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| number = ML14065A253
| number = ML14065A253
| issue date = 03/05/2014
| issue date = 03/05/2014
| title = 02/27/2014 Summary of Category 1 Public Meeting with Omaha Public Power District to Discuss Status of Oversight Activities at Fort Calhoun Station
| title = Summary of Category 1 Public Meeting with Omaha Public Power District to Discuss Status of Oversight Activities at Fort Calhoun Station
| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV
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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E. LAMAR BLVD. ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511   March 5, 2014   LICENSEE: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) FACILITY: Fort Calhoun Station  
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E. LAMAR BLVD.
ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511 March 5, 2014 LICENSEE:             Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)
FACILITY:             Fort Calhoun Station


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
SUMMARY OF FEBRUARY 27, 2014 MEETING WITH OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT On February 27, 2014 a Category 1 meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) in Blair, Nebraska. The NRC presented the status of oversight activities at Fort Calhoun Station (Enclosure 1). OPPD presented their actions for continued performance improvement following the plant restart in December 2013 (Enclosure 2). The slides from the presentations are available electronically from the Ns Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) and are enclosed in this notice. A video of the public meeting will be posted on the website devoted to the special oversight at Fort Calhoun Station, available at: http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/fcs/special-oversight.html. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the s Rules of Practice,py of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the s Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the Public Electronic Reading Room page of the s public web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To receive a summary of future meetings and other plant-specific e-mail distributions, you must subscribe to the Operating Reactor Correspondence electronic distribution for this plant via: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver/plants-by-region.html Once subscribed, if you wish to discontinue receiving electronic distribution, you may unsubscribe at any time by visiting the same web address above. CONTACT: Michael Hay, RIV/DRP (817) 200-1147 Docket No.: 50-285 Enclosure 1: NRC Presentation Slides Enclosure 2: OPPD Presentation Slides Introductions   Fort Calhoun Station Public Meeting   Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 27, 2014 Blair, Nebraska   Welcome    Introduction of NRC personnel  1 2                 Purpose of Meeting   NRC will present status of regulatory activities associated with the Fort Calhoun Station   OPPD will present details of Fort Calhoun Station performance improvement initiatives   Public comments and questions Opening Remarks      Marc Dapas  Regional Administrator  4           1 Enclosure 1 2          NRC Actions Completed     NRC completed inspection, assessment, and licensing activities associated with the Confirmatory Action Letter Restart Checklist NRC Actions Completed    NRC determined plant safe for restart and closed Confirmatory Action Letter December 17, 2013    NRC issued PosRestart Confirmatory Action Letter December 17, 2013   5 6                 PosRestart CAL     OPPD committed to the NRC to continue implementing improvement initiatives in key areas and address specific technical items       7 PosRestart CAL  PosRestart commitments consist of:    Key areas for sustained performance improvement  Long term flood recovery items High energy line break corrective actions associated with the Auxiliary Steam System Containment internal structure corrective actions to restore design margins   8 3          NRC Assessment Activities   Routine inspections Resident Inspectors Regional inspections Team inspection (Summer 2014) Assess Corrective Action Process effectiveness Assess PosRestart Confirmatory Action Letter items In Summary    Increased NRC oversight activities remain    NRC continues to implement independent and thorough inspection activities to assess station performance improvement progress  9 10                 OPPD Presentation Contacting the NRC   Report an emergency (301) 8165100 (call collect) Report a safety concern (800) 6957403 Allegation@nrc.gov General information or questions www.nrc.gov   11 12 OPPDs Fort Calhoun Station Driving To Excellence Public meeting with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission         February 27, 2014 1 Topics for Discussion  Safety Culture  Problem Identification and Resolution  Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use  Site Operational  Focus  Programs  Engineering Focus Areas   Flooding Recovery Action Plans   Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation   Fukushima Response Project   Tornado-Borne Missiles   High-Energy Line Break   10 CFR 50.59   Containment Internal Structures Nuclear Oversight Integration into the Exelon Nuclear Fleet 2                   Safety Culture Safety Culture Monitoring and Improvements Continue   Initial and continuing Safety Culture/SCWE training for leaders and site personnel What People Are Saying  hinking back over the past six months, Better     Better Same    70% 28%   Continue to utilize the 2Cs meetings (compliments and concerns)  Implemented a Site Employee Issues Advisory Committee   Continue our monthly Safety Culture Pulse Survey  Weekly leadership and station alignment meetings to discuss survey results   OPPD can determine both station safety culture trends and department level trends for departments of ten people or larger 3 is Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) at    hinking back over the past six months, is nuclear safety culture at    4 Same      Same  Worse Better Worse  Worse  Better Same Worse  2%  77%  23%  1%            1 Enclosure 2 2          Problem Identification and Resolution  Corrective Action Program (CAP) changes implemented to improve OPPDs detection and correction of plant issues  Streamlined CAP procedures and guidance  Established  expectations  managers,  supervisors  and staff trained  Accountability reinforced   Added staff  CAP Coordinators (CAPCOs)   Implemented detailed Exelon Nuclear performance monitoring tools   Conducted oral board interviews to assess & reinforce understanding Results   Station has seen a reduction in the number of open Corrective Actions and Causal Analyses over the last quarter   CAP performance indicators are showing improvements due to better alignment of the Senior Leadership Team (SLT)   Through performance data trending, the station has identified needed improvements in Causal Analysis quality 5 Problem Identification and Resolution Observations  Areas that have shown improvement in last quarter    Open corrective actions (Oct: 3,229 / Current: 2,124)    Open report evaluations  (Oct: 617 / Current: 410)     Open correction action prevent recurrences (CAPRs) (Oct: 33 / Current: 25)     RCA/ACA Rejection Rates (1st Two Quarters: 47% / Last Two Quarter: 24%)  Areas where we are still being challenged    Number of overdue CAP items    RCA / ACA timeliness  Actions addressing challenges    Common Factors Analysis required for department with five or more overdue CAP items    Increased Management  Oversight of open Causal Analysis. Developed Engineering  recovery plan to reduce analysis volume and increase qualified analysts  Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection scheduled for the weeks of June 23 and July 14, 2014 6                  Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use  OPPDs post restart commitment states that:  After restart, OPPD will complete a significant effort to perform a risk- focused reconstitution of the:  Design basis,  Licensing basis, and   Updated Safety Analysis Report  As part of this project, OPPD will:  Ensure proper classification of equipment,  Convert to a safety-related  approach for equipment classification, and  Complete a key calculation review  A pilot program will be completed during 2014 on a selected system to  and  the process, scheduling and resource allocation  Complete the reconstitution project before the end of 4th quarter 2018 7 Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use  January 2014: Commenced  review of key calculation    Pre-restart 93 calculations were reviewed with 45 revisions for administrative corrections    78 of 351 key calculations were reviewed with 33 revisions required for administrative corrections  February 7, 2014  Issue project request for proposal to vendors (COMPLETE) March 28, 2014  