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| {{#Wiki_filter:AC CElZRATZD DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRLHON SYFl'ZN REGULATO ZNPORMATZON DISTRIBUTION+STEM (RIDS)(ACCESSION NBR:8808050063 DOC.DATE: 88/07/15 NOTARIZED: | | {{#Wiki_filter:AC CElZRATZD DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRLHON SYFl'ZN REGULATO ZNPORMATZON DISTRIBUTION+STEM (RIDS) |
| NO~FACIL'.50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe'AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION POWERSPC.M.
| | (ACCESSION NBR:8808050063 DOC.DATE: 88/07/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET |
| Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MARTINPJ.B. | | ~ |
| Region 5, Ofc of the Director DOCKET 05000397 | | FACIL'.50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 |
| | 'AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION POWERSPC.M. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MARTINPJ.B. Region 5, Ofc of the Director |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| Forwards completed executive summary of App R high impedance fault analysis,per NRC 880606 request.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IEOZD COPIES RECEIVED:LTR t ENCL I SIZE: TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD INTERNAL: ACRS DEDRO NRR/DLPQ/PEB 11 NRR/DOEA DIR 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NRR/PMAS/ILRB12 OE LLZB NPJ RE FILE 02 DEPY EXTERNAL: LPDR NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ZD CODE/NAME SAMWORTHPR AEOD NRR MORISSEAU,D | | Forwards completed executive summary of App R high impedance fault analysis,per NRC 880606 request. |
| ~,NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/EPB 10 NRR/DRZS DIR 9A NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS2 RES/DSIR DEPY RGN5 FILE 01 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i'D 8 D D TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George Washington Way~Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No.50-397 July 15, 1988 G02-88-157 Mr.J.B.Martin Regional Administrator U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Attention:
| | DISTRIBUTION CODE: IEOZD COPIES RECEIVED:LTR t ENCL I SIZE: |
| C.Ramsey | | TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES: |
| | RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ZD CODE/NAME COPIES LTTR ENCL i' PD5 PD 1 1 SAMWORTHPR 2 2 INTERNAL: ACRS 2 2 AEOD 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR MORISSEAU,D 1 1 D NRR/DLPQ/PEB 11 1 1 ~ |
| | ,NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA DIR 11 1 1 NRR/DREP/EPB 10 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 2 2 NRR/DRZS DIR 9A 1 1 NRR/PMAS/ILRB12 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 8 OE LLZB NPJ 1 1 OGC/HDS2 1 1 RE FILE 02 1 1 RES/DSIR DEPY 1 1 DEPY 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 D |
| | D TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26 |
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| | WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No. 50-397 July 15, 1988 G02-88-157 Mr. J.B. Martin Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Attention: C. Ramsey |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| NUCLEAR PLANT NO.2 OPERATING L'ICENSE NPF-21 APPENDIX R HIGH IMPEDANCE FAULT ANALYSIS" EXECUTIVE | | NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 OPERATING L'ICENSE NPF-21 APPENDIX R HIGH IMPEDANCE FAULT ANALYSIS " EXECUTIVE |
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| ==SUMMARY== | | ==SUMMARY== |
| -During the Fire Protection Audit the week of June 6,, 1988, the staff requested that we submit an Executive Summary of the Appendix R High Impedance Fault Analysis upon its completion. | | - |
| That Summary is now complete and is attached hereto.Very truly yours, BLRQ 0 C.M.Powers NNP-2 Plant Manager Attachment cc: R.B.Samworth-NRC NRC Site Inspector-901A 8808050063 88000~97 pDR ADQCK 0 pNU F EXECUTIVE SUNNARY APPENDIX R HIGH INPEDANCE FAULT ANALYSIS PURPOSE The purpose of this calculation is to identify all"high resistance loads" and a single worst case"spurious load" on the Appendix R safe shutdown power distribution system that results from a design basis fire in each fire area;to ensure that safe shutdown capability is not lost.ASSUNPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS High resistance/spurious loads are defined as follows: EXPLANATION USINB DETAIL"A" A design basis fire (DBF)in a Division 2 fire area presumes the loss of"Appendix R Division 2 Safe Shutdown" (which includes its power distribution system)~Therefore, a high resistance fault on a Division 2 Appendix R distributio'n center is not considered as a high resistance load in a Division 2 fire area since the entire system is presumed inoperative. | | During the Fire Protection Audit the week of June 6,, 1988, the staff requested that we submit an Executive Summary of the Appendix R High Impedance Fault Analysis upon its completion. That Summary is now complete and is attached hereto. |
| However, a high resistance fault on a Division 1 Appendix R distribution center is identified as a high resistance load in a Division 2 fire area.For purposes of this analysis, a high resistance fault will be categorized along wit%spurious signals.For'a general discussion of spurious signals see Calculation No.NES-02-85-19V. | | Very truly yours, BLRQ 0 C.M. Powers NNP-2 Plant Manager Attachment cc: R.B. Samworth - NRC NRC Site Inspector - 901A 8808050063 88000~97 pDR ADQCK 0 pNU F |
| DEFINITIONS (AND SEQUENCE OF REVIEW): The failure modes resulting from a DBF that cause high resistance faults and"spurious loads" are the consequences of a single fire in a fire area, and are dete'rmined in the following sequence: a)High Resistance Load: An unprotected normally energized power feeder will fail in a manner to cause a high resistance ground with a fault current increasing to just below the fuse rating breaker trip setting.The interconnected control circuits in this fire area do not have to be considered since their failure would result in a smaller"spurious load".b)Spurious Load: If the power feeder is not normally energized or's completely protected in this fire area ot does not route into this fire area then the interconnected control circuits in this fire area will be reviewed to determine if a possible failure mode exists (ice., hot short, ground, or open)that could cause the load'to become connected due to a DBF in this fire area--that is a load that results from a spurious signal actuation. | | |
| | EXECUTIVE SUNNARY APPENDIX R HIGH INPEDANCE FAULT ANALYSIS PURPOSE The purpose of this calculation is to identify all "high resistance loads" and a single worst case "spurious load" on the Appendix R safe shutdown power distribution system that results from a design basis fire in each fire area; to ensure that safe shutdown capability is not lost. |
| | ASSUNPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS High resistance/spurious loads are defined as follows: |
| | EXPLANATION USINB DETAIL "A" A design basis fire (DBF) in a Division 2 fire area presumes the loss of "Appendix R Division 2 Safe Shutdown" (which includes its power distribution system) ~ Therefore, a high resistance fault on a Division 2 Appendix R distributio'n center is not considered as a high resistance load in a Division 2 fire area since the entire system is presumed inoperative. However, a high resistance fault on a Division 1 Appendix R distribution center is identified as a high resistance load in a Division 2 fire area. For purposes of this analysis, a high resistance fault will be categorized along wit% spurious signals. For 'a general discussion of spurious signals see Calculation No. NES-02-85-19V. |
| | DEFINITIONS (AND SEQUENCE OF REVIEW): |
| | The failure modes resulting from a DBF that cause high resistance faults and "spurious loads" are the consequences of a single fire in a fire area, and are dete'rmined in the following sequence: |
| | a) High Resistance Load: |
| | An unprotected normally energized power feeder will fail in a manner to cause a high resistance ground with a fault current increasing to just below the fuse rating breaker trip setting. The interconnected control circuits in this fire area do not have to be considered since their failure would result in a smaller "spurious load". |
| | b) Spurious Load: |
| | If the power feeder is not normally energized or's completely protected in this fire area ot does not route into this fire area then the interconnected control circuits in this fire area will be reviewed to determine if a possible failure mode exists (ice., hot short, ground, or open) that could cause the load'to become connected due to a DBF in this fire area--that is a load that results from a spurious signal actuation. |
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| | ENPLANATIQN USING DETAIL "A" It should be noted that the review of cables in fire areas is limited to only those cables that are potentially "spurious loads". |
