ML20071M358

Midland Independent Design & Const Verification Program Monthly Status Rept 1, Covering Period from Project Inception Through 830527

ML20071M358
Person / Time
Site:	Midland
Issue date:	05/27/1983
From:	Levin H, Tulodieski D TERA CORP.
To:
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ML20071M345	List: ML20071M342 ML20071M358
References
NUDOCS 8305310203
Download: ML20071M358 (62)

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MIDLAto INDEPENDENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION PROGRAM MONTiiY STATUS REPORT NUMBERI PERIOD INCEPTION THROUGH MAY 27,1983 Prepared by: .~ /f4v

$ oh h as waA Reviewed by: w,w / .:

f t ,i Project Manager Approved by: /d.

Prinhal-in-charge 8305310203 830527 PDR ADOCK 05000329 R PDR

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MIDLAND INDEPENDENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION PROGRAM (IDCV)

MONTH _Y STATUS REPORT NUMBER I PERIOD INCEPTION THROUGH MAY 27,1983 1.0 Introduction and Purpose Monthly Status Reports have been instituted by agreement between the Consumers Power Company (CPC), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and TERA to provide parties e'xternal to TERA's IDCV project team with up-to-date informction relative to program progress and any important issues identified during the reporting period. This initial report covers the period from project inception through May 27, 1983. A description of the scope, reporting periods and report iscoance dates for Monthly Status Reports, as well as a summcry of the background of the IDCV program are presented in this initial report. Subsequent reports will include only those items discussed in section 3.0.

2.0 Midland IDCV Program Background The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a letter on July 9,1982 which requested that Consumers Power Company (CPC) provide for on independent assessment of the design adequacy of the Midland plant. CPC responded to this request on October 5,1982 by submitting on outline of the scope of a proposed independent review program. A public meeting was held on October 25,1982 at the NRC's Bethesda, Maryland offices to discuss details of the proposed program, the scope of which included on evaluation of the Midland Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system. During this meeting, the NRC requested that the scope of the independent design assessment program be expanded, including on assessment of the quality of construction. The NRC requested that CPC identify three condidate systems for scope expansion based upon their contribution to plant risk, from which one system would be selected.

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CPC responded to NRC by a letter dated December 3,1982 which identified the Standby Electric Power system (diesel generator), Safeguards Chilled Water system and Containment Isolation system as candidate systems. A public meeting was held on February 8,1983 at Midland, Michigan to discuss details of the program related to the evaluation of the AFW system and to provide status.

On March 22, 1983 the NRC selected the Standby Electric Power system and the Control Room HVAC system for scope expansion. Proposed elements of the scope of evaluation for these systems os well as the AFW system were discussed l of another public meeting held on April 13,1983 of the NRC's Bethesda, Maryland i offices.

TERA Corporation has been selected by CPC to scope, manage, and implement the Midland Independent Design and Construction Verification (IDCV) Program.

By a letter dated May 3,1983, the NRC approved the selection of TERA. The selection is based upon the firm's technical qualifications, experience, and independence from the Midland project. Such independence includes all individuals who may contribute to the IDCV Program.

The Engineering Program Plan (EPP), Revision 2, dated May 18, 1983, has been established to outline the scope, philosophy of review, met'hodology, independence requirements, organization, control, documentation, reporting, and quality assurance requirements for the Midland IDCV Program. The Project Quality Assurance Plan (PGAP), Revision 3, dated May 18, 1983, has been established to define the documented, auditable, control measures necessary to ensure the quality of services provided by TERA.

3.0 Scope The following items are included in Monthly Status Reports:

e IDCV Program Status Summary e Tracking System Summary for Open, Confirmed and Resolved (OCR) Item Reports, Finding Reports and Finding Resolution Reports 2 .

e Current Confirmed item Reports, Finding Reports and Finding Resolution Reports e Financial Status Report (CPC only) 4.0 Reporting Period and issuance Dates The reporting period shall generally be on a calendar month basis with issuance of the corresponding Monthly Status Report around mid-month of the month following the end of the reporting period. The reporting period for this initial Monthly Status Report is from project inception through May 27, 1983, the date of this report. The second Monthly Status Report will be issued in mid-July, covering the period from May 27,1983 through June 30,1983.

5.0 IDCV Program Status Summary S.I Programmatic Activities Attachment I provides the chronology for major project nellestones during the reporting period. This chronology will be maintained up- aate and included in future reports.

Several milestones warrant special highlight. On March 22, 1983, the NRC selected the Standby Electric Power (SEP) system and the Control Room HVAC (CR-HVAC) system for inclusion within the IDCV program scope. This selection along with the previously identified Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system completes the scope identification process for the IDCV program. A public meeting was held on April 13, 1983 to discuss details of TERA's AFW system review and conceptual plans for the.SEP system and CR-HVAC system reviews.

Comments were assimulated from CPC, NRC and interested members of the public. TERA responded to this direction by further development of the existing program to ' incorporate the revised scope. On May 18,1983, TERA issued Revision 2 of the Engineering Program Plan and Revision 3 of the Project Quality Assurance Plan, reflecting the full scope of the IDCV program.

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During the period of March-April, TERA transmitted information to the NRC relative to corporate and individual independence and professional qualifications.

The NRC reviewed this information and on May 3,1983 documented their formal acceptance of TERA to conduct the IDCV program and acceptance of the scope of the AFW system review. The NRC is currently reviewing TERA's proposed scope of review for the SEP system and CR-HVAC system as defined in Revision 2 of the Engineering Program Plan.

5.2 Design Verification Activities 5.2.1 Introduction and Background Independent Design Verification (IDV) review activities during the reporting period of this status report focused upon the development and establishment of resources, programs, and organizational interfaces necessary to execute the IDV review methodology and making substantial progress in the IDV review for the AFW system. The methodology, as described in the IDCV Engineering Program Plan, strives to establish a consistent set of review activities applicable to systems, components, structures, and materials subject to IDV review. These review activities have been categorized into five areas as follows:

e Review of Design Criteria and Commitments e Review of Implementing Documents l e Check of Calculations or Evaluations e Confirmatory Calculation or Evaluation e Check of Drawings and Specifications l

The intent of this portion of the status report is to present and summarize important IDV octivities undertaken during the reporting period relative to review progress made in the above five categories for each of the 45 design topics within the scope of the AFW system review. Future reports will be limited to significant activities on topics which have been completed during the month or on which substantial progress has been made.

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The programatic development was completed for the Standby Electric Power (SEP) system and the Control Room HVAC (CR-HVAC) system during the reporting period. Preliminary review activities were also initiated and will be reported in the next Monthly Status Report, it is estimated that the AFW system IDV review is 60-75% complete relative to the initial scope defined in Revision 0 of the Engineering Program Plan. This estimate does not include any efforts required to resolve existing issues identified in section 6.0.

5.2.2 IDV Topic Summaries The IDV Topics and summaries of the scope for the AFW system are presented in section 3.1.3 of Revision 2 of the Engineering Program Plan. The corresponding Initial Sample Review Matrices are presented in Figure I for convenience. The

.following sections provide a topic-by-topic summary of progress:

1.1- 1 SYSTEM OPERATING LIMITS Applicable operating limits for various components of the AFW system have been extracted from documents such as the FSAR and the Babcock and Wilcox (B&W)

Balance-of-Plant Criteria Document. The review includes a check for completeness of specified parameters and bounding values and a check for consistency from document to document.

A check of appropriate calculations and evaluations is being conducted to verify that the specified limits are either capable of being met or are used correctly as input to assure proper system or component operation.

The limits identified in this review are being utilized in the review of other topics related specifically to component operability.

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INITIAL SAMPLE REVIEW MATRIX FOR THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM I

MIDLAND INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM

[ SCOPE OF REVIEW i L  ! !

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AFW SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS l.1-1 SYSTEM OPERATING LIMITS X X X l.2-1 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS X e 1.3-1 SINGLE FAILURE X X X e 1.4-1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS X X l.5-1 SYSTEM ALIGNMENT /SWITCHOVER X X l.6-1 REMOTE OPERATION AND SHUTDOWN X l.7-1 SYSTEM ISOLATION / INTERLOCKS X X l.S 1 OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION X e *

• l.91 COMPONENT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS X X X X l.10-1 SYSTEM HYDRAULIC DESIGN X X X e 1.11 1 SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY X X X e 1.12-1 COOLING REQUIREMENTS X 1.13-1 WATER SUPPLIES X X I,l4 l PRESERVICE TESTING / CAPABILITY FOR OPERATIONAL TESTING X e e 1.15-l PC.'t!ER SUPPLIES X X e 1.16-1 ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS X e e 1.17-l PROTECTIVE DEVICES / SETTINGS X X X l.18-1 INSTRUMENTATION X X X X I.19-1 CONTROL SYSTEMS X X X e 1.20-1 ACTUATION SYSTEMS X e 1.21-1 NDE COMMITMENTS X e e 1.22 1 MATERIALS SELECTION X X l.23-1 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS * *

• KEY NOTE X -INITIAL SCOPE OF REVIEW

l. INITIAL SAMPLE DOCUMENTED IN REV. O AND l h- DELETED SCOPE OF REVIEW OF THIS PLAN HAS BEEN MODIFIED EFFECTIVE 4/13/83

• - ADDED SCOPE OF REVIEW FIGURE I

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- INITIAL SAMPLE REVIEW MATRIX FOR THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM-2

. ' MIDLAND INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM (CONTINUED)I q

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, AFW SYSTEM PROTECTION FEATURES

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s II.1-1 SEISMIC DESIGN X e PRESSURE BC-UNDARY X X X X X

11. 2 - 1

11. 3 - I e PIPE /EQUlPMENT SUPPORT X X X X; X

11. 4 - I e EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION X X -X X

11. 5 - 1 HIGH ENERGY LINE EREAK ACCIDENTS X #

11. 6 - 1 e PIPE WHIP X X X X

11. 7 1 e JET IMPlNGEMENT X

11. 8 1 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION X lt( .

li.9 1 d.10-1 a x ENVIRONMENTAL ENVELOPES e EQUIPMENIUUALIFICATION X

X X

X X

X X X X , ;{(:..

i 11. 1 1 - 1 e HVAC DESIGN y X ..,

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FIRE PROTECTION X X X k.. 11. 1 2 - 1

11. 1 3 - 1 MISSI: E PROTECTION X }

• ll.I'4-1 SYSTEMS INTERACTION X X X

,s. _y l'

l STRUCTURES THAT HOUSE THE AFW SYSTEM t

111.1 1 SEISMIC DESIGN / INPUT TO EQUIPMENT X X X X lil.2-1 WIND & TORNADO DESIGN / MISSILE PROTECTION X 111. 3 - 1 FLOOD PROTECTION X 111. 4 - 1 MELBA LOADS X 111. 5 - 1 CIVIL / STRUCTURAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS X -l 111. 6 - 1 e FOUNDATIONS X X X 111. 7 - l e CONCRETt/ STEEL DESIGN X X X X

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111. 8 - 1 e TA.*5 @ @ @

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's ~J NOTE lt'- - KEY '

X-lNITIAL SCOPE OF REVIEW s

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l. INITIAL SAMPLE DOCUMENTED N REV. O AND l OF THIS PLAN HAS BEEN MODIFl*D EFFECTIVE

, h DELETED SCOPE OF REVIEW 4/l /83 e . ADDED SCOPE OF REVIEW clGUREI

1.2-1 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS The FSAR has been reviewed to determine those events for which the AFW system would be expected to play a role either in mitigation or recovery. The system was also reviewed to determine if there were any plausible means by which it could cause on accident or exacerbate an existing accident.