Vendor proposals due  April 30, 2014  Award project contract  May 5, 2014  Commence pilot project      August 1, 2014  Complete project status assessment  December 31, 2014  Complete pilot project (NRC commitment)  February 1, 2015  Complete project status assessment  February 28, 2015  Implement lessons learned from pilot project      March 1, 2015  Commence remainder of project  December 31, 2018  Complete reconstitution project (NRC commitment)  Approximately every six months between March 1, 2015 and December 31, 2018  Complete project status assessments 7 8  8 3          Site Operational Focus Site Operational Focus combines the awareness of plant and equipment performance, knowledge of the plant design and licensing basis, with qualified personnel and procedures supporting sustained operations  Elements of Operational Focus include:  Shift Managers leads the station's  of the Day providing oversight and setting the priorities for the station  Daily activities are assessed for impact to the station based on risk  Risk assessment includes ensuring activities are resource-loaded (compatible work bundled, parts procured and personnel support) Site Operational Focus  Elements of Operational Focus include: (continued)   Actual and potential issues screened using formal systematic decision-making process  CAP used to support trending, investigations and causal analysis  Operator rounds and monitoring plans to trend performance  Plant Health Committee reviews equipment status against expected performance  Exelon Fleet provides a suite of Performance Indicators  Fleet resources available for support needed  9  10                  Site Operational Focus  Fort Calhoun has resumed safe operations Site Operational Focus Traveling screen sluice gate shaft was found damaged by Operations personnel. Commenced Heatup Nov. 24, 2013 @1432    Reactor Critical Dec. 18, 2013 @1848  Breakers Closed Dec. 21, 2013 @2100    Reactor Shutdown (CW-14C) Jan. 9, 2014 @0900  Reactor Critical Jan. 12, 2014 @0308    Manual Reactor Shutdown (CEA-41) Jan. 12, 2014 @0323  Reactor Critical Jan. 13, 2014 @0136    Breakers Closed Jan. 13, 2014 @1411  The shaft was bent by moving the gate with heavy ice buildup, caused by a leak above from a backwash pipe  Root Cause from CAP analysis   Motor torque settings allowed the stem to be bent  Corrective Actions   The stem has been replaced 1. Heat-up performed to support testing and equipment  verifications 2. Reactor startup only after conditions  confirmed and commitments met 3. Unit returned to service 4. Forced outage to repair river sluice gate 5. Control rod issue identified during unit startup; unit shut down to support repairs 6. Reactor restarted after repairs made and returned to service    Motor torque settings were verified and reset    The pipe leak is being repaired  11  12 4           Site Operational Focus  Organizational Changes:    Enhanced operator rounds to monitor for ice on gates beneath catwalk over the river    Inspect other motor actuator torque settings GATES at INTAKE STRUCTURE Flooding Recovery Action Plans Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action Plan status    There are five Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments outlined in section 2 of the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL)   Three Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments have been submitted to the NRC resident inspectors    Two Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments are on-going        File photo of Gates  13  14                  Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation  Interim action currently in place  New portable system Fukushima Response Project  Project scope  Flooding reevaluation and seismic evaluation  Mitigates effects of floods above  elevation  Designed and tested for beyond design basis conditions  NRC approved license amendment  for minimum river level Portable Submersible Pumps    Flooding and seismic walkdowns      Results submitted to the NRC      Actions ongoing  Mitigating strategies for beyond design basis external events Portable Skids for Water and Power Distribution Portable Diesel Generators  Strategy developed and submitted to NRC      Portable equipment pre-staged at FCS      Procedures (Admin/Operations/PM/Testing)      Staffing      Communications  (internal and external)  Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (SFPI)    SFPI modifications  submitted to the NRC  15  16 5          Tornado-Borne Missiles High-Energy Line Break  Protection of key equipment from potential tornado-borne missiles  Used 250 tons of steel  Completed 37 modifications  High-Energy Line Break (HELB)   Established  a clear licensing basis  Reassessed  all high-energy  systems  Revised over 30 design documents  Completed  over 30 hardware changes  Post-Restart Action commitments outlined in section 3 of the CAL Piping Changes  Redundancy to Mitigate HELBs  Improved  Piping Supports  HELB Flood Barriers      17  18                  10 CFR 50.59 of actions taken regarding 10 CFR 50.59:  Reduced population  of individuals  qualified to perform Section 50.59 Screens and Evaluations  Provided vendor training for the reduced population  of qualified individuals. This training was specifically  developed for FCS by utilizing examples of station products. A custom exam was also created. The training has two purposes: 1. Develop subject matter experts and alternates  for Section 50.59, which will be able to give the initial and requalification training. 2. Increase the level of knowledge  of individuals  that will be mentoring our less-experienced engineers in Section 50.59 screens and evaluations  Implemented the Engineering Assurance  Group (EAG). All Screens and Evaluations  are required to be reviewed by EAG prior to issuance  Completed  focused briefings on specific deficiencies  seen through EAG reviews  Implementing Exelons Quality Review Team, which will review Section 50.59 products as part of the review scope Containment Internal Structures  OPPD committed to:    Evaluate the structural design margin for the containment  internal structure, and reactor cavity and compartments, and resolve any deficiencies  in accordance  with FCSs CAP    Regarding  Beams 22A and Beam 22B under Safety Injection Tanks 6B/D, resolve any deficiencies  in accordance  with the CAP  Significant  effort and resources  utilized to analyze the containment  internal structure and develop resolution strategies. Resolution  Strategy  Reactor Vessel Head stand  Replace current existing pedestal supports with deep beams that span the floor to take the load to adjacent walls and columns  19  20 6          Nuclear Oversight Independent Assessment    Plant Startup    Post-Restart The Exelon Nuclear Management Model Transition in five phases  Framework development  Organization, Procedures, Performance Indicators, Information Technology  Analysis   Gap analysis of 27 functional areas   Design  Recommendations  to address key gaps   Implementation planning   Schedule development  to include change management   Implementation  Majority of activities due for completion in 2015   completed over 2000 activities as of today   Approved by OPPD and Exelon executives 21  22                  The Exelon Nuclear Management Model   Check and adjust approach using weekly status meetings and workload look-aheads to maintain schedule adherence   Review progress   Defined process for any schedule changes  Monthly Executive Status Meetings  Fleet  Corporate Functional Area Manager Peer Support  oversight  NSRB  Station visits with report outs to the OPPD board What it Took  So Far  person-hours  69,000 task completions -year operating agreement with Exelon  More than 450 restart checklist items closed Industry-leading measurement of safety culture  23  24 7          What it Took  The Details  Tasks complete: 69,032  Person-hours worked: 8,027,621  Work orders planned: 26,956  Work order tasks completed: 50,197  Engineering changes completed: 187  NRC yellow sheets addressed: 1,885  Modifications installed: 90  Modification tasks: 11,614  Parts issued: 50,317  Radiography exams (RT shots): 474  Clearances used: 7,906  Clearance tags hung and removed: 34,547  Dose to complete the work:180.113 REM What it Took  The Details  CAP items assigned: 51,726  Cause Analyses (RCAs) assigned: 77  Cause Analyses (ACAs) assigned: 287  Simple Causes assigned: 16,742 -level Condition Reports (CRs) assigned: 34,384  25  26                  Closing Remarks Tonight, we updated you on  Safety Culture  Problem  Identification and Resolution  Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use  Site Operational Focus  Programs  Engineering Focus Areas  Flooding  Recovery  Action Plans  Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation  Fukushima Response Project  Tornadne Missiles  Highrgy Line Break  10 CFR 50.59   Containment Internal Structures Nuclear Oversight Integration into the Exelon Nuclear Fleet 27}}
 
