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{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20206D280 | |||
| issue date = 03/26/1987 | |||
| title = Safety Insp Repts 50-324/87-03 & 50-325/87-03 on 870201-28, 0303-04.Violation Noted:Failure to Maintain Unit 2 PWR Fuel Storage Capacity | |||
| author name = Fredrickson P, Garner L, Ruland W | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000324, 05000325 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| document report number = 50-324-87-03, 50-324-87-3, 50-325-87-03, 50-325-87-3, NUDOCS 8704130291 | |||
| package number = ML20206D205 | |||
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 11 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000324/1987003]] | |||
=Text= | |||
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ! | |||
,8 - | |||
, REGION 11 I | |||
g ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W. . | |||
* t ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 a | |||
\, * * * * / | |||
Report Nos. 50-325/87-03 and 50-324/87-03 | |||
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company | |||
P. O. Box 1551 | |||
Raleigh, NC 27602 | |||
Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62 | |||
Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 | |||
Inspection Conducted: February 1 - 28, 1987 and March 3-4, 1987 | |||
Inspectors: | |||
g | |||
.I. N & | |||
, H. Ruland | |||
3/16/f7 | |||
Date Signed | |||
9.6.d | |||
@ LM W. Garner , | |||
slu tt? | |||
Date Signed , | |||
Approved by: . . 3 /2(> [87 | |||
g P4 Division | |||
E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Date Signed | |||
of Reactor Projects | |||
SUMMARY | |||
Scope: This routine safety inspection involved the areas of maintenance | |||
observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verification, onsite | |||
Licensee Event Reports (LER) review, in-office LER review, followup on | |||
inspector identified and unresolved items, Limitorque Operators, spent fuel | |||
storage capacity, and refueling activities. | |||
Results: One violation - failure to maintain Unit 2 PWR spent fuel storage | |||
capacity, paragraph 11, | |||
1 | |||
0704130291 870330 | |||
PDR ADOCK 0D000324 | |||
0 PDR | |||
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REPORT DETAILS | |||
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1. Persons Contacted | |||
Licensee Employees | |||
P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project | |||
l C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project | |||
' | |||
T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction | |||
J. Holder, Manager - Outages | |||
R. Eckstein, Manager - Technical Support | |||
E. Bishop, Manager - Operations | |||
l L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)- | |||
R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP | |||
J. Chase, Assistant to General Manager | |||
J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance | |||
G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control | |||
J. Smith, Manager - Administrative Support | |||
K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance | |||
A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations | |||
, W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor | |||
l B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor | |||
l B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor | |||
R.Creech,I&C/ElectricalMaintenanceSupervisor(Unit 2) | |||
R. Warden, ISC/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1) | |||
W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA | |||
W. Hatcher Supervisor - Security | |||
R. Kitchen,MechanicalMaintenanceSupervisor(Unit 2) | |||
! C. Treubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1) | |||
R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist | |||
W. Murray, Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit | |||
; Otiler licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, | |||
' | |||
engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force | |||
members. | |||
1 | |||
2. ExitInterview(30703) | |||
l The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 3,1987, with | |||
' | |||
the general manager and vice-president. The violation, excess capacity in | |||
the Unit 2 spent fuel pool (paragraph 11), was discussed in detail. The | |||
i inspector stated that the item was unresolved pending inspector discussion | |||
with regional management. On March 4, 1987, the licensee was informed by | |||
' | |||
the inspector that the spent fuel pool issue was a violation. The | |||
i licensee agreed to address the issue of board walkdowns/ reviews | |||
(paragraph 6) along with the response to the violation. The licensee | |||
l acknowledged the findings without exception. The licensee did not | |||
l identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by | |||
the inspectors during the inspection. | |||
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . | |||
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2 | |||
3. Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) | |||
Not inspected. | |||
; 4. Maintenance Observation (62703) | |||
The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to | |||
verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, | |||
Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The | |||
inspectors also verified that: redundant components were operable; | |||
administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel | |||
were qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls | |||
were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points | |||
were adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was | |||
performed; and independent verification requirements were implemented. | |||
The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly | |||
returned to service. | |||
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave | |||
priority to safety-related maintenance. | |||
. | |||
The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance | |||
activities: | |||
MP-09 Dryer / Separator, Cattle Chute, and Fuel Pool Gates | |||
Removal and Installation. | |||
OLP-NVT001 Topaz Static Inverter and Lambda Power Supply. | |||
WR&A-87-AGEB1 Repair of Unit 2 Annunciation Horn Circuit. | |||
During performance of work request 87-AGEB1, the inspector observed a | |||
communication problem between operations and maintenance personnel. At | |||
' | |||
first, the annunciator horn being repaired, could not be silenced. Later, | |||
j the horn stopper' continuously sounding and would not sound when another | |||
! annunciator came in. Operations was aware of this and took proper | |||
compensatory actions, e. g., assigned sections of the board to individuals | |||
to note when a new annunciator came in. The first problem was correctly | |||
conmunicated to maintenance; however, the change in symptoms was not. | |||
Operations assumed the change was due to Instrumentation and Control (I&C) | |||
trouble shooting activities. The inspector informed the maintenance | |||
personnel of the second item approximately 30 minutes after it happened. | |||