A meeting was held with Babcock and Wilcox to gather information related to the design requirements for the auxiliary feedwater system. Further review of CPC/Bechtel actions in response to the B&W-developed Anticipated Transient Operation Guidelines document has been deemed necessary and will be accom-plished.

The review scope also was expanded somewhat to review calculations regarding the required system heat removal capability under accident conditions. This subject is being considered further under Topic 1.11-1, System Heat Removal Capability.

l.3-1 SINGLE FAILURE Applicable criteria have been extracted from the FSAR, NRC Regulat' ions, and the B&W Balance-of-Plant Criteria document. Applicable documents such as piping cnd instrumentation diagrams and electrical -schematics have been reviewed to determine whether the system can meet these criteria.

p it has been determined that two complementary actions are necessary to verify the design relative to the capability of the AFW system to withstand a single failure. First, a confirmatory evaluation of the system is being conducted to verify the design from a single-failure-proof standpoint, especially regarding power supplies. This effort will concentrate mainly on the portions of the system comprising the pumps' suction and the steam discharge to the steam-driven turbine.

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Concurrently, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis will be performed, as documented under Topic 1.23-1.

l .4-I TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The draft Midland Technical Specifications contained in the FSAR have been reviewed as they relate to the AFW system. The finalization of these specifications is on-going as well as the NRC's review. TERA is monitoring this process and when complete, the IDCV review will verify that the specifications t

are complete, consistent with NRC Standard Technical Specifications, and reflect commitments made in the FSAR.

1 1.5-1 SYSTEM ALIGNMENT /SWITCHOVER Applicable criteria have been drawn from such sources as the NRC Regulations, FSAR, B&W Balance-of-Plant Criteria document and the NRC Standard Review Plan and appli chte Branch Technical Position.

The pertinent Piping and Instrumentation Diagram was reviewed to ascertain whether the criteria had been implemented. In addition, a CPC letter regarding specific switchover design capabilities, and the process by which they were derived, was reviewed. Finally, available procedures were reviewed to deter-mine what guidance will be available to operators regarding alignment and l

switchover. These procedures are in draft form; further review will be undertaken later in the IDCV process.

The switchover of AFW control from the main control room to the auxiliary shutdown panel is under review as part of the control systems topic and also will be covered as part of the fire protection review.

l.6-1 REMOTE OPERATION AND SHUTDOWN Applicable criteria are included in the NRC Regulations, the FSAR, and the B&W Balance-of-Plant Criteria document. These criteria have been reviewed to 7

i determine their completeness and consistency. Results of the review also included several systems capabilities requiring further review under other topics.

For example, the capability to control the system and shut down the plant from the auxiliary shutdown panel, and the regulatory guidance for manual actuation and control,'are under review as part of the applicable electrical, instrumenta-tion and control topics.

l.7-1 SYSTEM ISOLATION / INTERLOCKS Criteria for this topic are contained in the NRC Regulations, the FSAR, the

, B&W Balance-of-Plant Criteria document, and the NRC Standard Review Plan.

The applicable piping and instrumentation diagram was reviewed to determine whether the criteria had been implemented into the design.

Further review is being devoted to specific aspects of the design process, including a Design Change Approval Request relating to AFW pump low suction j pressure trips.

4 I.8-1 OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION The criteria for this topic review were drawn from the FSAR and applicable codes and standards, independent confirmatory calculations were performed for selected sections of piping to determine whether overpressure protection devices were needed. Attention was given to resolution of Management Corrective Action Report 6S and its related updates and submittals to the NRC. These deal l

with a potential AFW system suction piping overpressure problem discovered at on operating plant and applicable to the Midland design. The IDCV team will continue to follow the corrective action taken.

Site-requested changes to piping design pressure ratings are under review. This is an active review topic.

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I.9-1 COMPONENT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS The component functional requirements review is progressing in parallel with reviews in several other topics as AFW system design criteria are translated into corresponding component specifications for parameters such as flow rates, allowable pressure drops, NPSH, voltage, device settings and similar characteristics. The review has also included IDV confirmation of functional requirement parameters. For example, the functional requirements for the AFW pumps are being independently confirmed as confirmatory calculations related to the topic reviews of System Hydraulic Design and System Heat Removal are completed. Reviews of test data are also in progress to confirm that specific components con meet their specified functional requirements. The components shown in Table I have been initially selected for this review. Because of its dependency on many topic reviews, this topic will be among the last to be completed.

1.10-1 SYSTEM HYDRAULIC DESI.GN Significant progress has been made in the System Hydraulic Desian review area.

The ide.ntification of design criteria and confirmatory calculations which are part of this review are essentially complete. Several Bechtel calculations have received preliminary reviews to date. Completion of the reviews of these calculations and selection of those calculations to complete the sample is currently in progress. An initial identification of implementing documents to be reviewed has been made.

1.11-1 SYSTEM HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY Progress in the System Heat Removal Capability review area parallels that of the System Hydraulic Design review area. Identification of design criteria and development of confirmatory calculations is essentially complete. A B&W calculation concerning heat removal requirements has been reviewed. An initial identification of implementing documents to be reviewed has been made.

1.12-1 COOLING REQUIREMENTS The criteria for cooling requirements have been identified and reviewed. This review has provided input to the selection of calculations and other documents to 9

TABLE i .'

MIDLAND IDCV SUPPLIER DOCUMENTATICM REVIEW -

March 8,1983 Item Component ID Gen Fnct Mot No. Type ID No. P.O. No. Cmpi Dwgs Reqs EO SORT OA Props Misc Comments

1. Pump 2P-005A M- 14 X X X X X X X

2. Motor 2P-005A M-14 X X X X X X X

3. Pump 2P-005B M- 14 X X X X X X X

4. Turbine 2G-005B M- 14 X X X X X X

5. Valve 2LV-3975AIV J-255 X X X X X X X X

6. Operator 2LV-3975Al J-255 X X X X X X

7. Valve 2MO-3965AV M-I I7 X X X X X X X

8. Operator 2MO-3965A M-I l 7 X X X X X

9. Valve 2MO-3993A2V M-398 X X X

10. Operator 2MO-3993A2 M-398 X X X lI. Valve 2XV-3989 M-l I 8 X X X

12. Operator 2XV-3989Al M-I l 8 X X

13. Valve 25V-3969A J-256 X X X X X X l4. Valve 2MO-3226V M-l I 7 X X X

15. Operator 2MO-3226 M-l 17 X X X

16. Valve 2MO-3277AV M-I l7 X X X X X

17. Operator 2MO-3277A M-I l 7 X X X X

18. Heat-X 2E-105A M-14 X X X DL-83-024-1

TABLE I (CONTINUED) .'

Component ID Weld item Gen Fnct NDE Mot No. Type ID No. P.O. No. Cmpl Dwgs Regs EQ SORT OA Props Misc Comments

19. Panel 2C-l 14 J-202 X X X

20. MCC 2BP-03 E-45 X X X X 21.. SwGear 2A-05 E-205 X X X X X

22. Cable E-26A X X X X 600V

23. Transmitter 2PT39000BI J-245 X X X

24. Transmitter 2FT3969A J-245 X X X X

25. Transmitter 2FT3975AB J-245 X X X X

26. Transmitter 2LT3298 J-245 X X

27. Transmitter 2LT3975AA2 J-245 X X X X X X

28. Indicator 2LIK3975AA2 J-204 X X

29. Switch 2ZS3975Al J-255X X X X X X

30. Cable E-60 X X X Instru.

31. Air Cooler 2VM-54A M-149 X X X X X

32. Elec. Penet. E-20A X

33. Piping X X X l

34. Pipe supports X X X

35. Cable Troy X X

36. Troy Supports X X

37. Conduit X l DL-83-024-1

i TABLE I (CONTINUED) .

Component ID Weld item Gen Fnct NDE Mot No. Type ID No. P.O. No. Cmpi Dwgs Regs EO SGRT GA Props Misc Comments 1

! 38. Conduit Supports X X l 39. Instru. Piping X

-l 40. HVAC Ducts (later) j 41. HVAC Supports (later)

42. Rebar X

43. Str. Steel X X

44. Inserts X X i

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DL-83-024-1

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. be reviewed in the Equipment Qualification and Component Functional Require-1 ments review areas.

t 1.13-1 WATER SUPPLIES The criteria for the AFW water supplies have been identified and reviewed. This review has provided input to the selection of calculations and other documents to be reviewed in the System Hydraulic Design and Component Functional Require-ments review areas. For example, the criteria for switchover from condensate T storage to service water have been used as an input to reviewing calculations in the System Hydraulic Design area. Implementing documents for review of the l Water Supply area have been identified.

l 1.14-1 PRESERVICE TESTING / CAPABILITY FOR OPERATICNAL TESTING Criterio for the review of preservice testing requirements and operational

, test *ng capability are being identified in conjunction with other review areas,

including the Technica! Specification Review Area. The scope of review in this area has been expended to include a review of implementing documents and engineering evaluations supporting test programs. This will serve as input to the ICV' review. This expansion is bcsed upon the desire to further verify system conformance with design criteria and commitments through an evaluation of tests that serve to establish the odequacy of the design and the capability of the system to function as planned.

I.15-1 POWER SUPPLIES The applicable design criteria for AFW power supplies have been identified from NSSS vendor, regulatory and industry requirements. The Midland FSAR is the primary implementing document design which has been checked to verify the proper consideration of the design criteria determined from the criteria review.

The AFW system logic and schematic diagrams have been reviewed to ensure that requirements relative to the quality of power supplies (diversity and redundancy) are met. in particular the review included the assurance that th'e

AFW system is operable in the event of loss of offsite power and station blockout.

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l.16-1 ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS Design criteria relevant to the electrical characteristics of cable physical separation, system electrical separation, cable and raceway sizing and terminal voltage on power circuits have been identified. The Midland FSAR sections implementing these criteria have been reviewed to verify that the criteria have been considered in the design process. Cable sizing calculations have been reviewed as applied to seven power circuits in the AFW system. The cable routing design process is being reviewed to ensure consideration of cable separation criterin in that process.

1.17-1 PROTECTIVE DEVICES / SETTINGS Design criteria relevant to this topic have been identified. The Midiand FSAR has been reviewed to msure shut the criteria t. ave been documented and that comrnitments have Laei rrado to meet the criteria. The schernutic diagrams for ,

all motor-operated valves in the Ai W system hava teen reviewed to ensure incorporation of thermal overicad and opening torque swtich bypass features.

The AFW pump motor scher,ictic M being 'eviewed ogainst The comrnitted design criteria. The evaluation of the electricol penetrution casembly protection ,

scheme are under review to ensure compliance with design criteria.

