ML20236M777
Text
._ _ __ _ _ _ _ _. __
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-___: m-Report Issued: '
Report No. 5326-65 7AN 2 51936 Pacific Gas and Electric Company
, Department of Engineering Research
( DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR PLANT SITE PRELIMINARY GEOLOGIC INVESTIGATION
{ I. INTRODUCTION This investigation was uncertaken to explore the surface geology at Diablo l Canyon, San Luis Obispo County, for a proposed nuclear plant site. The attached geologic maps ano cross sections designated as DC-1, DC-2, DC-3, and DC-4, show the major geological and structural features of the area covered. A geologic description, photos, an earthquake 6 fault map of California, and conclusions and recommendations are also included in this report.
Altnough tnere is evidence of old and inactive faults in the area, the Diablo Canyon location appears geologically suitable for a Nuclear Generating Plant.
II. LOCATION AND ACCESSIBILITY i
The Diablo Canyon area is located on the coast, approximately ten miles south-west of San Luis Obispo. Access to the area is via highway 101 to Avila Beach and then via a rugged private dirt road, approximately one hour's ride. The proposed
( site is located near the mouth of Diablo Canyon, which is the only named topographic feature in the mapped area. The area is covered with low grazing grass (pasture) and can be easily traversed on foot.
It is proposed to locate the reactors, turbine generator, and related facilities on the terrace in the immediate vicinity of Diablo Cove on the south side of Diablo Creek, and to locate the switchyard in a widened section of Diablo Canyon about a quarter mile upstream from the mouth of the canyon.
III. GEOLOGY The mapped area is underlain by sedimentary rocks, marine terrace deposits, and minor occurrence of basic intrusive rocks. The sedimentary rocks occur in the upper Miocene Point Sal Tormation and lower Miocene Obispo Formation. The minor igneous rock, which instrudes the Point Sal Formation, is also Miocenic in age. Thesegpologic units are best exposed in the sea cliffs along the ocean. Exposures are poor on the adjacent hillside. At the proposed plant site, the bedrock units are overlain by a shallow veneer of terrace deposits.
/":
x
- 1. Tectonic The major structural features of the area intercept the coast line almost at right angles and are readily seen in the cliffs around Diablo Cove.
8708110229 070729 ,
~'-
Report No. 5326-65 The formations in the area of the reactor site appear to have been intensely folded in post-Miocene time. Nume ous sheared and faulted areas in the Point Sal
{ and Obispo Formations are visible in the near vertical sea cliffs. The faults are usually very small and only those of significance were mapped. The fault planes dip at various angles with small horizontal and vertical displacements, at times measurable in the order of one to three feet. All the mapped faults appear to be l old and inactive and of the fold-fault type, originated by a close-folding movement. 1 The folding thrusts are considered a combination of uplifting and subsequent lateral movements in a probable south-north direction. The occurrence of this type of tec-tonic movement in the area was probably contemporaneous with the'Pilocene orogenic )
movements of the West Coast.
- 2. Point Sal Formation The Point Sal Formation overlies the Obispo Formation and is overlain in part by isrine terrace deposits. The major rock types are dark gray and light brown silty and clay shale and mudstones, light-colored tuff and limestone. Occasional nodules and thin beds of black chert and thin beds of fine-grained sandstone are present.
l These various rock types are clearly exposed in the sea cliff to the west and east of Diablo Canyon. On the hillside to the northeast only outcrops of hard shale and
{ limestone are visible. The various members are well bedded and fairly hard. The pre-dominant rc,ck type is shale which is exposed in the sea cliffs in alternating beds of nearly uniform thickness, varying from very hard, firm and sparsely fractured, to weak and minutely fractured, and crushed at times. The apparent strike of the bedding planes is in a general east-west direction, with local variations due to folding. The beds di? at a high angle, almost vertical at times, where exposed in the sea cliffs. Some unrecognizable microfessils including fish bones microfragments, supposedly abundant in this formation, were detected in hand specimen and in one thin section.
