ML20198H775: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change) |
||
Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20198H775 | |||
| issue date = 05/16/1986 | |||
| title = Insp Rept 50-344/86-10 on 860318-0428.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Corrective Action Maint Surveillance,Refueling Activities & Review of Control of Heavy Loads | |||
| author name = Kellund G, Mendonca M, Richards S | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000344 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| case reference number = REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR | |||
| document report number = 50-344-86-10, NUDOCS 8605300550 | |||
| package number = ML20198H748 | |||
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 10 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000344/1986010]] | |||
=Text= | |||
{{#Wiki_filter:s . | |||
- | |||
. . | |||
. | |||
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
REGION ~V | |||
Report No. 50-344/86-10 | |||
Docket No. 50-344 | |||
License No. NPF-1 | |||
Licensee: Portland General Electric Company | |||
121 S. W. Salmon Street | |||
Portland, Oregon 97204 | |||
Facility Name: Troj an | |||
Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon | |||
Inspection conducted: March 18 - April 28, 1986 | |||
Inspectors: h %s- /o - r/A /J 4' | |||
O | |||
S. A. Richards Date Signed | |||
Senior Resident Inspector | |||
K An - 4, f//tt /86 | |||
G. C. Kellund Date Signed | |||
Resident Inspector | |||
Approved By: """ IN# # | |||
M. M. Mendonca, Chief Date Signed | |||
Reactor Projects Section 1 | |||
Summary: | |||
Inspection on March 18 - April 28, 1986 (Report 50-3'44/86-10) | |||
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of operational safety verification, | |||
corrective action, maintenance, surveillance, refueling activities, review of | |||
licensee response to system biological fouling, review of control of heavy | |||
loads, and review of preventative maintenance practices with the service water | |||
system. Inspection procedures 30702, 30703, 40700, 61720, 61726, 62702, | |||
62703, 71707,^92700, 92701~, 93702, and 94703 were used as guidance during the | |||
conduct of the inspection. | |||
Results: No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
B605300550 860516 * | |||
PDR ADOCK 05000344 | |||
G pm | |||
. | |||
A | |||
J | |||
. | |||
c | |||
. | |||
DETAILS | |||
. | |||
* | |||
1. Persons Contacted | |||
*W. S. Orser, Plant General Manager | |||
*R. P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance. | |||
*D. R. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services | |||
*J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maint. and Construction | |||
*J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services | |||
R. E. Susee, Operations Supervisor | |||
D. W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor | |||
A. S. Cohlmeyer, Engineering Supervisor | |||
G. L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor | |||
T. O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor | |||
S. B. Nichols, Training Supervisor | |||
D. L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor | |||
C. H. Brown, Quality Assurance Operations Branch Manager | |||
R. W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor | |||
H. E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor | |||
The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees | |||
during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, | |||
reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians | |||
and engineers, and quality assurance personnel. | |||
* Denotes those attending the exit interview. | |||
2. Operational Safety Verification | |||
During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined | |||
; activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility. | |||
j The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a | |||
; daily, weekly, or biweekly basis. | |||
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to | |||
verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as | |||
prescribed in the facility technical specifications. Logs, | |||
instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were | |||
examined to obtain ir. formation on plant conditions, trends,.and | |||
compliance with regulations. On occasions when a shift turnover was in | |||
progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to | |||
determine that all pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming | |||
shift. | |||
t | |||
During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the | |||
facility to observe the following items: | |||
a. General plant and equipment conditions. | |||
b. Maintenance requests and repairs. | |||
c. Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment. I | |||
d. Ignition sources and flammable material control. | |||
l | |||
l | |||
' | |||
l | |||
l | |||
___- | |||
. | |||
' 2 | |||
e. Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's | |||
administrative controls and approved procedures. | |||
f. Interiors of electrical and control panels. | |||
g. Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan. | |||
h. Radiation protection controls. | |||
i. Plant housekeeping and cleanliness. | |||
j. Radioactive waste systems. | |||
k. Proper storage of compressed gas bottles. | |||
The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the | |||
inspectors to determine that the licensee complied with technical | |||
specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal | |||
of equipment from service. Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure | |||
that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance | |||
evolutions. | |||
During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control | |||
room, and with other plant personnel. The discussions centered on | |||
pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, | |||
security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities | |||
involved. | |||
The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCR) to | |||
confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system. | |||
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the | |||
completion of corrective action. NCRs reviewed during this inspection | |||
period included 86-009 and 86-013. | |||
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the | |||
inspectors. Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified | |||