1.18-1 INSTRUMENTATION The instrumentation and alarms required to operate, monitor and protect the l AFW system, as determined by design criteria, commitments and expected plant operations, have been reviewed against those specified for the AFW system to l verify the adequacy of the instrumentation. Selected instrument accuracies under applicable plant operating conditions have been reviewed and evaluated.

Instrument loop diagrams for steam generator water level indication have been reviewed for proper circuit electrical design. The calculation for steam generator low water level setpoint has been reviewed for compliance with design criteria. Major instrument package procurement specifications have been j reviewed to verify that the design criteria have been considered in the purchase of the instrument hardware.

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i 1.19-1 CONTROL SYSTEMS Design criteria and commitmants governing the steam generator water level and AFW turbine control systems have been checked to verify the inclusion of

] necessary regulatory, industry, and system performance requirements. The Midland FSAR has been reviewed to verify that the necessary requirements were used as input to the control system design. An evaluation of control system chorocteristics such as time response, component characteristics, and separation from actuation systems has been performed. A very limited FMEA review has been made (See Topic 1.23-1, Failure Mode and Effects). Control system circuitry design (voltages, currents, polarity) has been reviewed to verify that selected components will function as intended in the steam generator water level control system. The circuitry design review has included instrument loop diagrams, logic diagrams, and Scive and motor schematic diegrcms. .

l 1.20-1 ACTUATION SYSTEMS The cuxiliary feedwater actuation system (AFWAS - which includes FOGG, " Feed Only Good Ger.eratc,r") design criteria ar.d commitments have been reviewed to verify the proper consideration of regulatory requirements, industry codes and standards, and plant operational requirements. AFW system logic diag ~ roms and

! schematic diagrams for all motor operated valves and the AFW pump motor have been reviewed against the design commitments. In addition, the AFWAS procurement specification is being reviewed against the design criteria and commitments.

I.21-1 NDE COMMITMENTS Design criteria, commitments and implementing documents related to nondestructive examination have been identified and are under review against i applicable industry codes and standards. A detailed checklist has been developed to assist in this activity. As commitments and proper translation into l

specifications and field procedures are verified, this input is being factored directly into the ICV review process to verify that these have been properly 12 .

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implemented. The review of implementing documents and specifications was added to the scope of the IDV to support the expanded NDE/Moterial Testing program documented in section 5.3.1 of this report.

l.22-1 MATERIAL SELECTION This topic will be initiated in June,1983 and will be reported upon in future status reports.

l.23-1 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS This topic has been added to the scoce of the IDV to verify conclusions reached about system and component failure modes end effects under various operating conditions.

The topic review will be initiated by continu na whme the FSAR evoluction i

ended. It is intended, at the present time, that emphasis will !.e placed on components of the electrical, instrumentatien and control systems. Criteria from other review areas will be consolidated as on initial step in prepcring the planned confirmatory evaluation.

11.1-1 SEISMIC DESIGN The seismic design chain, criteria and commitments applicable to the design of the Midland plant were identified and reviewed with particular emphasis on specific aspects of the criteria applicable to AFW componec 's and systems and structures that house these components and systems. In view of several major perturbations during the design process, a significant portion of time was devoted to the identification and understanding of the seismic design chronology for the plant. The knowledge gained from this activity was utilized to assist IDV reviewers in the selection of issues and methodologies on which to concentrate the review. The selection of specific structural elements / features, components and systems was also influenced by this activity.

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II.2-1 SEISMIC DESIGN - PRESSURE BOUNDARY 4

Progress on this topic has been made in two principal areas. A confirmatory seismic stress analysis is nearing completion for a portion (i.e. one piping problem) of AFW piping and supports on the "B" train inside the Unit 2 containment building. The line evaluated runs from the containment penetration to the first anchor which is approximately midway along the "B" train line on its paths from the containment penetration to the steam generator ring header for the AFW discharge. IDV analysts will soon be in the process of comparing the results of their analyses with Bechtel's analyses to independently confirm the adequacy of implementation of the design methodology and results. The comparison includes the contribution of seismic stress at critical locations, predicted support loads for all supports along the line and a design verification for representative support types. The mods! was developed by the IDV onclysts without prior benefit or knowledge of Bect.ie!'s methodo!ogy and in particular, specific modeling assun.ptions. The IDV cnulpts utilized tne dimensionot as-i built dcta that was indepenaently compiled through the ICV field verificction f program related to the program activity, Verification of Physical Configuraticn (see sections 5.3.8 and S.3.6 of this report). In a separate activity, IDV reviewers ,

identified and initiated a review of pertinent c.-iteria, implementing documents, calculations and specifications applicable to ASME Code considerations associated with the pressure boundary integrity of a portion of the AFW discharge piping located in the auxiliary building. Future activities will include a review of Bechtel's recent configuration changes associated with the AFW piping' and supports inside containment as well as a review of field engineering for small bore piping.

II.3-1 SE!SMIC DESIGN - PIPE / EQUIPMENT SUPPORT This topic closely parallels that of Topic 11.2-1 which is associated with pressure boundary integrity and ASME Code considerations. As discussed, piping supports are chosen for evaluation consistent with the selection of piping lines to permit an integrated evaluation of the seismic design capabilities of the total system.

Progress to date has been discussed for piping supports. The anchorage and 14 1

support for AFW equipment is under evaluation as part of Topic II.4-l. For components selected for evaluation under this topic (see Table 1), selected calculations, drawings and specifications are being checked to verify adequate seismic capability in accordance with seismic design criteria and commitments.

II.4-1 SEISMIC DESIGN - EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION In addition to a review of seismic equipment qualification design criteria and commitments and implementing documents, the principal progress on this topic has been to select a sample of components for review (see Table 1) and to acquire existing SQRT qualification " packages" from Bechtel. Progress has been slowed because Bechtel's seismic equipment qualification process is in early stages ~ of completion. Complete SOP,T packages cre being reviewed along with the process for completing additional p<nkages.

l 11.5-1 HELB/ PIPE WHIP / JET iMPlNGEMENT (inc!uding 11.6-1 and 11.7 - l)

Criteria for this group of review area have been identified and preliminary reviews conducted, implementing documents, calculations, and drawings will be reviewed upon completion of the confirmatory calculation in the Seismic Design review area.

II.8-l ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION / ENVIRONMENTAL ENVEL-(Including OPES / EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION /HVAC DESIGN

11. 9 - 1 ,

11.1 0 - 1 &

11.11-1)

The criteria and commitments for this group of review areas have been identified and reviewed. A sample of equipment for the review of calculations and evaluations, primarily associated with the Equipment Qualification Report, has been made as shown in Table 1. Reviews of the selected equipment qualification packages have been initiated. A confirmatory calculation in the 15

O t environmental envelopes review area has been initiated. HVAC design criteria have been identified.

.. 11.1 2 - 1 FIRE PROTECTION Steps have been completed to organize the review of fire protection for the AFW system into subtopics. These topics are:

e Safe shutdown analyses e Associated circuits analyses e Fire hazards analyses e Remote shutdown transfer switches / isolation devices e Fire barriers e Cire d3tection systems e Suppression systems ,

e Emergency lign+ing FSAR ccmmitments, decementation of the fire pectection program, and CPC submittcis to *1RC taloted to a careparison to ICCFR50 Appendi,c R and to BTP CMEB 9.5-1 have been reviewed. Interactions with Bechtel personnel have taken place to identify and collect design documentation pertaining to tne AFW fire protection features, and to discuss fire protection program status and approaches in key areas. Detailed design and analysis information has been received.

Verifications and reviews were initiated for two of the eight fire protection subtopics, namely fire barriers and emergency lighting. It is expected that these two subtopics and the remaining six will be completed in the next reporting period.

II.13-1 MISSILE PROTECTION The review scope for the Missile Protection review area consists of a review of criteria and commitments. This review is currently in progress.

11. 1 4 - 1 SYSTEMS INTERACTION Criteria for this review are defined in the Bechtel/CPC program for determina-tion and resolution of potential systems interactions. This program was obtained for review af ter discussion with key Bechtel personnel involved in the program.

The program will be reviewed for completeness and consistency. System walkdowns in selected areas will be observed, and selected data sheets and recommendations will be reviewed.

111.1-1 SEISMIC DESIGN / INPUT TO EQUIPMENT in parallel with discussions and reviews associated with the seismic design chronology, substantial progress has been made relative to the understanding and review of moceling procedures and techniques utilized to generate in-structure ,

seismic input (e.g. floor respme spectra). This octivity hos taken mcre effort than anticipated to identify the complex history associated with the ceismic design cf.ain and verify that the vcriot s perturbaiions were adequately handled by the project designers and analysts. Particular attention has been focused on <

the acquisition and review of information re!cted to the effects of floo-flexibility on predicted floor response spectra. Emphasis is beir:g placed on the proper specification, use, and transfer of floor response spectra between interfacing groups both internal and external to Bechtel.

111. 2 -1 WIND AND TORNADO / MISSILE PROTECTION 111. 3 - 1 FLOOR PROTECTION 111. 4 - 1 HELBA LOADS The criteria and commitments associated with these topics h- e been identified and the review commenced. Progress will be reported in future eports.

111. 5 - 1 CIVIL-STRUCTURAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS Progress has been made on this topic in two principal areas. First efforts to identify design criteria such as that incorporated within Bechtel's 17 .

Civil / Structural Design Criteria document and the FSAR have been completed and the review is continuing. Secondly, efforts are continsing in a review of project experience within the civil / structural discipline to identify important issues that have surfaced during the project, review how these have been resolved and verify that these do not exist in the same or similar form elsewhere.

111. 6 -1 FOUNDATIONS The concentration of this topic is on structural aspects of foundation design verses soil mechanics aspects. Accordingly, a portion of the auxiliary building foundation has been selected for detailed structural review. Efforts to date have focused on en identification of fouadation design criteria, a review of project experience to understond the design chrcnology and important Icading conditions ,

and the collection of pertinent ecleulations. The detailed :.trucii.rol review is Jost i>eiag initiated and will be reported upon in future reports.

Ill.7-1 CONCRETE / STEEL DESIGN Specific structural elements (e.g. shear walls, floor diaphrom) have been selected for detailed review and evaluation. Emphasis is being placed upon on evaluation of the project's capability to transfer loading information both internally and externally from one organization (e.g. analytical groups) to another (e.g. design groups) and on the proper identification and interpretation of this information, input from other IDV topics is important relative to information gained in the review of the various loading conditions that offect structural elements. The specific use and implementation of this information is being verified through a review of design calculations. These calculations are being reviewed to verify the design organization's capability to properly size and c'etail concrete and steel structural elements.

18

5.3 Construction Verification Activities 5.3.1 Introduction and Background independent Construction Verification (ICV) review acitvities during the report-ing period of this status report focused upon the development and establishment of resources, programs, and organizational interfaces necessary to execute the ICV review methodology and initiation of the ICV review. The methodology, as described in the IDCV Engineering Program Plan, strives to establish a consistent set of review activities applicable to systems, components, structures, and materials subject to ICV review. These review activities have been categorized into five areas as follows: -

o Review of Supplier Documentation e Review of Storage and Maintenanca Documentation ,

e Review of Construction / Installation Documentation e Review of Selected Verification Activities a Verification of Physical Configuration The intent of this portion of the states repo.-t is to present and summarize -

important ICV octivities undertaken during the reporting period and to categorize these activities using the above five review categories. Sections 5.3.2 through 5.3.6 address each of these review categories respectively. The ICV review categories and Topics for the AFW System are presented in section l 3.2.3 of Revision 2 of the Engineering Program Plan. The corresponding Initial Sample Review Matrix is presented in Figure 2 for convenience.

l Events external to the ICV review program have had significant impact on the program. Accordingly, the following discussion summarizes the background of events which have had on influence on where the ICV review is today and where it is to be directed in the future.

