ML20198H775

Insp Rept 50-344/86-10 on 860318-0428.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Corrective Action Maint Surveillance,Refueling Activities & Review of Control of Heavy Loads

ML20198H775
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	05/16/1986
From:	Kellund G, Mendonca M, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198H748	List: IR 05000344/1986010 ML20198H742 ML20198H775
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR 50-344-86-10, NUDOCS 8605300550
Download: ML20198H775 (10)

See also: IR 05000344/1986010

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION ~V

Report No. 50-344/86-10

Docket No. 50-344

License No. NPF-1

Licensee: Portland General Electric Company

121 S. W. Salmon Street

Portland, Oregon 97204

Facility Name: Troj an

Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon

Inspection conducted: March 18 - April 28, 1986

Inspectors: h %s- /o - r/A /J 4'

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S. A. Richards Date Signed

Senior Resident Inspector

K An - 4, f//tt /86

G. C. Kellund Date Signed

Resident Inspector

Approved By: """ IN# #

M. M. Mendonca, Chief Date Signed

Reactor Projects Section 1

Summary:

Inspection on March 18 - April 28, 1986 (Report 50-3'44/86-10)

Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of operational safety verification,

corrective action, maintenance, surveillance, refueling activities, review of

licensee response to system biological fouling, review of control of heavy

loads, and review of preventative maintenance practices with the service water

system. Inspection procedures 30702, 30703, 40700, 61720, 61726, 62702,

62703, 71707,^92700, 92701~, 93702, and 94703 were used as guidance during the

conduct of the inspection.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

B605300550 860516 *

PDR ADOCK 05000344

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

• W. S. Orser, Plant General Manager

• R. P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance.

• D. R. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services

• J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maint. and Construction

• J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services

R. E. Susee, Operations Supervisor

D. W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor

A. S. Cohlmeyer, Engineering Supervisor

G. L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor

T. O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor

S. B. Nichols, Training Supervisor

D. L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor

C. H. Brown, Quality Assurance Operations Branch Manager

R. W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor

H. E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor

The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees

during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors,

reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians

and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.

• Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. Operational Safety Verification

During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined

activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.

j The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a

daily, weekly, or biweekly basis.

On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to

verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as

prescribed in the facility technical specifications. Logs,

instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were

examined to obtain ir. formation on plant conditions, trends,.and

compliance with regulations. On occasions when a shift turnover was in

progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to

determine that all pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming

shift.

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During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the

facility to observe the following items:

a. General plant and equipment conditions.

b. Maintenance requests and repairs.

c. Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment. I

d. Ignition sources and flammable material control.

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e. Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's

administrative controls and approved procedures.

f. Interiors of electrical and control panels.

g. Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.

h. Radiation protection controls.

i. Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.

j. Radioactive waste systems.

k. Proper storage of compressed gas bottles.

The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the

inspectors to determine that the licensee complied with technical

specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal

of equipment from service. Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure

that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance

evolutions.

During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control

room, and with other plant personnel. The discussions centered on

pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures,

security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities

involved.

The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCR) to

confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.

Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the

completion of corrective action. NCRs reviewed during this inspection

period included 86-009 and 86-013.

Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the

inspectors. Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified

by observing portions of area surveys being performed, when possible, and

by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that

prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used.

Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability

and calibration status.

The inspectors verified the operability of selected engineered safety

features. This was done by direct visual verification of the correct

position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system

integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable'. ESF systems

verified operable during this inspection period included the component

cooling water system, the service water system, and the diesel fuel oil

system.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Corrective Action

The inspectors performed a general review of the licensee's problem

identification systems-to verify that licensee identified quality related

deficiencies are being tracked and reported to cognizant management for

resolution. Types of records examined by the inspectors included

Requests for Evaluation, Event Reports, Plant Review Board meeting

minutes, and Quality Assurance Program Nonconformance Reports. The

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inspectors concluded that the licensee's systems were being utilized to

correct identified deficiencies'. A Plant Review Board meeting was

attended by the inspectors on April 9. The inspectors verified that the

appropriate committee members were present at the meeting and that the

meeting was conducted in accordance with the requirements of section

6.5.1 of the facility technical specifications.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Maintenance

