ML20140C788
| ML20140C788 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1986 |
| From: | Garner L, Holmesray P, Nejfelt G, Panciera V, Ponciera V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140C756 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-85-34, 50-366-85-34, NUDOCS 8601280402 | |
| Download: ML20140C788 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1985034
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-321/85-34 and 50-366/85-34
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket Nos..
50-321 and 50-366
License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
Facility Name:
Hatch 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
November 10 - December 20, 1985
Inspectors:
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P. Holmes-Ray, Seniorgsidfift'IHspector
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G.M.Nejfelt,ResiftI[pector
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Approved by: Y .{
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V. W.'Pa Wiera, Section Chief
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Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This inspection involved 236 inspector-hours on site in the areas of
Technical
Specification
compliance, operator performance, overall
plant
operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management
practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security
procedures, radiation control activities, refueling (Unit 1), and surveillance
activities.
Results:
Of the areas inspected, three violations were identified.
An
inadequate procedure resulting in isolation of shutdown cooling during refueling
operations (Unit 1), an improperly performed procedure resulting in inadvertent
isolation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) steam line with Unit 2 at
rated conditions, and in Unit 2,
a backseatea valve which could not meet
Technical Specification (TS) closing requirements (see paragraphs 5 and 7).
9601280402 860115
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
H. C. Nix, Site General Manager
- T. Greene, Deputy Site General Manager
- H. L. Summer, Operations Manager
- T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager
- C. T. Jones, Engineering Manager
- R. W. Zavodoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
P. E. Fornel, Site 0.A. Manager
- S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security
force members, and office personnel.
" Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 20, 1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
During the reporting period
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frequent discussions were held with the General Manager and/or his
assistants concerning inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the
findings and took no exception.
The licensee did not identify as
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proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors
during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Findings
The following items have been reviewed by the inspectors and are considered
resolved.
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a.
(Closed) Violation (321/85-02-01) - Startup of Unit I with one
Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valve inoperable,
b.
(Closed) Violation (321/85-02-02) - Procedures not adhered to.
c.
(Closed) Violation (321,366/85-09-03) - Personnel' error.
d.
(Closed) Violation (321,366/85-10-02) - Improper battery surveillance.
e.
(Closed) Violation (321/85-10-01) - Valve position error.
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f.
-(Closed) Violation (366/85-18-04) - Nitrogen valves out of position.
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g.
(Closed) Violation (321,366/85-22-02) - Lack of administrative control
of vendor manuals used in safety related calibration procedures.
h.
(Closed) Violar. ion (321/85-24-01) - Failure to make a four hour
notification,
i.
(Closed) IFI (321,366/85-18-01) - Diesel
temperature
monitoring.
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(Closed) IFI (321,366/85-18-02) - Diesel water jacket limits.
k.
(Closed) IFI (321,366/85-18-03) - Diesel lube oil level check.
4.
Unresolved Items
URI 321,366/85-05-06: The inspector reviewed the Final Safety Analysis
Report (FSAR) and Technical Specifications (TSs) for both Units to detareine
if the load ratings specified in Hatch procedures for the diesel generator
operation were correct even though differing from vendor recommendations.
The ordering data for the diesels was also reviewed.
The Unit 1 FSAR does
not specify load ratings for the diesel generators; but Unit 2 FSAR does,
and the operating procedures agree with these requirements.
Hatch
procedures were revised to reflect 2850 KW as the upper limit beyond which
the_ diesel should never be loaded during normal surveillance. This item is
closed.
URI 321/84-48-01c
Procedure 42FH-ENG-004 has been issued and contains
adequate instructions to control the placement of new fuel into the fuel
pool.
Included is the requirement for two persons to independently verify
that the fuel is placed in its proper location and to document the spent
fuel storage location in the post-inspection fuel bundle location log. This
item is closed.
5.
Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector (s) conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection
interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required,
equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant
conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors
also determined that appropriate radiation controls were
properly
established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with
procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible
material and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours the
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inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping
vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and
breaker positions, equipment danger tags, component positions, adequacy of
fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were
conducted on backshifts and/or weekends.
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The inspector routinely conduct partial walkdowns of Emergency Core Cooling
Systems (ECCS).
Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions
are randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
During a centrol board walkdown on November 18, 1985, in Unit 2,
the
inspector observed an information tag (2-85-31) which indicated that valve
2E51-F008 (RCIC inboard steam line isolation valve) had been electrically
backseated on November 7,
1985.