In a letter to the NRC dated October 5,1982, CPC outlined a proposed scope for the planned Midland independent design review program. In addition to a design 19 l

l

6 3 INITIAL SAMPLE REVIEW MATRIX FOR THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM I

MIDLAND INDEPENDENT CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION PROGRAM SCOPE OF REVIEW 8 8 85 $3 9 9i A

SYSTEM / COMPONENT 6

& b

% $ &$ d BR

• y &~gg & ~2658 2

/ &

1. N$ EN MY C*

4 F3 2 8

• 8 4 2 M2CHANICAL X X X X X 1.1-Ic e EQUIPMENT X X X X l.?-Ic ' e Pl?;NG X X X X l.3-le e PIPE SUPPORTS 1

ELECTRICAL X X X X X 11.1 e EGU:%?N1 ,

X *

• X ll:j ll.?-ic e $A*(5 AND SUPPORTS l X l *

• X ll.3-le e CONDUlT AND StFPORTS i X X X X X ll.4-lc e CABLE INSTRUMENTATlON AND CONTROL lil.l-lc e INSTRUMENTS X X X X X X X lli.2-Ic e PIPING / TUBING X *

• X lil.3-Ic e CABLE HVAC IV.1-Ic e EQUIPMENT X X X X X X X IV.2-Ic e DUCTS AND SUPPORTS STRUCTURAL V.1-Ic e FOUNDATIONS X X V.2-Ic e CONCRETE X X X V.3-Ic e STRUCTURAL STEEL X X X e

VI.1-le NDE/ MATERIAL TESTING PROGRAM KEY ,

NOTE X . INITlAL SCOPE OF REVIEW l. INITIAL SAMPLE DOCUMENTED IN REV. O AND I OF THIS PLAN HAS BEEN MODIFIED EFFECTIVE

@. DELETED SCOPE OF REVIEW 4/13/83

• - ADDED SCOPE OF REVIEW FIGURE 2

O a verification component, this program included a verification of physical configuration of selected structures and components for the AFW system. . A public meeting was held on October 25, 1982 at NRC's Bethesda, Maryland offices where the details of this program were discussed. The NRC indicated that they would like the proposed program to be expanded to include a review of an additional system with increased emphasis on the verification of the quality of construction including additional verification of physical configuration.

TERA responded to NRC and CPC direction by developing an expanded independent Construction Verification (ICV) program centered around the five previously discussed review categories. The scope of this revised program was documented in Revision 0 of the EPP dated November 29, 1982. Details of the ICV and IDV were discussed at public meetings held on February 8,1983 at Midland, Michigon and April 13,1983 at NRC's Bethesda, Maryland offices.

TERA's initial field verificction activities were initiated the week of November 29,1982 with a physical configurction verification of the AFW system piping and supports inside containment. !n early December 1982, CPC instituted their Constructin Completion Program (CCP). Under direction from NRC and CPC, TERA wcs asked to held certain portions (in particular, physical configuratinn verification) of the ICV review in abeyance pending resolution of critical interfnces with the CCP and other on-going construction related programs.

Accordingly, only reviews of supplier documentation, storage and maintenance documentation and selected verification activities proceeded.

( On March 22,1983, the NRC selected the Standby Electric Power system and the HVAC system assuring control room habitability as additional systems for IDCV review. Revision 2 of the EPP dated May 18, 1983 incorporates these systems into the scope of the ICV as well as the IDV.

During the April 13, 1983 public meeting, the NRC, CPC and TERA agreed that the scope of ICV activities within the prescribed sample selection boundaries could proceed irrespective of the stage of construction completion. This direction enables the ICV review to obtain better insight into the quality of:

i .

e Completed construction activities e On-going construction processes from the standpoint of how these will impact future completed construction products e Remedial and corrective actions taken in response to on-going construction review efforts such as the CCP At the current time, the ICV scope has been fully defined and the review process is gearing up to full speed, consistent with critical interfaces with on-going construction related programs.

The events described above have enabled the initiction of all planned ICV review octivities which are described below and in the following sections.

e The sample selection boundaries for the ICV review of the '

AFW system were firmly established and implemented into the ICV review program. Development of the AFW System samp!e selectico boundaries was performed through the joint efforts of IDV and ICV reviewers.

Additional, detailed discussions were undertaken by Lead IDV and ICV eenonnel to identify whbh components, structures, and materiel within the sample selection boundaries nu!d be subject to detoi'ed ICV review. The s21ection process employed the sornp;e selection criteric as defined in the _PP C and resulted in the designation of the items shown in Table I as being subject to initial ICV review.

e The ICV review activities associated with the AFW System were expanded in scope. The additional review activities and the reason these activities were factored into the ICV review program are as follows:

System / Component Scope of Review Added Reason (s)

- Electrical Cable - Review of Construc- - Project experience Trays & Supports tion / Installation - Monitor the outputs Conduit & Supports Documentation & of the on-going over I&C Cable Review of Selected inspection program Verification Activities for cable separation as directed by NRC

- NDE/ Material - Verification of - Project experience Testing Program Physical Configura- - NRC direction tion 21 .

e As a result of adding the NDE/ Material Testing Program as an integral part of the AFW system ICV review, Lead ICV personnel commenced the development of this pro-gram. Program execution will involve first the selection of the sample and sample size, selection of the specific components and material to be tested, determination of the type (s) of testing to be performed, testing, and evaluation and documentation of the test results. To assist in executing the NDE/ Material Testing Program, Lead ICV program personnel initiated the solicitation and review of proposals from material testing firms who have exhibited the capability to accomplish required testing in a professional, objective manner. Selection of a material testing firm has not been completed; review of proposals and identification of material testing firm capabilities continues. .

e Important interfaces between the Lead ICV program per-sonnel and reviewers and IDV personnel have been tested and utilized to ensure their effectiveness and efficacy.

Additionally, critical interfaces with site-construction personnel have evolved to the point where ICV reviewers can acquire needed information and are afforded the flexibility and latitude necessary to be effective in the ICV review program.

5.3.2 Review of Supplier Decumentation The overwhelming majority of resources expended in executing the nCV review activities has been devoted to defining the detailed steps of the Supplier Documentation Review and performing the review steps. These activities are of substantial importance to the remaining portions of the ICV review, because they establish the documented resource which is used as initial input to evaluating remaining construction activities. Additionally issues and trends determined as a result of performing the review of sepplier documentation have alerted, and will continue to alert, ICV reviewers to outputs in the construction process which require a greater degree of scrutiny. In eseence, the results of the review of supplier documentation establishes the reference for the effective continuance of the ICV review process.

During the period of this status report the following important activities have been undertaken as part of the review of supplier documentation.

22

1 a e i

e Detailed review matrices for components within the AFW system sample selection oundary were developed as a joint effort with IDV reviewers and serve to direct the l activities of the ICV reviewers performing the review of supplier documentation. The review of supplier documentation has been broken down into discrete review categories as follows:

General Completion -

Overall review of documentation to ensure that the supplier package is generally complete for Document Categories required by specification for the component.

Drawings - Review of supplier drawings for conformance to specification requirements for the component, subcomponent or part.

- Functional Requirements - Review of supplier documentation for conformance of major functional requirements to specifications, i - Environmental Qualification - Review of supplier l documentation for cor.formance to specification  ;

. requ:rements.

3eismic Quo lification - Review of supplier l documentation for conformance to specification ,

requirements.

- Welding, NDE, GA -

Review of supplier documantntion for conformance to specification requirements for the component, subcomponent or part.

- Material Properties - Review of supplier certified material property reports for conformance to j specification requirements for the component, l subcomponent or part.

t

- - Miscellaneous - Review of instruction manuals, 2

cleaning and coating procedures, storage and handling instructions and shipping procedures for i conformance to specification requirements for the component, subcomponent or part.

In proctice, an ICV or IDV reviewer is assigned one or more of these review categories for a specific component I, or group of components identified for ICV review.

l As of the writing of this report, the majority of the j octivities necessary to perform the following documenta-tion reviews for the AFW system have been completed:

1 i 23 i

l I >

- General Completion Drawings

- Functional Requirements Miscellaneous As a result of conducting the above reviews, approxi-mately 1,000 documents have been reviewed for applic-ability, catalogued, and categorized as to the type of document - i.e., drawing, welding procedure, seismic qualification report, etc.

The " Environmental" and " Seismic Qualification" reviews are tied closely to the IDV review process and have progressed to the stage of completion identified for selected components in the IDV review portion of this status report.

The " Welding, NDE, GA" documentation review has.

focused upon identifying the derivation of the require-ments, the completeness and consistency of the require-ments and the cataloguing of vendor-supplied documenta-tion which satisfies the requirements for weiding, NDE, and QA aspects of selected fabricated components.

Further, more detailed review of the vendor-supplied documentation has not been aggressively pursued pendir.g finalization of the degree of involvement of an outside material testing firm (see Section 5.3.1 of this status report)in the ICV review program.

The review necessary to verify the adequacy of Material Properties by reviewing certified material property reports has most recently been initiated and, as a result, not much progress has been made toward completing this review during the current reporting period.

e To ensure that a consistent method and set of data are used and collected during the review of supplier documen-tation, detailed checklists were prepared and imple-mented. The checklists, and associated implementing Project Instruction (PI-3201-007), direct the ICV reviewer to sources of information and direct the recording of required information onto a standardized form. As of the writing of this report, five checklists have been prepared and used to conduct the review of vendor supplied docu-mentation. The title and a brief description of each checklist used in this protion of the ICV review are as follows:

Documentation Verificction Form (DVF) 24

O i Checkoff lis - utilized to record those requirements imposed upon suppliers and vendors which define the specific documents to be submitted to fulfill and satsify procurement and specification requirements;

- Documentation Availability Checklist (DAC)

The DAC is used to document the process and sources of information used to complete the Documentation Verification Form and to provide a consistent, standard format for documenting the results of evaluating the completeness of vendor documentation submittals;

- Supplier Documentation Functional Review (SDFR)

Form The SDFR provides the format and directs the recording of data relevant to the following of specific categories of vendor-supplied documentation:

a) Instructions (operating, maintenance, etc.)

b) Cleoning & Coating Procedures c) Certified Material Repcrts d) Supplier Shipping Precedures; ,

- Supplier Documentation Adequa:y (SDA)

Verification Form This form is used in conjunction with the SDFR to evabate the adequacy of the vendor's documeatation submittal; and Time-Base Evoluotion (TBE) Form for Vender Documentation Submittals This form provides the format for establishing a method to evaluate the timeliness of certain vendor documenta-tion submittals associated with a specific component.