by observing portions of area surveys being performed, when possible, and | |||
by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that | |||
prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used. | |||
Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability | |||
and calibration status. | |||
The inspectors verified the operability of selected engineered safety | |||
features. This was done by direct visual verification of the correct | |||
position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system | |||
integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable'. ESF systems | |||
verified operable during this inspection period included the component | |||
cooling water system, the service water system, and the diesel fuel oil | |||
system. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
3. Corrective Action | |||
The inspectors performed a general review of the licensee's problem | |||
identification systems-to verify that licensee identified quality related | |||
deficiencies are being tracked and reported to cognizant management for | |||
resolution. Types of records examined by the inspectors included | |||
Requests for Evaluation, Event Reports, Plant Review Board meeting | |||
minutes, and Quality Assurance Program Nonconformance Reports. The | |||
i | |||
1 | |||
. . - - _ . _ - _. .. .. .-- . | |||
. , | |||
. 13 | |||
inspectors concluded that the licensee's systems were being utilized to | |||
correct identified deficiencies'. A Plant Review Board meeting was | |||
attended by the inspectors on April 9. The inspectors verified that the | |||
appropriate committee members were present at the meeting and that the | |||
meeting was conducted in accordance with the requirements of section | |||
6.5.1 of the facility technical specifications. | |||
. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
4. Maintenance | |||
During this inspection period, the inspectors witnessed maintenance | |||
activities associated with inspection of the D23 battery charger and | |||
retermination of the power cables to the 'B' safety injection pump. In | |||
both cases, the inspectors verified that appropriate facility procedures | |||
were being followed, that calibrated equipment was used when required, | |||
and that personnel involved'were familiar with the various requirements | |||
for properly performing the work. With regard to the battery charger | |||
maintenance, the inspectors determined through discussions with | |||
Instrumentation and Control personnel that.the shunt device used to | |||
accurately measure the charger output had been calibrated just prior to | |||
the maintenance activity. The inspectors also noted the direct | |||
involvement of electrical quality control inspectors in the retermination | |||
work performed on the safety injection pump. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
5. Surveillance | |||
The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the | |||
inspectors. Observations by the inspectors included verification that | |||
proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that | |||
the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if | |||
required by the test procedure. Following completion of the surveillance | |||
tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the appropriate | |||
acceptance criteria. Surveillance tests witnessed during this period | |||
were associated with incore flux mapping and quadrant power tilt ratio | |||
determination, local leak rate testing of the containment purge exhaust | |||
penetration, and operational testing of the 'A' emergency diesel | |||
- generator and the associated fuel oil system. The inspectors also | |||
witnessed a special inspection of the 'B' reactor coolant system loop. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
6. Preventative Maintenance Activities | |||
the inspectors reviewed the licensee!s maintenance program to ascertain | |||
the degree to which the licensee performs preventative maintenance to | |||
ensure reliable operation of plant safety systems. -For this review, the | |||
inspectors selected the service water system (SWS) for'a specific | |||
examination of preventative maintenance activities.- The SWS is a | |||
safety-related system and serves as the ultimate heat' sink for the | |||
operation of the majority-of plant safety systems. The SWS consists + | |||
primarily of three service water. pumps.'(SWP), which take a suction from | |||
l | |||
.i | |||
* | |||
i | |||
' | |||
, | |||
. 4 | |||
the Columbia River at the intake structure, two service water strainers, | |||
four service water booster pumps (SWBP), and various instrumentation, | |||
valves, piping, and heat exchangers. A portion of the system serves the | |||
secondary plant and is not safety related. This part of the system was | |||
3 | |||
not reviewed. | |||
In accordance with the facility technical specifications, the licensee is | |||
required to perform inservice testing (IST) of the-SWS pumps and valves | |||
and inservice inspection (ISI) of the system, as required by section XI | |||
of the ASME code. Under normal conditions, the pumps and remotely | |||
operated valves are generally tested quarterly by the IST program. The | |||
l ISI program requires the system to be pressure tested for leakage every | |||
40 months and hydrostatically tested once every 10 years. A general | |||
visual examination of-the system structural supports is also performed | |||
under the ISI program. | |||
Through reviews of procedures and discussions with licensee personnel, | |||
the inspectors determined that the following maintenance activities, | |||
which are not required by the technical specifications, are being | |||
performed on the SWS. | |||
- Service water pumps are overhauled every 3 years. | |||
- Service water booster pump motor bearings are lubricated quarterly. | |||
- Service water booster pumps have oil changes and coupling lubrications | |||
semi-annually. | |||
- Service water strainers are visually inspected and lubricated | |||
semi-annually. | |||
- Service water strainer tubes and shear keys are inspected annually. | |||
! - Valve motor operators are cleaned, lubricated and inspected every 3 | |||
years. | |||
- Valve air actuators are inspected every 2 years. | |||
- Selected valves are repacked every 5 years. | |||
- All system instrumentation is calibrated at various scheduled | |||
intervals. | |||
- The intake structure is inspected and dredged, if necessary, annually. l | |||