==SUMMARY==
OF FEBRUARY 27, 2014 MEETING WITH OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT On February 27, 2014 a Category 1 meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) in Blair, Nebraska.
The NRC presented the status of oversight activities at Fort Calhoun Station (Enclosure 1).
OPPD presented their actions for continued performance improvement following the plant restart in December 2013 (Enclosure 2). The slides from the presentations are available electronically from the NRCs Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) and are enclosed in this notice.
A video of the public meeting will be posted on the website devoted to the special oversight at Fort Calhoun Station, available at:
http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/fcs/special-oversight.html.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the Public Electronic Reading Room page of the NRCs public web site at:
http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html.
To receive a summary of future meetings and other plant-specific e-mail distributions, you must subscribe to the Operating Reactor Correspondence electronic distribution for this plant via:
http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver/plants-by-region.html Once subscribed, if you wish to discontinue receiving electronic distribution, you may unsubscribe at any time by visiting the same web address above.
CONTACT:       Michael Hay, RIV/DRP (817) 200-1147 Docket No.:   50-285 : NRC Presentation Slides : OPPD Presentation Slides
 
===Introductions===
Fort Calhoun Station Public Meeting
* Welcome Nuclear Regulatory Commission
* Introduction of NRC personnel February 27, 2014 Blair, Nebraska 1                                     2 Purpose of Meeting                                   Opening Remarks
* NRC will present status of regulatory activities associated with the Fort Calhoun Station Marc Dapas - Regional Administrator
* OPPD will present details of Fort Calhoun Station performance improvement initiatives
* Public comments and questions 4
1  
 
NRC Actions Completed                            NRC Actions Completed
* NRC determined plant safe for restart and closed Confirmatory Action Letter December NRC completed inspection, assessment, and       17, 2013 licensing activities associated with the Confirmatory Action Letter Restart Checklist
* NRC issued PostRestart Confirmatory Action Letter December 17, 2013 5                                                               6 PostRestart CAL                                  PostRestart CAL PostRestart commitments consist of:
OPPD committed to the NRC to continue implementing improvement initiatives in key       - Key areas for sustained performance improvement areas and address specific technical items       - Long term flood recovery items
                                                  - High energy line break corrective actions associated with the Auxiliary Steam System
                                                  - Containment internal structure corrective actions to restore design margins 7                                                                8 2
 
