IR 05000348/1998009: Difference between revisions

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)


==REGION II==
==REGION II==
Docket Nos: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report No: 50-348/98-09 and 50-364/98-09 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC)
Docket Nos:
Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP). Units 1 and 2 Location: 7388 North State Highway 95 Columbia, AL 36319 Dates: March 23-25, 1998 Inspectors: William P. Kleinsorge. P.E., Reactor Inspector Approved by:   #st /i /IN Bruce S. Mallett. Deputy Director D/.e signed Division of Reactor Safety i
50-348 and 50-364 License Nos:
  ~
NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report No:
9905220219 990511 PDR ADOCK 05000349 G FDR
50-348/98-09 and 50-364/98-09 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC)
Facility:
Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP). Units 1 and 2 Location:
7388 North State Highway 95 Columbia, AL 36319 Dates:
March 23-25, 1998 Inspectors:
William P. Kleinsorge. P.E., Reactor Inspector Approved by:
#st / /IN i
Bruce S. Mallett. Deputy Director D/.e signed Division of Reactor Safety i
9905220219 990511
~
PDR ADOCK 05000349 G
FDR
 
-
.
l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Farley Nuclear Powi:r Plant. Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-348/98-09. 50-364/98-09 This inspection was conducted to follow up on an investigation by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) conducted during the period May 12. 1997 through February 9. 1998.
 
The findings of the investigation are documented in the syno] sis to 01 Report No. 2-97-011. issued on February 9. 1998.
 
The purpose of t1e inspection was to determine whether violations of NRC requirements occurred and to determine whether the licensee's corrective actions for a March 5.1997, improper weld repair were adequate to address the identified problems.
 
The improper weld repair was ident1fied by the 11u-nsee ir, Occurrence Report No. 1-97-071.
 
The inspection was co announced, special inspection conducted from March 23-25, 1998.
 
Maintenance A welder failed to document a deficiency and deviated from the work sequence by making a base material weld repair to a safety-related pipe without a properly authorized repair plan.
 
This failure resulted in a weld that was not in compliance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; however, the licensee's program detected an, _orrected the improper weld.


-
(Section M1.1)
.
l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Farley Nuclear Powi:r Plant. Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-348/98-09. 50-364/98-09 This inspection was conducted to follow up on an investigation by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) conducted during the period May 12. 1997 through February 9. 1998. The findings of the investigation are documented in the syno] sis to 01 Report No. 2-97-011. issued on February 9. 1998. The purpose of t1e inspection was to determine whether violations of NRC requirements occurred and to determine whether the licensee's corrective actions for a March 5.1997, improper weld repair were adequate to address the identified problems. The improper weld repair was ident1fied by the 11u-nsee ir, Occurrence Report No. 1-97-071. The inspection was co announced, special inspection conducted from March 23-25, 199 Maintenance A welder failed to document a deficiency and deviated from the work sequence by making a base material weld repair to a safety-related pipe without a properly authorized repair plan. This failure resulted in a weld that was not in compliance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; however, the licensee's program detected an, _orrected the improper wel (Section M1.1)
I
I


.
.
.
.
REPORT DETAILS M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Review of Occurrence Reports (OR) Insoection Scope (62700)
REPORT DETAILS M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Review of Occurrence Reports (OR)
This inspection was conducted to follow up on the findings and conclusions from an NRC Office of Investigations (01) report. No. 2-97-011. which was completed on February 9. 1998. OI substantiated that a contract employee intentionally made c safety-related weld repair without obtaining a weld repair procedure in 1997. Weld repairs under similar circumstances were identified in 1993. This inspection also included a review of th9 W ensee's Occurrence Report (OR) No. 1-97-07 which documented this issue, licensee procedures, examination of quality records, and discussions with licensee and contractor personnel. The purpose of the review was to determine whether the actions were in violation of NRC requirements for repairing welds and whether the licensee's actions in response to the issue were adequate to prevent recurrenc Observations and Findinas On March 5.1997, while welding weld No.1F of Work Order (WO) 11405, a safety-related socket weld, in the service water system. a welder burned a hole in a pipe adjacent to the weld creating a welding deficiency. Subsequent h , the welder failed to document this deficiency contrary to Procedurc FNP-0-AP-52. " EQUIPMENT STATUS CONTROL AND MAINTENANCE AUTH0R EATION". General Revision 24. dated November 2 paragraph 13.2 which states in Jart that ". . .any deficiencies found while performing the task will 3e documented..." The welder then deviated from the work sequence scope of WO 11405 (which did not include authorization to perform repair welding of base materials) by making a base material weld repair to the pipe without a completed repair pla This action was contrary to Procedure FNP-0-AP-52, paragraph 9.2. which l states in part that "The individual performing the work shall follow the
a.
 