Vendor documentation submittals are compared on a time-base against two key events in the construction process:

a) Date component is received at the site b) Date component is withdrawn from storage for installation.

e Commencement of the supplier documentation review required a greater-than-anticipated scope of task initi-ation activities. These activities were necessary to develop on understanding of the following.

25 -

i 5

- Relationship of site vendor files to vendor files retained in Ann Arbor;

- Distinctions made between supplier documentation included as part of a QA data package and that documentation included as part of the vendor docu-ment control system; Location of different document control centers and their principal file holdings and scope of responsi-bilities;

- Information required to access needed documents and records; and

- Location and operation of systems utilized to index needed information.

e As of the writing of this report, activities undertaken with regard to supplier documentation reviews, have been focused upon the collection and assimilation of vendor-supplied informatior.. Current and nect term activities of the ICV reviewers are and will be directed toward a thorough evaluatior, and assessment of the significance of find ngs resulting from the review of supplier documenta-tico 5.3.3 Review of Storage and Maintenance Documentation This review is intended to ascertain the stored and as-installed condition of selecied components of the systems selected as part of the IDCV program.

Discrete activities which constitute this review include the following:

- Documentation Review and Observation of Receipt in-spections; Documentation Review and Observation of Warehouse Storage Practices;

- Documentation Review and Observation of In-place Main-tenance Practices; and Visual Inspection of Installed / Stored Components.

I t

I 26

The progress made to date in conducting this review has all been associated with the components selected in the AFW System. Activities undertaken to date include the following:

o Checklists have been prepared and implemented which direct the acquisition and recording of information and data which characterize the receipt inspection, storage and maintenance activities. Detailed Project Instructions (PI-3201-007) have been prepared which provide ICV reviewers with an explanation in the use of the following checklists:

- Receipt inspection Checklist; and

- Storage and Maintenance Checklist. -

e Data required by the checklists have been collected and completed for the components selected with the AFW System sample selection boundaries. The components selected f or this review are shown in Table !.

Current and near-term activities involve the evoluotion of the collected data cod an assessment and recording of the significance of any issues resulting from the evoluotion.

e ICV reviewers, in a joint effort with the IDV reviewers, prepared the review mctrices for the Control Room HVAC and Standby Electric Power Systems. The matrices require a review of storage and maintenance documenta-tion applicable to the following categories of components within the sample boundaries of the indicated systems.

Standby Electric Power System Mechanical Equipment Electrical Equipment and Cable

- Instruments and Instrument Cable Control Rcom HVAC System

- Mechanical Equipment Instruments

- HVAC Ducts & Supports Specific components within each of the above categories are currently being identified.

27

5.3.4 Review of Construction / Installation Documentation As of the writing of this report, no resources have been expended in performing the actual review of construction / installation documentation. Activities undertaken to date have been directed toward the selection of specific com-ponents within the AFW System sample selection boundaries which will be subject to this review.

5.3.5 Review of Selected Verification Activities During this reporting period ICV reviewers commenced the review of selected outputs from the cable separation and pipe support over-inspection program which relate directly to cables and pipe supports within the ICV review sample selection boundaries of the AFW System. These activities were conducted at the site and focused upon the collection of required documentation, including procedures and drawings, and the evaluation of the procedures to discern the methodology employed by the over-inspection programs. This evaluation is necessary to identify those outputs of the program which are most representative of the final products of the over-inspection process and therefore those products which should be subject to ICV review. Evaluation of selected outputs was initiated and continues. Near term activities relate to continued detailed evaluation of selected outputs from the program that relate to the AFW i system and the extension of these evaluations to include the Control Room HVAC and Standby Electric Power Systems.

5.3.6 Verification of Physical Configuration As a first end important review associated with the verification of the physical configuration of selected components within the sample selection boundaries of the AFW system, ICV reviewers conducted a review of selected AFW System pipe, hangers, and supports. This review involved not only the careful selection of those pipes, hangers and supports to ensure a comparative basis for other, similar reviews and extrapolation to similar items, but also extensive field verification and measurement.

28 .

t The review involved the field measurement of pipe, hangers, and supports of the "B" Auxiliary Feedwater train, inside the Midland Unit 2 containment building.

Subsequent to ocquisition of field measurements and verification of identity and orientction,'the collected data were compared against design documentation and

, documentation used as input to representative stress and seismic design calculations. The results of these efforts have been summarized into an engineering evaluation report which highlights the salient findings of the review and evaluation and documents the methodology utilized in conducting the physical conf!guration verification.

Near term activities relate to completing the review of issues crising from the physiccl configuration verification of selected AFW System pipe, hangers, and supports andIefecting similar samples assoc *ated with the Control Room HVAC and Standby Electric Power systems.

6.0 Summary of Open, Confirmed and Resolved (OCR) Item Reports, Finding Reports and Finding Resolution Reports

, Attachment 2 provides TERA's Tracking System Summary for Open, Confirmed and Resolved (OCR) Item Reports, Finding Reports and Finding Resolution Reports. This tool assists TERA in tracking the disposition of issues as they progress through the review process. Attachment 3 provides re-typed copies of all existing Confirmed item Reports. To date no items have progressed to the

! i9ndings stage of the reporting process which is documented in Project

=!nstruction PI-3201-008 and can be found as part of Appendix B of the Project Quality Assurance Plan.

A meeting will be held on June 3,1983 at Bechtel's Ann Arbor, Michigan offices to obtain additional information reitoive to the Confirmed items presented in Attachment 3.

29 1

ATTACHMENTI PROJECT CHRONOLOGY MIDLAto INDEPENDENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIF. CATION PROGRAM TERA PROJECT 3201 TFROUGH 5/27/83 y

Milestone -

a Date September 2,1982 TERA proposal to CPC for Midland independent Cesign Verification (IDV) Program September 20,1982 CPC letter of intent to use TERA for Midland IDV September 24,1982 TERA identification of IDV goals, objectives, system selection criteria, methodology, tasks, and schedule (outline presented to CPC on 9/28/82)

September 28,1982 Meeting of CPC, TERA, and MAC in Jackson to develop submittal to NRC addressing IDV and INPO evaluation programs. TERA selects con-didate system for IDV program September 30,1982 TERA submittal of corporate Quality Assurance Plan to CPC for their review and acceptance October 5,1982 CPC submittal of Midland independent Review /

Program to NRC October 12,1982 CPC approval of TERA corporate Quality Assurance Plan October 25,1982 Preseniation on Midland IDV and INPO pro-grams to NRC at NRC's Bethesda offices October 27,1982 TERA conceptual development of IDV program modifications to further address the quality of construction (telecopy to CPC)

October 28,1982 CPC decision to separate IDV and INPO evalu-ation programs I

ATTACHMENTI Date Milestone November 2,1982 Introductory meeting at the Midland site to initiate IDV and INPO programs November 3,1982 Midland site tour and walkdown of the AFW system November 4,1982 TERA project team meetings in Jackson to review Midland project experience (e.g., 50.55e reports, NRC inspection reports, etc.); identi-fication of information needs November 5,1982 Meeting of TERA, CPC and Bechtel manage-ment in Ann Arbor to discuss programmatic de-tails of the IDV program, logistics for TERA-Bechtel interaction on the IDV; review of Bechtel organization, interfaces, etc.; identi-fication of information needs November 11,1982 NRC issues meeting summary for October 25, 1982 meeting November 15,1982 TERA issues Revision 0 of the Midland in-dependent Design and Construction Verification (IDCV) Project Quality Assurance Plan November 23,1982 CPC approval of TERA Project Quality Assur-ance Plan November 29,1982 TERA issues draft Engineering Program Plan for interim use and comments November 29 - TERA field verification team is on-site conduc-December 3,1982 ting physical configuration verification of AFW system piping and supports inside containment December 3,1982 CPC submittal to NRC of response to NRC comments during October 25, 1982 meeting; CPC commits to separate IDV and INPO evalu-ation, identifies candidate systems for adding an additional system to the IDV scope, expansion of IDV program to include a verification of the quality of construction of the IDV systems; details of IDV intercetions and INPO reporting 2

ATTACHMENTI Date Milestone December 6,1982 TERA project team meets individually with Bechtel group supervisors and group leaders to give a programmatic overview of the expanded IDCV; identify elements of the design process, interfaces, logistics for conducting the IDCV review; identify information, etc.

4 December 8-15,1982 Lead technical reviewers interview Bechtel personnel as part of the IDCV review process; identification of information needs December 10,1982 Agreement reached with Bechtel on proprietary information December 16,1982 TERA completes Engineering Program Plan January 17-21, 1983 TERA design review team in Ann Arbor January 24,1983 TERA begins ICV program -- review of supplier documentation, storage, and maintenance docu.

mentation January 24-26,1983 TERA construction review team on-site review-ing supplier documentation and storage and maintenance documentation January 25-27,1983 TERA design review team in Ann Arbor February 7-l 1,1983 TERA construction review team on-site February 8,1983 Public meeting on Midland Construction Com-pletion Program and independent Design and Construction Verification Program February 9,1983 TERA transrnits Engineering Program Plan (EPP) and Project Quality Assurance Plan (PGAP) to the NRC Febroory 17,1983 TERA issues Revision I of the EPP and Revision 2 of PGAP 3

t 3 ATTACHMENT I Date Milestone February 28 - TERA construction review team on-site and March 4,1983 design review team at Ann Arbor February 28,1983 TERA meeting with B&W in Lynchburg March I,1983 TERA meets with Bechtel management in Ann Arbor to clarify requests for information March 2,1983 Project team meeting, Ann Arbor March II,1983 Project quality assurance audit conducted by the Project Quality Assurance Engineer March 18,1983 TERA transmits information to NRC regarding corporate and individual independence, profes-sional qualifications, scope of review, reporting and auditobility, and program status March 21-25,1983 TERA construction review team on-site and TERA design review team at Ann Arbor March 22,1983 NRC selects Standby Electric Power System as the second system and the HVAC system assur-Ing control room habitability as the third system for the IDCV proaram March 24,1983 NRC provides TERA with a service list for Midland IDCV program March 28,1983 NRC issues the protocol for the Midland IDCV program March 30,1983 TERA transmits supplemental information to NRC regarding affidavits of independence and professional qualifications, including additional affidavits by individuals previously employed by NRC 4

i L

4 ATTACHMENTI Date Milestone April 8,1983 Project quality assurance audit report issued by the Project Quality Assurance Engineer April 9,1983 Senior Review Team meets to review project status, review OCRs, and develop recommenda-tions for the project team April 13,1983 Meeting at NRC, Bethesda, including TERA, CPC, GAP, and NRC. TERA presents synopsis of progress to date of AFW system review, plus discussion of topics to be reviewed for the t'wo additional systems (Standby Electric Power; Control Room HVAC) selected by NRC. All parties discuss protocol for Midland IDCV Pro-gram April 21,1983 TERA transmits supplemental information to NRC regarding affidavits of independence for individuals previously employed by NRC May 3,1983 NRC letter, Novak to Cook (CPC) stating acceptance of TERA Corporation to conduct IDCV Program and acceptance of Engineering Program Plan for the Auxiliary Feedwater System May 18,1983 TERA issues general Revision 2 of the EPP and Revision 3 of the PGAP to incorporate the addition of the Standby Electric Power System l

and Control Room HVAC System to the IDCV l scope, update personnel qualifications, add i project instructions and reference new protocol for communications May 18,1983 TERA meets with NRC, l&E HQ management to discuss consideration of the Midland IDCV program within NRC's response to the Ford Amendment legislation.