| | As such, a Division i cable or Division i associated cable in a Division 2 fire area that is connected to an "Appendix R Division i Safe Shutdown Distribution Center" (which is most probably located outside the Division 2 fire area) does reqiure a review since a DBF in this Division 2 fire area is not permitted to cause the loss of the Division i load source: |
| | 2~ The assumptions and references that apply to each of the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Systems as described in this calculation in sections NES-02-i9-II, III, and IV also apply to those respective systems in this calculation. |
| | During the interval of time between the main control room evacuation and the operation of the remote control transfer switches, no high resistance faults will occur of such a nature as to cause coordinated "upstream" fuses to fail before the "down stream" fuses f ail. |
| | If the maximum 'net spurious load on a bus is less than 25% of the designed load and the resultant load on the diesel generatoris between 50% and i00% of its rated load, then no further analysis is necessary since feeder sizes include a 25% margin and the distribution b'uses are designed accordingly. |
| | Distribution centers that are (shunt) tripped by loss of "off"site power signals" and are not automatically (i.e., remain tripped until manually closed) reset do not contribute to the Appendix R distribution loads. |
| | NETHQDQLQGY A general approach to this analysis would be to analyze each cable in each fire area with a "cause and effect" relationship; the cause being a design basis fire and the effect being the worst case load on the required Appendix R distribution system. The sum total of the loads due to the design basis fire would then be analyzed'his type of an analysis would not only be very repetitious it would involve many distribution centers not connected to the required Appendix R distribution centers. A more selective approach to the analysis was taken by identifying the extended distribution system for the Appendix R sSafe Shutdown System. Since one of three different systems are used; depending upon the fire area involved, three "'extended" Appendix R distribution systems were identified. Each of these distribution systems contain all the load centers that would be connected to them during an Appendix R design basis fire (which postulates loss of off-site power). Every load center, such as switchgears (both 4ihOV and 480V), motor control centers, power panels, lighting panels, chargers or inverters that supply other panels that are in the extended Appendix R distribution system are studied individually. |
| | All the power cables (and their interconnect control cables) that are |
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| ENPLANATIQN USING DETAIL"A" It should be noted that the review of cables in fire areas is limited to only those cables that are potentially"spurious loads".As such, a Division i cable or Division i associated cable in a Division 2 fire area that is connected to an"Appendix R Division i Safe Shutdown Distribution Center" (which is most probably located outside the Division 2 fire area)does reqiure a review since a DBF in this Division 2 fire area is not permitted to cause the loss of the Division i load source: 2~The assumptions and references that apply to each of the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Systems as described in this calculation in sections NES-02-i9-II, III, and IV also apply to those respective systems in this calculation.
| | attached to the load center are listed and a circuit review is provided that allows tabulation of cables by the fire area they are routed into, Pertinent information relating to each cable is also listed. Once all of the cable reviews for each load center are completed, a review of a specific fire area is made listing only those cables that are connected to the required Appendix R distribution center. These loads are analyzed to ensure that they are not duplicated by "upstream" spurious loads on the same distribution system. For example, a panel feeder and its branch circuit feeder are in the same fire area where the high resistance fault load on the panel feeder encompasses the simultaneous fault on the branch feeder (i.e., the branch load is not added on top of th maximum panel feeder load). The resultant high resistance/spurious loads that are due to a design basis fire in the identified fire area are then added to the required Appendix R distribution system load. Justification for the continuous resultant high resistance/spurious load in a fire area is based upon the margin that exists between the diesel generatol 5 seven-day load rating which is 4900 KVA and the continuous load following a loss of "off-site" power (which is shown on Tables 8.3. 1 and .2 in the FBAR) coupled with the initiation of the Appendix R safe shutdown system. The task was divided into three phases as follows: |
| During the interval of time between the main control room evacuation and the operation of the remote control transfer switches, no high resistance faults will occur of such a nature as to cause coordinated"upstream" fuses to fail before the"down stream" fuses f ail.If the maximum'net spurious load on a bus is less than 25%of the designed load and the resultant load on the diesel generatoris between 50%and i00%of its rated load, then no further analysis is necessary since feeder sizes include a 25%margin and the distribution b'uses are designed accordingly.
| | Phase I A listing of the Appendix R load centers was prepared to assign work and identify each worksheet. The three Appendix R distribution systems that identify each load center are included in Attachment I. |
| Distribution centers that are (shunt)tripped by loss of"off"site power signals" and are not automatically (i.e., remain tripped until manually closed)reset do not contribute to the Appendix R distribution loads.NETHQDQLQGY A general approach to this analysis would be to analyze each cable in each fire area with a"cause and effect" relationship; the cause being a design basis fire and the effect being the worst case load on the required Appendix R distribution system.The sum total of the loads due to the design basis fire would then be analyzed'his type of an analysis would not only be very repetitious it would involve many distribution centers not connected to the required Appendix R distribution centers.A more selective approach to the analysis was taken by identifying the extended distribution system for the Appendix R sSafe Shutdown System.Since one of three different systems are used;depending upon the fire area involved, three"'extended" Appendix R distribution systems were identified.
| | : 1. A worksheet was prepared for each load center in accordance with contained in Attachment II. the'nstructions |
| Each of these distribution systems contain all the load centers that would be connected to them during an Appendix R design basis fire (which postulates loss of off-site power).Every load center, such as switchgears (both 4ihOV and 480V), motor control centers, power panels, lighting panels, chargers or inverters that supply other panels that are in the extended Appendix R distribution system are studied individually.
| | : 2. A cable routing diagram identifying each fire area was provided in accordance with the example provided in Attachment II. |
| All the power cables (and their interconnect control cables)that are attached to the load center are listed and a circuit review is provided that allows tabulation of cables by the fire area they are routed into, Pertinent information relating to each cable is also listed.Once all of the cable reviews for each load center are completed, a review of a specific fire area is made listing only those cables that are connected to the required Appendix R distribution center.These loads are analyzed to ensure that they are not duplicated by"upstream" spurious loads on the same distribution system.For example, a panel feeder and its branch circuit feeder are in the same fire area where the high resistance fault load on the panel feeder encompasses the simultaneous fault on the branch feeder (i.e., the branch load is not added on top of th maximum panel feeder load).The resultant high resistance/spurious loads that are due to a design basis fire in the identified fire area are then added to the required Appendix R distribution system load.Justification for the continuous resultant high resistance/spurious load in a fire area is based upon the margin that exists between the diesel generatol 5 seven-day load rating which is 4900 KVA and the continuous load following a loss of"off-site" power (which is shown on Tables 8.3.1 and.2 in the FBAR)coupled with the initiation of the Appendix R safe shutdown system.The task was divided into three phases as follows: Phase I A listing of the Appendix R load centers was prepared to assign work and identify each worksheet.
