ML20236N334

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Responds to 770805 Note Requesting NRC Comments on F Chase Concerns Re Role of NRC in Licensing Review.No Pressure Applied Upon USGS
ML20236N334
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 08/30/1977
From: Gossick L
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To: Cranston A
SENATE
Shared Package
ML20236J368 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-87-214 NUDOCS 8708110458
Download: ML20236N334 (7)
v • d • e


Text

.

4 A j ',) O J,  ;

AUG 30 IBR Tne lionorable Alan Cranston United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Cranston:

l j

I am pleased to respond to your note of August 5,1977. You forwarded a letter from your constituent, Mr. Frederic Chase, and requested our coments on Mr. Chase's concerns regarding the role of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NaC) staff in the licensing review of the Diablo ,

1 Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.

l i

Hr. Chase expressed his. i@ression, gained from an article in the f Los Angeles Times, that the NRC staff tried to twist and suppress the )

facts abotit earthquake faults near the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant and to bring pressure upon the U. S. Geological Survey to change its findings or upon the staff's reviewers to upgrade their estimates of the plant's capabilities. Ife also belleved that the matter should be investigated.

4 The i@ressions that Mr. Chase has received are erroneous. These matters were aired in public hearings before the liouse Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment on June 30, 1977. Among other things, representatives f roul the NRC staff ano the U. S. Gmlogical Survey have born testified at these Congressional hearings that there was no pressure applied upon the Survey. {

In addition, the llouse Subcommittee on oversight and Investigations has. l since early 1977, kept itself well informed about the NRC staff's continuing review of the operating license application for' the' D'iablo Canyon Plant.

i

! A copy of the newspaper article is provided in Enclosure No. I and a detailed l

, discussion of the points raised by Mr. Chase is provided in Enclosure No. 2.

l I trust you will fina this information responsive to Mr. Chase's concerns.

Sincerely, (Signed) Lee Y. Cossick Lee V. Gossick l

Executive Director a

for Operations

[

1 Enclosures

1. Newspaper Article SEE PREVIOUS YELLOW FOR CONCURRENCES:

RETYPE 0 FOR THE PilRPOS OF A0 ING ENCLOSURE 3 hb

2. Discussion of Concerns
s. -e, f \7b g O ucu ru of sf , ,

or ric=

  • q]r N .i I p/ . E.00. .0

, .u.~.N.* EChs ..LGosf k. .[CA ,[h.'.

DATE> .. . . . . . . . .., . . . . . . .

NRC FORM 518 (9-7r) NRCM 0240 W u. s. coVERNMENT PRaNTBNG OFFICEa 19 e= 626-424 j

, 8708110458 870729

, PDR FOIA

! CONNDRB7-214 PDR h(kV

i i

. 4

\

DISTRIBifrION l Docket Files (50-275 4 50-325) ( ._4g 1 NRC PDR local PDR ,

EDO Reading 1' NRR Reading LWR-#1 File E. Case

!' R. Boyd R. DeYoung Attorney, ELD

, CA (3) l G. Ertter (#02359) s l M. Gruff

  • i E. linghes .

L. Dreher )

J. Stolz )

D..Allison i E. Ilylton j

E. Case D. Crutchfield

, H. Denton 1 t

R. Mattson l V. Stello '

J. Yore, ASLB IE (3)

SECY Mail Facility (3) (#77-1264) 3 I

bec: Pacific Gas 6 Electric Company l

l l

l 1

4 I I

, orr c=* . . . . . _ ....

l eunN Au: >

l o Arr >

NRC PORM 318 (9 76) NRCM 0240 ft us s. ooVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICES 1976-626034

Los Angeles Times 6-29-77

(

Officials Push Diablo Plants '

l  ! DespiteMajorQuake Fault .

BY FAUL E.STEIGER n,,, s.,n m , utthly, coulo seen a two. year interim operati,1 license W "

WASHINGTONh St aff officials of. "" "

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the agency charged by Congress with

'fc*en whe e'n PG&E was reluctant t preventing unsafe uses of atomic en. self, the staff suggested the intenm license approach in a crgy, have engaged m an unusual ef. letter to Richard Maullin, chairman of California's Energy fort to jusufy beensing two nuclear Resources Conservation and Development Commission.

