the EDGs when

=

they were in parallel with the grid and operating at low

power.

The inspectors were also informed that the manner in

which the switchgear was instrumented, on what phases the

e

i

voltage and current were sensed, could be changed to help

prevent unnecessary reverse power trips.

Under current

j

conditions the CR operators could possibly have erroneous

indication on an EDG and due to the harmonics get a reverse

,

j

power trip.

i

c.

Conclusions

'

The engineering group was actively pursuing a solution to

,

j

the effects of the harmonics on EDG operation and testing.

~

At the end of this report period, the inspectors concluded

i

that the information about the effects of the harmonics had

not been forwarded to the Operations Department.

Recommendations to assist the operators in mitigating the

harmonic effects on EDG operation had also not been

i

forwarded.

EDG reverse power trips during surveillance

1

testing has been a problem at the site.

Some of the reverse

power trips were due to personnel error and inattention to

,

detail while the root cause of others was inconclusive.

The

inspectors were informed that the potential harmonic effects

on EDG operations was being reviewed by the Engineering

.

Enclosure 2

.

.

GPC

18

Department.

The results of the review will be forwarded to

the Operations Department.

This is identified as Inspector

Followup Item (IFI) 321, 366/96-11-01:

Review of

-

Engineering Report on the Effects of Harmonics on EDG

Operation.

E2.2 ASME Code Insoection Not Performed

a.

Inspection Scope (92903)

The inspectors followed up the licensee activities involving

a missed ASME code-required inspection of Unit 1 HPCI

injection valve, 1E41-F006.

b.

Observations and Findinas

The inspectors identified a violation in IR 50-321,

,

366/96-06 involving activities associated with missed VT-3

inspections for three valves.

The VT-3 inspections were

required by procedure but only the HPCI valve required a

VT-3 inspection in accordance with the ASME code.

During the inspectors' initial review of the problem, the

inspectors were informed that a VT-3 inspection was

performed on HPCI valve 1E41-F006, in conjunction with a

cleanliness inspection conducted by contract personnel.

The

inspectors reviewed licensee-supplied documents and agreed

with the licensee's assessment that an adequate VT-3

inspection had been performed.

On August 12, the licensee informed the inspectors that new

information had been received from the contract personnel

who performed the cleanliness inspection.

This led site

personnel to conclude that an adequate VT-3 inspection had

not been completed.

As a result, an ASME code-required post

maintenance VT-3 inspection was not performed.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's testing of the valve

and the valve's performance since the completion of the

maintenance activities and the missed VT-3 inspection.

No

deficiencies were identified.

Cognizant licensee personnel

stated that they planned to disassemble and complete a VT-3

inspection of the valve during the next scheduled refueling

outage.

The licensee provided the inspectors with information which

indicated that the root cause of the missed VT-3 inspection

was an inadequate resolution to the Quality Control

Inspection Report (QCIR) that identified the original

problem.

The QCIR did not specify that a VT-3 inspection

should be performed after completion of maintenance.

As a result of this problem, the inspectors conducted i

review of maintenance and engineering activities that

Enclosure 2

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_ _ . . _ .

.

. . _ _ _ _ .

_ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _

.

.

GPC

19

occurred during the last two refueling outages to determine

l

if other code-required VT-3 inspections were missed.

The

inspectors review included Safety Audit and Engineering

!

l

Review (SAER) audits, Design Change Requests (DCRs), DCs,

,

i

Maintenance Work Orders (MWOs), SORc, work records, Quality

l

Control (QC) documents, and discussions with licensee

'

,

management personnel.

The inspectors did not identify other

j

examples of missed code-required VT-3 inspections.

The

inspectors also reviewed the licensee evaluation, dated

August 12, 1996, which concluded that there was no valve

operability concern.

The failure to perform an ASME code-required VT-3 inspection

on a safety related component was considered significant.

Lack of thoroughness in determining post-maintenance testing

,

'

requirements centributed to this problem.

The failure to

complete a code-required VT-3 inspection was identified as

VIO 50-321/96-11-02,

Failure to Perform an ASME Code-

Required VT-3 Inspection on HPCI Valve 1E41-F006.

c.

Conclusions

j

The inspectors concluded that an operability concern did not

i

exist for the HPCI injection valve.

The inspectors did not

i

identify other examples of missed code-required VT-3

inspections and concluded this was not a recurring problem.

E7

Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities

E7.1 Unit 2 Station Service Batteries

a.

Insoection ScoDe (92903)

The inspectors continued to monitor the licensee activities

involved with the sediment in the Unit 2 Station Service

(SS) Battery cells. Previous inspector observations are

documented in IR 50-321,366/96-07.