| | An evaluation of each cable is made using the elementary wiring diagram to determine high resistance loads or spurious loads as required by instructions in Attachment II. |
| The three Appendix R distribution systems that identify each load center are included in Attachment I.1.A worksheet was prepared for each load center in accordance with the'nstructions contained in Attachment II.2.A cable routing diagram identifying each fire area was provided in accordance with the example provided in Attachment II.An evaluation of each cable is made using the elementary wiring diagram to determine high resistance loads or spurious loads as required by instructions in Attachment II.Phase II The individual load centers were following steps were taken: reviewed for correctness and then the All Division 1 fire areas were reviewed on every Appendix R Division 2 load center worksheet. | | Phase II The individual load centers were reviewed for correctness and then the following steps were taken: |
| These Ioads were reviewed and summarized. | | All Division 1 fire areas were reviewed on every Appendix R Division 2 load center worksheet. These Ioads were reviewed and summarized. |
| 2~All Division 2 fire areas were reviewed in every Appendix R Division 1 load center worksheet. | | 2~ All Division 2 fire areas were reviewed in every Appendix R Division 1 load center worksheet. These loads were reviewed and summarized. |
| These loads were reviewed and summarized. | | All multi-division (dedicated) fire areas were reviewed on every Appendix R Division 2 load center worksheet. These loads were reviewed and summarized. |
| All multi-division (dedicated) fire areas were reviewed on every Appendix R Division 2 load center worksheet. | |
| These loads were reviewed and summarized. | |
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| 4, All non-Appendix R fire areas were reviewed on every Appendix R Division 2 load center worksheet. | | 4, All non-Appendix R fire areas were reviewed on every Appendix R Division 2 load center worksheet. These loads were reviewed and summarized. |
| These loads were reviewed and summarized. | | : 5. Fire area RC-IIC, the 20'rea of non-intervening combustibles in the cable spreading room, was reviewed on every Appendix R load center worksheet. These loads were reviewed and summarized. |
| 5.Fire area RC-IIC, the 20'rea of non-intervening combustibles in the cable spreading room, was reviewed on every Appendix R load center worksheet. | | Fire area RC-X, the main control room, was reviewed in every Appendix R remote shutdown load center worksheet. These loads were reviewed and summarized. |
| These loads were reviewed and summarized. | | Phase I II An Appendix R distribution diagram was prepared for each fire area that indicates the total high resistance load including a single worst case spurious load along with the justification. These loads are considered on top of the normal operating load plus operation of Appendix R loads (see Attachment I). |
| Fire area RC-X, the main control room, was reviewed in every Appendix R remote shutdown load center worksheet. | | The results of this study are shown on the Phase III distribution diagrams which are included as Attachment III and the load summary sheets are included as Attachment IV. All the load center worksheets and cable routing diagrams were done on Phase I, an index of the load centers and the signature of the preparer and checker has been included in Attachment V. The worksheets are contained in several volumes that are identified as Attachment V and can be requested individually. |
| These loads were reviewed and summarized. | | ANALYSIS RESULTS/RESOLUTIONS The addition of spurious loads to the Appendix R safe shutdown distribution system, that results from a design basis fire in any fire area will not cause the loss of reactor safe shutdown capability (the load on the diesel generator is between 50 and 100/ of its rated load) ~ This analysis indicates that the Division DC distribution system is available 1 |
| Phase I II An Appendix R distribution diagram was prepared for each fire area that indicates the total high resistance load including a single worst case spurious load along with the justification. | | for at least 30 minutes following a main control room evacuation. This is sufficient to open the three Division 1 safety relief valves for 10 minutes (during a 20 minute period). |
| These loads are considered on top of the normal operating load plus operation of Appendix R loads (see Attachment I).The results of this study are shown on the Phase III distribution diagrams which are included as Attachment III and the load summary sheets are included as Attachment IV.All the load center worksheets and cable routing diagrams were done on Phase I, an index of the load centers and the signature of the preparer and checker has been included in Attachment V.The worksheets are contained in several volumes that are identified as Attachment V and can be requested individually. | | The analysis indicates that the three Division 2 relief valves are available from event initiation to 7.9 days (50% open). However, in order to ensure the availability of the Division 2 DC distribution system, some operator actions are required. Within two hours following a main control room evacuation, certain loads must be removed from the main distriubtion panel (DP-SI-2) providing the Division 2 battery charger Ci-2 is running at or near maximum output (revision to PPN 4. 12. 1. 1 is required). In addition, DG-2 powered emergency lighting is required for operator actions in the room containing DP-SI-2 and C1-2.}} |
| ANALYSIS RESULTS/RESOLUTIONS The addition of spurious loads to the Appendix R safe shutdown distribution system, that results from a design basis fire in any fire area will not cause the loss of reactor safe shutdown capability (the load on the diesel generator is between 50 and 100/of its rated load)~This analysis indicates that the Division 1 DC distribution system is available for at least 30 minutes following a main control room evacuation. | |
| This is sufficient to open the three Division 1 safety relief valves for 10 minutes (during a 20 minute period).The analysis indicates that the three Division 2 relief valves are available from event initiation to 7.9 days (50%open).However, in order to ensure the availability of the Division 2 DC distribution system, some operator actions are required.Within two hours following a main control room evacuation, certain loads must be removed from the main distriubtion panel (DP-SI-2)providing the Division 2 battery charger Ci-2 is running at or near maximum output (revision to PPN 4.12.1.1 is required). | |
| In addition, DG-2 powered emergency lighting is required for operator actions in the room containing DP-SI-2 and C1-2.}} | |
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217K9681999-10-19019 October 1999 Ack Receipt of Transmitting Rev 40 to Physical Security Plan for Washington Nuclear Plant 2.Based on Determination That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan,No NRC Approval Required ML17284A8981999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR 99-15, IAW Requirements of TS 5.6.5 ML17284A9061999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Final Rept for 990812 out-of-sequence Drills for Energy Northwest Washington Nuclear Power Project 2 (Lab, Food Control Point & Milk Sampling).No Deficiences & No Areas Requiring C/A Identified in Three Drills ML17284A8881999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs NRC of Change in Schedule Pertaining to Final Implementation of Reactor Stability long-term Solution for WNP-2 ML17292B7591999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to WNP-2 Emergency Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.4(b), 50.54(q) & 10CFR50 App E.Detailed Synopsis of Changes,Encl ML17292B7581999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 396 & 398 for Nl Hancock,License SOP-50027-3,AR Herrington,License OP-50013-3,WH Sawyer, License SOP-50023-3 & Dl Strote,License SOP-50031-3,for Renewal of Licenses.Without NRC Forms 396 & 398 ML17284A8811999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990623 