. power stauons now neanng comple. There has been no suggestion that any of these actions.

tion in Cahforniaa Diablo Canyon Y olated the law. And NRC staff officials defend the moves ;

near San Luis Obispo-despite the' vigorously as justified in light of events as they occurred and, facts as they became known.

discovery of a major earthquake faultj a few miles offshore. - ,

(

Among the concerns motivating' Still, the frieves ralse questions as to how well Congress the staff officials, documents obtamed succeeded in its goal of separating safety concerns from by The Times indicate, were fearsa economic and pohtical factors when it created the NRC in that failure to Ucense the reactors 1974, carryintit out of the old Atomic Energy Commiss on.

would have a damagmg effect both orf l the nuclear power industry and on Unlike the Atr, so the argument went, the new regulato-government efforts to increase U.S. ry commission would not be charged with promoting energy supplies. atomic energy as well as regulating it, and hence would be free to focus on safety concerns alone.

In an interview Tuesday, two of the officials involved, Edson Case, acting *l The Carter Administration emphasized the importance of this division earlier this year, when it left the NRC out-director of nuclear reactor regulation of the new Department of Energy it asked Congress to for the NRC, and Richard DeYoung, form. That way the public would have full assurance that deputy d4 rector of the division of' safety considerations were not being subordmated to the project manhement, mamtamed dnve for new domestic energy sources and for diminished

}' such pohtic and economic factord thati dependence on the oil.exportmg nations, Jame': R. Schle- ,

affected only how much time and efJ singer, Carter's chief energy adviser, told reporters. I j fort they and their subordmates wed Concerned about these issues, and about how safety de-prepared to spend analyz:mg the safe. cisions are being made under the new system, the Houseq f <

ty risks' Intenor Committee's subcommittee on energy and the en.

{ vironment has called NRC officials to testify on the Diablo

,g P htical and. economic con-siderations, they said, would not in. Canyon case at a heanng Thursday.

fluence their ulumate recommenda. Also invited are two major opposing parties in the case, tion-which is still pending-on PG&E and representatives of the " interveners," local citi-whether the plants should be granted zens' groups m the San Luis Obispo area who have op-an operating license. posed the Diablo Canyon facihty smce its drawing board days in the 1960s.

j Nevertheless, exammation of inter-nal NRC memoranda. amphfied by - The issues are not simple. Deciding how much in the i l interviews with the staff off cials. in. way of precautions constitutes safety is a matter of judg. ; j i

dicates that the commission staff has ment, and judgments can differ. A look at the Diablo Can. ; j xxpended a major effort to find a basis on wNch the plants yon project suggestsjust how comphe ted thosejudgmentst Inight be granted heenses. can become, and how difficult to achieve may be Congress' goal of keeping them completely separate from economic '

- The effort came after the U.S. Geological Survey, an and political factors.

arm of the Interior Department, disclosed the existence of Nit a orce e yo d t p ere d gn t After prolonged studies of environmental and safety fac-tors, and over the objections of local groups concerned The moves by the NRC staffinclude. . about preserving the wild shoreline and nearby hills from I -Marshaling geologists, seismologists and other experts . unsightly plants and transmission lines, the old Atomic from inside and outside the commission for a year long Energy Commission awarded PG&E construction permits  !

challenge-ultimately without success-of the Geological for the two reactors in 1968 and 1970. l' Survey's assessment of the earthquake danger. Unfortunately for PG&E, however, the studies had not included a sufficiently thorough check of the Pacific Ocean

.-Sharply upgrading the staff's previous view of how floor near the site. In 1973, when the planta were under great a shock the plants might be able to resist. construction, the AEC staff learned of the existence of the l -Devising a plan by which the builder of the plants, Bosgri Fault, named after two oil company geologists wh6

' Pacific Gas, & Electnc Co., the big San Francisco-based identifiedit.

