ML18019A976

Forwards Proposed FSAR Pages,Incorporating Fire Protection Program Per Generic Ltr 86-10.Listed Limiting Conditions of Operation,Action Statements & Surveillance Procedures Will Be Established in Operating Manual to Replace Tech Specs

ML18019A976
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	06/04/1986
From:	Cutter A CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0800, RTR-NUREG-800 GL-86-10, NLS-86-188, NUDOCS 8606100428
Download: ML18019A976 (67)

Text

~~ REQUL RY INFORNATION DISTRIBUTI SYSTEM'I (R IDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8606100428 DOC. DATE: 86/06/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET

'AC IL: 50-400 Sheav on Hav v is Nuclear Poeer Planti Unit ii Cav olina 05000400 AUTH. MANE AUTHOR AFFILIATION CUTTERS A. B. Cav olina Pa(acr Zc Light Co.

RECIP. MANE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONi H. R. Office of Nuclear Reactov'egulationi Directov'post 851125

SUBJECT:

Fortoards pv'oposed. FSAR pagesi incorpovating fiv'e pvotection progv'am per Generic Ltv 86-10. Listed limiting condi ti ons of operationi action statements 0 suvveillance proceduv es vill be established in opev ating manual to v eplace Tech Specs.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: B002D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: Licensing Submittal: Fiv e Protection NOTES:Application for pevmit v enewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT I COP ES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NANE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NANE LTTR ENCL PMR-A ADTB 1 PWR-A PD2 L* 0 PMR-A PD2 PD 1 1 BUCKLEY'S 8 01 1 INTERNAL: *DN/LFNB 0 ELD/ PB1 1 0 NRR STANQ> S 3 3 EQ FIL 04 RCN2 EXTERNAL: 24X 1 LPDR 03 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 05 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 15 ENCL 12

8)>> < i i "<',,

<,'>'i';'~7~.iP, i<OK i'i'~>> iilO'!'>> >. Y)>>>> >a>>N.'.<)', ~ ~

M Qf'~'0$ lip'I g l >>'~(: ->g>> Pr;."ioQ l '>~>,~Q f '.'lgQ+Q~AA

')>>P('>>>, ~

>>,g i. fs) 'r', ) ~

'>>;>>tU ~" >>.. lL",'SU~G "0 IS'3x.)dl>> ~ 4 i rf~H>>t>>)'li. 'A>>.. i "00:~".. 3T ~Y>> 0 l~'QI 1' lF l 9>>. )',-l i U>>t .4l ih'~>> .l.lT Vf

.03 9:,pS. 3 4 'r>>"f'1" 3 4>>tr s>>l'rp~.l .U .6,":) I l ll:i lrIQL I pP. >). ii~> l >>"I ~ ~ qv~ ) ]>l ';ll iP" .'l t.'.> 3>>'.

~ .s.',vCi Pc" >>>> 0 > >>'>>'t >>>>'>>="', ') >t>>>P'~'>>

> t')4 3699 lG,> P ->>>JN 4 rt '13 P. l '$U ., H . j l<<,l i(>> l'l4.'"0 fthm)

'>'ro Q3QL <<89 ps q Hg)cl't 4'>> '>>"

Q J's>>) i~ O'T.~>>'>>'fQ-I rl.le.~'UB d "rJ Ol >>28 vr.l,>>i r>>t,t l'>> ran r~-.i~qv rq

'r>>j 4 ) >>vp~ t.'.>>" r>> 3'<<,>:f >>)$ ~> ,'t >can p, e>>'>>t f, J'6'T9 qA a:~ ~r>>. rtcm prtrf,.v <<>>lu rri. be~i.~Hd>>. 4"9 sd t )l13 '~'a -",;>XBJAP ."JX~IUG Q~~OO>>T,'MO~ NGAT(g>>>XATBXG

>>toi,'e J oaH @~i.l:l'.>>." "'in:duU prrivr>>.) ~i l:3 ll K l z;O

CRK Carolina Power 8 Light Company SERIAL: NLS-86-188 JUN 4 pe Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 - DOCKET NO.50-000 FIRE PROTECTION

Dear Mr. Denton:

As discussed in Generic Letter 86-10, Carolina Power &. Light Company (CP&L) is incorporating the fire protection program into Chuter 9 of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power, Plant (SHNPP) FSAR. In addition, CP&L is requesting that the fire protection technical specifications be removed from the SHNPP Technical Specifications. This will transfer the fire protection program commitments, reporting requirements, and amendments from the jurisdiction of 10CFR50.73 and 10CFR50.90 to 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.71(e). The Shearon Harris Fire Protection Program will then be described and controlled through the FSAR and plant procedures.

Attachment 1 provides proposed FSAR pages to include the following:

1) Changes made as a result of our May 7, 1986 letter which revised our comparison to BTP CMEB 9.5-1,(NUREG-0800), 3uly 1981.

2) Changes made to incorporate the Technical Specification requirements into the procedures and instructions of the Plant Operating Manual.

The FSAR will be formally revised in a future amendment.

The limiting conditions of operation, action statements, and surveillance requirements will be established within the Plant Operating Manual to provide equivalent level of protection as described in the following sections of the Shearon Harris Technical Specifications:

1) 3/0.7.10.1 Fire Protection Water Supply and Distribution System

2) 3/0.7.10.2- Preaction and Multicycle Sprinkler System

3) 3/0.7.10.3 Fire Hose Stations

0) 3/0.7.10.0- Yard Fire Hydrants and Hydrant Hose Houses

5) 3/0.7.11 Fire Rated Assemblies

6) 3/0.3.3.8 - Fire Protection Instrumentation

7) 6.2.2- Unit Staff (Fire Brigade)

"'-"----"illeStreet o P. O. Box 1551 o Raleigh. N. C. 27602 qO 8606100428 860604 PDR ADOCK 08000400 1 DR

'" Mr. Harold R. Denton 0 NLS-86-188/Page 2 Attachment 2 provides proposed marked-up pages for the Shearon Harris Technical Specif ications.

The procedures which replace the Technical Specification requirements and other procedures which effect the insertion of the program into the FSAR will be completed and implemented by fuel load.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Patrick P.

Carier at (919) 836-8165.

Yours very tr A. B. Cutter - Vice President Nuclear Engineering R Licensing ABC/PPC/pgp (3932PPC)

Attachments CC: Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC) Mr. Wells Eddleman Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP) Mr. 3ohn D. Runkle Dr. 3. Nelson Grace (NRC-Rll) Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU) Mr. G. O. Bright (ASLB)

Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP) Dr. 3. H. Carpenter (ASLB)

Wake County Public Library Mr. 3. L. Kelley (ASLB)

~ P J

ATTACHMENT 1 TO NLS-86-188 MARKEI3-UP FSAR PAGES

SUPP F SAR 9.5 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5.1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM I

The Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PLant (SHNPP) fire protection program is based on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidelines, Nuclear Mutual Limited (NML) Property Loss Prevention Standards for Nuclear Generating Stations and related industry standards. With regard to NRC criteria, the SHNPP fire protection program addresses the guidelines outlined in Branch TechnicaL Position CMEB 9.5-1, dated July 1981. Various aspects of the Eire protection progxam are detailed, as required, to show conformance with the guidelines or to demonstrate the equivalency of altexnative approaches.

General Design Criterion 3, "Fire Protection" of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria foz Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilizatio'n Facilities," was followed in the design of safety and non-safety zelated structures, systems, and components. They aze designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions. Noncombustible and heat-resistant materials ade used wherever practical thzoughout the plant, particularly in locations such as the containment and contzol room. Fire detection and suppression systems of appropxiate capacity and capability are provided and designed to minimize the adverse effect of fires on structures, systems, and components important to safety. Firefighting systems are designed to ensure that their failure, rupture or inadvertent operation will not impair the safety capability of these structures, systems, and components'ranch Technical Position 9.5-1 is used in the design of fire protection program Eor safety-related systems and equipment and Eox other plant areas containing fire haxards that could adversely aEfect safety-related is understood that it does not give guidance foz protecting the life or systems't safety of the site personnel or for protection agai'nst economic or property loss'egulatory Guide 1 75, "Physical Independence of Electrical Systems,"

~

in determining the Eire protection for redundant cable systems was followed in the pLant design. Redundant safety-zelated. . st m ~C

~

required Eo safe sh .po RE8 are separated xn a cor ance with ~ ~

agog a4 exemptzo was requested as detailed in the Safe Shutdown Duc,y le(~

Analysis in Case of Fire (SSA) ~

The Shearon Harzis Fire Protection Program considered the information found in national standards and other publications related to fire protection, such as "The International Guidelines for the Fire Protection of Nuclear Power Plants" (IGL), 1974 Edition, Second Reprint, published on behalf of the National Nuclear Risks Insurance Pools and Association, which provides a step-by-step approach to assessing the fire risk in a nuclear power plant and describes protective measures to be taken as a part of the Eire protection of these plants, the Nuclear Energy Liability and Property Insurance Association (NELPIA) and the Mutual Atomic Energy Reinsurance Pool (MAERP) "Specification for Fire Protection of New Plants," and NUREG"0050, "Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire," in February 1976. 4 Wherever designs or methods different from the NRC guidelines were used, they are intended to provide equivalent Eire protection. Suitable bases and justification are provided for alternative approaches to establish acceptable implementation of General Design Criterion 3.

9 '.1-1 Amendment No. 27

~ ~

SliÃPP FSAR The SHNPP fire protection program consists of design features, personnel, equipment, and procedures to provide defense-in-depth protection of public health and safety. The, purpose of the Eire protection program is to prevent signiEicant fires, ensure the capability to safely shut down the reactor, maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and to limit the radioactive release to the environment in the event of a fire. The program is implemented through plant system and facility design, fire prevention, fire detection, annunciation, confinement, extinguishment, administrative controls, fire brigade organization, inspection and maintenance, training, quality assurance, and testing. Procedures have been prepared to implement the plan and the plant is staffed to implement these procedures. The Plant General Manager directs the Staff who are knowledgeable in Eire protection and nuclear safety.

Tables 9.5.1"6 and 9.5.1-7 are the resumes of EBASCO's ire Protection Engineers involved in the'ormulation and implementation of thegire rotectiongrogram. SHNPP has a Senior Specialist - Fire Protection on its staff who Ts responsible Eor the formuLation and implementation of the plant Fire Protection Program.

9.5.1.1 Desi n Basis 9.5.1.1.1 Fire Areas The Eire protection program covers areas containing safety related systems and equipment and other plant areas containing fire hazards that could adversely aEEect safety-related systems.

The initial design of SHNPP was based on Eire protection criteria in effect prior to the issuance oE NVREG-0800. Separate Eire areas possibility of fire"related damage to 27 redundant safety related ~n~

which reduce the mrs ins were established to separate redundant saEety divisions and to isolate safety related systems from fire hazards in non-safety related areas to the extent possible. Where feasible, fire barrier separation was used to limit the spread of fires between components that presented major Eire hazards within the same safety division. Where redundant systems could not be separated by fire barriers, alternate measures, as permitted by Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 0, were employed in order to prevent 'a fire"caused loss of function of safety related systems. These measures included limitation of the amount. of combustible materials, utilization of fire-resistive construction, provision of fire breaks and/or Eire-retardant coatings in cable trays, and installation of fire detection systems and automatic fire extinguishing systems or combination thereof. The Eire hazard analysis (Section 9.5.1.3 and Appendix 9.5A) and Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire (SSA) were used to demonstrate the adequacy of the fire prevention and protection measures utilized.

Spread of the products of combustion to other fire areas was limited by provision of adequate means to ventilate, exhaust, or isolate the fire area as required. Consideration was given to the consequences of failure of 9.5.1-2 Amendment No. 27

~ ~  :

~

S'C~PP FSAR ventilation systems due to Eire causing loss of control Eor ventilating, exhausting, or isolating a given fire area. Provisions were made for personnel access to and escape routes from each fire area.

Areas in which fire could affect, directly or indirectly, safety related stzuctures, systems or components are listed in Table 9.5.1-1.

9.5.1.1.2 Defense-in-Depth The defense-in-depth concept was used in SHNPP to achieve the desired degree of Eire safety. This concept was applied to the fire protection program to achieve an adequate balance in'.

a) Prevention of Eire initiation through the control, separation and guarding of sources oE ignition, b) Prompt detection of Eizes or i'ncipient Eire conditions in areas containing safety related equipment or in areas of high combustible loading which may expose safety related equipment; c) Effective suppression of fires to limit consequent damage and to reduce exposure to safety related equipment; d) Confinement of fires to their areas of initiation by provision oE fire barriers, spatial separation and segregation of combustibles', and e) Separation of redundant safety related equipment to maintain operational capability undez postulated Eire conditions.

9.5.1.1.3 Program Objectives The primary objective of the SHNPP fire protection progzam is to minimize both the probability and the consequences of postulated fixes. However, some Eires occur. Therefoxe, regardless of fire prevention measures incorporated in plant design and operation, adequate means for prompt detection and Eor effective control and suppression of Eire have been provided.

For those plant systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown, with or without offsite power available, particulaz'mphasis was given to the provision of both passive Eire prevention and damage limitation design features and active Eire protection equipment and systems having appropriate capability and adequate capacity to ensure:

a) One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions fzom either the controL room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage; and b) Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from eithez'he control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired and cold shutdown 27 achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />'esign concepts used in the fire protection program provide assurance that a fire will not cause the complete loss of function of safety-related systems>

even though limited loss of redundancy within one system may occur.

9.5.1-3 Amendment No. 27

~ ~

ZiPP FSAq The 230 kV oil-filled cable runs underground from the switchyard to the startup transformers. Twenty-four above ground oil tanks, 50 gal. each, are spaced 16 Et. apart. The oil used is a special low viscosity oil having a minimum flash point of 295 F tested in accordance with ASTM Method D-92. The tanks are installed on graveL which will absorb any oil spill.

e) In the cable spreading rooms, cabling Eor redundant safety divisions A and B are separated by three-hour fire barriers except as noted in Section 9.5.1.2.4 and the SSA. Further depth in the defense against fires is achieved by providing automatic suppression and detection systems Eor the special hazard presented by heavy cable concentrations.