, | |||
- Soundings are taken of the intake structure channel annually. | |||
- The system is chlorinated weekly to prevent fouling from marine growth. | |||
- The component cooling water heat exchangers are inspected every 2 | |||
' | |||
years. | |||
; The inspectors concluded that the licensee has in place a program for | |||
performing preventative maintenance on various components of the system, | |||
i | |||
1 | |||
. | |||
- 5 | |||
Two items of concern were identified by the inspectors. First, the | |||
licensee does not periodically cycle all manual valves.that may be used | |||
under abnormal crerating conditions. The code exempts the majority of | |||
manual valves from this cycling requirement, however, valves which are | |||
required to reposition to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an | |||
accident are required to be cycled periodically. The service water | |||
system does contain several manual valves which the licensee agrees | |||
appear prudent to periodically cycle, such as SW 031, 032, 041, 042, 043, | |||
044, 045, 046, however it was not clear whether they are covered by the | |||
code requirements. The licensee was considering this concern at the | |||
close of the inspection and the inspectors will follow this Unresolved | |||
Item under Open Item No. 86-10-01. The second concern regards IST of | |||
relief valves. The licensee is not testing approximately 20-25 relief | |||
valves which are designated as therraal reliefs. The licensee has stated | |||
that the ASME code does not require testing of thermal reliefs, however, | |||
at the close of the inspection, licensee representatives had not yet | |||
located the section of the code which exempts thermal reliefs from | |||
testing. This Unresolved Item will be followed as Open Item | |||
344/86-10-02. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
7. Biological Fouling of Cooling Water Systems | |||
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the issue of fouling | |||
of open cooling water systems by aquatic organisms. This fouling can | |||
degrade system flows and heat exchanger performance. The major | |||
susceptible systems at the site are the service water system and the fire | |||
water system. This problem has occurred at several plants and is | |||
described in IE Bulletin 81-03, IE Information Notices 81-21 and 83-46 | |||
and INP0 SOER 84-1. The inspectors examined the licensee's in place and | |||
proposed measures to address this issue, including use of portable flow | |||
instruments to monitor flows when degradation is suspected, since | |||
permanent flow instrumentation is not generally installed in the service | |||
water system. The licensee presently performs chlorination of water | |||
systems and periodic inspections of potentially affected heat exchangers. | |||
The inspectors also noted that the plant has experienced very few | |||
problems of this nature over the past 10 years. The inspectors will | |||
continue to monitor this area in the future. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
8. Residual Heat Removal System Operability | |||
On March 31, with the plant operating at full power, the inspectors | |||
observed that residual heat removal (RHR) system valve MO-8809A was | |||
tagged as under test. When questioned, the operators stated that the | |||
' | |||
valve was shut for maintenance purposes. This valve'is the RHR discharge | |||
to the reactor coolant system (RCS) loops 1 and 2. .The licensee had | |||
declared the 'A' train of RHR inoperable due to this valve being shut and | |||
considered the plant to be in compliance with the action statement of the | |||
technical specifications by maintaining the 'B' train operable. The | |||
inspectors questioned whether the 'B' train of RHR was operable with | |||
MO-8809A shut. Although the injection path to RCS loops 3 and 4 was | |||
- _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ ______-. . _ _ _ _ _ . | |||
. | |||
- | |||
6 | |||
available via valve MO-8809B, the inspectors question whether all four | |||
injection paths were required for either train to be operable. The | |||
licensee took prcmpt action to reopen M0-8809A. After a review of the | |||
operational requirements of the RHR system, the licensee determined that | |||
all four injection paths are required for either train of RHR to be | |||
operable and subsequently issued LER 86-03 on this event. The valve | |||
was shut for a period of one hour and ten minutes. | |||
Technical Specification 3.5.2 requires two independent subsystems | |||
consisting, in part, of an "0PERABLE" flow path. The flow path for the | |||
RHR system is not clearly defined in plant Technical Specifications. | |||
Therefore, clarification from NRR will be requested and this issue will | |||
be followed as Unresolved Item No. 344/86-10-03. | |||
The apparent cause of this occurrence according to the licensee was a | |||
misunderstanding by the licensee concerning the operation of the RHR | |||
system. Licensee perscnnel at the plant regarded the RHR injection paths | |||
as segregated by train and therefore, they had allowed the valve to be | |||
closed as proceduralized by maintenance procedure 12-5, " Valve Motor | |||
Operators." Further, review of the procedure by the onsite review | |||
committee during issuance failed to identify this discrepancy. The | |||
inspectors were concerned that this occurrence was similar to recently | |||
identified problems with the control room emergency ventilation system | |||
and auxiliary feedwater system in that personnel knowledge of the proper | |||
operation of the system was deficient. | |||
No violation or deviation was identified. | |||
9. Plant Calorimetric Measurement | |||
The inspectors examined procedure POT-22-1, " Plant Heat Balance | |||
Calibration" which is used to conduct a periodic plant calorimetric | |||
measurement, and procedure PET-13-3, "Recalibration of Feedwater Flow | |||
Venturis" which is used to correct the venturi flow constants used in the | |||
calorimetric calculation. During operation, the venturi flow constants | |||
change due to fouling of the venturis. The result of this change is a | |||
reduction of the plant electrical output. PET-13-3 was subsequently | |||
written to recover the lost output by correcting the flow constants over | |||
the course of an operating cycle. The procedure assumes that the ratio | |||
-"f | |||
of p'rimary power to secondary power remains constant throughout the | |||
