IR 05000216/2003015

From kanterella
(Redirected from ML20127H171)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Rept 50-416/85-06 on 850216-0315.Violation & Deviation Noted:Inadequate Procedure for Calibr Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrument & Failure to Submit Annual Repts on ECCS Outages as Committed in FSAR
ML20127H171
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf, 05000216 Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/05/1985
From: Butcher R, Caldwell J, Panciera V
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127H069 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.3.17, TASK-TM 50-416-85-06, 50-416-85-6, GL-83-28, IEB-81-01, IEB-81-1, NUDOCS 8505210242
Download: ML20127H171 (9)


Text

L:

.

>n E E UNITED STATES j

!6q#o

-/_ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

[" p REGloN ll g g j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * t ATLANTA, G EORGI A 30323

\...../

t Report-No.: '50-416/85-06 Licensee: Mississippi Power. and Light Company Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.: -50-416 License No.: NPF-29 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Inspection Conducted February 16 - Mar h 15, 1985

"

Inspectors: _

R. C.:B r

[/ Date Signed

  • ~

Date Signed

. Caldw rf Approved by: . [] ) / na h t

hef, V. W.'Panc'ibr6 Cnief Date Vigned Project Section 28 Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection entailed 285 inspector-hours at the site in the

~

areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance' Observation, Surveillance Observation, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown, Reportable Occur-rences, Operating Reactor Events, Independent Inspection, and Bulletin Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent violations or deviations were identified in seven areas; one apparent violation and one deviation were found in one are PDR ADOCK 05000416 0 PDR

_

. . . . . . _ . . - . - - . . - . . . . - . - .

T- .

Y REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted

  • J. E. Cross, General Manager C. R. Hutchinson, Manager, Plant Maintenance R. 'F. Rogers, General Manager, Technical Assistant
  • J..D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator
  • M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Operations L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent D. Cupstid, Start-up Supervisor
  • L. G. Temple, Assistant, I&C Superintendent R. V. Moomaw, I&C Superintendent
  • B. Harris, Compliance Coordinator
  • J. L. Robertson, Operations Superintendent

'

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security

. force members, and office personne ,

. *Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 15, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The 1icensee did not identify

~

as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed -by the inspectors during this inspectio The licensee had no comment on the following inspection findings: Violation (50-416/85-06-01), Inadequate procedure for calibrating reactor vessel water level instrument paragraph 1 Deviation (50-416/85-06-02), Failure to submit annual reports on ECCS outages paragraph 1 Unresolved Item (50-416/85-06-03), Post trip review procedure adequacy paragraph 1 .

, Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Violation 50-416/84-42-01; Failure to check the standby service water basin syphon line filled and vente The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and found them to be acceptabl The temporary information tags installed next to the basin level instruments are sufficient until permanent tags can be installed per Design Change Package

- 84-247. This item is close (Closed) Violation 50 416/84-42-02; Failure to recognize and document the

!

entry into Technical Specification (TS) action statement. The inspector

,

,

p

reviewed the changes to the licensee's procedures and found them acceptabl Proper implementation of -these procedures will prevent further occurrences of' failure to recognize and document the entry into TS action statement This item is close (Closed) Violation 50-416/84-42-03; Failure to' provide proper documentation during procedure performance. The inspector has reviewed the documentation associated with the corrective actions taken by the licensee and found them acceptable. . The memoranda and letters issued by the licensee to plant personnel indicates increased sensitivity in the area of failure to follow

' procedures and make it clear _ that the plant management will not tolerate further procedural noncompliances. This item is close . Unresolved Items *

See paragraph 11 for the unresolved ite . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

'

plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operation Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staf The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings status of operating systems; tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; adherence _to limiting conditions for operation; temporary alterations in effect; . daily journals and data sheet entries; control room manning; and access controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisor Weekly, when onsite, a selected ESF system is confirmed operable. The confirmation is made by verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path alignment; power supply breaker and fuse status; major component leakage,

, lubrication, cooling and general condition; and instrumentatio General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside areas - were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica-tions; shift turnover; sampling program; housekeeping and general plant conditions; fire protection equipment; control of activities in progress; radiation protection controls; physical security; problem identification systems; and containment isolatio *An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviatio _

,-

While reviewing the' licensee's Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) equipment-status with the plant in the shutdown condition (Mode 4), the inspectors-had a concern regarding the adequacy of Technical Specification (TS)

requirements. It appeared to the inspectors that equipment lineup .and operational requirements were less than that required by Standard TS. The inspectors have discussed their concerns with the licensee and the licensee has issued ETS position statements and night orders to address these

. concerns. The inspectors have requested the region staff to review these_

concerns and develope a regional position. This is Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50/416 85-06-0 In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspector observed -selected maintenance activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical

. Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality control In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed the performance of selected surveillcnce The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteri In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710)

A complete walkdown was conducted on the accessible portions of the combustible gas control system. The walkdown consisted of an inspection and verification, where possible, of the required system valve alignment, including valve power available and valve locking, where required; instrumentation valved in and functioning; electrical and instrumentation cabinets free from debris, loose materials, jumpers and evidence of rodents; and system free from other degrading conditions.

i In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

.

The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if I

the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination

!

.

---y

.

E

_

,

included adequacy ,df _ event description. and corrective : action taken or planned, existence of - potential generic problems and the relative safety '

, significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and. discussions with plant personnel ' as appropriate,were conducted for the reports indicated by-an asterisk. The : LERs -were--reviewed using the guidance of the general

. policy .and : procedure for NRC enforcement. actions. - The following LERs are close .LER N Report Date 4 Event 85-003 February 18, 1985 Failu're to perform dose-equivalent analysis following reactor scram *84-057= - January 18, 1985 Reactor scram on reactor low

water leve *85-004 February 26, 1985 Reactor scram on reactor' low water leve *
  • 85-002 February 26, 1985 Reactor scram on reactor low

-

-

water leve *84-056 January 18,.1985 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system containment isolatio August 24, 1985 . Inadequate radioactive gaseous waste surveillanc The event of LER 85-004 was discussed in IE Report 85-0 ~

'The event of LER 85-002 was discussed in IE Report 85-03 and is tracked by violation 50-416/85-03-0 The event of LER 84-056 was discussed in IE Report 85-03 and is tracked as IFI 50-416/85-03-04.

ll The event of LER 84-057 was discussed in IE Report 85-03.

!: .

A part 21 report, Reportable Deficiency 85/01, was reported to the NRC in a letter Ldated February 18, 1985. An air filter bowl on the air supply line

.

'

. to the diesel generator engine control panel was subject to possible-

,. failure. This item was discussed in'IE Report 85-03 and is an Inspector Followup Item (50-416/85-06-04) for tracking purposes. 'The licensee has

'

replaced the subject bowls. This reportable deficiency is close In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie '

l I

.

t

p~ !.; - - '

-

_;. ' '

,

_

'

'

_- 5'

'

~7 10. l Operating l Reactor Events' (93702)

-

Thefinspectors reviewed. activities associated with-the below listed reactor scrams. ;The review ' included determination .of. cause, . safety ~ significance,

-

performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action. The inspectors-examined :. instrument recordings, computer printouts, . operations journal entries,-'sc' ram reports, and~.had discussions with operations maintenance and fengineering support' personnel as appropriat Scram No. 19 At 6:51 a.m. on February 10, 1985,- the reactor scrammed as operations was attempting to switch from Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) B.to SJAE A due to decreasing condenser vacuum as a result of fouling of the B SJAE inter -

.

r ' condense Reactor power had been reduced- to approximately 49% in preparation for swapping.the SJAEs. Main condenser vacuum as indicated on

-

'the P680 panel was 26.5 inches of Hg prior to the event. The steam supply

to the B SJAE was throttled closed . in. order to increase the steam flow .to

/.7 the A SJAE. The valve .from the condenser to the A SJAE (N62-F003A) was

-

observed to-have dual : indication and didn't appear to respond to local or-remote open signal . An. operator was sent to manually.open the N62-F003A valve while another operator: was sent ~ to clear a red tag on N62-F003B :so the valve could be

. closed. During this time, the condenser vacuum had decreased to the turbine trip setpoint and a turbine trip. occurred. Valve F0038 had-previously been

' tagged open for troubleshooting under Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 15058 ' The MWO addressed the closing of ' F003B: due to a low flow signal when adequate flow appeared to be present. The licensee has determined that the

.

present steam supply piping to the SJAEs is underdesigned and a design change is planned to be incorporated during the present outage. -It appears