- 3. Obispo Formation The Obispo Formation crops out along the coast, south of the plant site and under-lies the Point Sal Formation. The major rock types in the formation are light colored, buff and gray tuff, and black shale. Black chert interbeds are present in minor amounts.
The tuff, which is the predominant rock type, is generally hard. White when fresh, it weathers to an orange-brown color that makes it clearly distinguishable in outcrop.
The tuff seems to be basically vitric with presence of crystal fragments. Different The black shale, generally well-indur-G types of hard, welded tuff are also present.
ated, seems to be more abundant in the outcrops west of Diablo Canyon.
Report No. 5326-65 Both the tuff and the shale have undergone some degree of crystallization which,
~
at times, renders the shale very hard. These rocks have been subjected to extensive folding movements and like the Point Sal Formation vary from extensively to moderately 1 1
fractured. The tuff and the shale are generally well-bedded and trend east-west with I a high angle of dip. When the tuff predominates, the shale occurs as interbedded streaks and lenses.
The contact with the overlying Point Sal Formation is clearly distinguishable along the ocean front. The two formations appears to be in fault' contact along a surface roughly paralleling the coast. The fault contact probably lies approximately along the dotted contact line shown on drawing DC-1, but its exact location and extent, if it exists, cannot be determined by surface examination.
l 4. Terrace Deposits Terrace deposits overlie more than half of the mapped area. Although mapped as a single unit, they include marine deposits, non-marine talus and slope wash. The deposits range in thickness from a few feet to 30 or perhaps 40 feet at the base of the hill to the northeast. Slope wash and talus material from the nearby hills account for some of the greater thickness near the hills. Over most of the area, these sediments 1
occur as a black adobe-like material that contain occasional fragments of rocks of the Point Sal Formation.
Morphologically, this area appears to be a cut terrace. The gentle slope might also indicate a slow rise of the land from the sea with contemporary marine sedimentation.
Typical marine terrace deposits overlying the Obispo Formation are visible only in a few small and localized parts of the mapped area. They contain essentially flat lying, crudely otretified thin beds of small pe W r alternating with thicker beds of sandy and silty material containing some small rock fragments. Outside the mapped area, especially west of Diablo Canyon these stratified marine terrace deposits are clearly and continuously exposed along the sea cliff. They were thoroughly explored, but no sign of any fault movement was detected. Any minor displacement ( due to faulting) in these stratified deposits, if present, would have been easily observed. In the immediate vicinity of the proposed reactor site the fields hav'e been cultivated and surface features have been obliterated.
- 5. Igneous Intrusive A small intrusive body crops out to the east of Diablo Canyon. The rock which is highly weathered appears to have relict granitic texture.
Report No. 5326-65
- 6. Landslides C'1 On the south facing hillside, immediately above the reactor site, bedding planes of the Point Sal formation dip into the hill. This situation is very favorable to avoidance of slides, and no sliding is to be anticipated in this area.
Several old slides were noted on the north facing slope of Diablo Canyon in an area beginning approximately 1000 ft. upstream from the mouth. The slides appear i
t to be partially stabilized and there is no evidence of any particularly recent move-ment. The cross sections shown on Drawing DC-4 indicate the general dips four.d near the crest and on the south side of the hill, but some surface visual indications would suggest that the dips might be somewhat flatter. These hillsides can be so treated that they will not threaten the proposed switchyard.
This section of Diablo Canyon appears to be the only feasible location for the switchyard, but certain precautions should be observed in design and construction.
Sizeable hill cuts should be avoided. Whatever level land is required for the switch-yard should be created by filling with provisions for drainage. Considering the area between Sections C-C and E-E, drawing DC-4, an area approximately 1000 feet square, could be made with a fill extending across Diablo Canyon whose maximum height would I not exceed 80 or 90 feet. Such a fill, if desired, could be used as a dam to store water on Diablo Creek.
I IV. SEISMICITY This area has not been the source of any strong earthquakes. See enclosed map from Bulletin No.116-2, by the Department of Water Resources.