NRC Assessment Activities                                           In Summary
* Routine inspections
* Increased NRC oversight activities remain
  - Resident Inspectors
  - Regional inspections
* Team inspection (Summer 2014)
* NRC continues to implement independent and
  - Assess Corrective Action Process effectiveness     thorough inspection activities to assess station
  - Assess PostRestart Confirmatory Action Letter     performance improvement progress items 9                                                    10 OPPD Presentation                                     Contacting the NRC
* Report an emergency
                                                          - (301) 8165100 (call collect)
* Report a safety concern
                                                          - (800) 6957403
                                                          - Allegation@nrc.gov
* General information or questions
                                                          - www.nrc.gov 11                                                   12 3
 
Topics for Discussion OPPDs Fort Calhoun Station
* Safety Culture Driving To Excellence
* Problem Identification and Resolution
* Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use Public meeting with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
* Site Operational Focus
* Programs - Engineering Focus Areas
                                                                          - Flooding Recovery Action Plans
                                                                          - Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation
                                                                          - Fukushima Response Project
                                                                          - Tornado-Borne Missiles
                                                                          - High-Energy Line Break
                                                                          - 10 CFR 50.59
                                                                          - Containment Internal Structures
* Nuclear Oversight February 27, 2014
* Integration into the Exelon Nuclear Fleet 1                                                              2 Safety Culture                                     What People Are Saying
* Safety Culture Monitoring and Improvements Continue
          - Initial and continuing Safety Culture/SCWE               Thinking back over the past six months, Better         Better 70%
training for leaders and site personnel                                                            Same          Same  28%
is Safety Conscious Work Environment
          - Continue to utilize the 2Cs meetings (compliments and concerns)                               (SCWE) at FCS                                  Worse  Worse   2%
          - Implemented a Site Employee Issues Advisory Committee
          - Continue our monthly Safety Culture Pulse                                                                 Better Better  77%
Survey                                                  Thinking back over the past six months, Same Same    23%
          - Weekly leadership and station alignment is nuclear safety culture at FCS meetings to discuss survey results                                                                       Worse  Worse    1%
          - OPPD can determine both station safety culture trends and department level trends for departments of ten people or larger 3                                                               4 1
 
Problem Identification and Resolution                                              Problem Identification and Resolution
* Corrective Action Program (CAP) changes implemented to
* Observations improve OPPDs detection and correction of plant issues                              - Areas that have shown improvement in last quarter Open corrective actions (Oct: 3,229 / Current: 2,124)
      - Streamlined CAP procedures and guidance                                                Open report evaluations (Oct: 617 / Current: 410)
Established expectations - managers, supervisors and staff trained                Open correction action prevent recurrences (CAPRs) (Oct:
Accountability reinforced                                                           33 / Current: 25)
      - Added staff - CAP Coordinators (CAPCOs)                                                 RCA/ACA Rejection Rates (1st Two Quarters: 47% / Last Two Quarter: 24%)
      - Implemented detailed Exelon Nuclear performance monitoring tools
      - Conducted oral board interviews to assess & reinforce understanding             - Areas where we are still being challenged Number of overdue CAP items
* Results                                                                                     RCA / ACA timeliness
      - Station has seen a reduction in the number of open Corrective                   - Actions addressing challenges Actions and Causal Analyses over the last quarter                                     Common Factors Analysis required for department with five or more overdue CAP items
      - CAP performance indicators are showing improvements due to Increased Management Oversight of open Causal Analysis.
better alignment of the Senior Leadership Team (SLT)                                 Developed Engineering recovery plan to reduce analysis
      - Through performance data trending, the station has identified                           volume and increase qualified analysts needed improvements in Causal Analysis quality
* Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection scheduled for the weeks of June 23 and July 14, 2014 5                                                                                  6 Design and Licensing Basis                                                          Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use                                                                      Control and Use
* OPPDs post restart commitment states that:
* January 2014: Commenced review of key calculation
                                                                                        -  Pre-restart 93 calculations were reviewed with 45 revisions for administrative corrections
     - After restart, OPPD will complete a significant effort to perform a risk-
                                                                                        -  78 of 351 key calculations were reviewed with 33 revisions required for administrative focused reconstitution of the:                                                       corrections Design basis,
* February 7, 2014 - Issue project request for proposal to vendors (COMPLETE)
Licensing basis, and
* March 28, 2014 - Vendor proposals due Updated Safety Analysis Report
* April 30, 2014 - Award project contract
* As part of this project, OPPD will:
* May 5, 2014 - Commence pilot project Ensure proper classification of equipment,
* August 1, 2014 - Complete project status assessment Convert to a safety-related Q List approach for equipment
* December 31, 2014 - Complete pilot project (NRC commitment) classification, and
* February 1, 2015 - Complete project status assessment Complete a key calculation review
* February 28, 2015 - Implement lessons learned from pilot project
    - A pilot program will be completed during 2014 on a selected system to
* March 1, 2015 - Commence remainder of project check and adjust the process, scheduling and resource allocation
* December 31, 2018 - Complete reconstitution project (NRC commitment)
    - Complete the reconstitution project before the end of 4th quarter 2018
* Approximately every six months between March 1, 2015 and December 31, 2018 - Complete project status assessments 7                                                                        7          8                                                                                          8 2
 