The inspectors were

informed that 52 of 120 cells had sediment in the bottom of

their jars.

-

b.

Observations and Findinos

The inspectors observed the preparation of a new battery

receiving and storage area in an onsite warehouse.

This

area was constructed so that replacement batteries received

on site could be stored in an area that has battery charging

capability as well as temperature and cleanliness controls.

The new cells can be maintained fully charged for

replacement when required.

l

c.

Conclusions

At the end of this report period, the inservice SS battery

capacity exceeded TS requirements.

Increased battery

,

Enclosure 2

__

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e

1

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GPC

20

monitoring and testing continued and no immediate

operability concerns were identified.

Onsite engineering

was taking appropriate pre-installation measures to ensure

adequate replacement battery cell condition.

E8

Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92700) (92903)

E8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-321/95-16-01:

Contract Personnel Failure to

Follow Procedure While Performing Maintenance on Valve

1E41-F003.

This violation was identified after contract

'

personnel performed GL 89-10 activities on valve 1E41-F003,

,

HPCI Steam Isolation Valve.

The contractors were under the

control of site engineering personnel.

The inspector

,

reviewed the response from the licensee dated September 28,

"

1995.

The valve was repaired.

The licensee counseled site

'

contractor representatives on the importance of following

procedures.

The inspectors reviewed records which indicated

'

that all contractor valve technicians received procedure

training.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's

corrective actions were appropriate.

JV. Plant Suonort

R1

Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls

R1.1 Observation of Routine Radiolocical Controls

a.

Insoection Scoce (71750)

j

General Health Physics (HP) activities were observed during

the report period.

This included locked high radiation area

i

doors, proper radiological postings, and personnel frisking

upon exiting the Radiologically-Controlled Area (RCA).

The

inspectors made frequent tours of the RCA and discussed

radiological controls with HP technicians and HP management.

No deficiencies were identified.

R1.2 Misalioned Sucoression Pool Sample Valve

a.

Insoection Scoce (71750)

The inspectors discovered Suppression Pool Sample Valve

2P33-F364 to be open on August 14.

The valve is located on

Sample Panel 2P33-P101 in the Reactor Building.

b.

Observations and Findinas

During a routine tour of the Reactor Building, the

'

inspectors observed a steady stream of water flowing from

the Suppression Pool Sample Valve, 2P33-F364.

The inspectors reviewed the applicable plant procedure,

64CH-SAM-004-OS, " General Chemistry Sampling," Rev.5, Ed.

1,

'

dated November 7,

1995, and Piping and Instrumentation

}

Enclosure 2

4

.

GPC

21

Diagram (P&ID) which indicated that the normal position of

the valve was closed.

FSAR section 9.3.2,

Process Sampling

System, did not specifically indicate the normal position of

,

'

the valve but stated that the sampling valve is for drawing

process fluid into a closed sample container.

l

l

The inspectors discussed the problem with chemistry

g

personnel.

The inspectors were informed that sampling flow

J

through this sample valve and the corresponding valve on

Unit 1 was, as a matter of routine, left running because of

problems encountered with sample line blockage due to

i

sediment buildup.

The inspectors were not able to find any

I

procedural guidance that allowed the continuous flow of

I

sampling streams to prevent line blockage for these valves.

l

1

The licensee took immediate corrective action by returning

j

the valve to its normal position as specified by procedure.

1

The licensee stated they would monitor the buildup of

j

sediment in the sample lines.

In the future, if conditions

warrant, a procedural change will be initiated prior to

leaving any sample valves open to prevent line. blockage.

The inspectors verified that the corresponding suppression

pool sample valve on Unit 1 was in the closed position,

c.

Conclusions

This NRC-identified failure to follow procedure is being

treated as an NCV consistent with Section IV of the NRC

Enforcement Policy.

NCV 50-366/96-11-03, Failure to Follow

Procedure for Sample Valve Lineup, was identified.

R4

Staff Knowledge and Performance

j

1

R4.1 Samolino Analysis Collection Technicues (71750)

1

On August 8,

Chemistry Department personnel informed the

d

operations Department that fuel oil samples collected on EDG

1A and 1B fuel oil tanks and the diesel-driven fire pump

fuel oil tank were not within specifications.

Analysis

indicated particulate at 16 milligrams per liter (mg/1) and

11 mg/l for the 1A and 1B EDG, respectfully.

The fire pump

fuel oil analysis indicated particulate at 55 mg/1.

TS 3.8.3.D for stored fuel oil requires total particulate to be

less that or equal to 10 mg/1.

The Operations Department

immediately entered the appropriate TS LCO for the systems.