V. EXPLORATORY TRENCHING On the enclosed aerial photo, the terrace deposits, overlying the fault immediate-ly west of Diablo Canyon, showed indications that might have been suggestive of recent faulting. -
To clarify these conditions, only partly visible on the ground, two exploratory trenches were excavated transversally to the projection of the fault line. These trenches were so located that any faultin'g in the terracet material, if it existed, was certain to be intercepted.
The first trench was excavated approximately 100 feet north of the sea cliff.
The trench was dug to an average depth of 4-1/2 to 5 feet with a maximum of 11 feet
[~} at one point. Exposed in the trench was a black, organic, clayey, adobe-like mater-ial that grades uniformly downward into a gray-greenish type of fat clay.
w.--.-.- .- - - -- _ - _ - - - - _ _ _ - - - _ . _ _ - _ - . -_-
Report No. 5326-65 The second trench was located north of the first, approximately 400 feet-from the sea. It was excavated to an average depth of 4-1/2 to 5 feet with a )
maximum of 9 feet. The trench was in black, silty, organic, partly clayey, adobe-like meterial which directly overlies the westerly sloping surface of the Point Sal Formation. No sign of any fault movement in the terrace deposits was detected j in either trench. I VI. RECOMMENDATIONS In the event that this site is to be used, and layout and design work is to proceed, a seismie investigation in combination with a drilling and trenching program should be carried out. These investigations will determine the thickness of the terrace deposits and the extent and location of contacts, faults, and sheared zones in the older 1 rocks. l Approximately five or six continous core bore holes should be drilled in the area j l
of the reactor site to an approximate depth of 60 to 70 feet. Additional holes may be required. Some underwater geologic mapping in the immediate vicinity of the coast line should be done for planning of offshore construction. !
VII. CONCLUSIONS There are no apparent g.sological conditions which would preclude the construction of a nuclear reactor at this site.
No slide problems are anticipated at the reactor site. There are minor faults present in the older rocks that appear to be old and inactive. No evidence of faulting was detected on the hillsides or in the recent terrace deposits. While moderate seismit shaking may be anticipated, rupture is not to be expected. l 1
.dL /$b4f M. Micheli,' Geologist
)
)
W.O. 21935 Distribution: TFMautz Encl. Cross Sections 2 Sheets - f Geologic Maps 2 Sheets Earthquake f. Fault Map C* Photos 5 Sheets sd
, 4 $' .
. j
UNITED STATES OF AMERIC-l 4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISb20N-
.l
-1 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Shs 1
In the Matter of ) l
)
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY )
) Docket No. 50-275 Unit 1 )
)
Diablo Canyon Site )
) .
1 1
MOTION FOR INTERIM OPERATING LICENSE
)
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (PGand E) , in ,
accordance with 10 CFR 50.57, hereby requests this Licensing Board to authorize loading, testing and operation of Unit 1 of its Diablo Canyon Power Plant at power levels up to-full power until such time as this Board shall render its complete initial decision in this proceeding.
Respectfully submitted this 2 5th day of August, 1977.
JOHN C. MORRISSEY MALCOLM H. FURBUSH PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 t (415) 781-4211 ARTHUR C. GEHR I Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Center 7,1 L
-] h' Phoenix, Arizona 85073 (602) 257-7288 9<(")[Uj(Af.l)k-)1^
?
,\(v 3(p.
Q s BRUCE NORTON
\ Suite 202, 3216 North Third Street 1
Phoenix, Arizona 85012 '
y (602) 264-0033
\ Attorneys for
\ Pa i Gas and El :ric o pany 1
o Ph .t b
p A. Cran
.; ]2 dAto, Ji.