cycle, and that a ratio of the heat rates measured at some point in the | |||
cycle to baseline value heat rates measured when the venturis are known ! | |||
to be clean will allow the new venturi constants to be determined, | |||
i | |||
The inspectors reviewed the technical content of the procedures and the j | |||
error analysis associated with PET-13-3. The inspectors noted that no ! | |||
account is taken for charging and letdown flows and the effect of | |||
pressurizer heaters on the calorimetric measurement. Subsequent | |||
calculations by the inspectors and by the licensee demonstrated that | |||
these effects were negligible. Additionally, the inspectors identified | |||
some minor discrepancies in PET-13-3. The licensee noted these and ! | |||
stated that they would be corrected. The inspectors concluded that the ! | |||
licensee's calorimetric measurement procedures were acceptable. l | |||
. _ _ _ _ _ _ . | |||
. | |||
. 7 | |||
} | |||
No violations or deviaticns were identified. | |||
10. Plant Operations | |||
The plant continued full power operation from the outset of the | |||
inspection period until early April when power was reduced to 73% due to | |||
excess hydroelectric capacity in the region. On April 11, at 10:45 p.m., | |||
the Ming Winter, a grain freighter in the Columbia River lost control of | |||
steering and veered into the shore in the vicinity of the plant intake | |||
, | |||
structure. The ship contacted the plant 36 inch outfall pipe resulting | |||
in significant damage to approximately 30 feet of the pipe. The event | |||
did not interrupt service water flow and the service water system | |||
continued to operate normally. The outfall pipe is not safety related. | |||
With regard to presenting a hazard to the intake structure, the FSAR | |||
notes that a ship would not normally be capable of coming inshore to the | |||
point that contact with the intake structure would be made due to the | |||
depth of the water. In the unlikely event that service water flow is | |||
interrupted, the cooling tower can be lined up with the service water | |||
system to allow the plant to cool down. | |||
On April 16, the plant shutdown for its annual refueling outage. The | |||
inspectors witnessed the plant shutdown and noted that it proceeded | |||
without incident. Major work planned for the outage includes feedwater | |||
heater replacement, steam generator sludge lance and eddy current | |||
testing, main turbine inspection, repair of the damaged outfall pipe and | |||
containment integrated leak rate. testing. At the end of the inspection | |||
period, the plant was in Mode 6 with core unloading in progress. The | |||
licensee's current schedule calls for a return to operation on June 10. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
11. Control of Heavy Loads During Refueling | |||
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrative controls which | |||
ensure that lifting of heavy loads in containment is conducted in a safe, | |||
controlled manner. A major portion of the program is based on the | |||
guidelines contained in NUREG 0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear | |||
Power Plants," and on correspondence between the licensee and NRR | |||
concerning the content of their program. The inspectors verified that | |||
the following areas are addressed by the licensee in controlling heavy | |||
loads: | |||
- Control of safe load paths inside containment. | |||
- Procedures for load handling. | |||
- Requirements for operator training and qualification. | |||
- Control of special lifting devices (SLD). | |||
- Maintenance requirements and procedures for cranes and lifting | |||
equipment. | |||
With regard to lifting of large components during refueling operations, | |||
the inspectors determined that the licensee's procedures were acceptable. | |||
For attachment of the lifting device to the reactor upper internals, the | |||
licensee requires that the number of turns needed to connect each arm of | |||
the lifting device to the internals be recorded and checked against an | |||
l | |||
_ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . - ___ _ _____ _ _______ -___-_______-- - _ - _ - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ J | |||
_ - - .- | |||
. | |||
. 8 | |||
, | |||
, | |||
acceptance criteria. The axial displacement of each arm is also | |||
recorded. Specific requirements for attachment of the vessel head | |||
lifting device and the missile shield lifting device are not stated in | |||
the refueling procedures, however, the attachment points for these lifts | |||
are easily accessible and the method for making the attachment is | |||
relatively simple. For lifting of the vessel head, the expected weight | |||
is listed in the procedure and the head is checked for levelness after | |||
two inches of vertical movement." The procedure also requires that | |||
] personnel verify that the lift is clear of interfereace during the | |||
initial portion of the lift. | |||
The inspectors identified one concern. The lifting device for removal of | |||
the missile shields, which are normally located over the vessel, is not | |||
classified as a SLD. From a review of NUREG 0612, the inspectors were | |||
unable to ascertain whether the device should be categorized as a SLD and | |||
thereby receive more extensive periodic inspections by the licensee than | |||
a normal lifting device receives. This item will be followed up by the , | |||
inspectors as Open Item No. 344/86-10-04. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
12. Miscellaneous Observations | |||
During a routine control room tour, the inspectors observed the discharge | |||
pipe of the electric auxiliary feedwater pump at a pressure of | |||
approximately 1825 psig. The pump and the piping are not safety-related. | |||
The design pressure of the pipe is 1700 psig. The control room operators | |||
took immediate action to depressurize the pipe. The excessive pressure | |||
apparently resulted from the thermal expansion of water trapped in the | |||
line. The licensee is reviewing the piping design and considering | |||
modifications to prevent recurrence of this problem. | |||
The inspectors also observed a deficiency with one leg of a support | |||
associated with the platform for a control room emergency ventilation fan | |||
and with two supports associated with service water supply to a cable | |||
spreading ronm area cooler. The licensee was informed of these | |||