During this inspection period, the inspectors witnessed maintenance

activities associated with inspection of the D23 battery charger and

retermination of the power cables to the 'B' safety injection pump. In

both cases, the inspectors verified that appropriate facility procedures

were being followed, that calibrated equipment was used when required,

and that personnel involved'were familiar with the various requirements

for properly performing the work. With regard to the battery charger

maintenance, the inspectors determined through discussions with

Instrumentation and Control personnel that.the shunt device used to

accurately measure the charger output had been calibrated just prior to

the maintenance activity. The inspectors also noted the direct

involvement of electrical quality control inspectors in the retermination

work performed on the safety injection pump.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Surveillance

The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the

inspectors. Observations by the inspectors included verification that

proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that

the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if

required by the test procedure. Following completion of the surveillance

tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the appropriate

acceptance criteria. Surveillance tests witnessed during this period

were associated with incore flux mapping and quadrant power tilt ratio

determination, local leak rate testing of the containment purge exhaust

penetration, and operational testing of the 'A' emergency diesel

- generator and the associated fuel oil system. The inspectors also

witnessed a special inspection of the 'B' reactor coolant system loop.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Preventative Maintenance Activities

the inspectors reviewed the licensee!s maintenance program to ascertain

the degree to which the licensee performs preventative maintenance to

ensure reliable operation of plant safety systems. -For this review, the

inspectors selected the service water system (SWS) for'a specific

examination of preventative maintenance activities.- The SWS is a

safety-related system and serves as the ultimate heat' sink for the

operation of the majority-of plant safety systems. The SWS consists +

primarily of three service water. pumps.'(SWP), which take a suction from

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the Columbia River at the intake structure, two service water strainers,

four service water booster pumps (SWBP), and various instrumentation,

valves, piping, and heat exchangers. A portion of the system serves the

secondary plant and is not safety related. This part of the system was

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not reviewed.

In accordance with the facility technical specifications, the licensee is

required to perform inservice testing (IST) of the-SWS pumps and valves

and inservice inspection (ISI) of the system, as required by section XI

of the ASME code. Under normal conditions, the pumps and remotely

operated valves are generally tested quarterly by the IST program. The

l ISI program requires the system to be pressure tested for leakage every

40 months and hydrostatically tested once every 10 years. A general

visual examination of-the system structural supports is also performed

under the ISI program.

Through reviews of procedures and discussions with licensee personnel,

the inspectors determined that the following maintenance activities,

which are not required by the technical specifications, are being

performed on the SWS.

- Service water pumps are overhauled every 3 years.

- Service water booster pump motor bearings are lubricated quarterly.

- Service water booster pumps have oil changes and coupling lubrications

semi-annually.

- Service water strainers are visually inspected and lubricated

semi-annually.

- Service water strainer tubes and shear keys are inspected annually.

! - Valve motor operators are cleaned, lubricated and inspected every 3

years.

- Valve air actuators are inspected every 2 years.

- Selected valves are repacked every 5 years.

- All system instrumentation is calibrated at various scheduled

intervals.

- The intake structure is inspected and dredged, if necessary, annually. l

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- Soundings are taken of the intake structure channel annually.

- The system is chlorinated weekly to prevent fouling from marine growth.

- The component cooling water heat exchangers are inspected every 2

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years.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee has in place a program for

performing preventative maintenance on various components of the system,

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Two items of concern were identified by the inspectors. First, the

licensee does not periodically cycle all manual valves.that may be used

under abnormal crerating conditions. The code exempts the majority of

manual valves from this cycling requirement, however, valves which are

required to reposition to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an

accident are required to be cycled periodically. The service water

system does contain several manual valves which the licensee agrees

appear prudent to periodically cycle, such as SW 031, 032, 041, 042, 043,

044, 045, 046, however it was not clear whether they are covered by the

code requirements. The licensee was considering this concern at the

close of the inspection and the inspectors will follow this Unresolved

Item under Open Item No. 86-10-01. The second concern regards IST of

relief valves. The licensee is not testing approximately 20-25 relief

valves which are designated as therraal reliefs. The licensee has stated

that the ASME code does not require testing of thermal reliefs, however,

at the close of the inspection, licensee representatives had not yet

located the section of the code which exempts thermal reliefs from

testing. This Unresolved Item will be followed as Open Item

344/86-10-02.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Biological Fouling of Cooling Water Systems

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the issue of fouling

of open cooling water systems by aquatic organisms. This fouling can

degrade system flows and heat exchanger performance. The major

susceptible systems at the site are the service water system and the fire

water system. This problem has occurred at several plants and is

described in IE Bulletin 81-03, IE Information Notices 81-21 and 83-46

and INP0 SOER 84-1. The inspectors examined the licensee's in place and

proposed measures to address this issue, including use of portable flow

instruments to monitor flows when degradation is suspected, since

permanent flow instrumentation is not generally installed in the service

water system. The licensee presently performs chlorination of water

systems and periodic inspections of potentially affected heat exchangers.