The out-of-specification tanks were immediately re-sampled

and the samples sent offsite for analysis.

On August 9,

the

re-analysis indicated satisfactory results.

Chemistry

personnel investigated the problem to determine the root

cause for the discrepancy and identified areas for

improvement in the collection techniques.

Licensee

l

i

Enclosure 2

l

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!

_ . _ _ .

_

_ _ _ .

. _ . _ _ _ _

_ _ _

. _

_

_

__ _

,

.

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CPC

22

l

representatives stated that they believed personnel

collecting the samples stirred up the bottom of the tanks

resulting in non- representative samples.

Poor collection

-

techniques were also suspected as a problem during

,

subsequent backup sample collections.

Personnel who collected the samples were qualified in

collection techniques but had not recently performed the

task.

As part of the corrective actions, management

cautioned personnel of the importance of obtaining

representative samples and the impact and consequences of

poor sampling techniques.

.

The inspectors reviewed and discussed the problem with

licensee management, reviewed applicable sampling procedures

l

4

.

and the licensees corrective actions.

The inspectors

'

concluded that poor sampling techniques were probably the

root cause of the problem.

More attention to detail during

the sample collection process may prevent similar problems.

This was identified as an area for improvement in the

chemistry sampling process.

P2

Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources

'

P2.1 Facility Insoection

a.

Inspection Scoce (82701)

'

The inspectors toured the facilities to determine whether

!

key facilities and equipment were adequately maintained in

accordance with the site Emergency Plan.

i

b.

Observations and Findinas

The inspectors toured the Technical Support Center (TSC)

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) , and Operational Support

Center (OSC).

The inspectors witnessed the testing of

selected telephones, fax machines, Safety Parameter Display

System (SPDS), Non-Regulated Emergency Response Data System

(ERDS), Dose Assessment Computer, and the Emergency

Notification Network (ENN) phone.

The equipment operated

properly.

No significant changes had been made to the

facilities.

.

i

The inspectors reviewed documentation that indicated

surveillance of emergency equipment and verification of

'

communications capability were performed at the frequencies

specified in 73EP-TET-001-OS, Control And Testing Of

Emergency Communication Equipment, Revision 4 Ed.

1,

Effective Date June 9,

1994.

The inspectors noted that

deficiencies were resolved in a timely manner.

The inspectors reviewed documentation that indicated

]

facility supplies were being inventoried and maintained in

4

i

Enclosure 2

i

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.

. . .

.

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. - -

-

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,

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GPC

23

accordance with the requirement in 73EP-INS-001-OS,

Emergency Equipment Inventory, Revision 1,

Effective Date

April 27, 1996.

The inspectors randomly selected facility

cabinets and audited emergency supplies and tested

equipment.

No discrepancies were identified by the

inspectors.

c.

Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that the licensee maintained the

facilities and equipment at a satisfactory level of

I

operational readiness.

P2.2 Emercency Response Dose Assessment Cacabilities

a.

Inspection Scoce (82701)

Dose assessment capabilities were inspected to verify that

the licensee maintained continuous dose assessment

capabilities which used real time meteorological and

radiological data.

Also, the inspectors reviewed the

licensee's computerized dose assessment system to evaluate

the training required to operate the system, the capability

of the system, and verify that the licensee's system had

been compared to Radiological Assessment System for

Consequence Analysis (RASCAL).

b.

Observations and Findinos

l

The licensee's Meteorological Information and Dose

'

Assessment System (MIDAS) program was installed on

designated personal computers in the TSC and EOF and if

needed, the program could be loaded on other personal

computers.

Real time radiological and meteorological data

was input to the computer.

The program used default values

from WASH 1400 for the source terms and did not have the

,

'

capability of using actual isotopic analysis data from a

Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) sample.

MIDAS had the

capability to use field team radiological data to back

l

calculate a source term.

The inspectors observed the licensee perform several dose

assessment calculations using MIDAS.

The inspectors

observed that the computer dose assessment system was user

friendly and did not require extensive training to obtain a

dose assessment.

The Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) and Reactor Operators

(ROs) were trained to do on-shift dose assessment using the

" Prompt offsite dose assessment" version of MIDAS.

This was

a simplified version of MIDAS which used some default

i

l

values.

The operators received MIDAS training as part of

l

licensed operator training.

Enclosure 2

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_ - - ~ . ~ - - - . -

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.- .

.

A

GPC

24

The inspectors verified that the licensee had compared dose

j

assessment calculations from MIDAS to calculations from

NRC's RASCAL and that the results were comparable,

i

c.

Conclusion

l

The inspectors concluded that licensee personnel were

capable of performing on-shift dose assessments using real

l

time meteorology.