Although the inspector was confident that the problem would have been | |||
fixed, the failure of operations personnel to recognize that a new | |||
condition existed versus a condition induced by I&C personnel performing | |||
trouble shooting or repair, was a concern. Inadequate communication can | |||
noticeably increase the length of time an unsatisfactory condition exists. | |||
This matter was discussed with cognizant supervision. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
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3 | |||
5. SurveillanceObservation(61726) | |||
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical | |||
Specifications. Through observation and record review, the inspectors | |||
verified that: tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements; | |||
administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified; | |||
instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete. The | |||
inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return | |||
to service of equipment. | |||
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test | |||
activities: | |||
IMST-DG12R Diesel Generator DG-2 Loading Test. | |||
2MST-APRM12 Average Power Range Monitor (APRM), (Ch. 8, D & F) | |||
Channel Functional Test (Reactor Protection System | |||
(RPS) Inputs]. | |||
2MST-ATWS22M Anticipated Transcient Without Scram (ATWS) Reactor | |||
High Pressure Trip Instrument Channel Calibration. | |||
2MST-RHR21M Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Pressure Coolant | |||
Injection (LPCI), Core Spray System (CSS) and HPCI Hi | |||
Drywell Pressure Trip Unit Channel Calibration. | |||
PT-12.8 Electrical Power Systems Operability Test. | |||
During performance of IMST-DG12R on February 17, 1987, the licensee | |||
identified that step 7.4.30 had not been performed correctly. The step | |||
requires stopping of the core spray pump while supplying rated flow to | |||
verify that the DG does not trip. This is a surveillance requirement | |||
specified in Technical Specification (TS) .4.8.1.1.2.d.2. The operator | |||
reduced the flow prior to stopping the pumb. This is the method normally | |||
used to stop the pump as required by either the quarterly required | |||
Surveillance Test Procedure PT-07.2.4b, or the Operating Procedure OP-18. | |||
The licensee verified that during another performance of MST-DG12R, the | |||
step was satisfactorily performed. This item meets all the requirements | |||
to be considered as a licensee identified violation. The licensee is | |||
preparing an Operating Experience Report (0ER) to address the root cause | |||
of the communication failure between the I&C personnel in charge of the | |||
test and the control operator. The inspector plans to review the OER when | |||
issued. This is an Inspector Followup Item: Review of IMST-DG12R | |||
ProcedureViolationOER(325/87-03-03). | |||
One licensee identified violation and no deviations were identified. | |||
6. Operational Safety Verification (71707) ) | |||
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: The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct | |||
, | |||
. observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, | |||
reviewing of records and independent-verification.of safety. system status. | |||
1 | |||
! The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR | |||
< | |||
50.54 and the Technical Specifications were-met. . Control room, shift | |||
< | |||
supervisor, and clearance logs were reviewed to obtain information- | |||
j concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to ensure | |||
' | |||
that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting | |||
: Conditions for Operations. Direct observations were conducted of control | |||
' | |||
room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to | |||
a verify operability and that parameters were within~ Technical Specification | |||
] limits. The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity | |||
;. of system status was maintained. :The' inspectors verified the status of | |||
selected control room annunciators. | |||
1 | |||
i Operability of ' a selected Engineered ' Safety Feature (ESF) train was - | |||
i verified by insuring that: each accessible valve in the flow path was in | |||
; its correct position; each power supply' and breaker,. including control | |||
room fuses, were aligned for components that must activate upon initiation | |||
; signal; removal of power from those - ESF motor-operated valves, so | |||
identified by Technical Specifications, was completed; there was. no | |||
~ | |||
1 | |||
1 | |||
leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling | |||
i water available; and a condition did. not exist which might prevent | |||
. | |||
fulfillment of the system's functional requirements. Instrumentation | |||
i essential to system actuation or performance was. verified operable by | |||
observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve lineup, if | |||
' | |||
j accessible. | |||
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics | |||
J policies / procedures were followed. This includod a review of area | |||
, | |||
surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument calibration. | |||
j- ' | |||
. | |||
The inspectors verified that: the security. organization was properly | |||
{ manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned | |||
4 | |||
functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the | |||
! protected area (PA); vehicles were properly authorized, searched and | |||
; escorted within the PA; persons within the PA ~ displayed photo | |||
: identification badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; and | |||
effective compensatory measures were employed when required. | |||
! | |||
i On February 1, -1987, the inspector found a vital area door closed but ! | |||
' | |||
unlatched. While an unauthorized person could have opened the door, the l | |||
i | |||
security computer would have detected the intrusion, enabling the security j | |||
> force to respond. The inspector reported the condition to security. A | |||
{ security member responded in a timely manner, verified the condition and | |||
took action as required. | |||
. | |||
i The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified | |||
! position of certain containment isolation valves, and verified ' the | |||
i operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.- | |||
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4 | |||
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5 | |||
On February 2,1987, the inspector observed the Unit 2 A and 6 trains of | |||
Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system with loose blower and motor pedestal | |||
mounting rubber bushing retaining bolts. The licensee issued work | |||
requests 87-ADJIl and 87-ADJJ1 to correct the deficiency. The licensee | |||
inspected Unit I and issued work requests ADJK1 and ADJL1 to correct | |||
similar deficiencies on Unit 1 SBGT trains A and B. Technical support | |||
reviewed the "as found" condition and determined that the condition had | |||
not rendered the SBGT trains inoperable. | |||