Site Operational Focus                                                                                      Site Operational Focus
* Site Operational Focus combines the awareness of
* Elements of Operational Focus include:
plant and equipment performance, knowledge of the                                                              (continued) plant design and licensing basis, with qualified                                                                - Actual and potential issues screened using personnel and procedures supporting sustained                                                                      formal systematic decision-making process operations
                                                                                                                      - CAP used to support trending, investigations
* Elements of Operational Focus include:                                                                            and causal analysis
        - Shift Managers leads the station's Plan of the                                                            - Operator rounds and monitoring plans to trend Day providing oversight and setting the priorities                                                        performance for the station
                                                                                                                      - Plant Health Committee reviews equipment
        - Daily activities are assessed for impact to the                                                                status against expected performance station based on risk
                                                                                                                      - Exelon Fleet provides a suite of Performance
        - Risk assessment includes ensuring activities are                                                              Indicators resource-loaded (compatible work bundled, parts
                                                                                                                      - Fleet resources available for support needed procured and personnel support) 9                                                                                                            10 Site Operational Focus                                                                                     Site Operational Focus
* Traveling screen sluice gate shaft was found damaged by
* Fort Calhoun has resumed safe operations                                                                        Operations personnel.
Commenced                      Breakers                  Reactor                    Reactor Heatup                        Closed                    Critical                    Critical
* The shaft was bent by moving the gate with heavy ice Nov. 24, 2013                Dec. 21, 2013              Jan. 12, 2014              Jan. 13, 2014
  @1432                        @2100                      @0308                      @0136                          buildup, caused by a leak above from a backwash pipe
* Root Cause from CAP analysis Reactor                    Reactor                    Manual                    Breakers          - Motor torque settings allowed the stem to be bent Critical                  Shutdown                    Reactor                    Closed Dec. 18, 2013                (CW-14C)                    Shutdown                  Jan. 13, 2014
                  @1848                    Jan. 9, 2014                (CEA-41)                     @1411
* Corrective Actions
                                              @0900                    Jan. 12, 2014
                                                                          @0323                                        - The stem has been replaced
: 1.      Heat-up performed to support testing and equipment verifications                                                - Motor torque settings were verified and reset
                                                                                                                        - The pipe leak is being repaired
: 2.      Reactor startup only after conditions confirmed and commitments met
: 3.      Unit returned to service
: 4.      Forced outage to repair river sluice gate
: 5.      Control rod issue identified during unit startup; unit shut down to support repairs
: 6.      Reactor restarted after repairs made and returned to service 11                                                                                                            12 3
 
Site Operational Focus                                           Flooding Recovery Action Plans
* Organizational Changes:
Enhanced operator rounds to monitor for ice on
* Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action Plan status gates beneath catwalk over the river                                    - There are five Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments outlined in section 2 of the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL)
Inspect other motor actuator torque settings                              - Three Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments have been submitted to the NRC resident inspectors GATES at INTAKE STRUCTURE                                - Two Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments are on-going File photo of Gates 13                                                                         14 Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation                                            Fukushima Response Project
* Interim action currently in place
* Project scope
* New portable system                                                        - Flooding reevaluation and seismic evaluation
* Mitigates effects of floods above 1,014 elevation              Portable Submersible   - Flooding and seismic walkdowns
* Designed and tested for beyond design basis Pumps                Results submitted to the NRC conditions                                                                          Actions ongoing
* NRC approved license amendment for minimum                                  - Mitigating strategies for beyond design basis external events river level Portable Skids for Water                Portable Diesel                          - Strategy developed and submitted to NRC Generators                                    Portable equipment pre-staged at FCS and Power Distribution Procedures (Admin/Operations/PM/Testing)
Staffing Communications (internal and external)
                                                                                - Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (SFPI)
SFPI modifications submitted to the NRC 15                                                                        16 4
 
Tornado-Borne Missiles                                                                High-Energy Line Break
* Protection of key equipment from potential tornado-borne missiles
* High-Energy Line Break (HELB)                                Piping Changes
                                                                                          - Established a clear licensing basis
* Used 250 tons of steel                                                                  - Reassessed all high-energy systems
                                                                                          - Revised over 30 design documents
* Completed 37 modifications                                                              - Completed over 30 hardware changes
                                                                                      - Post-Restart Action commitments outlined in section 3 of the CAL Redundancy to          Improved Piping Supports          HELB Flood Barriers Mitigate HELBs 17                                                                                    18 10 CFR 50.59                                                Containment Internal Structures
* Summary of actions taken regarding 10 CFR 50.59:
   - Reduced population of individuals qualified to perform Section 50.59
* OPPD committed to:
Screens and Evaluations                                                            -  Evaluate the structural design margin for the containment internal structure,
  - Provided vendor training for the reduced population of qualified individuals.            and reactor cavity and compartments, and resolve any deficiencies in This training was specifically developed for FCS by utilizing examples of               accordance with FCSs CAP station products. A custom exam was also created. The training has two              - Regarding Beams 22A and Beam 22B under Safety Injection Tanks 6B/D, purposes:                                                                              resolve any deficiencies in accordance with the CAP
: 1. Develop subject matter experts and alternates for Section 50.59, which
* Significant effort and resources utilized to analyze the containment internal will be able to give the initial and requalification training.
structure and develop resolution strategies.
: 2. Increase the level of knowledge of individuals that will be mentoring our
* Resolution Strategy less-experienced engineers in Section 50.59 screens and evaluations
  - Implemented the Engineering Assurance Group (EAG). All Screens and                  - Reactor Vessel Head stand Evaluations are required to be reviewed by EAG prior to issuance                        - Replace current existing pedestal supports with deep beams that span
  - Completed focused briefings on specific deficiencies seen through EAG                        the floor to take the load to adjacent walls and columns reviews
  - Implementing Exelons Quality Review Team, which will review Section 50.59 products as part of the review scope 19                                                                                    20 5
 