Insoection Scope (62700)
This inspection was conducted to follow up on the findings and conclusions from an NRC Office of Investigations (01) report. No. 2-97-011. which was completed on February 9. 1998. OI substantiated that a contract employee intentionally made c safety-related weld repair without obtaining a weld repair procedure in 1997.
 
Weld repairs under similar circumstances were identified in 1993.
 
This inspection also included a review of th9 W ensee's Occurrence Report (OR) No. 1-97-071.
 
which documented this issue, licensee procedures, examination of quality records, and discussions with licensee and contractor personnel.
 
The purpose of the review was to determine whether the actions were in violation of NRC requirements for repairing welds and whether the licensee's actions in response to the issue were adequate to prevent recurrence.
 
b.
 
Observations and Findinas On March 5.1997, while welding weld No.1F of Work Order (WO) 11405, a safety-related socket weld, in the service water system. a welder burned a hole in a pipe adjacent to the weld creating a welding deficiency.
 
Subsequent h, the welder failed to document this deficiency contrary to Procedurc FNP-0-AP-52. " EQUIPMENT STATUS CONTROL AND MAINTENANCE AUTH0R EATION". General Revision 24. dated November 20.
 
1995 paragraph 13.2 which states in Jart that "...any deficiencies found while performing the task will 3e documented..."
The welder then deviated from the work sequence scope of WO 11405 (which did not include authorization to perform repair welding of base materials) by making a base material weld repair to the pipe without a completed repair plan.
 
This action was contrary to Procedure FNP-0-AP-52, paragraph 9.2. which l
states in part that "The individual performing the work shall follow the work sequence specified in the WO". and contrary to Procedure
!
!
work sequence specified in the WO". and contrary to Procedure FNP-0-M-23. "SPECIAL PROCESSES MANUAL". Section FNP-0-SPP-GW-001, Revision 17. dated December 19, 1995, paragraph 8.1 which states in part that "A repair plan shall be completed prior to the start of the -
FNP-0-M-23. "SPECIAL PROCESSES MANUAL". Section FNP-0-SPP-GW-001, Revision 17. dated December 19, 1995, paragraph 8.1 which states in part that "A repair plan shall be completed prior to the start of the
repair. ."
-
The inspector confirmed that. as documented in the licensee's OR 1-97-071, the licensee identified this weld defect and unauthorized repair l during a planned ins)ection of welds. The licensee determined that the l welder burned throug1 the pipe and did not stop and obtain an authorized repair procedure. Instead, the individual welded over the defect without a repair procedur _______________-___A
repair.."
The inspector confirmed that. as documented in the licensee's OR 1-97-071, the licensee identified this weld defect and unauthorized repair l
during a planned ins)ection of welds.


-
The licensee determined that the l
.
welder burned throug1 the pipe and did not stop and obtain an authorized repair procedure.
.
f  2


The licensee's corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence included the following:
Instead, the individual welded over the defect without a repair procedure.
      '
 
. Replaced the pipe section that contained the unauthorized base material repair, to the burn-through.
-
A
 
-
.
.
f
 
1 The licensee's corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence included the following:
'
Replaced the pipe section that contained the unauthorized base
.
material repair, to the burn-through.


,
,
Disciplinary action for individual involved.
Disciplinary action for individual involved.