"}
. UNITED STATCS OF AMERICA-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIUN In the Matter of )
)
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-275-OL
) 50-323-OL Units 1 and 2 )
)
Diablo Canyon Site )
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The ' foregoing document (x) of Pacific Gas and Electric Company l has (haxak been served today on the following by deposit in the United States mail, properly stamped and addressed:
Elizabeth S. Bowers, Esq. Mrs. Sandra A. Silver Chairman 42 5 Luneta Drive Atomic Safety and Licensing Board San Luis Obispo, California 93401 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Gordon Silver 425 Luneta Drive f Mr. Glenn O. Bright San Luis Obispo, California 93401 "
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Brent Rushforth, Esq.-
Washington, D. C. 20555 Center for Law in the Public Interest 10203 Santa Monica Drive Dr. William E. Martin Los Angeles,. California 90067 ,
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board j l Senior Ecologist Neil Goldberg, Esq. ]
i Battelle Memorial Institute Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering Columbus, Ohio 43201 1666 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
, Mrs. Elizabeth Apfelberg 1415 Cazadero David F. Fleischaker, Esq.
San Luis Obispo, California 93401 1025 15th Street, N.W. ]'
5th Floor Janice E. Kerr, Esq. Washington, D. C. 20005 j Public Utilities Commission -
of the State of California Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
5246 State Building Snell & Wilmer i 350 McAllister Street 3100 Valley Center i San Francisco, California 94102 Phoenix, Arizona 85073 I Mrs. Raye Fleming Bruce Norton, Esq.
1746 Chorro Street 3216 North Third Street San Luis Obispo, California 93401 Suite 202 Phoenix, Arizona 85012 Mr. Frederick Eissler Scenic Shoreline Preservation Chairman Conference, Inc. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 4623 More Mesa Drivo Panel Santa Barbara, California 93105 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 i
4
~< J
{
i 1
l I i 1
Chairman t
Atomic Safety and Licensing l Appeal Panel U . 'S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
, Secretary I l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j l
Washington, D. C. 20555 Attn.: Docketing and Service Section ,
1
. s James'R. Tourtellotte, Esq. 1 Office of Executive Legal Director )
BETH 042 )
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 ]
1 Paul C. Valentine, Esq. l 400 Channing Avenue '
j Palo Alto, Califoknia 94301 Yale I. Jones, Esq.
100 Van Ness Avenue 19th Floor t San Francisco, Califorr.ia 94102 l
l l
t 1
,j h , 'b MP' (p A. Cra e, Jr, Attorne Pacific as and Elec ric Company Dated: August 2 5, 1977 l <
1 l
e
UNITED STATES OF AMERIC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
I BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD j In the Matter of ) .
)
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) !
) Docket No. 50-275 i I
Unit 1 )
)
Diablo Canyon Site )
)
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF l MOTION FOR INTERIM OPERATING LICENSE !
)
FACTS l
l 1. The Need for Unit _1 The most recently announced NRC schedule indicates that a decision on issuance of a full term operating license for Unit 1 would q not occur until the summer of 1978. However, the power supply available ;
l i to serve Northern and Central California is presently seriously inadequate and could deteriorate further in 1978 without Diablo Canyon Unit 1. For the balance of 1977, assuming no major breakdowns of generating units, ,
PGandE expects to be able to meet the demands of its customers by its l own facilities and through purchases of power from neighboring utilities. ,
l If the drought conditions of the past two years continue, even with Diablo Canyon Unit 1 in operation, capacity margins next year would be less than 6% of the peak load during the critical months of July and August and PGandE would be energy deficient nearly every month. Without Unit 1, those margins would vanish. The 1978 l 1
power supply could be further reduced because the current estimates !
i do not reflect the uncertain status of the Humboldt Bay Nuclear Unit !
_i (63 MN) nor the likely delay of several months in the expected
.. / [\ - s'
) ]f. tf l) ue b
\n f m JQ- I c /
1 ~) Og j
' I pl .
j j
1 service dates of two new units at The Geysers Power Plant which are ]
I currently scheduled for operation on July 1, 1978 (106 MN) and on
]
s September 1, 1978 (55 MN). Purchasing more power could improve next i i year's supply situation but the outlook for buying significant amounts j i
of additional capacity and energy from sources outside the system is i not favorable. Without Diablo Canyon Unit 1 service curtailments are almost a certainty in 1978 if drought conditions continue. Detailed figures giving 1978 loads and resources with and without Diablo Canyon
! Unit 1 are set forth in Exhibit A attached.