Redundant safety reLated cable systems outside the cable spreading room are separated from potential fire exposure hazards in non-safety related areas by Eire barriers having a mi'nimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Safety related cable tray systems outside the cable spreading room are separated from each other and Erom potential fire exposure hazards by separation criteria given in Regulatory Guide 1.75. Automatic smoke detection and/or area coverage preaction or multi-cycle sprinkler systems are actuated by thermal detection in those areas where a high concentration of cable is present. Redundant cable systems requ'red Eor aa shutdo i ase of Ei a rat in accordance wi'th as et x. e xn t Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire, with noted exceptions. Spot type ionization smoke detectors and thermal detectors located above the cable trays are provided instead of line type thermal detection. These ionization detectors are sensitive to products of combustion and provide early warning in the first stages of a fire. The thermal detectors are sensitive to heat (rate anticipated/fixed temperature) and actuate the automatic suppression system.

Cables are designed to allow wetting- down with Eire suppression water without electrical faulting. Manual hose stations and portable hand extinguishers are provided.

SaEety-related cable trays separated by fire barriers with a minimum rating of three hours and accessible for manual fire fighting are protected from the effects of an exposure Eire by automatic suppression systems. Where provided, automatic area protection considers cable tray arrangements and transient combustibles to assure adequate protection against exposure fires'anual hose stations are not relied upon Eor primary fire suppression for redundant safety cables in lieu of automatic water suppression.

Locations of safety-related cable trays are accessible for manual fire fighting, except for the Cable Spreading Area 1A-SA where SB cable trays are enclosed in three-hour fire resistive barriers along the outside wall of the area north from column Line 41B to 43B and west from 43B to 43E. In other areas where it may not be possible because of other overriding design features necessary Eor reasons of nuclear safety to separate safety-related cables systems by 3-hour"rated fire barriers, cable trays are protected by either preaction or multi-cycle sprinkler systems equipped with closed sprinkler heads. For further description, see the Fire Hazard Analysis and the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire. Since the two-step operation of closed sprinkler head systems requires activation of the sprinkler flow control valve by automatic detectors or manual fire alarm stations and fusing of the sprinkler heads by heat from the fire before ~ater is discharged, unnecessary 9.5.1-10 Amendment No. 27

SIL'tPP FSAR water damage resulting from premature discharge or inadvertent operation is avoided. Water is discharged only from sprinkler heads in the immediate area of the fire. The capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of fire is evaluated in the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire.

For the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire, wherever three"hour rated Eire barriers could not be provided for those systems needed to achieve and maintain cold shutdown in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, d. 5.hQ~

is used or and the technical basis for it identified, as detailed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Pire. The capability to achieve and maintain safe shctdoen considering the effects of a fire invoLves fixed and potential transient combustibles and is evaluated with and without actuation of the automatic system, as detailed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire, with noted exceptions'dditional evaluation and identification of exceptions resuLting from recent clarifications are ongoing. Exposure fires are considered only for systems /zy designated as required for Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire.

f) For safety related charcoal filter assemblies, not including the 27 Control Room Emergency Filtration System, a low-flow air bleed cooling system is provided. This consists of air circulated through the charcoal adsorbers removing the decay heat, thus maintaining the charcoal below combustion temperature. The controL room operator will be alerted to any charcoal heating by the high-adsorber temperature instrumentation alarm. In the event of fire in the adsorbers, the fire wiLL be controlled by closing the isolation dampers to the pressure-tight filter cabinet, thus restricting the fire's oxygen supply.

Further means oE protection oE safety related equipment located adjacent to the charcoaL filters is provided by automatic Eire suppression systems over the charcoal filter housings for Limitation of the extent or damage from possible fires.

BARRIERS AND ACCESS Fire areas, as designated in Section 9.5.1.1.1 and listed in Table 9.5.1-1, are isolated from other plant areas by floors, walls and ceilings having three hour fire resistance ratings. The fire area boundaries and barrier ratings are shown on Figures 9.5A-l through 9.5A-40. These fire ratings are based on standard fire tests made in accordance with "Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Material" ASTM E-119 and NFPA 251 (the applicable fire protection codes, standards and guidelines are listed in FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.1) ~

Fire barriers with a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours are provided to satisfy that:

a) Safety-related systems are separated from non-safety areas that could affect their ability to perform their safety functions. Turbine Building, C"~~

Waste Processing Building, Building are separated by three-hour rated fire barriers from buildings housing safety-related equipment and systems.

9.5.1-11 Amendment tfo. 27

SlL'HAPP FSAR I O'RC

~

C. 5.~~ca) g 87<

b) Redundant divisions or trains of safety-related systems are separated e~ss g~~

from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire to Crim or~)

the extent practical. However, a single train of ductwork provides air between redundant air handling units AH"15A and'H-15B and the Control Room. Doc.y /p$ (

The same is true between the Electrical. Equipment Protection Rooms and redundant air handlin g units AH-16A a nd AH-16B. R e du n d a nt safet y -related systems required Eor safe shutdown are separated in accordance with~

'identified as detailed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire. For redundant safety-related systems not required Eor Safe Shutdown, Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation criteria are followed, as described in Section 8.3. In most cases, the equipment is separated by distance in excess of that prescribed by Regulatory Guide 1.75, structural barriers, provision of automatic suppression and detection, or combination thereof.

c) Fire barriers are provided as required within a single safety division to separate components that present a fire hazard to other safety-related components or high concentrations of safety-related cables within that division.

Door openings in Eire barriers have Eire resistant ratings equivalent to that of the fire barrier and are certified and guaranteed by the manufacturer to have fire resistant construction and evaluated or tested by a nationally recognized testing laboratory. Such doors are'ither self-closing or provided with closing mechanisms and will be inspected semiannually to verify that automatic hold-open, release, and closing mechanisms and latches are operable, or normally secured closed.

One of the following measures are provided to ensure that the door will protect the opening as required in case of fire'.

a) Fire doors will be kept closed and electronically supervised at a continuously manned location; b) Fire doors will be locked closed and inspected weekly to verify that the doors are in the closed position',

c) Fire doors will be provided with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms and inspected daily to verify that doorways are free of obstructions; or .

d) Fire doors will be kept closed and inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position.

The fire brigade leader will have ready access to keys for any locked fire doors'7 Areas protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems are

) electrically supervised self-closing fire doors or satisfy option (a) above.

Openings through fire barriers for pipe, conduit, and cable trays which separate fire areas are sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that required of the barrier itself. Openings inside conduit Larger than 4 inches in diameter are sealed at the the fire barrier 9.5.1-12 Amendment No. 27

S1LNPP FSAR penetration. Openings inside conduit 4 inches or less in diameter are sealed 27 at the fire barrier unless the conduit extends at least feet o.vaibxble crt.s qe. 5 first side of on.,each Dccess the Eire barrier and is sealed either at both ends)or at he fare barrier with noncombustible material to,prevent the passage of smoke and hot gases. Fire barrier penetrations that must maintain environmental isolation or pressure difEerentials are qualified by test to maintain the barrier integrity under such conditions.

Penetration designs utilize only noncombustible materials and are qualified by tests. The penetrations qualiEication tests use the time-temperature exposure curve specified by ASTM E-L19, "Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials." The acceptance criteria for the test requires that:

a) The Eire barrier penetration has withstood the Eire endurance test without passage of flame or ignition of cables on the unexposed side for a period of time equivalent to the fire resistance rating required of the barrier.

b) The temperature levels recorded Eor the unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperature does not exceed an average of more than 250'F above its initial temperature; if any temperature readings on the unexposed surface exceed 250'F rise by greater than 30 percent, the reason shall be investigated and documented in the test report.

c) The fire barrier penetration remains intact and does not allow projection of water beyond the unexposed surface during the hose stream test. The stream will be delivered through a l-l/2 inch nozzle set at a discharge angle of 30 percent with 'a nozzle pressure oE 75 psi and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 6 ft from the exposed face; or the stream will be delivered through a 1-1/2 inch nozzle set at a discharge angLe of 15 percent with a nozzle pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 10 ft from the exposed face; or the stream will be delivered through a 2-1/2 inch )27 national standard playpipe equipped with 1-1/2 inch tip, nozzle pressure of 30 psi, located 20 Et from the exposed face; or the stream will be in accordance with NucLear Mutual Limited Appendix A-14, which follows a modified IEEE 634.

II Penetration openings Eor ventilation systems are protected by fire dampers having a rating equivalent to 'that required of the barrier per NFPA-90A, "Air 27 Conditioning and Ventilating Systems" with the following exceptions:

a) Exhaust and intakes at exterior walls, stacks and roofs. Because these walls are not contiguous with fire areas, it was not necessary to provide fire dampers ~

b) Transfer air from RAB, HVAC equipment room to the tank area Elevation 286 because the tank area has negligible combustibles')

Ductwork identified in the SSA Fire A

Damper Deviation.

When a high-combustible fire load is present, automatic fusible link closing and manual reopening fire dampers are provided in ventilation openings through 9.5.1-13 Amendment No. 27

SHNP P F SAR fire barrier ~alls which are nor. provided with ductwork on either side (for example, in make-up air transEer griLL openings in the walls of the diesel

~

fuel oiL pump rooms).

fn most cases, as detailed in the Eire hazards analysis and on the general arrangement drawings, more than one means oE access and egress are provided for each Eire area, suitably marked and emergency Lighted, to permit escape of occupants and entry of fire response personnel; PLant elevators and stairways outside the containment serving as escape routes, access routes Eor Eire fighting, or access routes to areas containing equipment necessary Eor Safe Shutdown (except Eor Turbine Building, which is an open structure), are encased in towers having 2-hour fire rating as required by the HFPA Life SaEety Code and provided with Class B self-closing Eire doors rated at 1-L/2 hour. Fire exit rouces are clearly marked by means oE exit signs Administrative operating procedures

~ will govern operation of eLevators during Eire emergencies.

Mails and structural materials are non-combustible. Other interior finish materiaLs, including thermal insulation, radiation shielding, and sound-proofing are non-combustible or have a flame spread, smoke and EueL contribution of 50 or Less as defined in ASTH F.-84, "Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Haterials."

MateriaLs used as interior finish without evidence oE test and listing by a nationally recognized laboratory are the EoLlowing:

L) - Plaster, gypsum plasterboard (gypsum wallboard), or painted with oil- or water-base paint

2) Ceramic tile, ceramic panels

3) Class

4) Concrete blocks, plain or painted

5) Steel panels, painted

6) Vinyl tile, vinyL-asbestos tile The use oE plastic materials is minimized. Plastics are used only where required as essentiaL equipment and to the minimum extent possible, as detailecLin the Eire hazards analysis. A smalL quantit~of vinyl is used wl thI r+

rl 'lr'.~ r C~

1 ~A~ r t vw1 motor controL center an Eor tr<mming <<

25 cable tray edges for cable exarch rom trays. Standard Products guickedge Hinitrim Part Ho. 75000341, which is a vinyl, was selected Eor thi,s appLication. its use is Limited. The "guickedge" vinyl is self-extinguishing passing Federal SpeciEication FSS-302. PVC is used Eor raceways embedded in concrete or under round application Mat r p~cM wg~

ct ~~ ~~ ~ + 1

~7 ~ ~~~.