The inspectors also noted that the plant has experienced very few

problems of this nature over the past 10 years. The inspectors will

continue to monitor this area in the future.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Residual Heat Removal System Operability

On March 31, with the plant operating at full power, the inspectors

observed that residual heat removal (RHR) system valve MO-8809A was

tagged as under test. When questioned, the operators stated that the

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valve was shut for maintenance purposes. This valve'is the RHR discharge

to the reactor coolant system (RCS) loops 1 and 2. .The licensee had

declared the 'A' train of RHR inoperable due to this valve being shut and

considered the plant to be in compliance with the action statement of the

technical specifications by maintaining the 'B' train operable. The

inspectors questioned whether the 'B' train of RHR was operable with

MO-8809A shut. Although the injection path to RCS loops 3 and 4 was

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available via valve MO-8809B, the inspectors question whether all four

injection paths were required for either train to be operable. The

licensee took prcmpt action to reopen M0-8809A. After a review of the

operational requirements of the RHR system, the licensee determined that

all four injection paths are required for either train of RHR to be

operable and subsequently issued LER 86-03 on this event. The valve

was shut for a period of one hour and ten minutes.

Technical Specification 3.5.2 requires two independent subsystems

consisting, in part, of an "0PERABLE" flow path. The flow path for the

RHR system is not clearly defined in plant Technical Specifications.

Therefore, clarification from NRR will be requested and this issue will

be followed as Unresolved Item No. 344/86-10-03.

The apparent cause of this occurrence according to the licensee was a

misunderstanding by the licensee concerning the operation of the RHR

system. Licensee perscnnel at the plant regarded the RHR injection paths

as segregated by train and therefore, they had allowed the valve to be

closed as proceduralized by maintenance procedure 12-5, " Valve Motor

Operators." Further, review of the procedure by the onsite review

committee during issuance failed to identify this discrepancy. The

inspectors were concerned that this occurrence was similar to recently

identified problems with the control room emergency ventilation system

and auxiliary feedwater system in that personnel knowledge of the proper

operation of the system was deficient.

No violation or deviation was identified.

9. Plant Calorimetric Measurement

The inspectors examined procedure POT-22-1, " Plant Heat Balance

Calibration" which is used to conduct a periodic plant calorimetric

measurement, and procedure PET-13-3, "Recalibration of Feedwater Flow

Venturis" which is used to correct the venturi flow constants used in the

calorimetric calculation. During operation, the venturi flow constants

change due to fouling of the venturis. The result of this change is a

reduction of the plant electrical output. PET-13-3 was subsequently

written to recover the lost output by correcting the flow constants over

the course of an operating cycle. The procedure assumes that the ratio

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of p'rimary power to secondary power remains constant throughout the

cycle, and that a ratio of the heat rates measured at some point in the

cycle to baseline value heat rates measured when the venturis are known  !

to be clean will allow the new venturi constants to be determined,

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The inspectors reviewed the technical content of the procedures and the j

error analysis associated with PET-13-3. The inspectors noted that no  !

account is taken for charging and letdown flows and the effect of

pressurizer heaters on the calorimetric measurement. Subsequent

calculations by the inspectors and by the licensee demonstrated that

these effects were negligible. Additionally, the inspectors identified

some minor discrepancies in PET-13-3. The licensee noted these and  !

stated that they would be corrected. The inspectors concluded that the  !

licensee's calorimetric measurement procedures were acceptable. l

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No violations or deviaticns were identified.

10. Plant Operations

The plant continued full power operation from the outset of the

inspection period until early April when power was reduced to 73% due to

excess hydroelectric capacity in the region. On April 11, at 10:45 p.m.,

the Ming Winter, a grain freighter in the Columbia River lost control of

steering and veered into the shore in the vicinity of the plant intake

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structure. The ship contacted the plant 36 inch outfall pipe resulting

in significant damage to approximately 30 feet of the pipe. The event

did not interrupt service water flow and the service water system

continued to operate normally. The outfall pipe is not safety related.