i

j 1 i

At first the stall aiu not take the fault seriously. But in A

l late IW4, as the AEC was being readied for oblivion " and ga.aked to' lain this statement, DeYoung I the NRC and Energy Research and Development Agency investment by the utility might have be were being fashioned from its parts, the staff was con could have said at that time, we have spent enough star fronted by a conclusion from the Geological Survey that; time and public money on this review, aM ten the iault was big enough to produce an earthquake that 'wew!!!notgiveyoua constructionpermit.'

would shake the earth under the plants more than they were designed to withstand - "But at & , ting 11eense stage, we had cor l

If the impact were enough to shatter the plants' safety with the des!gn s established by the utility at the cons q 1

systems, the resultmg failure could spew sigmfkant quan, structim permit stage We had a part in this. And when i I rating license stage, where a billion dol-tities of radioactive matenalinto the surroundmg lars worth country of p. we Imk at the ogant was sitting there e chagrin of NRC staff rnernbers over this information structed on bases with which we had concurred, you can't is well documented in a pair of memos wntten in Feb. take the same approach as you could when only $30 mil-ruary,1975, by DeYoung. The construction permit had lienhadbeenspent, called for the plants to withstand a ground acceleration of.

0.4g., or 40% of gravity. The NRC staff had concluded that . A wee'k after DeYoung's Januar the design might be able to withstand a seisnue event of ing #ss called involving DeYoung,y,1976, Case and about a dozen mem somewhat higher magnitude,0.5 g. other NRC staff officials. Before the meeting a

  • talking "An extensive reanal spplicant (PG&El," Dehsts could"but oung wrote, be undertaken will profablybablothe Canyon

' Paper"entityd " Program was circulated to Establish to the participants. Basis to License show that some parts of the plant are capable of with. The paper proposed several actions, including a final standing various loadmgs in excess of 0.4g.,0.5g.,0.6g., and stab at changmg the USGS conclusions by inducing In 0.7g.,but that other vitalparts willnot have such capabili 'or Department superiors to intervene, a move to assess, l .ty. Some increase in capability is possible from design chances of " upgrading the plant design" by a combination changes to bnn that might be undertaken, but changes sufficient of new analysis and structural changes, and an effort to tical." g the design up to a 0.6-0.7g. capability are imprac determine whether a basis could be established for licens-ing the first reactor on an intenm basis.

To convince the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor included in the paper was a section entitled " Associated Safety that even a 0.5g. quake could be withstood would Conriduations," which suggested that the NRC sta1 require months of analysis aad documentation, DeYoung nal conclusion on whether to recommend licensing of wrote.

costly modifications For 0.6g.,of he said, plant it would design as well. take years, and many. Plant ought to take into account the impact on the na energy problems, on the nuclear moratorium issue Califor-But the Geological Survey analysts were pointing to nians were to vote on the following June,and on other nu-

' ward a conclusion that the ground acceleration in a quake clear plants where new earthquate data might suddenly could approach 0.7g., and information to be sent them by become available. ,

,PG&E was not hkely to change the survey's mind, )

'IU""8 ** >

Case and DeYoung conceded this document was embar-suade the Geological Survey staff to change its view, proThe imphcation was clear. Witho viding an operating license to the nearly finished plants 1976 meetmg. "Like every piece of paper we put out for a might be impossible.

meetmg, we nsually don't get beyond the first page,"

"Unless specific guidance, support and directien is p' ro. DeYoung said.