C W~ ~~~~ ~ ~~~~

47 p

~

d4 4' WWOW~a~~

~ ZMSHR7

~~ace Mme i

~~~

~ cZ~~~

~

S!L'HAPP FSAR

1) Outside containment, where cabLes or equipment (including associated non-essential circuits that could prevent operation or cause f27 maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or short to gxound) of redundant safe shutdown divisions of systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions are Located within the same fire area outside of-primary containment, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant divisions is Eree of fire damage is provided: )27 (a) Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant safe shutdown divisions by a Eire barrier having a 3-hour rating or equivalent. Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers is protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier.

(b) Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant safe shutdown divisions by a horizontal distance of i 27 more than 20 Eeet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, Eire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system is installed in the fire area.

(c) Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, Eire detectors and an automatic fire suppression .system are instaLled in the fire area.

2) One of the Eire protection means specified above or one of the following Eire protection means below provided fox inside containment:

(a) Separation oE cables and equipment and associated non-essential circuits of redundant safe shutdown divisions by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fixe hazards,'b)

Installation of fire detectors and automatic Eire suppression system in the fixe area; or (c) Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-essential circuits of redundant safe shutdown divisions by a ) "7 noncombustible radiant energy shield.

Specific design details are provided in the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire.

c) Fire Protection of Cables and Circuitr - Safety related cable trays and circuits are isolated or protected from the effects of fire through enclosure with fire resisting barriers, physical isolation, spatial separation, non-combustible covering, fire prevention through provision of automatic sprinkler systems or any combination of these methods, to ensure the integrity of essential electric circuitry'eeded during the fire fox safe shutdown of the plant and for fire controls Generally wiring runs outside of cable trays are enclosed in metallic conduit to reduce the exposure of the cable to ignition and combustible loading of the area. However, occasionally, 9.5.1-17 Amendment No. 27

SIClPP FSAR when a cable tray passes over a piece of equipment, cable feeding this equipment drops out of the tray into the top of the equipment without conduit. Such runs are limited to a maximum of approximately three (3) feet in Length.

Several approaches are used to limit the hazard presented by combustible cable insulation. All electrical raceway cable construction, as a minimum, meet the IEEE-383"74 flame test, except in a Limited number of places, as outlined in the Eire hazards analysis. Low voltage lighting and communication cable does not meet IEEE-383 qualification but runs only in metalLic conduit or underground. Additional fire protection Eor concentration of cables is provided, as required. Cable insulating materials which do not create hazardous concentrations of corrosive or toxic gas when overheated or when exposed to flames are used to the extent practicable, as detailed in the fire hazards analysis, Section 9.5.1.3 and Appendix 9.5A.

Cable tray construction materials are non-combustible and satisEy the requirements of ASTM E-136. For cable tray fill and derating allowance provided, refer to Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2. Cable trays and conduit are used Eor cables only'miscellaneous storage is not permitted in cable trays, raceways, trenches or culverts. Interior high voltage ampere transformers located in safety related structures are of the dry type.

Cable, cable tray and conduit penetrations of fire barriers (vertical and horizontal) are sealed (fire stops) to give protection at least equivalent to that required for the fire barriers. Fire stops at penetrations of cable Subdivisions' trays through fire barriers and all floors are designed to meet the requirements of NFPA 803 1978'ection 6-3, "Protection of Openings in Fire Walls and "

Fire breaks and crossover protection Eor cable trays criteria is based on guidance from NRC and NML.

Fire breaks are provided as detailed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis along horizontal, vertical and horizontal/vertical. cable tray runs, at intervals dictated by the safety function performed, type of trays, and runs. In determining the Eire break spacing, the fire stops provided at penetrations are considered as Eire breaks.

Fire breaks are PACHA~~ ~ P Fire protection for are s containin'g cab es and circ entry is achieved i the 4d design of the plant through a combination of the following (detailed in the fire hazards analysis):

1) For early warning of fire conditions in the cables, ionization type smoke detectors are provided along major cable tray runs throughout the plant.

9.5.1-18 Amendment No 27

~ ~

S!Ci? P F SAR

2) For contxol and minimixation of fire effects, either in case of significant cable combustible loading within the same safety train, or for congested runs of cable trays (outside the cabl.e spreading roam) where redundant trains may expose each other, or may be exposed to a common fire, automatic suppression systems located above the tra'ys at the ceiling level and manual. backup capabilities were considered and pxavided, as required.

3) For essential electxic circuits integrity assurance needed during safe shutdown of the plant and Eor Eire control. the electrical. cabLes are designed to allow wetting without electrical EauLting.

Safety rel.ated equipment that does not itself requixe ~ater protection, but which could be advexsely affected by the operation of sprinklers Eor such cable trays, are physically protected from sprinkler operation or malfunction, as detailed in the Fire Hazards Analysis.

In the cable spreading rooms, cabling Eox redundant safety trains+A and+

are separated by thxee hour fire barriers except as described in Section 9.5.1.2.4. For detailed descriptions of fire protection features provided for various areas containing Class IE equipment and cabKes refer to.

1) Control Room, See Section 9.5.1.2.4,a

2) Cabl.e Spx'eading Rooms, See Section 9.5.1.2.4.c 27

3) Camputer Room See Section 9.5.1.2.4.d

4) Switchgear Rooms - See Section 9.5.1.2.4.e

5) Remote Safety Related Panel.s - See Section 9.5.1 ~ 2.4.f

6) Battery Rooms See Section 9.5.1.2.4.g 9.5.1.2.3 Fire Protection (Active Systems)

The Fire Protection System encompasses the following:

a) Mater supply and distribution system, including the fixe pumps> yard and interior distribution piping.

b) Automatic suppression systems.

c) Fire detection system, covexing detection of fire, automatic suppression systems actuation, fire protection equipment supervision and signaling.

d) Manual Eire response equipment such as portable fire extinguishers,

.hose stations, breathing equipment, protective clothing, emergency use of

. plant coaxnunication equipment, access emergency lighting.

4 C 1 9.5.1-19 Amendment No. 27

Sii::PP FSAR traveLing sc.eens axe pxovided at the intake structure Eor the removal oi which may be present in the water. (Fox more details, see larger impu itios rv>c description of ~Water systems, Section 9.2.1.) Although the water supply serves as the service ultimate heat sink and also as the fire protection water supply, with sufficient capacity foz both functions, fire protection system failure will not degrade the ultimate heat sink function (see Section 9.2.5).

Fire Pumps Fixe pumps and controllers are installed in accordance with NFPA 20. Water is supplied from the Auxiliary Reservoir by two 100 percent capacity outdoor type, vertical, 2,500 gpm, 125 psi Eire pumps. Each Eire pump is capable oE delivering 3,000 gpm at approximately 110 psig, and 150 percent of rated capacity at not less than 65 pez'cent oE rated head. Each pump is also capable oE delivering the design demand over the longest route of the water supply system. One electric motor driven Eire pump and one diesel engine driven Eire pump, suitabLe Eor outdoor operation, are installed outdoors at opposite ends oE the Emergency Service Water Screening Structure which produces spatial sepaxation in lieu of a Eirewall. The electric motor driven pump is UL listed. The diesel engine driven pump is FM approved. Both pump controllers ere UL Listed and FM approved. There are no spec Eic requirements in NFPA 20 that eLectz ic motors Eor fire pumps be listed or appxoved by an independent laboratory and, therefore, they are not listed. Each pump has a separate intake and discharges through independent undexground connections into the main Eire 1.oop (see Figure 9.5.1-1). Adequate isolation is provided between pump installations to,prevent Loss oE service of more than one pump in event oE a single Eize occurrence.

The largest firewater flow a'nd pxessure requirement is 2750 gpm, 72 psi at the system interface valve Eoz the area below the turbine building operating floor (2000 gpm Eor the pre-action sprinklex system and 750 gpm Eor manuaL hose stzeams). This demand can be met by either of the two Eire pumps ~

Each fire pump provides the total Eire protection water supply requirement to the fire main loop, thus required Eire pump discharge capacity and pressure are available with either pump out of service.

The pump discharge connections aze separated by approximately 40 Et. to prevent damage to both connections simultaneously. The Eire main loop valves and fire pump discharge valves are arranged to permit discharge from either connection to the main fire loop. Sectional valves between individual pump connections are provided. No single failure or event in the Emergency Service Water Intake System will result in a Eailuze oE the Erre protection watex supply.

Alarms and indications of fire pump operating conditions, such as pump running, driver availability, and failure to start, are 6

rt~/~ ~ ~~ ~~oC~w~ W~~ r~m M~~.

9.5.1-21 Amendment No. 27

StL'zPP FSAR The fire pumps. are designed Eor sequential automatic starting on progressive drops in fire main water pressure. The motor driven Eire pump starts zz automatically when the pressure in the fire loop drops to 93 psig.

pressure continues to drop, at 83 psig, the diesel driven fire pump starts If the i

automatically. Both pumps aze stopped manually'. The water pressure in the 27 )

distribution system is maintained at approximately 105-120 psig by the 50 gpm electric motor driven jockey pump, started automatically on drop in pressure and stopped on restoration of pressure after a suitabLe time delay provided to prevent unnecessary operation of the fire pumps. A Low fire"main pressure zz alarm is not provided since automatic start-up of the electric driven pump is annunciated in the main Control Room via the Communications Room.

Power Eor the electric motor driven fize pump is supplied from a 480V power center, which is fed from a 6.9 kV switchgear that has an alternate feed through a bus tie with another 6.9 kV switchgear. Fuel supply for the diesel engine driven fire pump, a 550 gal. No. 2 oil tank, is J,ocated outdoors about 12 feet away from the emergency sezvice water intak5lsBuQture, suitably protected against fire and does not expose both Eire pumps to Eire damage. A 4

12 in. dike is provided to direct oil to a pit within the dike, capable oE containing the entire oil volume in case of an oil spill or tank rupture. A manual controlled drain system is provided in order to remove the spillage required.

if A pump test discharge header is provided of such capacity that the fire pumps may be given initial. acceptance flow test and periodic performance tests ~ The discharge of flow test water is sent back to the"reservoir. Water discharged from the pressure relief valves on the fire pumps and jockey pump are returned to the reservoir.

Distribution System The Eire protection water distribution system (Figures 9.5 '-1 through 9.5.1-5) consists of an underground 12 in. mechanical joint, ductile iron, cement or bituminous lined pipe loop around the main plant building compLex to supply the water requirements for fire protection systems and equipment. The underground loop is cross-connected in a north-south direction through the Waste Processing and Fuel Handling Buildings. The underground loop also suppLies the Reactor Auxiliary Building and the Turbine Building. In addition to the undergzound suppLies, the RAB and TB are cross-connected in an east-west direction.

zz )

These cross-connections are ductile iron, cement or bituminous lined pipe for underground runs and carbon steel pipe, suitably supported, for above-ground piping within buildings. Sectional control valves are provided to assure two-dizectional supply to all areas.

All sectional and isolation valves in the fire suppression ~ater supply system (except hydrant valves and inside hose connections) are either post indicator valves (PIVs) for underground piping or outside screw and yoke (OS&Y) valves Eor interior building piping.

The guidelines of NFPA 24 were used in the design and installation of the underground yard main fire loop. Fire protection main piping is not interconnected with any plant service or sanitary water systems.

9.5.1-22 Amendment No ~ 27

~ ~

S jP~P P FSAR Ductile iron, cement or bituminous lined pipe is used Eor the yard main fire loop to minimize the effects oE tuberculation. Flushing of the system is through the yard hydrants, hose connections and suppression system drains, Post indicator valves are provided in the distribution system as required Eor adequate sectionalization of loops and isolation of branch lines to facilitate system maintenance. Isolation valves are located in branch lines connecting to Eire suppression systems in the buildings to avoid closing sectionaL valves in the main loop. Sectional isolation valves are provided in the yard loop piping to minimize the impairment of fire protection water supply if maintenance on the loop or~yard hydrants becomes necessary. Sectional control valves provided in the pump discharge connections to the loop and in the yard main loop piping are positioned to assure supply of fire water systems for any area from either or both fire pumps.

Sprinkler systems and manual hose station standpipes have connections to the plant underground water main so that a single active failure or a crack in the moderate-energy line cannot impair both the primary and backup fire suppression systems Eor Safety-Related Areas. Headers fed from each end are used inside buildings to supply both sprinkler and standpipe systems in the Waste Processing, Fuel Handling, Turbine, and Reactor Auxiliary Buildings.

They are fabricated of carbon steel piping and fittings meeting the requirements of ANSI B31 F 1 "Power Piping". Each sprinkler and standpipe system is equipped with an OS&Y gate valve and pater flow alarm except that in the RAB the header supplying the hose standpipes is arranged so that the OS&Y gate valves in the header on each side of a standpipe must be closed to isolate the standpipe. Since this header is fed from both ends, the water supply to other standpipes served by this header is not interrupted. The Fire Hazards Analysis describes the methods used to protect safety"related equipment in each Eire area from water damage.

Control and sectionalizing valves in the Eire water systems are electrically supervised. The electricaL supervision signal indicates Qn the Local Fire Detection and Control Panels and at the Main Fire Detection Information Center located in the Communication Room. A common trouble annunciation will be given in the Control Room if any valve is out of position.

Non-freeze type fire hydrants, equipped with a minimum of two 2-1/2 in. gated outlets, are installed approximately every 250 Et. along the fire main loop in the yard area around the main plant building complex and are protected from mechanical damage Erom vehicular traffic. Branch connections from the main loop supply hydrants, hose station and systems at outlying structures. Hose houses are installed adjacent to each hydrant and are equipped with the standard complement of 2-1/2 in. Eire hose, nozzles, and hose-line equipment in accordance with NFPA 24 requirements. A curb box valve is installed on hydrant branches.

Screw threads and gaskets Eor fire hose and hose line equipment are American National Fire Hose Connection. Screw threads (NST) are in accordance with NFPA No. 1963. Each hose house is provided with two each adapters tagged "Raleigh Fire Department Adapter" and "Sanford Fire Department Adapter" which fit local fire department hose threads.

9.5.1-23 Amendment No . 27

Fire hose is hydrostatical.ly tested in accordance with the recosxnendations of NFPA 1962, "Fize Hose Care, Use, Maintenance". Hose stored in outside hose houses vil.l. be tested annually. Interior standpipe hose vill be tested every three years.

The standpipe system is designed and sized to provide, to the most remoce hose stacion, the fLov xate and pressure required Eor effective hose streams.

Opexation oE a hose scation associated with a particular riser is alarmed locally and al.armed and annunciated at the Hain Fize Detection Infoxmation 27 Center (HFDIC) in the Pl.ant Communications Room and the ConcxoL Room following sensing of vacer flow in the standpipe riser by system flow switches.

Sectional shutofE val.ves provided Eor scandoipes serving hose scations in safety reLaced areas are located outside the safety related areas to permit access during a Eire.

Portions of the standpipe and hose systems install.ed in the Containment, Reactor Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buil.dings, as shown on (Figuxes 9.5.1"2 and 9.5.1-4), are designed to be operable, if needed, foz manuaL Eire control in areas required Eoz safe pl.ant shutdown fol.lowing a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) ~ These portions of the standpipe system were analyxed-Eor SSE l.oading and seismically supported to assure system pressure integrity. The piping aad valves Eor these standpipes are designed to satisfy ANSI B31.1, "Povez Piping."

Normally, the posc-SSE standpipe hose station headex is suppLied from the fire pzocection crater distzibucion system thxough seismically qual.ified check valves. Following an SSE event, vacer supply for the post-SSE poztion of the standpipe system can be obtained by local operator manual positioning of valves to connect the Seismic Category 'I Emergency Service Mater System, located in the Reactor Auxiliary Building, to the post-SSE hose standpipe headex. Seismic- Categozy I vater suopl.y is provided for the Post SSE Fire Pzocection Standpipe aad Hose System by the emergency service vacer booster pumps. The ESM boostez pumps are normally used Eollowiag a LOCA to provide high head cooling wacex'o the containmeat Ean coolers. However, in the event oE a Post-SSE fire, the ESW pump (A or B) and ESW boostez pump would be 27 started. This azzaagemenc provides sufficient TDH to supply the two most remote hose stations with 75 gpm (each) oE water at approximately 65 psig~

The seismic check val.ves prevent oucflo'w to other portions of the fire protection vatez distribution system, vh'ch may have failed during the seismic ~~

eveat, aad thus avoid loss of hose line protection after the earthquake. AEgg ~

c) Self"Contained Breathin Eauiameat - Bxeathing equipmeat is provided as required for protection agaiasc smoke inhalation oE personael. required to be in plant areas to control fires or co continue vital pLant operations.

Self-contained breathing appaxatus, using full face positive pxessure masks>

approved by National. Institute for Occupational Safety aad Heal.th (NIOSH)p with a minimum capacity of one half hour, are provided for fire brigade aad control. room personnel'vo extra air bottles aze Located oasite Eor each self-contained breaching unit, used by fire bxigade and control. room personnel, with an oasite six hour 9.5.1-25 Ameadmeat No . 27

~ ~

~ s p

StL'gPP FSAR supply of reserve air and refilling manifolds for recharging air bottles. The six hour reserve supply is provided from storage cylinders, with resupply from an approved breathing air compressore The air compressor is equipped with a carbon monoxide monitor and with an air intake located away Erom dust, organic vapor and o'ther contaminant sources.

d) Protective clothin Protective clothing will be provided to members of the plant fire brigade or other designated personnel and is located in accessible locations for use of Eire response personnel as developed in the Fire Protection PLan.

Instruction in the use of protective clothing and assignment to personnel is a part of the overall Eire response procedures developed by plant operating groups')

Emer enc Li htin Redundant AC normal/emergency lighting (powered from safety related motor control centers) is provided in areas where safety related Eunctions are performed, in access routes to these areas, and for emergency evacuation.

'y Except Eor the control, auxiliary control and computer rooms, fixed self-contained sealed beam units with individuaL 8"hour minimum battery power supplies are provided in areas that must be manned Eor safe shutdown and for access and egress routes to and from aLL fire areas. Emergency DC lighting, Eed from the 125V station battery, provides lighting in the Control Room, gy

) auxiliary controL and computer rooms in the event that either train of the AC normal/emergency lighting is lost. The cable routing for the DC Emergency Lighting wilL be included in the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire and separated or protected in accordance with MRc ~'~ D.g. hag g. $ 7crea 'g g Suitable sealed-beam battery-powered portable hand lights are provided for

/

(sysvAVAjp&a) emergency use by the Eire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown. Spare batteries .are provided (see

+~ pygmy Section 9.5e3).

E Emer enc Communications Duri a Eire emergency, the eration and aintenance two- y radar,o system wil be used by the fire br'de and other operations pe onnel required to ieve safe plant shutdo . This system i totally in pendent Erom the pl security radio syste with the exceptio that bot systems utilize the arne antenna system wit n the plant. The wo radio ystems will not inte ere with each other in ny manner, since ey ope te at different freq ncies.

Fir ress@on Systems The selection oE type of fire suppression system, mode of operation, and performance criteria is based on the Eire hazards found in an area, the realistic fire expected and the overall fire control approach utilized for containment of the fire, limitation of damage and adverse effects on plant operating systems, and eventual extinguishment. sw Primary fire suppression systems Eor the plant discharge water through sprinkler heads, water spray nozzles, or, with the addition of foam solution, through foam making devices. Each system is designed, procured, installed and tested in accordance with applicable NFPA standards.

9.5.1-26 Amendment No. 27

(

7 )

c

. z(~~

~~CVPp ~NdP k~ 'P g) rc'~M~~'~~

~ ~WmWr C~ c~

CEJ ++~ wWC5~M g~ ~g~rn+ ~~ 7 ~

~~ ~.ca9~.~

~

M

~rc~~M~ ~~~~~

. ~F

~ Ck ~~~cEW~M~~'ZCS'A'~~~~<<~~~

~

>MMM ~c'~~

ct.Z ~A'wHW~~ ~ ~<< ~~~M c&wH.ej, M~Z~~~e