The licensee's MIDAS dose assessment

l

calculation program was user friendly and results were

l

comparable to those from RASCAL.

,

P2.3 Emeroency Operations Facility - Emeroency Ventilation System

I

a.

Insoection Scoce (82701)

The inspectors reviewed the EOF Emergency Ventilation System

L

and its testing to determine if the licensee was maintair.ing

the system in accordance with Emergency Plan requirenents.

b.

Observations and Findinas

'

The EOF was not designed as a hardened facility and the

l

licensee maintained a fully equipped backup EOF.

The EOF's

l

Emergency Ventilation System was a zero pressure system with

j

High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) Filters and no carbon

.

filter.

In the emergency mode of operation, the Emergency

ventilation System isolated outside air and recirculated air

in the EOF through HEPA filters.

The inspectors interviewed

the system engineer responsible for the system, performed a

walkdown of the system, and observed an operational

demonstration of the system.

All components (dampers) and

instrumentation worked properly.

!

c.

Conclusion

l

The inspectors concluded that the licensee was testing and

maintaining the EOF Emergency Ventilation System adequately.

!

P2.4 Tone Alert Radios. Public Alert And Notification

Caoabilities

a.

Insoection Scone (82701)

This area was inspected to determine if the licensee's

method of notifying the public in the event of an emergency

was in accordance with the site Emergency Plan.

In

addition, the inspectors reviewed the system's procedures,

l

configuration, and reliability.

j

l

\\

!

!

l

Enclosure 2

l

l

l

i

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_

.

.

- - - - .

.

.

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_

. . .

.-

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_

_ .__ _ _ __

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_

!

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!

.

]

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GPC

25

!

b.

Observations and Findinos

!

The inspectors reviewed licensee's documentation and

discussed with the licensee, their public alert and

<

notification process.

The licensee's system for alerting

and notifying the public used approximately 2900 Tone Alert

Radios located within about a ten mile radius of the plant.

i

The licensee maintained accountability of local business and

4

residence within the ten-mile Emergency Preparedness Zone

i

(EPZ) that needed Tone Alert Radios with the aid of the

i

local electrical power companies.

When a local business or

resident changed their electrical power services, the

utility notified the licensee.

i

i

In September 1995, Plant Hatch's National Oceanographic &

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) service was discontinued

from the Savannah, Georgia weather station and service was

updated and switched to the National Weather Service (NWS)

.

in Jacksonville, Florida.

The primary communication was

'

from Jacksonville and utilized a leased line from

Jacksonville to the Brunswick micro-wave tower, then the

Georgia Power Company (GPC) micro-wave system to the site.

A secondary line was a leased land line from Jacksonville to

'

1

Plant Hatch.

The radios were operationally tested each

Wednesday when the NWS station generated a tone which was

'

transmitted from the Plant Hatch NWS transmitter to activate

the tone alert radios.

In addition to the testing, there

-

were numerous instances in 1995 and 1996 in which the system

was activated for severe weather conditions.

The inspectors

reviewed the 1995 annual report for the Tone Alert Radios.

The report and supporting data indicated a 99 percent

i

ava: lability factor for 1995.

There were two instances of

minor losses of services during the year, one for 50 minutes

!

and another for 22 minutes.

c.

Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that the Tone Alert Radio system

had been demonstrated to be reliable through testing and

actual actuation, and the system was being adequately

maintained.

P3

EP Procedures and Documentation

P3.1 Maintenance of th3 Emeroency Plan and Procedures

a.

Insoection Scone (8?701)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's process for making

changes to the Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing

Procedures (EIPs).

The inspectors reviewed changes to the

EIPs and verified that changes to the EIPs were in agreement

with and implemented the Emergency Plan.

Enclosure 2

i

j

.

J

j

_ .

.

.

__

_

e

.

-

.

GPC

26

'

b.

Observations and Findinos

1

Procedures were revised in accordance with administrative

.

procedure 10AC-MGR-003-OS, Preparation and Control of

,

4

'

Procedures.

Proposed changes to the Emergency Plan and EIPs

received a 50.59 evaluation and a review by the Plant Review

Board. The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation

t

for four EIP changes.

The inspectors reviewed the changes

4

to evaluate the licensee's evaluation of the changes, and to

i

independently evaluate the changes for the intent of the

.

change and to verify that the change continued to

I

implemented the plan.

A review of licensee records

indicated that the revisions to the EIPs were satisfactory

and were submitted to the NRC within 30 days of the

implementation date, as required.

l

Controlled copies of the EIPs in the EOF and TSC were

l

reviewed and determined to be maintained up to date.