Nuclear Oversight                            The Exelon Nuclear Management Model Independent Assessment
* Transition in five phases
                                                                  - Framework development Organization, Procedures, Performance Indicators, Information Technology
* Plant Startup                                                - Analysis Gap analysis of 27 functional areas
                                                                  - Design
* Post-Restart                                                      Recommendations to address key gaps
                                                                  - Implementation planning Schedule development to include change management
                                                                  - Implementation - Majority of activities due for completion in 2015 completed over 2000 activities as of today Approved by OPPD and Exelon executives 21                                                            22 The Exelon Nuclear Management Model                                          What it Took - So Far
* Check and adjust approach using weekly status meetings
* 8,000,000 person-hours and workload look-aheads to maintain schedule adherence
* 69,000 task completions
    - Review progress
* 20-year operating
    - Defined process for any schedule changes                    agreement with Exelon
* Monthly Executive Status Meetings
* More than 450 restart
* Fleet - Corporate Functional Area Manager Peer Support        checklist items closed
* Independent oversight
* Industry-leading
    - NSRB - Station visits with report outs to the OPPD board measurement of safety culture 23                                                            24 6
 
What it Took - The Details                  What it Took - The Details
* Tasks complete: 69,032
* CAP items assigned: 51,726
* Person-hours worked: 8,027,621
* Root Cause Analyses (RCAs) assigned: 77
    -   Work orders planned: 26,956
    -   Work order tasks completed: 50,197
* Apparent Cause Analyses (ACAs) assigned: 287
    -   Engineering changes completed: 187
* Simple Causes assigned: 16,742
    -   NRC yellow sheets addressed: 1,885
    -   Modifications installed: 90
* D-level Condition Reports (CRs) assigned: 34,384
    -   Modification tasks: 11,614
    -  Parts issued: 50,317
    -   Radiography exams (RT shots): 474
    -   Clearances used: 7,906
    Clearance tags hung and removed: 34,547
    -   Dose to complete the work:180.113 REM 25                                            26 Closing Remarks Tonight, we updated you on
* Safety Culture
* Problem Identification and Resolution
* Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use
* Site Operational Focus
* Programs - Engineering Focus Areas
    - Flooding Recovery Action Plans
    - Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation
    - Fukushima Response Project
    - TornadoBorne Missiles
    - HighEnergy Line Break
    - 10 CFR 50.59
    - Containment Internal Structures
* Nuclear Oversight
* Integration into the Exelon Nuclear Fleet 27 7}}

Latest revision as of 07:33, 5 December 2019

Summary of Category 1 Public Meeting with Omaha Public Power District to Discuss Status of Oversight Activities at Fort Calhoun Station
ML14065A253
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 03/05/2014
From:
NRC Region 4
To:
Hay M
References
Download: ML14065A253 (11)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E. LAMAR BLVD.

ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511 March 5, 2014 LICENSEE: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)

FACILITY: Fort Calhoun Station

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF FEBRUARY 27, 2014 MEETING WITH OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT On February 27, 2014 a Category 1 meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) in Blair, Nebraska.

The NRC presented the status of oversight activities at Fort Calhoun Station (Enclosure 1).

OPPD presented their actions for continued performance improvement following the plant restart in December 2013 (Enclosure 2). The slides from the presentations are available electronically from the NRCs Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) and are enclosed in this notice.

A video of the public meeting will be posted on the website devoted to the special oversight at Fort Calhoun Station, available at:

http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/fcs/special-oversight.html.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the Public Electronic Reading Room page of the NRCs public web site at:

http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html.

To receive a summary of future meetings and other plant-specific e-mail distributions, you must subscribe to the Operating Reactor Correspondence electronic distribution for this plant via:

http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver/plants-by-region.html Once subscribed, if you wish to discontinue receiving electronic distribution, you may unsubscribe at any time by visiting the same web address above.

CONTACT: Michael Hay, RIV/DRP (817) 200-1147 Docket No.: 50-285 : NRC Presentation Slides : OPPD Presentation Slides

Introductions

Fort Calhoun Station Public Meeting

  • Welcome Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  • Introduction of NRC personnel February 27, 2014 Blair, Nebraska 1 2 Purpose of Meeting Opening Remarks
  • NRC will present status of regulatory activities associated with the Fort Calhoun Station Marc Dapas - Regional Administrator
  • OPPD will present details of Fort Calhoun Station performance improvement initiatives
  • Public comments and questions 4

1

NRC Actions Completed NRC Actions Completed

  • NRC determined plant safe for restart and closed Confirmatory Action Letter December NRC completed inspection, assessment, and 17, 2013 licensing activities associated with the Confirmatory Action Letter Restart Checklist
  • NRC issued PostRestart Confirmatory Action Letter December 17, 2013 5 6 PostRestart CAL PostRestart CAL PostRestart commitments consist of:

OPPD committed to the NRC to continue implementing improvement initiatives in key - Key areas for sustained performance improvement areas and address specific technical items - Long term flood recovery items

- High energy line break corrective actions associated with the Auxiliary Steam System

- Containment internal structure corrective actions to restore design margins 7 8 2

NRC Assessment Activities In Summary

  • Routine inspections
  • Increased NRC oversight activities remain

- Resident Inspectors

- Regional inspections

  • Team inspection (Summer 2014)
  • NRC continues to implement independent and

- Assess Corrective Action Process effectiveness thorough inspection activities to assess station

- Assess PostRestart Confirmatory Action Letter performance improvement progress items 9 10 OPPD Presentation Contacting the NRC

  • Report an emergency

- (301) 8165100 (call collect)

  • Report a safety concern

- (800) 6957403

- Allegation@nrc.gov

  • General information or questions

- www.nrc.gov 11 12 3

Topics for Discussion OPPDs Fort Calhoun Station

  • Safety Culture Driving To Excellence
  • Problem Identification and Resolution
  • Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use Public meeting with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  • Site Operational Focus
  • Programs - Engineering Focus Areas