~~~~ 8'W~ ~

~~~~.CHa) ~&M g~4 ~'aa:~~~ ~

StLhtPP FSAR b) Fize detection devices and associated equipment are either UL Listed and!or FM appzoved and so labeled. They are installed in accoz'dance with manufacturer's instruction manual and NFPA Std. 72E.

c) The fire detection system consists of data signaling loops used to carry fire and trouble alarms from the local Eire detection control panels (LFDCP) to the main fire detection information center (MFDZC). The alarm signals are transmitted by a solid state digital multiplexing technique. The signal transmission system is completely supervised by automatic built-in-test-equipment and aLarmed on the MFDZC when a trouble condition exists. A hard"wired alazm is also provided from each LFDCP to the MFDZC as a back-up to the Digital Multi-Plex system. The detector power is nominal 24V DC.

The MFDIC, located in the Communications Rooms on El. 305 in the RAB, supervises the Fire Detection System of the plant including directly associated support buildings. The alarm status of each Eire xone is displayed on the MFDLC, CRT and printer. Included on the MFDIC hard-wized annunciatoz are indicating lights Eor the operational status oE the Eize pumps. The- MFDIC initiates a visual and audible alarm in the Main Control Room.

The control room operator, after receiving a Eire or trouble condition signal at the annunciator, will be able to sound the alarm and to give instruction to plant personnel needed Eor investigation and control oE the emergency through plant communication systems.

Power for operation of fire detection systems and for actuation oE fire suppzession system =is suppLied from the non-nuclear safety related balance of plant static uninterzuptible power supply. The MFDZC hard-wired annunciator is powered from the security vital bus, The Eire detection alarm panels MFDIC and LFDCP are supplied Erom the 60 kVA 27 Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) system. The SUPS system in turn is supplied from non-Class 1E motor control centers (MCC). Zn the event of loss of offsite power,. the station 250 volt DC battery which is capable of supplying the 60 kVA inverter for 3 houzs, is connected via the 250 volt Bus DP"1-250 to the 60 kVA static UPS system. Bus DP-1-250 is also connected via battery chargers to the Class 1E emezgency diesel generator manuaL load bLock. Figure Bel.3-3 shows this configuzation.

d) Each local fire detection control panel displays local alarm, trouble, normal and actuation signals. When a fire condition is sensed by a detector, a white xone light is energixed on the detector's respective LFDCP. Whenever there is a fire condition indicated at a LFDCP, an audible alarm (Eire bell),

which pz'oduces a sound distinctive from other alarm systems, is activated locally ag~e fire rane and at its associated LFDCP.' light is actuated oa J 27 the LFDCP~ Kf there is any required autonatic sctioa to be initiated for fire suppression the LFDCP performs this function. ,Zn addition, the fire condition is indicated on the HFDZC located in the Comtunications Room.'- Any audible .

alarm can be silenced by means of a pushbutton. Further, any local audible alarm may be silenced without affecting Che remote alarm on the MFDZC. Fire detection panels are aLso equipped with "lamp test" pushbuttons. A local graphic display unit is provided for the cable spreading rooms located in the Reactor Auxiliary and Waste Processing Building. Graphic displays are also 9.5.1-31 Amendment No. 27

SiiNPP FSAR a h) Eire rated barxiers i) construction techniques 1

The protection and extinguishing systems provided to protect the Control Room of the SHNPP and other operating areas containing safety related equipment, special. equipment and cables are as follows'.

a) The Control Room The controL room forms one Eire area and is separated from other pl.ant areas by three houx fire wall.s, ceiling slabs, and floors. The Terminal Cabinet Room and Living Quarters axe part of the Control Room Fire Area. A kitchen, ofEice and component cooling water tank are located within the Terminal Cabinet Room. Combustibles in the kitchen consist of limited amount.s of ordinary Class A combustibles such as paper tow.els and napkins. The combustibles in the Terminal Cabinet Roam are limited to cables within the panels whish are considered negligible. A fire hose station and portable extinguisher ax'e located in this room. The Control Room Fire Area is served by AH-15 (1A-SA) backed up by AH"15 (LB-SB). Zn case oE Eire causing a loss of the ventilation to the Contxol Room fire area, the ContxoL Room could be evacuated and safe shutdown wilL be achieved from the Auxiliary Control Ry Panel Room, per the Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA).

I AI.L'abling entering the Control Room -terminates there. There is no cabling

,The underfloor trenches Eor cables were reduced to the minimum possible. A cast-in-place concrete trench of approximately 11 Et. Long, 2 Et. wide, 8 in. deep is provided under the HVAC control board loca'ted in the Control Room. Covers were not provided Eor the trench, because of its small. size and location, internal to the HVAC control board. The Eire Loading of the cabl.e within the trench is low, less than 2000 BTU/sq. Et. No suppression system is provided. There are redundant saEety related radiation monitoring cables, installed in conduits and in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, located above the suspended ceiling.

As stated in the Fire Hazards Analysis, Section 9.5A of the FSAR, the 27 combustible loading in the Control Room is considered negligible. The 24-houx occupancy of the Control Room combined with the availability of fire extinguishers and hose stations mitigate the effects of an exposure fire.

The Control Room suspended ceil.ing is aluminum luminous louver type, egg crate construction. A perforated duct located above the suspended ceiling introduces air into the Control Room. The space above the suspended ceiling does not contain any cable tray, only conduits. Conduits, 4 inch and smaller in diameter, run through this space. The conduit are sealed in accordance with NUREG-0800 criteria. Automatic suppression is not provided, as there is no fire loading in the space between the suspended ceiling and the concrete

, Cdwcsg&.

87/ CPfEQ 9.5-1 (hluce -ozu) g+, /q8 ~ pm~5J>

Standpipe hose stations are located outside the Control Room. The immediate availability of these hose lines, together with the location of carbon dioxide and pressurized water portable fixe extinguishers within the "Contx'ol Roomy provide adequate manual fire protection capability for fires originating within a cabinet or console, or exposure fires involving combustibles in the 9.5.1-36 Amendment No. 27

0 I I SUPP FSAR hazards. When personnel and transient materials are present in the containment areas, Eire hazards and protection of combustible materials are controlled by administrative procedures.

Fire detection and suppression systems, to the extent practicaL, remain operational during refueling and maintenance.

One and one-half inch hose connections, equipped with 100 Et. of hose and water spray nozzles, approved Eor use on energized eLectrical equipment and on combustible liquid fires, are permanently provided in the Containment Building as standby fire extinguishing equipment Eor use during refueling and maintenance. Water supplies Eor the hose connections are shut off during normal operation by means of shutoff valves located outside the Containment Building. Therefore, during normal operation the standpipe and hose system piping remain drained.

Self-contain bre hing apparatus rtable Eire extin 'shers are issue<< provided ar the containment b 'ing e trances. Thes unit wilL be indepe ent of a breathin apparatus o air supp~1 ystems provided for eneral plan activ es and wiLL b clearl arked as ergenc uipment.

c) Cable Spreading Room (Figure 9.5A-9) Redundant cable spreading rooms are separated from each other by barriers having a minimum Eire resistance rating oE three hours or equivalent, except at points where the seismic cable trays are boLted to the seismic supports and form a part oE the barrier. This occurs in a number of places on the TSI ThermoLag three-hour rated barrier on l 27 the Cable Spreading Room B side. A fire in this area does not have sufficient combustibles to damage this construction. Automatic smoke detectors and preaction sprinkler systems are provided in the area.

Each cable spreading room is separated from other plant areas by three-hour Eire resistance rated barriers.

In Cable Spreading Room A, redundant safe shutdown division cabLes are routed. They have been analyzed in accordance with &6E~~peadM Details are given in the Safe Shutdown Analysis. ~ @PE~~ g~p~~ g.g /

(Afu~+ 0946),

The primary Eire suppression system in the Cable Spreading Room is an automatic pre-action sprinkler system actuated by rate compensated thermal , /g1/

detectors, located at the ceiling level. Cable tray arrangements were considered in the location of sprinkler heads to ensure adequate water coverage. Since there are only cables and panels in this room, the Fire l 27 Hazards Analysis postulates that transients such as oil, grease, rags, or solvents normally associated with equipment maintenance or repair will not be brought into the area. The preaction valve can be tripped mechanically at the valve or operated by manual alarm stations located outside the room located at elevation 286'. Inadvertent operation is precluded by the two-step discharge cycle of the preaction system which requires both the operation oE the preaction valve and fusing of the sprinkler head.

tL Smoke venting is accomplished manually through a smoke purge operation via control room operator, as described in Section 9.4.5 ~ However, should sufficient heat be generated by a fire to close the automatic fire dampers, 27 smoke removal capacity will be reduced.

9.5.1-39 Amendment No. 27

I 1,

~ wc ac~

~~ r

~

~44K

~ ~~~nn ~'CC

~ Z4a

h) Turbine Lubrication and Control. Oil Storage and Use Axeas (Figures 9.5A-34 through 9.5A-39) The turbine building is separated fzom adjacenc structuzes concaining safety-related equipmenc by a fire barzie" with a minimum racing of thxee hours. The Turbine Building design prect.udes the coll. apse of the building tovard the adjacenc struceuxes containing safety related equipment, thereby maincaining the Eire baxrier. Oaenings and penecrations in the Eire barrie s are minimized and are not Located vheze the turbine oil. system or ge" zator hydrogen cooling syscem creates a direct fire exposure hazard to the barrier. Automatic vacer spray syscems actuated by thermal. deteccion are provided ove" open oil hazards such as vaste oil, sump, and turbine oil. reservoirs and hydzogen seal oil units ~ Preaction sprinkler systems actuated by thermal dececcors are install.ed under the oaeraeing and mezzanine flaox s ~ Earl.y warning ionization type smoke detection is install.ed ove. major cable tray runs and in el.ectxical. equipmenc room. See Seccion 9.5A Eor addicional information.

i) Diesel. Genexaeor and Diesel. Day Tank Areas (Figures 9.5A-21 and 9.5A-22) The diesel. generators are Located vithin the dieseL generator buil.ding sepaxaced Exam each ocher and Ezam othe plane stzuctures and components by barriers having a minimum Eire resistance rating of three hours. The east val.l has an opening Eor the air incake which is considered eauival.ene to thx'ee-hour fixe resistance rating, based on physical separation from othe" structuxes ~

Automatic multicycle suppression systems axe installed in the dieseL gene atox rooms to protect againsc diesel generator'or lubricating oil Eizes ~ These systems. vill not affect the diesel. when it is running since the combustion air intake is Located outside the roam. Thermal deeeccors are used Eor actuation af the mulcicycl.e sprinkLez systems and detection of heat over the air starting units zone. Ionization type smoke detectors ax'e instal.led in the eLectrical. room. ULtravi~LeeLcccl A-ICC, deteccors are inseaLled in the diesel engine and vucsxae cne diesel. rooms Hose stations are provided in the corzidar LF~P

~ These hase scatians satisEy 27 Section C.l.c(2) of NUREG-0800 ~ Xn addition, suppLemental. hose stations have been provided inside the diesel rooms next to the electrical xoams to provide

'aaaitional fire fighting capability. Portable excinguishers are also avail.abl.e inside ehe xooms ~ Drainage for firefighting wace" is provided. The coneinuaus use of the normal vencil.acion e"hausc system provides smoke purging'he electrical. equipment roam empl.oys a recirculating system which

',upor activation of smoke detectors in the space can be switched to a once-thxough purge system. The systems used for these functions are descxibed in Section 9 ' '

day tank fox'ach dieseL generator has a capacity oE 3,000 gallons. and is

'he contained within its individual encLosure having a minimum Eire resistance hating of three hours. All penetration barriers and the door have the same Eire resistance rating. Thexe is a three-foot high dike in the doorway which Turbines' Ls abLe to contain 110 percent oE the tank contents'he tank is also equipped vi.th an automatic fill shutoff. The floor'drain is equipped with a normally cl.osed val.ve located outside the roam which vhen opened drains to the diesel generaeox sump.: The instaLLation of the day tank is in accordance >>eh NFPA 37: "Installation'and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines 'snd Gas