1

c.

Conclusion

i

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's review process

was satisfactory and met the requirements of

10 CFR 50.54(q).

j

P3.2 Use Of The Emeroency Implementino Procedures

a.

Insoection Scoce (82701)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's event declaration to

verify that the event was properly classified and the

Emergency Implementing Procedures were properly implemented.

b.

Observations and Findinos

!

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's one event declaration

since the last inspection conducted in April 1995.

On March 20, 1996, a NOUE was declared due to a

contaminated, injured individual being transferred off-site

to a local hospital.

,

I

c.

Conclusion

,

The inspectors concluded that the event was properly

classified, the notification was made in a timely manner,

!

and the applicable EIP was implemented.

i

a

I

1

i

l

Enclosure 2

J

!

l

. .

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.

GPC

27

P5

Staff Training and Qualification in EP

PS.1 Trainino of Emercency Response Personnel

a.

Inspection Scoce (82701)

The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Response Training

Program and verified that emergency response personnel were

initially trained and retrained annually to maintain their

training current.

b.

Observations and Findinos

The inspectors reviewed Plant E.I.

Hatch System Master Plan

for Emergency Preparedness Training. The Master Plan

described the program, position, qualification requirements,

required job performance task, and initial and continuing

training requirements.

Emergency Response Organization

(ERO) training consisted of completing job task, classroom

training, and self study.

The inspectors selected two

lesson plans and their associated exams from the Master Plan

for review.

The inspectors concluded from the review that

the lesson plans satisfactorily covered the information

necessary for the position; the lesson plans were organized

and contained the appropriate depth of material; and the

exams were challenging.

The inspector selected six individuals within the ERO from

the current revision of the Emergency Response Position

Matrix and reviewed their training records against their

required training.

All of the individual qualifications

reviewed by the inspectors were up-to-date,

c.

Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that the licensee maintained a

satisfactory Emergency Preparedness training program.

P5.2 Emeroency Plannino Drills

a.

Insoection Scope (82701)

The inspectors compared the licensee drill commitments to

the actual drills performed, and evaluated the quality of

those drills.

b.

Observations and Findinos

The inspectors reviewed and compared the licensee's drill

documentation to Section N,

Exercises and Drills of their

Emergency Plan, and the requirement in 73EP-ADM-001-OS,

Maintaining Emergency Preparedness, Revision 3, Effective

Date April 9,

1996.

The inspectors found the licensee's

documentation to be well-organized.

The licensee's drill

Enclosure 2

.

--

.

- .-

- . - _ - _ - _ _ _ - - . .

.~ -

.

.

.

'

i-

GPC

28

scenarios were satisfactory, the critiques were objective,

and the drill comments or action items were well-documentad

and tracked.

I

c.

Conclusion

l

l

The licensee satisfactorily met their its drill commitments.

P6

EP Organization and Administration

a.

Insoection Scoce (82701)

The inspectors reviewed this area to determine if any

changes in management or personnel had occurred which would

affect the efficiency or performance of the ERO.

b.

Observations and Findinos

The inspectors reviewed the licensee ERO structure and

discussed the current ERO with the Emergency Preparedness

Coordinator.

c.

Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that since the last inspection in

April 1995, no onsite management or significant personnel

changes had occurred which would affect the performance or

maintenance of the Emergency Preparedness Program.

P7

Quality Assurance in EP Activities

P7.1 Recuired 10 CFR 50. 54 (t) Audit Of Emeroency Preparedness

Procram

a.

Inspection Scoce (82701)

The inspectors reviewed this area to assess the quality of

the required audit, the qualifications of the auditors, and

verify that the audit met the requirements of

10 CFR 50.54(t).

b.

Observations and Findinos

The inspector reviewed SAER-07, " Hatch Project Safety Audit

And Engineering Review Procedure For SAER Audits", Revision

8,

dated December 12, 1995.

The procedure required an

" Audit Planning Matrix" to be prepared once per year for the

upcoming year and the final revision to be distributed to

the SRB.

The Audit Planning Matrix was to list the Audit

Area Titles and a breakdown of the Audit Elements.

Lead

Auditors were to use the Audit Planning Matrix to prepare an

audit plan and checklist.

Enclosure 2

__.

_

_

_ _ .

_ __ _ _. __

. . . . _ . -

__ _ _ _ _ . _

.

.

1

'

GPC

29

'

The inspectors reviewed the Audit Planning Matrix for the

Emergency Plan.

The matrix listed fifteen areas which

'

corresponded to the titles of each chapter in the Emergency

)

I

Plan.

l

The inspector reviewed Audit 95-EP-2, which was a three-

person audit conducted between November 13, and December 13,

,

1595.