If average precipitation occurs in Northern and Central California during the winter of 1977-1978 increased hydro capacity would improve considerably the situation in 1978. Based on preliminary studies which assume a return to average precipitation conditions, the predicted capacity margin in August, the most critical month, is about 15% with Diablo Canyon Unit 1 but only about 9% without the Unit, which is well below the level required for reliable service. Again these figures do not take into account the uncertain status of Humboldt Bay and the likely delay in the two Geysers units.
- 2. Reduction of Air Contaminants Although the most immediate reason for this request for an interim operating license is PGandE's need for power from Unit 1, )
operation of the Unit also would reduce the amount of oil required to generate electricity in the State of California. This in turn would geduce emissions of air contaminants consistent with the policy enunci-ated by the California Air Resources Board. Therefore, even in the absence of the drought-induced electricity shortage there are strong l
2 i
l 1
I i
reasons for authorizing the operation of this completed Unit on an interim basis so long as there is reasonable assurance that such opera-
]
tion can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the 1
public. l
)
- 3. Public Health and Safety l l
The construction permits for the Diablo Canyon units were issued on the basis that this plant would be designed and constructed i to withstand an earthquake producing a ground acceleration of 0.4g.
1 This earthquake, termed the Double Design Earthquake (DDE), is equiva- i lent to the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) as presently defined in 10 CFR 100, Appendix A. The then AEC Staff, its consultants, the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) , and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards considered the seismic design basis for the plant would be l acceptable.
1 During review of PGandE's application for an operating license l the USGS recommended that the facility be evaluated for a 7.5M carthquake l
on the Hosgri Fault considering ground motion for near site events, as set forth in Table 2 of USGS Circular 672. Based upon this recommenda-tion the NRC Staff consultant on structural design recommended, and the Staff concurred, that an effective horizontal ground acceleration of 0.759 be used for the development of design response spectra for the plant. Although PGandE and its consultants believe, on the basis of independent investigations, that the magnitude of the postulated Hosgri event and resulting ground acceleration at the site are excessive, PGandE has undertaken to make the required evaluation. The first phase of the evaluation has been filed as Amendment No. 50 to the operating license 3
application and demonstrates that, with some modifications (see S 5 below) structures, systems, and components required to shut down and maintain the plant in a safe condition will be available following the postulated Hosgri earthquake. The second phase of the evaluation, which will be filed on or about October 1, 1977, will demonstrate that with _ some additional modifications the remainder of the Design Class I structures, systems and components are capable of withstanding the Hosgri event. '
- 4. Probabilistic Study In support of this motion for an interin operating license PGandE has prepared a report entitled
" Analysis of the Risk to the Public From Possible Damage To the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station From Seismic Events" This report is being filed separately as Amendment No. 52 to the operating license application for the Diablo Canyon Units, and it is based on the assumption that an earthquake of 7.5 Richter magnitude could occur on the Hosgri Fault.
The results of the previous studies filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have shown that, even assuming the Hosgri Fault were capable of a 7.5M event, an earthquake causing an effective ground 1
acceleration of 0.75g or greater at the plant site would be expected to occur no more often than once every 50,000 years. This present study includes the possibility of even higher effective ground accelerations, although such accelerations may not be physically realizable at the site.
Nevertheless, even including the impact on the plant of such unreasonably high accelerat ons far in excess of 0,75g, the maximum the NRC asked PGandE 4
{
I to consider, the risk to the health and safety of the public from radi-ation emissions caused by possible earthquake damage to the plant was found to be extremely remote. As an illustration, the probability of I
an individual in the closest community to the site (Avila Beach) being exposed to as much as 25 Rem of radiation to the whole body is only l
about one in seven million per year. (Exposures below 25 Rem - a federal emergency radiation guideline - rarely result in any noticeable l clinical effect on humans.) For effective ground accelerations up to ;
- i l
0.75g, the ri.sk of 25 Rem exposure drops to only one in 400 million per )
i year. Calculations for other communities show even lower risk of l l
l exposure to radiation. ,
l The principal reasons that the risk of radiation exposure is I so low are as follrws:
- 1. The extreme rarity of earthquakes of sufficient size I 4
to cause major damage to the plant.