" The tank 'and associated piping are designed ta Safety Class 3 a 9.5.1-42 Amendmenc No. 27

I I S

IV~0/C I

Si'-'i-"P FSPX puxg'ng capability is provided as described in Section 9.4.9. A LocaL graphics disp1.ay is provided Eor the subELoor space to indicate the location oE the detector which alarmed first, thus directing the manuaL Eire response 27 to the origin of the Eire.

e) Switchgear Rooms (Figure 9.5A"9) - Redundant switchgear rooms containing safety-related equipment are separated Erom each other and other pLant areas by walls having, as a minimum, a Eire resistance rating of thxee hours. Automatic ionization type smoke detectors, pxovided in each room, a1.arm Local.l.y and in the control. room. Za3Qg ~~;>>~~~the-s~gaar cnoms-are-h

~LB '~8

'J~ixrrooms~rw~~ni.-y Eor-swicchgear~i~d~

oca ea an attery rooms Eor saf'ety the rooms. Hose stations are adjac nt to the rooms'...

Carbon dioxide poxtab1.e evtinguishers are Located in and adjacent to rHC8z7 Q Smoke is zemoved by the normal ventil.ation 27 system Eoz this azea which is switched remote-manua1.1.y to once-through purge }

ooeration as described in Section 9.4.5. Howeverp shoul.d sufficient heat be generated by a fize to c1ose automatic fize dampers; smoke xemoval. capacity wiLL be reduced. Rexe to Appendi= 9.5A.B and 9.5A.9 for additionaL infozmation.

9) Auxiiiary controL paneL Room (Figure 9.9A-9) - Areas remote Prom the I 27 Control Room, containing safety related panels, are provided with detectors which alarm local}.y and alarm and annunciate in the ContzoL Room. Panel.s pzoviding remote shutdown capabil.ity are. located in the Auxiliary Contxo'L PaneL Room, Cable Spreading Rooms A and B, and th'e Diesel. Generator Building, which are remote from the Contzol Room and sepazated fzom other pl.ant areas by barriers having a fixe zesistance rating oE three hours. Pane1,s providing remote shutdown in the Au iliary ControL Panel Room and those in the Control Room are el.ectrically isol.ated and are connected to redundant transfer panels each of which are located in separate fire areas. Lonization detectors in the Auxiliary ControL Panel. Room aLarm Local.ly and alarm and annunciate in the Control. Room. PortabLe extinguishe s and manual hose stations az'e availab1.e in the area. Redundant safety rel.ated panels required for Safe Shutdown are separated as described in the Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire.

tourney contxolled in these areas.

Combustible material.s aze strictl.y g) Battery Rooms (Figure 9.5A-9) - The battery rooms are separated from each (

27 other and othex plant areas by bazriers having a minimum Eire xesistance rating oE thzee hours incl.uding penetrations and openings'C switchgear and inverters are not located in the battery rooms, but are Located in the 's adjacent switchgear rooms. Automatic ionization smoke detection

' ' type Jv<cdtg'&

provided inside tha tartary Battery chargers are so regulated that overcharging with resultant liberation of free hydrogen gases is minimized. The rooms aze provided with adequate ventilation (see Rection 9.d.ga2.2) to maintain the concentration oi hydrogen gas reieased into } 27 any room air belo~ the specified 1.imits. Air flow switches are provided Eor he battery rooms with alaxm and annunciation in the Control Room, as shown in ig<<e 7.3.1-21. Standpipey hose stations, and portable extinguishexs are

~

27 xeadily avail. able outside the rooms.

~ ~

9.5. 1-41 Amendment No ~ 27

I I W

AXC +~

g

\

.1 II

~~8~~

Z.C PC P'z,w

&MAC oz M NKD/C'g/

SKIP FSAR C

Decontamination areas in the Waste Processing Building are equipped with automatic smoke detectors and are protected by standpipe hoselines and portable Eire extinguishers. Manual Eire alarm stations are provided at strategic locations throughout the building, xn the vicinity of hose stations. They alarm locally and annunciate in the Control Room via the Communications Room.

p) Safety Related Water Tanks (Figure 9.5A-ll) - The refueling water storage tank, reactor makeup water storage tank, and the condensate storage tank are Located in the Tank Building. Standpipe hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided. No safety related tanks are exposed to the outdoors, with the exception of the reactor makeup water storage tank and the refueling water storage tank which are located in the open within the Tank Building (see Figure 9.5A-11). Combustible materials are not stored next to these tanks.

q) Cooling Tower (Figure 1.2.2-1) The hype boljc, Cooling Tower is of non-combustible construction. Its basin is not >e ulcc 8 Eor fire protection 27 water supply. Yard hydrants and hoselines are provided in the immediate vicinity of the cooling tower at strategic Locations. A fire at the cooling tower will not adverseLy affect any safety-related system or component.

r) Miscellaneous Areas (Figure 1.2.2-2) Miscellaneous areas such as plant administrative offices, shops,"warehouses, and auxiliary boilers are located so that a fire or effects of a Eire, including-smoke, do not adversely

" 'affect any safety related systems or equipment, since most of these areas are located in separate, detached buildings. Fire protection consisting of sprinklers, standpipe and hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided', as dictated by the Eire loadings. present in these 'areas.

The record storage EaciLity is enclosed within 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire rated barriers constructed in accordance with ANSI N45.2.9 1974 as referenced by Regulatory Guide 1.88, Revision 2. It is located in the Administration Building, separate from main plant structures and does not present a fire exposure to any safety related equipment. Fire protection for the record storage facility is in accordance with NFPA standard 12A and consists of an automatic Halon 1301 system, providing a 6 percent concentration within ten seconds from the discharge. A cross-zoned detection system utilizing thermal and ionization is installed Eor the automatic release of the agent. The same detection system is used for early warning of a smoke condition and automatic closure of dampers and fire doors. Fire protection Eor the Administration Building consists of a sprinkler system, portable extinguishers, and standpipe hoselines.

The fuel oil tanks for auxiliary boilers are above ground surrounded by dikes sized to contain the entire tank content of oil and are equipped with a semi-fixed manual foam system.

27 s) Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange Resins (Figure 1.2.2-2) - Bulk i resins storage is maintained in an area t.'hat does not house or expose areas containing safety related systems'ortable extinguishers and standpipe hoselines are provided for these areas. Selected storage areas are adequately drained, and curbed as necessary.

9.5.1-45 Amendment No. 27

e: S1BPP FSAR I

3) Exposure fire, heat, smoke, or water exposure, including those that may necessitate evacuation from areas that are required to be attended for safe shutdown.

4) Fire in Control 'Room or other locations having critical safety-related functions.

5) Lack of adequate access or smoke removal facilities that impede Eire extinguishment in safety-related areas.

6) Lack of explosion-prevention measures.

27

7) Loss of electric power or control circuits.

8) Inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems.

As stated in Subsections 9.5.1.1.5 and 9.5.1.2.3, the evaluation of the consequences of inadvertent operation of the fire suppression system is addressed in the description of each system used in safety related areas.

These systems require two steps for the release of water, thus preventing any potential misoperation, mechanical damage, or premature discharge .of water.

Further> as detailed in each fire hazard analysis item 8, Fire Suppression System, equipment which could be adversely nSiewo imoacted automatic water w< by suppression system was provided with water-~ ana, foe enclosures,rt installed on pedestals ~or r

racks~

Water seals will be provided inside conduit entering power centers and motor control centers.

The fire hazard analysis was initiated by establishing the fire areas listed in Table 9.5.1-1. These are delineated in Figures 9.5A-2 through 9.5A-41.

Boundaries for these areas were based on the nature of occupancy of the plant space, the amount and distribution of combustible materials within the area, and the location of safety-related systems and equipment.

Plant areas important to the plant's capability for safe shutdown, such as electrical penetration area, cable spreading rooms, diesel generator areas, switchgear and battery rooms, were designated as fire areas. Other plant areas were considered as fire zones within the overall building fire areas.

Fire areas are bounded by barriers with construction that provide a minimum three hour Eire rating. Fire zones within fire areas may be founded entirely or partially with barriers having three hour fire rating 'or less or may be defined by the area limits of fire protection systems or of occupancies of different nature based upon the results of the fire hazard analysis'or each oE the designated fire areas, listed in Table 9.5.1-1, the fire hazard analysis, as detailed in Appendix 9.5.A, covers the following:

Identification b) Occupancy 9.5.1-48 Amendment No. 27

Sc IPP FSAR locaLized concentration oE combustibles, over the ELoor area within the sphere of in'fluence of the postulated fixe. For fire areas with multiple fire zones Located on more than a single plant elevation, the square foot area of the Eire area is taken as the, projected cross-sectional area oE a continuous fire Eloor barrier. Combustibles in fix'e zones are considered with regard to this area.,

The configuration of fire loading vaxies Exom area to area. Some areas are devoid, ox essentially so, of coinbustible materials', other areas contain one ox more localized fuel concentrations, spatially separated fxom each other. A Localized concentration of combustible material is delineated by finite parameters beyond which the Eire loading is shaxply reduced. Examples oE Local fuel concentrations include cable insulation in MCC units or electrical cabinets, charcoal beds in filter housings, oil in equipment resexvoirs, waste materials in containers or on skids, and similar items. Linear concentrations of combustibles are usually associated with cable trays either soleLy within the Eix'e axea or extending thxough several Eire areas by penetration oE .

intervening fire barrier walls'o simplify the calculation of area combustible loadings, conservative caloxific values, based on National Fire Protection Association Handbook and specific manufacturer's data (for cables), were adopted for classes of combustible materials which were representative oE heat values of specific materials grouped within the class. .These are:

Ordinaxy C'ombustibles 8,000 Btu/lb.

Ib Combustible or 20,000 Btu/lb (108,000 Btu/gal.)

Flammable'iquids Diesel Fuel Oil (No. 2) 140,000 Btu/gal.

.Charcoal ~1 GIAN Btu/lb.

Combustible loading for minor amounts of grease, integral with equipment, not e"ceeding one lb. each, was not inventoried since it does not create a significant Eire hazard.

Using manufacturer's data on specific cable construction used in SHNPP and the Btu content of the insulation materials, Btu values were derived for each running foot (RF) of 24 in. wide, 4-inch deep, 40 percent loaded, powex, control and instrumentation cable trays.

These are Power 200,000 Btu/RF Control 170,000 Btu/RF Instrumentation 155,000 Btu/RF 27 These values are then adjusted pxoportionally for trays of different width or cable tray loading (fill depth) ~ Maximum allowable fill is assumed and is based on plant design criteria of 30 percent for power trays and 60 pexcent for control and instrumentation txays. The running foot (RF) value reflected in the fire hazard analysis represents cable trays oE various widths and 9.5.1-50 Amendment No. 27

~ ( ~

4.5. 1.4 [nsoection and Testing Requirements a) 'onstru<.cion and initial acceptance pe.iod operational. integrity oE the FLce Prot ctLon System Ls assuhed byh

1) Lnspeccion oE Eire protection system comoonents and equipment h

according to des ign speci f icat ions and procurement documentat Lon;

2) InstaLLar ion of the Fire Protection System according to accepted Lndustry practice <

3) Inspection of the install.ed Fire Protection System against design-speci. fied standards or crite ia,

4) Testing of the F're Prorection Sysrems against design pe formance czireria. These systems are subjected ro pzeoperational.

and startuo tests as described in Section l4.2.2.

As an integraL part of the Eire protection system design, Eeatures were incl.uded to EaciLitate inspection and testing oE Fire Protection Systems. For examoLe, the Eire pumos are orovided with test hose man'oLds sprinkLer, water soray, or deluge system control valves are fitted with

> t¹ auto...atic flow-test connections and pressure gages; and detector relays and panels, and Eire-,pump controLle.s are 'equipoed with test circuit connections. AEter instaLLation, acc otance tests are perEormed in accordance with NFPA standards and Section 14.2.12. (Se aLso description of Fire Protection Quality Assurance Program, Sec" ion 9.5. 1.5).

b) Continuing PLant Operation Period - Operational integrity of the various components of the Fire Pr'otection System provided as pare of the plant design wiLl. continue to be assured through the imolementation ";