The audit was considered by the licensee to be the

-

annual Emergency Preparedness. Audit required by

l

10 CFR 50.54(t).

The cover letter stated that the audit was

based upon completing the fifteen elements specified in the

Audit Planning Matrix.

The inspectors reviewed each

auditor's checklists and noted that the audit was not based

upon or conducted in accordance with the Planning Matrix or

as specified in the report cover letter.

The actual audit

was performed using the guidance in an Institute of Nuclear

Power Operations (INPO) document,85-014, " Generic Guidanco

For Emergency Preparedness Review."

The auditors' checklist

and notes mirrored the elements, A through G,

and the

elements breakdown in the INPO document.

The audit

contained 118 element breakdowns.

In reviewing the

auditors' notes, the inspectors noted that, for some issues,

the auditors relied on discussions with EP staff but did not

independently verify their results.

One element breakdown questioned whether the EIPs provided a

space for a check mark or initial to indicate that the step

had been complete.

The audit result indicated that the

procedures did provide a space. The inspectors independently

reviewed approximately five different EIP's and did not

observe any such provision in the EIPs.

There were no issues identified by the licensee in the Audit

report.

The inspector reviewed the audit to verify that the elements

identified in 10 CFR 50.54(t) were addressed.

The

inspectors noted that Audit 95-EP-2 did not address the

requirement in 10 CFR 50.54 (t) for " Adequacy of interface

with State and local governments."

After discussions with

the licensee, it was determined that the element was covered

in an independent Corporate audit, Audit Report No. 96-3.

The inspectors reviewed the qualification requirements for

an auditor and lead auditor and concluded that the program

qualification requirements were in accordance with American

National Standards Institute, Inc. (ANSI)-N45.2.23.

The

inspectors reviewed each auditor's qualification card and

noted that their qualifications were satisfactorily

completed and up-to-date.

Enclosure 2

.

~ . . .

.

--.

- - . . ~

. . -

. ~

. - -

.- -.

-.- -

.

-

.

.

GPC

30

c.

Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that the audit performed did not

independently verify some conclusions and at least one audit

finding was incorrect.

Although the audit was not conducted

in accordance with the Audit Planning Matrix, the aggregate

,

j

of the audit elements satisfied the 10 CFR 50.54 (t)

requirement for an annual independent. audit of the~EP

program.

The inspectors concluded that the auditors

,

qualification program was satisfactory and the auditors were

qualified.

'

I

P7.2 Licensee's Corrective Action Procram For Drill Comments and

Issues

a.

Insoection Scoce (82701)

The area was inspected to evaluate the licensee's corrective

.

actions to comments and issues identified in their drills.

J

b.

Observations and Findinas

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's drill documentation

and verified that significant critique comments were being

tracked and resolved.

Emergency Preparedness issues were

tracked on-the licensee's Action Item Tracking (AIT) system.

.

For each issue, the AIT gave a description of the issue,

J.

identified the responsible group and person, and indicated

its status and estimated completion date.

Individuals

maintained a file on the issues assigned to them, and when

,

{

the AIT was updated, the individual was responsible to

review the status of their issues.

The inspectors noted

from the review of the AIT that there were few issues older

-

than one year old,

c.

Conclusion

The inspectors' review concluded that the emergency

preparedness issues were satisfactorily tracked and resolved

in a timely manner.

The licensee's resolution of items

tracked was adequate.

P8

Miscellaneous EP Issues

,

P8.1 (Closed) Follow-uo Item 50-321.366/95-09-01:

Correction of

discrepancies between the Plan and EIPs regarding follow-up

i

notifications to the State and counties at the Alert level

and above.

The inspector reviewed and verified that

procedures 73EP-EIP-004-OS, Duties Of Emergency Director,

Revision 5,

Effective Date July 26, 1995 and

73EP-EIP-073-OS, Offsite Emergency Notifications,

^

Revision 11, Effective Date July 19, 1995, had been revised

+

i

to correct discrepancies regarding follow-up notifications

to State and local officials during declared emergencies.

i

!

Enclosure 2

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i

GPC

31

The applicable emergency preparedness training material was

revised to reflect the changes to the procedures.

Both

'

procedures had been changed to require follow-up

notifications to be performed " periodically."

P8.2 Conclusion / Assessment

i

The licensee Emergency Preparedness Program plan and

procedures, training equipment, and response facilities were

being satisfactorily maintained.

The licensee properly

classified an event and made the necessary notifications in

a timely manner.

Licensee personnel were capable of

performing on-shift dose assessments.

The tone alert radio

system was reliable and adequately maintained.