Nevertheless, following the meeting, several of the steps d S to the w in evhs th t o org nizat o , mentioned in the talkmg paper were ca ried out, including positions that do not necessarily reflect the judgment of the suggestion to PG&E that it request an mterim. license, upper level management will be formulated and doc- Officials at the utility took "the reluctant. bride ap-umented to the extent that later modification will be diffi proach" to this suggestion, Case said. "They wanted to be.

cult." DeYoung wrote.

told to apply for this interim heense." Such licenses have 1

The NRC did mount an effort to change the USGS view,' been granted before, but only to operate a plant at about attacking both its estimate of the size earthquake the Hos. 5% capacity during testing. What the NRC staff had in gri Fault was likely to produce and its assessment of the mind was fulloperation for about two years.

i shock an carthquake of any given size would impart to the Bu bYJariuarT The problern was solved when Maulbn, the Caiifornia I

clear, the USGS '1976, another memo b DeYoung makeswas still studing fast. And by May ll, ejj IM6, the NRC staff gave in on this pomt. It accepted 0.75g. March askin what could be done to ex as the ground acceleration value for the Diablo Canyon .the Diablo banyon plants in view ofedite a the state's water Pl ants. shortage and consequent need for extra electric power.

the staff felt considerable reluctance to recommendThe NRC was not giving up, however, F against granting the operating license. ,

"We have a poor basis for this action at this time," De , Canyon plants might be able to wi Young wrote in the January memo, "other than general ' quake impact without huge design changes. The reasont conservatism enough to make and (a feeling everyone happy.'that) 'PG&E hasn t done treanalysis by PG&E of a portion of the plants' design suge "Such arbitrary conservatism would not be an adequate.' gests it is stronger than previously believed.

yolved and the sevey impact such actkn1would have onbasis in this case bec the nuclearindustry.. . .. . other bodies within the NRC for decision. That decision I ya them be appealed to the commission and (Veourts.

x J

!~.

! ENCIDSURE NO. 2 i  !

DISCUSSION Ot CONCERIS MAISED BY MR. FREDERIC CHASE FOLLIDWING

, XTGiWKWEIRTICLE IR~ME~IEB ANGELES TIRES ~~diMSETIT17~

REIATIONS WITH GEOWGICAL SURVEY ,

! The newspaper article states that the NRC staff marshalled various experts i in a year-long effort to challenge the U. S. Geological Survey's assessment l of the earthquake har.ard. W at is incorrect. An explanation of what j happened is provided below.

l Construction of the two Diablo Canyon units hat 1 been approved in 1968 and

! 1970. Sey had originally been designed to withstand an earthquake with l a horizontal acceleration of 0.49 Tne existence of the Hovgri fault, i which runs offshore about 31/2 miles from the plant site, had come to light I in 1971. The operating license application for these units has been under i

review since 1973.

In late 1974, the applicant, Pacific Gas and Electric Corapany, submitted the results of its investigation of the Hoagri fault. Se Company's geology and seismology consultants believed that an acceleration of 0.5g would adequately represent the 130sgri fault's earthquake potential and it was apparent that the plant's design could readily be shown to be adequate for 0.59 without extensive analysis or modification.

In January 1975, the NRC staff received an assessment from the U. S. Geological Survey indicating that, in light of the then current information, 0.5g would not be adequate. The NIC staff's own experts in seismology were, tentatively, of a differait view. Thus, it was appc. rent that there might, in the end, be significantly different expert opinions about wnat would be'an adequate seicenic l

design value. Ihat would not De unusual for difticult geological and seismological situations.

One of the options mentioned in internal staff me:aoranda, at that time and later, was tne appointment of a panel of eminent experts in geology, seismology ano seismic design to stuay the entire question and make a recoinendation.

2ne purpose of such a panel, if it had been employed, would have been to

, explore all of the issues and provide the best. advice the panel could j giv0-wnatever that advice might be-not to reach some precietermined conclusion. '

l i

6 O' FFICE w ' . _ , , , ,

s'GRN'aus > .,

tiATE % ,,,,,,,,,,,,-.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, , , , , .

,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,4, m.

! NRC FORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240 W u. s. oOVERNMENT PRINTING OFPfCE 1974 = 894-.44

w .-

I 2- ,

stat idea was not completely witnout merit. Indeed, since then, one of the interveners in this case has formally petitioned for the employment of just such a " blue riboon" panel to evaluate seismic cesign questions. .

In addition, the Advisory Committee on Foactor Safeguards, which is )

independent of tne NRC staff, has employed a panel of ten eminent experts i to review this case. Fiowver, that option was not jtx3ged appropriate  ;

and it was not aoopted, or even discussed by the NRC staff's upper "

management. .