These procedures will. be based on the guidance given in aoplicable NFPA standards and regulatory guide'ines. I hrh St h' ~

gee 4 *hhhhh <,h, Vyh h

These detailed procedures ~iLL be developed as an integral. part oi the plant ooe.aring procedures. (Se Section 9.5.1.5.c).

9.5.l..5 Personnel ual.iEicar.ion and Training a) Fire Protection Engine ring and Plant PersonneL Fire Training Fire Protection Enginee. Qualifica<.'ions -.'Ln orde. -to provide a unified and effective Fire Pror.ection System, qualified tice protecti.on engineers and~<<

consuLtants are providing the necessary 'expertise, during conceptuali=a<<os ',

design, construction,'.testing, and startup periods., Ln the course'.of .this work, they'.

h h

1) Analy"e Eire ha"ards and potential Loss exposures in pl.ant areas'<

9.5.1-53 Amendment No.

Equipment out of service including fire suppression, detection, and barriers Mill be controlled through the adcinstrative program and appropriate remedial actions taken.;

hc conditions Marrant remedial actions vould include coapensatory aeasures to ensure equivalent level of fire protection in additions to ti=ely efforts.to effect repairs and restore equipment to service.

S'."=-P FSAR TABLE 9o5.1-3 PRE-ACTION SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

1. Cable Spreading Rooms-RAB, Elevation 286 and Charcoal. Filter ~Rir Af~~

Cot.umn Lines 41 through 45, I through L, 27 RAB, Elevation 286.

2. HVAC (Charcoal Filter)

Room, Over Air Cleanup Unit-RAB, CoLumn Lines 41 through 45, G /H through L Elevation 305. I 27

3. Cable Vault (Elevation 240), Area Below the I 27 Turbine Operating Floor with Extension Over Oil Lines at Bearings of the Turbine Generator, Between Columns ll and I 27 27, Turbine Buil.ding.

4. HGV Room (Elevation 240), Area Bel.ow the Turbine Operating Floor with Extension Over Oil Lines at Bearings of the Turbine Generator Between CoLumns 27 and 43, Turbine Building.

27 9.5.1-76 Amendment No. 27

~:

SHNPP FSAR s

Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfm)

Exhaust Standby 0 N/A Smoke Purge 3 Standby 21,550 4 0 There are no radioactive sources in this area.

6. Fire Detection The type of detection and signal.ing system provided in this area and their functions are as follows.'ocal Main Fire Detection Control Panel.* Information Center Local~ Suppres Audible Det Ann 6 System Visual Alarm.

Fire Area Zone Tyye Basis Alarm Actu Indication .E 'Ann 1-A-SACRA 1-35 Ionization Area No 2C Manual Alarm Station Area X No X

- The local Eire detection control panel (1-LFDCP-6) located in the RAB, L20 Elevation 286 ft. covers the Eire areas and fire zones on the same elevation.

Local zone indication and audible alarm and annunciation of 'fire or trouble condition, are provided at the local control panel. and for a fire condition, an audible alarm sounds. in the Eire area.

7 c Access and Initial Res onse Access to this area is provided Erom adjacent fire areas: 1-A-SMCRB, 1-A-BAL (fire zones: 1-A-5-HV3, 1-A-5"HVA, 1-A-5"BATN) and 1-A-BATA. Carbon dioxide portable extinguishers are provided in and adjacent to the area in accordance with NFPA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided adjacent to the area.

8. Fire Sup ression S stem There are no automatic fire suppression systems provided to protect, this ar'ea.

e~~~r'cc~~~Z N+ ~'c+Cc ouse ~g ~g~c'. ~ cctucwcuscd g/'

czP~Z ~ ~~oC'~~/M~

mc ~~, ~~~ ~o

~~A~ (lC

SUPP FSAR Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel* Information Center Local"=- Suppres Audible Det Ann & System Visual Alarm Fire Area Zone Tyye Basis Alarm Actu Indication & Ann 1-A-SWCRB 1-36 Ionization Area X No X X 2(

Manual Alarm Stations Area X Ho X X

• The local. Eire detection control panel (1"LFDCP-6) located in the RAB, Elevation 286 Et. covers the fire areas and fire zones on the same elevation.

~ Local zone indication and audible alarm of Eire or trouble condition, are provided at the local control panel, and for a Eire condition, an 20 audible alarm sounds in the Eire and Initial Res area'ccessible onse

/

Access to this area is provided from adjacent Eire areas: 1-A-SACRA, 1-A-CSRA, l-A-CSRB, 1-A-ACP, 1-A-BATB, 1"A"BAL (fire zone 1-A-5-HVB), stair tower column 36-D and Turbine Building. Carbon dioxide portable extinguishers are provided in and adjacent to the area in accordance with NFPA 10.

Standpipe hose stations have been provided adjacent to the area.

8; Fire Suppression S stems There are no automatic Eire suppression systems provided to protect this area.

9 ~ Anal sis of Effects of Postualted Fires In Fire Area 1-A-SWCRB, the Switchgear Room 1B, area fire hazard combustibles include normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, conduit, connection boxes and limited amounts of cable insulation within control panels. Transient materials are not anticipated to be present in the area.

Ho~ever, transient materials, such as rags,'ood, solvents, etc. may be brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair.

The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires, and consequently the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced:

ATTACHMENT2 TO NLS-86-l88 MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES

I I

I

i"co

!mxi~

ldUb INDEX PEQQF II FENB LIPID j

LIMITIHG CONOITEONS FOR OPERATION AHO SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE TABLE 3-3" 6 RAOIATIOH MONITORING IHSTRUMEHTATIOH FOR PLANT OPERATIONS..................................... 3/4 3-46 TABLE 4. 3" 3 RADIATION MONETORING INSTRUMEHTATIOH FOR PLANT OPERATIONS SURVEiLLANCE RE(UIREMEHTS..................... 3/4 3"48 Movabl e Encore Detectors.......... 3/4 3"49 Seismic Instrumentation...........; ...................... 3/4 3-50 TABLE 3. 3-7 SEISMIC MOHITORIHG INSTRUMENTATION.......... 3/4 3-51 fABLE 4.3"4 SEISMEC MONITOR'ING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE

'E(UIREMEHTS............................. 3/4 3-52 Meteorological Instrumentation........................... 3/4 3-53 TABLE 3.3"8 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING IHSTRUMEHTATION............. 3/4 3-54 TABLE 4. 3" 5 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE(UIREMEHTS....'......................................... 3/4 3-55 Remote Shutdown System................................... 3/4 3"56 TABLE 3.3"9 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM................................ 3/4 3-57 TABLE 4. 3-6 REMOTE SHUTOQMH 'MONITORING IHSTRUMEHTATIOH CLIENTS SURVEILLANCE RE(UEREHENTS............................. 3/4 3-58 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation................:.. 3/4 3-59 TABLE 3. 3-10 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION............... 3/4 3"60 TABLE 4. 3-7 ACCEDENT MONITORING IHSTRVMEHTATIQN SURVEILLANCE I

R Eg U R o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3/4 3-62 Chlorine Detection Systems............................ 3/4 3"64

~ ~ ~ o gPWVel W ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o 3/4 3-65 TABLE 3.3"11 3/4 3 Metal Impact Monitoring System...... 3/4 3"70 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation... 3/4 3-71 TABLE 3.3" 12 RAOIQACTiVE LI(UID EFFLUEHT MONITORING INSTRUMEHTATIQH 3/4 3-72 TABLE 4. 3-8 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUEHT MONITORING IHSTRUMEHTATION SURVEiLLANCE RE)UEREMEHTS................ 3/4 3-75 Radioactive Gaseous'Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation.. 3/4 3"78 TABLE 3.3-13 RADIOACTIVE GASFOUS EFFLUEHT MONITORING INSTRUMEHTATION.:........'.'........ -..... - . -.... - .. 3/4 3-79 TABLE 4.3-9 RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLVEHT MONITORING -.-.,".:.; .-;

.SURVEILLANCE RE)UIREMENTS.;.;:--....-. 'INSTRUMEHTATIOH 3/4 3-82 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION......'......'......, . ~ ~ ~ 3/4 3"85 SHEAROH HARRIS " UNIT 1 vi

. 0/fgjnwi

,-;- f3 8Mb INOEX PROOF APg gp(( y ggpy ,

CONOITIONS FOR OPERATION ANO SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j'IMITIHG g g'FES $85 SECTION PAGE 3/4.7.7 REACTOR AUXIL1ARY BUILOIHG (RAB) EMERGENCY EXHAUST S YSTEM. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3/4 7-17 3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS... 3/4 7-19 FiGURE 4.7"1 SAMPk.E PLAN 2) FOR SNUBBER FUNCTiOHAL TEST........... 3/4 7-24 3/4 7 9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION 3/4 7"25 3/4.7. 10 GEt ETE~

3/4 7-27 3/4 7-30 TABLE 3.7-3 3/4 7-31 3/4 7-33 TABLE 3.7-4 ~ ~ o NLRB@' rm~o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3/4 7-34 3/4 7-36 TABLE 3.7"5 3/4.7.12

~trna AREA TEMPERATURE

.....PNSIICR MQHITORiNG.............

K LKW 3/4 3/4 3/4 7"37 7"38 7-40 TABLE 3 7 6

~ AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING.. 3/4 7-41 3/4.7.13 ESSENTIAL SERVICES CHILLED WATER SYST&....... 3/4 7-42 3/4 8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8. 1 A.C. SOURCES 0 peratl llg o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3/4 8-1 TABLE 4 8 1 OIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE 3/4 8"8 S hutdo'Hn o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3/4 8-9 3/4.8.2 O.C. SOURCES Operating......... 3/4 8-10 TABLE 4.8"2 BAllERY SURVEILLANCE REqUIREMENTS 3/4 8-12 S hutdown....................... ~ ~ ~ 3/4 8-13 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER OISTRIBUTION 0 perating............................ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3/4 8"14 S hutdown................................................. 3/4 8"16 SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1

INDEX Pkt)OI: hI'I flFJit,";] Ilo"'-'f BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE .. 8 3/4 7"1 3/4. 7. 2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION........... 8 3/4 7-2 3/4; 7. 3 COMPONENT COOLIHG WATER SYSTEM..... 8 3/4 7-3 3/4. 7. 4 EMERGEHCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM....... 8 3/4 7-3 3/4. 7. 5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK... 8 3/4 7-3 3/4. 7. 6 CONTROL RQQM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM............... .. o 8 3/4 7-3 3/4. 7. 7 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST..S.KS.6~8; .. 8 3t4 7-3 3/4. 7. 8 SHUBBERS.. 8 3/4 7"4 3/4. 7. 9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION.. 8 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.1O pG 8~-0 8 3/4 7"6 3l4.7.11 ~ ~ o M KM-D QglppT ~ oo 'I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8 3/4 7-6 3/4. 7. 12 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING............. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ 8 3/4 7"12 3/4 7.13 ESSENTIAL SERVICES CHILLED WATER SYSTEM.. 8 3/4 7-12 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL- POWER SYSTEMS 3/4. 8. 1, 3t4.8.2, AND 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES, AHD OHSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION........;...................... 8 3/4 8"1 3/4. 8. 4 ELECTRICAL EgUIPMEHT PROTECTIVE DEVICES................... 8 3/4 8-3 3/4. 9 REFUELIHG OPERATIONS 3/4. 9. 1 BORON CONCENTRATION...................... .. . ..... 8 3l4 9"1 3/4. 9. 2 INSTRUMEHTATIOH................ .. ..... .. ............. 8 3/4 9"1 3/4. 9. 3 DECAY TIME>> ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ 8 3/4 9-1 3/4. 9.4 CONTAIHMEHT BUILDING PEHETRATIQNS............ 8 3/4 9-1 3l4. 9. 5 COMMUNICATIONS ~.................................. 8 3/4 9-1 3/4. 9. 6 REFUELING MACHIHE...................'................. 8 3/4 9-2.

3/4. 9. 7 CRANE TRAVEL " FUEL HANDLIHG BUILDING......;.......'...... ', 8 3/4 9"2 3/4. 9. 8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND CQOLAHT CIRCULATION...............8.3/4 9"2 3/4. 9. 9 COHTAIHMEHT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM...'.'. '...;....::. "". '..-- 8 3/4, 9".2 3/4. 9. 10 and 3/4.9.11 .WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AHOoHEW AHD .:"':.::i ';-,:.:;;.':-

SPEHT FUEL POOLS...........; '........'.....'.....";.'."". 8 3/4 9"3

'3 ol 3/4.9. 12 FUEL HAHOLIHG BUll DING EMERGEHCY EXHAUST SYSTEM.....".;...." 8 3/4 9 3 SHEARON HARRIS " UNIT 1 XV

l'i330$ hN F36'J d 3uPj INSTRUMEHTATIOH FIRE OETECTIOH IHSTRUMEi'STATION L ITIHG COHOITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.

effect APPLICABI 8

is require s a msnsmum, n zone shown TY:

to the fire detection i ~Table 3.3-11 shalVbe Whenever equipment be OPERABLE. / I igmrumentation for each OPERABLE.

protected by the fire detect on ire instrument ACTION:

a. Nith an, but not~more than one-ha.'f the total in any fire zone,.-'Func-tion A re detection instruments shown in T le 3.3-11 inoperable, restore t inoperable instrument(s) to OPE ABLE status withi'n 14 days or within t e next 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> establish a fir watch patrol toy'inspect the zone(s) wi4h he inoperable/instrument(s at least once per hour, unless the ins rument(s)gs located ins de the containment, then inspect that co tainmeni. zone at leas once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> (or monitor the containment air t ture at least once per hour A the locations li ted in Specific~,ionpeter 4.6. 1. 5).