Licensee

drill comments were satisfactorily resolved in a timely

manner.

S2

Status of Security Facilities and Equipment

The inspectors toured the protected area and coserved that

the perimeter fence was intact and not compromised by

erosion nor disrepair.

The fence fabric was secured and

barbed wire was angled as required by the licensee's Plant

Security Plan (PSP).

Isolation zones were maintained on

both sides of the barrier and were free of objects which

could shield or conceal an individual.

The inspectors

observed that personnel and packages entering the protected

area were searched either by special purpose detectors or by

a physical search for firearms, explosives and contraband.

Badge issuance was observed, as was the processing and

escorting of visitors.

Vehicles were searched, escorted,

and secured as described in the PSP.

The inspectors

verified that the security procedures addressed suspension

of safeguards during emergencies in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 54 (x) and 50. 54 (y) .

The inspectors concluded that the areas of the PSP inspected

met the PSP requirements.

V.

Manacement Meetinas

X.

Review of UFSAR Commitments

A recent discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a

manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

(UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a special

focused review that compares plant practices, procedures

and/or parameters to the UFSAR description.

While

performing the inspections discussed in this report, the

inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR

l

that related to the areas inspected.

The inspectors

verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the

l

observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters.

!

i

Enclosure 2

.

.

  • GPC

32

X.1

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members

of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection

on September 20, 1996.

The license acknowledged the

findings presented.

An interim exit was conducted on

August 30, 1996.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials

examined during the inspection should be considered

proprietary.

No proprietary information was identified.

X.2

Other NRC Personnel On Site

On August 19-20, 1996, Mr.

P.H. Skinner, Chief Reactor

i

Projects Branch 2, visited the site.

He met with the

l

resident inspector staff and discussed plant issues,

licensee performance, and generic issues.

He also attended

licensee management meetings and met with licensee

management to discuss licensee performance and regulatory

issues.

l

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

Anderson,

J.,

Unit Superintendent

Betsill,

J.,

Operations Manager

Coggin,

C.,

Engineering Support Manager

Curtis,

S.,

Operations Support Superintendent

Davis,

D.,

Plant Administration Manager

Fornel,

P., Performance Team Manager

Fraser,

O.,

Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor

Hammonds,

J.,

Regulatory Compliance Supervisor

Kirkley,

W.,

Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

Lewis,

J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

Moore,

C.,

Assistant General Manager - Plant Support

Reddick,

R.,

Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

Roberts,

P.,

Outages and Planning Manager

Sumner,

H.,

General Manager - Nuclear Plant

Thompson,

J.,

Nuclear Security Manager

Tipps,

S.,

Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager

Wells,

P.,

Assistant General Manager - Operations

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37551:

Onsite Engineering

IP 40500:

Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in

Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems

IP 61726:

Surveillance Observations

IP 62703:

Maintenance Observation

IP 62707:

Maintenance Observation

IP 71707:

Plant Operations

IP 71750:

Plant Support Activities

Enclosure 2

.-.-.-.-. _ -. . - - _ ..-.- .-_ - -. - . .- _ ..- .-.- _ .-....~. _ ._ .. - . - ._. .

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GPC

33

IP 82701:

Operational Status Of The Emergency Preparedness

Program

IP 92700:

Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine

Events at Power Reactor Facilities

r

'

IP 92901:

Followup - Operations

p IP 92902:

Followup - Maintenance / Surveillance

NIP 92903:

Followup - Followup Engineering

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

!

!

Opened

I

!

50-321,366/96-11-01

IFI

Review of Engineering Report

l

on the Effects of Harmonics on

EDG Operation (Section E2.1).

50-321/96-11-02

VIO

Failure to Perform an ASME

Code Required VT-3 Inspection

on HPCI Valve 1E41-F006, was

identified (Section E2.2).

$

Closed

l

50-321,366/95-09-01

IFI

Correction of discrepancies

l

between the Plan and EIPs

regarding follow-up

notifications to the State and

counties at the Alert level

and above (Section P8.1).

50-321/95-16-01

VIO

Contract personnel failure to

]

follow procedure while

performing maintenance on

valve 1E41-F003

i

!

(Section E8.1).

50-321,366/95-18-02

VIO

Failure to follow Procedure.

First example (Section M8.2).

Second example (Section 08.5).

50-366/95-26-01

VIO

Inability to safely shutdown

Unit 2 from Remote Shutdown

Panel in the event of a fire

in the Main Control Room

(Section 08.4).

50-321/95-23-01

VIO

Operators' failure to follow

procedure while transferring

diesel fuel oil

(Section 08.3).

.

