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{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20127H171 | |||
| issue date = 04/05/1985 | |||
| title = Insp Rept 50-416/85-06 on 850216-0315.Violation & Deviation Noted:Inadequate Procedure for Calibr Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrument & Failure to Submit Annual Repts on ECCS Outages as Committed in FSAR | |||
| author name = Butcher R, Caldwell J, Panciera V | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000416 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| case reference number = RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.3.17, TASK-TM | |||
| document report number = 50-416-85-06, 50-416-85-6, GL-83-28, IEB-81-01, IEB-81-1, NUDOCS 8505210242 | |||
| package number = ML20127H069 | |||
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 9 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000416/1985006]] | |||
=Text= | |||
{{#Wiki_filter:L: | |||
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>n E E UNITED STATES j | |||
!6q#o | |||
-/_ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ' | |||
[" p REGloN ll | |||
g g j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W. | |||
* t ATLANTA, G EORGI A 30323 | |||
\...../ | |||
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Report-No.: '50-416/85-06 | |||
Licensee: Mississippi Power. and Light Company | |||
Jackson, MS 39205 | |||
Docket No.: -50-416 License No.: NPF-29 | |||
Facility Name: Grand Gulf | |||
Inspection Conducted February 16 - Mar h 15, 1985 | |||
" | |||
Inspectors: _ | |||
R. C.:B r | |||
[/ Date Signed | |||
* | |||
J. | |||
~ | |||
Date Signed | |||
. Caldw | |||
rf | |||
Approved by: . [] ) / na h | |||
t | |||
hef, | |||
V. W.'Panc'ibr6 Cnief Date Vigned | |||
Project Section 28 | |||
Division of Reactor Projects | |||
SUMMARY | |||
Scope: This routine inspection entailed 285 inspector-hours at the site in the | |||
~ | |||
areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance' Observation, Surveillance | |||
Observation, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown, Reportable Occur- | |||
rences, Operating Reactor Events, Independent Inspection, and Bulletins. | |||
Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent violations or deviations were | |||
identified in seven areas; one apparent violation and one deviation were found in | |||
one area. | |||
8505210242 850405 | |||
PDR ADOCK 05000416 | |||
0 PDR | |||
_ | |||
. . . . . . _ . . - . - - . . - . . . . - . - . | |||
T- . | |||
Y | |||
REPORT DETAILS | |||
1. Licensee Employees Contacted | |||
*J. E. Cross, General Manager | |||
C. R. Hutchinson, Manager, Plant Maintenance | |||
R. 'F. Rogers, General Manager, Technical Assistant | |||
*J..D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator | |||
*M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Operations | |||
L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent | |||
D. Cupstid, Start-up Supervisor | |||
*L. G. Temple, Assistant, I&C Superintendent | |||
R. V. Moomaw, I&C Superintendent | |||
*B. Harris, Compliance Coordinator | |||
*J. L. Robertson, Operations Superintendent | |||
' | |||
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security | |||
. force members, and office personnel. | |||
, | |||
. *Attended exit interview | |||
2. Exit Interview | |||
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 15, 1985, with | |||
those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The 1icensee did not identify | |||
~ | |||
as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed -by the | |||
inspectors during this inspection. | |||
The licensee had no comment on the following inspection findings: | |||
a. Violation (50-416/85-06-01), Inadequate procedure for calibrating | |||
reactor vessel water level instrument paragraph 11. | |||
b. Deviation (50-416/85-06-02), Failure to submit annual reports on ECCS | |||
outages paragraph 11. | |||
c. Unresolved Item (50-416/85-06-03), Post trip review procedure | |||
adequacy paragraph 1 . | |||
, | |||
3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters | |||
(Closed) Violation 50-416/84-42-01; Failure to check the standby service | |||
water basin syphon line filled and vented. The inspector reviewed the | |||
licensee's corrective actions and found them to be acceptable. The | |||
temporary information tags installed next to the basin level instruments are | |||
sufficient until permanent tags can be installed per Design Change Package | |||
- | |||
84-247. This item is closed. | |||
(Closed) Violation 50 416/84-42-02; Failure to recognize and document the | |||
! | |||
entry into Technical Specification (TS) action statement. The inspector | |||
, | |||
, | |||
p | |||
2 | |||
reviewed the changes to the licensee's procedures and found them acceptable. | |||
Proper implementation of -these procedures will prevent further occurrences | |||
of' failure to recognize and document the entry into TS action statements. | |||
This item is closed. | |||
(Closed) Violation 50-416/84-42-03; Failure to' provide proper documentation | |||
during procedure performance. The inspector has reviewed the documentation | |||
associated with the corrective actions taken by the licensee and found them | |||
acceptable. . The memoranda and letters issued by the licensee to plant | |||
personnel indicates increased sensitivity in the area of failure to follow | |||
' procedures and make it clear _ that the plant management will not tolerate | |||
further procedural noncompliances. This item is closed. | |||
4. Unresolved Items * | |||
See paragraph 11 for the unresolved item. | |||
5. Operational Safety Verification (71707) | |||
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall | |||
' | |||
plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. | |||
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the | |||
plant operating staff. | |||
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was | |||
visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included | |||
instrument readings, setpoints and recordings status of operating systems; | |||
tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; | |||
adherence _to limiting conditions for operation; temporary alterations in | |||
effect; . daily journals and data sheet entries; control room manning; and | |||
access controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal | |||
discussions with operators and their supervisors. | |||
Weekly, when onsite, a selected ESF system is confirmed operable. The | |||
confirmation is made by verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path | |||
alignment; power supply breaker and fuse status; major component leakage, | |||
, lubrication, cooling and general condition; and instrumentation. | |||
General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions | |||
of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside | |||
areas - were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica- | |||
tions; shift turnover; sampling program; housekeeping and general plant | |||
conditions; fire protection equipment; control of activities in progress; | |||
radiation protection controls; physical security; problem identification | |||
systems; and containment isolation. | |||
*An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to | |||
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation. | |||
_ | |||
,- | |||
3 | |||
While reviewing the' licensee's Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) equipment- | |||
status with the plant in the shutdown condition (Mode 4), the inspectors-had | |||
a concern regarding the adequacy of Technical Specification (TS) | |||
requirements. It appeared to the inspectors that equipment lineup .and | |||
operational requirements were less than that required by Standard TS. The | |||
inspectors have discussed their concerns with the licensee and the licensee | |||
has issued ETS position statements and night orders to address these | |||
. concerns. The inspectors have requested the region staff to review these_ | |||
concerns and develope a regional position. This is Inspector Followup Item | |||
(IFI) 50/416 85-06-05. | |||
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. | |||
6. Maintenance Observation (62703) | |||
During the report period, the inspector observed -selected maintenance | |||
activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for | |||
adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical | |||
. Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the | |||
actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and | |||
adherence to the appropriate quality controls. | |||
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. | |||
7. Surveillance Observation (61726) | |||
The inspector observed the performance of selected surveillcnces. The | |||
observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, | |||
conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument | |||
calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal | |||
from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and | |||
review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria. | |||
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. | |||
8. ESF System Walkdown (71710) | |||
A complete walkdown was conducted on the accessible portions of the | |||
combustible gas control system. The walkdown consisted of an inspection and | |||
verification, where possible, of the required system valve alignment, | |||
including valve power available and valve locking, where required; | |||
instrumentation valved in and functioning; electrical and instrumentation | |||
cabinets free from debris, loose materials, jumpers and evidence of rodents; | |||
and system free from other degrading conditions. | |||
i In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. | |||
: | |||
9. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700) | |||
. | |||
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if | |||
I | |||
the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination | |||
! | |||
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---y | |||
;. | |||
E | |||
_ | |||
, | |||
4 | |||
: included adequacy ,df _ event description. and corrective : action taken or | |||
planned, existence of - potential generic problems and the relative safety ' | |||
, significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and. discussions with | |||
plant personnel ' as appropriate,were conducted for the reports indicated by | |||
-an asterisk. The : LERs -were--reviewed using the guidance of the general | |||
. policy .and : procedure for NRC enforcement. actions. - The following LERs are | |||
closed. | |||
.LER No. Report Date 4 | |||
Event | |||
85-003 February 18, 1985 Failu're to perform dose | |||
-equivalent analysis following | |||
reactor scrams. | |||
*84-057= - January 18, 1985 Reactor scram on reactor low | |||
: water level. | |||
*85-004 February 26, 1985 Reactor scram on reactor' low | |||
water level. | |||
* | |||
*85-002 February 26, 1985 Reactor scram on reactor low | |||
- | |||
- | |||
water level. | |||
*84-056 January 18,.1985 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling | |||
(RCIC) system containment | |||
isolation. | |||
84-035 August 24, 1985 . Inadequate radioactive gaseous | |||
waste surveillance. | |||
The event of LER 85-004 was discussed in IE Report 85-03. | |||
~ | |||
'The event of LER 85-002 was discussed in IE Report 85-03 and is tracked by | |||
violation 50-416/85-03-01. | |||
The event of LER 84-056 was discussed in IE Report 85-03 and is tracked as | |||
IFI 50-416/85-03-04. | |||
ll The event of LER 84-057 was discussed in IE Report 85-03. | |||
!: . | |||
A part 21 report, Reportable Deficiency 85/01, was reported to the NRC in a | |||
letter Ldated February 18, 1985. An air filter bowl on the air supply line | |||
. | |||
' | |||
. to the diesel generator engine control panel was subject to possible- | |||