- Flooding Recovery Action Plans

- Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation

- Fukushima Response Project

- Tornado-Borne Missiles

- High-Energy Line Break

- 10 CFR 50.59

- Containment Internal Structures

  • Nuclear Oversight February 27, 2014
  • Integration into the Exelon Nuclear Fleet 1 2 Safety Culture What People Are Saying
  • Safety Culture Monitoring and Improvements Continue

- Initial and continuing Safety Culture/SCWE Thinking back over the past six months, Better Better 70%

training for leaders and site personnel Same Same 28%

is Safety Conscious Work Environment

- Continue to utilize the 2Cs meetings (compliments and concerns) (SCWE) at FCS Worse Worse 2%

- Implemented a Site Employee Issues Advisory Committee

- Continue our monthly Safety Culture Pulse Better Better 77%

Survey Thinking back over the past six months, Same Same 23%

- Weekly leadership and station alignment is nuclear safety culture at FCS meetings to discuss survey results Worse Worse 1%

- OPPD can determine both station safety culture trends and department level trends for departments of ten people or larger 3 4 1

Problem Identification and Resolution Problem Identification and Resolution

  • Corrective Action Program (CAP) changes implemented to
  • Observations improve OPPDs detection and correction of plant issues - Areas that have shown improvement in last quarter Open corrective actions (Oct: 3,229 / Current: 2,124)

- Streamlined CAP procedures and guidance Open report evaluations (Oct: 617 / Current: 410)

Established expectations - managers, supervisors and staff trained Open correction action prevent recurrences (CAPRs) (Oct:

Accountability reinforced 33 / Current: 25)

- Added staff - CAP Coordinators (CAPCOs) RCA/ACA Rejection Rates (1st Two Quarters: 47% / Last Two Quarter: 24%)

- Implemented detailed Exelon Nuclear performance monitoring tools

- Conducted oral board interviews to assess & reinforce understanding - Areas where we are still being challenged Number of overdue CAP items

  • Results RCA / ACA timeliness

- Station has seen a reduction in the number of open Corrective - Actions addressing challenges Actions and Causal Analyses over the last quarter Common Factors Analysis required for department with five or more overdue CAP items

- CAP performance indicators are showing improvements due to Increased Management Oversight of open Causal Analysis.

better alignment of the Senior Leadership Team (SLT) Developed Engineering recovery plan to reduce analysis

- Through performance data trending, the station has identified volume and increase qualified analysts needed improvements in Causal Analysis quality

  • Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection scheduled for the weeks of June 23 and July 14, 2014 5 6 Design and Licensing Basis Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use Control and Use
  • OPPDs post restart commitment states that:
  • January 2014: Commenced review of key calculation

- Pre-restart 93 calculations were reviewed with 45 revisions for administrative corrections

- After restart, OPPD will complete a significant effort to perform a risk-

- 78 of 351 key calculations were reviewed with 33 revisions required for administrative focused reconstitution of the: corrections Design basis,

  • February 7, 2014 - Issue project request for proposal to vendors (COMPLETE)

Licensing basis, and

  • March 28, 2014 - Vendor proposals due Updated Safety Analysis Report
  • April 30, 2014 - Award project contract
  • As part of this project, OPPD will:
  • May 5, 2014 - Commence pilot project Ensure proper classification of equipment,
  • August 1, 2014 - Complete project status assessment Convert to a safety-related Q List approach for equipment
  • December 31, 2014 - Complete pilot project (NRC commitment) classification, and
  • February 1, 2015 - Complete project status assessment Complete a key calculation review
  • February 28, 2015 - Implement lessons learned from pilot project

- A pilot program will be completed during 2014 on a selected system to

  • March 1, 2015 - Commence remainder of project check and adjust the process, scheduling and resource allocation
  • December 31, 2018 - Complete reconstitution project (NRC commitment)

- Complete the reconstitution project before the end of 4th quarter 2018

  • Approximately every six months between March 1, 2015 and December 31, 2018 - Complete project status assessments 7 7 8 8 2

Site Operational Focus Site Operational Focus

  • Site Operational Focus combines the awareness of
  • Elements of Operational Focus include:

plant and equipment performance, knowledge of the (continued) plant design and licensing basis, with qualified - Actual and potential issues screened using personnel and procedures supporting sustained formal systematic decision-making process operations

- CAP used to support trending, investigations

  • Elements of Operational Focus include: and causal analysis

- Shift Managers leads the station's Plan of the - Operator rounds and monitoring plans to trend Day providing oversight and setting the priorities performance for the station

- Plant Health Committee reviews equipment

- Daily activities are assessed for impact to the status against expected performance station based on risk

- Exelon Fleet provides a suite of Performance

- Risk assessment includes ensuring activities are Indicators resource-loaded (compatible work bundled, parts

- Fleet resources available for support needed procured and personnel support) 9 10 Site Operational Focus Site Operational Focus

  • Traveling screen sluice gate shaft was found damaged by
  • Fort Calhoun has resumed safe operations Operations personnel.

Commenced Breakers Reactor Reactor Heatup Closed Critical Critical

  • The shaft was bent by moving the gate with heavy ice Nov. 24, 2013 Dec. 21, 2013 Jan. 12, 2014 Jan. 13, 2014

@1432 @2100 @0308 @0136 buildup, caused by a leak above from a backwash pipe

  • Root Cause from CAP analysis Reactor Reactor Manual Breakers - Motor torque settings allowed the stem to be bent Critical Shutdown Reactor Closed Dec. 18, 2013 (CW-14C) Shutdown Jan. 13, 2014

@1848 Jan. 9, 2014 (CEA-41) @1411

  • Corrective Actions

@0900 Jan. 12, 2014

@0323 - The stem has been replaced

1. Heat-up performed to support testing and equipment verifications - Motor torque settings were verified and reset

- The pipe leak is being repaired

2. Reactor startup only after conditions confirmed and commitments met
3. Unit returned to service
4. Forced outage to repair river sluice gate
5. Control rod issue identified during unit startup; unit shut down to support repairs
6. Reactor restarted after repairs made and returned to service 11 12 3