observations and initiated action to correct them. At the completion of | |||
the inspection period, the inspectors were still considering whether the | |||
deficiencies were of significance to the system operation. The | |||
inspectors will follow this Unresolved Item as Open Item 344/86-10-05. | |||
The inspectors discussed the status of the Safety Parameter Display | |||
System (SPDS) with various site personnel and found the system to be | |||
substantially more reliable now then when the system was first placed in | |||
i | |||
operation in July, 1985. The operators find it useful for monitoring | |||
such parameters as core exit thermocouples, cooldown parameters, and | |||
effluent radiation monitors. The system also has proven useful for | |||
providing information to the Technical Support Center during emergency | |||
drills. Not all operations personnel are totally familiar with the | |||
. | |||
system, however the licensee is working towards improving this area. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified, | |||
i | |||
. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ - - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ - - | |||
. . - _ . | |||
" | |||
j . | |||
, | |||
- 9 | |||
13. Unresolved Items | |||
, | |||
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in | |||
order to ascertain whether.they are acceptable items, violations, or | |||
deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are | |||
discussed in paragraphs 6, 8 and 12. | |||
t | |||
4 | |||
14. Exit Interview | |||
, | |||
The inspectors met with the plant general manager and the manager of | |||
operations and maintenance at the conclusion of the inspection period. | |||
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of | |||
the inspection. | |||
] | |||
; | |||
l | |||
; | |||
1 | |||
J | |||
# | |||
., | |||
N | |||
I | |||
1 i | |||
! | |||
! | |||
}} |
Latest revision as of 20:25, 20 December 2021
ML20198H775 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
Issue date: | 05/16/1986 |
From: | Kellund G, Mendonca M, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20198H748 | List: |
References | |
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR 50-344-86-10, NUDOCS 8605300550 | |
Download: ML20198H775 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000344/1986010
Text
s .
-
. .
.
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION ~V
Report No. 50-344/86-10
Docket No. 50-344
License No. NPF-1
Licensee: Portland General Electric Company
121 S. W. Salmon Street
Portland, Oregon 97204
Facility Name: Troj an
Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon
Inspection conducted: March 18 - April 28, 1986
Inspectors: h %s- /o - r/A /J 4'
O
S. A. Richards Date Signed
Senior Resident Inspector
K An - 4, f//tt /86
G. C. Kellund Date Signed
Resident Inspector
Approved By: """ IN# #
M. M. Mendonca, Chief Date Signed
Reactor Projects Section 1
Summary:
Inspection on March 18 - April 28, 1986 (Report 50-3'44/86-10)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of operational safety verification,
corrective action, maintenance, surveillance, refueling activities, review of
licensee response to system biological fouling, review of control of heavy
loads, and review of preventative maintenance practices with the service water
system. Inspection procedures 30702, 30703, 40700, 61720, 61726, 62702,
62703, 71707,^92700, 92701~, 93702, and 94703 were used as guidance during the
conduct of the inspection.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
B605300550 860516 *
PDR ADOCK 05000344
G pm
.
A
J
.
c
.
DETAILS
.
1. Persons Contacted
- W. S. Orser, Plant General Manager
- R. P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance.
- D. R. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services
- J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maint. and Construction
- J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services
R. E. Susee, Operations Supervisor
D. W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor
A. S. Cohlmeyer, Engineering Supervisor
G. L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor
T. O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor
S. B. Nichols, Training Supervisor
D. L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor
C. H. Brown, Quality Assurance Operations Branch Manager
R. W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor
H. E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor
The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees
during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors,
reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians
and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2. Operational Safety Verification
During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined
- activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
j The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a
- daily, weekly, or biweekly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to
verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as
prescribed in the facility technical specifications. Logs,
instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were
examined to obtain ir. formation on plant conditions, trends,.and
compliance with regulations. On occasions when a shift turnover was in
progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to
determine that all pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming
shift.
t
During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the
facility to observe the following items:
a. General plant and equipment conditions.
b. Maintenance requests and repairs.
c. Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment. I
d. Ignition sources and flammable material control.
l
l
'
l
l
___-
.
' 2
e. Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's
administrative controls and approved procedures.
f. Interiors of electrical and control panels.
g. Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.
h. Radiation protection controls.
i. Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
j. Radioactive waste systems.
k. Proper storage of compressed gas bottles.
The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the
inspectors to determine that the licensee complied with technical
specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal
of equipment from service. Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure
that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance
evolutions.