RAI to Support Review of Pending Request for Amend to Reactor pressure-temp Limit Curve TS GO2-99-168, Forwards Rev 40 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-09-0808 September 1999 Forwards Rev 40 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17284A8711999-08-30030 August 1999 Informs Staff of Errors in world-wide-web Database Related to WNP-2 Reactor Vessel Structural integrity.Marked-up Pages Containing Errors or Omissions Will Be Forwarded by 991201 ML17284A8751999-08-30030 August 1999 Provides Correct Page from License NPF-21 Marked to Show Rev Addressed in 990729 Application for Amend,Which Included Page That Was Inadvertently Included as Attachment 4.Replace Attachment 4 with Attached Page & Disregard Attachment 5 ML17284A8721999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary Info to Support Review of Request for Amend to License NPF-21,re Min Critical Power Ratio Safety Limits Tss,As Requested During 990816 Conversation. Proprietary Encl Withheld ML17292B7531999-08-24024 August 1999 Requests That Eleven Individuals Listed Below Take BWR Generic Fundamentals Examination to Be Administered on 991006 ML17292B7511999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty (FFD) Semiannual Performance Data Rept for Jan-June 1999,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML17284A8701999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee & NRC Form 398, Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee, for Jd Prescott (License SOP-50262-1).Without Encls ML17292B7501999-08-19019 August 1999 Informs Staff That Licensee Has Completed Review of NRC SER for B&Wog Util Resolution Guidance Document Addressing ECCS Suction Strainer Blockage ML17284A8681999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Two ISI Program Plan Relief Requests for NRC Review & Approval,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Proposed Alternatives Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams ML17284A8541999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary Addl Info to Support Review of Pending Request for Amend to MCPR Safety Limit Ts.Info Consists of Proprietary Ltr from Abb Combustion Engineering,Inc.Encl Withheld ML17284A8531999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Estimate of Number of Licensing Action Requests Planned for Submittal in Future,As Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-02.Twenty-nine Submittals Scheduled for Fy 2000 & Four for Fy 2001 ML17284A8301999-07-22022 July 1999 Clarifies Change of Licensee Name from Wpps to Energy Northwest & Change of Facility Name from Wppss Nuclear Project Number 2 to WNP-2,as Requested in 990719 Telcon with Js Cushing of NRC.Marked-up OL Pages,Encl ML17292B7451999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Rev 23 to WNP-2 Emergency Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.4(b) & 50.54(q) & 10CFR50 App E.Rev 23 Provides Updated Description Re Establishment of Separate Emergency Operation Centers for Benton & Franklin Counties ML17292B7391999-07-16016 July 1999 Submits Withdrawal of Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & Standby Gas Treatment Sys Ts.Util Currently Plan to re-submit Amend Request in Entirety by 991112 ML17292B7381999-07-12012 July 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396 & NRC Form 398,for If Sumsion,License OP-50487 & Ga Westergard,License SOP-50415 for Renewal of Operator Licenses.Without Encls ML17292B7171999-07-0606 July 1999 Provides Notification of Early Completion on 990630 of Exception Noted in 990629 Ltr.Equipment within Scope of GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants, Evaluated & Y2K Ready ML17292B7181999-07-0202 July 1999 Responds to 990623 RAI to Support Review of Evaluation of Planar Indication Found on Weld Number 24RRC(2)A-1 During 1998 RO ML17292B7161999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Addl Info Requested in 990513 Ltr to Support Review of Pending Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power Operated Gate Valves. ML17292B7131999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. ML17292B7091999-06-21021 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary Response to NRC 990603 RAI Re Licensee Request for Amend to MCPR Safety Limit Tss.Proprietary Info Withheld IAW Requirements of 10CFR2.790 ML17292B7041999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 396 & 398 for Three Individuals Listed Below for Renewal of Operator Licenses.Without Encls ML17292B7031999-06-10010 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990511 RAI Re License Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & SGTS Tss.Results of Addl Benchmark of Gothic Computer Code Performed to Demonstrate Modeling Capability of Drawdown Response,Encl ML17292B6841999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990326 RAI Re WNP-2 GL 96-05 Program for Periodic Verification of design-basis Capability of MOVs ML17292B6851999-06-0101 June 1999 Forwards 1999 Quality Audit of WNP-2 Emergency Preparedness Program, Per NUREG-0654,Section Ii,Criteria P.9.Seven Problem Evaluation Requests & Nine Recommendations for Improvement Were Issued as Result of Audit Activities ML17292B6831999-05-25025 May 1999 Informs That Request for NRC Approval of Changes to Emergency Plan Requesting Reduction in on-shift HP Staffing, Is Retracted.Util Will Resubmit Request with Required Addl Info at Later Date ML17292B6751999-05-25025 May 1999 Forwards Proprietary ABB-CE Ltr Re WNP-2 Cycle 15 SLMCPR & Core Reload Design Rept,Per Util Request for Amend Re MCPR Safety Limits.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20206U4501999-05-19019 May 1999 Ack Receipt of Which Transmitted Rev 39 to Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).No NRC Approval Is Required,Since Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Security Plan ML17292B6661999-05-0707 May 1999 Requests Exemption to Requirement in 10CFR55.59(a)(2) Re Annual Operating Test requirements.One-time Exemption from Requirement to Period Not to Exceed 15-months from Last Date of Passing Operating Exam for Licensee at Facility ML17292B6531999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990402 RAI Re Licensed Operator Positive Drug Test.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML17292B6561999-04-29029 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to Calculation ME-02-98-04, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1 Safe End & Calculation Mod Record CMR-98-0243, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1A Nozzle Safe End, as Suppl Info to ISI Exam ML17292B6421999-04-19019 April 1999 Responds to NRC 990319 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/99-01.Corrective Actions:Provisions Are Presently in Place to Maintain Adequate Level of Security GO2-99-073, Forwards Rev 39 to WNP-2 Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Approved Plan.Encl Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 10CFR2.7901999-04-19019 April 1999 Forwards Rev 39 to WNP-2 Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Approved Plan.Encl Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 10CFR2.790 ML17292B6401999-04-13013 April 1999 Requests That WNP-2 Operator Requalification Program Be Granted one-time Extension Beyond Requirement in 10CFR55.59(a)(2) for Annual Operating Tests ML17292B6371999-04-12012 April 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990211 RAI Re Util Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & SBGTS TS ML17292B6281999-04-0606 April 1999 Informs NRC That Insp Interval Ending Date for ISI Program Plan Has Been Extended by One Year to Dec 12,2005 Due to Changes in Plant Refueling Outage Schedule ML20196K6961999-03-30030 March 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Transmitting Rev 38 to Physical Security Plan for Plant.No NRC Approval Is Required,In Accordance with 10CFR50.54(p) GO2-99-060, Submits Rept of Status of WNP-2 Decommissioning Fund as of 981231,IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1)1999-03-26026 March 1999 Submits Rept of Status of WNP-2 Decommissioning Fund as of 981231,IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1) ML17292B6131999-03-24024 