,. failure. This item was discussed in'IE Report 85-03 and is an Inspector | |||
Followup Item (50-416/85-06-04) for tracking purposes. 'The licensee has | |||
' | |||
replaced the subject bowls. This reportable deficiency is closed. | |||
-In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. | |||
' | |||
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p~ !.; - - ' | |||
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_;. ' ' | |||
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_- 5' | |||
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~7 10. l Operating l Reactor Events' (93702) | |||
- | |||
: Thefinspectors reviewed. activities associated with-the below listed reactor | |||
scrams. ;The review ' included determination .of. cause, . safety ~ significance, | |||
- | |||
performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action. The inspectors- | |||
examined :. instrument recordings, computer printouts, . operations journal | |||
entries,-'sc' ram reports, and~.had discussions with operations maintenance and | |||
fengineering support' personnel as appropriate. | |||
Scram No. 19 | |||
At 6:51 a.m. on February 10, 1985,- the reactor scrammed as operations was | |||
attempting to switch from Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) B.to SJAE A due to | |||
decreasing condenser vacuum as a result of fouling of the B SJAE inter - | |||
. | |||
r ' condenser. Reactor power had been reduced- to approximately 49% in | |||
preparation for swapping.the SJAEs. Main condenser vacuum as indicated on | |||
- | |||
'the P680 panel was 26.5 inches of Hg prior to the event. The steam supply | |||
:to the B SJAE was throttled closed . in. order to increase the steam flow .to | |||
/.7 | |||
the A SJAE. The valve .from the condenser to the A SJAE (N62-F003A) was | |||
- | |||
observed to-have dual : indication and didn't appear to respond to local or | |||
-remote open signals. | |||
. An. operator was sent to manually.open the N62-F003A valve while another | |||
operator: was sent ~ to clear a red tag on N62-F003B :so the valve could be | |||
. closed. During this time, the condenser vacuum had decreased to the turbine | |||
trip setpoint and a turbine trip. occurred. Valve F0038 had-previously been | |||
' tagged open for troubleshooting under Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 150587. | |||
' The MWO addressed the closing of ' F003B: due to a low flow signal when | |||
adequate flow appeared to be present. The licensee has determined that the | |||
. | |||
present steam supply piping to the SJAEs is underdesigned and a design | |||
change is planned to be incorporated during the present outage. -It appears | |||
' that valve F003A would . not respond because it had tripped on thermal- | |||
overload -due- to excessive cycling on low steam flow caused by undersized - | |||
piping. .The turbine trip initiated a reactor scram and reactor. feedwater | |||
limited reactor water level decrease to 4.5 inches. | |||
- At 8:04 a.m. on February 10, 1985,- the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) | |||
;were slow closed using-the test switch in an attempt to limit the cooldown | |||
rate. When the MSIVs reached the closed position, the associated emergency | |||
handswitches were moved to the close-position, MSIVs F028A, F028C, and F0220 | |||
reopened. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to close the valves and | |||
they were declared inoperable. The cause of:the failure to remain closed | |||
'was determined to be the solenoid _ valve (ASCO) HTX8323-20V) which is called | |||
-the main pilot control valve. The licensee conducted some in house testing | |||
which indicated that the solenoid valve failure may be temperature related. | |||
ASCO and GE were sent seven solenoid valves for further testing (Three from | |||
Unit 1 that had failed to function). The licensee then installed all new | |||
solenoid valves on .the eight MSIVs in order to continue startup testing. | |||
The newly installed valves were similar to those removed except the removed | |||
solenoid valves had a'15.4 watt coil on one end and a 6 watt coil on 'the | |||
other=end while the new solenoid valves had a 10 watt coil on one end and a | |||
6 ' watt coil ion the opposite end and the part number had been revised to | |||
HTX8323A20V. In a letter to the NRC dated February 14, 1985, the licensee | |||
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- - | |||
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6 | |||
h proposed'the ifollowing stroking . requirements to verify MSIV operation for | |||
. restart: | |||
a. Verify operability of MSIVs prior-to restart. | |||
b. Verify ' operability.to MSIVs at approximately 600 psig reactor pressure, | |||
, | |||
- | |||
c. Verify operability of MSIVs prior to exceeding 25% power. | |||
d. Verify . operability Lof L MSIVs- daily - for the first week,' every'other day | |||
for the' next two weeks and weekly thereafter until : solenoids are - | |||
replaced with environmentally qualified models. | |||
_ | |||
e. Monitor an inboard and an; outboard MSIV solenoid-temperature with a | |||
thermocouple to assess ambient temperature conditions. | |||
. Subsequently, on February 13, 1985, the licensee was in startup with reactor | |||
. power at 16% when a reactor scram occurred.' During preparations for restart | |||
. :on February 15, 1985, the licensee discovered leaks in the main condensers | |||
:and'the MSIV stroking program noted above was not completed.. The condenser | |||
-leakage problem. forced the licensee to enter a maintenance. outage:and is not | |||
scheduled to end until .the end of. March. Due to the outage, the licensee | |||
has ' expedited the installation of replacement solenoid valves that are | |||
environmentally qualified. The replacement valves are not fully certified | |||
for the seismic range for the Grand Gulf facility so the licensee is testing | |||