During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control
room, and with other plant personnel. The discussions centered on
pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures,
security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities
involved.
The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCR) to
confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the
completion of corrective action. NCRs reviewed during this inspection
period included 86-009 and 86-013.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the
inspectors. Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified
by observing portions of area surveys being performed, when possible, and
by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that
prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used.
Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability
and calibration status.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected engineered safety
features. This was done by direct visual verification of the correct
position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system
integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable'. ESF systems
verified operable during this inspection period included the component
cooling water system, the service water system, and the diesel fuel oil
system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3. Corrective Action
The inspectors performed a general review of the licensee's problem
identification systems-to verify that licensee identified quality related
deficiencies are being tracked and reported to cognizant management for
resolution. Types of records examined by the inspectors included
Requests for Evaluation, Event Reports, Plant Review Board meeting
minutes, and Quality Assurance Program Nonconformance Reports. The
i
1
. . - - _ . _ - _. .. .. .-- .
. ,
. 13
inspectors concluded that the licensee's systems were being utilized to
correct identified deficiencies'. A Plant Review Board meeting was
attended by the inspectors on April 9. The inspectors verified that the
appropriate committee members were present at the meeting and that the
meeting was conducted in accordance with the requirements of section
6.5.1 of the facility technical specifications.
.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4. Maintenance
During this inspection period, the inspectors witnessed maintenance
activities associated with inspection of the D23 battery charger and
retermination of the power cables to the 'B' safety injection pump. In
both cases, the inspectors verified that appropriate facility procedures
were being followed, that calibrated equipment was used when required,
and that personnel involved'were familiar with the various requirements
for properly performing the work. With regard to the battery charger
maintenance, the inspectors determined through discussions with
Instrumentation and Control personnel that.the shunt device used to
accurately measure the charger output had been calibrated just prior to
the maintenance activity. The inspectors also noted the direct
involvement of electrical quality control inspectors in the retermination
work performed on the safety injection pump.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5. Surveillance
The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the
inspectors. Observations by the inspectors included verification that
proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that
the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if
required by the test procedure. Following completion of the surveillance
tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the appropriate
acceptance criteria. Surveillance tests witnessed during this period
were associated with incore flux mapping and quadrant power tilt ratio
determination, local leak rate testing of the containment purge exhaust
penetration, and operational testing of the 'A' emergency diesel
- generator and the associated fuel oil system. The inspectors also
witnessed a special inspection of the 'B' reactor coolant system loop.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Preventative Maintenance Activities
the inspectors reviewed the licensee!s maintenance program to ascertain
the degree to which the licensee performs preventative maintenance to
ensure reliable operation of plant safety systems. -For this review, the
inspectors selected the service water system (SWS) for'a specific
examination of preventative maintenance activities.- The SWS is a
safety-related system and serves as the ultimate heat' sink for the
operation of the majority-of plant safety systems. The SWS consists +
primarily of three service water. pumps.'(SWP), which take a suction from
l
.i
i
'
,
. 4
the Columbia River at the intake structure, two service water strainers,
four service water booster pumps (SWBP), and various instrumentation,
valves, piping, and heat exchangers. A portion of the system serves the
secondary plant and is not safety related. This part of the system was
3
not reviewed.
In accordance with the facility technical specifications, the licensee is
required to perform inservice testing (IST) of the-SWS pumps and valves
and inservice inspection (ISI) of the system, as required by section XI
of the ASME code. Under normal conditions, the pumps and remotely
operated valves are generally tested quarterly by the IST program. The
l ISI program requires the system to be pressure tested for leakage every
40 months and hydrostatically tested once every 10 years. A general
visual examination of-the system structural supports is also performed
under the ISI program.
Through reviews of procedures and discussions with licensee personnel,
the inspectors determined that the following maintenance activities,
which are not required by the technical specifications, are being
performed on the SWS.
- Service water pumps are overhauled every 3 years.
- Service water booster pump motor bearings are lubricated quarterly.
- Service water booster pumps have oil changes and coupling lubrications
semi-annually.
- Service water strainers are visually inspected and lubricated
semi-annually.
- Service water strainer tubes and shear keys are inspected annually.
! - Valve motor operators are cleaned, lubricated and inspected every 3
years.
- Valve air actuators are inspected every 2 years.
- Selected valves are repacked every 5 years.
- All system instrumentation is calibrated at various scheduled
intervals.
- The intake structure is inspected and dredged, if necessary, annually. l
,
- Soundings are taken of the intake structure channel annually.
- The system is chlorinated weekly to prevent fouling from marine growth.
- The component cooling water heat exchangers are inspected every 2
'
years.
- The inspectors concluded that the licensee has in place a program for
performing preventative maintenance on various components of the system,
i
1
.