On February 12, 1987, at 7:50 a.m., the inspector found valve 1-E11-F007B, | |||
the Division II RHR minimuni flow valve, open instead of closed. The valve | |||
had remained open after the licensee had performed OP-17, RHR Operating | |||
Procedure Section 8.7, draining the suppression pool to radwaste. | |||
Valve]-Ell F007B auto-opened when the RHR pump was started, but no | |||
procedure step existed to manually reshut the valve. Thus, the valve was | |||
in the position required by the last procedure performed on the RHR | |||
system. However, the licensee reported that the evolution had occurred | |||
two shifts prior to discovery. Therefore, three shifts and two shift | |||
turnovers failed to identify the mi:; positioned valve. The Plant General | |||
Manager agreed to address this issue, weakness in board walkdowns and | |||
board review after valve manipulations, when responding to the violation | |||
issued with this report. This is an Inspector Followup Item: Inadequate | |||
Board Walkdown and Review (325/87-03-04). | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
7. Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) | |||
The listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to verify that the | |||
inforr.ation provided met NRC reporting requirements. The verification | |||
included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or | |||
planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety | |||
significance of the event. Onsite inspections were performed and | |||
concluded that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance | |||
with existing requirements, licensee conditions and commitments. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-13, Control Building Emergency Air Filtration System | |||
Start Due to Corrosion on Radiation Monitor Sensor Converter. The | |||
inspector verified that the applicable Maintenance Procedure, MI-26-11A, | |||
was revised July 29, 1986, to include inspection for corrosion as | |||
comitted to in the LER. A sign-off on the data sheet was also provided | |||
to document the review. | |||
(OPEN) LER 1-87-01, Failure of Unit 1 HPCI System Turbine Steam Supply | |||
Valve E41-F002 to Open. The licensee discovered a failed auxiliary | |||
contact adder block assembly during the followup to the valve failure. | |||
The auxiliary contact block assemblies are attached to the main contactor | |||
in each breaker compartment, with from one to six auxiliary blocks per | |||
breaker. There are over 3000 auxiliary contact blocks on site in both Q | |||
and non Q app'eications. The licensee sent several auxiliary contact | |||
blocks to General Electric (GE) for failure analysis. GE reported to the | |||
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6 | |||
licensee that the supplied blocks (CR205X100E) failed because dimensional | |||
problems caused excess wear of the movable plunger, allowing the plunger | |||
to eventually stick inside the block, preventing the contact and thus the | |||
valve from moving. | |||
Further licensee investigation revealed a potential generic problem with | |||
the auxiliary cor. tact adder block. Maintenance record searches by the | |||
licensee turned up over 50 potential auxiliary contactor problems since | |||
1982. GE has redesigned the auxiliary contact adder block (new part No. | |||
CR305X100E) and it appears that the new design is not susceptible to the | |||
binding problem. Further inspection of this item will be conducted after | |||
the licensee issues an LER supplement due May 22, 1987. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-13, Failure to Prcperly Verify Reactor Protection | |||
System (RPS) Shorting Links Installed During Testing Causes Full RPS Trip | |||
During Refueling. The in5pector verified via the training report that | |||
members of the I&C crews were trained on proper verification of | |||
installation of the RPS shorting links. The training class syllabus | |||
adequately addressed the item. It required class participants to field | |||
verify that the shorting links were in place. | |||
(CLOSED) . Level Scram During Pipe | |||
Flushing Due LER | |||
to 2-86-16, | |||
PersonnelAutomatic | |||
Error. TheLowinspect | |||
Water,'or verified that the lesson | |||
plan associated with the committed real time training satisfactorily | |||
discussed the circumstances surrounding the event and the lessons which | |||
can be learned. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-24, Inadvertent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) | |||
Actuation During Refueling Outage Due to Personnel Error. The inspector | |||
reviewed the documentation which demonstrated that new tags were | |||
installed. The inspector visually verified that the tags were in place on | |||
the Unit 1 Division ECCS inverters and power supplies on February 24, | |||
1987. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
8. In Office LER Review (90712) | |||
The listed LERs were reviewed to verify that the information provided met | |||
NRC reporting requirements. The verification included adequacy of event | |||
description and corrective action taken or planned, existance of potential | |||
generic problems and the relative safety significance of the avent. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-17, Late Performance of Required Hourly Fire Watches. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-18, Output Breaker EPA-2, Reactor Protection System | |||
(RPS) Motor Generator 1A, Tripped Unexpectedly to De-energize RPS Bus A; | |||
Cause - Undetermined. | |||
. | |||
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7 | |||
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-23, Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 Entered Due to | |||
Inoperability of the Unit 1 Reactor Core Spray Subsystem B and RHR Low | |||
Pressure Coolant Injection Loop. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-32, Failure to Functionally Test Relay TR/2 in Logic | |||
Channels A2, A4, B2 and B4 Primary Containment Isolation Instruments | |||
B21-TS-3229-3232; Procedure Deficiency. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-04, Primary Containment Group 6 Isolation / Automatic | |||
Isolation of Reactor Building Ventilation System and Automatic Starting of | |||
Standby Gas Treatment System Occurred; Cause - Electrical Shorting. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-07, High Radiation Alarm Trip of Reactor Building | |||
Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor D12-RM-N010B; Due to Electrical | |||
Grounding of the Monitor Power Lead. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-09, Upscale Trip of Instrument Trip Unit to Reactor | |||
Building Exhaust Ventilation Monitor D12-RM-N010B: Cause Could Not Be | |||
Determined. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-11, Reactor Water Cleanup System Inlet Primary | |||
Containment Outboard Isolation Valve, Automatically Closed; Cause - Fuse | |||
F18 Blew. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-14, Upscale Trip of Reactor Power Intermediate Range | |||