- 2. The effectiveness of the plant safety systems in preventing major damage to key plant components.
- 3. The effectiveness of plant backup safety systems in reducing radiation releases, even if major damage occurs.
- 4. The rarity of combinations of atmospheric conditions and wind directions which would tend to' result in significant exposures to the population.
In addition to these factors, the very low population density in the
' )
1 vicinity of the site, one of the most remote sites for such plants in the world, results in a low risk of population exposure.
)
5
The study also concluded that the completion of proposed major modifications to the turbine building for the purpose of raising the seismic qualification level would not result in further significant reduction of the public health risk. It was also concluded that inevi- :
table health effects, however small, due to increased air pollution, would be associated with providing alternate sources of electric power, whether generated by PGandE or purchased, if the Diablo Canyon Units 1
were delayed for modifications.
As a result of this study and others filed previously, PGandE concludes that the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, with or without modifica- l 1
tions, can be operated safely and without undue risk to the health and
( safety of the public.
- 5. Modifications and commitment To Make Changes PGandS is proceeding with modifications to the plant required for the Hosgri seismic event. However, the risk analysis referred to under S 4 above demonstrates that the risk to the health and safety of the public due to operation of Unit 1 during the period of an interim license would be acceptably low, even without these modifications.
Although PGandE is proceeding to make the required modifications at the earliest possible time, some or all of the modifications could be made af ter initial operation without significantly increasing the risk to the public.
Certain of the modifications required for the Hosgri event would be difficult to make after operation, primarily because the modifications require working for extended periods in areas where significant exposure of workers to radioactivity might be required. ,
6
Modifications in this category would be limited to those inside the i
containment and to some systems and components in the auxiliary building )
which are associated with radwaste systems, the chemical and volume i
j control system, and the residual heat removal system. PGandE will complete all such modifications prior to commencing operation of the 1
Diablo Canyon Units. I l 6. Technical and Financial Qualifications t
l The Atomic Energy Commission has previously found PGandE l l
technically and financially qualified to operate nuclear power plants .
(4 AEC 89,447) . A copy of its Annual Report for the year 1976 containing certified financial statements is currently on file with the Commission.
PGandE and the Commission have entered into indemnity agreements pursu-ant to 10 CFR 140 to cover receipt of fuel at the site, and the agreement for Unit 1 can be amended to reflect the increased insurance coverage required when the Unit goes into operation.
ARGUMENT 10 CFR 50.57(c) clearly and explicitly authorizes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in connection with a pending proceeding, to issue l
an interim operating license
". . . authorizing low-power testing . . .
and further operations short of full power i operation." i The fact that PGandE has committed to make certain modifications to the Diablo Canyon facility is no obstacle to issuance of the requested license since 10 CFR 50. 57 (b) expressly provides for issuance of operating licenses with
. . . appropriate provisions with respect to any uncompleted items of construction and such limita-tions or conditions as are required to assure that ,
operation during the period of the completion of such items will not endanger public health and safety."
7 l
Finally, 10 CFR 50. 57 (c) provides that the Licensing Board or the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation must make the findings on all matters specified in 50. 57 (a) , which include, among other things, reasonable assurance l
". . . that the activaties authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the j l
public . . ." )
At the hearing on this motion PGandE will show that it complies with all parts of 10 CFR 50.57 and that issuance of the re- !
i quested interim license is necessary for the protection of the public health and safety. By its motion PGandE is not requesting a novel form of relief short cutting the protective provisions of the Atomic Energy ;
i Act of 1954, as amended, and the regulations issued thereunder, but j rather relief which is entirely consistent with the Act and NRC regula-I tions, and which Licensing Boards have granted in the past (see, for j i'
example, 3 NRC 711 (based in part upon a probability analysis and com-mitment by the applicant to install a backup to the primary intake system), 2 NRC 27, 1 NRC 431) .