! .
!
Trained the contractor welder / fitters in lessons learned from this
Trained the contractor welder / fitters in lessons learned from this
! occurrence, emphasizing the importance of procedural complianc Reviewed all welds made by the welder for other improper repair CFR 50. Appendix B. Criteria V and IX and the licensee's Operations l Quality Assurance Program. UFSAR 17.2.5 and 17.2.9. collectively require
.
'
!
that activities affecting quality, such as welding. be accomplished in accordance with documented procedure The welder's willful actions placed the licensee in violation of these criteria and the applicabh procedures. The inspector determined that the licensee had taken timely and effective corrective actions, conducted an appropriate survey and determined the extent of the noncompliance, and took appropriate actions to correct and prevent a recurrence of similar circumstances. Although the violation was willful, it was identified by the licensee, it involved the isolated acts of a low-level employee and it was addressed by appropriate remedial actions. Therefore, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this licensee-identified violation is identified as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-348.364/
occurrence, emphasizing the importance of procedural compliance.
98-09-01: " Unauthorized Base Metal Repair" These actions also resulted in the weld not being in compliance with the applicable code for Weld No.1F on Work Order 11405. American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code Section III. 1971 Edition. Summer 1971 Addenda. (71S71). Paragraph No ND-4120. ND-4130. ND-2500. ND-2559 ND-2539.1 and ND-253 For defects in base materials, the ASME B&PV Code requires the removal of those defects or reduction of those defects to an acceptable size verified by nondestructive examination, leaving a cavity suitable for welding. This cavity is required to be repaired (filled) by welding to restore minimum wall thickness. The resulting weld repair is required to be surface examined by liquid penetrant examination and volumetrically examined by radiography. None of these actions were accomplished during the unauthorized weld repai Subsequent to the licensee's identification of the unauthorized weld repair, the licensee corrected the problems associated with the weld not meeting the code and not being adequately examined by replacing the pipe l section and welds were appropriately examined.
 
Reviewed all welds made by the welder for other improper repairs.
 
10 CFR 50. Appendix B. Criteria V and IX and the licensee's Operations Quality Assurance Program. UFSAR 17.2.5 and 17.2.9. collectively require l
'
that activities affecting quality, such as welding. be accomplished in accordance with documented procedures.
 
The welder's willful actions placed the licensee in violation of these criteria and the applicabh procedures. The inspector determined that the licensee had taken timely and effective corrective actions, conducted an appropriate survey and determined the extent of the noncompliance, and took appropriate actions to correct and prevent a recurrence of similar circumstances.
 
Although the violation was willful, it was identified by the licensee, it involved the isolated acts of a low-level employee and it was addressed by appropriate remedial actions.
 
Therefore, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this licensee-identified violation is identified as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-348.364/
98-09-01: " Unauthorized Base Metal Repair" These actions also resulted in the weld not being in compliance with the applicable code for Weld No.1F on Work Order 11405. American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code Section III. 1971 Edition. Summer 1971 Addenda. (71S71). Paragraph Nos.
 
ND-4120. ND-4130. ND-2500. ND-2559 ND-2539.1 and ND-2539.4.
 
For defects in base materials, the ASME B&PV Code requires the removal of those defects or reduction of those defects to an acceptable size verified by nondestructive examination, leaving a cavity suitable for welding.
 
This cavity is required to be repaired (filled) by welding to restore minimum wall thickness.
 
The resulting weld repair is required to be surface examined by liquid penetrant examination and volumetrically examined by radiography.
 
None of these actions were accomplished during the unauthorized weld repair.
 
Subsequent to the licensee's identification of the unauthorized weld repair, the licensee corrected the problems associated with the weld not meeting the code and not being adequately examined by replacing the pipe l
section and welds were appropriately examined.


i l
i l
!
!
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{ .
{
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    -
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l 3 Conclusion A welder's willful failure to follow licensee procedures to document a deficiency and subsequent deviation from the work sequence by making a base material weld repair to the Jipe without a properly authorized
.
.
repair plan. resulted in a weld tlat was not in compliance with the ASME l
-
.
l
-
 
c.
 
Conclusion A welder's willful failure to follow licensee procedures to document a deficiency and subsequent deviation from the work sequence by making a base material weld repair to the Jipe without a properly authorized repair plan. resulted in a weld tlat was not in compliance with the ASME
.
B&PV Code. The licensee identified this, corrected the weld, and took l
'
'
B&PV Code. The licensee identified this, corrected the weld, and took actions to correct the root cause X1 Exit Meeting Summary Mr. Paul Fredrickson Chief. Maintenance Branch, presented the inspection results to members of licensee management during a telephone conference of April 17. 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente On March 25, 1998, the inspector also discussed the findings with the licensee and asked the licerze whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie INSPECTION PROCEPURES USED IP 62700: Maintenance Implementation ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED TYDe Item Number Description and Reference Onened/ Closed NCV 50-348.364/98-09-01 Unauthorized Base Metal Repair PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee
actions to correct the root causes.
    *R. Badham SAER Supervisor
    *J. Brantley. PMMS Supervisor
    *K. Dyar Security Manager
    *J. Fitzgerald. Maintenance - Team Leader
    *R. Fredrico. Sr. Engineer - Engineering Support Performance Review
    *R. Fucich. Engineering Support Manager
    *D. Grissette. Operations Manager
  ** *R. Hill. FNP General Manager
  .
    *C. Letchman. PMMS Weld Engineer
    *R. fiartin. Maintenance Team Leader
  ** *C. Nesbitt Assistant General Manager - Support
  .
    *C. Schaule. Security - NSOS
  ** *B. Yance. Plant Modifications and Maintenance Support Manager
  .
  **L. Stinson. Assistant General Manager - Operations
- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . - .


*
X1 Exit Meeting Summary Mr. Paul Fredrickson Chief. Maintenance Branch, presented the inspection results to members of licensee management during a telephone conference of April 17. 1998.
.
,
.


Williams Power Kinney. Site Manager NRC
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
*J. Bartley, Sr. Resident Inspector (Acting)
 
*R. Caldwell, Resident Inspector
On March 25, 1998, the inspector also discussed the findings with the licensee and asked the licerze whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
**P. Fredrickson. Chief, Maintenance Branch
 
**T. Ross, Sr. Resident inspector
No proprietary information was identified.
* Attended onsite exit interview March 25. 1998
 
** Participated in telephonic exit interview on. April 17, 1998 l
INSPECTION PROCEPURES USED IP 62700:
Maintenance Implementation ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED TYDe Item Number Description and Reference Onened/ Closed NCV 50-348.364/98-09-01 Unauthorized Base Metal Repair PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee
*R. Badham SAER Supervisor
*J. Brantley. PMMS Supervisor
*K. Dyar Security Manager
*J. Fitzgerald. Maintenance - Team Leader
*R. Fredrico. Sr. Engineer - Engineering Support Performance Review
*R. Fucich. Engineering Support Manager
*D. Grissette. Operations Manager
** *R. Hill. FNP General Manager
.
*C. Letchman. PMMS Weld Engineer
*R. fiartin. Maintenance Team Leader
** *C. Nesbitt Assistant General Manager - Support
.
*C. Schaule. Security - NSOS
** *B. Yance. Plant Modifications and Maintenance Support Manager
.
**L. Stinson. Assistant General Manager - Operations
- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _. -.
 
*
.
,
.
 
Williams Power L.
 
Kinney. Site Manager NRC
*J. Bartley, Sr. Resident Inspector (Acting)
*R. Caldwell, Resident Inspector
**P. Fredrickson. Chief, Maintenance Branch
**T. Ross, Sr. Resident inspector
* Attended onsite exit interview March 25. 1998
** Participated in telephonic exit interview on. April 17, 1998 l
{
{
,   _ __ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ - - -_---_ _ -
,
_
__
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _
_ - - _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ - - -_---_ _ -
 
.
.
.
.
SYN 0PSIS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II, Office of Investigations initiated this investigation on May 12, 1997, to determine if a contract
,
employee intentionally failed to obtain a welding repair procedure while l
working at the Southern Nuclear Operating Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.
 
l The evidence developed during this investigation substantiated that the I
contract employee intentionally made safety related weld repairs without obtaining weld repair procedures in 1993 and 1997.
 
NOT IOR PUOLIC CISCLOSURE WIT"OUT APPR0t'AL Or ENCIINRE 2 JIELO OIIICE DIRECTOR. 0FEICE Or ink' ESTIMATIONS, REGION II I NVM b Case No. 2 97 011


  .
est m My /1, Mft
  .
  .
.
SYN 0PSIS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II, Office of Investigations initiated this investigation on May 12, 1997, to determine if a contract ,
employee intentionally failed to obtain a welding repair procedure while l working at the Southern Nuclear Operating Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plan l The evidence developed during this investigation substantiated that the I contract employee intentionally made safety related weld repairs without obtaining weld repair procedures in 1993 and 199 NOT IOR PUOLIC CISCLOSURE WIT"OUT APPR0t'AL Or ENCIINRE 2 JIELO OIIICE DIRECTOR. 0FEICE Or ink' ESTIMATIONS, REGION II Case No. 2 97 011  1  I NVM b est m My /1, Mft
- _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
- _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
}}
}}

Revision as of 20:03, 1 December 2024

Special Insp Repts 50-348/98-09 & 50-364/98-09 on 980323-25. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Follow Up on OI Rept 2-97-011 Issued on 980209 Re Improper Weld Repair
ML20247K836
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 05/11/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247K816 List:
References
50-348-98-09, 50-348-98-9, 50-364-98-09, 50-364-98-9, NUDOCS 9805220219
Download: ML20247K836 (7)
v • d • e