Monitor D Occurred When Control Rod 02-19 Was Selected in Reactor Manual | |||
Control System While Performing PT-18.1; Cause - Electronic Noise Spike. | |||
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-22, Unit 2 Shutdown in Accordance With TS 3.4.1.1 Due | |||
to a Lockout / Trip of the Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
9. Followup on Inspector Identified and Unresolved Items (92701) | |||
(OPEN) Inspector Followup Item, (325/84-04-01 and 324/84-04-01), Licensee | |||
to Identify and Repair Cab *ie Tray Raceway Z Clamps Problems. The I clamps | |||
secure the tray to the horizontal tray support. The inspector reviewed | |||
completed work requests 1-E84-1658 and 2-E84-2009 which documented | |||
completion of this particular inspection and repair. The inspector ' | |||
performed an inspection of safety related cable trays 50F/DA and 50M/DA in | |||
the Unit 2 control room on February 22. Of twenty four Z clamps installed | |||
on these trays, five were bent such that they were not engaged with the | |||
tray top, four others had loose I clamp nuts, and three others were turned | |||
to the side. In addition, two Z clamps were missing. The inspector also | |||
observed several tray covers which were not in their proper place. Based | |||
on discussions with the architect / engineer, the licensee determined that | |||
the "as found" condition of these two trays would not render the raceway | |||
inoperble or adversely effect the cables in the trays. | |||
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . | |||
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Discussion with Quality Assurance (QA) personnel revealed that an | |||
outstanding non-conformance report (NCR), number E-86-002, involving cable | |||
tray covers had been issued on July 1,1986, but a review of the NCR | |||
responses by the QC supervisor and the inspector showed that poor work | |||
control practices which allowed the 2 clamp problems to occur had not been | |||
specifically addressed. Hence, both the licensee and the inspector have | |||
determined that the responses were inadequate. On February 27, 1987, | |||
licensee QA issued a Notice of Deficiency against this NCR in accordance | |||
with QA procedure 0QA-104, which required correction of the inadequate | |||
response within seven days. | |||
This item will remain open pending final resolution of NCR E-86-002 and | |||
the Notice of Deficiency and subsequent review by the inspector. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
10. LimitorqueOperators(71707) | |||
The licensee has recently procured information from Limitorque Corporation | |||
concerning actuator sizing and settings on both safety and non-safety | |||
related valves. The data was recently reviewed (December - January) and | |||
compiled from original design documents into a new format at the | |||
licensee's request. Review of the data sheets showed that Limitorque was | |||
now recommending upgrade of some actuator motors to a larger size. | |||
Apparently, Limitorque had used 100% full voltage to size the motors, | |||
instead of the currently specified degraded supply of 85%. Reviews of | |||
documents between the licensee, the valve manufacturer and the valve | |||
manufacturer's subcontractor (Limitorque), has not been able to determine | |||
what was specified to Limitorque (or by whom) when the original plant | |||
equipment was procured. The licensee has evaluated this condition on the | |||
applicable safety related valves and has determined that these valves | |||
would function under design conditions. The affected valves are: | |||
E41-F002, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) inboard steam line | |||
isolation valve; E41-F004, HPCI condensate storage tank suction valve; | |||
E41-F008, HPCI full flow test isolation valve; E11-F017A and B, RHR system | |||
outboard isolation valves; and E11-F024A and B, suppression pool test | |||
return isolation valve. The inspector has reviewed the justification for | |||
continued operation for Unit 2 contained in Engineering Evaluation | |||
EER-87-0088. In summary, the evaluation concludes that no safety problem | |||
exists based upon either application and/or electrical distribution | |||
voltage studies. The voltage studies determined that the degraded voltage | |||
of some of the valves would not drop below 85%. Under these anticipated | |||
voltages, there is no motor sizing concern. In addition, contact with the | |||
applicable valve vendors, Anchor Darling and Rockwell, revealed that they | |||
perfonn their own sizing and setting calculations. Of three valves. | |||
reviewed by Anchor Darling, a degraded voltage of 85% was used. A list of | |||
the other valves has been supplied to the vendors to verify exactly what | |||
, | |||
value was used. | |||
The licensee has contracted with B&W to review the Limitoroue data sheets, | |||
calculations and generally assist in resolving the concerns. Their review | |||
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9 | |||
has indicated potential problems with Limitorque data sheets. Two DC | |||
motor powered actuators had been treated as AC powered. In addition, one | |||
of these had the wrong pull-out efficiency used for the overall unit ratio | |||
(motor design speed-RPM / actuator speed RPM). Apparently the wrong value | |||
had been taken from the Limitorque Gate and Globe Valve Efficiency Chart. | |||
The actuators involved were SMB-3 and SMB-000. Another valve with an | |||
SMB-5T actuator also had the wrong pull-out efficiency used in the torque | |||
switch calculation. This was attributed to using the wrong motor speed | |||
when obtaining values from the Gate and Globe Valve Efficiency Chart. | |||
The licensee is continuing his review. This is an Inspector Followup | |||
Item: Potential Problems with Limitorque Data Sheets (324/87-03-02). | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
11. Spent Fuel Storage Capacity (59095) | |||
The inspectors reviewed the available storage capacity in the Unit 1 and | |||
Unit 2 spent fuel storage pools to determine if full core offload | |||
capability existed for each unit. Based on discussions with licensee | |||
personnel and review of the licensee's fuel map, full offload capability | |||
(560 assemblies) existed. Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) has room for 566 | |||
more BWR assemblies: | |||
1839 allowed by TS | |||
- | |||
36 displaced by a PWR rack | |||
- 36 rack not installed | |||
- | |||
I contains stuck blade guide | |||
- | |||
2 boral sample stations | |||
- 442 not yet installed | |||
1322 available spaces | |||
- 756 assemblies in pool | |||
~566 BWR spaces available | |||
Unit 1 SFP has room for 925 more BWR assemblies: | |||
1803 allowed by TS | |||
- 36 rack not installed | |||
- 2 boral sample stations | |||
T7EE available spaces | |||
- 840 assemblies in pool | |||
975 BWR spaces available | |||
The above data is as of February 15, 1987. | |||
The inspector noted that each SFP contained 10 PWR spent fuel modules each | |||
capable of storing 16 assemblies for a PWR capacity in each pool of 160 | |||
PWR assemblies. The Unit 1 SFP contained 160 assemblies while the Unit 2 | |||