March 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to Calculation ME-02-98-04, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1 Nozzle Safe End. Info Will Be Used to Assist NRC in Review of WNP-2 ISI Activities Associated with Evaluation of Planar Indication ML20204F0261999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-397/99-01 on 990201-04 & 0303-05.No Violations Noted.Areas of Physical Security Plan Effectively Implemented with Listed Exceptions ML17292B6001999-03-16016 March 1999 Responds to Weakness Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/98-24. Corrective Actions:Developed Document to Identify Areas Needing Improvement,Assigned Responsibility for Actions & Provided Milestones for Achievement ML17292B5941999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee, & NRC Form 398, Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee, for MD Comstock,Mc Naulty & RR Nelson.Without Encls 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML17284A8981999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR 99-15, IAW Requirements of TS 5.6.5 ML17284A9061999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Final Rept for 990812 out-of-sequence Drills for Energy Northwest Washington Nuclear Power Project 2 (Lab, Food Control Point & Milk Sampling).No Deficiences & No Areas Requiring C/A Identified in Three Drills ML17292B7591999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to WNP-2 Emergency Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.4(b), 50.54(q) & 10CFR50 App E.Detailed Synopsis of Changes,Encl ML17284A8881999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs NRC of Change in Schedule Pertaining to Final Implementation of Reactor Stability long-term Solution for WNP-2 ML17292B7581999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 396 & 398 for Nl Hancock,License SOP-50027-3,AR Herrington,License OP-50013-3,WH Sawyer, License SOP-50023-3 & Dl Strote,License SOP-50031-3,for Renewal of Licenses.Without NRC Forms 396 & 398 ML17284A8811999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990623 RAI to Support Review of Pending Request for Amend to Reactor pressure-temp Limit Curve TS GO2-99-168, Forwards Rev 40 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-09-0808 September 1999 Forwards Rev 40 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17284A8751999-08-30030 August 1999 Provides Correct Page from License NPF-21 Marked to Show Rev Addressed in 990729 Application for Amend,Which Included Page That Was Inadvertently Included as Attachment 4.Replace Attachment 4 with Attached Page & Disregard Attachment 5 ML17284A8721999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary Info to Support Review of Request for Amend to License NPF-21,re Min Critical Power Ratio Safety Limits Tss,As Requested During 990816 Conversation. Proprietary Encl Withheld ML17284A8711999-08-30030 August 1999 Informs Staff of Errors in world-wide-web Database Related to WNP-2 Reactor Vessel Structural integrity.Marked-up Pages Containing Errors or Omissions Will Be Forwarded by 991201 ML17292B7531999-08-24024 August 1999 Requests That Eleven Individuals Listed Below Take BWR Generic Fundamentals Examination to Be Administered on 991006 ML17292B7511999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty (FFD) Semiannual Performance Data Rept for Jan-June 1999,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML17284A8701999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee & NRC Form 398, Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee, for Jd Prescott (License SOP-50262-1).Without Encls ML17292B7501999-08-19019 August 1999 Informs Staff That Licensee Has Completed Review of NRC SER for B&Wog Util Resolution Guidance Document Addressing ECCS Suction Strainer Blockage ML17284A8681999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Two ISI Program Plan Relief Requests for NRC Review & Approval,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Proposed Alternatives Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML17284A8541999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary Addl Info to Support Review of Pending Request for Amend to MCPR Safety Limit Ts.Info Consists of Proprietary Ltr from Abb Combustion Engineering,Inc.Encl Withheld ML17284A8531999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Estimate of Number of Licensing Action Requests Planned for Submittal in Future,As Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-02.Twenty-nine Submittals Scheduled for Fy 2000 & Four for Fy 2001 ML17284A8301999-07-22022 July 1999 Clarifies Change of Licensee Name from Wpps to Energy Northwest & Change of Facility Name from Wppss Nuclear Project Number 2 to WNP-2,as Requested in 990719 Telcon with Js Cushing of NRC.Marked-up OL Pages,Encl ML17292B7451999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Rev 23 to WNP-2 Emergency Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.4(b) & 50.54(q) & 10CFR50 App E.Rev 23 Provides Updated Description Re Establishment of Separate Emergency Operation Centers for Benton & Franklin Counties ML17292B7391999-07-16016 July 1999 Submits Withdrawal of Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & Standby Gas Treatment Sys Ts.Util Currently Plan to re-submit Amend Request in Entirety by 991112 ML17292B7381999-07-12012 July 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396 & NRC Form 398,for If Sumsion,License OP-50487 & Ga Westergard,License SOP-50415 for Renewal of Operator Licenses.Without Encls ML17292B7171999-07-0606 July 1999 Provides Notification of Early Completion on 990630 of Exception Noted in 990629 Ltr.Equipment within Scope of GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants, Evaluated & Y2K Ready ML17292B7181999-07-0202 July 1999 Responds to 990623 RAI to Support Review of Evaluation of Planar Indication Found on Weld Number 24RRC(2)A-1 During 1998 RO ML17292B7161999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Addl Info Requested in 990513 Ltr to Support Review of Pending Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power Operated Gate Valves. ML17292B7131999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. ML17292B7091999-06-21021 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary Response to NRC 990603 RAI Re Licensee Request for Amend to MCPR Safety Limit Tss.Proprietary Info Withheld IAW Requirements of 10CFR2.790 ML17292B7041999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 396 & 398 for Three Individuals Listed Below for Renewal of Operator Licenses.Without Encls ML17292B7031999-06-10010 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990511 RAI Re License Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & SGTS Tss.Results of Addl Benchmark of Gothic Computer Code Performed to Demonstrate Modeling Capability of Drawdown Response,Encl ML17292B6841999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990326 RAI Re WNP-2 GL 96-05 Program for Periodic Verification of design-basis Capability of MOVs ML17292B6851999-06-0101 June 1999 Forwards 1999 Quality Audit of WNP-2 Emergency Preparedness Program, Per NUREG-0654,Section Ii,Criteria P.9.Seven Problem Evaluation Requests & Nine Recommendations for Improvement Were Issued as Result of Audit Activities ML17292B6751999-05-25025 May 1999 Forwards Proprietary ABB-CE Ltr Re WNP-2 Cycle 15 SLMCPR & Core Reload Design Rept,Per Util Request for Amend Re MCPR Safety Limits.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML17292B6831999-05-25025 May 1999 Informs That Request for NRC Approval of Changes to Emergency Plan Requesting Reduction in on-shift HP Staffing, Is Retracted.Util Will Resubmit Request with Required Addl Info at Later Date ML17292B6661999-05-0707 May 1999 Requests Exemption to Requirement in 10CFR55.59(a)(2) Re Annual Operating Test requirements.One-time Exemption from Requirement to Period Not to Exceed 15-months from Last Date of Passing Operating Exam for Licensee at Facility ML17292B6531999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990402 RAI Re Licensed Operator Positive Drug Test.