With regard to presenting a hazard to the intake structure, the FSAR

notes that a ship would not normally be capable of coming inshore to the

point that contact with the intake structure would be made due to the

depth of the water. In the unlikely event that service water flow is

interrupted, the cooling tower can be lined up with the service water

system to allow the plant to cool down.

On April 16, the plant shutdown for its annual refueling outage. The

inspectors witnessed the plant shutdown and noted that it proceeded

without incident. Major work planned for the outage includes feedwater

heater replacement, steam generator sludge lance and eddy current

testing, main turbine inspection, repair of the damaged outfall pipe and

containment integrated leak rate. testing. At the end of the inspection

period, the plant was in Mode 6 with core unloading in progress. The

licensee's current schedule calls for a return to operation on June 10.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Control of Heavy Loads During Refueling

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrative controls which

ensure that lifting of heavy loads in containment is conducted in a safe,

controlled manner. A major portion of the program is based on the

guidelines contained in NUREG 0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear

Power Plants," and on correspondence between the licensee and NRR

concerning the content of their program. The inspectors verified that

the following areas are addressed by the licensee in controlling heavy

loads:

- Control of safe load paths inside containment.

- Procedures for load handling.

- Requirements for operator training and qualification.

- Control of special lifting devices (SLD).

- Maintenance requirements and procedures for cranes and lifting

equipment.

With regard to lifting of large components during refueling operations,

the inspectors determined that the licensee's procedures were acceptable.

For attachment of the lifting device to the reactor upper internals, the

licensee requires that the number of turns needed to connect each arm of

the lifting device to the internals be recorded and checked against an

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acceptance criteria. The axial displacement of each arm is also

recorded. Specific requirements for attachment of the vessel head

lifting device and the missile shield lifting device are not stated in

the refueling procedures, however, the attachment points for these lifts

are easily accessible and the method for making the attachment is

relatively simple. For lifting of the vessel head, the expected weight

is listed in the procedure and the head is checked for levelness after

two inches of vertical movement." The procedure also requires that

] personnel verify that the lift is clear of interfereace during the

initial portion of the lift.

The inspectors identified one concern. The lifting device for removal of

the missile shields, which are normally located over the vessel, is not

classified as a SLD. From a review of NUREG 0612, the inspectors were

unable to ascertain whether the device should be categorized as a SLD and

thereby receive more extensive periodic inspections by the licensee than

a normal lifting device receives. This item will be followed up by the ,

inspectors as Open Item No. 344/86-10-04.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Miscellaneous Observations

During a routine control room tour, the inspectors observed the discharge

pipe of the electric auxiliary feedwater pump at a pressure of

approximately 1825 psig. The pump and the piping are not safety-related.

The design pressure of the pipe is 1700 psig. The control room operators

took immediate action to depressurize the pipe. The excessive pressure

apparently resulted from the thermal expansion of water trapped in the

line. The licensee is reviewing the piping design and considering

modifications to prevent recurrence of this problem.

The inspectors also observed a deficiency with one leg of a support

associated with the platform for a control room emergency ventilation fan

and with two supports associated with service water supply to a cable

spreading ronm area cooler. The licensee was informed of these

observations and initiated action to correct them. At the completion of

the inspection period, the inspectors were still considering whether the

deficiencies were of significance to the system operation. The

inspectors will follow this Unresolved Item as Open Item 344/86-10-05.

The inspectors discussed the status of the Safety Parameter Display

System (SPDS) with various site personnel and found the system to be

substantially more reliable now then when the system was first placed in

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operation in July, 1985. The operators find it useful for monitoring

such parameters as core exit thermocouples, cooldown parameters, and

effluent radiation monitors. The system also has proven useful for

providing information to the Technical Support Center during emergency

drills. Not all operations personnel are totally familiar with the

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system, however the licensee is working towards improving this area.

No violations or deviations were identified,

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13. Unresolved Items

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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in

order to ascertain whether.they are acceptable items, violations, or

deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are

discussed in paragraphs 6, 8 and 12.

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14. Exit Interview

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The inspectors met with the plant general manager and the manager of

operations and maintenance at the conclusion of the inspection period.

During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of

the inspection.

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