pool contained 144 assemblies. However, Unit 2 Technical Specification | |||
5.6.3 states that, "the fuel storage pool is designed and shall be | |||
maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 144 PWR fuel | |||
,_ , | |||
. | |||
.. | |||
10 | |||
I | |||
assemblies and 1839 BWR fual assemblies. The extra 16 storage locations | |||
in the Unit 2 SFP pose no safety problem since the Unit 1 SFP has been | |||
reviewed and approved by NRR, contains 160 PWR assemblies and locations, | |||
also contains additional high density racks, and is essentially identical | |||
to the Unit 2 SFP. The excess storage capacity in the Unit 2 SFP is a | |||
violation of TS 5.6.3: Failure to Meet TS 5.6.3 Regarding Spent Fuel Pool | |||
l PWR Capacity (324/87-03-01). | |||
! | |||
j One violation and no deviations were identified. | |||
12. RefuelingActivities(60705) | |||
Selected refueling activities were witnessed and reviewed by the | |||
inspector. These included verification that: | |||
- The fuel pool gates were removed per MP-09. | |||
l - | |||
Surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 4.9.6 associated | |||
l | |||
with refueling bridge interlocks were performed prior to fuel | |||
movement. | |||
- Number of operable SRM's per Technical Specification 3.9.2.a. and b. | |||
were maintained. | |||
- Continues communications between the refueling bridge and the control | |||
room were established per Technical Specification 3.9.5. | |||
- | |||
Fuel movements were conducted in accordance with operating procedures | |||
and the Fuel Movement Sheets. | |||
The last activity was performed during a two hour inspection conducted on | |||
the refueling bridge during fuel movements. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
l | |||
i | |||
. | |||
l | |||
1 | |||
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}} |
Latest revision as of 23:21, 19 December 2021
ML20206D280 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Brunswick ![]() |
Issue date: | 03/26/1987 |
From: | Fredrickson P, Garner L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20206D205 | List: |
References | |
50-324-87-03, 50-324-87-3, 50-325-87-03, 50-325-87-3, NUDOCS 8704130291 | |
Download: ML20206D280 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1987003
Text
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p Ktog UNITE 3 STATES l
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION !
,8 -
, REGION 11 I
g ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W. .
- t ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 a
\, * * * * /
Report Nos. 50-325/87-03 and 50-324/87-03
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62
Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: February 1 - 28, 1987 and March 3-4, 1987
Inspectors:
g
.I. N &
, H. Ruland
3/16/f7
Date Signed
9.6.d
@ LM W. Garner ,
slu tt?
Date Signed ,
Approved by: . . 3 /2(> [87
g P4 Division
E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Date Signed
of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine safety inspection involved the areas of maintenance
observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verification, onsite
Licensee Event Reports (LER) review, in-office LER review, followup on
inspector identified and unresolved items, Limitorque Operators, spent fuel
storage capacity, and refueling activities.
Results: One violation - failure to maintain Unit 2 PWR spent fuel storage
capacity, paragraph 11,
1
0704130291 870330
PDR ADOCK 0D000324
0 PDR
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REPORT DETAILS
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1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project
l C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project
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T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction
J. Holder, Manager - Outages
R. Eckstein, Manager - Technical Support
E. Bishop, Manager - Operations
l L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)-
R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP
J. Chase, Assistant to General Manager
J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance
G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control
J. Smith, Manager - Administrative Support
K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance
A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations
, W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor
l B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor
l B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor
R.Creech,I&C/ElectricalMaintenanceSupervisor(Unit 2)
R. Warden, ISC/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA
W. Hatcher Supervisor - Security
R. Kitchen,MechanicalMaintenanceSupervisor(Unit 2)
! C. Treubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist
W. Murray, Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit
- Otiler licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
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engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force
members.
1
2. ExitInterview(30703)
l The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 3,1987, with
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the general manager and vice-president. The violation, excess capacity in
the Unit 2 spent fuel pool (paragraph 11), was discussed in detail. The
i inspector stated that the item was unresolved pending inspector discussion
with regional management. On March 4, 1987, the licensee was informed by
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the inspector that the spent fuel pool issue was a violation. The
i licensee agreed to address the issue of board walkdowns/ reviews
(paragraph 6) along with the response to the violation. The licensee
l acknowledged the findings without exception. The licensee did not
l identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
the inspectors during the inspection.
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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3. Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
Not inspected.
- 4. Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to
verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures,
Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The
inspectors also verified that: redundant components were operable;
administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel
were qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls
were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points
were adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was
performed; and independent verification requirements were implemented.
The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly
returned to service.
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave
priority to safety-related maintenance.
.
The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance
activities:
MP-09 Dryer / Separator, Cattle Chute, and Fuel Pool Gates
Removal and Installation.
OLP-NVT001 Topaz Static Inverter and Lambda Power Supply.
WR&A-87-AGEB1 Repair of Unit 2 Annunciation Horn Circuit.