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML17292B6561999-04-29029 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to Calculation ME-02-98-04, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1 Safe End & Calculation Mod Record CMR-98-0243, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1A Nozzle Safe End, as Suppl Info to ISI Exam ML17292B6421999-04-19019 April 1999 Responds to NRC 990319 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/99-01.Corrective Actions:Provisions Are Presently in Place to Maintain Adequate Level of Security GO2-99-073, Forwards Rev 39 to WNP-2 Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Approved Plan.Encl Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 10CFR2.7901999-04-19019 April 1999 Forwards Rev 39 to WNP-2 Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Approved Plan.Encl Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 10CFR2.790 ML17292B6401999-04-13013 April 1999 Requests That WNP-2 Operator Requalification Program Be Granted one-time Extension Beyond Requirement in 10CFR55.59(a)(2) for Annual Operating Tests ML17292B6371999-04-12012 April 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990211 RAI Re Util Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & SBGTS TS ML17292B6281999-04-0606 April 1999 Informs NRC That Insp Interval Ending Date for ISI Program Plan Has Been Extended by One Year to Dec 12,2005 Due to Changes in Plant Refueling Outage Schedule GO2-99-060, Submits Rept of Status of WNP-2 Decommissioning Fund as of 981231,IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1)1999-03-26026 March 1999 Submits Rept of Status of WNP-2 Decommissioning Fund as of 981231,IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1) ML17292B6131999-03-24024 March 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to Calculation ME-02-98-04, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1 Nozzle Safe End. Info Will Be Used to Assist NRC in Review of WNP-2 ISI Activities Associated with Evaluation of Planar Indication ML17292B5991999-03-16016 March 1999 Informs That Listed Property & Liability Insurance Coverage for WNP-2 Is in Force,In Compliance with Licensing Responsibilities Delineated in 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML17292B5911999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards 1998 Environ Operating Rept, Per Reporting Requirements of Section 5.4.1 of WNP-2 Epp.No Design or Operational Changes or Tests in 1998 Involved Unreviewed Environ Question ML17292B5941999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee, & NRC Form 398, Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee, for MD Comstock,Mc Naulty & RR Nelson.Without Encls ML17292B6001999-03-16016 March 1999 Responds to Weakness Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/98-24. Corrective Actions:Developed Document to Identify Areas Needing Improvement,Assigned Responsibility for Actions & Provided Milestones for Achievement ML17292B5901999-03-11011 March 1999 Forwards Hard Copy of Addl Occupational Exposure Data Requested in GL 94-04,per 990303 e-mail.Original Electronic Version Was Corrupted ML17292B5681999-03-0101 March 1999 Forwards Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW 10CFR50.36a(a)(2) & TS 5.6.3 & Complete Copy of WNP-2 ODCM Per TS 5.5.1 ML17292B5651999-02-22022 February 1999 Forwards Relief Request 2ISI-20,proposing Alternate Exam Expected to Reduce Dose Significantly & Still Provide Adequate Safety & Quality.Attached Relief Request Will Be Used to Support ALARA Dose Reduction Efforts During Maint ML17292B5581999-02-0404 February 1999 Requests Change to Co Which Modified WNP-2 OL to Reflect Schedule for Implementing Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier C/As.Change Requested to Reflect That Final Implementation of C/As Will Be Completed During Fall 1999 Not Spring 1999 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML17286A2801990-08-27027 August 1990 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for 900103-0630,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML17286A2671990-08-23023 August 1990 Provides Info on Steps Taken to Minimize Potential Effects of NRC Maint Insp Interface Record, Form on Candor of Supply Sys Personnel When Talking W/Nrc Inspectors ML17286A2641990-08-20020 August 1990 Advises That Tech Spec Rev Re ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip Will Be Submitted by 900928,per Discussions W/ P Eng & H Lee ML17285B4341990-08-20020 August 1990 Withdraws 900302 Request for Amend to Tech Spec 3.8.1.1, AC Sources Reducing Excessive Testing of Diesel Generators. IR 05000397/19900141990-08-10010 August 1990 Provides Info Re Final Assessment of Causes & Corrective Actions Associated W/Recent 25 Kv iso-phase Bus Electrical Fault Incident,Per Request in Cover Ltr to Insp Rept 50-397/90-14.Plant Procedure 10.25.141 Will Be Revised ML17285B4171990-08-10010 August 1990 Provides Info Re Final Assessment of Causes & Corrective Actions Associated W/Recent 25 Kv iso-phase Bus Electrical Fault Incident,Per Request in Cover Ltr to Insp Rept 50-397/90-14.Plant Procedure 10.25.141 Will Be Revised ML17285B4041990-08-0202 August 1990 Submits Justification for Continued Operation W/Emergency Diesel Generator 2 Shorted Turns ML17285B3981990-07-30030 July 1990 Advises That Installation of Detector Check Valve in Fire Protection Underground Piping Sys Complete,Per 890911 Ltr. Sys Monitors for Underground Sys Leakage Over Entire Fire Protection Sys ML17285B3991990-07-27027 July 1990 Forwards Justification for Continued Operation Re Emergency Diesel Generator 2 Shorted Turns.Justification Concludes That Diesel Generator Capable of Supporting Present Operability Requirements of Tech Specs ML17285B3711990-07-12012 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount. Confirms That Items 1,2,3,4 & 5 of Requested Actions of Operating Reactors Completed ML17285B3761990-07-12012 July 1990 Discusses Potential for Surface Entry & Mining Near Plant Sites.Concludes That NRC Need Not Consider Issue as One Requiring Continued Monitoring ML17285B3781990-07-11011 July 1990 Requests Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 3.8.1.2 Re Ac Sources - Shutdown.Waiver Will Allow Performance of Rotor Pole Ac Voltage Drop Test to Provide Confirmation That for Extended Run Degradation Condition Will Not Occur ML17285B3841990-07-10010 July 1990 Forwards Util 1990 Emergency Exercise Scenario.W/O Encl ML17285B3661990-07-0505 July 1990 Advises of Listed Organizational & Personnel Changes, Effective 900707.J Burn Will Be New Director of Projects, C Powers Promoted to Director of Engineering & J Baker Promoted to Plant Manager ML17285B3641990-06-29029 June 1990 Advises That All Equipment Identified W/Atws Safety Function Acceptable from Environ Qualification Standpoint. ATWS Equipment Has Been Determined to Be Qualified to Normal Design Environ Conditions Followed by ATWS Accident Environ ML17285B3571990-06-28028 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Licensee Implementation of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. ML20055D2391990-06-28028 June 1990 Forwards Response to Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/90-12.Response Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML17285B3501990-06-22022 June 1990 Advises That Mods to Recirculation Pump Trip Sys Implemented During 1990 Spring Refueling Outage.Remaining ATWS Items to Be Resolved as Listed ML17285B3511990-06-20020 June 1990 Forwards WPPSS-FTS-129, BWR Transient Analysis Model, for Review & Approval ML17285B3441990-06-20020 June 1990 Advises That Util Intends to Utilize R-value of 0.13% Delta K/K in Cycle 6 Implementing Procedures.Should R-value Change in Final Startup & Operations Rept,Changed Value Shall Be Used Instead ML17285B3451990-06-19019 June 1990 Forwards Rev 10 to EPIP 13.1.1, Classifying Emergency. Rev Includes New Format of Matrix Charts Intended to Improve Identification of Symptomatic & situation-based Emergency Conditions ML17285B3431990-06-18018 June 1990 Advises of Appointment of AL Oxsen to Position of Deputy Managing Director,Effective 900601 ML17285B3461990-06-15015 June 1990 Responds to NRC Evaluation Findings of Licensed Operator Requalification Program.Quality of Written Exam & Job Performance Measure Question