' that valve F003A would . not respond because it had tripped on thermal-overload -due- to excessive cycling on low steam flow caused by undersized -

piping. .The turbine trip initiated a reactor scram and reactor. feedwater limited reactor water level decrease to 4.5 inche At 8:04 a.m. on February 10, 1985,- the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)

were slow closed using-the test switch in an attempt to limit the cooldown rate. When the MSIVs reached the closed position, the associated emergency handswitches were moved to the close-position, MSIVs F028A, F028C, and F0220 reopened. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to close the valves and they were declared inoperable. The cause of
the failure to remain closed

'was determined to be the solenoid _ valve (ASCO) HTX8323-20V) which is called-the main pilot control valve. The licensee conducted some in house testing which indicated that the solenoid valve failure may be temperature relate ASCO and GE were sent seven solenoid valves for further testing (Three from Unit 1 that had failed to function). The licensee then installed all new solenoid valves on .the eight MSIVs in order to continue startup testin The newly installed valves were similar to those removed except the removed solenoid valves had a'15.4 watt coil on one end and a 6 watt coil on 'the other=end while the new solenoid valves had a 10 watt coil on one end and a 6 ' watt coil ion the opposite end and the part number had been revised to HTX8323A20V. In a letter to the NRC dated February 14, 1985, the licensee L

- -

, w - ,

,

n

,

..

h proposed'the ifollowing stroking . requirements to verify MSIV operation for

. restart: Verify operability of MSIVs prior-to restar Verify ' operability.to MSIVs at approximately 600 psig reactor pressure,

,

- Verify operability of MSIVs prior to exceeding 25% powe Verify . operability Lof L MSIVs- daily - for the first week,' every'other day for the' next two weeks and weekly thereafter until : solenoids are -

replaced with environmentally qualified model _ Monitor an inboard and an; outboard MSIV solenoid-temperature with a thermocouple to assess ambient temperature condition . Subsequently, on February 13, 1985, the licensee was in startup with reactor

. power at 16% when a reactor scram occurred.' During preparations for restart

. :on February 15, 1985, the licensee discovered leaks in the main condensers

and'the MSIV stroking program noted above was not completed.. The condenser-leakage problem. forced the licensee to enter a maintenance. outage:and is not scheduled to end until .the end of. March. Due to the outage, the licensee has ' expedited the installation of replacement solenoid valves that are environmentally qualified. The replacement valves are not fully certified for the seismic range for the Grand Gulf facility so the licensee is testing valves at Wy'le Laboratories in Huntsville, Alabama, which is expected to be completed prior to startupf rom f this : outage. The GE/ASCO testing of the removed valves has duplicated the failure . to function when soaked at

'

temperatures in the' 180*F range but no. cause of the failure has been determined. This failure has been duplicated'only on those test valves that had ' failed when installed at Grand Gulf. Based on the known data,' an IE Information Notice 85-17 was released to inform other users of this known failur The new valves are ASCO NP8323A20E and are presently being installe Design Change Package' (DCP) 84/3084 has been initiated to replace the

! installed ASCO' valves, with environmentally qualified valves with the qualifying statement that all seismic concerns 'shall be resolved prior to plant restart.

.

The inspectors will continue to' monitor the licensee's actions in this area.

L: 1 Independent Inspection (92704)

i

.- The inspectors reviewed a letter from L. F. Dale, Mississippi Power and Light (MP&L) to H. R. Denton, USNRC (AECM 85/0040) dated February 22, 1985, L

which stated that while reviewing the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),

the~ licensee discovered that Section 18.1.30.5 committed them to provide the

.

NRC with an annual report of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) outages.

l The letter went on to say that NUREG 0737, Item II.K.3.17 only required one report covering five years of operation and MP&L would wait five years from

'

..

-

' -

n

) ~

~ the date fof ' commercial ~ operation to provide the NRC with this report. The

' inspectors found this letter to be incomplete in several area The ifcensee did not state that they had failed to provide the NRC with the last three annual . reports as committed. The -inspectors also discovered that the licensee committed to provide the annual reports on ECCS~ outages in a letter dated June :12,1981 from L. F. Dale ~to H. R. Denton. Based on this letter, the' NRCL closed -TMI action item II.K.3.17 of NUREG 0737 as stated in the

  • Safety Evaluation Report (SER)' on page 22-26, item 17. . Additionally, the-inspectors reviewed II.K.3.17 and determined that the five year requirement

.

applied:specifically to operational plants and applicants for an operating license', of which MP&L was- at the time, would submit a plan . for ~ data -

collection. MP&L's plan for' data collection was to provide the 'NRC with

, -annual. report.s'of ECCS outages. .This plan was found acceptable to the NRC

'

ascstated in the SER. The failure of MP&L to submit the annual reports of ECCS outages as committed in. the FSAR,- Section 18.1.30.5 and letter dated

June 12, 1981, is a deviation (50-416/85-06-02).