!

i

Enclosure 2

l

l

.

wwa -

r-

,

,w

4

e-

+

-

-r

iw--

ni

e-wi

,-

>w-w,

e-

-

-g,+y9

.

_ .. ~ .

- - - - - - - - . _ _ _ - - -

..- - . - .- ._ - . .. -.. _ ..- -.

..-. - .

.

j

-

-

GPC

34

50-366/96-03

LER

High Pressure Coolant

Injection System Temporarily

Inoperable Following

Engineering Safety Feature

l

Actuation (Section M8.1) .

50-321,366/96-07-01

URI

Determine Safety Significance

and Testing Requirements for

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment

Isolation Status Panel

(Section

08.1).

50-321/96-11

LER

. Inadequate Procedure Results

in Missed Technical

!

Specifications Surveillances

(Section 08.2).

50-321,366/96-11-01

NCV

Failure to Test or Verify the

Function as Described in USFAR

of the Isolation valve

Indication on the Containment

Isolation Status Panels

,

'

(Section 08.1).

50-366/96-11-03

NCV

Failure to Follow Procedure

for Sample Valve Lineup

(Section R1.2).

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AIT

-

Action Item Tracking

ASME -

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

I

cfm

-

cubic feet per minute

CFR

-

Code of Federal Regulations

CR

-

Control Room

l

CRD

-

Control Rod Drive

!

DC

-

Design Change

DCR

-

Design Change Request

ECCS -

Emergency Core Cooling Systems

EDG

-

Emergency Diesel Generator

EHC

-

Electro Hydraulic Control

l

EIP

-

Emergency Implementing Procedures

ENN

-

Emergency Notification Network

EOF

-

Emergency Operating Facility

EP

-

Emergency Preparedness

EPZ

-

Emergency Preparedness Zone

ERDS -

Emergency Response Data System

l

ERO

-

Emergency Response Organization

i

FSAR -

Final Safety Analysis Report

(

GPC

-

Georgia Power Company

HEPA -

High-Efficiency Particulate Air Filters

'

HP

-

Health Physics

,

HPCI -

High Pressure Coolant Injection

I

j

Enclosure 2

-

. . . .

-

.

.

--

_ _ _ . _ . _ . _ - - _ _ - . - _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ - . - . . . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _

-

=

,\\<:

.

i j Ii

J

1 illl

GPC

35

ig;

1 5 It'

f ('

Hz

-

hertz

i

,

l

IFI

-

Inspector Followup Item

INPO -

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Inspection Report

IR

-

kw

-

kilowatt

1

-

liter

LCO

-

Limiting Condition of Operation

Licensee Event Report

LER

-

LPCI -

Low Pressure Coolant Injection

Main Control Room

MCR

-

MDC

-

Minor Design Change

mg

-

milligram

MG

-

Motor-Generator

l

MIDAS-

Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment

j

l

System

MSIV

- Main Steam Isolation Valve

MWO

-

Maintenance Work Order

NCV

-

Non-Cited Violation

NOAA -

National Oceanographic & Atmospheric Administration

NOUE -

Notice of Unusual Event

l

NRC

-

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR

-

Nuclear Reactor Regulation

'

I

NSSS -

Nuclear Steam Supply System

NWS

-

National Weather Service

OSC

-

Operations Support Center

P&ID -

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

PASS -

Post Accident Sample System

PDR

-

Public Document Room

PSP

-

Plant Security Plan

PSW

-

Plant Service Water System

QA

-

Quality Assurance

QC

-

Quality control

QCIR -

Quality Control Inspection Report

RAS

-

Required Action Statement

RASCAL- Radiological Assessment System for Consequence

Analysis

RAW

-

Risk Achievement Worth

RCA

-

Radiological Controlled Area

RFP

-

Reactor Feedwater Pump

RFPT -

Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine

RHR

-

Residual Heat Removal

RPS

-

Reactor Protection System

RR

-

Reactor Recirculation

RTP

-

Rated Thermal Power

SAE

-

Site Area Emergency

SAER -

Safety Audit and Engineering Review

Standby Gas Treatment

SGT

-

SOS

-

Superintendent On Shift

SPDS -

Safety Parameter Display System

Surveillance Requirement

SR

-

SRO

-

Senior Reactor Operator

SS

-

Station Service

7

TS

-

Technical Specifications

TSC

-

Technical Support Center

Enclosure 2

. -

. -

.

, _ . _

.

. _ _ _

._.

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GPC

36

TSIP -

Technical Specification Improvement Program

UFSAR-

Updated Fina) Safety Analysis Report

URI

-

Unresolved item

VIO

-

Violation

1

l

I

1

l

Enclosure 2

'

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