valves at Wy'le Laboratories in Huntsville, Alabama, which is expected to be | |||
completed prior to startupf rom f this : outage. The GE/ASCO testing of the | |||
removed valves has duplicated the failure . to function when soaked at | |||
' | |||
temperatures in the' 180*F range but no. cause of the failure has been | |||
determined. This failure has been duplicated'only on those test valves that | |||
had ' failed when installed at Grand Gulf. Based on the known data,' an IE | |||
Information Notice 85-17 was released to inform other users of this known | |||
failure. | |||
The new valves are ASCO NP8323A20E and are presently being installed. | |||
Design Change Package' (DCP) 84/3084 has been initiated to replace the | |||
! installed ASCO' valves, with environmentally qualified valves with the | |||
qualifying statement that all seismic concerns 'shall be resolved prior to | |||
plant restart. | |||
. | |||
The inspectors will continue to' monitor the licensee's actions in this area. | |||
L: 11. Independent Inspection (92704) | |||
i | |||
:.- The inspectors reviewed a letter from L. F. Dale, Mississippi Power and | |||
Light (MP&L) to H. R. Denton, USNRC (AECM 85/0040) dated February 22, 1985, | |||
L | |||
which stated that while reviewing the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), | |||
the~ licensee discovered that Section 18.1.30.5 committed them to provide the | |||
. | |||
NRC with an annual report of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) outages. | |||
l | |||
The letter went on to say that NUREG 0737, Item II.K.3.17 only required one | |||
report covering five years of operation and MP&L would wait five years from | |||
' | |||
.. | |||
- | |||
* | |||
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~ the date fof ' commercial ~ operation to provide the NRC with this report. The | |||
' inspectors found this letter to be incomplete in several areas. The | |||
ifcensee did not state that they had failed to provide the NRC with the last | |||
three annual . reports as committed. The -inspectors also discovered that the | |||
licensee committed to provide the annual reports on ECCS~ outages in a letter | |||
dated June :12,1981 from L. F. Dale ~to H. R. Denton. Based on this letter, | |||
the' NRCL closed -TMI action item II.K.3.17 of NUREG 0737 as stated in the | |||
* Safety Evaluation Report (SER)' on page 22-26, item 17. . Additionally, the | |||
-inspectors reviewed II.K.3.17 and determined that the five year requirement | |||
. | |||
applied:specifically to operational plants and applicants for an operating | |||
license', of which MP&L was- at the time, would submit a plan . for ~ data - | |||
collection. MP&L's plan for' data collection was to provide the 'NRC with | |||
, -annual. report.s'of ECCS outages. .This plan was found acceptable to the NRC | |||
' | |||
ascstated in the SER. The failure of MP&L to submit the annual reports of | |||
ECCS outages as committed in. the FSAR,- Section 18.1.30.5 and letter dated | |||
; June 12, 1981, is a deviation (50-416/85-06-02). | |||
' | |||
. At 10:09 a.m. on February 14, 1985, the reactor was in hot shutdown with | |||
reactor vessel water level at.36 inches when an inadvertent level 1 signal | |||
(-150 inches) caused an actuation of the Division II Emergency Safeguards | |||
' | |||
: Features (ESF). Reactor pressure was -375 psig and reactor temperature was | |||
373*F. No injection of water occurred due to reactor pressure and all | |||
systems functioned as designed. The false low reactor water level signal | |||
iwas 1due to technicians valving in level transmitter 821-LT-R009B. The | |||
technicians were . doing a calibration per Loop Calibration ' Instruction | |||
07-S-53-B21-2 which did not specify the method to valve the instrument back | |||
in service. . They correctly went to General ' Maintenance Instruction (GMI) | |||
07 S-13-1 which was to be utilized anytime a specific valve sequence was not | |||
specified in a~ procedure.- The' licensee was aware of the problem of pressure, | |||
transients affecting other rea~ctor vessel water level instruments utilizing | |||
the same reference leg when' valving in water level instruments per * | |||
GMI 07-5-13-1 but had failed to ' correct 07-S-53-B21-2. The failure to | |||
correct 07-S-53-B21-2 resulted in an inadequate procedure which caused an | |||
inadvertent ESF' actuation and is a violation (50-416/85-06-01). | |||
In IE Report 50-416/85-02, paragraph 12, the licensee had committed to | |||
' | |||
review all Design Change Packages (DCPs) and Design Change Requests (DCRs) | |||
' | |||
applicable. to safety related equipment by February 28, 1985, to ensure no | |||
' | |||
other DCPs or DCRs were misidentified as non-safety related. This was | |||
tracked as IFI 50-416/85-02-04. The licensee is now in an extended outage | |||
due'to condenser leakage problems and the inspectors agreed to revising the | |||
above commitment to prior to startup from the current outage. Region II | |||
, | |||
management concurred in the revised date. | |||
' | |||
[ - The inspectors reviewed Administrative Procedure (AP) 01-S-06-26, Rev. 3, | |||
: | |||
Post Trip Analysis, for completeness to ascertain the proper functioning of | |||
L safety related and other important equipment prior to restart. The | |||
! inspector had questions concerning certain equipment, i.e., division 3 | |||
diesel generator, ' division 3 standby service water, and also the inspectors | |||
questioned -the post- trip documentation adequacy. The licensee is presently | |||
revising AP 01-S-06-26. This will be an Unresolved Item pending review of | |||
m | |||
v. | |||
~ | |||
, | |||
p . | |||
, | |||
. | |||
* | |||
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8 | |||
the ~ revi sed ! document. ~ This area of concern is addressed in Generic Letter | |||
. | |||
' | |||
~ 83-28 which has not been inspected at this facility. (50-416/85-06-03) | |||
'12. Bulletins | |||
Closed IE8 81-01, Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers- | |||