'

. At 10:09 a.m. on February 14, 1985, the reactor was in hot shutdown with reactor vessel water level at.36 inches when an inadvertent level 1 signal (-150 inches) caused an actuation of the Division II Emergency Safeguards

'

Features (ESF). Reactor pressure was -375 psig and reactor temperature was 373* No injection of water occurred due to reactor pressure and all systems functioned as designe The false low reactor water level signal iwas 1due to technicians valving in level transmitter 821-LT-R009B. The technicians were . doing a calibration per Loop Calibration ' Instruction 07-S-53-B21-2 which did not specify the method to valve the instrument back in service. . They correctly went to General ' Maintenance Instruction (GMI)

07 S-13-1 which was to be utilized anytime a specific valve sequence was not specified in a~ procedure.- The' licensee was aware of the problem of pressure, transients affecting other rea~ctor vessel water level instruments utilizing the same reference leg when' valving in water level instruments per *

GMI 07-5-13-1 but had failed to ' correct 07-S-53-B21-2. The failure to correct 07-S-53-B21-2 resulted in an inadequate procedure which caused an inadvertent ESF' actuation and is a violation (50-416/85-06-01).

In IE Report 50-416/85-02, paragraph 12, the licensee had committed to

'

review all Design Change Packages (DCPs) and Design Change Requests (DCRs)

'

applicable. to safety related equipment by February 28, 1985, to ensure no

'

other DCPs or DCRs were misidentified as non-safety related. This was tracked as IFI 50-416/85-02-04. The licensee is now in an extended outage due'to condenser leakage problems and the inspectors agreed to revising the above commitment to prior to startup from the current outage. Region II

,

management concurred in the revised dat '

[ - The inspectors reviewed Administrative Procedure (AP) 01-S-06-26, Rev. 3,

Post Trip Analysis, for completeness to ascertain the proper functioning of L safety related and other important equipment prior to restart. The

! inspector had questions concerning certain equipment, i.e., division 3 diesel generator, ' division 3 standby service water, and also the inspectors questioned -the post- trip documentation adequacy. The licensee is presently revising AP 01-S-06-26. This will be an Unresolved Item pending review of

m ~

,

p .

,

.

.

the ~ revi sed ! document. ~ This area of concern is addressed in Generic Letter

.

'

~ 83-28 which has not been inspected at this facilit (50-416/85-06-03)

'1 Bulletins Closed IE8 81-01, Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers-The . licensee submitted responses to IEB 81-01 for Grand Gulf 1 to NRC-Region'II in letters dated May 1,1981, October ~27,1981, April 21,1982,-

June 4, 1982, August ~ 10, 1984, and September 25, 1984.' The May 1 and

, L0ctober 27,1981 letters contained schedules for completion of inspections required by IEB 81-01. _ The April 21, 1982 letter summarized'the results of >

the inspection of mechanical -snubber installed onsite and further stated that no INC snubbers had been installed in Unit 1. The letter-stated that six snubbers had recorded conditions characterized as. excessive noise during stroking or above average force to complete stroke. The June 4, 1982 letter slightly amended the. section of the April 21, 1982 letter pertaining to results of. inspections of mechanical snubber .

On August 10, 1984, the licensee submitted the results of tests performed on the six ' problems- snubbers discussed in the April 21, 1982 letter. Four of these snubbers were tested and found satisfactory. The remaining two were found to be marginal. However, these two snubbers were sent to~PSA, the vendor, for additional testing. -The results of the PSA tests were summarized in the September 25, 1984 letter. These snubbers were tested and-found to be satisfactory by PSA. 'The results of . the licensee'.s preservice snubber inspection / testing program were inspected by the NRC Region II staff

'

on April 30 to May 4,1984, Report Number 50-416/84-15, anti July 16-20,

-1984, Report Number. 50-416/84-2 Based on these inspections, and .the

. Region II staff's review of the Itcensee's responses, IEB 81-01 is closed.

>.

-

L.