It is clear that under the applicable statutes Congress has left it essentially to the Commission to make the basic judgments as to what is necessary to fulfill the requirement of " adequate protection to the health and safety of the public" (42 USC 2133, 2232; 6 AEC 1003, 1009). Moreover, the standard to be applied by the Commission in making this determination is not one of " absolute certainty" and "no risk" but 8
1 instead one of " reasonable assurance" or " low probal lity. " Thus 42 USC 2133 authorizes the Commission to issue licenses to persons
. . . who are equipped to observe and who agree to observe such safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property . . .
and . . . who agree to make available to the Com-mission such technical information and data . . .
as the Commission may determine necessary to promote the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public." (emphasis added) 42 USC 2232 requires applicants to furnish
( ". . . such other information as the Commission may . . . deem necessary . . . to enable it to find that the utilization of special nuclear material . . . will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public." (emphasis i
added) -
J l
l Similarly under the rc7ulations only reasonable assurance that the I health and safety of the public will not be endangered is required.
Thus, in addition to 10 CFR 50.57(a) already cited, 10 CFR 2.104(c) I provides that the issues to be considered in deciding applications for operating licenses include
" (3 ) Whether there is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities to be authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public (6) Whether issuance of the license will be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public . . ."
Similar language is found in 10 CFR 50.35(c) and 10 CFR 50, App. A.,
Introduction. 10 CFR 50.40 (a) provides that in determining whether to issue a license 9
". . . the commission will be guided by the follow-ing considerations:
(a) The processes to be performed, . . . the use of the facility . . . provide reasonable assurance . . . that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered . . . l (c) The issuance of a license to the applicant will not, in the opinion of the Commission, be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. "
(emphasis added) l Finally, 10 CFR 100.10 in discussing the factors to be considered when evaluating sites provides "It is expected that reactors will reflect through l
their design, construction and operation an extremelv l
low probability for accidents that could result in release of significant quantities of radioactive l fission products. In addition, the site location and the engineered features included as safeguards l against the hazardous consequences of an accident, i should one occur, should insure a low risk of public exposure." (emphasis added)
This standard of " reasonable assurance" has been recognized by the predecessor to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In a memorandum and order dated August 29, 1973, Docket RM-50 -8, (6 AEC 1069) , which was issued in response to a petition by Ralph Nader and others seeking the shutdown of twenty licensed reactors, the Commission stated as follows:
I
" Petitioners' case rests upon the assertion that I plants should be shut down because compliance with the IAC does not ' assure' ECC5 effectiveness.
Neither the statute nor the Commission regulations in issue, however, require such an unattainable guarantee of risk - free operation . . . We do not live in a riskless society, nor could modern j technological societies exist on that basis, 'We 1 are, of course, aware of the potential risks in nuclear matters if safety is not given the very i close attention it deserves . . . It is precisely because of this perceived risk that we have always imposed stringent and overlapping protective measures in implementing the concept of defense in depth.
However we cannot - and do not - claim ' assurance' as an absolute.
10 l
j
" Resting upon an assumed '(but impossible) standard of 100 percent assurance, petitioners build their case upon.what they claim is the ' undisputed in-adequacy of the' Interim Acceptance Criteria.' But the IAC can be viewed as ' inadequate' only if petitioners' notion.of absolute risklessness'is accepted. We reject petitioners' attempt to bootstrap their theory into a. conclusion of inadequacy.
. "Rather, the regulatory. process turns upon the concept of ' reasonable assurance' to public health and safety . . ."
For the above reasons PGandE submits there is' ample authority for the Commission to issue the-license requested.
Respectfully submitted,.
JOHN C. MORRISSEY MALCOLM H. FURBUSH PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 (415) 781-4211 ARTHUR C. GEHR Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Center Phoenix, Arizona 85073 (602) 257-7288 BRUCE NORTON Suite 202,-3216 North Third Street Phoenix, Arizona 85012 (602) 264-0033 Attorneys.for Pac' 1 Ru and_ Ele cric o pany
/ . ,
{}[
By(~ A , ./[ by
- Phili X. Crane! Jfi
(
Dated: August 25, 1977 11 l.