Text

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.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)

REGION II

Docket Nos:

50-348 and 50-364 License Nos:

NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report No:

50-348/98-09 and 50-364/98-09 Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC)

Facility:

Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP). Units 1 and 2 Location:

7388 North State Highway 95 Columbia, AL 36319 Dates:

March 23-25, 1998 Inspectors:

William P. Kleinsorge. P.E., Reactor Inspector Approved by:

  1. st / /IN i

Bruce S. Mallett. Deputy Director D/.e signed Division of Reactor Safety i

9905220219 990511

~

PDR ADOCK 05000349 G

FDR

-

.

l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Farley Nuclear Powi:r Plant. Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-348/98-09. 50-364/98-09 This inspection was conducted to follow up on an investigation by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) conducted during the period May 12. 1997 through February 9. 1998.

The findings of the investigation are documented in the syno] sis to 01 Report No. 2-97-011. issued on February 9. 1998.

The purpose of t1e inspection was to determine whether violations of NRC requirements occurred and to determine whether the licensee's corrective actions for a March 5.1997, improper weld repair were adequate to address the identified problems.

The improper weld repair was ident1fied by the 11u-nsee ir, Occurrence Report No. 1-97-071.

The inspection was co announced, special inspection conducted from March 23-25, 1998.

Maintenance A welder failed to document a deficiency and deviated from the work sequence by making a base material weld repair to a safety-related pipe without a properly authorized repair plan.

This failure resulted in a weld that was not in compliance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; however, the licensee's program detected an, _orrected the improper weld.

(Section M1.1)

I

.

.

REPORT DETAILS M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Review of Occurrence Reports (OR)

a.

Insoection Scope (62700)

This inspection was conducted to follow up on the findings and conclusions from an NRC Office of Investigations (01) report. No. 2-97-011. which was completed on February 9. 1998. OI substantiated that a contract employee intentionally made c safety-related weld repair without obtaining a weld repair procedure in 1997.

Weld repairs under similar circumstances were identified in 1993.

This inspection also included a review of th9 W ensee's Occurrence Report (OR) No. 1-97-071.

which documented this issue, licensee procedures, examination of quality records, and discussions with licensee and contractor personnel.

The purpose of the review was to determine whether the actions were in violation of NRC requirements for repairing welds and whether the licensee's actions in response to the issue were adequate to prevent recurrence.

b.

Observations and Findinas On March 5.1997, while welding weld No.1F of Work Order (WO) 11405, a safety-related socket weld, in the service water system. a welder burned a hole in a pipe adjacent to the weld creating a welding deficiency.

Subsequent h, the welder failed to document this deficiency contrary to Procedurc FNP-0-AP-52. " EQUIPMENT STATUS CONTROL AND MAINTENANCE AUTH0R EATION". General Revision 24. dated November 20.

1995 paragraph 13.2 which states in Jart that "...any deficiencies found while performing the task will 3e documented..."

The welder then deviated from the work sequence scope of WO 11405 (which did not include authorization to perform repair welding of base materials) by making a base material weld repair to the pipe without a completed repair plan.

This action was contrary to Procedure FNP-0-AP-52, paragraph 9.2. which l

states in part that "The individual performing the work shall follow the work sequence specified in the WO". and contrary to Procedure

!

FNP-0-M-23. "SPECIAL PROCESSES MANUAL". Section FNP-0-SPP-GW-001, Revision 17. dated December 19, 1995, paragraph 8.1 which states in part that "A repair plan shall be completed prior to the start of the

-

repair.."

The inspector confirmed that. as documented in the licensee's OR 1-97-071, the licensee identified this weld defect and unauthorized repair l

during a planned ins)ection of welds.

The licensee determined that the l

welder burned throug1 the pipe and did not stop and obtain an authorized repair procedure.

Instead, the individual welded over the defect without a repair procedure.

-

A

-

.

.

f

1 The licensee's corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence included the following:

'

Replaced the pipe section that contained the unauthorized base

.

material repair, to the burn-through.

,

Disciplinary action for individual involved.

!

Trained the contractor welder / fitters in lessons learned from this

.

!

occurrence, emphasizing the importance of procedural compliance.

Reviewed all welds made by the welder for other improper repairs.