b. with more than oge-ha f of the F nction A fire~detection instruments in any fire zopf shown n Tabl 3.3-11 inoperable, or with any Func-tion B fire de%ection in trum nts shown in g~able 3.3-11 inoperable, or with any,two or more a ent fire detection instruments sho~n 3.3<ll inoperable, w hin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> est'ablish a fire watch patrol in'able to inspect the zone(s) wi h e inoperable instrument(s) at leask once per hour, unless the in rume (s) isyfocat'ed inside the containment, then aspect that cont inment z ne at'east once per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> (or moni-tor the containment r temperat ef at least 'once per hour at the 1 cations Iisted in Speci ficatiojn .6.1.5).

provisions Specificationd 3.0. 3.0.4 are ot applicable.

r C. The o and SUR I LLANCE REOUIREM TS 4.3.3.8.1 Each of the above required fire detection in truments which are accessible durin plant operation shall be demonstrate8 ERABLE at least once 6 months by erformance fo/a TRIP ACTVATING OPE TIQNAL TEST. Fire -'er REVUE detectors whi are not accessible during plant op ration sh 11 be demonstrated OPERABLE by e performance 6f a TRIP ACTUATING D ICE OPERAT NAL TEST during each COLO S UTDOMN exceedi g 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> unless per ormed in the p vious 6 months.

4.'3.3.8. The NFPA Sta ard 72D supervised c rcuits supervision a ciated with the de ector alarms, of 'ach of .the above req ired fire detection i s uments shall be demonstrated PERABLE at least on e per 6 months.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 3"65

~

I f TABLE 3.5-11 TOTAL NU ER OF INST MEHTS ELEYATIgH HEAT F 'E SMO' ZOHE INSTRUMENT LOCATION (FT) h (A/8)* /8)" (A/ )*

1.0 Contai ent Building*"

1-C-1-RCP-lA eac tor Coolant Pump 1A 256. 33 12/O 1-C-1-RCP-1B Reaa tor Cpolant Pump 18 256. 33 1 /0 1-C-1-RCP-1C Reacto Coolant Pump 1C 256. 33. 12/0 1" C" 1" CHFA Air orne dioactivity 221. Q Q/5 R moval Uni 1A 1-C-1-CHFB Airborne Radio tivity 221/ 0/5 Removal Unit 1B 1-C-1-EP Electrical Penetrat n Area lA 61. 0 0/12 12 1-C- EPB Electrical Penetration rea 261. 0 O/12 12/

. 2. Reactori~Auxiliar Buildin 1"A"1-PA 'RHR Pump Room 1A 190.0 0/11

'1-A"1PB RHR Pump Room 18 90. 0 O/11 1"A-2MP h

M isc. Pumps 8 Equ ment 21 0 32/

II 1-A-3"PB Auxiliary Feed ter Pumps, 236. 0 o/46 50 Component Coo ing Mater Pumps 8 Heat Exch gers 1"A"3",COME Decontami ati,on Area 8 236~0 0/10 14 Corrido Cable Trays "A"3-COME Letd n Heat Exchanger ,'236. 0 o/

rridor Cable Trays "A-3-CQM1 ecycle Holdup Tank Area >: 236.0 0/10 21 8 Corridor Cable Trays e

(A/8) A = The number of early warning fire detectors.

8 = The hnumber of detectors used for actuation of fire suppressi systems.

Th fire detection instruments located wi hin the Containment, Building ar not r quired.to ba OFERA8LE during the performayLbe of Type A Containment Leaka I(ate ests.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 3-66 i

~ ~

~ ~

~ ~ ~

~ g g ~ ~ ~

I I ~ ~

I I~ ~

p l I I ~

os . ~

~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ I ~ It ~ ~

I ~ ~ ~

~ ~

~ ~

g ~ ~ ~ ~

l ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

II ~ ~ ~- ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~

~

~

g

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ' ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ I ~ '

~

~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~

I ~

~ ~

g

~ ~ ~ I

~ ~ ~ ~

~ I ~

~ ' I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~

~ ~

~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~

~ '

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ 0 ~ ~ ~

LANT SYSTEMS

~ - -- -----  : -.'. "-

7ROtlF QD MNBf<0 FIR SUPPRESSIO SYSTEMS FIRE PR ECT N MATER SUPPLY ANO OISTRIBUT'ION SYSTEM c,o"

'uo t4 SURYEIL NCE EOUIREMENTS Conti'nued

d. At leas once per 18 months by performin~a system func onal test which in udes. imulated automatic actuation of the sy em throughout its operat g equence, and:

1. Veridic that each pump deva'lope at 'least L2 00] gpm at a discharge ressure of I:131) psig.

t

2. Cycling each valve in the flow path s not, testable during lant operati n through at least on lete +cle of full travel, and Verifying that eaN fire suppr pump starts sequentially to maintain the Fi'uppres ter System press'ur greater than or equal to L8 psig.

At least once per 3 years by, perfo >ng a flow test of the sys em in accordance with Chapter 5, Sgtio 11 of the Fire Protection Handbook,.

4th Edition, published by th N ional Fire Protection Associatio .

4.7.10.1.2 The fire pump diesel engine h ll be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At leas once per 31 days b verif ng:

1. The f el storage ta k contains at least t:130] gallons of fuel, and

2. The diesel ta from ambient condi ions and operates or at least 30 min t s on relief valve flow.'

. At least once per 92 ays by verifying that sample of diesel fuel from the fuel s rage tank, obtained in accor nce with~ASTM-04057-81 is within the cceptahleglimits speciried in Ta le 1 of ASTM 0975-1901 when checked or viscosit and water and sedimen ; and

c. At least o ce per 18 months, 'during shutdown, by tgecting the diesel to an in+ection in accordance pith procedures prepared in conjunction with its'anufacturer's recommen ations for the class of service.

4.7.10.1.3 Thy'fire

/ pump diesel starting 24- olt battery bank an ,charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

s least veri fying t t:

a.

'.A The once per 7 days by elec rolyte level of each ba .ery 's above the plates~ and

2. The overall battery voltage i greater than or equal to 24 S EARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7"28 '

i PLANT SYSTEMS Cg FIRE SUPPRESSIOH SYSTEMS <<

g( 'Q FIRE PROTECTION WATER SUPPLY~ANO OISTRIBUTIOH SYST h g)

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMEHTS Continued

b. At<Teast once per 92 days b).-vgrifying that the specific gravity is~~.

.appropriate for continued ser'vice,.of the battery, and At least one@ per -

months by verifying that:

1. The batt6ries, cell plates, and battery racks~how no visual I in ication oN hysical damage or abnormal deterioration, and The battery-to-battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anticorrosion m4epial.

<<+u<<rr,i~r<<~ erma~

SHEARON HARRIS " UNIT 1 3/e 7-29

~ s

~

)

~ ~ PMOF M'l IL~f'BI r>H LANT SYSTEHS'"-

/ e y'R CTION ANO HULTICYCLEiSPRINKLER SYSTEHS

~

g'b IMITIN ONDITION FOR'PERATION Eel 'l&c4Ted 3.7.10.2 Th Preaction and MulticyclerSprinkler Systems~<listed s e P ERA E'.

~/

APPLICABILITY: never equipment'rotected by the Preaction'and ulticycle Sprinkler System is required to be OPERABLE.

. a. With one or mo . of the above required Pre

/6 and Multicycle Sprinkler System inoperable, within 1 o r ablish a continuous fire watch with'b kup fire m ent for those areas in or for suppress'hich redundant sy ems componen s be damaged; othe areas, establish an ourly fire watc

)I

b. The SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

/.

provisions of Spec fications 3.0. and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

/

/'.

4.7. 10. 2 Eachiof the shall be demo strated

a. t above OPERABLE:

required P action and least once per 31 day by ver ying that each valve>(manual, po~er-operated, or automatic) >n the fl path is in its correct.position, Multicycle Sprinkle Systems

b. At least olice per 12 onths by cycli each testable valve in the flow path through least one couplet cycle ogf full travel, C. At least once pe 18 months:

1. By perfo ing<a system functional test hich includes simulate automat actuation of the system, and:

a) erifying that the automatic'alves in he flow path actuate to their correct positions on a ermal test signal, and

) Cycling each valve in he flow path that is n testable during plant operati n through at least one corn elete cycle

• '. of full travel.

2. By a,yisual inspectio of the+dry pipe spray and sprinkl headers to verify t eir integrioty; and

3. By a vis ql inspy tion of each nor. le's spra area to verify he spray patte n ~ not obstructed.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7"30

1'ROOF Ã$ 'EJlB APE TABLE 3.7"3 gLBCAO NQg- ".-;:r5 cv'i SERI a.

LER SYSTEM Ai orne Radioactiv

~ DELETE t>> LOCATION/EL ATION C.B. /221 b.

/

Remo al Unit - IA Sprin 1er (1-C-1-CHFA)

Airbor n C.B. /221

~ r

/

it-18 Sprinkler Radioactivity-'emoval (1-C-1-CH

c. Electrical C le Penetration Area-1A C.B. /261

. Sprinkler,. (1- 1-EPA)

d. El ectrical Cable enetration Area-18 C.B. /261 Sprjnkjer (1-C R)

. e> , Containment Spray an RHR RAB /190 Pump Room 1A Sprinkle (I-A"1-PA) l f. Containment Spray and Pump RAB /190 Room 1B Sprinkler (1"A"1- )

g. AUX. Feed Mat r Pumps RAB /236 y,>>

and Component Cooling Wa at Exchanger and Pumps Spri ler -A-3"PB)

h. Oecontamination Area a d Corridor RAB /236

~ Cable Tray .Sprinkler 1-A-3-COMB)

i. Letdown Heat Exch er RAB /236 Area., Corridor'C e Tray Sprinkler (1"A-3 COME)

Recycle Holdu Tank' RAB /236 Area, Corrido{. Cable+

Tray Sprink er (1-A-3-COMI)

k. HVAC Chil er Equipment RAB /261 Area and Cable Tray Sprinkl r (1"A-4-CHLR) I

'1. Boric Acid Equipment Area, Corr dor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1- COMB)

~

8 C rridor Cable Tray RAB /261 prinkl er (1-A-4-COMQ Column 43, E o Corridor Cable Tray RAB /261 5 rinkler (1-A-4-COMI.) 43, ! to SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-31

PROOF AttD "ltEN tlOP't TABLE 3.?-3 Con~u R ION AND MUL ICYCLE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS KLER SYSTEM LOCATION/ELEYATI N.

a a

rcoal Filter RAB'26'PRI

o. C Room ,

1A rinkler (1-A-4-CHFA)

P- Charco 1 Filter Room RAB /261 18 Spri kler (1-A-4"CHFB)

Electrical Penetration B /26@p Area SA Spr nkler (1-A"EPA)

Electrica)'errqtration

/' 261 Area 58 j Sprinkler (1-A-EPB)

Cable/Spreading Room Sprinkler (1-A-CSRA) C! /286 A

/ RAB

~

Cable Spreading Room 8 Sprinkler (1-A-CSRB) g /286 y RAB u HVAC Equipment Room RAB /305 (Sprinkler (12-A-6-HVT)

V Eiergency Exhaust FHB /261 System E-12 .{5-F-3-CHFA)

/'

X Emergency Exhaust System'E-13 (5-F-3-CHFB)

. / FHB /261 //

/

Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchanger s FHB /236 and Pumps ( -F-2-FPC),

/

/

Diesel Generator DGB /261 1A-Sprinkl er (1" D"1".DGA-RM) a a Diesel Generator '., ZOGB /261 18-Sprinkler (1- GB-RM)

/ a

b. Dieael Fuel Dig Day Tank DGB /280 1A"Sprinkler (1-D-1-DGA- K)

/

Diesel Fuel/'Oil Day Tank DGB /280 18-Sprinkler (1-D"1-DGB-TK)

Diesel O'ump Room Diesel Fuel /242.25 lA-Spri ler (1-0-PA) Oil Storage Tank Area ee Diese Oil Pump Room Diesel Fuel /242.25 18"5 rinklez'1"0"PB) Oil Storage Tank Area SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-32

PLANT SYSTEMS

~ Ql r5'o 4N5 ~~gP LIMIT 7 ~

G COHOITION FOR OPERATION PPLICABILITY:

77 7 e te henever equipment 7 7'~

moicit S~F~~~'qup~qm Lm-in the areas protecte 7

by the 7

ire hose stations is requi d to be OPERABLE

a. With one or mo iof the fsre ~el~l~( Sat.~

hose stations: ln

~R ip~e4v L~r &a inoperable, prov y gated wye(s) on the a OPERABLE ose station(s). iOne o let of the wye shall nnected to th standard length of h e provided for e se stat>on. The second outlet ofithe wye sha be connect length of hose suffi 'ent to prov>de coverage for e area e protected by the inopera le hoseAtation. Where it c routing of the fire hose wo d resu be dern n ated that the physical in a recognizable hazard to operating technicians, plant.. quip nt, or the hose itself, the fire .

shall be stored in a roll the outlet of the OPERABLE hose 'se station. Signs shall be mounte above the gated wye(s) to identify the proper hose to use. The ov ACTION requirement shall be,.

accomplished within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> i the i perable fire hose is the

.imary means of fire suppr ssion; o erwise route the additional h e within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />..

/

b. The p visions of Spec ications 3.0.3 an 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIRBIEHTS 77

.7.. E*

jcckii4tcP4 QRAs<cATlod .GpvtPhh~f Ltd RdGf26.~

demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least on e per 1 days, by a visual inspection of he fire hose stations cessible 'during plant operations to assure ll required equipmen is at the st tion.

b. At le t once per 18 mont , by:

1. Visual inspection of the stations not accessible duringqlant operations to assure alii quired equipment is at the sta$ ion,

2. Removing the hose foriinspect n and re-racking, and

3. Inspecting all gas@Its and replac' any degraded gaskets in the couplings.

T H&JS~ve~cQ,- (.~ ~'T V'~6'/4- l-33 o-)

" ire hose stations within the containment are required to be operable only during refueling and maintenance outages.

ARRIS-

s I ~ ~

av oW AT LEAST ONCE pER '8 YEARS y:

I. PARTl ALL/ oP&416+ 6 vER'LFQ QAI 9'6 0 H CK,Q QlULYQ 4l4+ t40 ~

~ATlOH V~VG TO ELocv ~y &D Z. Covnucm~ uosa vy~osvcvic. mes< ~w"p ~assume OP l Pstg ea bw u ~T'0 Wig A'B~C ~C ~1HV 4

>g,G mAiH oPewAt14+ 'FV~WgE, NHlCHCUGR. 4s G ~R,

TABLE F 7-4 TIO ELECTION HOSE R K NO.

CB '21 1" C-4 CB 221 1-C-12 CB 221 221-C-19 CB 236 236-C"4 CB 226 236-C"12 CB 236 236-C-19 CB 261 261-C-4 CB 261 261-C-12 CB 261 261-C-19 CB 286 286-C"4 CB 286 286"C-12 CB 286 286-C"19 RAB 190 190-G-16 RAB 190 "190-G"38 RAB 216 216-G-16 RAB 216 21.

216-Fz-27 ~

216"G-38'16-Gy;13 6

RAB 36 ~ 236-Gy-'13 RAB 236 236" G-16'>,,

RAB y236 236" Fz-27 RA 2/6 236" 0-27 RAB 2~& 236-G-38 23&, 236"Kz-31 RAB 236 i 236-C-39 RAB 236 X 236"Fw-43 RAB 236 236-Jz"43 RAB 236 236-E-15 RAB 261

. 261-Gy-13 RAB 261 261" E-15 RAB 261 261-G-16 RAB 261 261-0"27 RAB 261-Kz-31 RAB 261 261-G-38 RAB 261 261-C-39 RAB 261 261- Fw-42 RAB 286-C-15 RAB 286 286" E-15 RAB 28 286"G-16 RAB 286-E-38 RAB 6 286"C"39 RAB 286 286; Jv" 41 RAB 286 286 w-42