The . licensee submitted responses to IEB 81-01 for Grand Gulf 1 to NRC- | |||
Region'II in letters dated May 1,1981, October ~27,1981, April 21,1982,- | |||
June 4, 1982, August ~ 10, 1984, and September 25, 1984.' The May 1 and | |||
, L0ctober 27,1981 letters contained schedules for completion of inspections | |||
required by IEB 81-01. _ The April 21, 1982 letter summarized'the results of > | |||
the inspection of mechanical -snubber installed onsite and further stated | |||
that no INC snubbers had been installed in Unit 1. The letter-stated that | |||
six snubbers had recorded conditions characterized as. excessive noise during | |||
stroking or above average force to complete stroke. The June 4, 1982 letter | |||
slightly amended the. section of the April 21, 1982 letter pertaining to | |||
results of. inspections of mechanical snubbers. | |||
. | |||
On August 10, 1984, the licensee submitted the results of tests performed on | |||
the six ' problems- snubbers discussed in the April 21, 1982 letter. Four of | |||
these snubbers were tested and found satisfactory. The remaining two were | |||
found to be marginal. However, these two snubbers were sent to~PSA, the | |||
vendor, for additional testing. -The results of the PSA tests were | |||
summarized in the September 25, 1984 letter. These snubbers were tested and- | |||
found to be satisfactory by PSA. 'The results of . the licensee'.s preservice | |||
snubber inspection / testing program were inspected by the NRC Region II staff | |||
' | |||
on April 30 to May 4,1984, Report Number 50-416/84-15, anti July 16-20, | |||
* | |||
-1984, Report Number. 50-416/84-29. Based on these inspections, and .the | |||
. Region II staff's review of the Itcensee's responses, IEB 81-01 is closed. | |||
>. | |||
- | |||
L. | |||
}} |
Revision as of 15:44, 4 September 2020
ML20127H171 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Grand Gulf, 05000216 ![]() |
Issue date: | 04/05/1985 |
From: | Butcher R, Caldwell J, Panciera V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20127H069 | List: |
References | |
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.3.17, TASK-TM 50-416-85-06, 50-416-85-6, GL-83-28, IEB-81-01, IEB-81-1, NUDOCS 8505210242 | |
Download: ML20127H171 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000416/1985006
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-/_ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
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- t ATLANTA, G EORGI A 30323
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Report-No.: '50-416/85-06
Licensee: Mississippi Power. and Light Company
Jackson, MS 39205
Docket No.: -50-416 License No.: NPF-29
Facility Name: Grand Gulf
Inspection Conducted February 16 - Mar h 15, 1985
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Inspectors: _
R. C.:B r
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Approved by: . [] ) / na h
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V. W.'Panc'ibr6 Cnief Date Vigned
Project Section 28
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine inspection entailed 285 inspector-hours at the site in the
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areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance' Observation, Surveillance
Observation, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown, Reportable Occur-
rences, Operating Reactor Events, Independent Inspection, and Bulletins.
Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent violations or deviations were
identified in seven areas; one apparent violation and one deviation were found in
one area.
8505210242 850405
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REPORT DETAILS
1. Licensee Employees Contacted
- J. E. Cross, General Manager
C. R. Hutchinson, Manager, Plant Maintenance
R. 'F. Rogers, General Manager, Technical Assistant
- J..D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator
- M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Operations
L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent
D. Cupstid, Start-up Supervisor
- L. G. Temple, Assistant, I&C Superintendent
R. V. Moomaw, I&C Superintendent
- B. Harris, Compliance Coordinator
- J. L. Robertson, Operations Superintendent
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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security
. force members, and office personnel.
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. *Attended exit interview
2. Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 15, 1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The 1icensee did not identify
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as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed -by the
inspectors during this inspection.
The licensee had no comment on the following inspection findings:
a. Violation (50-416/85-06-01), Inadequate procedure for calibrating
reactor vessel water level instrument paragraph 11.
b. Deviation (50-416/85-06-02), Failure to submit annual reports on ECCS
outages paragraph 11.
c. Unresolved Item (50-416/85-06-03), Post trip review procedure
adequacy paragraph 1 .
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3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
(Closed) Violation 50-416/84-42-01; Failure to check the standby service
water basin syphon line filled and vented. The inspector reviewed the
licensee's corrective actions and found them to be acceptable. The
temporary information tags installed next to the basin level instruments are
sufficient until permanent tags can be installed per Design Change Package
- 84-247. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 50 416/84-42-02; Failure to recognize and document the
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entry into Technical Specification (TS) action statement. The inspector
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reviewed the changes to the licensee's procedures and found them acceptable.