During performance of work request 87-AGEB1, the inspector observed a
communication problem between operations and maintenance personnel. At
'
first, the annunciator horn being repaired, could not be silenced. Later,
j the horn stopper' continuously sounding and would not sound when another
! annunciator came in. Operations was aware of this and took proper
compensatory actions, e. g., assigned sections of the board to individuals
to note when a new annunciator came in. The first problem was correctly
conmunicated to maintenance; however, the change in symptoms was not.
Operations assumed the change was due to Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
trouble shooting activities. The inspector informed the maintenance
personnel of the second item approximately 30 minutes after it happened.
Although the inspector was confident that the problem would have been
fixed, the failure of operations personnel to recognize that a new
condition existed versus a condition induced by I&C personnel performing
trouble shooting or repair, was a concern. Inadequate communication can
noticeably increase the length of time an unsatisfactory condition exists.
This matter was discussed with cognizant supervision.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5. SurveillanceObservation(61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical
Specifications. Through observation and record review, the inspectors
verified that: tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements;
administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified;
instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete. The
inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return
to service of equipment.
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test
activities:
IMST-DG12R Diesel Generator DG-2 Loading Test.
2MST-APRM12 Average Power Range Monitor (APRM), (Ch. 8, D & F)
Channel Functional Test (Reactor Protection System
(RPS) Inputs].
2MST-ATWS22M Anticipated Transcient Without Scram (ATWS) Reactor
High Pressure Trip Instrument Channel Calibration.
2MST-RHR21M Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Pressure Coolant
Injection (LPCI), Core Spray System (CSS) and HPCI Hi
Drywell Pressure Trip Unit Channel Calibration.
PT-12.8 Electrical Power Systems Operability Test.
During performance of IMST-DG12R on February 17, 1987, the licensee
identified that step 7.4.30 had not been performed correctly. The step
requires stopping of the core spray pump while supplying rated flow to
verify that the DG does not trip. This is a surveillance requirement
specified in Technical Specification (TS) .4.8.1.1.2.d.2. The operator
reduced the flow prior to stopping the pumb. This is the method normally
used to stop the pump as required by either the quarterly required
Surveillance Test Procedure PT-07.2.4b, or the Operating Procedure OP-18.
The licensee verified that during another performance of MST-DG12R, the
step was satisfactorily performed. This item meets all the requirements
to be considered as a licensee identified violation. The licensee is
preparing an Operating Experience Report (0ER) to address the root cause
of the communication failure between the I&C personnel in charge of the
test and the control operator. The inspector plans to review the OER when
issued. This is an Inspector Followup Item: Review of IMST-DG12R
ProcedureViolationOER(325/87-03-03).
One licensee identified violation and no deviations were identified.
6. Operational Safety Verification (71707) )
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- The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct
,
. observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel,
reviewing of records and independent-verification.of safety. system status.
1
! The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR
<
50.54 and the Technical Specifications were-met. . Control room, shift
<
supervisor, and clearance logs were reviewed to obtain information-
j concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to ensure
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that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting
- Conditions for Operations. Direct observations were conducted of control
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room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to
a verify operability and that parameters were within~ Technical Specification
] limits. The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity
- . of system status was maintained.
- The' inspectors verified the status of
selected control room annunciators.
1
i Operability of ' a selected Engineered ' Safety Feature (ESF) train was -
i verified by insuring that: each accessible valve in the flow path was in
- its correct position; each power supply' and breaker,. including control
room fuses, were aligned for components that must activate upon initiation
- signal; removal of power from those - ESF motor-operated valves, so
identified by Technical Specifications, was completed; there was. no
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leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling
i water available; and a condition did. not exist which might prevent
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fulfillment of the system's functional requirements. Instrumentation
i essential to system actuation or performance was. verified operable by
observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve lineup, if
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j accessible.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics
J policies / procedures were followed. This includod a review of area
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surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.
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The inspectors verified that: the security. organization was properly
{ manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned
4
functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the
! protected area (PA); vehicles were properly authorized, searched and
- identification badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; and
effective compensatory measures were employed when required.
!
i On February 1, -1987, the inspector found a vital area door closed but !
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unlatched. While an unauthorized person could have opened the door, the l
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security computer would have detected the intrusion, enabling the security j
> force to respond. The inspector reported the condition to security. A
{ security member responded in a timely manner, verified the condition and
took action as required.
.
i The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified
! position of certain containment isolation valves, and verified ' the
i operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.-
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On February 2,1987, the inspector observed the Unit 2 A and 6 trains of
Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system with loose blower and motor pedestal
mounting rubber bushing retaining bolts. The licensee issued work
requests 87-ADJIl and 87-ADJJ1 to correct the deficiency. The licensee
inspected Unit I and issued work requests ADJK1 and ADJL1 to correct
similar deficiencies on Unit 1 SBGT trains A and B. Technical support
reviewed the "as found" condition and determined that the condition had
not rendered the SBGT trains inoperable.
On February 12, 1987, at 7:50 a.m., the inspector found valve 1-E11-F007B,
the Division II RHR minimuni flow valve, open instead of closed. The valve
had remained open after the licensee had performed OP-17, RHR Operating
Procedure Section 8.7, draining the suppression pool to radwaste.
Valve]-Ell F007B auto-opened when the RHR pump was started, but no
procedure step existed to manually reshut the valve. Thus, the valve was
in the position required by the last procedure performed on the RHR
system. However, the licensee reported that the evolution had occurred
two shifts prior to discovery. Therefore, three shifts and two shift
turnovers failed to identify the mi:; positioned valve. The Plant General
Manager agreed to address this issue, weakness in board walkdowns and
board review after valve manipulations, when responding to the violation
issued with this report. This is an Inspector Followup Item: Inadequate
Board Walkdown and Review (325/87-03-04).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7. Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to verify that the
inforr.ation provided met NRC reporting requirements. The verification
included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or
planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety
significance of the event. Onsite inspections were performed and
concluded that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance
with existing requirements, licensee conditions and commitments.