May 27,1983 TERA issues first Monthly Status Report.

l l

I S

Attachment 2 OCR, FitOING REPORT, APO FitOING RESOLUTION REPORT TRACKING SYSTEM MIDLAfO INDEPEF0ENT DESIGN APO CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION PROGRAM OCR No. Resp. LTR Potential Open Confirmed Resolved Finding aFindi Topic Comments Open item item item item Report Resolution Report 001 RPS 12/21/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.4-1 Tech Specs 002 RPS 12/21/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.4-1 Tech Specs 003 RPS I/3/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.8-1 Overpressure Protection 004 RPS I/3/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 f.8-l Overpressure Protection 005 RPS 1/4/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.1-1 System Operating Limits 006 RPS 1/12/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 f.2-1 Accident Ar6 ifs Consideratio%

007 RPS I/12/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.2-1 Accident Analysis Considerations 006 LB 1/19/83 3/4/83 1.19-1 Control Systems 009 CS 1/20/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 II.I-l Seismic Design 010 FAD l/20/83 3/4/83 4/14/83 1.10-1 Hydraulic Design Oil LB 1/27/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.19-1 Control Systems 012 LB 2/7/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.15-I Power Supplies 013 RPS 2/8/83 3/4/83 f.5-1 Syst. Align./Switchover

1 OCR, Fl>0 LNG REPORT, APO FItOING RESOLUTION REPORT TRACKING SYSTEM MIDLAPO ltOEPEF0ENT DESIGN APO CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION PROGRAM (Continued)

OCR No. Resp. LTR Potential Open Confirmed Resolved aFindi Fi 3ndi Topic Comments Open item Item item item Report Resolution Report 014 RPS 2/8/83 3/4/83 1.5-1 Syst. Align./Switchover 015 CS 2/10/83 3/4/83 111.1- 1 Seismic Design / Input to Equipment 016 CS 2/10/8 3 3/4/83. 111. 5 - 1 Civil /Stu Design Consid.

017 FAD 2/17/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.11-1 Heat Removal Cop I.10-1 Hydraulic Design 018 FAD 2/17/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.11-1 Heat Removal Cap.

019 LB 2/21/8 3 3/4/83 1.18-1 Instrumentation 020 FAD 2/24/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.11-1 Heat Removal Cop.

1.9-1 Comp. Fune. Req.

021 FAD 2/24/83 3/4/83 11.1 0 -1 Eq. Qual. Rev. I,4/14/83 022 LB 2/24/83 3/4/83 1.19-1 Control Syst.

023 LB 2/28/83 3/4/83 1.18-1 Instrumentation 1.19-1 Control t

OCR, FItOING REPORT, APO FitotNG RESOLUTION REPORT TRACKING SYSTEM MIDLAto itOEPEPOENT DESIGN Ato CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION PROGRAM

(Continued)

OCR No. Resp. LTR Potential Open Confirmed Resolved Finding Finding Topic Comments Open item item item item Report Resolution Report 024 RPS 3/l/83 3/4/83 1.2.I Acc. Anal. Consid.

02S RPS 3/l/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.21 Acc. Anol. Consid.

026 RPS 3/l/83 3/4/83 1.8-1 Overpress. Prof.

027 FAD 3/l/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 f.9-1 Comp. Func. Req.

fl.9-1 Env.Eng.

! 028 FAD 3/2/83 3/4/83 4/14/83 f.9-1 Comp. Func. Req.

029 LB 2/22/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.18-1 Instrumentation 1.19-1 Control System 030 LB 1/19/8 3 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.19-1 Control System 0 31 CS 2 /11/ 8 3 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.3-Ic Pipe Supports 032 CS 2 / 11 / 8 3 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.3-Ic Pipe Supporis I

OCR, FitOING REPORT, AFO FitOING RESOLUTION REPORT TRACKING SYSTEM MIDLAFO INDEPEFOENT DESIGN APO CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATlON PROGRAM (Continued)

OCR No. Resp. LTR Potential Open Confirmed Resolved aFindi Findi Topic Comments Open item item item item Repori eso ution Report 033 CS 2 /11 / 8 3 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.3-Ic Pipe Supports 034 CS 2 /11/ 8 3 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.3-Ic Pipe Supports 035 CS 2 /11/ 8 3 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.3-Ic Pipe Supports Rev. I,5/25/83 036 CS 2 /11/ 8 3 3/4/83 3/4/83  !!.2-1 Pressure Boundary Rev.1, 5/25/83 037 CS 1/20/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 III.1-1 Seismic Design / Input to Equipment 038 LB 3/l/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 1.15-1 Power Supplies 039 LB 3/30/83 4/14/83 l!.10-1 Env. Eq. Gual.

040 LB 3/8/83 4/14/83 1.16-1 Elec. Chorocteristics 041 LB 3/25/83 4/14/83 1.15-l Power Supplies 042 LB 3/31/83 4/I4/83 1. I 0-1 Env. Eq. Oval.

043 FAD 3/15/83 4/l4/83 1.10-I System Hydraulic Design 044 FAD 3/15/83 4/14/83 II.10-1 Env. Eq. Qual.

045 Tulo 3/l7/83 4/14/83 5/25/83 II.1-1C ' Electrical Equipment /

Storage & Maintenance 043 Tulo 3/l7/83 4/14/83 5/25/83 1.1-1 C Mechanical Equipment /

Storage & Maintenance

4 9 ATTACHMENT 3 CURRENT CONFIRMED ITEM REPORTS i

t l , __ __ . - _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - - _

MIDLAfO INDEPEtOENT DESIGN AFO CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT N

~ TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X NO. 3201- aC 001 RESOLVED ITEM REV. NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL IN. CHARGE J///dd CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (5), SYSTEM (5), OR COMPONENT (S) INv0LVED:

AFW-system operability and surveillance requirements in Technical Specifications IDCV P.ROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Topic I.4-1, Technical Specifications DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

A commitment made in response to NRC requests has not been incorporated into the Midland Technical Specifications. That commitment involved NUREG-0611, Appendix III, recommendation GS-6 regcrding verification of proper AFW system valve lineup. It is not clear that the Technical Specifications do incorporate the means to' assure dual valve lineup after maintenance. Also, the associated draft procedure does not incorporate a requirement for valve lineup verification (See OCR-014).

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

Valve lineup after maintenance or testing may not be correct.

RECOMMENDATION

^ OR RESOLUTION  :

Process in accordance with Project Quality Assurance Plan.

COMMENTS BY SRT (lF REQUIRED):

REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

FSAR, REV. 47 SIGNATURE (S):

RPS Rii s HAL JWB N/A JWB OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

MIDLMO INDEPENDENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT N '

CONFIRMED X TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN NO. 320l-008 C 002 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/03 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE J///dd CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (5), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

AFW system operability and surveillance requirements in Technical Specifications.

IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Topic I.4-1, Technical Specifications DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

Midland Technical Specifications do not meet NRC B&W Standard Technical Specifications in that:

An action statement is needed to require immediate action if both AFW systems are inoperable.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

Lack of action statement may result in inadequate plant protection.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

Process in accordance with Project Quality Assurance Plan.

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

Midland Technical Specifications (Rev.33) in FSAR; NUREG-0103, REV. 4, FALL 1980 SIGNATURE (S):

RPS RPS HAL JWB N/A JWB OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

l MIDLAto INDEPEPOENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X N { f84 005 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL-IN. CHARGE 3///83 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (5), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

Entire AFW system IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Topic I.1-1, System Operating Limits DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

Balance of plant criteria are inconsistent with regard to AFW system flowrate requirements and other design parameters. OCRs C-017, C-018, C-020, C-027, and 0-028 also apply.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

Nuclear steam supply system performance requirements for the AFW system may not be adequately or consistently reflected in the balance of plant design.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

Process in accordance with Project Quality Assurance Plan.

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

t i REFERENCES (INCL. REL ATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.): ,

FSAR, REV. 47; B&W BOP Criteria Document 36-1004477, REV. 01 (6/25/82)

OCRS SIGNATURE (5): .

RPS RPS HAL JWB N/A JWB OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

MIDLAtO INDEPENDENT DESIGN APO CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT j TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X

[0-0jj0'- 01 s.C.010 RESOLVED ITEM REV. NO.

DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/d/dd SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. ?lb(G PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE M(lG CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (5), SYSTEM (s), OR COMPONENT (S) INv0LVED:

AFW - piping and valves IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Hydraulic Design (I.10-1)

DESCRIPTION OF COpCERN:

In calculat t storage?fbl, ions service he volume water suction source of water it wasavailable assumed that during the transfer all Category from the I piping was full of water. However, the water might leak out prior to the service water be-coming available because of the lack of Category I check valves.

The recommendation of OCR-3201-008-0-010 was implemented. It was determined that the AFW pumps could have a loss of suction during switchover to service water.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

Although unstated, except by inference in calculations, the AFW design criteria call .for prevention of any occurrance of the pump running dry. Under some sequences of events it may be possible for the AFW pump to lose suction.

The AFW pumps could be damaged by running dry.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

1. Process per PQAP.

2. Review seismic analysis of suction piping to evaluate assumption in Bechtel's analysis of the switchover to service water that credit can be taken for piping upstream of Category I/non-Category I interface.

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

l l

l REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

SIGNATURE (5):

FAD FAD LTR D

PROJECT MANAGER

@k

' PRINCIPAL. SRT (IF REQUIRED)

OCR ITEM REPORT ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/29/83 3/29/83 4}i4{G '

f//./n DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

MIDLAPO INDEPEPOENT DESIGN Af0 CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT F N TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X D NO. 3201-ooa.C 011 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. _0 DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/4/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/4/83 PRINCIPAL-IN. CHARGE 3///83 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM ($), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

AFW " Feed Only Good Generator" (F0GG) Control IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Topic I.19-1, Control Systems DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

The B&W B0P criteria document (36-1004477 Draft) section 3.12 requires that control for F0GG be available at both the MCR and the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel.

The F0GG interlocks are controllable (invertable) from the MCR but are not controllable from the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

B&W B0P criteria regarding control of F0GG from Auxiliary Shutdown Panel are not met.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

Project team confirms concern and has determined that design interface between B&W and Bechtel should be reviewed further.

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

SIGNATURE (S): -

RPS HAL JWB N/A JWB RPS

, OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PR!NCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/4/83 3/4/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

MIDLAPO INDEPEIOENT DESIGN abo CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPOR T FILE NO. 3201 008 TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X DOC NO. 3201008.C 012 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 2/7/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL.lN-CHARGE 3/ 7 /83 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (5), SYSTEM (5), OR COMPONENT (5) INVOLVED:

F0GG Interlock IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (lF APPLICABLE):

Topic I.15-1, Power Supplies DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

The Midland FSAR and the B&W balance of plant criteria document (36-1004477-01) require that the AFW system be capable of operating for two hours in a station blackout condition (loss of all AC). The F0GG interlock relays for channel AA and BA are powered from Class lE AC (lost during blackout). This would cause valves 2M0-3277A and B to shut, cutting off steam to the AFW turbine and causing loss of AFW function during blackout.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

The AFW system may not be functional during station blackout conditions.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

Although limited Failure Modes Effects Analyses (FMEAs) have been performed on AFW, a systematic analysis should be done which considers all applicable plant conditions.