Proper implementation of -these procedures will prevent further occurrences
of' failure to recognize and document the entry into TS action statements.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 50-416/84-42-03; Failure to' provide proper documentation
during procedure performance. The inspector has reviewed the documentation
associated with the corrective actions taken by the licensee and found them
acceptable. . The memoranda and letters issued by the licensee to plant
personnel indicates increased sensitivity in the area of failure to follow
' procedures and make it clear _ that the plant management will not tolerate
further procedural noncompliances. This item is closed.
4. Unresolved Items *
See paragraph 11 for the unresolved item.
5. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
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plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the
plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was
visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included
instrument readings, setpoints and recordings status of operating systems;
tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms;
adherence _to limiting conditions for operation; temporary alterations in
effect; . daily journals and data sheet entries; control room manning; and
access controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal
discussions with operators and their supervisors.
Weekly, when onsite, a selected ESF system is confirmed operable. The
confirmation is made by verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path
alignment; power supply breaker and fuse status; major component leakage,
, lubrication, cooling and general condition; and instrumentation.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions
of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside
areas - were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica-
tions; shift turnover; sampling program; housekeeping and general plant
conditions; fire protection equipment; control of activities in progress;
radiation protection controls; physical security; problem identification
systems; and containment isolation.
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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While reviewing the' licensee's Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) equipment-
status with the plant in the shutdown condition (Mode 4), the inspectors-had
a concern regarding the adequacy of Technical Specification (TS)
requirements. It appeared to the inspectors that equipment lineup .and
operational requirements were less than that required by Standard TS. The
inspectors have discussed their concerns with the licensee and the licensee
has issued ETS position statements and night orders to address these
. concerns. The inspectors have requested the region staff to review these_
concerns and develope a regional position. This is Inspector Followup Item
(IFI) 50/416 85-06-05.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6. Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the report period, the inspector observed -selected maintenance
activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for
adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical
. Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and
adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
7. Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed the performance of selected surveillcnces. The
observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,
conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument
calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal
from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and
review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8. ESF System Walkdown (71710)
A complete walkdown was conducted on the accessible portions of the
combustible gas control system. The walkdown consisted of an inspection and
verification, where possible, of the required system valve alignment,
including valve power available and valve locking, where required;
instrumentation valved in and functioning; electrical and instrumentation
cabinets free from debris, loose materials, jumpers and evidence of rodents;
and system free from other degrading conditions.
i In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
9. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)
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The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if
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the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination
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- included adequacy ,df _ event description. and corrective : action taken or
planned, existence of - potential generic problems and the relative safety '
, significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and. discussions with
plant personnel ' as appropriate,were conducted for the reports indicated by
-an asterisk. The : LERs -were--reviewed using the guidance of the general
. policy .and : procedure for NRC enforcement. actions. - The following LERs are
closed.
.LER No. Report Date 4
Event
85-003 February 18, 1985 Failu're to perform dose
-equivalent analysis following
reactor scrams.
- 84-057= - January 18, 1985 Reactor scram on reactor low
- water level.
- 85-004 February 26, 1985 Reactor scram on reactor' low
water level.
- 85-002 February 26, 1985 Reactor scram on reactor low
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water level.
- 84-056 January 18,.1985 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
(RCIC) system containment
isolation.84-035 August 24, 1985 . Inadequate radioactive gaseous
waste surveillance.
The event of LER 85-004 was discussed in IE Report 85-03.
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'The event of LER 85-002 was discussed in IE Report 85-03 and is tracked by
violation 50-416/85-03-01.
The event of LER 84-056 was discussed in IE Report 85-03 and is tracked as
IFI 50-416/85-03-04.
ll The event of LER 84-057 was discussed in IE Report 85-03.
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A part 21 report, Reportable Deficiency 85/01, was reported to the NRC in a
letter Ldated February 18, 1985. An air filter bowl on the air supply line
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. to the diesel generator engine control panel was subject to possible-
,. failure. This item was discussed in'IE Report 85-03 and is an Inspector
Followup Item (50-416/85-06-04) for tracking purposes. 'The licensee has
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replaced the subject bowls. This reportable deficiency is closed.
-In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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~7 10. l Operating l Reactor Events' (93702)
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- Thefinspectors reviewed. activities associated with-the below listed reactor
scrams. ;The review ' included determination .of. cause, . safety ~ significance,
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performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action. The inspectors-
examined :. instrument recordings, computer printouts, . operations journal
entries,-'sc' ram reports, and~.had discussions with operations maintenance and
fengineering support' personnel as appropriate.
