ML19326D414

Responds to AEC 721215 Request for Outside Containment Postulated Pipe Failure Safety Analyses.Discusses Methods to Be Used,Per Util 721228 Ltr,Ensuring Conformance Re High Energy Fluid Line Rupture Effects & Postulated Locations

ML19326D414
Person / Time
Site:	Midland
Issue date:	02/26/1973
From:	Howell S CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:	Giambusso A US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 8006110430
Download: ML19326D414 (4)

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[ h L C0ilSilm8TS P0"/8T Stephen H. Howell Voce Presocent cenera: ome..: aim w.. u cn.g.n 4..au.. sacuson Michigan 49201. Area Coo. 517 788 0550 February 26, 1973 ,g g .

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MIDLAND PLA'i2 d, U G, Pipe Failures Outsi he Containment 3- bdk1 i~

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• Mr. A. Giambusso, Deputy Director "

for Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing .

United States Atomic Energy Commission W ashington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Gia=busso:

Ycur lette ber 15, 1972 requested a safety analysis of postulai .pe failures outside of the containment structure. Our letter of December 28, 1972 stated that we vould respond to your request in two steps. As indicated in our letter of December 28, 1972, we are hereby sub=itting a discussion of the methods we intend to employ to ensure conformance with your guidelines relative to the postulated locations and effects of ruptures of high energy fluid line breaks outside the reactor building.

The effects of such breaks vill be minimized at least to the extent that the reactor can be shut devn and brought to and maintained in a safe cold shutdown condition. Systems which must remain functional to obtain this cold shutdown condition after rupture of a high energy fluid line include:

Reactor Coolant System Portions of the Makeup and Purification System used for High Pressure Safety Injection

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g ,' Decay Heat Removal System Auxiller/ Feedvater Systen lY' FY'

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Mr. A. Giambusso 2 Docket Nos. 50-329 & 50-330

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February 26, 1973 Atmospheric Steam Dump System Portions of the Component Cooling Water System Portions of the Service Water System Emergency AC Power Distribution System Emergency 125 V DC Power Distribution System Portions of the Engineered Safeguards Actuation Eystem Reactor Protective System Control Room (including its habitability syste=s)

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Certain ventilation systems, control instruments, actuation equipment, electrical cable, wire, and raceway circuits associated with the above listed systems are also considered essential.

It vill be noted that almost all of these systems are located, at least in part, outside the reactor building.

In order to ensure operability of the above systems, plant layout and structures are being designed and the designs reviewed within the constraints of the following criteria:

1. Only a single pipe break is considered.

2. Plant conditions prior to rupture are normal steady state or hot standby.

3 No accident is assumed to og:ur concurrently with the pipe failure outside the containment.

4. Loss of off-site power is assumed after accidents causing plant trip.

5 Capability must be maintained to eventually establish and maintain a cold shutdown of the reactor.

6. A single failure of an active component is assumed in the analysis of the accident and subsequent cooldown to the cold shutdown condition.

7 Failure in any piping systems whose service te=perature exceeds 2000F and also whose design pressure exceeds 275 psig vill be considered.

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Mr. A. Giambaso 3 Docket Nos. 50-329 & 50-330

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8. Effects considered must include pipe whip, jet impinge-ment, water flooding, steam flooding and structural integrity of compartments.

Design ar.alytical tools used vill include Bechtel's tcpical report BN-TOP-2, " Design for Pipe Break Effects", and the Jechtel code COPRA (for the effects of steam flooding and compartment pressurization).

The topical report BN-TOP-2 was transmitted separately to you by Mr. R. D.

Allen of Bechtel Corporation in September 1972. It it la found that adverse environmental conditions cannet be prevented in certain areas of a building, any essential equipment within these areas vill be designed for the vorst environmental conditions calculated.

The basic design approach on the Midland Plant will be to locate essential equipment away from areas containing high energy fluid l!ces. When the basic approach is not feasible, pipe restraints and structural barriers vill also be employed to mi* igate the consequences of piping failure. As noted above, essential equipment vill also be designed for the vorst environmertal conditions in the area in which it is Jocated. Redundant equipment within the same essential system vill also be located so as to preclude a failure of one " train" from causing a failu're in the other. Finally, valls adjacent to high energy fluid lines vill be designed to withstand pipe whip, jet forces, and missiles emanating from a failure of the line, if the valls are required to pro-tect requi. red equipment.

As indicated in our December 28,197P submittal, we vill a=end the Midland PSAR to include deta! led anal;rses cormensurate v2.th your guidelines " General Information Required for Consideration of Effects of a Piping System Break Outside Containment". The amendment will be submitted by Havenber 1,1973. By that time our design vill have reached a stage where meaningful analyses are possible.

Yours very truly,

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, AEC DIfrWTION FOR PART 50 DOCXET MATEF9L ~

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(TEMPORARY FORM) CONTROL NO:_ 1985-

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' FIIZ FROM: DAG OF DOC: DATE REC'D

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LTR MEMO RF2 'JDEd Consu=ers Power Company Jackson, Michigan 49201 .

wr han tr. unun11 2-26-;t 9-1 73 X TO: ORIG CC OTHER SE C idC FD3 x SEIC LOCAL PDR x

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m . Ainnbussn 1 sin.e4 CIASS: IliPUT 60 GYS REC'D

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m 1 d-329/330

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DESCRIFIION: ENCLOSURES: u -

Ltr re our 12n15-72 ltr.... furnishing info re postulated pipe failures outside of the containment ctructure......

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PLAIC NAMES: Midland Un:.ts 1 & 2 . . h

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FOR ACTION /I CORMATjoN 3-1-73 AB BUTLER (L) y SCHWEIiUER(L) SCHEMEL(L) KNICEION(E)

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INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION _ _ _

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P. COLLIIS MOORE MULLER WIIEOU L PIRIS CARTER HOUSTON DICKER MAIGRET L MCDONALD / KLECKER REG OPR ./fEDESCO KNICETON SMITH L DUBE y EISENHUT FILE & REGION (2) VIDNG YOUNGBIDOD GEARIN L FORRIS LAINAS PROJ .LE JER DIGGS L IIFO STEELE BENAPDYA TEUIS L C. MILES

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