~CB - I Containment Building FHB - Fuel Handling Building RAB - Reactor Auxiliary Building OGB " Oiesel Generator Building SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 ~

3/4 7-34

e PRDOF MD RHaEV( COPY TABLE 3. 7-4 Continued

&KRE HOSE STATION OCATIONi ELEYATION Cg HOSE RACK B 261 261-J 43 261 261- w-43 RAB 305 30 C"39 RAB 305 3 -I-41 RAB 305 05-Fw-43 FHB 236 236-L" 41 FHB 236 236" L"45 FHB 261 261-L-41 FHB 261 1-L"45 FHB 286 86-L"27 FHB 286 ,286-N-36 FHB 286 '286" L"43 FHB 286 286-N-51 FHB 286 86)L-65 FHB 286 286" N-71

'H 286 286- L-,75y OGB 261 261-C-2 8 261 261-C"4 GB'B 261 261-B"f.

261"B-2

~CB ontainment Building FHB - Fuel Handling Building

" React uxH+ary-Bui-lding--GGB - Oiesel Generator Building HEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7"35

PR00F AN9

~e.r USB$

p LIMITIN i ONDITION FOR OPERATION

.7.10.4 fire ard hydrants and as ociated hydrant

/ y.i Th se houses~fven in e . -5 sh' be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

hydrants is required Whe ever equipmen be OPE

-in the areas protected b t yard fire LE.

ACTION:

'a e With one or mor f the yard fire hydrants r. associated hydra t hose houses glen 7'q. Table 3.7-5 inoperabilez 'within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> have sufficient additionafilengths of 2 1/2 @eh diamete r hose 1 ocate in an adjacent/OPERABLE fi'grant hose hous to provide service to the unprotecteda area(s) if e inoperabl hydrantPose house is the'imary cans of fire suppression; fjre hydrant or associated otherw Se, provide the add onal ose within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b. The rovisions of Specificatio 3'.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVCILLANC REOUI REMENTS 4 .7.10 Each the yard fire h drants and asso a.ed hydrant hose houses given, in Table 3. -5 shall be d o strated OPERABLE'y

a. At least on e per 3 days, by visual inspec 'on of;the hydrant hose house to ass re alVmquired equipment is at e hose house, vr

b. At least once p , 12 months by:

1. Conductin a ose hydrostatic test at a>press&re of 150 psig or at'east 0 ps'bove maximum fire main operatip pressure, whichev r is gre ter,

2. Insp ting all the askets and replacing any degraded askets in e couplings, an

3. erforanng a flow check of eac/h ydrant to verify ita P ERAB I LITY.

Visually inspecting each yapd hydrant and verifying that the.

hydrant is dry and is notfamage (to be performed during September, October, or November) a

5. Visually inspecting e h hydrant and v ifying that it is not damaged (to be perfo ed during March, A i or May) 1 SHEARON HARRIS " UNIT 1 3/4 7-36

PROOF AND A!IIlBY COPY A

LOcATI0 +~KTSQ H T:NUH ergency~Service Wa r Intake Strvctvre Emergehcy Service Water/r Screenin Structure

~ 1-4AI-HNS gI Oi'esel Gene tor Building Ho Side ei,, 1-48-HNS outh ide ',1-4A-NHS

/ Diesel Fuel Oi /S rage Tank L Building ~

i .. East Side 1".4V-KBS ~

West Side 1" 4H" HHS SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-37

PROOF AND RPllM t.'OP-HT SYSTEHS 3/4.7. n gg piB LIHITIHG CONO IOH FOR OPERATIO

,3.7.U. All fire ra d as lies (walls, floor/ceilings, bl tray encl osur es, and other fire barrie separating safety-related fire or separating

. portions of redundant stems important to safe shutdow i 'in a fire area and all sealing dev es ih ire rated assembly penetra i (ftre doors, fire windows, fire dam rs, cable piping, and ventilati penetration seal s shall be OPERAB APAJCABILI: Mhenever the equip nt in the a s required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. ith one or more of the above quoi'ed fire rated assemblies and/qr se ling devices inoperable, with 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either establish a con inuous fire watch on at leas ne side of the affected assembly, or verify the OPERABILITY of f e d ectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly and e tablish an hourly J

fire watch patrol.

The provis>ons of Specific ions 3.0.3 d 3.0.4 are not applicab'.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMEHT&

4.7.H..l At least once per months the above required ire~rated assemblies and penetration sealing de ce shall be verified OPERABLE y performing a visual inspection of:

a. The exposedg rfaces of each fire rated assem ly,

b. Each fire 4indow/fire dampe and associated hardware, h d of of s el ed pptCetration. If appa ent w'.

At leasf. 1OX each type changes in appearance or abnormal defradations are found, visual insp'ection of an additional 10Ã o ach type of sealed pene ration sgll be made. This inspection r cess shall continue until a 1%

Sample with no apparent change in appearance or abnormal da adation

~is found. Samples shall be ected ~c that each penetratio will be inspected every 15 years.

SHEARON HARRIS " UNIT 1 3/4 7-38

e e

PLANT EBS

~ --

~

F AHO FalBf Y I

I

)

1 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS Continued 4.7..2 Each of. the above required fice doors verified OPERAS by p 11 be mechanism inspec ing the automatic hold-open, releahg agd'losing and latches at least once per' months, and by verifying+

a. q OPERABILITY of the fire 46or super sion system for each electrically supervised fQ'e door by per rming a'TRIP ACTUATING OEVIC OPERATIONAL TEST..ht least once per days, b That each locked sed fire door is closed at east once~per 7 daysd

c. That door ithyautomatic hold-open and release mec nisms are free of obs ctions at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and,"a fu tional test is p armed at le t once per 18 months, and ~

r'.

at each unlocked fire door without electrical supervisi is closed at least once~ er 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

v SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-39

~

~ ~

vnaor M nwvxcoy; IHSTRUMEHTATIOH BASES Continued

'EMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM This capability is consistent with General Design Criterion 3 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.3. 6 ACCIDENT MONITORING IHSTRUMEHTATIOH The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that suffi-cient. information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, "Instrumentation for Light"Mater-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," May 1983 and HUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

3/4.3.3. 7 CHLORINE DETECTIOH SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of 'the Chlorine Detection Systems ensures that sufficient capa-bility is. available to promptly detect and initiate protective action in th event of an accidental chlorine release. This capability is required to+ro-tect control room personnel and is consistent with the recommendations f Regu-latory Guide 1.95, Revision 1, "Protection of Huclear Power Plant Con rol goom Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release," January 1977.

3.8 UMESt M e OPERABI of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that both equat warning capabils is available fot prompt detection of fires and Fire Suppression Systems, at are actuated by fire detectors, will charge extin-guishing agents in a tim manner. Prompt detection and pression of fires will reduce the potential fo age to safety-relate uipment and is an integral element in the overall 'lity Fire Pro ion Program.

Fire detectors that are used to actuate uppression Systems represent a more critically important component of pla Fire Protection Program than .

detectors that are installed solel or early fir arning and notification.

Consequently, the minimum numb of OPERABLE fire de ors must be greater.

The loss of detection c ility for Fire Suppression System , actuated by fire detectors, represen significant degradation of fire protects for any area.

As a result, th tablishment of a fire watch patrol must be initi d at an earlier s an-would-be-warranted for the loss of detectors that p ide only ear fire warning. The establlshmmnt-of--frequent fire patrols in th aff d areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperab trumentation is resto BILITY.

" &>taa<Hq

/4. 3.3. 9 ." SYSTEM HETM IhAPAcT M0HrNRI~Q OPERABILITY of the System ensures that sufficient capa-bil' is available to detect loose metallic parts in the Reac.or System and SHEAROH HA R~~ T 1 B l4&-5

P800F hHl) EPtlFH 5377 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES Fi8 o j

SHUBBERS Continued radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored

'an n ed not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

3 7. 10 PEMM~

he OPE LITY of the Fire Suppression Systems ensures that adequate fire suppression ability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion the facility where safety-related equipment is lo ed. The Fire Suppression em consists of the fire protection water su y and dis" tribution system, pre ion and multicycle sprinkler systems ire hose stations, and yard fire hydrants. e collective capability of th ire Suppression Sys-tems is adequate'o minimiz otential damage to saf -related equipment and is a major element in the faci Fire Protecti rogram.

In the event that portions of the Fir u ession Systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire-fighting equipme 'equired to be made available in the affected areas until the inoper e equi nt is restored to service. When the inoperable fire-fighting e 'ent is inten for use as a backup means of fire suppression, a longer od of time is allow to provide an alternate means fire of fire fighting t if the inoperable equipme is the primary means of suppression.

The Surveillanc equirements provide assurance that the minim OPERABILITY requirements the Fire Suppression Systems are met.

In th vent the Fire Suppression Water System becomes inoperable, imm ate co ctive measures must be taken since this system provides the major fi pression capability of the plant.

he functiona tegrity of the fire rated assemblies and barr enetrations ensures that fires 1 be confined or adequately retarde om spreading to adjacent portions of the ility. These design fea~Cs minimize the possi-bility of a single fire rapi involving sever~Mreas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishing o Ae fire..-Me fire barrier penetrations are a passive element in the facility Fire~tection Program and are subject to periodic inspections.

Fire barrier penetrations;"including cable penetratio barriers, fire doors and dampers are considered functional when the visually obse condition is the same as the asQesigned condition. For those fire barrier pelietrations that are not i the as-designed condition, an evaluation shall be performed to show that modification has not degraded the fire rating of the fire barrier p ration.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 8 3/4 7"6

I MloF No EilB'( I;OPT PLANT SYSTEMS .

BASES 4

During pe~ri ds of t'ai'eMen-a.kaLrier pinot functional",either: (1}.a.contin-uous fjre watch is required to be tiiaf~ned.jJL the-vicinity of the affected b rrier, or (2) the firy. detect'ors'n at least one side-efQhe affected barrier must be verified OPERABLE and'an hourly fire latch patro~lstabtished~ntil the barri estored to functional statu 3/4.7.12 AREA TEMPERATURE MQHITORIHG The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures. Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can cause a loss of its OPERABILITY.

Qck. do Ill 3.4.7.13 aK~P fg&

ESSENTIAL SERVICES CHILLED WATER SYSTEM f The OPERABILITY of the Emergency Service Chilled Water System ensures that.

sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

SHEAROH HARRIS

- UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-7

~

r

~

PROOF ANQ HEVID'l IlDPY

6. 0 AONIHISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6. 1 RESPONSIBILITY ..

6.1.1 The Plant General Manager shall be responsible.;for overall unit opera-tion and shall delegate in writing the succession to this responsibility dur ing his absence.

5 6.1.2 The Shift Foreman (or, during his absence from the control room, a designated individual) shall be responsible far the control room command func" tion. A management directive to this effect, signed by the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project shall be reissued to all station personnel on an annual basis.

6. 2 ORGANIZATION OFFSITE 6.2.1 The offsite organization for unit management and technical support shall be as shown in,Figure 6.2-1.

UNIT STAFF 6.2.2 The unit organization shall be as shown in, Figure 6.2-2 and:

'a 0 Each on-duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table-6.2"1;

b. At least one licensed Operator shall be in the control room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is in HOOE 1, 2, 3, or 4, at least one licensed Senior Operator shall be in the control room; C. An individual qualified as a Radiation Control Technician" shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor;

d. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Operator or licensed Senior Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation;

e. A te F e B gade at ast f e me ers" all main ined te all imes. The F re Br ade all no incl e the hift upend viso and e tw other ember of t mini m sh' crew nece ary for safe utd n of e uni and y pers nnel equire for her senti fun ions ring fire emerge  ; a "The Radiation Control Technician.k~nFire Brigade~corn psition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, in order to accommodate unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required positions.

r r

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 6" 1

l

~ 7