2he Nhc staff did hold a public meeting with the applicant and the Survey l

in February 1975 to discuss the technical issues and the Survey's concerns.

2he imC staff then believed that the technical

  • issues might be resolved, one way or another, by obtaining nore data. Accordingly, tne applicant was requested to sutxnit appropriate information. For example, since there j j was disagreement about the length of the fault, the applicant was requested j to sutnit note seismic refraction survey records to provide a better picture of whetner the fault died out or continued at the north ord. ]

, It took until the end ot 1975 for tne applicant to submit this additional j information and for the NRC staff and the Survey to review it. 2his activity

{

i did not in any way resemble a challenge to the Survey's assessment. It was merely our routine procedure of requesting additional information that 3 would be needed to enable us to make a decision. , j In this case, review of tne additional information did not eliminate the conflict between the various expert opinions. After furtner discuscion i of tne tecnnical issues with the Survey and the applicant, the NRC staff l adopted the Survey's assessment of the fault's earthgaake potential. 1 l

UFGRADIliG PLANf CAPABILITIES l

Mr. Chase also has the impression that the NRC staff reviewers were put under  !

pressure to upgrade their view of tne plant's capabilities. We cannot find j an implication to that effect in the newspaper article. In any event, j the impression is not correct.

2be internal memoranda that were quoted in the article were merely discussing 1 what tne possibilities were with regard to upgraaing the plant. 2 hey were l based on the opinions of staff engineers as to what might be practical. 2 hey correctly predictea that tne plant could readily be chown to De capable oi 1

MCEM ,,,,,,,,,

eURNAME)>

D' ATE 9m*

NRC FORM 318 (946) NRCM 0240 W u. e. oovanuuswr ensurine orrics, sete .ame.ee4

f l 7- g .

,c l

_3_

i withstanding 0.5g but that the applicant would need to spend years  !

performing extensive reanalysis and modifications in' order to meet $

significantly higher levels. (2he applicant has now been performing i such analyses for more than a year). I There has never been any suggestion that the NRC staff's opinion of the

, plant's capability should sigly be increased. This was only to be cone I after the applicant had performed the appropriate analyses and modifications and the NRC staff had reviewed them and found them acceptable.

STAPP MDEERS

! Mr. Chase mentioned Richard DeYoung in connection with his impressions, presumably because Mr. DeYoung's menoranda were cited in the newspaper ,

article. As discussed above, there was not any atte @ t to pressure the ]

Survey or the NRC staff. l In addition to expressing Mr. DeYoung's ideas, those mesoranda reflect, to a I large degree, the opinions of various other staff menters and they attribute i such opinions to those persons. Our reviewers have the right and the duty i to form their own opinions on safety questions and to express those opinions I to the NRC staff's manageant. Obviously, they are not and should not be  !

bound to agree with any particular point of view, including the Survey's .

assessments. In this case, the reviewers have expressed their opinions and i then the principal staff decisions have been made by the staff's upper )

, management after thorough discussion with the people involved. This open wthod of reaching NHC staff conclusions on safety matters is part of the Commission's po.licy. l In addition, the NiC staff's determinations are not final Comission decisions.

Tney are reviewed by the independent Advisory Comittee on Reactor safeguards which provides a written opinion. Then an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board makes a decision baseo on the evidence presented in public hearings by the applicant, the interveners and the NRC staff. The Licensing Board's decision is then subject to review by an Appeal Board and/or the Commissioners.

Tne Diablo Canyon earthquake safety questions are quite conplex and the decisions involved are hard ones. We have faced such decisions before and we have a

! careful and deliberate procedure for dealing with them. ~ Assuring adequate protection for the public health and safety will always be the foremost l ,

consideration.

l l

i l

OFrtCE P ,,

1 punNAMEF , , , , . .

DATE >

NRC FORM 318 (9 76) NRCM 0240 W u. s. novspawswr enswrswo orricas tore -ese ea4 l

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20236N334&oldid=3273764"