- 5
Two items of concern were identified by the inspectors. First, the
licensee does not periodically cycle all manual valves.that may be used
under abnormal crerating conditions. The code exempts the majority of
manual valves from this cycling requirement, however, valves which are
required to reposition to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an
accident are required to be cycled periodically. The service water
system does contain several manual valves which the licensee agrees
appear prudent to periodically cycle, such as SW 031, 032, 041, 042, 043,
044, 045, 046, however it was not clear whether they are covered by the
code requirements. The licensee was considering this concern at the
close of the inspection and the inspectors will follow this Unresolved
Item under Open Item No. 86-10-01. The second concern regards IST of
relief valves. The licensee is not testing approximately 20-25 relief
valves which are designated as therraal reliefs. The licensee has stated
that the ASME code does not require testing of thermal reliefs, however,
at the close of the inspection, licensee representatives had not yet
located the section of the code which exempts thermal reliefs from
testing. This Unresolved Item will be followed as Open Item
344/86-10-02.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7. Biological Fouling of Cooling Water Systems
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the issue of fouling
of open cooling water systems by aquatic organisms. This fouling can
degrade system flows and heat exchanger performance. The major
susceptible systems at the site are the service water system and the fire
water system. This problem has occurred at several plants and is
described in IE Bulletin 81-03, IE Information Notices 81-21 and 83-46
and INP0 SOER 84-1. The inspectors examined the licensee's in place and
proposed measures to address this issue, including use of portable flow
instruments to monitor flows when degradation is suspected, since
permanent flow instrumentation is not generally installed in the service
water system. The licensee presently performs chlorination of water
systems and periodic inspections of potentially affected heat exchangers.
The inspectors also noted that the plant has experienced very few
problems of this nature over the past 10 years. The inspectors will
continue to monitor this area in the future.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8. Residual Heat Removal System Operability
On March 31, with the plant operating at full power, the inspectors
observed that residual heat removal (RHR) system valve MO-8809A was
tagged as under test. When questioned, the operators stated that the
'
valve was shut for maintenance purposes. This valve'is the RHR discharge
to the reactor coolant system (RCS) loops 1 and 2. .The licensee had
declared the 'A' train of RHR inoperable due to this valve being shut and
considered the plant to be in compliance with the action statement of the
technical specifications by maintaining the 'B' train operable. The
inspectors questioned whether the 'B' train of RHR was operable with
MO-8809A shut. Although the injection path to RCS loops 3 and 4 was
- _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ ______-. . _ _ _ _ _ .
.
-
6
available via valve MO-8809B, the inspectors question whether all four
injection paths were required for either train to be operable. The
licensee took prcmpt action to reopen M0-8809A. After a review of the
operational requirements of the RHR system, the licensee determined that
all four injection paths are required for either train of RHR to be
operable and subsequently issued LER 86-03 on this event. The valve
was shut for a period of one hour and ten minutes.
Technical Specification 3.5.2 requires two independent subsystems
consisting, in part, of an "0PERABLE" flow path. The flow path for the
RHR system is not clearly defined in plant Technical Specifications.
Therefore, clarification from NRR will be requested and this issue will
be followed as Unresolved Item No. 344/86-10-03.
The apparent cause of this occurrence according to the licensee was a
misunderstanding by the licensee concerning the operation of the RHR
system. Licensee perscnnel at the plant regarded the RHR injection paths
as segregated by train and therefore, they had allowed the valve to be
closed as proceduralized by maintenance procedure 12-5, " Valve Motor
Operators." Further, review of the procedure by the onsite review
committee during issuance failed to identify this discrepancy. The
inspectors were concerned that this occurrence was similar to recently
identified problems with the control room emergency ventilation system
and auxiliary feedwater system in that personnel knowledge of the proper
operation of the system was deficient.
No violation or deviation was identified.
9. Plant Calorimetric Measurement
The inspectors examined procedure POT-22-1, " Plant Heat Balance
Calibration" which is used to conduct a periodic plant calorimetric
measurement, and procedure PET-13-3, "Recalibration of Feedwater Flow
Venturis" which is used to correct the venturi flow constants used in the
calorimetric calculation. During operation, the venturi flow constants
change due to fouling of the venturis. The result of this change is a
reduction of the plant electrical output. PET-13-3 was subsequently
written to recover the lost output by correcting the flow constants over
the course of an operating cycle. The procedure assumes that the ratio
-"f
of p'rimary power to secondary power remains constant throughout the
cycle, and that a ratio of the heat rates measured at some point in the
cycle to baseline value heat rates measured when the venturis are known !
to be clean will allow the new venturi constants to be determined,
i
The inspectors reviewed the technical content of the procedures and the j
error analysis associated with PET-13-3. The inspectors noted that no !
account is taken for charging and letdown flows and the effect of
pressurizer heaters on the calorimetric measurement. Subsequent
calculations by the inspectors and by the licensee demonstrated that
these effects were negligible. Additionally, the inspectors identified
some minor discrepancies in PET-13-3. The licensee noted these and !
stated that they would be corrected. The inspectors concluded that the !
licensee's calorimetric measurement procedures were acceptable. l
. _ _ _ _ _ _ .
.