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

l l

REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

OCR 3201-008-0-038 & C-038 Drawings E-158Q SH41, 42, 24, 25 SIGNATURE (S):

LB LB HAL JWB N/A JWB l OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED) l ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN. CHARGE 2/7/83 2/9/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

I MIDLAtO INDEPENDENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X DO NO. 3 01-0084 . 017 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE 3/7/83 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (5), OR COMPONEN1(S) INVOLVED:

AFW Pumps IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Component Functional Requirements (I.9-1) System Hydraulic Design (I.10-1)

System Heat Removal Capability (I.11-1) (Criteria & Commitments / Review of Cales)

DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

There are inconsistencies in the minimum required AFW flow. B&W document BAW 1612, Rev.1, (Ref.1) lists values of 500 gpm and 720 gpm. The B&W B0P Criteria Document (Ref. 2) requires 850 gpm and a B&W calculation (Ref. 3) is consistent with this value, although (as reported in other 0CRs) this calculation may not be consistent with appropriate design parameters. The 850 gpm figure may not provide enough water to remove the heat being generated at the time specified in the B&W Criteria Document (i.e. 30 sec after reactor trip).

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

This would result in a temperature increase in the primary system until the decay heat rate falls to the point where 850 gpm is adequate.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

Process per Project Quality Assurance Plan.

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.): (1) Conceptual Design Study for Auxiliary Feedwater System Feed Rate Control for B&W 177-Fuel Assembly Plant, BAW 1612, Rev.1.

@029P 5 ggrfg - Aux Feedwater Sys (36-1004477, Rev.1). (3) B&W AFW Calculation SIGNATURE (S):

FD FD HAL JWB N/A JWB OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE l

1

MIDLAto INDEPEtOENT DESIGN APO CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED APO RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT X

FILE NO. 3201-008 TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED DOC NO. 3201-0084 .01 8 Rd50LVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE 4///dd CPC/DEslGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (s), OR COMPO.*fdNT(S) INVOLVED:

AFW System (general)

IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

System heat removal capability (I.11-1)

DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

There are inconsistencies in the information presented in the listed references concerning the decay heat curve used to determine the heat load which the AFW must be capable of removing. The AFW calculation performed by B&W (Ref.1) uses a B&W decay heat curve. FSAR page 10A-17 item (e) states that 1.0 x ANS 5.1 (Ref. 2) heat curve whereas FSAR page 10.4-37 states that the design is in conformance with the method of the NRC's Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.2 (Ref. 3). B&W Docu-ment BAW 1612 (Ref. 4) uses the ANS curve plus 20% which is consistent with

. Reference 3. Ref. 3 requires a 20% margin to be added to the ANS curve. The actual SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN: design basis is not Clearly identified.

If the heat load used for analysis is less than the ANS curve (Ref. 2) plus 20% the calculated heat removal requirement will be too low and could conse-quently result in undersizing the AFW pumps.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

Process per Project Quality Assurance Plan l

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

l l

l REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.): (1) B&W Calculation for AFW 32-0525, Rev.00.

(2) American Nuclear Society Standard 5.1-1979. (3) NRC Branch Technical Position l APCSB 9.2. (4) B&W 1612(Rev.1),. Conceptual Design Study. j SIGNATURE (S): ,

FAD FAD HAL JWB N/A JWB l OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARCE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

MIDLAPO INDEPEFOENT DESIGN Ato CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X C.020 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL.lN-CHARGE 3/7 /R3 CPC/DE5tGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (5), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

AFWSystem(general)

IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE): System Hydraulic Design (I.10-1)

System Heat Removal Capability (I.11-1)

Component Functional Requirements (I.9-1)

DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN: There are inconsistencies in inlet water temperatures used in AFW analyses. The B&W criteria * (section 2.14) require the use of 90 F inlet water temperature for AFW system design. B&W's " Specific Design Criteria for Safety Grade AFW Control System" document (4100) describes 90 F as " typical". BAW 1612, Rev.1 (section 2.1) makes use of a 100 F value in calculating minimum flow requirements. The FSAR contains analyses indicating a maximum service water temperature of 105 F.

Bechtel calculation FM 4117-28 uses a max. SW temperature of 108 F.

• (Document #36-1004477, Rev.1)

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

Use of a 90 F temperaturewhen 105 F can occur results in an underestimate of the quantity of water required to remove the heat being generated in the primary system.

This in turn affects the AFW system heat removal capability, its hydraulic design basis and the sizing of components.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

Process per Project Quality Assurance Plan COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIREO):

4 REFERENCES (INCL. REL ATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.): (1) Bechtel Calculation FM4117-28 (Rev.0).

(2) B&W Balance of Plant Criteria for AFW (36-1004477,Rev.01). (3) B&W Conceptual Design Study Control systen(BAW-1612.Rev.1)

(86-1119130. c. (4)4/80)B&W Specific Design Criteria for Safety Grade AFW ate SIGNATURE (S):

FAD FAD HAL JWB N/A JWB OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- sRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

MIDLAto INDEPEPOENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT f

TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X DO Ol 3 01008.C 025 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/03 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MCR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL.IN. CHARGE 3 / 7 /83 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (5), SYSTEM (5), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

AFW system operability under postulated accident conditions "F0GG" system may function in detrimental manner IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Topic I.2-1, Accident Analysis Considerations DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN: The " Feed Only Good Generator" system may perform in a detri-mental manner under conditions of steam generator tube failure followed by loss of offsite power. Its design would force it to direct feed to the " bad" steam generator only because F0GG logic directs feed to the steam generator with the higher pressure based upon a delta pressure measurement between thw two SGs. Without prompt operator action, the steam-driven pump could be flooded and rendered inoperable as a result of leaking primary coolant. The FSAR analysis assumes operator action (no time delay mentioned) to " invert" F0GG and send flow to good generator such that the SG tube rup-ture is recognized & mitigated in sufficient time. The basis for this assumption is SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

not clear. With a single failure of the motor driven AFW pump, all AFW may be rendered inoperable.

Failure of operator to take action quickly could result in total loss of AFW (taking into account single failure).

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

Process in accordance with Project Quality Assurance Plan.

l i

j COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

Topic 1.2-1 Engineering Evaluation; FSAR Revision 47.

SIGNATURE (S):

RPS RPS HAL JWB N/A JWB OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- sRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM !N. CHARGE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE 1

MIDLAto INDEPEPOENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X O O. 2 - C 027 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL-IN. CHARGE 3/7 /oq CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (5) OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

AFW (general)

IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Component Functional Requirements (I.9-1)

Environmental Envelopes (II.9-1)

DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN: The FSAR contains references to the following power levels:

(a) 2452 MWt - license power level, (b) 2552 MWt - power level for calculation of core inventories for accident analyses, (c) 2603 MWt - power level for containment analysis.

The 2552 MWt power was used in the B&W AFW calculation (Ref.1). The 2603 MWt is 102% of 2552. FSAR page 10A-17 (Item a) states that 102% of maximum power level is used for AFW analysis. Thus the power level for AFW analysis should be 2603 MWt.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

If 2552 MWt was used, the heat load which must be removed by the AFW will be underestimated compared to the heat load associated with operation at 2603 MWt resulting in undersizing of AFW components. Furthermore, other analyses may need to be performed at 2603 MWt.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

Process per Project Quality Assurance Plan.

PIC COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

Before doing any confirmatory AFW flow requirements analyses, determine the rationale for the use of 2552 MWt by B&W, and discuss core power level to be used with project manager and PIC.

! JWB REFERENCES (INCL, RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

Ref 1: B&W AFW Calculation 32-0525, Rev. 00 SIGNATURE (5):

i FAD FAD HAL JWB N/A JWB l OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED) l ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE l 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE I

MIDLAtO INDEPENDENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT FILE NO. 3201-008 TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X DOC NO. 3201-008 C. 028 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO.

DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/29/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3l%lt3 PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE 4l!% b 5 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (S), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

AFW System IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Component Functional Requirements (I.9-1)

(Review of Criteria and Conmitments)

DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

The AFW system design may not meet a B&W interface requirement that auxiliary feed-water temperature be at least 40 F. B&W's B0P criteria for AFW (Ref. 1) requires a 40 F minimum AFW temperature. This criterion is consistent with the B&W document for reactor coolant system analysis (Ref. 2) which is used in analysis of reactor coolant system components. Bechtel calcluation FM-4117-28 (Ref. 3) uses a 32 F temperature as a worst case winter temperature. The recommendation contained in the original was implemented, but no addition analyses were identified.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

If the interface requirement is not met, analyses of the reactor coolant system components could become invalid.

RECOMMENDATION ^ OR RESOLUTION  :

Process per PQAP.

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

(1 fTN $1fe'r"ia'i"o'M C

N.'M[8fRg): 1)

(2) B&W Functional Contract Specification for Reactor Coolant System (18-1092000012-04)

(3) Bechtel Calculation FM-4117-28 SIGNATURE (5):

FAD FAD 1%

PROJECT MANAGER Q.f L

' PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

OCR ITEM REPORT LTR ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN CHARGE 3/29/83 3/29/83 4-l14 h3 f//,/fj DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

D MIDLAtO INDEPENDENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT FILE NO. 3201-008 TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X DOC NO. 3201-008 C 031 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL.IN-CHARGE 3/7/83 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (5), SYSTEM (S), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

AFW System Pipe Supports IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Topic I.3.lc - Pipe Supports Verification of Physical Cor. figuration DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

Refer to OCR's C-32 thru 35, same program area as above, for description of four hangers field measured by TERA to be out of installation tolerance limits. .

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

The construction deviation control process is not functional.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

1. Review further the construction deviation control process to determine extent of breakdown.

I 2. Process per Project Quality Assurance Plan.

l COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REGUIRED):

! REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.): /

l Dwg 7220-H-639 SH 14 (Q), Rev 11 Spec 7220-M-326 (Q) Rev 8 " Install . , Inspect. & Doc. of Pipe Supports" SIGNATURE (5): .

CS CS HAL JWB N/A JWB l OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL. SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE l

MIDLAto INDEPEtOENT DESIGN A!O CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X Q { a.C 032 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MCR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL.lN-CHARGE 3/7/83 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (5), SYSTEM (5), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

AFW System Pipe Supports IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (lF APPLICABLE):

Topic I.3-Ic - Pipe Supports Verification of Physical Configuration DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

Hanger H-10, a horizontal snubber, was field measured by TERA to be about 3'-0" from its design location (along the direction of the pipe axis) which exceeds the allowable tolerance for snubbers of 0'-6". Construction deviation information was not forwarded for approval and processing by engineering as required by procedures.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

1. The piping analysis for this portion of the system may be affected as a result of this change leading to higher support loads and piping stresses than calculated.

2. The construction deviation control process does not appear to be functioning for this case (refer to separate OCR for recommendation).