Site Operational Focus Flooding Recovery Action Plans

  • Organizational Changes:

Enhanced operator rounds to monitor for ice on

  • Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action Plan status gates beneath catwalk over the river - There are five Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments outlined in section 2 of the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL)

Inspect other motor actuator torque settings - Three Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments have been submitted to the NRC resident inspectors GATES at INTAKE STRUCTURE - Two Flooding Recovery Post-Restart Action commitments are on-going File photo of Gates 13 14 Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation Fukushima Response Project

  • Interim action currently in place
  • Project scope
  • New portable system - Flooding reevaluation and seismic evaluation
  • Mitigates effects of floods above 1,014 elevation Portable Submersible - Flooding and seismic walkdowns
  • Designed and tested for beyond design basis Pumps Results submitted to the NRC conditions Actions ongoing
  • NRC approved license amendment for minimum - Mitigating strategies for beyond design basis external events river level Portable Skids for Water Portable Diesel - Strategy developed and submitted to NRC Generators Portable equipment pre-staged at FCS and Power Distribution Procedures (Admin/Operations/PM/Testing)

Staffing Communications (internal and external)

- Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (SFPI)

SFPI modifications submitted to the NRC 15 16 4

Tornado-Borne Missiles High-Energy Line Break

  • Protection of key equipment from potential tornado-borne missiles
  • High-Energy Line Break (HELB) Piping Changes

- Established a clear licensing basis

  • Used 250 tons of steel - Reassessed all high-energy systems

- Revised over 30 design documents

  • Completed 37 modifications - Completed over 30 hardware changes

- Post-Restart Action commitments outlined in section 3 of the CAL Redundancy to Improved Piping Supports HELB Flood Barriers Mitigate HELBs 17 18 10 CFR 50.59 Containment Internal Structures

  • Summary of actions taken regarding 10 CFR 50.59:

- Reduced population of individuals qualified to perform Section 50.59

Screens and Evaluations - Evaluate the structural design margin for the containment internal structure,

- Provided vendor training for the reduced population of qualified individuals. and reactor cavity and compartments, and resolve any deficiencies in This training was specifically developed for FCS by utilizing examples of accordance with FCSs CAP station products. A custom exam was also created. The training has two - Regarding Beams 22A and Beam 22B under Safety Injection Tanks 6B/D, purposes: resolve any deficiencies in accordance with the CAP

1. Develop subject matter experts and alternates for Section 50.59, which
  • Significant effort and resources utilized to analyze the containment internal will be able to give the initial and requalification training.

structure and develop resolution strategies.

2. Increase the level of knowledge of individuals that will be mentoring our
  • Resolution Strategy less-experienced engineers in Section 50.59 screens and evaluations

- Implemented the Engineering Assurance Group (EAG). All Screens and - Reactor Vessel Head stand Evaluations are required to be reviewed by EAG prior to issuance - Replace current existing pedestal supports with deep beams that span

- Completed focused briefings on specific deficiencies seen through EAG the floor to take the load to adjacent walls and columns reviews

- Implementing Exelons Quality Review Team, which will review Section 50.59 products as part of the review scope 19 20 5

Nuclear Oversight The Exelon Nuclear Management Model Independent Assessment

  • Transition in five phases

- Framework development Organization, Procedures, Performance Indicators, Information Technology

  • Plant Startup - Analysis Gap analysis of 27 functional areas

- Design

  • Post-Restart Recommendations to address key gaps

- Implementation planning Schedule development to include change management

- Implementation - Majority of activities due for completion in 2015 completed over 2000 activities as of today Approved by OPPD and Exelon executives 21 22 The Exelon Nuclear Management Model What it Took - So Far

  • Check and adjust approach using weekly status meetings
  • 8,000,000 person-hours and workload look-aheads to maintain schedule adherence
  • 69,000 task completions

- Review progress

  • 20-year operating

- Defined process for any schedule changes agreement with Exelon

  • Monthly Executive Status Meetings
  • More than 450 restart
  • Fleet - Corporate Functional Area Manager Peer Support checklist items closed
  • Independent oversight
  • Industry-leading

- NSRB - Station visits with report outs to the OPPD board measurement of safety culture 23 24 6

What it Took - The Details What it Took - The Details

  • Tasks complete: 69,032
  • CAP items assigned: 51,726
  • Person-hours worked: 8,027,621
  • Root Cause Analyses (RCAs) assigned: 77

- Work orders planned: 26,956

- Work order tasks completed: 50,197

  • Apparent Cause Analyses (ACAs) assigned: 287

- Engineering changes completed: 187

  • Simple Causes assigned: 16,742

- NRC yellow sheets addressed: 1,885

- Modifications installed: 90

  • D-level Condition Reports (CRs) assigned: 34,384

- Modification tasks: 11,614

- Parts issued: 50,317

- Radiography exams (RT shots): 474

- Clearances used: 7,906

- Clearance tags hung and removed: 34,547

- Dose to complete the work:180.113 REM 25 26 Closing Remarks Tonight, we updated you on

  • Safety Culture
  • Problem Identification and Resolution
  • Design and Licensing Basis Control and Use
  • Site Operational Focus
  • Programs - Engineering Focus Areas

- Flooding Recovery Action Plans

- Beyond Design Basis Flood Mitigation

- Fukushima Response Project

- TornadoBorne Missiles

- HighEnergy Line Break

- 10 CFR 50.59

- Containment Internal Structures

  • Nuclear Oversight
  • Integration into the Exelon Nuclear Fleet 27 7