. 7
}
No violations or deviaticns were identified.
10. Plant Operations
The plant continued full power operation from the outset of the
inspection period until early April when power was reduced to 73% due to
excess hydroelectric capacity in the region. On April 11, at 10:45 p.m.,
the Ming Winter, a grain freighter in the Columbia River lost control of
steering and veered into the shore in the vicinity of the plant intake
,
structure. The ship contacted the plant 36 inch outfall pipe resulting
in significant damage to approximately 30 feet of the pipe. The event
did not interrupt service water flow and the service water system
continued to operate normally. The outfall pipe is not safety related.
With regard to presenting a hazard to the intake structure, the FSAR
notes that a ship would not normally be capable of coming inshore to the
point that contact with the intake structure would be made due to the
depth of the water. In the unlikely event that service water flow is
interrupted, the cooling tower can be lined up with the service water
system to allow the plant to cool down.
On April 16, the plant shutdown for its annual refueling outage. The
inspectors witnessed the plant shutdown and noted that it proceeded
without incident. Major work planned for the outage includes feedwater
heater replacement, steam generator sludge lance and eddy current
testing, main turbine inspection, repair of the damaged outfall pipe and
containment integrated leak rate. testing. At the end of the inspection
period, the plant was in Mode 6 with core unloading in progress. The
licensee's current schedule calls for a return to operation on June 10.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Control of Heavy Loads During Refueling
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrative controls which
ensure that lifting of heavy loads in containment is conducted in a safe,
controlled manner. A major portion of the program is based on the
guidelines contained in NUREG 0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear
Power Plants," and on correspondence between the licensee and NRR
concerning the content of their program. The inspectors verified that
the following areas are addressed by the licensee in controlling heavy
loads:
- Control of safe load paths inside containment.
- Procedures for load handling.
- Requirements for operator training and qualification.
- Control of special lifting devices (SLD).
- Maintenance requirements and procedures for cranes and lifting
equipment.
With regard to lifting of large components during refueling operations,
the inspectors determined that the licensee's procedures were acceptable.
For attachment of the lifting device to the reactor upper internals, the
licensee requires that the number of turns needed to connect each arm of
the lifting device to the internals be recorded and checked against an
l
_ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . - ___ _ _____ _ _______ -___-_______-- - _ - _ - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ J
_ - - .-
.
. 8
,
,
acceptance criteria. The axial displacement of each arm is also
recorded. Specific requirements for attachment of the vessel head
lifting device and the missile shield lifting device are not stated in
the refueling procedures, however, the attachment points for these lifts
are easily accessible and the method for making the attachment is
relatively simple. For lifting of the vessel head, the expected weight
is listed in the procedure and the head is checked for levelness after
two inches of vertical movement." The procedure also requires that
] personnel verify that the lift is clear of interfereace during the
initial portion of the lift.
The inspectors identified one concern. The lifting device for removal of
the missile shields, which are normally located over the vessel, is not
classified as a SLD. From a review of NUREG 0612, the inspectors were
unable to ascertain whether the device should be categorized as a SLD and
thereby receive more extensive periodic inspections by the licensee than
a normal lifting device receives. This item will be followed up by the ,
inspectors as Open Item No. 344/86-10-04.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Miscellaneous Observations
During a routine control room tour, the inspectors observed the discharge
pipe of the electric auxiliary feedwater pump at a pressure of
approximately 1825 psig. The pump and the piping are not safety-related.
The design pressure of the pipe is 1700 psig. The control room operators
took immediate action to depressurize the pipe. The excessive pressure
apparently resulted from the thermal expansion of water trapped in the
line. The licensee is reviewing the piping design and considering
modifications to prevent recurrence of this problem.
The inspectors also observed a deficiency with one leg of a support
associated with the platform for a control room emergency ventilation fan
and with two supports associated with service water supply to a cable
spreading ronm area cooler. The licensee was informed of these
observations and initiated action to correct them. At the completion of
the inspection period, the inspectors were still considering whether the
deficiencies were of significance to the system operation. The
inspectors will follow this Unresolved Item as Open Item 344/86-10-05.
The inspectors discussed the status of the Safety Parameter Display
System (SPDS) with various site personnel and found the system to be
substantially more reliable now then when the system was first placed in
i
operation in July, 1985. The operators find it useful for monitoring
such parameters as core exit thermocouples, cooldown parameters, and
effluent radiation monitors. The system also has proven useful for
providing information to the Technical Support Center during emergency
drills. Not all operations personnel are totally familiar with the
.
system, however the licensee is working towards improving this area.
No violations or deviations were identified,
i
. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ - - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ - -
. . - _ .
"
j .
,
- 9
13. Unresolved Items
,
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether.they are acceptable items, violations, or
deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are
discussed in paragraphs 6, 8 and 12.
t
4
14. Exit Interview
,
The inspectors met with the plant general manager and the manager of
operations and maintenance at the conclusion of the inspection period.
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of
the inspection.
]
l
1
J
.,
N
I
1 i
!
!