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

1. Input this information to the TERA confirmatory piping analysis for further evaluation.

2. Process per Project Quality Assurance Plan l

l l

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

l REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

Dwg 7220-H-639 SH 14 (Q), Rev.11 Spec 7220-M-326 (Q), Rev. 8 " Install., Inspect. & Doc. of Pipe Supports" SIGNATURE (5):

CS CS HAL JWB N/A JWB OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

MIDLA?O INDEPEFOENT DESIGN Abo CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED Ato RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT FILE NO. 3201 008 TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X DOC NO. 3201-008.C- 033 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE 3 / 7 /R1 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (5), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

AFW System Pipe Supports h E Y kp^e $ p# pN s Verification of Physical Configuration DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

Hanger H-7, a vertical rigid hanger, was field measured by TERA to be about 3'-0" from its design location (along the direction of the pipe axis) which exceeds the allowable tolerance of l'-0". Construction deviation information was not forwarded for approval and processing by engineering as required by procedures.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

1. The piping analysis for this portion of the system may be affected as a result of this change leading to higher support loads and piping stresscs than calculated.

2. The construction deviation control process does not appear to be functioning for this case (refer to separate OCR for recommendation).

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

1. Input to TERA confirmatory piping analysis for further evaluation.

'2. Process per Project Quality Assurance Plan.

l i COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

Dwg 7220 N I"3ISH N fQ [ Re N Spec 7220-M-326 (Q), Rev. 8 " Install . , Inspect. & Doc. of Pipe Supports. . ."

SIGNATURE (S):

CS CS HAL JWB N/A JWB

~

l OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE o

i.

MIDLAto INDEPEtOENT DESIGN AFO CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED APO RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X D NO. 320 C.034 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. 0 ,

DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL lN-CHARGE 1/7 /A3 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (5), SYSTEM (5), OR COMPONENT (5) INVOLVED:

AFW System Pipe Supports IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Topic I.3 Pipe Supports Verification of Physical Configuration DESCRIPT ON OF CONCERN:

Hanger H-4, a vertical spring hanger, was field measured by TERA to be located on the opposite side of a 90 elbow (along the axis of the pipe) which exceeds the allowabla tolerance. Construction deviation information was not forwarded for approval and processing by engineering as required by procedures.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

1. The piping analysis for this portion of the system may be affected as a result of this change leading to a higher support loads and piping stresses than calculated.

2. The construction deviation control process does not appear to be functioning for this case (refer to separate OCR for recommendation).

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

1. Input to TERA confirmatory piping analysis for further evaluation.

2. Process per Project Quality Assurance Plan.

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

W -

-b 4Q Spec 7220-M-326 (Q), Rev 8 " Install . , Inspect. , & Doc. of Pipe Supports.. ."

SIGNATURE (5):

CS HAL JWB JWB N/A CS __

OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM, IN-CHARGE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

~

MIDLAbo INDEPEtOENT DESIGN Abo CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN , CONFIRMED , X NO. 3201 008-C -035 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. (1) One DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 5/10/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 5/20/83 PRINCIPAL IN-CHARGE 5/26/63 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (S), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

AFW System Pipe Supports IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE): ,

Topic l.3-Ic Pipe Supports Verification of Physical Configuration DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

Hanger H-il, a vertical rigid hanger was field measured by TERA to be at the proper elevation but mis-located by l'-3" according to drawing dimensions from DP-260.

Further measurements show DP-260 at proper elevation, but dimensions do not match elevations shown for DP-260 or 265 Steel locations and penetration locations support elevations as measured.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

1. Drawing errors of this nature are not consistent with pipe analysis and may indicate the probability of other drawing errors that would develope loading higher than design levels.

2. The construction deviation control process and drawing checking process does not appear to be functioning.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

1. Investigate quality paperwork to determine effectiveness of acceptance procedures and feed back of results of design group for determination l

of acceptance resolution.

l

2. Investigate shop drawing approval and establish feed back to design and drawing of dimension / elevation nonconformance.

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

Drawing 7220-H639 Sh. 14(Q), Rev. 11 & Engineering Evaluation 3201-001-001, Pgs 7 & 8 SIGNATURE (S):

RCS DBT HAl JB f

l OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED) l ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE

! 5/10/83 5/20/83 <;/ 2 5 /83_.  ;/27/8t DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

MIDLAND INDEPEf0ENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT l FILE NO. 3201-003 TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X DOC NO. E01-008 C_036 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. (1) One DATES REPORTED TO: LTR __,,'_3 /1 1 /83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. S/20/83 PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE 5/26/83 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (S), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOL.VED:

AFW System Piping IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Topic 1!.2-1 Pressure Boundary Drawing Review DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

Theoffsetdimensionstothereactor$enterlinearenotconsistentwithdimensions given along pipe cdnterline as follows. Distances between DP 270 and 280, 280 and 285, 300 and 306. Differences range from 5/16 and 7/16. Drawings that have been

. signed ' have not beert adequately checked.

1 SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERhi' Inconsistencies in design drawings could lead to deviation of constructed structures, systems and components from design assumptions.

\ i RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

I 1. Investigate shop drawing approval system to establish method of resolution and feed back to design and drafti'ng.

N -

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

)

l l

4 REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

Drawing 7220-H-639 (Q), Sh. 14, Rev. 11 & Eng. Eval. 3201-001-001, page 9 SIGNATURE (S):

RCS DBT HAL JB OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE-5/10/83 5/20/83 5/25/83 5/27/83 l

DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE l

l -. ~ v l . .~. ..

MIDLAto INDEPEPOENT DESIGN Abo CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT 32 '

TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X [g; 32 i- C.037 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/3/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE 1/7/R1 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (s), SYSTEM (5), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

AFW System - All IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Topic III.1 Seismic Design Review of Design Criteria DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

FSAR Figures 3.7-2 through 3.7-53 are not current as they are not consistent with FSAR text nor the models and response spectra for the containment and auxiliary l building. The FSAR updating process is not consistent nor timely. -

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

FSAR errors could lead to the utilization of improper input to the design process.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

1. Review further information regarding the FSAR updating process.

2. Process per Project Quality Assurance Plan.

• COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

FSAR, Rev. 46, Section 3.7 Spec. 7220-G-6, Rev. 7 and G-7, Rev. 9, Containment & Aux. Bldg. Response Spectra.

SIGNATURE (S): .

HAL JWB N/A JWB CS CS OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/3/83 3/3/83 3/4/83 3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE

, DATE

-. _ _ _ - . _ _ . _ _ . - _ - _ . _ - . _ _ _ , . - _ , - _ ~ _ _ _ _ . - - - . _ _ . _ _ __ _ _ _

Q MIDLAto INDEPENDENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT X

FILE NO. 3201-008 TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED DOC NO. 3201-oos C 038 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO. O DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/1/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 3/3/83 PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE 1/7/R1 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (S), OR COMPONENT (S) INVCLVED:

AFW Pump Turbine Minimum Flow Valve T

IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

Topic I.15-1, Control / Power Supplies DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

Under condition of loss of all AC (station blackout), the AFW pump minimum flow valve 2SV-3969B would not be operable because it is powered from Class lE AC power. The Midland FSAR and B&W B0P criteria document (36-1004477) both require that AFW be operable for two hours under station blackout. During this period of time flow through the minimum flow line may be necessary to prevent damage to the pump.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

Failure to provide minimum flow would cause consequential damage to the AFW turbine driven pump during station blackout.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

Process per Project Quality Assurance Plan.

l

! COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

OCR 3201-008-0-012 & C-012 ; Drawing E-158(Q) SH 29, 29A, 29B, 29C SIGNATURE (S):

LB HAL JWB N/A JWB LB OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/1/83 3/1/83 3/4/83 -

3/14/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

• O MIDLAPO INDEPENDENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT FILE NO. 3201-008 TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED Y DOC NO. 3201-00s. C. 045 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO.

DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/17/83 SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. __ _5/20/83 PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE 5/26/83__ CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (S), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

Auxiliary Feedwater System: AFW Pump Motor 2P005A IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

ICV: Review of Storage and Maintenance Documentation DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

1. Manufacturer's recommended storage Instructions require motor shaft rotation every two weeks while motor is in storage (Ref: Vendor Doc. No. 7220-M14-68).

2. Bechtel procedure governing in-place maintenance (F-10-247) requires rotation of motor shaft every 90 days, exceeding the maximum duration between shaft rotations, as recommended by the vendor, by a factor of 6.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN:

- Failure to comply with manufacturer's recommended shaft rotation schedule for the motor may have a deleterious effort upon the shaft bearing surfaces, shaft bearings, and rotating elements of the motor.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

• Recommend motor inspection by manufacturer's rep. and ICV reviewer of motor bearing surfaces.

COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

Bechtel Storage Procedure F-10-247 Vendor Document No. 7220-M14-68 SIGNATURE (5):

MBJ DBT HAL JB OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN. CHARGE 3/17/83 5/20/83 5/25/83 5/27/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE

MIDLAfO INDEPEtOENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION OPEN, CONFIRMED AND RESOLVED (OCR) ITEM REPORT TYPE OF REPORT: OPEN CONFIRMED X

. f2 -008. C. 046 RESOLVED ITEM REV.NO.

DATES REPORTED TO: LTR 3/I7/83_ SRT PROJECT TEAM / PROJECT MGR. 5/20/83 PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE 5/26/63 CPC/ DESIGN ORG.

STRUCTURE (S), SYSTEM (S), OR COMPONENT (S) INVOLVED:

Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps = 2P005A & 2P005B IDCV PROGRAM AREA OR TASK (IF APPLICABLE):

ICV: Review of Storage & Maintenance Documentation DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:

1. Pump manufacturer's recommended storage instructions require pump to be stored under vacuum with VPI crystals (dessicant) to maintain Relative Humidity at less than 50%.

2. Bechtel Procedure for storage of pumps, Proc. #F-10-ll8, does not require vacuum nor humidity check per item #1 above.

3 Further to concern, review of records indicates pump have been open, subject to flooding & other damage, & several NCR's remain open against the AFW pump turbine SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCERN: indicating maintenance problems which have not been addressed nor closed out.

Failure to comply with the vendor's recommended storage instructions coupled with the long time (since 1978) the pumps and turbine have been in storage (both in the warehouse and in place) raise concerns as to the existence of internal damage to the pumps and turbine resulting from rust, corrosion, and foreign materials.

RECOMMENDATION X OR RESOLUTION  :

- Recommend pumps and turbine disassembly and inspection.

- Disassembly and inspection should be witnessed by manufacturer's rep. and ICV reviewe r.

i COMMENTS BY SRT (IF REQUIRED):

REFERENCES (INCL. RELATED OCR ITEM REPORT NO.):

Bechtel Procedure F-10-Il8 and Storage and Maintenance Checklist GN-3-il8 SIGNATURE (Sh MBJ DBT HAL JB OCR ITEM REPORT LTR PROJECT MANAGER PRINCIPAL- SRT (IF REQUIRED)

ORIGINATOR FOR PROJECT TEAM IN-CHARGE 3/17/83 5/20/83 5/25/83 5/27/83 DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE l

1

- - - - - - - - - . m , - ,_. _ , _ _ _ _ _ , _