Operating personnel indicated that they
were not aware of any testing which had been performed to verify that the
closure time requirement in TS could still be met from the backseated
position.
Valve 1G31-F001 (Reactor Water Cleanup System [RWCU] inboard
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isolation valve) was also tagged on its backseat (tag 1-85-44 of
September 26, 1985). Upon failure to locate evidence that testing had been
done from the backseat position, the licensee tested both valves.
Valve
2E51-F008 tested satisfactorily, however valve IG31-F001 exceeded the time
specified in TS Table 3.7-1 by four seconds (34 vs. 30 sec.). The valve was
timed again from its normal open, not backseated, position. On this second
attempt when the timing was performed in accordance with the surveillance
procedure, the time was 29 seconds and therefore within specifications. The
valve was reopened and ' eft off its backseat. The major difference between
the two tests was that t a first time was determined from when the control
switch was turned until the fully closed indication was received.
By the
licensee's surveillance procedure, the method used the second time, the time
was recorded from the illumination of the closure light (dual indication,
both open and closed light lit) to the extinguishing of the open light (only
the closed light lit).
Therefore, the normal method used by the licensee
did not include the breakaway and initial valve movement time.
Failure to
maintain the RWCU valve, 1G312-F001, in a condition such that the specified
closure time in TS Table 3.7-1 could be met is a violation (321/85-34-01).
6.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift
logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and
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records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs
and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and
equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator
alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
During normal events, operator
performance and response actions were observed and evaluated.
The
inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting
interval to assure that operations and security remained at acceptable
levels. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in
accordance with approved licensee procedures.
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with
selected Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs) and results of selected
surveillance tests.
These verifications were accomplished by direct
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observation
of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions,
switch
positions, and review of completed logs and records.
The licensee's
compliance with selected LC0 action statements were reviewed on selected
occurrences as they happened.
On December 6, 1985, with Unit 1 in the process of being defueled, the
shutdown cooling mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system was
inadvertently isolated, while performing design
change
instruction
42SP-DCI-009-1S " Terminations for ECCS Loop "G" per DCR 81-138". When link
CC 80 was opened in panel
1H11,
in accordance with procedure
42SP-DCI-009-15, relay K 30 dropped out causing valve 1E11-F008 to shut
isolating shutdown cooling. As soon as the valve went shut, the licensee
realized what had happen and closed the link and reestablished the shutdown
cooling lineup.
Shutdown cooling was isolated for arproximately eight
minutes. The licensee reviewed the procedure for the other loop of RHR and
found the same error in that procedure. This inadequate procedure affecting
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a safety system is a violation (321/85-34-02).
On December 18, 1985, with Unit 2 at rated conditions, the procedure for
High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) differential pressure instrument
functional test and calibration, 575V-E41-003-2, was being performed. The
Instrument and Control (I&C) technician plugged into the RCIC module rather
than the HPCI module causing valve 2E51-F008 to close, thereby isolating the-
RCIC steam line.
The error was immediately recognized and the 2E51-F008
valve was reopened, returning RCIC to its standby lineup. This failure to
follow procedure is a violation (366/85-34-03).
8.
Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting
interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the
facility met
current
requirements.
Areas
inspected
included
the
organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of
gates, doors and isciation zones in proper condition, that access control
and badging was proper, and procedures were followed.
During this reporting period the licensee issued a unrestricted access badge
to a person authorized only escorted access. The person gained entry to the
protected area and the vital area using this badge. The details of this
event and any enforcement action will be contained in report 321,366/85-36.
9.
Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee
The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential
generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective
actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were
also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications
were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost considera-
tion.
The following LERs are considered closed:
Unit 1: 85-15, 85-18*, 85-19, 85-22
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Unit 2:
84-11, 84-18*, 85-16, 85-18, 85-20, 85-21
- In-depth review performed
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10.
Refue',ing (Unit 1)
During this reporting interval the inspectors verified by observation,
interviews, and procedure review that the refueling was being conducted in
accordance with regulations.
Areas inspected included adequacy of
procedures, inspection of fuel to be reused, Technical Specification
compliance and refueling floor housekeeping.
During this reporting interval, Unit I core was unloaded with no major
problems. Also preparation for recovery of the new fuel bundle, which had
been-dropped into the fuel pool, continued. The method and procedures have
been established and the lift expected to take place on December 21, 1985.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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