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-13, Control Building Emergency Air Filtration System
Start Due to Corrosion on Radiation Monitor Sensor Converter. The
inspector verified that the applicable Maintenance Procedure, MI-26-11A,
was revised July 29, 1986, to include inspection for corrosion as
comitted to in the LER. A sign-off on the data sheet was also provided
to document the review.
(OPEN) LER 1-87-01, Failure of Unit 1 HPCI System Turbine Steam Supply
Valve E41-F002 to Open. The licensee discovered a failed auxiliary
contact adder block assembly during the followup to the valve failure.
The auxiliary contact block assemblies are attached to the main contactor
in each breaker compartment, with from one to six auxiliary blocks per
breaker. There are over 3000 auxiliary contact blocks on site in both Q
and non Q app'eications. The licensee sent several auxiliary contact
blocks to General Electric (GE) for failure analysis. GE reported to the
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licensee that the supplied blocks (CR205X100E) failed because dimensional
problems caused excess wear of the movable plunger, allowing the plunger
to eventually stick inside the block, preventing the contact and thus the
valve from moving.
Further licensee investigation revealed a potential generic problem with
the auxiliary cor. tact adder block. Maintenance record searches by the
licensee turned up over 50 potential auxiliary contactor problems since
1982. GE has redesigned the auxiliary contact adder block (new part No.
CR305X100E) and it appears that the new design is not susceptible to the
binding problem. Further inspection of this item will be conducted after
the licensee issues an LER supplement due May 22, 1987.
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-13, Failure to Prcperly Verify Reactor Protection
System (RPS) Shorting Links Installed During Testing Causes Full RPS Trip
During Refueling. The in5pector verified via the training report that
members of the I&C crews were trained on proper verification of
installation of the RPS shorting links. The training class syllabus
adequately addressed the item. It required class participants to field
verify that the shorting links were in place.
(CLOSED) . Level Scram During Pipe
Flushing Due LER
to 2-86-16,
PersonnelAutomatic
Error. TheLowinspect
Water,'or verified that the lesson
plan associated with the committed real time training satisfactorily
discussed the circumstances surrounding the event and the lessons which
can be learned.
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-24, Inadvertent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Actuation During Refueling Outage Due to Personnel Error. The inspector
reviewed the documentation which demonstrated that new tags were
installed. The inspector visually verified that the tags were in place on
the Unit 1 Division ECCS inverters and power supplies on February 24,
1987.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8. In Office LER Review (90712)
The listed LERs were reviewed to verify that the information provided met
NRC reporting requirements. The verification included adequacy of event
description and corrective action taken or planned, existance of potential
generic problems and the relative safety significance of the avent.
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-17, Late Performance of Required Hourly Fire Watches.
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-18, Output Breaker EPA-2, Reactor Protection System
(RPS) Motor Generator 1A, Tripped Unexpectedly to De-energize RPS Bus A;
Cause - Undetermined.
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(CLOSED) LER 1-86-23, Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 Entered Due to
Inoperability of the Unit 1 Reactor Core Spray Subsystem B and RHR Low
Pressure Coolant Injection Loop.
(CLOSED) LER 1-86-32, Failure to Functionally Test Relay TR/2 in Logic
Channels A2, A4, B2 and B4 Primary Containment Isolation Instruments
B21-TS-3229-3232; Procedure Deficiency.
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-04, Primary Containment Group 6 Isolation / Automatic
Isolation of Reactor Building Ventilation System and Automatic Starting of
Standby Gas Treatment System Occurred; Cause - Electrical Shorting.
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-07, High Radiation Alarm Trip of Reactor Building
Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor D12-RM-N010B; Due to Electrical
Grounding of the Monitor Power Lead.
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-09, Upscale Trip of Instrument Trip Unit to Reactor
Building Exhaust Ventilation Monitor D12-RM-N010B: Cause Could Not Be
Determined.
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-11, Reactor Water Cleanup System Inlet Primary
Containment Outboard Isolation Valve, Automatically Closed; Cause - Fuse
F18 Blew.
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-14, Upscale Trip of Reactor Power Intermediate Range
Monitor D Occurred When Control Rod 02-19 Was Selected in Reactor Manual
Control System While Performing PT-18.1; Cause - Electronic Noise Spike.
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-22, Unit 2 Shutdown in Accordance With TS 3.4.1.1 Due
to a Lockout / Trip of the Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9. Followup on Inspector Identified and Unresolved Items (92701)
(OPEN) Inspector Followup Item, (325/84-04-01 and 324/84-04-01), Licensee
to Identify and Repair Cab *ie Tray Raceway Z Clamps Problems. The I clamps
secure the tray to the horizontal tray support. The inspector reviewed
completed work requests 1-E84-1658 and 2-E84-2009 which documented
completion of this particular inspection and repair. The inspector '
performed an inspection of safety related cable trays 50F/DA and 50M/DA in
the Unit 2 control room on February 22. Of twenty four Z clamps installed
on these trays, five were bent such that they were not engaged with the
tray top, four others had loose I clamp nuts, and three others were turned
to the side. In addition, two Z clamps were missing. The inspector also
observed several tray covers which were not in their proper place. Based
on discussions with the architect / engineer, the licensee determined that
the "as found" condition of these two trays would not render the raceway
inoperble or adversely effect the cables in the trays.