Scram No. 19
At 6:51 a.m. on February 10, 1985,- the reactor scrammed as operations was
attempting to switch from Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) B.to SJAE A due to
decreasing condenser vacuum as a result of fouling of the B SJAE inter -
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r ' condenser. Reactor power had been reduced- to approximately 49% in
preparation for swapping.the SJAEs. Main condenser vacuum as indicated on
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'the P680 panel was 26.5 inches of Hg prior to the event. The steam supply
- to the B SJAE was throttled closed . in. order to increase the steam flow .to
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the A SJAE. The valve .from the condenser to the A SJAE (N62-F003A) was
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observed to-have dual : indication and didn't appear to respond to local or
-remote open signals.
. An. operator was sent to manually.open the N62-F003A valve while another
operator: was sent ~ to clear a red tag on N62-F003B :so the valve could be
. closed. During this time, the condenser vacuum had decreased to the turbine
trip setpoint and a turbine trip. occurred. Valve F0038 had-previously been
' tagged open for troubleshooting under Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 150587.
' The MWO addressed the closing of ' F003B: due to a low flow signal when
adequate flow appeared to be present. The licensee has determined that the
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present steam supply piping to the SJAEs is underdesigned and a design
change is planned to be incorporated during the present outage. -It appears
' that valve F003A would . not respond because it had tripped on thermal-
overload -due- to excessive cycling on low steam flow caused by undersized -
piping. .The turbine trip initiated a reactor scram and reactor. feedwater
limited reactor water level decrease to 4.5 inches.
- At 8:04 a.m. on February 10, 1985,- the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)
- were slow closed using-the test switch in an attempt to limit the cooldown
rate. When the MSIVs reached the closed position, the associated emergency
handswitches were moved to the close-position, MSIVs F028A, F028C, and F0220
reopened. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to close the valves and
they were declared inoperable. The cause of:the failure to remain closed
'was determined to be the solenoid _ valve (ASCO) HTX8323-20V) which is called
-the main pilot control valve. The licensee conducted some in house testing
which indicated that the solenoid valve failure may be temperature related.
ASCO and GE were sent seven solenoid valves for further testing (Three from
Unit 1 that had failed to function). The licensee then installed all new
solenoid valves on .the eight MSIVs in order to continue startup testing.
The newly installed valves were similar to those removed except the removed
solenoid valves had a'15.4 watt coil on one end and a 6 watt coil on 'the
other=end while the new solenoid valves had a 10 watt coil on one end and a
6 ' watt coil ion the opposite end and the part number had been revised to
HTX8323A20V. In a letter to the NRC dated February 14, 1985, the licensee
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h proposed'the ifollowing stroking . requirements to verify MSIV operation for
. restart:
a. Verify operability of MSIVs prior-to restart.
b. Verify ' operability.to MSIVs at approximately 600 psig reactor pressure,
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c. Verify operability of MSIVs prior to exceeding 25% power.
d. Verify . operability Lof L MSIVs- daily - for the first week,' every'other day
for the' next two weeks and weekly thereafter until : solenoids are -
replaced with environmentally qualified models.
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e. Monitor an inboard and an; outboard MSIV solenoid-temperature with a
thermocouple to assess ambient temperature conditions.
. Subsequently, on February 13, 1985, the licensee was in startup with reactor
. power at 16% when a reactor scram occurred.' During preparations for restart
. :on February 15, 1985, the licensee discovered leaks in the main condensers
- and'the MSIV stroking program noted above was not completed.. The condenser
-leakage problem. forced the licensee to enter a maintenance. outage:and is not
scheduled to end until .the end of. March. Due to the outage, the licensee
has ' expedited the installation of replacement solenoid valves that are
environmentally qualified. The replacement valves are not fully certified
for the seismic range for the Grand Gulf facility so the licensee is testing
valves at Wy'le Laboratories in Huntsville, Alabama, which is expected to be
completed prior to startupf rom f this : outage. The GE/ASCO testing of the
removed valves has duplicated the failure . to function when soaked at
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temperatures in the' 180*F range but no. cause of the failure has been
determined. This failure has been duplicated'only on those test valves that
had ' failed when installed at Grand Gulf. Based on the known data,' an IE
Information Notice 85-17 was released to inform other users of this known
failure.
The new valves are ASCO NP8323A20E and are presently being installed.
Design Change Package' (DCP) 84/3084 has been initiated to replace the
! installed ASCO' valves, with environmentally qualified valves with the
qualifying statement that all seismic concerns 'shall be resolved prior to
plant restart.
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The inspectors will continue to' monitor the licensee's actions in this area.
L: 11. Independent Inspection (92704)
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- .- The inspectors reviewed a letter from L. F. Dale, Mississippi Power and
Light (MP&L) to H. R. Denton, USNRC (AECM 85/0040) dated February 22, 1985,
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which stated that while reviewing the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),
the~ licensee discovered that Section 18.1.30.5 committed them to provide the
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NRC with an annual report of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) outages.