Bank Testing Matls Will Be Improved to Meet Std Prior to Next Program Evaluation Cycle ML17285B3301990-06-12012 June 1990 Forwards Warrant for $50,000 in Response to Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty Dtd 900521 ML17285B3251990-06-0707 June 1990 Advises That Calculated Max Control Room Temp Re Station Blackout Will Be Provided by 900701 ML17285B2931990-05-29029 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900426 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/90-09.Validity of Violation Challenged.Opposes Issuance of Severity Level IV Violation Based on Listed Reasons ML17285B2861990-05-22022 May 1990 Advises That Submittal of Improved Tech Spec Scheduled for Mar 1991 & Implementation Tenatively Scheduled for Oct 1991 ML17285B2881990-05-11011 May 1990 Forwards Engineering Std EES-4,Rev 0, Setpoint Methodology, as Committed in Util 900329 Ltr.W/O Encl ML17285B2471990-05-0101 May 1990 Advises That No Changes to Tech Specs Required as Stated in 891130 Ltr in Response to Generic Ltr 89-21 Requesting Plant Status on Implementation of USI Re ATWS ML17285B2741990-04-26026 April 1990 Advises That Util Has No Comments on Licensed Operator Annual Requalification Exam During Wks of 900226 & 0305.All Comments Resolved When Exams Administered ML17285B2321990-04-25025 April 1990 Submits Revised Scheduled Completion Dates for Commitments Made in Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-397/89-06 & 50-397/89-17 ML17285B2121990-04-19019 April 1990 Responds to Fire Protection Issues Identified in 900201 Notice of Violation.Corrective Actions:Major Hardware Changes Implemented & Independent Consultant Will Be Employed to Review Fire Protection Program ML17285B2221990-04-16016 April 1990 Forwards Status Rept for Commitments Made in 891130 Ltr Re commercial-grade Dedication Process.Resolution of 10 Samples Identified by NRC & 50 Samples Identified by Cynga Completed ML17285B1881990-04-11011 April 1990 Responds to NRC 900312 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/90-01.Corrective Actions:Complete Job & Task Analysis Completed for Health Physics Technician Training Program & New Program Will Include Training on Fundamentals ML17285B1821990-04-0505 April 1990 Requests Exemption from Filing Requirements of 10CFR55.45(b)(2)(iii) & (IV) to Allow Delayed Submittal of NRC Form-474, Simulation Facility Certification & to Administer Simulation Test as Upgraded,Respectively ML17285B1741990-04-0505 April 1990 Advises That NRC Approved Use of Final Feedwater Temp Reduction in Amend 77 to License NPF-21 ML20012F6141990-04-0404 April 1990 Forwards Rev 17 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML17285B2041990-03-29029 March 1990 Requests Review of Encl Topical Rept WPPSS-FTS-127,Rev 0, Qualification of Core Physics Methods for BWR Design & Analysis. Upon Rept Approval,Tech Spec Changes (Per Generic Ltr 88-16) Scheduled for Jan 1992 ML17285B1421990-03-29029 March 1990 Forwards Revised Schedule for Plant Equipment Setpoint Methodology Program Plan.Methodology Revised to Incorporate Latest ISA Std Draft.Setpoint Program Design Team for FY90 Onsite,Trained & Began Work on 900312 ML17285B1381990-03-29029 March 1990 Forwards Concluding Rept of Results Requested by Generic Ltr 88-14, Instrument Air Supply Sys Problems Affecting Safety- Related Equipment. Air Quality Testing Performed to Date Reveals Steadily Improving Results ML17285B1131990-03-28028 March 1990 Advises of Release of Subchannel Thermal Hydraulic Computer Code & Requests Review of VIPRE-01 Mod-02 & Issuance of SER for PWR & BWR Applications.Bwr Qualification Analyses Completed & Rept on BWR Applications Encl ML17285B1331990-03-23023 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900221 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/89-40.Corrective Actions:Plant Procedure 10.25.63, Emergency Lighting Insp in Process of Being Expanded to Provide Instructions & Check Sheets to Ensure Uniform Insps ML17285B1311990-03-21021 March 1990 Forwards Proposed Bases Change Re 891129 Request for Amend to Tech Spec Table 4.3.6.1, Srm/Irm Detector Not-Full-In Functional Test. Bases Change Describes Special Circumstances Re Test Exception ML17285B1291990-03-19019 March 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Resolution of USI A-47 on Safety Implications of Control Sys in LWRs & Generic Ltr 89-21 Re Status of Implementation of Usis.Tech Specs Adequate to Verify Operability of Overfill Protection Sys ML17285B1171990-03-19019 March 1990 Suppls 900102 Response Re Implementation of fitness-for-duty Program at Facility.All Items Identified as Incomplete as of 900103 Completed at End of Jan 1990 ML17285B1121990-03-15015 March 1990 Provides Level of Property & Liability Insurance Coverage for Facility,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(2) Annual Requirement ML17285B0931990-03-0202 March 1990 Forwards Supplementary Info Re 900214 Application for Amend to License NPF-21,revising Tech Spec 3.3.7.5 to Address Failed Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators ML17285B0741990-03-0202 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900201 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/89-30.Corrective Action:Plant Personnel Currently in Process of Making Improvements to Plant Operations Procedure Writers Guide ML17285B0861990-03-0101 March 1990 Forwards Compilation of Responses to Regulatory Impact Survey Questionnaire,Per Generic Ltr 90-01 ML17285B0581990-02-26026 February 1990 Forwards Washington Nuclear Plant-2 Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept,Jul-Dec 1989 & Amend 7 to Odcm. 1990-08-27
[Table view] |
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AC CElZRATZD DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRLHON SYFl'ZN REGULATO ZNPORMATZON DISTRIBUTION+STEM (RIDS)
(ACCESSION NBR:8808050063 DOC.DATE: 88/07/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET
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FACIL'.50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397
'AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION POWERSPC.M. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MARTINPJ.B. Region 5, Ofc of the Director
SUBJECT:
Forwards completed executive summary of App R high impedance fault analysis,per NRC 880606 request.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IEOZD COPIES RECEIVED:LTR t ENCL I SIZE:
TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES:
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ZD CODE/NAME COPIES LTTR ENCL i' PD5 PD 1 1 SAMWORTHPR 2 2 INTERNAL: ACRS 2 2 AEOD 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR MORISSEAU,D 1 1 D NRR/DLPQ/PEB 11 1 1 ~
,NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA DIR 11 1 1 NRR/DREP/EPB 10 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 2 2 NRR/DRZS DIR 9A 1 1 NRR/PMAS/ILRB12 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 8 OE LLZB NPJ 1 1 OGC/HDS2 1 1 RE FILE 02 1 1 RES/DSIR DEPY 1 1 DEPY 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 D
D TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No. 50-397 July 15, 1988 G02-88-157 Mr. J.B. Martin Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Attention: C. Ramsey
Subject:
NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 OPERATING L'ICENSE NPF-21 APPENDIX R HIGH IMPEDANCE FAULT ANALYSIS " EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
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During the Fire Protection Audit the week of June 6,, 1988, the staff requested that we submit an Executive Summary of the Appendix R High Impedance Fault Analysis upon its completion. That Summary is now complete and is attached hereto.
Very truly yours, BLRQ 0 C.M. Powers NNP-2 Plant Manager Attachment cc: R.B. Samworth - NRC NRC Site Inspector - 901A 8808050063 88000~97 pDR ADQCK 0 pNU F
EXECUTIVE SUNNARY APPENDIX R HIGH INPEDANCE FAULT ANALYSIS PURPOSE The purpose of this calculation is to identify all "high resistance loads" and a single worst case "spurious load" on the Appendix R safe shutdown power distribution system that results from a design basis fire in each fire area; to ensure that safe shutdown capability is not lost.
ASSUNPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS High resistance/spurious loads are defined as follows:
EXPLANATION USINB DETAIL "A" A design basis fire (DBF) in a Division 2 fire area presumes the loss of "Appendix R Division 2 Safe Shutdown" (which includes its power distribution system) ~ Therefore, a high resistance fault on a Division 2 Appendix R distributio'n center is not considered as a high resistance load in a Division 2 fire area since the entire system is presumed inoperative. However, a high resistance fault on a Division 1 Appendix R distribution center is identified as a high resistance load in a Division 2 fire area. For purposes of this analysis, a high resistance fault will be categorized along wit% spurious signals. For 'a general discussion of spurious signals see Calculation No. NES-02-85-19V.
DEFINITIONS (AND SEQUENCE OF REVIEW):
The failure modes resulting from a DBF that cause high resistance faults and "spurious loads" are the consequences of a single fire in a fire area, and are dete'rmined in the following sequence:
a) High Resistance Load:
An unprotected normally energized power feeder will fail in a manner to cause a high resistance ground with a fault current increasing to just below the fuse rating breaker trip setting. The interconnected control circuits in this fire area do not have to be considered since their failure would result in a smaller "spurious load".
b) Spurious Load:
If the power feeder is not normally energized or's completely protected in this fire area ot does not route into this fire area then the interconnected control circuits in this fire area will be reviewed to determine if a possible failure mode exists (ice., hot short, ground, or open) that could cause the load'to become connected due to a DBF in this fire area--that is a load that results from a spurious signal actuation.
ENPLANATIQN USING DETAIL "A" It should be noted that the review of cables in fire areas is limited to only those cables that are potentially "spurious loads".
As such, a Division i cable or Division i associated cable in a Division 2 fire area that is connected to an "Appendix R Division i Safe Shutdown Distribution Center" (which is most probably located outside the Division 2 fire area) does reqiure a review since a DBF in this Division 2 fire area is not permitted to cause the loss of the Division i load source:
2~ The assumptions and references that apply to each of the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Systems as described in this calculation in sections NES-02-i9-II, III, and IV also apply to those respective systems in this calculation.
During the interval of time between the main control room evacuation and the operation of the remote control transfer switches, no high resistance faults will occur of such a nature as to cause coordinated "upstream" fuses to fail before the "down stream" fuses f ail.
If the maximum 'net spurious load on a bus is less than 25% of the designed load and the resultant load on the diesel generatoris between 50% and i00% of its rated load, then no further analysis is necessary since feeder sizes include a 25% margin and the distribution b'uses are designed accordingly.
Distribution centers that are (shunt) tripped by loss of "off"site power signals" and are not automatically (i.e., remain tripped until manually closed) reset do not contribute to the Appendix R distribution loads.
NETHQDQLQGY A general approach to this analysis would be to analyze each cable in each fire area with a "cause and effect" relationship; the cause being a design basis fire and the effect being the worst case load on the required Appendix R distribution system. The sum total of the loads due to the design basis fire would then be analyzed'his type of an analysis would not only be very repetitious it would involve many distribution centers not connected to the required Appendix R distribution centers. A more selective approach to the analysis was taken by identifying the extended distribution system for the Appendix R sSafe Shutdown System. Since one of three different systems are used; depending upon the fire area involved, three "'extended" Appendix R distribution systems were identified. Each of these distribution systems contain all the load centers that would be connected to them during an Appendix R design basis fire (which postulates loss of off-site power). Every load center, such as switchgears (both 4ihOV and 480V), motor control centers, power panels, lighting panels, chargers or inverters that supply other panels that are in the extended Appendix R distribution system are studied individually.
All the power cables (and their interconnect control cables) that are
attached to the load center are listed and a circuit review is provided that allows tabulation of cables by the fire area they are routed into, Pertinent information relating to each cable is also listed. Once all of the cable reviews for each load center are completed, a review of a specific fire area is made listing only those cables that are connected to the required Appendix R distribution center. These loads are analyzed to ensure that they are not duplicated by "upstream" spurious loads on the same distribution system. For example, a panel feeder and its branch circuit feeder are in the same fire area where the high resistance fault load on the panel feeder encompasses the simultaneous fault on the branch feeder (i.e., the branch load is not added on top of th maximum panel feeder load). The resultant high resistance/spurious loads that are due to a design basis fire in the identified fire area are then added to the required Appendix R distribution system load. Justification for the continuous resultant high resistance/spurious load in a fire area is based upon the margin that exists between the diesel generatol 5 seven-day load rating which is 4900 KVA and the continuous load following a loss of "off-site" power (which is shown on Tables 8.3. 1 and .2 in the FBAR) coupled with the initiation of the Appendix R safe shutdown system. The task was divided into three phases as follows:
Phase I A listing of the Appendix R load centers was prepared to assign work and identify each worksheet. The three Appendix R distribution systems that identify each load center are included in Attachment I.
- 1. A worksheet was prepared for each load center in accordance with contained in Attachment II. the'nstructions
- 2. A cable routing diagram identifying each fire area was provided in accordance with the example provided in Attachment II.
An evaluation of each cable is made using the elementary wiring diagram to determine high resistance loads or spurious loads as required by instructions in Attachment II.
Phase II The individual load centers were reviewed for correctness and then the following steps were taken:
All Division 1 fire areas were reviewed on every Appendix R Division 2 load center worksheet. These Ioads were reviewed and summarized.
2~ All Division 2 fire areas were reviewed in every Appendix R Division 1 load center worksheet. These loads were reviewed and summarized.
All multi-division (dedicated) fire areas were reviewed on every Appendix R Division 2 load center worksheet. These loads were reviewed and summarized.
4, All non-Appendix R fire areas were reviewed on every Appendix R Division 2 load center worksheet. These loads were reviewed and summarized.
- 5. Fire area RC-IIC, the 20'rea of non-intervening combustibles in the cable spreading room, was reviewed on every Appendix R load center worksheet. These loads were reviewed and summarized.
Fire area RC-X, the main control room, was reviewed in every Appendix R remote shutdown load center worksheet. These loads were reviewed and summarized.
Phase I II An Appendix R distribution diagram was prepared for each fire area that indicates the total high resistance load including a single worst case spurious load along with the justification. These loads are considered on top of the normal operating load plus operation of Appendix R loads (see Attachment I).
The results of this study are shown on the Phase III distribution diagrams which are included as Attachment III and the load summary sheets are included as Attachment IV. All the load center worksheets and cable routing diagrams were done on Phase I, an index of the load centers and the signature of the preparer and checker has been included in Attachment V. The worksheets are contained in several volumes that are identified as Attachment V and can be requested individually.
ANALYSIS RESULTS/RESOLUTIONS The addition of spurious loads to the Appendix R safe shutdown distribution system, that results from a design basis fire in any fire area will not cause the loss of reactor safe shutdown capability (the load on the diesel generator is between 50 and 100/ of its rated load) ~ This analysis indicates that the Division DC distribution system is available 1
for at least 30 minutes following a main control room evacuation. This is sufficient to open the three Division 1 safety relief valves for 10 minutes (during a 20 minute period).
The analysis indicates that the three Division 2 relief valves are available from event initiation to 7.9 days (50% open). However, in order to ensure the availability of the Division 2 DC distribution system, some operator actions are required. Within two hours following a main control room evacuation, certain loads must be removed from the main distriubtion panel (DP-SI-2) providing the Division 2 battery charger Ci-2 is running at or near maximum output (revision to PPN 4. 12. 1. 1 is required). In addition, DG-2 powered emergency lighting is required for operator actions in the room containing DP-SI-2 and C1-2.