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Discussion with Quality Assurance (QA) personnel revealed that an
outstanding non-conformance report (NCR), number E-86-002, involving cable
tray covers had been issued on July 1,1986, but a review of the NCR
responses by the QC supervisor and the inspector showed that poor work
control practices which allowed the 2 clamp problems to occur had not been
specifically addressed. Hence, both the licensee and the inspector have
determined that the responses were inadequate. On February 27, 1987,
licensee QA issued a Notice of Deficiency against this NCR in accordance
with QA procedure 0QA-104, which required correction of the inadequate
response within seven days.
This item will remain open pending final resolution of NCR E-86-002 and
the Notice of Deficiency and subsequent review by the inspector.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. LimitorqueOperators(71707)
The licensee has recently procured information from Limitorque Corporation
concerning actuator sizing and settings on both safety and non-safety
related valves. The data was recently reviewed (December - January) and
compiled from original design documents into a new format at the
licensee's request. Review of the data sheets showed that Limitorque was
now recommending upgrade of some actuator motors to a larger size.
Apparently, Limitorque had used 100% full voltage to size the motors,
instead of the currently specified degraded supply of 85%. Reviews of
documents between the licensee, the valve manufacturer and the valve
manufacturer's subcontractor (Limitorque), has not been able to determine
what was specified to Limitorque (or by whom) when the original plant
equipment was procured. The licensee has evaluated this condition on the
applicable safety related valves and has determined that these valves
would function under design conditions. The affected valves are:
E41-F002, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) inboard steam line
isolation valve; E41-F004, HPCI condensate storage tank suction valve;
E41-F008, HPCI full flow test isolation valve; E11-F017A and B, RHR system
outboard isolation valves; and E11-F024A and B, suppression pool test
return isolation valve. The inspector has reviewed the justification for
continued operation for Unit 2 contained in Engineering Evaluation
EER-87-0088. In summary, the evaluation concludes that no safety problem
exists based upon either application and/or electrical distribution
voltage studies. The voltage studies determined that the degraded voltage
of some of the valves would not drop below 85%. Under these anticipated
voltages, there is no motor sizing concern. In addition, contact with the
applicable valve vendors, Anchor Darling and Rockwell, revealed that they
perfonn their own sizing and setting calculations. Of three valves.
reviewed by Anchor Darling, a degraded voltage of 85% was used. A list of
the other valves has been supplied to the vendors to verify exactly what
,
value was used.
The licensee has contracted with B&W to review the Limitoroue data sheets,
calculations and generally assist in resolving the concerns. Their review
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has indicated potential problems with Limitorque data sheets. Two DC
motor powered actuators had been treated as AC powered. In addition, one
of these had the wrong pull-out efficiency used for the overall unit ratio
(motor design speed-RPM / actuator speed RPM). Apparently the wrong value
had been taken from the Limitorque Gate and Globe Valve Efficiency Chart.
The actuators involved were SMB-3 and SMB-000. Another valve with an
SMB-5T actuator also had the wrong pull-out efficiency used in the torque
switch calculation. This was attributed to using the wrong motor speed
when obtaining values from the Gate and Globe Valve Efficiency Chart.
The licensee is continuing his review. This is an Inspector Followup
Item: Potential Problems with Limitorque Data Sheets (324/87-03-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Spent Fuel Storage Capacity (59095)
The inspectors reviewed the available storage capacity in the Unit 1 and
Unit 2 spent fuel storage pools to determine if full core offload
capability existed for each unit. Based on discussions with licensee
personnel and review of the licensee's fuel map, full offload capability
(560 assemblies) existed. Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) has room for 566
more BWR assemblies:
1839 allowed by TS
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36 displaced by a PWR rack
- 36 rack not installed
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I contains stuck blade guide
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2 boral sample stations
- 442 not yet installed
1322 available spaces
- 756 assemblies in pool
~566 BWR spaces available
Unit 1 SFP has room for 925 more BWR assemblies:
1803 allowed by TS
- 36 rack not installed
- 2 boral sample stations
T7EE available spaces
- 840 assemblies in pool
975 BWR spaces available
The above data is as of February 15, 1987.
The inspector noted that each SFP contained 10 PWR spent fuel modules each
capable of storing 16 assemblies for a PWR capacity in each pool of 160
PWR assemblies. The Unit 1 SFP contained 160 assemblies while the Unit 2
pool contained 144 assemblies. However, Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.6.3 states that, "the fuel storage pool is designed and shall be
maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 144 PWR fuel
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assemblies and 1839 BWR fual assemblies. The extra 16 storage locations
in the Unit 2 SFP pose no safety problem since the Unit 1 SFP has been
reviewed and approved by NRR, contains 160 PWR assemblies and locations,
also contains additional high density racks, and is essentially identical
to the Unit 2 SFP. The excess storage capacity in the Unit 2 SFP is a
violation of TS 5.6.3: Failure to Meet TS 5.6.3 Regarding Spent Fuel Pool
l PWR Capacity (324/87-03-01).
!
j One violation and no deviations were identified.
12. RefuelingActivities(60705)
Selected refueling activities were witnessed and reviewed by the
inspector. These included verification that:
- The fuel pool gates were removed per MP-09.
l -
Surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 4.9.6 associated
l
with refueling bridge interlocks were performed prior to fuel
movement.
- Number of operable SRM's per Technical Specification 3.9.2.a. and b.
were maintained.
- Continues communications between the refueling bridge and the control
room were established per Technical Specification 3.9.5.
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Fuel movements were conducted in accordance with operating procedures
and the Fuel Movement Sheets.
The last activity was performed during a two hour inspection conducted on
the refueling bridge during fuel movements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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