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The letter went on to say that NUREG 0737, Item II.K.3.17 only required one
report covering five years of operation and MP&L would wait five years from
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~ the date fof ' commercial ~ operation to provide the NRC with this report. The
' inspectors found this letter to be incomplete in several areas. The
ifcensee did not state that they had failed to provide the NRC with the last
three annual . reports as committed. The -inspectors also discovered that the
licensee committed to provide the annual reports on ECCS~ outages in a letter
dated June :12,1981 from L. F. Dale ~to H. R. Denton. Based on this letter,
the' NRCL closed -TMI action item II.K.3.17 of NUREG 0737 as stated in the
- Safety Evaluation Report (SER)' on page 22-26, item 17. . Additionally, the
-inspectors reviewed II.K.3.17 and determined that the five year requirement
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applied:specifically to operational plants and applicants for an operating
license', of which MP&L was- at the time, would submit a plan . for ~ data -
collection. MP&L's plan for' data collection was to provide the 'NRC with
, -annual. report.s'of ECCS outages. .This plan was found acceptable to the NRC
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ascstated in the SER. The failure of MP&L to submit the annual reports of
ECCS outages as committed in. the FSAR,- Section 18.1.30.5 and letter dated
- June 12, 1981, is a deviation (50-416/85-06-02).
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. At 10:09 a.m. on February 14, 1985, the reactor was in hot shutdown with
reactor vessel water level at.36 inches when an inadvertent level 1 signal
(-150 inches) caused an actuation of the Division II Emergency Safeguards
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- Features (ESF). Reactor pressure was -375 psig and reactor temperature was
373*F. No injection of water occurred due to reactor pressure and all
systems functioned as designed. The false low reactor water level signal
iwas 1due to technicians valving in level transmitter 821-LT-R009B. The
technicians were . doing a calibration per Loop Calibration ' Instruction
07-S-53-B21-2 which did not specify the method to valve the instrument back
in service. . They correctly went to General ' Maintenance Instruction (GMI)
07 S-13-1 which was to be utilized anytime a specific valve sequence was not
specified in a~ procedure.- The' licensee was aware of the problem of pressure,
transients affecting other rea~ctor vessel water level instruments utilizing
the same reference leg when' valving in water level instruments per *
GMI 07-5-13-1 but had failed to ' correct 07-S-53-B21-2. The failure to
correct 07-S-53-B21-2 resulted in an inadequate procedure which caused an
inadvertent ESF' actuation and is a violation (50-416/85-06-01).
In IE Report 50-416/85-02, paragraph 12, the licensee had committed to
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review all Design Change Packages (DCPs) and Design Change Requests (DCRs)
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applicable. to safety related equipment by February 28, 1985, to ensure no
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other DCPs or DCRs were misidentified as non-safety related. This was
tracked as IFI 50-416/85-02-04. The licensee is now in an extended outage
due'to condenser leakage problems and the inspectors agreed to revising the
above commitment to prior to startup from the current outage. Region II
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management concurred in the revised date.
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[ - The inspectors reviewed Administrative Procedure (AP) 01-S-06-26, Rev. 3,
Post Trip Analysis, for completeness to ascertain the proper functioning of
L safety related and other important equipment prior to restart. The
! inspector had questions concerning certain equipment, i.e., division 3
diesel generator, ' division 3 standby service water, and also the inspectors
questioned -the post- trip documentation adequacy. The licensee is presently
revising AP 01-S-06-26. This will be an Unresolved Item pending review of
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the ~ revi sed ! document. ~ This area of concern is addressed in Generic Letter
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~ 83-28 which has not been inspected at this facility. (50-416/85-06-03)
'12. Bulletins
Closed IE8 81-01, Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers-
The . licensee submitted responses to IEB 81-01 for Grand Gulf 1 to NRC-
Region'II in letters dated May 1,1981, October ~27,1981, April 21,1982,-
June 4, 1982, August ~ 10, 1984, and September 25, 1984.' The May 1 and
, L0ctober 27,1981 letters contained schedules for completion of inspections
required by IEB 81-01. _ The April 21, 1982 letter summarized'the results of >
the inspection of mechanical -snubber installed onsite and further stated
that no INC snubbers had been installed in Unit 1. The letter-stated that
six snubbers had recorded conditions characterized as. excessive noise during
stroking or above average force to complete stroke. The June 4, 1982 letter
slightly amended the. section of the April 21, 1982 letter pertaining to
results of. inspections of mechanical snubbers.
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On August 10, 1984, the licensee submitted the results of tests performed on
the six ' problems- snubbers discussed in the April 21, 1982 letter. Four of
these snubbers were tested and found satisfactory. The remaining two were
found to be marginal. However, these two snubbers were sent to~PSA, the
vendor, for additional testing. -The results of the PSA tests were
summarized in the September 25, 1984 letter. These snubbers were tested and-
found to be satisfactory by PSA. 'The results of . the licensee'.s preservice
snubber inspection / testing program were inspected by the NRC Region II staff
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on April 30 to May 4,1984, Report Number 50-416/84-15, anti July 16-20,
-1984, Report Number. 50-416/84-29. Based on these inspections, and .the
. Region II staff's review of the Itcensee's responses, IEB 81-01 is closed.
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