10 CFR 50. Appendix B. Criteria V and IX and the licensee's Operations Quality Assurance Program. UFSAR 17.2.5 and 17.2.9. collectively require l

'

that activities affecting quality, such as welding. be accomplished in accordance with documented procedures.

The welder's willful actions placed the licensee in violation of these criteria and the applicabh procedures. The inspector determined that the licensee had taken timely and effective corrective actions, conducted an appropriate survey and determined the extent of the noncompliance, and took appropriate actions to correct and prevent a recurrence of similar circumstances.

Although the violation was willful, it was identified by the licensee, it involved the isolated acts of a low-level employee and it was addressed by appropriate remedial actions.

Therefore, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this licensee-identified violation is identified as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-348.364/

98-09-01: " Unauthorized Base Metal Repair" These actions also resulted in the weld not being in compliance with the applicable code for Weld No.1F on Work Order 11405. American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code Section III. 1971 Edition. Summer 1971 Addenda. (71S71). Paragraph Nos.

ND-4120. ND-4130. ND-2500. ND-2559 ND-2539.1 and ND-2539.4.

For defects in base materials, the ASME B&PV Code requires the removal of those defects or reduction of those defects to an acceptable size verified by nondestructive examination, leaving a cavity suitable for welding.

This cavity is required to be repaired (filled) by welding to restore minimum wall thickness.

The resulting weld repair is required to be surface examined by liquid penetrant examination and volumetrically examined by radiography.

None of these actions were accomplished during the unauthorized weld repair.

Subsequent to the licensee's identification of the unauthorized weld repair, the licensee corrected the problems associated with the weld not meeting the code and not being adequately examined by replacing the pipe l

section and welds were appropriately examined.

i l

!

-

-

-

--

---

{

.

-

.

l

-

c.

Conclusion A welder's willful failure to follow licensee procedures to document a deficiency and subsequent deviation from the work sequence by making a base material weld repair to the Jipe without a properly authorized repair plan. resulted in a weld tlat was not in compliance with the ASME

.

B&PV Code. The licensee identified this, corrected the weld, and took l

'

actions to correct the root causes.

X1 Exit Meeting Summary Mr. Paul Fredrickson Chief. Maintenance Branch, presented the inspection results to members of licensee management during a telephone conference of April 17. 1998.

The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

On March 25, 1998, the inspector also discussed the findings with the licensee and asked the licerze whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.

No proprietary information was identified.

INSPECTION PROCEPURES USED IP 62700:

Maintenance Implementation ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED TYDe Item Number Description and Reference Onened/ Closed NCV 50-348.364/98-09-01 Unauthorized Base Metal Repair PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee

  • R. Badham SAER Supervisor
  • J. Brantley. PMMS Supervisor
  • K. Dyar Security Manager
  • J. Fitzgerald. Maintenance - Team Leader
  • R. Fredrico. Sr. Engineer - Engineering Support Performance Review
  • R. Fucich. Engineering Support Manager
  • D. Grissette. Operations Manager
    • *R. Hill. FNP General Manager

.

  • C. Letchman. PMMS Weld Engineer
  • R. fiartin. Maintenance Team Leader
    • *C. Nesbitt Assistant General Manager - Support

.

  • C. Schaule. Security - NSOS
    • *B. Yance. Plant Modifications and Maintenance Support Manager

.

    • L. Stinson. Assistant General Manager - Operations

- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _. -.

.

,

.

Williams Power L.

Kinney. Site Manager NRC

  • J. Bartley, Sr. Resident Inspector (Acting)
  • R. Caldwell, Resident Inspector
    • P. Fredrickson. Chief, Maintenance Branch
    • T. Ross, Sr. Resident inspector
  • Attended onsite exit interview March 25. 1998
    • Participated in telephonic exit interview on. April 17, 1998 l

{

,

_

__

_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _

_ - - _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ - - -_---_ _ -

.

.

.

.

SYN 0PSIS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II, Office of Investigations initiated this investigation on May 12, 1997, to determine if a contract

,

employee intentionally failed to obtain a welding repair procedure while l

working at the Southern Nuclear Operating Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.

l The evidence developed during this investigation substantiated that the I

contract employee intentionally made safety related weld repairs without obtaining weld repair procedures in 1993 and 1997.

NOT IOR PUOLIC CISCLOSURE WIT"OUT APPR0t'AL Or ENCIINRE 2 JIELO OIIICE DIRECTOR. 0FEICE Or ink' ESTIMATIONS, REGION II I NVM b Case No. 2 97 011

est m My /1, Mft

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